KEXEC_SIG with appended signature
Subsystems (12)
v4 cover KEXEC_SIG with appended signature
Hello,
This is a refresh of the KEXEC_SIG series.
This adds KEXEC_SIG support on powerpc and deduplicates the code dealing with appended signatures in the kernel.
powerpc supports IMA_KEXEC but that's an exception rather than the norm. On the other hand, KEXEC_SIG is portable across platforms.
For distributions to have uniform security features across platforms one option should be used on all platforms.
Thanks
Michal
Previous revision: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/cover.1637862358.git.msuchanek at suse.de/ Patched kernel tree: https://github.com/hramrach/kernel/tree/kexec_sig
Michal Suchanek (6):
s390/kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature check. powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.
kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.
module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.
module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in
verify_appended_signature
module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig
arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 16 +++++++ arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 12 +++++ arch/s390/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 41 +---------------- crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 1 + include/linux/module_signature.h | 1 + include/linux/verification.h | 5 +++ kernel/module-internal.h | 2 - kernel/module.c | 12 +++-- kernel/module_signature.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++- kernel/module_signing.c | 34 +++++++------- security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 22 ++-------- 12 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 88 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
PATCH v4 1/6 s390/kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature check.
Module verification already implements appeded signature check.
Reuse it for kexec_file.
The kexec_file implementation uses EKEYREJECTED error in some cases when there is no key and the common implementation uses ENOPKG or EBADMSG instead.
---
v3: Philipp Rudo <[email protected]>: Update the commit with note about change of return value
--- arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 22 +++++----------------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +5 -17
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)const unsigned long marker_len =sizeof (MODULE_SIG_STRING ) -1 ;struct module_signature *ms;unsigned long sig_len; +int ret;/* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */ if (!ipl_secure_flag)
@@ -45,25 +46,12 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) kernel_len -= marker_len; ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len -sizeof (*ms); - kernel_len -=sizeof (*ms); + ret =mod_check_sig (ms, kernel_len,"kexec" ); +if (ret) +return ret; sig_len =be32_to_cpu (ms->sig_len); -if (sig_len >= kernel_len) -return -EKEYREJECTED ; - kernel_len -= sig_len; - -if (ms->id_type !=PKEY_ID_PKCS7 ) -return -EKEYREJECTED ; - -if (ms->algo !=0 || - ms->hash !=0 || - ms->signer_len !=0 || - ms->key_id_len !=0 || - ms->__pad[0 ] !=0 || - ms->__pad[1 ] !=0 || - ms->__pad[2 ] !=0 ) { -return -EBADMSG ; - } + kernel_len -=sizeof (*ms) + sig_len; return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len, kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
Re: [PATCH v4 1/6] s390/kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature check.
Quoted 31 lines · Michal Suchanek
Module verification already implements appeded signature check.
Reuse it for
kexec_file.The
kexec_fileimplementation uses EKEYREJECTED error in some cases when there is no key and the common implementation uses ENOPKG or EBADMSG instead.Signed-off-by Michal Suchanek <[email protected]>Acked-by Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>---
v3: Philipp Rudo <[email protected]>: Update the commit with note about change of return value--- arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 22 +++++----------------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +1
-0@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)const unsigned long marker_len =sizeof (MODULE_SIG_STRING ) -1 ;struct module_signature *ms;unsigned long sig_len; +int ret;/* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */ if (!ipl_secure_flag)@@ -45,25 +46,12 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) kernel_len -= marker_len;
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) · line 52
Quoted 10 lines
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +3
-3ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len -sizeof (*ms); - kernel_len -=sizeof (*ms); + ret =mod_check_sig (ms, kernel_len,"kexec" ); +if (ret) +return ret; sig_len =be32_to_cpu (ms->sig_len); -if (sig_len >= kernel_len) -return -EKEYREJECTED ;
There is a small minor fix here, where by using mod_check_sig() now decreased the kernel_len by the sizeof(*ms). It is minor though.
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) · line 56
Quoted 4 lines
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +0
-4- kernel_len -= sig_len; - -if (ms->id_type !=PKEY_ID_PKCS7 ) -return -EKEYREJECTED ;
More importantly is the return value used here changes but given the Ack by Heiko I suspect this if fine and does not break old userspace, the only change here is the possible error value returned by the kexec_file_load() system call.
Luis
PATCH v4 2/6 powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.
In reply to Michal SuchanekCopy the code from s390x
Both powerpc and s390x use appended signature format (as opposed to EFI based patforms using PE format).
---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <[email protected]>: Update the comit message with
explanation why the s390 code is usable on powerpc.
- Include correct header for mod_check_sig
- Nayna <[email protected]>: Mention additional IMA features in kconfig text
--- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 16 ++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +16 -0
@@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY def_bool KEXEC_FILE +config KEXEC_SIG + bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall" + depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT + help + This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for + the kexec_file_load() syscall. + + In addition to that option, you need to enable signature + verification for the corresponding kernel image type being + loaded in order for this to work. + + Note: on powerpc IMA_ARCH_POLICY also implements kexec'ed kernel + verification. In addition IMA adds kernel hashes to the measurement + list, extends IMA PCR in the TPM, and implements kernel image + blacklist by hash. + config RELOCATABLE bool "Build a relocatable kernel" depends on PPC64 || (FLATMEM && (44x || FSL_BOOKE))
arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c +36 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@#include <linux/of_fdt.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/module_signature.h> static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf, unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
@@ -151,7 +152,42 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,return ret ?ERR_PTR (ret) :NULL ; } +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG +int elf64_verify_sig (const char *kernel,unsigned long kernel_len) +{ +const unsigned long marker_len =sizeof (MODULE_SIG_STRING ) -1 ; +struct module_signature *ms; +unsigned long sig_len; +int ret; + +if (marker_len > kernel_len) +return -EKEYREJECTED ; + +if (memcmp (kernel + kernel_len - marker_len,MODULE_SIG_STRING , + marker_len)) +return -EKEYREJECTED ; + kernel_len -= marker_len; + + ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len -sizeof (*ms); + ret =mod_check_sig (ms, kernel_len,"kexec" ); +if (ret) +return ret; + + sig_len =be32_to_cpu (ms->sig_len); + kernel_len -=sizeof (*ms) + sig_len; + +return verify_pkcs7_signature (kernel, kernel_len, + kernel + kernel_len, sig_len, +VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING , +VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE , +NULL ,NULL ); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */ +const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_elf64_ops = { .probe = kexec_elf_probe, .load = elf64_load, +#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG + .verify_sig = elf64_verify_sig, +#endif };
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
PATCH v4 3/6 kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.
In reply to Michal SuchanekModule verification already implements appeded signature verification.
Reuse it for kexec_file.
---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <[email protected]>: Update the dependency on
MODULE_SIG_FORMAT to MODULE_SIG
- Include linux/verification.h - previously added in earlier patch
v4: - kernel test robot <[email protected]>: Use unsigned long rather than size_t for data length
- Update the code in kernel/module_signing.c to use pointer rather
than memcpy as the kexec and IMA code does
--- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 19 +++------------ arch/s390/Kconfig | 2 +- arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 18 ++------------ include/linux/verification.h | 3 +++ kernel/module-internal.h | 2 -- kernel/module.c | 4 +++- kernel/module_signing.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++----------- 8 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +1 -1
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY config KEXEC_SIG bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall" - depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT + depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG help This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for the kexec_file_load() syscall.
arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c +3 -16
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@#include <linux/of_fdt.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/types.h> +#include <linux/verification.h> #include <linux/module_signature.h> static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
@@ -156,9 +157,6 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,int elf64_verify_sig (const char *kernel,unsigned long kernel_len) {const unsigned long marker_len =sizeof (MODULE_SIG_STRING ) -1 ; -struct module_signature *ms; -unsigned long sig_len; -int ret;if (marker_len > kernel_len)return -EKEYREJECTED ;
@@ -168,19 +166,8 @@ int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)return -EKEYREJECTED ; kernel_len -= marker_len; - ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len -sizeof (*ms); - ret =mod_check_sig (ms, kernel_len,"kexec" ); -if (ret) -return ret; - - sig_len =be32_to_cpu (ms->sig_len); - kernel_len -=sizeof (*ms) + sig_len; - -return verify_pkcs7_signature (kernel, kernel_len, - kernel + kernel_len, sig_len, -VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING , -VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE , - NULL, NULL); +return verify_appended_signature (kernel, &kernel_len,VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING , + "kexec_file"); }#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
arch/s390/Kconfig +1 -1
@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY config KEXEC_SIG bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall" - depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT + depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG help This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for the kexec_file_load() syscall.
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +2 -16
@@ -29,9 +29,6 @@ const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = {int s390_verify_sig (const char *kernel,unsigned long kernel_len) {const unsigned long marker_len =sizeof (MODULE_SIG_STRING ) -1 ; -struct module_signature *ms; -unsigned long sig_len; -int ret;/* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */ if (!ipl_secure_flag)
@@ -45,19 +42,8 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)return -EKEYREJECTED ; kernel_len -= marker_len; - ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len -sizeof (*ms); - ret =mod_check_sig (ms, kernel_len,"kexec" ); -if (ret) -return ret; - - sig_len =be32_to_cpu (ms->sig_len); - kernel_len -=sizeof (*ms) + sig_len; - -return verify_pkcs7_signature (kernel, kernel_len, - kernel + kernel_len, sig_len, -VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING , -VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE , - NULL, NULL); +return verify_appended_signature (kernel, &kernel_len,VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING , + "kexec_file"); }#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
include/linux/verification.h +3 -0
@@ -60,5 +60,8 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen, enum key_being_used_for usage);#endif +int verify_appended_signature (const void *data,unsigned long *len, +struct key *trusted_keys,const char *what); +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */ #endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */
kernel/module-internal.h +0 -2
@@ -27,5 +27,3 @@ struct load_info {unsigned int sym, str, mod, vers, info, pcpu; } index; }; - -extern int mod_verify_sig (const void *mod,struct load_info *info);
kernel/module.c +3 -1
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@#include <linux/bsearch.h> #include <linux/dynamic_debug.h> #include <linux/audit.h> +#include <linux/verification.h> #include <uapi/linux/module.h> #include "module-internal.h"
@@ -2894,7 +2895,8 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags) memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) {/* We truncate the module to discard the signature */ info->len -= markerlen; - err =mod_verify_sig (mod, info); + err =verify_appended_signature (mod, &info->len, +VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING ,"module" );if (!err) { info->sig_ok = true;return 0 ;
kernel/module_signing.c +20 -14
@@ -14,32 +14,38 @@#include <crypto/public_key.h> #include "module-internal.h" -/* -* Verify the signature on a module. +/** +* verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module with the +* signature marker stripped. +* @data: The data to be verified +* @len: Size of @data. +* @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification +* @what: Informational string for log messages */ -int mod_verify_sig (const void *mod,struct load_info *info) +int verify_appended_signature (const void *data,unsigned long *len, +struct key *trusted_keys,const char *what) { -struct module_signature ms; -size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len; +struct module_signature *ms; +unsigned long sig_len, modlen = *len;int ret; -pr_devel ("==>%s(,%zu)\n" , __func__, modlen); +pr_devel ("==>%s(,%lu)\n" , __func__, modlen); -if (modlen <=sizeof (ms)) +if (modlen <=sizeof (*ms))return -EBADMSG ; -memcpy (&ms, mod + (modlen -sizeof (ms)),sizeof (ms)); + ms = data + modlen -sizeof (*ms); - ret =mod_check_sig (&ms, modlen,"module" ); + ret =mod_check_sig (ms, modlen, what);if (ret)return ret; - sig_len =be32_to_cpu (ms.sig_len); - modlen -= sig_len +sizeof (ms); - info->len = modlen; + sig_len =be32_to_cpu (ms->sig_len); + modlen -= sig_len +sizeof (*ms); + *len = modlen; -return verify_pkcs7_signature (mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len, -VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING , +return verify_pkcs7_signature (data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len, + trusted_keys,VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE ,NULL ,NULL ); }
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
PATCH v4 4/6 module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.
In reply to Michal SuchanekIt is stripped by each caller separately.
Note: this changes the error for kexec_file from EKEYREJECTED to ENODATA when the signature marker is missing.
