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KEXEC_SIG with appended signature

PATCH Superseded Michal Suchanek 3 participants 9 messages Jan 10, 2022 – Jan 25, 2022

Subsystems (12)

v4 of 5 Superseded Latest is v5 →

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#0 lore raw

v4 cover KEXEC_SIG with appended signature

Hello,

This is a refresh of the KEXEC_SIG series.

This adds KEXEC_SIG support on powerpc and deduplicates the code dealing with appended signatures in the kernel.

powerpc supports IMA_KEXEC but that's an exception rather than the norm. On the other hand, KEXEC_SIG is portable across platforms.

For distributions to have uniform security features across platforms one option should be used on all platforms.

Thanks

Michal

Previous revision: https://lore.kernel.org/linuxppc-dev/cover.1637862358.git.msuchanek at suse.de/ Patched kernel tree: https://github.com/hramrach/kernel/tree/kexec_sig

Michal Suchanek (6):
s390/kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature check. powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.
kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.
module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.
module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in
verify_appended_signature
module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig

 arch/powerpc/Kconfig                     | 16 +++++++
 arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c              | 12 +++++
 arch/s390/Kconfig                        |  2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c    | 41 +----------------
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c |  1 +
 include/linux/module_signature.h         |  1 +
 include/linux/verification.h             |  5 +++
 kernel/module-internal.h                 |  2 -
 kernel/module.c                          | 12 +++--
 kernel/module_signature.c                | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
 kernel/module_signing.c                  | 34 +++++++-------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c      | 22 ++--------
 12 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 88 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH v4 1/6 s390/kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature check.

Module verification already implements appeded signature check.

Reuse it for kexec_file.

The kexec_file implementation uses EKEYREJECTED error in some cases when there is no key and the common implementation uses ENOPKG or EBADMSG instead.

---
v3: Philipp Rudo <[email protected]>: Update the commit with note about change of return value

---
 arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 22 +++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +5 -17
index 8f43575a4dd3..c944d71316c7 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
 	struct module_signature *ms;
 	unsigned long sig_len;
+	int ret;
 
 	/* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */
 	if (!ipl_secure_flag)
@@ -45,25 +46,12 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 	kernel_len -= marker_len;
 
 	ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms);
-	kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms);
+	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec");
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
 	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
-	if (sig_len >= kernel_len)
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-	kernel_len -= sig_len;
-
-	if (ms->id_type != PKEY_ID_PKCS7)
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-
-	if (ms->algo != 0 ||
-	    ms->hash != 0 ||
-	    ms->signer_len != 0 ||
-	    ms->key_id_len != 0 ||
-	    ms->__pad[0] != 0 ||
-	    ms->__pad[1] != 0 ||
-	    ms->__pad[2] != 0) {
-		return -EBADMSG;
-	}
+	kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len;
 
 	return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
 				      kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
#3 lore raw

PATCH v4 2/6 powerpc/kexec_file: Add KEXEC_SIG support.

In reply to Michal Suchanek

Copy the code from s390x

Both powerpc and s390x use appended signature format (as opposed to EFI based patforms using PE format).

---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <[email protected]>: Update the comit message with
explanation why the s390 code is usable on powerpc.
- Include correct header for mod_check_sig
- Nayna <[email protected]>: Mention additional IMA features in kconfig text

---
 arch/powerpc/Kconfig        | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+)
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +16 -0
index dea74d7717c0..1cde9b6c5987 100644
@@ -560,6 +560,22 @@ config KEXEC_FILE
 config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
 	def_bool KEXEC_FILE
 
