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m68k/kernel: array out of bound access in process_uboot_commandline

PATCH RESEND In review Hangyu Hua 2 participants 3 messages Jan 13, 2022 – Jan 18, 2022 m68k architecture

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Hangyu Hua

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#0 lore raw

PATCH RESEND v2 1/1 m68k/kernel: array out of bound access in process_uboot_commandline

When the size of commandp >= size, array out of bound write occurs because len == 0.

---
 arch/m68k/kernel/uboot.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/m68k/kernel/uboot.c +2 -1
index 928dbd33fc4a..63eaf3c3ddcd 100644
@@ -101,5 +101,6 @@ __init void process_uboot_commandline(char *commandp, int size)
 	}
 
 	parse_uboot_commandline(commandp, len);
-	commandp[len - 1] = 0;
+	if (len > 0)
+		commandp[len - 1] = 0;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#1 lore raw

Hi Hangyu,

Quoted 14 lines · Hangyu Hua

When the size of commandp >= size, array out of bound write occurs because len == 0.

---
  arch/m68k/kernel/uboot.c | 3 ++-
  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/m68k/kernel/uboot.c +0 -0
index 928dbd33fc4a..63eaf3c3ddcd 100644

arch/m68k/kernel/uboot.c __init void process_uboot_commandline(char *commandp, int size) · line 106

Quoted 7 lines
arch/m68k/kernel/uboot.c +2 -1
@@ -101,5 +101,6 @@ __init void process_uboot_commandline(char *commandp, int size)
  	}
 
  	parse_uboot_commandline(commandp, len);
-	commandp[len - 1] = 0;
+	if (len > 0)
+		commandp[len - 1] = 0;
  }

I am not convinced this is wrong for the reason you think it is. Looking at the code in its entirety:

__init void process_uboot_commandline(char *commandp, int size)

{
        int len, n;

        n = strnlen(commandp, size);
        commandp += n;
        len = size - n;
        if (len) {
                /* Add the whitespace separator */
                *commandp++ = ' ';
                len--;
        }

        parse_uboot_commandline(commandp, len);
        commandp[len - 1] = 0;
}

"commandp" is moved based on the return of the strnlen(). So in the case of commandp actually being full of valid characters (so n == size, and thus len == 0) the commandp technically points outside of its real size at that point. But "command[[len - 1]" would actually be pointing to the last char in the original commandp array (so the original commandp[size - 1]). Well at least if you are happy with the use of negative array indexes.

Clearly this could be structured better. There is no point in calling parse_uboot_commandline() if len == 0, or even if len == 1, since you cannot add anymore to the command line, it is full.

Regards
Greg

author
#2 lore raw

Hi Greg,

Quoted 46 lines · Greg Ungerer

Hi Hangyu,

Quoted 14 lines · Hangyu Hua

When the size of commandp >= size, array out of bound write occurs because len == 0.

---
  arch/m68k/kernel/uboot.c | 3 ++-

  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/m68k/kernel/uboot.c +0 -0
index 928dbd33fc4a..63eaf3c3ddcd 100644

arch/m68k/kernel/uboot.c __init void process_uboot_commandline(char · line 106

Quoted 7 lines
arch/m68k/kernel/uboot.c +2 -1
@@ -101,5 +101,6 @@ __init void process_uboot_commandline(char 
 *commandp, int size)
       }
       parse_uboot_commandline(commandp, len);
-    commandp[len - 1] = 0;
+    if (len > 0)
+        commandp[len - 1] = 0;
   }

I am not convinced this is wrong for the reason you think it is. Looking at the code in its entirety:

__init void process_uboot_commandline(char *commandp, int size) {
        int len, n;

        n = strnlen(commandp, size); commandp += n;
        len = size - n;
        if (len) {
                /* Add the whitespace separator */ *commandp++ = ' ';
                len--;
        }

        parse_uboot_commandline(commandp, len);
        commandp[len - 1] = 0;
}

Quoted 8 lines

"commandp" is moved based on the return of the strnlen(). So in the case of commandp actually being full of valid characters (so n == size, and thus len == 0) the commandp technically points outside of its real size at that point. But "command[[len - 1]" would actually be pointing to the last char in the original commandp array (so the original commandp[size - 1]). Well at least if you are happy with the use of negative array indexes.

You mean this is a friendly out of bound beacause "command[[len - 1]" pointing to the last char in the original commandp array. I used to think command[[len - 1] = 0 may be a zero-terminated for command. You can see my discussion with Andreas Schwab and my patch v1 in

https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAOo-nLJG71QqqD0-cJDyH0rY2VTx1eO9nHVQ5MCe8J0iiME_vw@mail.gmail.com/

But this still be a out of bound write because "commandp" is a macro definition with a fixed size.

Quoted 4 lines

Clearly this could be structured better. There is no point in calling parse_uboot_commandline() if len == 0, or even if len == 1, since you cannot add anymore to the command line, it is full.

I think it is no point too. But the caller (setup_arch()) don't check the size of "commandp" before call parse_uboot_commandline(). Instead we do this in parse_uboot_commandline(). So it may be better to move these checks to the caller ?

Quoted 2 lines

Regards
Greg

Thanks for your reply
Hangyu Hua