---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <[email protected]>: Update the commit with note about
change of raturn value
- the module_signature.h is now no longer needed for kexec_file
--- arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 11 ----------- arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 11 ----------- kernel/module.c | 7 +------ kernel/module_signing.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c +0 -11
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@#include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/verification.h> -#include <linux/module_signature.h> static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf, unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
@@ -156,16 +155,6 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG int elf64_verify_sig (const char *kernel,unsigned long kernel_len) { -const unsigned long marker_len =sizeof (MODULE_SIG_STRING ) -1 ; - -if (marker_len > kernel_len) -return -EKEYREJECTED ; - -if (memcmp (kernel + kernel_len - marker_len,MODULE_SIG_STRING , - marker_len)) -return -EKEYREJECTED ; - kernel_len -= marker_len; -return verify_appended_signature (kernel, &kernel_len,VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING ,"kexec_file" ); }
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +0 -11
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@#include <linux/elf.h> #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/kexec.h> -#include <linux/module_signature.h> #include <linux/verification.h> #include <linux/vmalloc.h> #include <asm/boot_data.h>
@@ -28,20 +27,10 @@ const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = {#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG int s390_verify_sig (const char *kernel,unsigned long kernel_len) { -const unsigned long marker_len =sizeof (MODULE_SIG_STRING ) -1 ; -/* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */ if (!ipl_secure_flag)return 0 ; -if (marker_len > kernel_len) -return -EKEYREJECTED ; - -if (memcmp (kernel + kernel_len - marker_len,MODULE_SIG_STRING , - marker_len)) -return -EKEYREJECTED ; - kernel_len -= marker_len; -return verify_appended_signature (kernel, &kernel_len,VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING ,"kexec_file" ); }
kernel/module.c +1 -6
@@ -2882,7 +2882,6 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct module *mod,static int module_sig_check (struct load_info *info,int flags) {int err = -ENODATA ; -const unsigned long markerlen =sizeof (MODULE_SIG_STRING ) -1 ;const char *reason;const void *mod = info->hdr;
@@ -2890,11 +2889,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)* Require flags == 0, as a module with version information * removed is no longer the module that was signed */ -if (flags ==0 && - info->len > markerlen && -memcmp (mod + info->len - markerlen,MODULE_SIG_STRING , markerlen) ==0 ) { -/* We truncate the module to discard the signature */ - info->len -= markerlen; +if (flags ==0 ) { err =verify_appended_signature (mod, &info->len,VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING ,"module" );if (!err) {
kernel/module_signing.c +10 -2
@@ -15,8 +15,7 @@#include "module-internal.h" /** -* verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module with the -* signature marker stripped. +* verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module * @data: The data to be verified * @len: Size of @data. * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
@@ -25,12 +24,21 @@int verify_appended_signature (const void *data,unsigned long *len,struct key *trusted_keys,const char *what) { +const unsigned long markerlen =sizeof (MODULE_SIG_STRING ) -1 ;struct module_signature *ms;unsigned long sig_len, modlen = *len;int ret;pr_devel ("==>%s(,%lu)\n" , __func__, modlen); +if (markerlen > modlen) +return -ENODATA ; + +if (memcmp (data + modlen - markerlen,MODULE_SIG_STRING , + markerlen)) +return -ENODATA ; + modlen -= markerlen; +if (modlen <=sizeof (*ms))return -EBADMSG ;
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
PATCH v4 5/6 module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in verify_appended_signature
In reply to Michal SuchanekAdd value for kexec appended signature and pass in key_being_used_for enum rather than a string to verify_appended_signature to produce log messages about the signature.
--- arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 2 +- arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 2 +- crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 1 + include/linux/verification.h | 4 +++- kernel/module.c | 3 ++- kernel/module_signing.c | 11 ++++++----- 6 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c +1 -1
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,int elf64_verify_sig (const char *kernel,unsigned long kernel_len) {return verify_appended_signature (kernel, &kernel_len,VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING , -"kexec_file" ); +VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE ); }#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +1 -1
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)return 0 ;return verify_appended_signature (kernel, &kernel_len,VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING , - "kexec_file"); + VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE); }#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c +1 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR] = { [VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE] = "kexec PE sig", [VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE] = "key sig", [VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE] = "key self sig", + [VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE] = "kexec appended sig", [VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE ] ="unspec sig" , };EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (key_being_used_for);
include/linux/verification.h +3 -1
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ enum key_being_used_for {VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE ,VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE ,VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE , +VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE ,VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE , NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR };
@@ -61,7 +62,8 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,#endif int verify_appended_signature (const void *data,unsigned long *len, -struct key *trusted_keys,const char *what); +struct key *trusted_keys, +enum key_being_used_for purpose);#endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */ #endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */
kernel/module.c +2 -1
@@ -2891,7 +2891,8 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)*/ if (flags ==0 ) { err =verify_appended_signature (mod, &info->len, -VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING ,"module" ); +VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING , +VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE );if (!err) { info->sig_ok = true;return 0 ;
kernel/module_signing.c +6 -5
@@ -19,17 +19,18 @@* @data: The data to be verified * @len: Size of @data. * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification -* @what: Informational string for log messages +* @purpose: The use to which the key is being put */ int verify_appended_signature (const void *data,unsigned long *len, -struct key *trusted_keys,const char *what) +struct key *trusted_keys, +enum key_being_used_for purpose) {const unsigned long markerlen =sizeof (MODULE_SIG_STRING ) -1 ;struct module_signature *ms;unsigned long sig_len, modlen = *len;int ret; -pr_devel ("==>%s(,%lu)\n" , __func__, modlen); +pr_devel ("==>%s %s(,%lu)\n" , __func__, key_being_used_for[purpose], modlen);if (markerlen > modlen)return -ENODATA ;
@@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len, ms = data + modlen -sizeof (*ms); - ret =mod_check_sig (ms, modlen, what); + ret =mod_check_sig (ms, modlen, key_being_used_for[purpose]);if (ret)return ret;
@@ -54,6 +55,6 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,return verify_pkcs7_signature (data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len, trusted_keys, -VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE , + purpose,NULL ,NULL ); }
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
PATCH v4 6/6 module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig
In reply to Michal SuchanekMultiple users of mod_check_sig check for the marker, then call mod_check_sig, extract signature length, and remove the signature.
Put this code in one place together with mod_check_sig.
This changes the error from ENOENT to ENODATA for ima_read_modsig in the case the signature marker is missing.
This also changes the buffer length in ima_read_modsig from size_t to unsigned long. This reduces the possible value range on 32bit but the length refers to kernel in-memory buffer which cannot be longer than ULONG_MAX.
---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <[email protected]>: Update the commit with note about
change of raturn value
- Preserve the EBADMSG error code while moving code araound
v4: - remove unused variable ms in module_signing
- note about buffer length
--- include/linux/module_signature.h | 1 + kernel/module_signature.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- kernel/module_signing.c | 27 +++----------- security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 22 ++---------- 4 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
include/linux/module_signature.h +1 -0
@@ -42,5 +42,6 @@ struct module_signature {int mod_check_sig (const struct module_signature *ms,size_t file_len,const char *name); +int mod_parse_sig (const void *data,size_t *len,size_t *sig_len,const char *name);#endif /* _LINUX_MODULE_SIGNATURE_H */
kernel/module_signature.c +55 -1
72 lines not on this page · raw message
kernel/module_signing.c +4 -23
@@ -25,35 +25,16 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,struct key *trusted_keys, enum key_being_used_for purpose) { -const unsigned long markerlen =sizeof (MODULE_SIG_STRING ) -1 ; -struct module_signature *ms; -unsigned long sig_len, modlen = *len; + unsigned long sig_len;int ret; -pr_devel ("==>%s %s(,%lu)\n" , __func__, key_being_used_for[purpose], modlen); +pr_devel ("==>%s %s(,%lu)\n" , __func__, key_being_used_for[purpose], *len); -if (markerlen > modlen) -return -ENODATA ; - -if (memcmp (data + modlen - markerlen,MODULE_SIG_STRING , - markerlen)) -return -ENODATA ; - modlen -= markerlen; - -if (modlen <=sizeof (*ms)) -return -EBADMSG ; - - ms = data + modlen -sizeof (*ms); - - ret =mod_check_sig (ms, modlen, key_being_used_for[purpose]); + ret =mod_parse_sig (data, len, &sig_len, key_being_used_for[purpose]);if (ret)return ret; - sig_len =be32_to_cpu (ms->sig_len); - modlen -= sig_len +sizeof (*ms); - *len = modlen; - -return verify_pkcs7_signature (data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len, +return verify_pkcs7_signature (data, *len, data + *len, sig_len, trusted_keys, purpose,NULL ,NULL );
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c +3 -19
@@ -37,33 +37,17 @@ struct modsig {* * Return: 0 on success, error code otherwise. */ -int ima_read_modsig (enum ima_hooks func,const void *buf,loff_t buf_len, +int ima_read_modsig (enum ima_hooks func,const void *buf,loff_t len,struct modsig **modsig) { -const size_t marker_len =strlen (MODULE_SIG_STRING ); -const struct module_signature *sig;struct modsig *hdr; -size_t sig_len; -const void *p; +unsigned long sig_len, buf_len = len;int rc; -if (buf_len <= marker_len +sizeof (*sig)) -return -ENOENT ; - - p = buf + buf_len - marker_len; -if (memcmp (p,MODULE_SIG_STRING , marker_len)) -return -ENOENT ; - - buf_len -= marker_len; - sig = (const struct module_signature *)(p -sizeof (*sig)); - - rc =mod_check_sig (sig, buf_len, func_tokens[func]); + rc =mod_parse_sig (buf, &buf_len, &sig_len, func_tokens[func]);if (rc)return rc; - sig_len =be32_to_cpu (sig->sig_len); - buf_len -= sig_len +sizeof (*sig); -/* Allocate sig_len additional bytes to hold the raw PKCS#7 data. */ hdr =kzalloc (sizeof (*hdr) + sig_len,GFP_KERNEL );if (!hdr)
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
kernel test robot
build bot[PATCH v4 6/6] module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig
Thank you for the patch! Yet something to improve:
Hi Michal,
Thank you for the patch! Yet something to improve:
[auto build test ERROR on powerpc/next]
[also build test ERROR on s390/features linus/master jeyu/modules-next v5.16 next-20220110] [If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Michal-Suchanek/KEXEC_SIG-with-appended-signature/20220110-215157 base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux.git next config: arc-allyesconfig (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20220111/202201110303.sLPF0o29-lkp at intel.com/config) compiler: arceb-elf-gcc (GCC) 11.2.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/cc363ca7724d96c534c176b8ed248336f562b7ae
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Michal-Suchanek/KEXEC_SIG-with-appended-signature/20220110-215157 git checkout cc363ca7724d96c534c176b8ed248336f562b7ae
# save the config file to linux build tree
mkdir build_dir
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=gcc-11.2.0 make.cross O=build_dir ARCH=arc SHELL=/bin/bash
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
kernel/module_signing.c: In function 'verify_appended_signature':
>> kernel/module_signing.c:33:35: error: passing argument 2 of 'mod_parse_sig' from incompatible pointer type [-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types]
33 | ret = mod_parse_sig(data, len, &sig_len, key_being_used_for[purpose]);
| ^~~
| |
| long unsigned int *
In file included from kernel/module_signing.c:11:
include/linux/module_signature.h:45:45: note: expected 'size_t *' {aka 'unsigned int *'} but argument is of type 'long unsigned int *'
45 | int mod_parse_sig(const void *data, size_t *len, size_t *sig_len, const char *name);
| ~~~~~~~~^~~
kernel/module_signing.c:33:40: error: passing argument 3 of 'mod_parse_sig' from incompatible pointer type [-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types]
33 | ret = mod_parse_sig(data, len, &sig_len, key_being_used_for[purpose]);
| ^~~~~~~~
| |
| long unsigned int *
In file included from kernel/module_signing.c:11:
include/linux/module_signature.h:45:58: note: expected 'size_t *' {aka 'unsigned int *'} but argument is of type 'long unsigned int *'
45 | int mod_parse_sig(const void *data, size_t *len, size_t *sig_len, const char *name);
| ~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~
cc1: some warnings being treated as errors
--
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c: In function 'ima_read_modsig':
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c:47:33: error: passing argument 2 of 'mod_parse_sig' from incompatible pointer type [-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types]
47 | rc = mod_parse_sig(buf, &buf_len, &sig_len, func_tokens[func]);
| ^~~~~~~~
| |
| long unsigned int *
In file included from security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c:12:
include/linux/module_signature.h:45:45: note: expected 'size_t *' {aka 'unsigned int *'} but argument is of type 'long unsigned int *'
45 | int mod_parse_sig(const void *data, size_t *len, size_t *sig_len, const char *name);
| ~~~~~~~~^~~
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c:47:43: error: passing argument 3 of 'mod_parse_sig' from incompatible pointer type [-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types]
47 | rc = mod_parse_sig(buf, &buf_len, &sig_len, func_tokens[func]);
| ^~~~~~~~
| |
| long unsigned int *
In file included from security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c:12:
include/linux/module_signature.h:45:58: note: expected 'size_t *' {aka 'unsigned int *'} but argument is of type 'long unsigned int *'
45 | int mod_parse_sig(const void *data, size_t *len, size_t *sig_len, const char *name);
| ~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~cc1: some warnings being treated as errors
vim +/mod_parse_sig +33 kernel/module_signing.c
16
17 /**
18 * verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module
19 * @data: The data to be verified
20 * @len: Size of @data.
21 * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
22 * @purpose: The use to which the key is being put
23 */
24 int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
25 struct key *trusted_keys,
26 enum key_being_used_for purpose)
27 {
28 unsigned long sig_len;
29 int ret;
30
31 pr_devel("==>%s %s(,%lu)\n", __func__, key_being_used_for[purpose], *len);
32
> 33 ret = mod_parse_sig(data, len, &sig_len, key_being_used_for[purpose]);---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all at lists.01.org