+config KEXEC_SIG
+	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
+	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
+	help
+	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
+	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
+
+	  In addition to that option, you need to enable signature
+	  verification for the corresponding kernel image type being
+	  loaded in order for this to work.
+
+	  Note: on powerpc IMA_ARCH_POLICY also implements kexec'ed kernel
+	  verification. In addition IMA adds kernel hashes to the measurement
+	  list, extends IMA PCR in the TPM, and implements kernel image
+	  blacklist by hash.
+
 config RELOCATABLE
 	bool "Build a relocatable kernel"
 	depends on PPC64 || (FLATMEM && (44x || FSL_BOOKE))
arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c +36 -0
index eeb258002d1e..98d1cb5135b4 100644
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/of_fdt.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/module_signature.h>
 
 static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
 			unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
@@ -151,7 +152,42 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
 	return ret ? ERR_PTR(ret) : NULL;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
+{
+	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
+	struct module_signature *ms;
+	unsigned long sig_len;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (marker_len > kernel_len)
+		return -EKEYREJECTED;
+
+	if (memcmp(kernel + kernel_len - marker_len, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
+		   marker_len))
+		return -EKEYREJECTED;
+	kernel_len -= marker_len;
+
+	ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms);
+	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec");
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
+	kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len;
+
+	return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
+				      kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
+				      VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
+				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+				      NULL, NULL);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
+
 const struct kexec_file_ops kexec_elf64_ops = {
 	.probe = kexec_elf_probe,
 	.load = elf64_load,
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
+	.verify_sig = elf64_verify_sig,
+#endif
 };
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
#4 lore raw

PATCH v4 3/6 kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature verification.

In reply to Michal Suchanek

Module verification already implements appeded signature verification.

Reuse it for kexec_file.

---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <[email protected]>: Update the dependency on
MODULE_SIG_FORMAT to MODULE_SIG
- Include linux/verification.h - previously added in earlier patch
v4: - kernel test robot <[email protected]>: Use unsigned long rather than size_t for data length
- Update the code in kernel/module_signing.c to use pointer rather
than memcpy as the kexec and IMA code does

---
 arch/powerpc/Kconfig                  |  2 +-
 arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c           | 19 +++------------
 arch/s390/Kconfig                     |  2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 18 ++------------
 include/linux/verification.h          |  3 +++
 kernel/module-internal.h              |  2 --
 kernel/module.c                       |  4 +++-
 kernel/module_signing.c               | 34 ++++++++++++++++-----------
 8 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/Kconfig +1 -1
index 1cde9b6c5987..4092187474ff 100644
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
 
 config KEXEC_SIG
 	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
-	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
+	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG
 	help
 	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
 	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c +3 -16
index 98d1cb5135b4..64cd314cce0d 100644
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/of_fdt.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <linux/module_signature.h>
 
 static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
@@ -156,9 +157,6 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
 int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 {
 	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
-	struct module_signature *ms;
-	unsigned long sig_len;
-	int ret;
 
 	if (marker_len > kernel_len)
 		return -EKEYREJECTED;
@@ -168,19 +166,8 @@ int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 		return -EKEYREJECTED;
 	kernel_len -= marker_len;
 
-	ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms);
-	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec");
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
-	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
-	kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len;
-
-	return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
-				      kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
-				      VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
-				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
-				      NULL, NULL);
+	return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
+					 "kexec_file");
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
 
arch/s390/Kconfig +1 -1
index 2a5bb4f29cfe..cece7152ea35 100644
@@ -544,7 +544,7 @@ config ARCH_HAS_KEXEC_PURGATORY
 
 config KEXEC_SIG
 	bool "Verify kernel signature during kexec_file_load() syscall"
-	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG_FORMAT
+	depends on KEXEC_FILE && MODULE_SIG
 	help
 	  This option makes kernel signature verification mandatory for
 	  the kexec_file_load() syscall.
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +2 -16
index c944d71316c7..345f2eab6e04 100644
@@ -29,9 +29,6 @@ const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = {
 int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 {
 	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
-	struct module_signature *ms;
-	unsigned long sig_len;
-	int ret;
 
 	/* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */
 	if (!ipl_secure_flag)
@@ -45,19 +42,8 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 		return -EKEYREJECTED;
 	kernel_len -= marker_len;
 
-	ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms);
-	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec");
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
-	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
-	kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms) + sig_len;
-
-	return verify_pkcs7_signature(kernel, kernel_len,
-				      kernel + kernel_len, sig_len,
-				      VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
-				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
-				      NULL, NULL);
+	return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
+					"kexec_file");
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
 
include/linux/verification.h +3 -0
index a655923335ae..32db9287a7b0 100644
@@ -60,5 +60,8 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
 				   enum key_being_used_for usage);
 #endif
 
+int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
+			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what);
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
 #endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */
kernel/module-internal.h +0 -2
index 33783abc377b..80461e14bf29 100644
@@ -27,5 +27,3 @@ struct load_info {
 		unsigned int sym, str, mod, vers, info, pcpu;
 	} index;
 };
-
-extern int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info);
kernel/module.c +3 -1
index 84a9141a5e15..8481933dfa92 100644
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
 #include <linux/bsearch.h>
 #include <linux/dynamic_debug.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/module.h>
 #include "module-internal.h"
 
@@ -2894,7 +2895,8 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 	    memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) {
 		/* We truncate the module to discard the signature */
 		info->len -= markerlen;
-		err = mod_verify_sig(mod, info);
+		err = verify_appended_signature(mod, &info->len,
+						VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, "module");
 		if (!err) {
 			info->sig_ok = true;
 			return 0;
kernel/module_signing.c +20 -14
index 8723ae70ea1f..30149969f21f 100644
@@ -14,32 +14,38 @@
 #include <crypto/public_key.h>
 #include "module-internal.h"
 
-/*
- * Verify the signature on a module.
+/**
+ * verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module with the
+ * signature marker stripped.
+ * @data: The data to be verified
+ * @len: Size of @data.
+ * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
+ * @what: Informational string for log messages
  */
-int mod_verify_sig(const void *mod, struct load_info *info)
+int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
+			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what)
 {
-	struct module_signature ms;
-	size_t sig_len, modlen = info->len;
+	struct module_signature *ms;
+	unsigned long sig_len, modlen = *len;
 	int ret;
 
-	pr_devel("==>%s(,%zu)\n", __func__, modlen);
+	pr_devel("==>%s(,%lu)\n", __func__, modlen);
 
-	if (modlen <= sizeof(ms))
+	if (modlen <= sizeof(*ms))
 		return -EBADMSG;
 
-	memcpy(&ms, mod + (modlen - sizeof(ms)), sizeof(ms));
+	ms = data + modlen - sizeof(*ms);
 
-	ret = mod_check_sig(&ms, modlen, "module");
+	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, modlen, what);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms.sig_len);
-	modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(ms);
-	info->len = modlen;
+	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
+	modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(*ms);
+	*len = modlen;
 
-	return verify_pkcs7_signature(mod, modlen, mod + modlen, sig_len,
-				      VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
+	return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len,
+				      trusted_keys,
 				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
 				      NULL, NULL);
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
#5 lore raw

PATCH v4 4/6 module: strip the signature marker in the verification function.

In reply to Michal Suchanek

It is stripped by each caller separately.

Note: this changes the error for kexec_file from EKEYREJECTED to ENODATA when the signature marker is missing.

---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <[email protected]>: Update the commit with note about
change of raturn value
- the module_signature.h is now no longer needed for kexec_file

---
 arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c           | 11 -----------
 arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 11 -----------
 kernel/module.c                       |  7 +------
 kernel/module_signing.c               | 12 ++++++++++--
 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c +0 -11
index 64cd314cce0d..6dec8151ef73 100644
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/verification.h>
-#include <linux/module_signature.h>
 
 static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
 			unsigned long kernel_len, char *initrd,
@@ -156,16 +155,6 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
 int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 {
-	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
-
-	if (marker_len > kernel_len)
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-
-	if (memcmp(kernel + kernel_len - marker_len, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
-		   marker_len))
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-	kernel_len -= marker_len;
-
 	return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
 					 "kexec_file");
 }
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +0 -11
index 345f2eab6e04..c3deccf1da83 100644
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@
 #include <linux/elf.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <linux/kexec.h>
-#include <linux/module_signature.h>
 #include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <asm/boot_data.h>
@@ -28,20 +27,10 @@ const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG
 int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 {
-	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
-
 	/* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */
 	if (!ipl_secure_flag)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (marker_len > kernel_len)
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-
-	if (memcmp(kernel + kernel_len - marker_len, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
-		   marker_len))
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;
-	kernel_len -= marker_len;
-
 	return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
 					"kexec_file");
 }
kernel/module.c +1 -6
index 8481933dfa92..d91ca0f93a40 100644
@@ -2882,7 +2882,6 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct module *mod,
 static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 {
 	int err = -ENODATA;
-	const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
 	const char *reason;
 	const void *mod = info->hdr;
 
@@ -2890,11 +2889,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 	 * Require flags == 0, as a module with version information
 	 * removed is no longer the module that was signed
 	 */
-	if (flags == 0 &&
-	    info->len > markerlen &&
-	    memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) {
-		/* We truncate the module to discard the signature */
-		info->len -= markerlen;
+	if (flags == 0) {
 		err = verify_appended_signature(mod, &info->len,
 						VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, "module");
 		if (!err) {
kernel/module_signing.c +10 -2
index 30149969f21f..39a6dd7c6dd2 100644
@@ -15,8 +15,7 @@
 #include "module-internal.h"
 
 /**
- * verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module with the
- * signature marker stripped.
+ * verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module
  * @data: The data to be verified
  * @len: Size of @data.
  * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
@@ -25,12 +24,21 @@
 int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
 			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what)
 {
+	const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
 	struct module_signature *ms;
 	unsigned long sig_len, modlen = *len;
 	int ret;
 
 	pr_devel("==>%s(,%lu)\n", __func__, modlen);
 
+	if (markerlen > modlen)
+		return -ENODATA;
+
+	if (memcmp(data + modlen - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
+		   markerlen))
+		return -ENODATA;
+	modlen -= markerlen;
+
 	if (modlen <= sizeof(*ms))
 		return -EBADMSG;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
#6 lore raw

PATCH v4 5/6 module: Use key_being_used_for for log messages in verify_appended_signature

In reply to Michal Suchanek

Add value for kexec appended signature and pass in key_being_used_for enum rather than a string to verify_appended_signature to produce log messages about the signature.

---
 arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c              |  2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c    |  2 +-
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c |  1 +
 include/linux/verification.h             |  4 +++-
 kernel/module.c                          |  3 ++-
 kernel/module_signing.c                  | 11 ++++++-----
 6 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kexec/elf_64.c +1 -1
index 6dec8151ef73..c50869195d51 100644
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static void *elf64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel_buf,
 int elf64_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 {
 	return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
-					 "kexec_file");
+					 VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
 
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +1 -1
index c3deccf1da83..63eec38e3137 100644
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 		return 0;
 
 	return verify_appended_signature(kernel, &kernel_len, VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
-					"kexec_file");
+					VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
 
crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c +1 -0
index ad8af3d70ac0..6fd20eec3882 100644
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ const char *const key_being_used_for[NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR] = {
 	[VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE]		= "kexec PE sig",
 	[VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE]		= "key sig",
 	[VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE]		= "key self sig",
+	[VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE]	= "kexec appended sig",
 	[VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE]	= "unspec sig",
 };
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_being_used_for);
include/linux/verification.h +3 -1
index 32db9287a7b0..f92c49443b4f 100644
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ enum key_being_used_for {
 	VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE,
 	VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE,
 	VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE,
+	VERIFYING_KEXEC_APPENDED_SIGNATURE,
 	VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
 	NR__KEY_BEING_USED_FOR
 };
@@ -61,7 +62,8 @@ extern int verify_pefile_signature(const void *pebuf, unsigned pelen,
 #endif
 
 int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
-			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what);
+			      struct key *trusted_keys,
+			      enum key_being_used_for purpose);
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION */
 #endif /* _LINUX_VERIFY_PEFILE_H */
kernel/module.c +2 -1
index d91ca0f93a40..0a359dc6b690 100644
@@ -2891,7 +2891,8 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 	 */
 	if (flags == 0) {
 		err = verify_appended_signature(mod, &info->len,
-						VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING, "module");
+						VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
+						VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE);
 		if (!err) {
 			info->sig_ok = true;
 			return 0;
kernel/module_signing.c +6 -5
index 39a6dd7c6dd2..20857d2a15ca 100644
@@ -19,17 +19,18 @@
  * @data: The data to be verified
  * @len: Size of @data.
  * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
- * @what: Informational string for log messages
+ * @purpose: The use to which the key is being put
  */
 int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
-			      struct key *trusted_keys, const char *what)
+			      struct key *trusted_keys,
+			      enum key_being_used_for purpose)
 {
 	const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
 	struct module_signature *ms;
 	unsigned long sig_len, modlen = *len;
 	int ret;
 
-	pr_devel("==>%s(,%lu)\n", __func__, modlen);
+	pr_devel("==>%s %s(,%lu)\n", __func__, key_being_used_for[purpose], modlen);
 
 	if (markerlen > modlen)
 		return -ENODATA;
@@ -44,7 +45,7 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
 
 	ms = data + modlen - sizeof(*ms);
 
-	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, modlen, what);
+	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, modlen, key_being_used_for[purpose]);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -54,6 +55,6 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
 
 	return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len,
 				      trusted_keys,
-				      VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE,
+				      purpose,
 				      NULL, NULL);
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
#7 lore raw

PATCH v4 6/6 module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig

In reply to Michal Suchanek

Multiple users of mod_check_sig check for the marker, then call mod_check_sig, extract signature length, and remove the signature.

Put this code in one place together with mod_check_sig.

This changes the error from ENOENT to ENODATA for ima_read_modsig in the case the signature marker is missing.

This also changes the buffer length in ima_read_modsig from size_t to unsigned long. This reduces the possible value range on 32bit but the length refers to kernel in-memory buffer which cannot be longer than ULONG_MAX.

---
v3: - Philipp Rudo <[email protected]>: Update the commit with note about
change of raturn value
- Preserve the EBADMSG error code while moving code araound
v4: - remove unused variable ms in module_signing
- note about buffer length

---
 include/linux/module_signature.h    |  1 +
 kernel/module_signature.c           | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 kernel/module_signing.c             | 27 +++-----------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c | 22 ++----------
 4 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
include/linux/module_signature.h +1 -0
index 7eb4b00381ac..1343879b72b3 100644
@@ -42,5 +42,6 @@ struct module_signature {
 
 int mod_check_sig(const struct module_signature *ms, size_t file_len,
 		  const char *name);
+int mod_parse_sig(const void *data, size_t *len, size_t *sig_len, const char *name);
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_MODULE_SIGNATURE_H */
kernel/module_signature.c +55 -1

72 lines not on this page · raw message

kernel/module_signing.c +4 -23
index 20857d2a15ca..1d4cb03cce21 100644
@@ -25,35 +25,16 @@ int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
 			      struct key *trusted_keys,
 			      enum key_being_used_for purpose)
 {
-	const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
-	struct module_signature *ms;
-	unsigned long sig_len, modlen = *len;
+	unsigned long sig_len;
 	int ret;
 
-	pr_devel("==>%s %s(,%lu)\n", __func__, key_being_used_for[purpose], modlen);
+	pr_devel("==>%s %s(,%lu)\n", __func__, key_being_used_for[purpose], *len);
 
-	if (markerlen > modlen)
-		return -ENODATA;
-
-	if (memcmp(data + modlen - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING,
-		   markerlen))
-		return -ENODATA;
-	modlen -= markerlen;
-
-	if (modlen <= sizeof(*ms))
-		return -EBADMSG;
-
-	ms = data + modlen - sizeof(*ms);
-
-	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, modlen, key_being_used_for[purpose]);
+	ret = mod_parse_sig(data, len, &sig_len, key_being_used_for[purpose]);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
-	modlen -= sig_len + sizeof(*ms);
-	*len = modlen;
-
-	return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, modlen, data + modlen, sig_len,
+	return verify_pkcs7_signature(data, *len, data + *len, sig_len,
 				      trusted_keys,
 				      purpose,
 				      NULL, NULL);
security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c +3 -19
index fb25723c65bc..b40c8fdf6139 100644
@@ -37,33 +37,17 @@ struct modsig {
  *
  * Return: 0 on success, error code otherwise.
  */
-int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t buf_len,
+int ima_read_modsig(enum ima_hooks func, const void *buf, loff_t len,
 		    struct modsig **modsig)
 {
-	const size_t marker_len = strlen(MODULE_SIG_STRING);
-	const struct module_signature *sig;
 	struct modsig *hdr;
-	size_t sig_len;
-	const void *p;
+	unsigned long sig_len, buf_len = len;
 	int rc;
 
-	if (buf_len <= marker_len + sizeof(*sig))
-		return -ENOENT;
-
-	p = buf + buf_len - marker_len;
-	if (memcmp(p, MODULE_SIG_STRING, marker_len))
-		return -ENOENT;
-
-	buf_len -= marker_len;
-	sig = (const struct module_signature *)(p - sizeof(*sig));
-
-	rc = mod_check_sig(sig, buf_len, func_tokens[func]);
+	rc = mod_parse_sig(buf, &buf_len, &sig_len, func_tokens[func]);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(sig->sig_len);
-	buf_len -= sig_len + sizeof(*sig);
-
 	/* Allocate sig_len additional bytes to hold the raw PKCS#7 data. */
 	hdr = kzalloc(sizeof(*hdr) + sig_len, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!hdr)
Signature · 1 line
2.31.1
#8 lore raw

[PATCH v4 6/6] module: Move duplicate mod_check_sig users code to mod_parse_sig

Thank you for the patch! Yet something to improve:

Hi Michal,

Thank you for the patch! Yet something to improve:

[auto build test ERROR on powerpc/next]
[also build test ERROR on s390/features linus/master jeyu/modules-next v5.16 next-20220110] [If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch]

url:    https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Michal-Suchanek/KEXEC_SIG-with-appended-signature/20220110-215157
base:   https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux.git next
config: arc-allyesconfig (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20220111/202201110303.sLPF0o29-lkp at intel.com/config)
compiler: arceb-elf-gcc (GCC) 11.2.0

reproduce (this is a W=1 build):
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/intel/lkp-tests/master/sbin/make.cross -O ~/bin/make.cross chmod +x ~/bin/make.cross
# https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/cc363ca7724d96c534c176b8ed248336f562b7ae
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git fetch --no-tags linux-review Michal-Suchanek/KEXEC_SIG-with-appended-signature/20220110-215157 git checkout cc363ca7724d96c534c176b8ed248336f562b7ae
# save the config file to linux build tree
mkdir build_dir
COMPILER_INSTALL_PATH=$HOME/0day COMPILER=gcc-11.2.0 make.cross O=build_dir ARCH=arc SHELL=/bin/bash

If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate

All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):

kernel/module_signing.c: In function 'verify_appended_signature':

>> kernel/module_signing.c:33:35: error: passing argument 2 of 'mod_parse_sig' from incompatible pointer type [-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types]
      33 |         ret = mod_parse_sig(data, len, &sig_len, key_being_used_for[purpose]);
         |                                   ^~~
         |                                   |
         |                                   long unsigned int *
   In file included from kernel/module_signing.c:11:
   include/linux/module_signature.h:45:45: note: expected 'size_t *' {aka 'unsigned int *'} but argument is of type 'long unsigned int *'
      45 | int mod_parse_sig(const void *data, size_t *len, size_t *sig_len, const char *name);
         |                                     ~~~~~~~~^~~
   kernel/module_signing.c:33:40: error: passing argument 3 of 'mod_parse_sig' from incompatible pointer type [-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types]
      33 |         ret = mod_parse_sig(data, len, &sig_len, key_being_used_for[purpose]);
         |                                        ^~~~~~~~
         |                                        |
         |                                        long unsigned int *
   In file included from kernel/module_signing.c:11:
   include/linux/module_signature.h:45:58: note: expected 'size_t *' {aka 'unsigned int *'} but argument is of type 'long unsigned int *'
      45 | int mod_parse_sig(const void *data, size_t *len, size_t *sig_len, const char *name);
         |                                                  ~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~
   cc1: some warnings being treated as errors
--
   security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c: In function 'ima_read_modsig':
>> security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c:47:33: error: passing argument 2 of 'mod_parse_sig' from incompatible pointer type [-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types]
      47 |         rc = mod_parse_sig(buf, &buf_len, &sig_len, func_tokens[func]);
         |                                 ^~~~~~~~
         |                                 |
         |                                 long unsigned int *
   In file included from security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c:12:
   include/linux/module_signature.h:45:45: note: expected 'size_t *' {aka 'unsigned int *'} but argument is of type 'long unsigned int *'
      45 | int mod_parse_sig(const void *data, size_t *len, size_t *sig_len, const char *name);
         |                                     ~~~~~~~~^~~
   security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c:47:43: error: passing argument 3 of 'mod_parse_sig' from incompatible pointer type [-Werror=incompatible-pointer-types]
      47 |         rc = mod_parse_sig(buf, &buf_len, &sig_len, func_tokens[func]);
         |                                           ^~~~~~~~
         |                                           |
         |                                           long unsigned int *
   In file included from security/integrity/ima/ima_modsig.c:12:
   include/linux/module_signature.h:45:58: note: expected 'size_t *' {aka 'unsigned int *'} but argument is of type 'long unsigned int *'
      45 | int mod_parse_sig(const void *data, size_t *len, size_t *sig_len, const char *name);
         |                                                  ~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~

cc1: some warnings being treated as errors

vim +/mod_parse_sig +33 kernel/module_signing.c

    16	
    17	/**
    18	 * verify_appended_signature - Verify the signature on a module
    19	 * @data: The data to be verified
    20	 * @len: Size of @data.
    21	 * @trusted_keys: Keyring to use for verification
    22	 * @purpose: The use to which the key is being put
    23	 */
    24	int verify_appended_signature(const void *data, unsigned long *len,
    25				      struct key *trusted_keys,
    26				      enum key_being_used_for purpose)
    27	{
    28		unsigned long sig_len;
    29		int ret;
    30	
    31		pr_devel("==>%s %s(,%lu)\n", __func__, key_being_used_for[purpose], *len);
    32	
  > 33		ret = mod_parse_sig(data, len, &sig_len, key_being_used_for[purpose]);

---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all at lists.01.org

maintainer Reviewed-by on v4 1/6
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v4 1/6] s390/kexec_file: Don't opencode appended signature check.

In reply to Michal Suchanek
Quoted 31 lines · Michal Suchanek

Module verification already implements appeded signature check.

Reuse it for kexec_file.

The kexec_file implementation uses EKEYREJECTED error in some cases when there is no key and the common implementation uses ENOPKG or EBADMSG instead.

---
v3: Philipp Rudo <[email protected]>: Update the commit with note about change of return value

---
 arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c | 22 +++++-----------------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +1 -0
index 8f43575a4dd3..c944d71316c7 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 	const unsigned long marker_len = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
 	struct module_signature *ms;
 	unsigned long sig_len;
+	int ret;
 
 	/* Skip signature verification when not secure IPLed. */
 	if (!ipl_secure_flag)
@@ -45,25 +46,12 @@ int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len)
 	kernel_len -= marker_len;

arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) · line 52

Quoted 10 lines
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +3 -3
 
 	ms = (void *)kernel + kernel_len - sizeof(*ms);
-	kernel_len -= sizeof(*ms);
+	ret = mod_check_sig(ms, kernel_len, "kexec");
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
 	sig_len = be32_to_cpu(ms->sig_len);
-	if (sig_len >= kernel_len)
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;

There is a small minor fix here, where by using mod_check_sig() now decreased the kernel_len by the sizeof(*ms). It is minor though.

arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c int s390_verify_sig(const char *kernel, unsigned long kernel_len) · line 56

Quoted 4 lines
arch/s390/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c +0 -4
-	kernel_len -= sig_len;
-
-	if (ms->id_type != PKEY_ID_PKCS7)
-		return -EKEYREJECTED;

More importantly is the return value used here changes but given the Ack by Heiko I suspect this if fine and does not break old userspace, the only change here is the possible error value returned by the kexec_file_load() system call.

Luis