Skip to contentSkip to conversation

arm64: split ARM64_PTR_AUTH option to userspace and kernel

PATCH Applied Daniel Kiss 2 participants 4 messages Jun 13, 2021 – Jun 15, 2021

Subsystems (3)
lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

v6 cover arm64: split ARM64_PTR_AUTH option to userspace and kernel

Changes from v5:
* Move config description to the second patch.
* Fix typos in commit message.
* Fix LD version check caused by the rebase.

Changes from v4:
* Rebased to 5.13-rc4.

Changes from v3:
* Removed the duplicated #ifdef block in asm/pointer_auth.h.

Changes from v2:
* Moved the toolchain version check under ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL.

Changes from v1:
* Keep the A key in register while running in the kernel.

Daniel Kiss (2):
arm64: Add ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL config option
arm64: Conditionally configure PTR_AUTH key of the kernel.

 arch/arm64/Kconfig                        | 33 +++++++------
 arch/arm64/Makefile                       |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h | 49 +++++++++++--------
 arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h     | 59 +++++++++++++----------
 arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h        |  2 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c           |  4 ++
 drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c                 |  6 +--
 7 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)
Signature · 7 lines
2.25.1


_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
#1 lore raw

PATCH v6 1/2 arm64: Add ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL config option

This patch add the ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL config and deals with the build aspect of it.

Userspace support has no dependency on the toolchain therefore all toolchain checks and build flags are controlled the new config option.
The default config behavior will not be changed.

---
 arch/arm64/Kconfig              | 33 +++++++++++++++++++--------------
 arch/arm64/Makefile             |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c |  2 ++
 drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c       |  6 +++---
 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/Kconfig +19 -14
index 9f1d8566bbf9..489e3e42320f 100644
@@ -1481,12 +1481,6 @@ menu "ARMv8.3 architectural features"
 config ARM64_PTR_AUTH
 	bool "Enable support for pointer authentication"
 	default y
-	depends on (CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS || CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) && AS_HAS_PAC
-	# Modern compilers insert a .note.gnu.property section note for PAC
-	# which is only understood by binutils starting with version 2.33.1.
-	depends on LD_IS_LLD || LD_VERSION >= 23301 || (CC_IS_GCC && GCC_VERSION < 90100)
-	depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || AS_HAS_CFI_NEGATE_RA_STATE
-	depends on (!FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER || DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS)
 	help
 	  Pointer authentication (part of the ARMv8.3 Extensions) provides
 	  instructions for signing and authenticating pointers against secret
@@ -1498,13 +1492,6 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH
 	  for each process at exec() time, with these keys being
 	  context-switched along with the process.
 
-	  If the compiler supports the -mbranch-protection or
-	  -msign-return-address flag (e.g. GCC 7 or later), then this option
-	  will also cause the kernel itself to be compiled with return address
-	  protection. In this case, and if the target hardware is known to
-	  support pointer authentication, then CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR can be
-	  disabled with minimal loss of protection.
-
 	  The feature is detected at runtime. If the feature is not present in
 	  hardware it will not be advertised to userspace/KVM guest nor will it
 	  be enabled.
@@ -1515,6 +1502,24 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH
 	  but with the feature disabled. On such a system, this option should
 	  not be selected.
 
+config ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL
+	bool
+	default y
+	depends on ARM64_PTR_AUTH
+	depends on (CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS || CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) && AS_HAS_PAC
+	# Modern compilers insert a .note.gnu.property section note for PAC
+	# which is only understood by binutils starting with version 2.33.1.
+	depends on LD_IS_LLD || LD_VERSION >= 23301 || (CC_IS_GCC && GCC_VERSION < 90100)
+	depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || AS_HAS_CFI_NEGATE_RA_STATE
+	depends on (!FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER || DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS)
+	help
+	  If the compiler supports the -mbranch-protection or
+	  -msign-return-address flag (e.g. GCC 7 or later), then this option
+	  will cause the kernel itself to be compiled with return address
+	  protection. In this case, and if the target hardware is known to
+	  support pointer authentication, then CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR can be
+	  disabled with minimal loss of protection.
+
 	  This feature works with FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER option only if
 	  DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS is enabled.
 
@@ -1606,7 +1611,7 @@ config ARM64_BTI_KERNEL
 	bool "Use Branch Target Identification for kernel"
 	default y
 	depends on ARM64_BTI
-	depends on ARM64_PTR_AUTH
+	depends on ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL
 	depends on CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET_BTI
 	# https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=94697
 	depends on !CC_IS_GCC || GCC_VERSION >= 100100
arch/arm64/Makefile +1 -1
index b52481f0605d..3b5b1c480449 100644
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ endif
 # off, this will be overridden if we are using branch protection.
 branch-prot-flags-y += $(call cc-option,-mbranch-protection=none)
 
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH),y)
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL),y)
 branch-prot-flags-$(CONFIG_CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS) := -msign-return-address=all
 # We enable additional protection for leaf functions as there is some
 # narrow potential for ROP protection benefits and no substantial
arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c +2 -0
index 0cb34ccb6e73..03420b89c602 100644
@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ int main(void)
   DEFINE(THREAD_SCTLR_USER,	offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.sctlr_user));
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
   DEFINE(THREAD_KEYS_USER,	offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.keys_user));
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL
   DEFINE(THREAD_KEYS_KERNEL,	offsetof(struct task_struct, thread.keys_kernel));
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MTE
drivers/misc/lkdtm/bugs.c +3 -3
index 0e8254d0cf0b..a164896dc6d4 100644
@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ void lkdtm_DOUBLE_FAULT(void)
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64
 static noinline void change_pac_parameters(void)
 {
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH)) {
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL)) {
 		/* Reset the keys of current task */
 		ptrauth_thread_init_kernel(current);
 		ptrauth_thread_switch_kernel(current);
@@ -477,8 +477,8 @@ noinline void lkdtm_CORRUPT_PAC(void)
 #define CORRUPT_PAC_ITERATE	10
 	int i;
 
-	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH))
-		pr_err("FAIL: kernel not built with CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH\n");
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL))
+		pr_err("FAIL: kernel not built with CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL\n");
 
 	if (!system_supports_address_auth()) {
 		pr_err("FAIL: CPU lacks pointer authentication feature\n");
Signature · 7 lines
2.25.1


_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
#2 lore raw

PATCH v6 2/2 arm64: Conditionally configure PTR_AUTH key of the kernel.

In reply to Daniel Kiss

If the kernel is not compiled with CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL=y, then no PACI/AUTI instructions are expected while the kernel is running so the kernel's key will not be used. Write of a system registers is expensive therefore avoid if not required.

---
 arch/arm64/Kconfig                        |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h | 49 +++++++++++--------
 arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h     | 59 +++++++++++++----------
 arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h        |  2 +
 arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c           |  2 +
 5 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/Kconfig +1 -1
index 489e3e42320f..dabe9b81012f 100644
@@ -1503,7 +1503,7 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH
 	  not be selected.
 
 config ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL
-	bool
+	bool "Use pointer authentication for kernel"
 	default y
 	depends on ARM64_PTR_AUTH
 	depends on (CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS || CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) && AS_HAS_PAC
arch/arm64/include/asm/asm_pointer_auth.h +29 -20

71 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/arm64/include/asm/pointer_auth.h +33 -26

92 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h +2 -0
index 9df3feeee890..e7d50c6f700d 100644
@@ -148,8 +148,10 @@ struct thread_struct {
 	struct debug_info	debug;		/* debugging */
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
 	struct ptrauth_keys_user	keys_user;
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL
 	struct ptrauth_keys_kernel	keys_kernel;
 #endif
+#endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_MTE
 	u64			gcr_user_excl;
 #endif
arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c +2 -0
index 03420b89c602..c9e72d92606f 100644
@@ -155,7 +155,9 @@ int main(void)
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH
   DEFINE(PTRAUTH_USER_KEY_APIA,		offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_user, apia));
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL
   DEFINE(PTRAUTH_KERNEL_KEY_APIA,	offsetof(struct ptrauth_keys_kernel, apia));
+#endif
   BLANK();
 #endif
   return 0;
Signature · 7 lines
2.25.1


_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel
maintainer Applied
#3 lore raw
In reply to Daniel Kiss
Quoted 9 lines · Daniel Kiss

Changes from v5:
* Move config description to the second patch.
* Fix typos in commit message.
* Fix LD version check caused by the rebase.

Changes from v4:
* Rebased to 5.13-rc4.

[...]

Applied to arm64 (for-next/ptrauth), thanks!

[1/2] arm64: Add ARM64_PTR_AUTH_KERNEL config option

      https://git.kernel.org/arm64/c/b27a9f4119af
[2/2] arm64: Conditionally configure PTR_AUTH key of the kernel.
      https://git.kernel.org/arm64/c/d053e71ac844

Cheers,

Signature · 10 lines
Will

https://fixes.arm64.dev
https://next.arm64.dev
https://will.arm64.dev

_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
[email protected]
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel