grub 2.04 security fixes
cover grub 2.04 security fixes
This series fixes a number of issues in grub 2.04. It is a part of a security series [1], except of the patch 5. The patch 5 is a dependency of patch 6, but also a bugfix on its own.
While none of them has an official CVE, they fix a number of NULL pointer dereferences, memory leaks and similar issues, so seem worth having.
Patches included here are also in Debian's backports [2].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
[2] https://salsa.debian.org/grub-team/grub/-/tree/debian/2.04-20/debian/patches/2021-02-security
Marta Rybczynska (46):
grub: fix a memory leak
grub: add a fix for a possible NULL dereference
grub: fix a dangling memory pointer
grub: fix wrong handling of argc == 0
grub: add a fix for malformed device path handling
grub: fix memory leak at error in grub_efi_get_filename()
grub: add a fix for a possible NULL pointer dereference
grub: add a fix for unused variable in gnulib
grub: fix an unitialized token in gnulib
grub: add a fix a NULL pointer dereference in gnulib
grub: add a fix for NULL pointer dereference
grub: fix an unitialized re_token in gnulib
grub: add a fix for unnecessary assignements
grub: add structure initialization in zstd
grub: add a missing NULL check
grub: fix a memory leak
grub: fix a memory leak
grub: fix a memory leak
grub: fix an integer overflow
grub: add a fix for a length check
grub: add a fix for a possible negative shift
grub: add a fix for a memory leak
grub: add a fix for possible integer overflows
grub: fix an error check
grub: add a fix for a memory leak
grub: add a fix for a possible unintended sign extension
grub: add a fix for a possible NULL dereference
grub: add a fix for a memory leak
grub: add a fix for a memory leak
grub: fix a memory leak
grub: remove unneeded return value
grub: fix an integer overflow
grub: fix multiple integer overflows
grub: fix a possible integer overflow
grub: test for malformed jpeg files
grub: remove dead code
grub: fix checking for NULL
grub: add a fix for a memory leak
grub: avoid a memory leak
grub: add a check for a NULL pointer
grub: add a fix for NULL pointer dereference
grub: add a fix for an incorrect cast
grub: fix incorrect use of a negative value
grub: add a fix for a NULL pointer dereference
grub: avoid a NULL pointer dereference
grub: add a fix for a crash in scripts
...leak-when-iterating-over-mapped-memo.patch | 39 +++ ...ible-dereference-to-of-a-NULL-pointe.patch | 39 +++ ...net-tftp-Fix-dangling-memory-pointer.patch | 33 +++ ...n-parser-Fix-resource-leak-if-argc-0.patch | 50 ++++ ...formed-device-path-arithmetic-errors.patch | 235 ++++++++++++++++++ ...-kern-efi-Fix-memory-leak-on-failure.patch | 30 +++ ...ix-possible-NULL-pointer-dereference.patch | 65 +++++ ...ulib-regexec-Resolve-unused-variable.patch | 59 +++++ ...mp-Fix-uninitialized-token-structure.patch | 53 ++++ ...-Fix-dereference-of-a-possibly-NULL-.patch | 52 ++++ ...egexec-Fix-possible-null-dereference.patch | 53 ++++ ...b-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-re_token.patch | 55 ++++ ...e-unnecessary-self-assignment-errors.patch | 41 +++ ...std-Initialize-seq_t-structure-fully.patch | 34 +++ ...heck-for-NULL-before-dereferencing-i.patch | 43 ++++ ...re-comp-data-is-freed-before-exiting.patch | 128 ++++++++++ ...-If-failed-then-free-vg-variable-too.patch | 28 +++ ...ory-leak-on-uninserted-lv-references.patch | 50 ++++ ...odisk-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch | 50 ++++ ...that-the-volume-name-length-is-valid.patch | 43 ++++ ...ix-possible-negative-shift-operation.patch | 42 ++++ ...source-leaks-while-constructing-path.patch | 121 +++++++++ ...3-zfs-Fix-possible-integer-overflows.patch | 56 +++++ ...-a-check-for-error-allocating-memory.patch | 35 +++ .../files/0025-affs-Fix-memory-leaks.patch | 82 ++++++ ...x-possible-unintended-sign-extension.patch | 36 +++ ...pt-mpi-Fix-possible-NULL-dereference.patch | 33 +++ ...slinux-Fix-memory-leak-while-parsing.patch | 43 ++++ ...n-Fix-leaking-of-memory-when-process.patch | 52 ++++ ...0-commands-hashsum-Fix-a-memory-leak.patch | 56 +++++ ...move-unnecessary-return-value-of-gru.patch | 94 +++++++ ...bfill-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch | 78 ++++++ ...eo_fb-Fix-multiple-integer-overflows.patch | 104 ++++++++ ...deo_fb-Fix-possible-integer-overflow.patch | 39 +++ ...eg-Test-for-an-invalid-next-marker-r.patch | 38 +++ ...-Remove-code-that-coverity-is-flaggi.patch | 34 +++ ...ader-bsd-Check-for-NULL-arg-up-front.patch | 47 ++++ .../0038-loader-xnu-Fix-memory-leak.patch | 38 +++ ...driverkey-data-when-an-error-is-dete.patch | 77 ++++++ ...k-if-pointer-is-NULL-before-using-it.patch | 42 ++++ ...nstall-Fix-NULL-pointer-dereferences.patch | 41 +++ ...v-Fix-incorrect-casting-of-a-signed-.patch | 46 ++++ ...x-incorrect-use-of-a-possibly-negati.patch | 50 ++++ ...ix-NULL-dereference-in-grub_script_e.patch | 28 +++ ...ire-device_name-is-not-NULL-before-p.patch | 33 +++ ...void-crash-when-using-outside-a-func.patch | 37 +++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 48 +++- 47 files changed, 2609 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0001-mmap-Fix-memory-leak-when-iterating-over-mapped-memo.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0002-net-net-Fix-possible-dereference-to-of-a-NULL-pointe.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0003-net-tftp-Fix-dangling-memory-pointer.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0004-kern-parser-Fix-resource-leak-if-argc-0.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0005-efi-Fix-some-malformed-device-path-arithmetic-errors.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0006-kern-efi-Fix-memory-leak-on-failure.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0007-kern-efi-mm-Fix-possible-NULL-pointer-dereference.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0008-gnulib-regexec-Resolve-unused-variable.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0009-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-token-structure.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0010-gnulib-argp-help-Fix-dereference-of-a-possibly-NULL-.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0011-gnulib-regexec-Fix-possible-null-dereference.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0012-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-re_token.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0013-io-lzopio-Resolve-unnecessary-self-assignment-errors.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0014-zstd-Initialize-seq_t-structure-fully.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0015-kern-partition-Check-for-NULL-before-dereferencing-i.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0016-disk-ldm-Make-sure-comp-data-is-freed-before-exiting.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0017-disk-ldm-If-failed-then-free-vg-variable-too.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0018-disk-ldm-Fix-memory-leak-on-uninserted-lv-references.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0019-disk-cryptodisk-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0020-hfsplus-Check-that-the-volume-name-length-is-valid.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0021-zfs-Fix-possible-negative-shift-operation.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0022-zfs-Fix-resource-leaks-while-constructing-path.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0023-zfs-Fix-possible-integer-overflows.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0024-zfsinfo-Correct-a-check-for-error-allocating-memory.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0025-affs-Fix-memory-leaks.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0026-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-unintended-sign-extension.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0027-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-NULL-dereference.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0028-syslinux-Fix-memory-leak-while-parsing.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0029-normal-completion-Fix-leaking-of-memory-when-process.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0030-commands-hashsum-Fix-a-memory-leak.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0031-video-efi_gop-Remove-unnecessary-return-value-of-gru.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0032-video-fb-fbfill-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0033-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-multiple-integer-overflows.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0034-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-possible-integer-overflow.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0035-video-readers-jpeg-Test-for-an-invalid-next-marker-r.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0036-gfxmenu-gui_list-Remove-code-that-coverity-is-flaggi.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0037-loader-bsd-Check-for-NULL-arg-up-front.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0038-loader-xnu-Fix-memory-leak.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0039-loader-xnu-Free-driverkey-data-when-an-error-is-dete.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0040-loader-xnu-Check-if-pointer-is-NULL-before-using-it.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0041-util-grub-install-Fix-NULL-pointer-dereferences.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0042-util-grub-editenv-Fix-incorrect-casting-of-a-signed-.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0043-util-glue-efi-Fix-incorrect-use-of-a-possibly-negati.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0044-script-execute-Fix-NULL-dereference-in-grub_script_e.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0045-commands-ls-Require-device_name-is-not-NULL-before-p.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0046-script-execute-Avoid-crash-when-using-outside-a-func.patch
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 1/46 grub: fix a memory leak
Backport a fix for a memory leak in grub_mmap_iterate(). This patch is a part of a security series [1]
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...leak-when-iterating-over-mapped-memo.patch | 39 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 3 +- 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0001-mmap-Fix-memory-leak-when-iterating-over-mapped-memo.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0001-mmap-Fix-memory-leak-when-iterating-over-mapped-memo.patch new file +39 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From 0900f11def2e7fbb4880efff0cd9c9b32f1cdb86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2020 14:39:45 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] mmap: Fix memory leak when iterating over mapped memory + +When returning from grub_mmap_iterate() the memory allocated to present +is not being released causing it to leak. + +Fixes: CID 96655 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=8cb2848f9699642a698af84b12ba187cab722031] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/mmap/mmap.c | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/mmap/mmap.c b/grub-core/mmap/mmap.c +index 7ebf32e..8bf235f 100644 +--- a/grub-core/mmap/mmap.c ++++ b/grub-core/mmap/mmap.c +@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ grub_mmap_iterate (grub_memory_hook_t hook, void *hook_data) + hook_data)) + { + grub_free (ctx.scanline_events); ++ grub_free (present); + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + } + +@@ -282,6 +283,7 @@ grub_mmap_iterate (grub_memory_hook_t hook, void *hook_data) + } + + grub_free (ctx.scanline_events); ++ grub_free (present); + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + } +
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +2 -1
@@ -47,7 +47,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2020-27779_7.patch \ file://CVE-2020-25632.patch \ file://CVE-2020-25647.patch \ -" + file://0001-mmap-Fix-memory-leak-when-iterating-over-mapped-memo.patch \ + " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 2/46 grub: add a fix for a possible NULL dereference
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis fix removes a possible NULL pointer dereference in grub networking code. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...ible-dereference-to-of-a-NULL-pointe.patch | 39 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0002-net-net-Fix-possible-dereference-to-of-a-NULL-pointe.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0002-net-net-Fix-possible-dereference-to-of-a-NULL-pointe.patch new file +39 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From f216a75e884ed5e4e94bf86965000dde51148f94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 27 Nov 2020 15:10:26 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] net/net: Fix possible dereference to of a NULL pointer + +It is always possible that grub_zalloc() could fail, so we should check for +a NULL return. Otherwise we run the risk of dereferencing a NULL pointer. + +Fixes: CID 296221 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=03f2515ae0c503406f1a99a2178405049c6555db] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/net/net.c | 9 +++++++-- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/net/net.c b/grub-core/net/net.c +index 38f19df..7c2cdf2 100644 +--- a/grub-core/net/net.c ++++ b/grub-core/net/net.c +@@ -86,8 +86,13 @@ grub_net_link_layer_add_address (struct grub_net_card *card, + + /* Add sender to cache table. */ + if (card->link_layer_table == NULL) +- card->link_layer_table = grub_zalloc (LINK_LAYER_CACHE_SIZE +- * sizeof (card->link_layer_table[0])); ++ { ++ card->link_layer_table = grub_zalloc (LINK_LAYER_CACHE_SIZE ++ * sizeof (card->link_layer_table[0])); ++ if (card->link_layer_table == NULL) ++ return; ++ } ++ + entry = &(card->link_layer_table[card->new_ll_entry]); + entry->avail = 1; + grub_memcpy (&entry->ll_address, ll, sizeof (entry->ll_address));
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2020-25632.patch \ file://CVE-2020-25647.patch \ file://0001-mmap-Fix-memory-leak-when-iterating-over-mapped-memo.patch \ + file://0002-net-net-Fix-possible-dereference-to-of-a-NULL-pointe.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 3/46 grub: fix a dangling memory pointer
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis change fixes a dangling memory pointer in the grub TFTP code. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...net-tftp-Fix-dangling-memory-pointer.patch | 33 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0003-net-tftp-Fix-dangling-memory-pointer.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0003-net-tftp-Fix-dangling-memory-pointer.patch new file +33 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +From 09cc0df477758b60f51fbc0da1dee2f5d54c333d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 19 Feb 2021 17:12:23 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] net/tftp: Fix dangling memory pointer + +The static code analysis tool, Parfait, reported that the valid of +file->data was left referencing memory that was freed by the call to +grub_free(data) where data was initialized from file->data. + +To ensure that there is no unintentional access to this memory +referenced by file->data we should set the pointer to NULL. + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=0cb838b281a68b536a09681f9557ea6a7ac5da7a] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/net/tftp.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/net/tftp.c b/grub-core/net/tftp.c +index 7d90bf6..f76b19f 100644 +--- a/grub-core/net/tftp.c ++++ b/grub-core/net/tftp.c +@@ -468,6 +468,7 @@ tftp_close (struct grub_file *file) + } + destroy_pq (data); + grub_free (data); ++ file->data = NULL; + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + } +
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2020-25647.patch \ file://0001-mmap-Fix-memory-leak-when-iterating-over-mapped-memo.patch \ file://0002-net-net-Fix-possible-dereference-to-of-a-NULL-pointe.patch \ + file://0003-net-tftp-Fix-dangling-memory-pointer.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 4/46 grub: fix wrong handling of argc == 0
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis change fixes wrong handling of argc == 0 causing a memory leak. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...n-parser-Fix-resource-leak-if-argc-0.patch | 50 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0004-kern-parser-Fix-resource-leak-if-argc-0.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0004-kern-parser-Fix-resource-leak-if-argc-0.patch new file +50 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From 8861fa6226f7229105722ba669465e879b56ee2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2021 12:32:41 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] kern/parser: Fix resource leak if argc == 0 + +After processing the command-line yet arriving at the point where we are +setting argv, we are allocating memory, even if argc == 0, which makes +no sense since we never put anything into the allocated argv. + +The solution is to simply return that we've successfully processed the +arguments but that argc == 0, and also ensure that argv is NULL when +we're not allocating anything in it. + +There are only 2 callers of this function, and both are handling a zero +value in argc assuming nothing is allocated in argv. + +Fixes: CID 96680 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=d06161b035dde4769199ad65aa0a587a5920012b] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/kern/parser.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/kern/parser.c b/grub-core/kern/parser.c +index 619db31..d1cf061 100644 +--- a/grub-core/kern/parser.c ++++ b/grub-core/kern/parser.c +@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ grub_parser_split_cmdline (const char *cmdline, + int i; + + *argc = 0; ++ *argv = NULL; + do + { + if (!rd || !*rd) +@@ -207,6 +208,10 @@ grub_parser_split_cmdline (const char *cmdline, + (*argc)++; + } + ++ /* If there are no args, then we're done. */ ++ if (!*argc) ++ return 0; ++ + /* Reserve memory for the return values. */ + args = grub_malloc (bp - buffer); + if (!args)
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0001-mmap-Fix-memory-leak-when-iterating-over-mapped-memo.patch \ file://0002-net-net-Fix-possible-dereference-to-of-a-NULL-pointe.patch \ file://0003-net-tftp-Fix-dangling-memory-pointer.patch \ + file://0004-kern-parser-Fix-resource-leak-if-argc-0.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 5/46 grub: add a fix for malformed device path handling
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis change fixes the malformed device paths in EFI handling. Device paths of length 4 or shorter could cause different kinds of unexpected behaviours.
This patch is NOT a part of [1], but is a dependency of one of the patches included in the series.
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...formed-device-path-arithmetic-errors.patch | 235 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 236 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0005-efi-Fix-some-malformed-device-path-arithmetic-errors.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0005-efi-Fix-some-malformed-device-path-arithmetic-errors.patch new file +235 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@ +From 16a4d739b19f8680cf93a3c8fa0ae9fc1b1c310b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Jones <[email protected]> +Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2020 16:53:27 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH] efi: Fix some malformed device path arithmetic errors + +Several places we take the length of a device path and subtract 4 from +it, without ever checking that it's >= 4. There are also cases where +this kind of malformation will result in unpredictable iteration, +including treating the length from one dp node as the type in the next +node. These are all errors, no matter where the data comes from. + +This patch adds a checking macro, GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID(), which +can be used in several places, and makes GRUB_EFI_NEXT_DEVICE_PATH() +return NULL and GRUB_EFI_END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH() evaluate as true when +the length is too small. Additionally, it makes several places in the +code check for and return errors in these cases. + +Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=d2cf823d0e31818d1b7a223daff6d5e006596543] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----- + grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c | 13 +++++- + grub-core/loader/i386/xnu.c | 9 +++-- + include/grub/efi/api.h | 14 ++++--- + 4 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c +index ad170c7..6a38080 100644 +--- a/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c ++++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c +@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ grub_efi_get_filename (grub_efi_device_path_t *dp0) + + dp = dp0; + +- while (1) ++ while (dp) + { + grub_efi_uint8_t type = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE (dp); + grub_efi_uint8_t subtype = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE (dp); +@@ -370,9 +370,15 @@ grub_efi_get_filename (grub_efi_device_path_t *dp0) + if (type == GRUB_EFI_MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE + && subtype == GRUB_EFI_FILE_PATH_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE) + { +- grub_efi_uint16_t len; +- len = ((GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (dp) - 4) +- / sizeof (grub_efi_char16_t)); ++ grub_efi_uint16_t len = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (dp); ++ ++ if (len < 4) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, ++ "malformed EFI Device Path node has length=%d", len); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ len = (len - 4) / sizeof (grub_efi_char16_t); + filesize += GRUB_MAX_UTF8_PER_UTF16 * len + 2; + } + +@@ -388,7 +394,7 @@ grub_efi_get_filename (grub_efi_device_path_t *dp0) + if (!name) + return NULL; + +- while (1) ++ while (dp) + { + grub_efi_uint8_t type = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE (dp); + grub_efi_uint8_t subtype = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE (dp); +@@ -404,8 +410,15 @@ grub_efi_get_filename (grub_efi_device_path_t *dp0) + + *p++ = '/'; + +- len = ((GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (dp) - 4) +- / sizeof (grub_efi_char16_t)); ++ len = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (dp); ++ if (len < 4) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, ++ "malformed EFI Device Path node has length=%d", len); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ len = (len - 4) / sizeof (grub_efi_char16_t); + fp = (grub_efi_file_path_device_path_t *) dp; + /* According to EFI spec Path Name is NULL terminated */ + while (len > 0 && fp->path_name[len - 1] == 0) +@@ -480,7 +493,26 @@ grub_efi_duplicate_device_path (const grub_efi_device_path_t *dp) + ; + p = GRUB_EFI_NEXT_DEVICE_PATH (p)) + { +- total_size += GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (p); ++ grub_size_t len = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (p); ++ ++ /* ++ * In the event that we find a node that's completely garbage, for ++ * example if we get to 0x7f 0x01 0x02 0x00 ... (EndInstance with a size ++ * of 2), GRUB_EFI_END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH() will be true and ++ * GRUB_EFI_NEXT_DEVICE_PATH() will return NULL, so we won't continue, ++ * and neither should our consumers, but there won't be any error raised ++ * even though the device path is junk. ++ * ++ * This keeps us from passing junk down back to our caller. ++ */ ++ if (len < 4) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, ++ "malformed EFI Device Path node has length=%d", len); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ total_size += len; + if (GRUB_EFI_END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH (p)) + break; + } +@@ -525,7 +557,7 @@ dump_vendor_path (const char *type, grub_efi_vendor_device_path_t *vendor) + void + grub_efi_print_device_path (grub_efi_device_path_t *dp) + { +- while (1) ++ while (GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp)) + { + grub_efi_uint8_t type = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE (dp); + grub_efi_uint8_t subtype = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE (dp); +@@ -937,7 +969,10 @@ grub_efi_compare_device_paths (const grub_efi_device_path_t *dp1, + /* Return non-zero. */ + return 1; + +- while (1) ++ if (dp1 == dp2) ++ return 0; ++ ++ while (GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp1) && GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp2)) + { + grub_efi_uint8_t type1, type2; + grub_efi_uint8_t subtype1, subtype2; +@@ -973,5 +1008,14 @@ grub_efi_compare_device_paths (const grub_efi_device_path_t *dp1, + dp2 = (grub_efi_device_path_t *) ((char *) dp2 + len2); + } + ++ /* ++ * There's no "right" answer here, but we probably don't want to call a valid ++ * dp and an invalid dp equal, so pick one way or the other. ++ */ ++ if (GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp1) && !GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp2)) ++ return 1; ++ else if (!GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp1) && GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp2)) ++ return -1; ++ + return 0; + } +diff --git a/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c b/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c +index daf8c6b..a8d7b91 100644 +--- a/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c ++++ b/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c +@@ -156,9 +156,18 @@ make_file_path (grub_efi_device_path_t *dp, const char *filename) + + size = 0; + d = dp; +- while (1) ++ while (d) + { +- size += GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (d); ++ grub_size_t len = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (d); ++ ++ if (len < 4) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, ++ "malformed EFI Device Path node has length=%d", len); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ size += len; + if ((GRUB_EFI_END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH (d))) + break; + d = GRUB_EFI_NEXT_DEVICE_PATH (d); +diff --git a/grub-core/loader/i386/xnu.c b/grub-core/loader/i386/xnu.c +index b7d176b..c50cb54 100644 +--- a/grub-core/loader/i386/xnu.c ++++ b/grub-core/loader/i386/xnu.c +@@ -516,14 +516,15 @@ grub_cmd_devprop_load (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), + + devhead = buf; + buf = devhead + 1; +- dpstart = buf; ++ dp = dpstart = buf; + +- do ++ while (GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp) && buf < bufend) + { +- dp = buf; + buf = (char *) buf + GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (dp); ++ if (GRUB_EFI_END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH (dp)) ++ break; ++ dp = buf; + } +- while (!GRUB_EFI_END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH (dp) && buf < bufend); + + dev = grub_xnu_devprop_add_device (dpstart, (char *) buf + - (char *) dpstart); +diff --git a/include/grub/efi/api.h b/include/grub/efi/api.h +index addcbfa..cf1355a 100644 +--- a/include/grub/efi/api.h ++++ b/include/grub/efi/api.h +@@ -625,6 +625,7 @@ typedef struct grub_efi_device_path grub_efi_device_path_protocol_t; + #define GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE(dp) ((dp)->type & 0x7f) + #define GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE(dp) ((dp)->subtype) + #define GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH(dp) ((dp)->length) ++#define GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID(dp) ((dp) != NULL && GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (dp) >= 4) + + /* The End of Device Path nodes. */ + #define GRUB_EFI_END_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE (0xff & 0x7f) +@@ -633,13 +634,16 @@ typedef struct grub_efi_device_path grub_efi_device_path_protocol_t; + #define GRUB_EFI_END_THIS_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE 0x01 + + #define GRUB_EFI_END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH(dp) \ +- (GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE (dp) == GRUB_EFI_END_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE \ +- && (GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE (dp) \ +- == GRUB_EFI_END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE)) ++ (!GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp) || \ ++ (GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE (dp) == GRUB_EFI_END_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE \ ++ && (GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE (dp) \ ++ == GRUB_EFI_END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE))) + + #define GRUB_EFI_NEXT_DEVICE_PATH(dp) \ +- ((grub_efi_device_path_t *) ((char *) (dp) \ +- + GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (dp))) ++ (GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp) \ ++ ? ((grub_efi_device_path_t *) \ ++ ((char *) (dp) + GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (dp))) \ ++ : NULL) + + /* Hardware Device Path. */ + #define GRUB_EFI_HARDWARE_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE 1
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0002-net-net-Fix-possible-dereference-to-of-a-NULL-pointe.patch \ file://0003-net-tftp-Fix-dangling-memory-pointer.patch \ file://0004-kern-parser-Fix-resource-leak-if-argc-0.patch \ + file://0005-efi-Fix-some-malformed-device-path-arithmetic-errors.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 6/46 grub: fix memory leak at error in grub_efi_get_filename()
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis change fixes a memory leak on error in grub_efi_get_filename(). It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...-kern-efi-Fix-memory-leak-on-failure.patch | 30 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0006-kern-efi-Fix-memory-leak-on-failure.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0006-kern-efi-Fix-memory-leak-on-failure.patch new file +30 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +From d4fd0243920b71cc6e03cc0cadf23b4fe03c352f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2020 10:15:25 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] kern/efi: Fix memory leak on failure + +Free the memory allocated to name before returning on failure. + +Fixes: CID 296222 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=ed286ceba6015d37a9304f04602451c47bf195d7] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c +index 6a38080..baeeef0 100644 +--- a/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c ++++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c +@@ -415,6 +415,7 @@ grub_efi_get_filename (grub_efi_device_path_t *dp0) + { + grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, + "malformed EFI Device Path node has length=%d", len); ++ grub_free (name); + return NULL; + } +
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0003-net-tftp-Fix-dangling-memory-pointer.patch \ file://0004-kern-parser-Fix-resource-leak-if-argc-0.patch \ file://0005-efi-Fix-some-malformed-device-path-arithmetic-errors.patch \ + file://0006-kern-efi-Fix-memory-leak-on-failure.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 7/46 grub: add a fix for a possible NULL pointer dereference
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis change fixes a possible NULL pointer dereference in grub's EFI support. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...ix-possible-NULL-pointer-dereference.patch | 65 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0007-kern-efi-mm-Fix-possible-NULL-pointer-dereference.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0007-kern-efi-mm-Fix-possible-NULL-pointer-dereference.patch new file +65 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +From be03a18b8767be50f16a845c389fd5ed29aae055 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 11 Dec 2020 15:03:13 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] kern/efi/mm: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference + +The model of grub_efi_get_memory_map() is that if memory_map is NULL, +then the purpose is to discover how much memory should be allocated to +it for the subsequent call. + +The problem here is that with grub_efi_is_finished set to 1, there is no +check at all that the function is being called with a non-NULL memory_map. + +While this MAY be true, we shouldn't assume it. + +The solution to this is to behave as expected, and if memory_map is NULL, +then don't try to use it and allow memory_map_size to be filled in, and +return 0 as is done later in the code if the buffer is too small (or NULL). + +Additionally, drop unneeded ret = 1. + +Fixes: CID 96632 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=6aee4bfd6973c714056fb7b56890b8d524e94ee1] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c | 19 ++++++++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c +index b02fab1..5afcef7 100644 +--- a/grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c ++++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c +@@ -328,15 +328,24 @@ grub_efi_get_memory_map (grub_efi_uintn_t *memory_map_size, + if (grub_efi_is_finished) + { + int ret = 1; +- if (*memory_map_size < finish_mmap_size) ++ ++ if (memory_map != NULL) + { +- grub_memcpy (memory_map, finish_mmap_buf, *memory_map_size); +- ret = 0; ++ if (*memory_map_size < finish_mmap_size) ++ { ++ grub_memcpy (memory_map, finish_mmap_buf, *memory_map_size); ++ ret = 0; ++ } ++ else ++ grub_memcpy (memory_map, finish_mmap_buf, finish_mmap_size); + } + else + { +- grub_memcpy (memory_map, finish_mmap_buf, finish_mmap_size); +- ret = 1; ++ /* ++ * Incomplete, no buffer to copy into, same as ++ * GRUB_EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL below. ++ */ ++ ret = 0; + } + *memory_map_size = finish_mmap_size; + if (map_key)
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0004-kern-parser-Fix-resource-leak-if-argc-0.patch \ file://0005-efi-Fix-some-malformed-device-path-arithmetic-errors.patch \ file://0006-kern-efi-Fix-memory-leak-on-failure.patch \ + file://0007-kern-efi-mm-Fix-possible-NULL-pointer-dereference.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 8/46 grub: add a fix for unused variable in gnulib
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis changes adds a fix for an unused variable issue in gnulib. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...ulib-regexec-Resolve-unused-variable.patch | 59 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0008-gnulib-regexec-Resolve-unused-variable.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0008-gnulib-regexec-Resolve-unused-variable.patch new file +59 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +From 9d36bce5d516b6379ba3a0dd1a94a9c035838827 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2020 14:41:27 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] gnulib/regexec: Resolve unused variable + +This is a really minor issue where a variable is being assigned to but +not checked before it is overwritten again. + +The reason for this issue is that we are not building with DEBUG set and +this in turn means that the assert() that reads the value of the +variable match_last is being processed out. + +The solution, move the assignment to match_last in to an ifdef DEBUG too. + +Fixes: CID 292459 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=a983d36bd9178d377d2072fd4b11c635fdc404b4] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + conf/Makefile.extra-dist | 1 + + .../lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch | 14 ++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch + +diff --git a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist +index 46c4e95..9b01152 100644 +--- a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist ++++ b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist +@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinit.sh + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinitheader.sh + + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-deref.patch ++EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-width.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/no-abort.patch + +diff --git a/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..ba51f1b +--- /dev/null ++++ b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch +@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ ++--- a/lib/regexec.c 2020-10-21 14:25:35.310195912 +0000 +++++ b/lib/regexec.c 2020-10-21 14:32:07.961765604 +0000 ++@@ -828,7 +828,11 @@ ++ break; ++ if (__glibc_unlikely (err != REG_NOMATCH)) ++ goto free_return; +++#ifdef DEBUG +++ /* Only used for assertion below when DEBUG is set, otherwise +++ it will be over-written when we loop around. */ ++ match_last = -1; +++#endif ++ } ++ else ++ break; /* We found a match. */
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0005-efi-Fix-some-malformed-device-path-arithmetic-errors.patch \ file://0006-kern-efi-Fix-memory-leak-on-failure.patch \ file://0007-kern-efi-mm-Fix-possible-NULL-pointer-dereference.patch \ + file://0008-gnulib-regexec-Resolve-unused-variable.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 9/46 grub: fix an unitialized token in gnulib
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis change adds a fix for an unitialized token structure in gnulib. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...mp-Fix-uninitialized-token-structure.patch | 53 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0009-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-token-structure.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0009-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-token-structure.patch new file +53 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +From 2af8df02cca7fd4b584575eac304cd03fa23f5cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2020 13:54:06 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] gnulib/regcomp: Fix uninitialized token structure + +The code is assuming that the value of br_token.constraint was +initialized to zero when it wasn't. + +While some compilers will ensure that, not all do, so it is better to +fix this explicitly than leave it to chance. + +Fixes: CID 73749 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=75c3d3cec4f408848f575d6d5e30a95bd6313db0] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + conf/Makefile.extra-dist | 1 + + .../lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch | 11 +++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch + +diff --git a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist +index 9b01152..9e55458 100644 +--- a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist ++++ b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist +@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinit.sh + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinitheader.sh + + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-deref.patch ++EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-width.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/no-abort.patch +diff --git a/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..7b4d9f6 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch +@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ ++--- a/lib/regcomp.c 2020-10-22 13:49:06.770168928 +0000 +++++ b/lib/regcomp.c 2020-10-22 13:50:37.026528298 +0000 ++@@ -3662,7 +3662,7 @@ ++ Idx alloc = 0; ++ #endif /* not RE_ENABLE_I18N */ ++ reg_errcode_t ret; ++- re_token_t br_token; +++ re_token_t br_token = {0}; ++ bin_tree_t *tree; ++ ++ sbcset = (re_bitset_ptr_t) calloc (sizeof (bitset_t), 1);
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0006-kern-efi-Fix-memory-leak-on-failure.patch \ file://0007-kern-efi-mm-Fix-possible-NULL-pointer-dereference.patch \ file://0008-gnulib-regexec-Resolve-unused-variable.patch \ + file://0009-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-token-structure.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 10/46 grub: add a fix a NULL pointer dereference in gnulib
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis change adds a fix for a NULL pointer dereference of state in gnulib. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...-Fix-dereference-of-a-possibly-NULL-.patch | 52 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0010-gnulib-argp-help-Fix-dereference-of-a-possibly-NULL-.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0010-gnulib-argp-help-Fix-dereference-of-a-possibly-NULL-.patch new file +52 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From eaf9da8b5f8349c51cfc89dd8e39a1a61f89790a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 14:43:01 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] gnulib/argp-help: Fix dereference of a possibly NULL state + +All other instances of call to __argp_failure() where there is +a dgettext() call is first checking whether state is NULL before +attempting to dereference it to get the root_argp->argp_domain. + +Fixes: CID 292436 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=3a37bf120a9194c373257c70175cdb5b337bc107] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + conf/Makefile.extra-dist | 1 + + .../lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch | 12 ++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch + +diff --git a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist +index 9e55458..96d7e69 100644 +--- a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist ++++ b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist +@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinit.sh + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinitheader.sh + + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-deref.patch ++EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-width.patch +diff --git a/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..813ec09 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch +@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ ++--- a/lib/argp-help.c 2020-10-28 14:32:19.189215988 +0000 +++++ b/lib/argp-help.c 2020-10-28 14:38:21.204673940 +0000 ++@@ -145,7 +145,8 @@ ++ if (*(int *)((char *)upptr + up->uparams_offs) >= upptr->rmargin) ++ { ++ __argp_failure (state, 0, 0, ++- dgettext (state->root_argp->argp_domain, +++ dgettext (state == NULL ? NULL +++ : state->root_argp->argp_domain, ++ "\ ++ ARGP_HELP_FMT: %s value is less than or equal to %s"), ++ "rmargin", up->name);
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0007-kern-efi-mm-Fix-possible-NULL-pointer-dereference.patch \ file://0008-gnulib-regexec-Resolve-unused-variable.patch \ file://0009-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-token-structure.patch \ + file://0010-gnulib-argp-help-Fix-dereference-of-a-possibly-NULL-.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 11/46 grub: add a fix for NULL pointer dereference
In reply to Marta RybczynskaAdd a fix for gnulib's regexec NULL pointer dereference. This patch a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...egexec-Fix-possible-null-dereference.patch | 53 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0011-gnulib-regexec-Fix-possible-null-dereference.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0011-gnulib-regexec-Fix-possible-null-dereference.patch new file +53 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +From 244dc2b1f518635069a556c424b2e7627f0cf036 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2020 10:57:14 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] gnulib/regexec: Fix possible null-dereference + +It appears to be possible that the mctx->state_log field may be NULL, +and the name of this function, clean_state_log_if_needed(), suggests +that it should be checking that it is valid to be cleaned before +assuming that it does. + +Fixes: CID 86720 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=0b7f347638153e403ee2dd518af3ce26f4f99647] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + conf/Makefile.extra-dist | 1 + + .../lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch | 12 ++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch + +diff --git a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist +index 96d7e69..d27d3a9 100644 +--- a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist ++++ b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist +@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinitheader.sh + + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-deref.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch ++EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-width.patch +diff --git a/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..db6dac9 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch +@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ ++--- a/lib/regexec.c 2020-10-21 14:25:35.310195912 +0000 +++++ b/lib/regexec.c 2020-11-05 10:55:09.621542984 +0000 ++@@ -1692,6 +1692,9 @@ ++ { ++ Idx top = mctx->state_log_top; ++ +++ if (mctx->state_log == NULL) +++ return REG_NOERROR; +++ ++ if ((next_state_log_idx >= mctx->input.bufs_len ++ && mctx->input.bufs_len < mctx->input.len) ++ || (next_state_log_idx >= mctx->input.valid_len
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0008-gnulib-regexec-Resolve-unused-variable.patch \ file://0009-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-token-structure.patch \ file://0010-gnulib-argp-help-Fix-dereference-of-a-possibly-NULL-.patch \ + file://0011-gnulib-regexec-Fix-possible-null-dereference.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 12/46 grub: fix an unitialized re_token in gnulib
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch adds a fix for an unitialized re_token in grub's gnulib. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...b-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-re_token.patch | 55 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0012-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-re_token.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0012-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-re_token.patch new file +55 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +From 512b6bb380a77233b88c84b7a712896c70281d2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2020 18:04:22 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] gnulib/regcomp: Fix uninitialized re_token + +This issue has been fixed in the latest version of gnulib, so to +maintain consistency, I've backported that change rather than doing +something different. + +Fixes: CID 73828 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=03477085f9a33789ba6cca7cd49ab9326a1baa0e] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + conf/Makefile.extra-dist | 1 + + .../gnulib-patches/fix-regcomp-uninit-token.patch | 15 +++++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regcomp-uninit-token.patch + +diff --git a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist +index d27d3a9..ffe6829 100644 +--- a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist ++++ b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist +@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinitheader.sh + + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-deref.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch ++EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regcomp-uninit-token.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch + EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch +diff --git a/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regcomp-uninit-token.patch b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regcomp-uninit-token.patch +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..02e0631 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regcomp-uninit-token.patch +@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ ++--- a/lib/regcomp.c 2020-11-24 17:06:08.159223858 +0000 +++++ b/lib/regcomp.c 2020-11-24 17:06:15.630253923 +0000 ++@@ -3808,11 +3808,7 @@ ++ create_tree (re_dfa_t *dfa, bin_tree_t *left, bin_tree_t *right, ++ re_token_type_t type) ++ { ++- re_token_t t; ++-#if defined GCC_LINT || defined lint ++- memset (&t, 0, sizeof t); ++-#endif ++- t.type = type; +++ re_token_t t = { .type = type }; ++ return create_token_tree (dfa, left, right, &t); ++ } ++
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0009-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-token-structure.patch \ file://0010-gnulib-argp-help-Fix-dereference-of-a-possibly-NULL-.patch \ file://0011-gnulib-regexec-Fix-possible-null-dereference.patch \ + file://0012-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-re_token.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 13/46 grub: add a fix for unnecessary assignements
In reply to Marta RybczynskaAdd a fix for unnecessary assignements grub's io/lzopio. This patch is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...e-unnecessary-self-assignment-errors.patch | 41 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0013-io-lzopio-Resolve-unnecessary-self-assignment-errors.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0013-io-lzopio-Resolve-unnecessary-self-assignment-errors.patch new file +41 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From c529ca446424f1a9c64f0007dfe31fa7645d13ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2020 14:44:10 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] io/lzopio: Resolve unnecessary self-assignment errors + +These 2 assignments are unnecessary since they are just assigning +to themselves. + +Fixes: CID 73643 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=59666e520f44177c97b82a44c169b3b315d63b42] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/io/lzopio.c | 4 ---- + 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/io/lzopio.c b/grub-core/io/lzopio.c +index 3014485..a7d4425 100644 +--- a/grub-core/io/lzopio.c ++++ b/grub-core/io/lzopio.c +@@ -125,8 +125,6 @@ read_block_header (struct grub_lzopio *lzopio) + sizeof (lzopio->block.ucheck)) != + sizeof (lzopio->block.ucheck)) + return -1; +- +- lzopio->block.ucheck = lzopio->block.ucheck; + } + + /* Read checksum of compressed data. */ +@@ -143,8 +141,6 @@ read_block_header (struct grub_lzopio *lzopio) + sizeof (lzopio->block.ccheck)) != + sizeof (lzopio->block.ccheck)) + return -1; +- +- lzopio->block.ccheck = lzopio->block.ccheck; + } + } +
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0010-gnulib-argp-help-Fix-dereference-of-a-possibly-NULL-.patch \ file://0011-gnulib-regexec-Fix-possible-null-dereference.patch \ file://0012-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-re_token.patch \ + file://0013-io-lzopio-Resolve-unnecessary-self-assignment-errors.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 14/46 grub: add structure initialization in zstd
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch adds initialization of a structure in grub's zstd, which might be left uninitialized by the compiler. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...std-Initialize-seq_t-structure-fully.patch | 34 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0014-zstd-Initialize-seq_t-structure-fully.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0014-zstd-Initialize-seq_t-structure-fully.patch new file +34 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +From f55ffe6bd8b844a8cd9956702f42ac2eb96ad56f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2020 10:29:59 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] zstd: Initialize seq_t structure fully + +While many compilers will initialize this to zero, not all will, so it +is better to be sure that fields not being explicitly set are at known +values, and there is code that checks this fields value elsewhere in the +code. + +Fixes: CID 292440 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=2777cf4466719921dbe4b30af358a75e7d76f217] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/lib/zstd/zstd_decompress.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/lib/zstd/zstd_decompress.c b/grub-core/lib/zstd/zstd_decompress.c +index 711b5b6..e4b5670 100644 +--- a/grub-core/lib/zstd/zstd_decompress.c ++++ b/grub-core/lib/zstd/zstd_decompress.c +@@ -1325,7 +1325,7 @@ typedef enum { ZSTD_lo_isRegularOffset, ZSTD_lo_isLongOffset=1 } ZSTD_longOffset + FORCE_INLINE_TEMPLATE seq_t + ZSTD_decodeSequence(seqState_t* seqState, const ZSTD_longOffset_e longOffsets) + { +- seq_t seq; ++ seq_t seq = {0}; + U32 const llBits = seqState->stateLL.table[seqState->stateLL.state].nbAdditionalBits; + U32 const mlBits = seqState->stateML.table[seqState->stateML.state].nbAdditionalBits; + U32 const ofBits = seqState->stateOffb.table[seqState->stateOffb.state].nbAdditionalBits;
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0011-gnulib-regexec-Fix-possible-null-dereference.patch \ file://0012-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-re_token.patch \ file://0013-io-lzopio-Resolve-unnecessary-self-assignment-errors.patch \ + file://0014-zstd-Initialize-seq_t-structure-fully.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 15/46 grub: add a missing NULL check
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis fix adds a missing check for NULL pointer from an external source in grub's kern/partition. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...heck-for-NULL-before-dereferencing-i.patch | 43 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0015-kern-partition-Check-for-NULL-before-dereferencing-i.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0015-kern-partition-Check-for-NULL-before-dereferencing-i.patch new file +43 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From 0da8ef2e03a8591586b53a29af92d2ace76a04e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2020 09:49:59 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] kern/partition: Check for NULL before dereferencing input + string + +There is the possibility that the value of str comes from an external +source and continuing to use it before ever checking its validity is +wrong. So, needs fixing. + +Additionally, drop unneeded part initialization. + +Fixes: CID 292444 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=bc9c468a2ce84bc767234eec888b71f1bc744fff] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/kern/partition.c | 5 ++++- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/kern/partition.c b/grub-core/kern/partition.c +index e499147..b10a184 100644 +--- a/grub-core/kern/partition.c ++++ b/grub-core/kern/partition.c +@@ -109,11 +109,14 @@ grub_partition_map_probe (const grub_partition_map_t partmap, + grub_partition_t + grub_partition_probe (struct grub_disk *disk, const char *str) + { +- grub_partition_t part = 0; ++ grub_partition_t part; + grub_partition_t curpart = 0; + grub_partition_t tail; + const char *ptr; + ++ if (str == NULL) ++ return 0; ++ + part = tail = disk->partition; + + for (ptr = str; *ptr;)
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0012-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-re_token.patch \ file://0013-io-lzopio-Resolve-unnecessary-self-assignment-errors.patch \ file://0014-zstd-Initialize-seq_t-structure-fully.patch \ + file://0015-kern-partition-Check-for-NULL-before-dereferencing-i.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 16/46 grub: fix a memory leak
In reply to Marta RybczynskaAdd a fix for a memory leak in grub's disk/ldm. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...re-comp-data-is-freed-before-exiting.patch | 128 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 129 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0016-disk-ldm-Make-sure-comp-data-is-freed-before-exiting.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0016-disk-ldm-Make-sure-comp-data-is-freed-before-exiting.patch new file +128 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +From 0c5d0fd796e6cafba179321de396681a493c4158 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Marco A Benatto <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2020 11:53:03 -0300 +Subject: [PATCH] disk/ldm: Make sure comp data is freed before exiting from + make_vg() + +Several error handling paths in make_vg() do not free comp data before +jumping to fail2 label and returning from the function. This will leak +memory. So, let's fix all issues of that kind. + +Fixes: CID 73804 + +Signed-off-by: Marco A Benatto <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=23e39f50ca7a107f6b66396ed4d177a914dee035] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/disk/ldm.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ + 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c +index 58f8a53..428415f 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c +@@ -554,7 +554,11 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk, + comp->segments = grub_calloc (comp->segment_alloc, + sizeof (*comp->segments)); + if (!comp->segments) +- goto fail2; ++ { ++ grub_free (comp->internal_id); ++ grub_free (comp); ++ goto fail2; ++ } + } + else + { +@@ -562,7 +566,11 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk, + comp->segment_count = 1; + comp->segments = grub_malloc (sizeof (*comp->segments)); + if (!comp->segments) +- goto fail2; ++ { ++ grub_free (comp->internal_id); ++ grub_free (comp); ++ goto fail2; ++ } + comp->segments->start_extent = 0; + comp->segments->extent_count = lv->size; + comp->segments->layout = 0; +@@ -574,15 +582,26 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk, + comp->segments->layout = GRUB_RAID_LAYOUT_SYMMETRIC_MASK; + } + else +- goto fail2; ++ { ++ grub_free (comp->segments); ++ grub_free (comp->internal_id); ++ grub_free (comp); ++ goto fail2; ++ } + ptr += *ptr + 1; + ptr++; + if (!(vblk[i].flags & 0x10)) +- goto fail2; ++ { ++ grub_free (comp->segments); ++ grub_free (comp->internal_id); ++ grub_free (comp); ++ goto fail2; ++ } + if (ptr >= vblk[i].dynamic + sizeof (vblk[i].dynamic) + || ptr + *ptr + 1 >= vblk[i].dynamic + + sizeof (vblk[i].dynamic)) + { ++ grub_free (comp->segments); + grub_free (comp->internal_id); + grub_free (comp); + goto fail2; +@@ -592,6 +611,7 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk, + if (ptr + *ptr + 1 >= vblk[i].dynamic + + sizeof (vblk[i].dynamic)) + { ++ grub_free (comp->segments); + grub_free (comp->internal_id); + grub_free (comp); + goto fail2; +@@ -601,7 +621,12 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk, + comp->segments->nodes = grub_calloc (comp->segments->node_alloc, + sizeof (*comp->segments->nodes)); + if (!lv->segments->nodes) +- goto fail2; ++ { ++ grub_free (comp->segments); ++ grub_free (comp->internal_id); ++ grub_free (comp); ++ goto fail2; ++ } + } + + if (lv->segments->node_alloc == lv->segments->node_count) +@@ -611,11 +636,23 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk, + + if (grub_mul (lv->segments->node_alloc, 2, &lv->segments->node_alloc) || + grub_mul (lv->segments->node_alloc, sizeof (*lv->segments->nodes), &sz)) +- goto fail2; ++ { ++ grub_free (comp->segments->nodes); ++ grub_free (comp->segments); ++ grub_free (comp->internal_id); ++ grub_free (comp); ++ goto fail2; ++ } + + t = grub_realloc (lv->segments->nodes, sz); + if (!t) +- goto fail2; ++ { ++ grub_free (comp->segments->nodes); ++ grub_free (comp->segments); ++ grub_free (comp->internal_id); ++ grub_free (comp); ++ goto fail2; ++ } + lv->segments->nodes = t; + } + lv->segments->nodes[lv->segments->node_count].pv = 0;
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0013-io-lzopio-Resolve-unnecessary-self-assignment-errors.patch \ file://0014-zstd-Initialize-seq_t-structure-fully.patch \ file://0015-kern-partition-Check-for-NULL-before-dereferencing-i.patch \ + file://0016-disk-ldm-Make-sure-comp-data-is-freed-before-exiting.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 17/46 grub: fix a memory leak
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch adds a fix for a memory leak in grub's disk/ldm. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...-If-failed-then-free-vg-variable-too.patch | 28 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0017-disk-ldm-If-failed-then-free-vg-variable-too.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0017-disk-ldm-If-failed-then-free-vg-variable-too.patch new file +28 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +From 253485e8df3c9dedac848567e638157530184295 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2020 10:07:47 -0300 +Subject: [PATCH] disk/ldm: If failed then free vg variable too + +Fixes: CID 73809 + +Signed-off-by: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=e0b83df5da538d2a38f770e60817b3a4b9d5b4d7] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/disk/ldm.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c +index 428415f..54713f4 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c +@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk, + { + grub_free (vg->uuid); + grub_free (vg->name); ++ grub_free (vg); + return NULL; + } + grub_memcpy (vg->uuid, label->group_guid, LDM_GUID_STRLEN);
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0014-zstd-Initialize-seq_t-structure-fully.patch \ file://0015-kern-partition-Check-for-NULL-before-dereferencing-i.patch \ file://0016-disk-ldm-Make-sure-comp-data-is-freed-before-exiting.patch \ + file://0017-disk-ldm-If-failed-then-free-vg-variable-too.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 18/46 grub: fix a memory leak
In reply to Marta RybczynskaAdd a fix for a memory leak in grub'd disk/ldm. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...ory-leak-on-uninserted-lv-references.patch | 50 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0018-disk-ldm-Fix-memory-leak-on-uninserted-lv-references.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0018-disk-ldm-Fix-memory-leak-on-uninserted-lv-references.patch new file +50 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From 3e1d2f1959acbe5152cdd5818d495f6455d1a158 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2020 10:00:51 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] disk/ldm: Fix memory leak on uninserted lv references + +The problem here is that the memory allocated to the variable lv is not +yet inserted into the list that is being processed at the label fail2. + +As we can already see at line 342, which correctly frees lv before going +to fail2, we should also be doing that at these earlier jumps to fail2. + +Fixes: CID 73824 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=156c281a1625dc73fd350530630c6f2d5673d4f6] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/disk/ldm.c | 10 ++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c +index 54713f4..e82e989 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c +@@ -321,7 +321,10 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk, + lv->visible = 1; + lv->segments = grub_zalloc (sizeof (*lv->segments)); + if (!lv->segments) +- goto fail2; ++ { ++ grub_free (lv); ++ goto fail2; ++ } + lv->segments->start_extent = 0; + lv->segments->type = GRUB_DISKFILTER_MIRROR; + lv->segments->node_count = 0; +@@ -329,7 +332,10 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk, + lv->segments->nodes = grub_calloc (lv->segments->node_alloc, + sizeof (*lv->segments->nodes)); + if (!lv->segments->nodes) +- goto fail2; ++ { ++ grub_free (lv); ++ goto fail2; ++ } + ptr = vblk[i].dynamic; + if (ptr + *ptr + 1 >= vblk[i].dynamic + + sizeof (vblk[i].dynamic))
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0015-kern-partition-Check-for-NULL-before-dereferencing-i.patch \ file://0016-disk-ldm-Make-sure-comp-data-is-freed-before-exiting.patch \ file://0017-disk-ldm-If-failed-then-free-vg-variable-too.patch \ + file://0018-disk-ldm-Fix-memory-leak-on-uninserted-lv-references.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 19/46 grub: fix an integer overflow
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch fixes a potential overflow in grub's disk/cryptodisk. It is a part of a security series [1]
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...odisk-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch | 50 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0019-disk-cryptodisk-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0019-disk-cryptodisk-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch new file +50 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From 2550aaa0c23fdf8b6c54e00c6b838f2e3aa81fe2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 11:38:31 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] disk/cryptodisk: Fix potential integer overflow + +The encrypt and decrypt functions expect a grub_size_t. So, we need to +ensure that the constant bit shift is using grub_size_t rather than +unsigned int when it is performing the shift. + +Fixes: CID 307788 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=a201ad17caa430aa710654fdf2e6ab4c8166f031] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c | 8 ++++---- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c +index 5037768..6883f48 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c +@@ -311,10 +311,10 @@ grub_cryptodisk_endecrypt (struct grub_cryptodisk *dev, + case GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MODE_CBC: + if (do_encrypt) + err = grub_crypto_cbc_encrypt (dev->cipher, data + i, data + i, +- (1U << dev->log_sector_size), iv); ++ ((grub_size_t) 1 << dev->log_sector_size), iv); + else + err = grub_crypto_cbc_decrypt (dev->cipher, data + i, data + i, +- (1U << dev->log_sector_size), iv); ++ ((grub_size_t) 1 << dev->log_sector_size), iv); + if (err) + return err; + break; +@@ -322,10 +322,10 @@ grub_cryptodisk_endecrypt (struct grub_cryptodisk *dev, + case GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MODE_PCBC: + if (do_encrypt) + err = grub_crypto_pcbc_encrypt (dev->cipher, data + i, data + i, +- (1U << dev->log_sector_size), iv); ++ ((grub_size_t) 1 << dev->log_sector_size), iv); + else + err = grub_crypto_pcbc_decrypt (dev->cipher, data + i, data + i, +- (1U << dev->log_sector_size), iv); ++ ((grub_size_t) 1 << dev->log_sector_size), iv); + if (err) + return err; + break;
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0016-disk-ldm-Make-sure-comp-data-is-freed-before-exiting.patch \ file://0017-disk-ldm-If-failed-then-free-vg-variable-too.patch \ file://0018-disk-ldm-Fix-memory-leak-on-uninserted-lv-references.patch \ + file://0019-disk-cryptodisk-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 20/46 grub: add a fix for a length check
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch adds a fix for a volume name length check in grub's hfsplus. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...that-the-volume-name-length-is-valid.patch | 43 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0020-hfsplus-Check-that-the-volume-name-length-is-valid.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0020-hfsplus-Check-that-the-volume-name-length-is-valid.patch new file +43 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From 7c1813eeec78892fa651046cc224ae4e80d0c94d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2020 17:09:31 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] hfsplus: Check that the volume name length is valid + +HFS+ documentation suggests that the maximum filename and volume name is +255 Unicode characters in length. + +So, when converting from big-endian to little-endian, we should ensure +that the name of the volume has a length that is between 0 and 255, +inclusive. + +Fixes: CID 73641 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=2298f6e0d951251bb9ca97d891d1bc8b74515f8c] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c | 9 +++++++++ + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c b/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c +index dae43be..03c3c4c 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c +@@ -1007,6 +1007,15 @@ grub_hfsplus_label (grub_device_t device, char **label) + grub_hfsplus_btree_recptr (&data->catalog_tree, node, ptr); + + label_len = grub_be_to_cpu16 (catkey->namelen); ++ ++ /* Ensure that the length is >= 0. */ ++ if (label_len < 0) ++ label_len = 0; ++ ++ /* Ensure label length is at most 255 Unicode characters. */ ++ if (label_len > 255) ++ label_len = 255; ++ + label_name = grub_calloc (label_len, sizeof (*label_name)); + if (!label_name) + {
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0017-disk-ldm-If-failed-then-free-vg-variable-too.patch \ file://0018-disk-ldm-Fix-memory-leak-on-uninserted-lv-references.patch \ file://0019-disk-cryptodisk-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch \ + file://0020-hfsplus-Check-that-the-volume-name-length-is-valid.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 21/46 grub: add a fix for a possible negative shift
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch adds a fix for a possible negative shift in grub's zfs. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...ix-possible-negative-shift-operation.patch | 42 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0021-zfs-Fix-possible-negative-shift-operation.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0021-zfs-Fix-possible-negative-shift-operation.patch new file +42 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From c757779e5d09719666c3b155afd2421978a107bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2020 16:41:49 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] zfs: Fix possible negative shift operation + +While it is possible for the return value from zfs_log2() to be zero +(0), it is quite unlikely, given that the previous assignment to blksz +is shifted up by SPA_MINBLOCKSHIFT (9) before 9 is subtracted at the +assignment to epbs. + +But, while unlikely during a normal operation, it may be that a carefully +crafted ZFS filesystem could result in a zero (0) value to the +dn_datalbkszsec field, which means that the shift left does nothing +and assigns zero (0) to blksz, resulting in a negative epbs value. + +Fixes: CID 73608 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=a02091834d3e167320d8a262ff04b8e83c5e616d] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c +index 36d0373..0c42cba 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c +@@ -2667,6 +2667,11 @@ dnode_get (dnode_end_t * mdn, grub_uint64_t objnum, grub_uint8_t type, + blksz = grub_zfs_to_cpu16 (mdn->dn.dn_datablkszsec, + mdn->endian) << SPA_MINBLOCKSHIFT; + epbs = zfs_log2 (blksz) - DNODE_SHIFT; ++ ++ /* While this should never happen, we should check that epbs is not negative. */ ++ if (epbs < 0) ++ epbs = 0; ++ + blkid = objnum >> epbs; + idx = objnum & ((1 << epbs) - 1); +
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0018-disk-ldm-Fix-memory-leak-on-uninserted-lv-references.patch \ file://0019-disk-cryptodisk-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch \ file://0020-hfsplus-Check-that-the-volume-name-length-is-valid.patch \ + file://0021-zfs-Fix-possible-negative-shift-operation.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 22/46 grub: add a fix for a memory leak
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch adds a fix for a memory leak in grub's path construction in zfs. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...source-leaks-while-constructing-path.patch | 121 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 122 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0022-zfs-Fix-resource-leaks-while-constructing-path.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0022-zfs-Fix-resource-leaks-while-constructing-path.patch new file +121 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +From 83fdffc07ec4586b375ab36189f255ffbd8f99c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2020 18:54:49 -0300 +Subject: [PATCH] zfs: Fix resource leaks while constructing path + +There are several exit points in dnode_get_path() that are causing possible +memory leaks. + +In the while(1) the correct exit mechanism should not be to do a direct return, +but to instead break out of the loop, setting err first if it is not already set. + +The reason behind this is that the dnode_path is a linked list, and while doing +through this loop, it is being allocated and built up - the only way to +correctly unravel it is to traverse it, which is what is being done at the end +of the function outside of the loop. + +Several of the existing exit points correctly did a break, but not all so this +change makes that more consistent and should resolve the leaking of memory as +found by Coverity. + +Fixes: CID 73741 + +Signed-off-by: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=89bdab965805e8d54d7f75349024e1a11cbe2eb8] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++--------- + 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c +index 0c42cba..9087a72 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c +@@ -2836,8 +2836,8 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn, + + if (dnode_path->dn.dn.dn_type != DMU_OT_DIRECTORY_CONTENTS) + { +- grub_free (path_buf); +- return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, N_("not a directory")); ++ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, N_("not a directory")); ++ break; + } + err = zap_lookup (&(dnode_path->dn), cname, &objnum, + data, subvol->case_insensitive); +@@ -2879,11 +2879,18 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn, + << SPA_MINBLOCKSHIFT); + + if (blksz == 0) +- return grub_error(GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "0-sized block"); ++ { ++ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "0-sized block"); ++ break; ++ } + + sym_value = grub_malloc (sym_sz); + if (!sym_value) +- return grub_errno; ++ { ++ err = grub_errno; ++ break; ++ } ++ + for (block = 0; block < (sym_sz + blksz - 1) / blksz; block++) + { + void *t; +@@ -2893,7 +2900,7 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn, + if (err) + { + grub_free (sym_value); +- return err; ++ break; + } + + movesize = sym_sz - block * blksz; +@@ -2903,6 +2910,8 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn, + grub_memcpy (sym_value + block * blksz, t, movesize); + grub_free (t); + } ++ if (err) ++ break; + free_symval = 1; + } + path = path_buf = grub_malloc (sym_sz + grub_strlen (oldpath) + 1); +@@ -2911,7 +2920,8 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn, + grub_free (oldpathbuf); + if (free_symval) + grub_free (sym_value); +- return grub_errno; ++ err = grub_errno; ++ break; + } + grub_memcpy (path, sym_value, sym_sz); + if (free_symval) +@@ -2949,11 +2959,12 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn, + + err = zio_read (bp, dnode_path->dn.endian, &sahdrp, NULL, data); + if (err) +- return err; ++ break; + } + else + { +- return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "filesystem is corrupt"); ++ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "filesystem is corrupt"); ++ break; + } + + hdrsize = SA_HDR_SIZE (((sa_hdr_phys_t *) sahdrp)); +@@ -2974,7 +2985,8 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn, + if (!path_buf) + { + grub_free (oldpathbuf); +- return grub_errno; ++ err = grub_errno; ++ break; + } + grub_memcpy (path, sym_value, sym_sz); + path [sym_sz] = 0;
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0019-disk-cryptodisk-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch \ file://0020-hfsplus-Check-that-the-volume-name-length-is-valid.patch \ file://0021-zfs-Fix-possible-negative-shift-operation.patch \ + file://0022-zfs-Fix-resource-leaks-while-constructing-path.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 23/46 grub: add a fix for possible integer overflows
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch adds a fix for a possible integer overflows in grub's zfs. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...3-zfs-Fix-possible-integer-overflows.patch | 56 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0023-zfs-Fix-possible-integer-overflows.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0023-zfs-Fix-possible-integer-overflows.patch new file +56 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +From ec35d862f3567671048aa0d0d8ad1ded1fd25336 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2020 22:17:04 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] zfs: Fix possible integer overflows + +In all cases the problem is that the value being acted upon by +a left-shift is a 32-bit number which is then being used in the +context of a 64-bit number. + +To avoid overflow we ensure that the number being shifted is 64-bit +before the shift is done. + +Fixes: CID 73684, CID 73695, CID 73764 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=302c12ff5714bc455949117c1c9548ccb324d55b] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c | 8 ++++---- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c +index 9087a72..b078ccc 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c +@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ find_bestub (uberblock_phys_t * ub_array, + ubptr = (uberblock_phys_t *) ((grub_properly_aligned_t *) ub_array + + ((i << ub_shift) + / sizeof (grub_properly_aligned_t))); +- err = uberblock_verify (ubptr, offset, 1 << ub_shift); ++ err = uberblock_verify (ubptr, offset, (grub_size_t) 1 << ub_shift); + if (err) + { + grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; +@@ -1543,7 +1543,7 @@ read_device (grub_uint64_t offset, struct grub_zfs_device_desc *desc, + + high = grub_divmod64 ((offset >> desc->ashift) + c, + desc->n_children, &devn); +- csize = bsize << desc->ashift; ++ csize = (grub_size_t) bsize << desc->ashift; + if (csize > len) + csize = len; + +@@ -1635,8 +1635,8 @@ read_device (grub_uint64_t offset, struct grub_zfs_device_desc *desc, + + while (len > 0) + { +- grub_size_t csize; +- csize = ((s / (desc->n_children - desc->nparity)) ++ grub_size_t csize = s; ++ csize = ((csize / (desc->n_children - desc->nparity)) + << desc->ashift); + if (csize > len) + csize = len;
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0020-hfsplus-Check-that-the-volume-name-length-is-valid.patch \ file://0021-zfs-Fix-possible-negative-shift-operation.patch \ file://0022-zfs-Fix-resource-leaks-while-constructing-path.patch \ + file://0023-zfs-Fix-possible-integer-overflows.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 24/46 grub: fix an error check
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch fixes an error check in grub's zfsinfo. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...-a-check-for-error-allocating-memory.patch | 35 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0024-zfsinfo-Correct-a-check-for-error-allocating-memory.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0024-zfsinfo-Correct-a-check-for-error-allocating-memory.patch new file +35 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +From b085da8efda9b81f94aa197ee045226563554fdf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2020 10:56:45 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] zfsinfo: Correct a check for error allocating memory + +While arguably the check for grub_errno is correct, we should really be +checking the return value from the function since it is always possible +that grub_errno was set elsewhere, making this code behave incorrectly. + +Fixes: CID 73668 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=7aab03418ec6a9b991aa44416cb2585aff4e7972] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/fs/zfs/zfsinfo.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfsinfo.c b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfsinfo.c +index c8a28ac..bf29180 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfsinfo.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfsinfo.c +@@ -358,8 +358,8 @@ grub_cmd_zfs_bootfs (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("one argument expected")); + + devname = grub_file_get_device_name (args[0]); +- if (grub_errno) +- return grub_errno; ++ if (devname == NULL) ++ return GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + + dev = grub_device_open (devname); + grub_free (devname);
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0021-zfs-Fix-possible-negative-shift-operation.patch \ file://0022-zfs-Fix-resource-leaks-while-constructing-path.patch \ file://0023-zfs-Fix-possible-integer-overflows.patch \ + file://0024-zfsinfo-Correct-a-check-for-error-allocating-memory.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 25/46 grub: add a fix for a memory leak
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch fixes a memory leak in grub's affs. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- .../files/0025-affs-Fix-memory-leaks.patch | 82 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 83 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0025-affs-Fix-memory-leaks.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0025-affs-Fix-memory-leaks.patch new file +82 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +From 929c2ce8214c53cb95abff57a89556cd18444097 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2020 12:48:07 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] affs: Fix memory leaks + +The node structure reference is being allocated but not freed if it +reaches the end of the function. If any of the hooks had returned +a non-zero value, then node would have been copied in to the context +reference, but otherwise node is not stored and should be freed. + +Similarly, the call to grub_affs_create_node() replaces the allocated +memory in node with a newly allocated structure, leaking the existing +memory pointed by node. + +Finally, when dir->parent is set, then we again replace node with newly +allocated memory, which seems unnecessary when we copy in the values +from dir->parent immediately after. + +Fixes: CID 73759 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=178ac5107389f8e5b32489d743d6824a5ebf342a] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/fs/affs.c | 18 ++++++++---------- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/affs.c b/grub-core/fs/affs.c +index 220b371..230e26a 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/affs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/affs.c +@@ -400,12 +400,12 @@ grub_affs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir, + { + unsigned int i; + struct grub_affs_file file; +- struct grub_fshelp_node *node = 0; ++ struct grub_fshelp_node *node, *orig_node; + struct grub_affs_data *data = dir->data; + grub_uint32_t *hashtable; + + /* Create the directory entries for `.' and `..'. */ +- node = grub_zalloc (sizeof (*node)); ++ node = orig_node = grub_zalloc (sizeof (*node)); + if (!node) + return 1; + +@@ -414,9 +414,6 @@ grub_affs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir, + return 1; + if (dir->parent) + { +- node = grub_zalloc (sizeof (*node)); +- if (!node) +- return 1; + *node = *dir->parent; + if (hook ("..", GRUB_FSHELP_DIR, node, hook_data)) + return 1; +@@ -456,17 +453,18 @@ grub_affs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir, + + if (grub_affs_create_node (dir, hook, hook_data, &node, &hashtable, + next, &file)) +- return 1; ++ { ++ /* Node has been replaced in function. */ ++ grub_free (orig_node); ++ return 1; ++ } + + next = grub_be_to_cpu32 (file.next); + } + } + +- grub_free (hashtable); +- return 0; +- + fail: +- grub_free (node); ++ grub_free (orig_node); + grub_free (hashtable); + return 0; + }
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0022-zfs-Fix-resource-leaks-while-constructing-path.patch \ file://0023-zfs-Fix-possible-integer-overflows.patch \ file://0024-zfsinfo-Correct-a-check-for-error-allocating-memory.patch \ + file://0025-affs-Fix-memory-leaks.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 26/46 grub: add a fix for a possible unintended sign extension
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch fixes a possible unintended sign extension in grub's libgcrypt/mpi. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...x-possible-unintended-sign-extension.patch | 36 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0026-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-unintended-sign-extension.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0026-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-unintended-sign-extension.patch new file +36 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +From 9b16d7bcad1c7fea7f26eb2fb3af1a5ca70ba34e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2020 16:43:37 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] libgcrypt/mpi: Fix possible unintended sign extension + +The array of unsigned char gets promoted to a signed 32-bit int before +it is finally promoted to a size_t. There is the possibility that this +may result in the signed-bit being set for the intermediate signed +32-bit int. We should ensure that the promotion is to the correct type +before we bitwise-OR the values. + +Fixes: CID 96697 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=e8814c811132a70f9b55418f7567378a34ad3883] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> + +--- + grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c b/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c +index a3435ed..7ecad27 100644 +--- a/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c ++++ b/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c +@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ gcry_mpi_scan (struct gcry_mpi **ret_mpi, enum gcry_mpi_format format, + if (len && len < 4) + return gcry_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT); + +- n = (s[0] << 24 | s[1] << 16 | s[2] << 8 | s[3]); ++ n = ((size_t)s[0] << 24 | (size_t)s[1] << 16 | (size_t)s[2] << 8 | (size_t)s[3]); + s += 4; + if (len) + len -= 4;
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0023-zfs-Fix-possible-integer-overflows.patch \ file://0024-zfsinfo-Correct-a-check-for-error-allocating-memory.patch \ file://0025-affs-Fix-memory-leaks.patch \ + file://0026-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-unintended-sign-extension.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 27/46 grub: add a fix for a possible NULL dereference
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch adds a fix for a possible NULL dereference in grub's libgcrypt/mpi. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...pt-mpi-Fix-possible-NULL-dereference.patch | 33 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0027-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-NULL-dereference.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0027-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-NULL-dereference.patch new file +33 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +From d26c8771293637b0465f2cb67d97cb58bacc62da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2020 10:41:54 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] libgcrypt/mpi: Fix possible NULL dereference + +The code in gcry_mpi_scan() assumes that buffer is not NULL, but there +is no explicit check for that, so we add one. + +Fixes: CID 73757 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=ae0f3fabeba7b393113d5dc185b6aff9b728136d] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c b/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c +index 7ecad27..6fe3891 100644 +--- a/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c ++++ b/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c +@@ -379,6 +379,9 @@ gcry_mpi_scan (struct gcry_mpi **ret_mpi, enum gcry_mpi_format format, + unsigned int len; + int secure = (buffer && gcry_is_secure (buffer)); + ++ if (!buffer) ++ return gcry_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ARG); ++ + if (format == GCRYMPI_FMT_SSH) + len = 0; + else
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0024-zfsinfo-Correct-a-check-for-error-allocating-memory.patch \ file://0025-affs-Fix-memory-leaks.patch \ file://0026-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-unintended-sign-extension.patch \ + file://0027-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-NULL-dereference.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 28/46 grub: add a fix for a memory leak
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch fixes a memory leak in grub's syslinux parsing. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...slinux-Fix-memory-leak-while-parsing.patch | 43 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0028-syslinux-Fix-memory-leak-while-parsing.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0028-syslinux-Fix-memory-leak-while-parsing.patch new file +43 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From ea12feb69b6af93c7e2fa03df7ac3bd1f4edd599 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2020 15:31:53 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] syslinux: Fix memory leak while parsing + +In syslinux_parse_real() the 2 points where return is being called +didn't release the memory stored in buf which is no longer required. + +Fixes: CID 176634 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=95bc016dba94cab3d398dd74160665915cd08ad6] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/lib/syslinux_parse.c | 6 +++++- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/lib/syslinux_parse.c b/grub-core/lib/syslinux_parse.c +index 4afa992..3acc6b4 100644 +--- a/grub-core/lib/syslinux_parse.c ++++ b/grub-core/lib/syslinux_parse.c +@@ -737,7 +737,10 @@ syslinux_parse_real (struct syslinux_menu *menu) + && grub_strncasecmp ("help", ptr3, ptr4 - ptr3) == 0)) + { + if (helptext (ptr5, file, menu)) +- return 1; ++ { ++ grub_free (buf); ++ return 1; ++ } + continue; + } + +@@ -757,6 +760,7 @@ syslinux_parse_real (struct syslinux_menu *menu) + } + fail: + grub_file_close (file); ++ grub_free (buf); + return err; + } +
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0025-affs-Fix-memory-leaks.patch \ file://0026-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-unintended-sign-extension.patch \ file://0027-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-NULL-dereference.patch \ + file://0028-syslinux-Fix-memory-leak-while-parsing.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 29/46 grub: add a fix for a memory leak
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch adds a fix for a memory leak in grub's normal/completion. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...n-Fix-leaking-of-memory-when-process.patch | 52 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0029-normal-completion-Fix-leaking-of-memory-when-process.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0029-normal-completion-Fix-leaking-of-memory-when-process.patch new file +52 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From 2367049d2021e00d82d19cee923e06a4b04ebc30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 18:56:48 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] normal/completion: Fix leaking of memory when processing a + completion + +It is possible for the code to reach the end of the function without +freeing the memory allocated to argv and argc still to be 0. + +We should always call grub_free(argv). The grub_free() will handle +a NULL argument correctly if it reaches that code without the memory +being allocated. + +Fixes: CID 96672 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=9213575b7a95b514bce80be5964a28d407d7d56d] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/normal/completion.c | 10 ++++------ + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/normal/completion.c b/grub-core/normal/completion.c +index 5961028..46e473c 100644 +--- a/grub-core/normal/completion.c ++++ b/grub-core/normal/completion.c +@@ -400,8 +400,8 @@ char * + grub_normal_do_completion (char *buf, int *restore, + void (*hook) (const char *, grub_completion_type_t, int)) + { +- int argc; +- char **argv; ++ int argc = 0; ++ char **argv = NULL; + + /* Initialize variables. */ + match = 0; +@@ -516,10 +516,8 @@ grub_normal_do_completion (char *buf, int *restore, + + fail: + if (argc != 0) +- { +- grub_free (argv[0]); +- grub_free (argv); +- } ++ grub_free (argv[0]); ++ grub_free (argv); + grub_free (match); + grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; +
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0026-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-unintended-sign-extension.patch \ file://0027-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-NULL-dereference.patch \ file://0028-syslinux-Fix-memory-leak-while-parsing.patch \ + file://0029-normal-completion-Fix-leaking-of-memory-when-process.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 30/46 grub: fix a memory leak
In reply to Marta RybczynskaAdd a fix of a memory leak in grub's commands/hashsum. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...0-commands-hashsum-Fix-a-memory-leak.patch | 56 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0030-commands-hashsum-Fix-a-memory-leak.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0030-commands-hashsum-Fix-a-memory-leak.patch new file +56 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +From b136fa14d26d1833ffcb852f86e65da5960cfb99 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Chris Coulson <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2020 23:41:24 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] commands/hashsum: Fix a memory leak + +check_list() uses grub_file_getline(), which allocates a buffer. +If the hash list file contains invalid lines, the function leaks +this buffer when it returns an error. + +Fixes: CID 176635 + +Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=8b6f528e52e18b7a69f90b8dc3671d7b1147d9f3] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/commands/hashsum.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/commands/hashsum.c b/grub-core/commands/hashsum.c +index 456ba90..b8a22b0 100644 +--- a/grub-core/commands/hashsum.c ++++ b/grub-core/commands/hashsum.c +@@ -128,11 +128,17 @@ check_list (const gcry_md_spec_t *hash, const char *hashfilename, + high = hextoval (*p++); + low = hextoval (*p++); + if (high < 0 || low < 0) +- return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "invalid hash list"); ++ { ++ grub_free (buf); ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "invalid hash list"); ++ } + expected[i] = (high << 4) | low; + } + if ((p[0] != ' ' && p[0] != '\t') || (p[1] != ' ' && p[1] != '\t')) +- return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "invalid hash list"); ++ { ++ grub_free (buf); ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "invalid hash list"); ++ } + p += 2; + if (prefix) + { +@@ -140,7 +146,10 @@ check_list (const gcry_md_spec_t *hash, const char *hashfilename, + + filename = grub_xasprintf ("%s/%s", prefix, p); + if (!filename) +- return grub_errno; ++ { ++ grub_free (buf); ++ return grub_errno; ++ } + file = grub_file_open (filename, GRUB_FILE_TYPE_TO_HASH + | (!uncompress ? GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NO_DECOMPRESS + : GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NONE));
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0027-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-NULL-dereference.patch \ file://0028-syslinux-Fix-memory-leak-while-parsing.patch \ file://0029-normal-completion-Fix-leaking-of-memory-when-process.patch \ + file://0030-commands-hashsum-Fix-a-memory-leak.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 31/46 grub: remove unneeded return value
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch removes an uneeded return value in grub's (static) grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info(). It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...move-unnecessary-return-value-of-gru.patch | 94 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 95 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0031-video-efi_gop-Remove-unnecessary-return-value-of-gru.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0031-video-efi_gop-Remove-unnecessary-return-value-of-gru.patch new file +94 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +From 2a1e5659763790201a342f8a897c8c9d8d91b1cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2020 21:14:31 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] video/efi_gop: Remove unnecessary return value of + grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info() + +The return value of grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info() is never able to be +anything other than GRUB_ERR_NONE. So, rather than continue to return +a value and checking it each time, it is more correct to redefine the +function to not return anything and remove checks of its return value +altogether. + +Fixes: CID 96701 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=fc5951d3b1616055ef81a019a5affc09d13344d0] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/video/efi_gop.c | 25 ++++++------------------- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/video/efi_gop.c b/grub-core/video/efi_gop.c +index 7f9d1c2..db2ee98 100644 +--- a/grub-core/video/efi_gop.c ++++ b/grub-core/video/efi_gop.c +@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ grub_video_gop_fill_real_mode_info (unsigned mode, + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + } + +-static grub_err_t ++static void + grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (unsigned mode, + struct grub_efi_gop_mode_info *in, + struct grub_video_mode_info *out) +@@ -252,8 +252,6 @@ grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (unsigned mode, + out->blit_format = GRUB_VIDEO_BLIT_FORMAT_BGRA_8888; + out->mode_type |= (GRUB_VIDEO_MODE_TYPE_DOUBLE_BUFFERED + | GRUB_VIDEO_MODE_TYPE_UPDATING_SWAP); +- +- return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + } + + static int +@@ -266,7 +264,6 @@ grub_video_gop_iterate (int (*hook) (const struct grub_video_mode_info *info, vo + grub_efi_uintn_t size; + grub_efi_status_t status; + struct grub_efi_gop_mode_info *info = NULL; +- grub_err_t err; + struct grub_video_mode_info mode_info; + + status = efi_call_4 (gop->query_mode, gop, mode, &size, &info); +@@ -277,12 +274,7 @@ grub_video_gop_iterate (int (*hook) (const struct grub_video_mode_info *info, vo + continue; + } + +- err = grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (mode, info, &mode_info); +- if (err) +- { +- grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; +- continue; +- } ++ grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (mode, info, &mode_info); + if (hook (&mode_info, hook_arg)) + return 1; + } +@@ -466,13 +458,8 @@ grub_video_gop_setup (unsigned int width, unsigned int height, + + info = gop->mode->info; + +- err = grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (gop->mode->mode, info, +- &framebuffer.mode_info); +- if (err) +- { +- grub_dprintf ("video", "GOP: couldn't fill mode info\n"); +- return err; +- } ++ grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (gop->mode->mode, info, ++ &framebuffer.mode_info); + + framebuffer.ptr = (void *) (grub_addr_t) gop->mode->fb_base; + framebuffer.offscreen +@@ -486,8 +473,8 @@ grub_video_gop_setup (unsigned int width, unsigned int height, + { + grub_dprintf ("video", "GOP: couldn't allocate shadow\n"); + grub_errno = 0; +- err = grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (gop->mode->mode, info, +- &framebuffer.mode_info); ++ grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (gop->mode->mode, info, ++ &framebuffer.mode_info); + buffer = framebuffer.ptr; + } +
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0028-syslinux-Fix-memory-leak-while-parsing.patch \ file://0029-normal-completion-Fix-leaking-of-memory-when-process.patch \ file://0030-commands-hashsum-Fix-a-memory-leak.patch \ + file://0031-video-efi_gop-Remove-unnecessary-return-value-of-gru.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 32/46 grub: fix an integer overflow
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch adds a fix for a potential integer overflow in grub's video/fb/fbfill. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...bfill-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch | 78 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 79 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0032-video-fb-fbfill-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0032-video-fb-fbfill-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch new file +78 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +From 99ecf5a44b99d529a6405fe276bedcefa3657a0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2020 15:10:51 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] video/fb/fbfill: Fix potential integer overflow + +The multiplication of 2 unsigned 32-bit integers may overflow before +promotion to unsigned 64-bit. We should ensure that the multiplication +is done with overflow detection. Additionally, use grub_sub() for +subtraction. + +Fixes: CID 73640, CID 73697, CID 73702, CID 73823 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Marco A Benatto <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=7ce3259f67ac2cd93acb0ec0080c24b3b69e66c6] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/video/fb/fbfill.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/video/fb/fbfill.c b/grub-core/video/fb/fbfill.c +index 11816d0..a37acd1 100644 +--- a/grub-core/video/fb/fbfill.c ++++ b/grub-core/video/fb/fbfill.c +@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ + #include <grub/fbfill.h> + #include <grub/fbutil.h> + #include <grub/types.h> ++#include <grub/safemath.h> + #include <grub/video.h> + + /* Generic filler that works for every supported mode. */ +@@ -61,7 +62,9 @@ grub_video_fbfill_direct32 (struct grub_video_fbblit_info *dst, + + /* Calculate the number of bytes to advance from the end of one line + to the beginning of the next line. */ +- rowskip = dst->mode_info->pitch - dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel * width; ++ if (grub_mul (dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel, width, &rowskip) || ++ grub_sub (dst->mode_info->pitch, rowskip, &rowskip)) ++ return; + + /* Get the start address. */ + dstptr = grub_video_fb_get_video_ptr (dst, x, y); +@@ -98,7 +101,9 @@ grub_video_fbfill_direct24 (struct grub_video_fbblit_info *dst, + #endif + /* Calculate the number of bytes to advance from the end of one line + to the beginning of the next line. */ +- rowskip = dst->mode_info->pitch - dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel * width; ++ if (grub_mul (dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel, width, &rowskip) || ++ grub_sub (dst->mode_info->pitch, rowskip, &rowskip)) ++ return; + + /* Get the start address. */ + dstptr = grub_video_fb_get_video_ptr (dst, x, y); +@@ -131,7 +136,9 @@ grub_video_fbfill_direct16 (struct grub_video_fbblit_info *dst, + + /* Calculate the number of bytes to advance from the end of one line + to the beginning of the next line. */ +- rowskip = (dst->mode_info->pitch - dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel * width); ++ if (grub_mul (dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel, width, &rowskip) || ++ grub_sub (dst->mode_info->pitch, rowskip, &rowskip)) ++ return; + + /* Get the start address. */ + dstptr = grub_video_fb_get_video_ptr (dst, x, y); +@@ -161,7 +168,9 @@ grub_video_fbfill_direct8 (struct grub_video_fbblit_info *dst, + + /* Calculate the number of bytes to advance from the end of one line + to the beginning of the next line. */ +- rowskip = dst->mode_info->pitch - dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel * width; ++ if (grub_mul (dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel, width, &rowskip) || ++ grub_sub (dst->mode_info->pitch, rowskip, &rowskip)) ++ return; + + /* Get the start address. */ + dstptr = grub_video_fb_get_video_ptr (dst, x, y);
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0029-normal-completion-Fix-leaking-of-memory-when-process.patch \ file://0030-commands-hashsum-Fix-a-memory-leak.patch \ file://0031-video-efi_gop-Remove-unnecessary-return-value-of-gru.patch \ + file://0032-video-fb-fbfill-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 33/46 grub: fix multiple integer overflows
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch adds a fix for multiple integer overflows in grub's video/fb/video_fb. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...eo_fb-Fix-multiple-integer-overflows.patch | 104 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 105 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0033-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-multiple-integer-overflows.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0033-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-multiple-integer-overflows.patch new file +104 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +From 69b91f7466a5ad5fb85039a5b4118efb77ad6347 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2020 14:43:44 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] video/fb/video_fb: Fix multiple integer overflows + +The calculation of the unsigned 64-bit value is being generated by +multiplying 2, signed or unsigned, 32-bit integers which may overflow +before promotion to unsigned 64-bit. Fix all of them. + +Fixes: CID 73703, CID 73767, CID 73833 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=08e098b1dbf01e96376f594b337491bc4cfa48dd] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- + 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c b/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c +index 1a602c8..1c9a138 100644 +--- a/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c ++++ b/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c +@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ + #include <grub/fbutil.h> + #include <grub/bitmap.h> + #include <grub/dl.h> ++#include <grub/safemath.h> + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + +@@ -1417,15 +1418,23 @@ doublebuf_blit_update_screen (void) + { + if (framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line + <= framebuffer.current_dirty.last_line) +- grub_memcpy ((char *) framebuffer.pages[0] +- + framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line +- * framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch, +- (char *) framebuffer.back_target->data +- + framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line +- * framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch, +- framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch +- * (framebuffer.current_dirty.last_line +- - framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line)); ++ { ++ grub_size_t copy_size; ++ ++ if (grub_sub (framebuffer.current_dirty.last_line, ++ framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line, ©_size) || ++ grub_mul (framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch, copy_size, ©_size)) ++ { ++ /* Shouldn't happen, but if it does we've a bug. */ ++ return GRUB_ERR_BUG; ++ } ++ ++ grub_memcpy ((char *) framebuffer.pages[0] + framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line * ++ framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch, ++ (char *) framebuffer.back_target->data + framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line * ++ framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch, ++ copy_size); ++ } + framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line + = framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.height; + framebuffer.current_dirty.last_line = 0; +@@ -1439,7 +1448,7 @@ grub_video_fb_doublebuf_blit_init (struct grub_video_fbrender_target **back, + volatile void *framebuf) + { + grub_err_t err; +- grub_size_t page_size = mode_info.pitch * mode_info.height; ++ grub_size_t page_size = (grub_size_t) mode_info.pitch * mode_info.height; + + framebuffer.offscreen_buffer = grub_zalloc (page_size); + if (! framebuffer.offscreen_buffer) +@@ -1482,12 +1491,23 @@ doublebuf_pageflipping_update_screen (void) + last_line = framebuffer.previous_dirty.last_line; + + if (first_line <= last_line) +- grub_memcpy ((char *) framebuffer.pages[framebuffer.render_page] +- + first_line * framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch, +- (char *) framebuffer.back_target->data +- + first_line * framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch, +- framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch +- * (last_line - first_line)); ++ { ++ grub_size_t copy_size; ++ ++ if (grub_sub (last_line, first_line, ©_size) || ++ grub_mul (framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch, copy_size, ©_size)) ++ { ++ /* Shouldn't happen, but if it does we've a bug. */ ++ return GRUB_ERR_BUG; ++ } ++ ++ grub_memcpy ((char *) framebuffer.pages[framebuffer.render_page] + first_line * ++ framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch, ++ (char *) framebuffer.back_target->data + first_line * ++ framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch, ++ copy_size); ++ } ++ + framebuffer.previous_dirty = framebuffer.current_dirty; + framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line + = framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.height;
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0030-commands-hashsum-Fix-a-memory-leak.patch \ file://0031-video-efi_gop-Remove-unnecessary-return-value-of-gru.patch \ file://0032-video-fb-fbfill-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch \ + file://0033-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-multiple-integer-overflows.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 34/46 grub: fix a possible integer overflow
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch adds a fix for a possible integer overflow in grub's video/fb/video_fb. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...deo_fb-Fix-possible-integer-overflow.patch | 39 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0034-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-possible-integer-overflow.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0034-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-possible-integer-overflow.patch new file +39 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From aac5574ff340a665ccc78d4c3d61596ac67acbbe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 14:51:30 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] video/fb/video_fb: Fix possible integer overflow + +It is minimal possibility that the values being used here will overflow. +So, change the code to use the safemath function grub_mul() to ensure +that doesn't happen. + +Fixes: CID 73761 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=08413f2f4edec0e2d9bf15f836f6ee5ca2e379cb] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c | 8 +++++++- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c b/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c +index 1c9a138..ae6b89f 100644 +--- a/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c ++++ b/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c +@@ -1537,7 +1537,13 @@ doublebuf_pageflipping_init (struct grub_video_mode_info *mode_info, + volatile void *page1_ptr) + { + grub_err_t err; +- grub_size_t page_size = mode_info->pitch * mode_info->height; ++ grub_size_t page_size = 0; ++ ++ if (grub_mul (mode_info->pitch, mode_info->height, &page_size)) ++ { ++ /* Shouldn't happen, but if it does we've a bug. */ ++ return GRUB_ERR_BUG; ++ } + + framebuffer.offscreen_buffer = grub_malloc (page_size); + if (! framebuffer.offscreen_buffer)
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0031-video-efi_gop-Remove-unnecessary-return-value-of-gru.patch \ file://0032-video-fb-fbfill-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch \ file://0033-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-multiple-integer-overflows.patch \ + file://0034-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-possible-integer-overflow.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 35/46 grub: test for malformed jpeg files
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch adds a fix for handling malformed JPEG files in grub's video/readers/jpeg. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...eg-Test-for-an-invalid-next-marker-r.patch | 38 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0035-video-readers-jpeg-Test-for-an-invalid-next-marker-r.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0035-video-readers-jpeg-Test-for-an-invalid-next-marker-r.patch new file +38 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +From 88361a7fd4e481a76e1159a63c9014fa997ef29c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 15:39:00 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] video/readers/jpeg: Test for an invalid next marker reference + from a jpeg file + +While it may never happen, and potentially could be caught at the end of +the function, it is worth checking up front for a bad reference to the +next marker just in case of a maliciously crafted file being provided. + +Fixes: CID 73694 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=5f5eb7ca8e971227e95745abe541df3e1509360e] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c +index 31359a4..0b6ce3c 100644 +--- a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c ++++ b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c +@@ -253,6 +253,12 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_quan_table (struct grub_jpeg_data *data) + next_marker = data->file->offset; + next_marker += grub_jpeg_get_word (data); + ++ if (next_marker > data->file->size) ++ { ++ /* Should never be set beyond the size of the file. */ ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "jpeg: invalid next reference"); ++ } ++ + while (data->file->offset + sizeof (data->quan_table[id]) + 1 + <= next_marker) + {
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0032-video-fb-fbfill-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch \ file://0033-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-multiple-integer-overflows.patch \ file://0034-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-possible-integer-overflow.patch \ + file://0035-video-readers-jpeg-Test-for-an-invalid-next-marker-r.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 36/46 grub: remove dead code
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch removes dead code from grub's gfxmenu/gui_list. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...-Remove-code-that-coverity-is-flaggi.patch | 34 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0036-gfxmenu-gui_list-Remove-code-that-coverity-is-flaggi.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0036-gfxmenu-gui_list-Remove-code-that-coverity-is-flaggi.patch new file +34 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +From 9433cb3a37c03f22c2fa769121f1f509fd031ae9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2020 14:44:47 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] gfxmenu/gui_list: Remove code that coverity is flagging as + dead + +The test of value for NULL before calling grub_strdup() is not required, +since the if condition prior to this has already tested for value being +NULL and cannot reach this code if it is. + +Fixes: CID 73659 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=4a1aa5917595650efbd46b581368c470ebee42ab] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/gfxmenu/gui_list.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/gfxmenu/gui_list.c b/grub-core/gfxmenu/gui_list.c +index 01477cd..df334a6 100644 +--- a/grub-core/gfxmenu/gui_list.c ++++ b/grub-core/gfxmenu/gui_list.c +@@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ list_set_property (void *vself, const char *name, const char *value) + { + self->need_to_recreate_boxes = 1; + grub_free (self->selected_item_box_pattern); +- self->selected_item_box_pattern = value ? grub_strdup (value) : 0; ++ self->selected_item_box_pattern = grub_strdup (value); + self->selected_item_box_pattern_inherit = 0; + } + }
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0033-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-multiple-integer-overflows.patch \ file://0034-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-possible-integer-overflow.patch \ file://0035-video-readers-jpeg-Test-for-an-invalid-next-marker-r.patch \ + file://0036-gfxmenu-gui_list-Remove-code-that-coverity-is-flaggi.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 37/46 grub: fix checking for NULL
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch adds a fix for checking for NULL in grub's loader/bsd. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...ader-bsd-Check-for-NULL-arg-up-front.patch | 47 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0037-loader-bsd-Check-for-NULL-arg-up-front.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0037-loader-bsd-Check-for-NULL-arg-up-front.patch new file +47 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +From 7899384c8fdf9ed96566978c49b0c6e40e70703d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2020 21:47:13 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] loader/bsd: Check for NULL arg up-front + +The code in the next block suggests that it is possible for .set to be +true but .arg may still be NULL. + +This code assumes that it is never NULL, yet later is testing if it is +NULL - that is inconsistent. + +So we should check first if .arg is not NULL, and remove this check that +is being flagged by Coverity since it is no longer required. + +Fixes: CID 292471 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=5d5391b0a05abe76e04c1eb68dcc6cbef5326c4a] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c b/grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c +index b92cbe9..8432283 100644 +--- a/grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c ++++ b/grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c +@@ -1605,7 +1605,7 @@ grub_cmd_openbsd (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char *argv[]) + kernel_type = KERNEL_TYPE_OPENBSD; + bootflags = grub_bsd_parse_flags (ctxt->state, openbsd_flags); + +- if (ctxt->state[OPENBSD_ROOT_ARG].set) ++ if (ctxt->state[OPENBSD_ROOT_ARG].set && ctxt->state[OPENBSD_ROOT_ARG].arg != NULL) + { + const char *arg = ctxt->state[OPENBSD_ROOT_ARG].arg; + unsigned type, unit, part; +@@ -1622,7 +1622,7 @@ grub_cmd_openbsd (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char *argv[]) + "unknown disk type name"); + + unit = grub_strtoul (arg, (char **) &arg, 10); +- if (! (arg && *arg >= 'a' && *arg <= 'z')) ++ if (! (*arg >= 'a' && *arg <= 'z')) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, + "only device specifications of form " + "<type><number><lowercase letter> are supported");
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0034-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-possible-integer-overflow.patch \ file://0035-video-readers-jpeg-Test-for-an-invalid-next-marker-r.patch \ file://0036-gfxmenu-gui_list-Remove-code-that-coverity-is-flaggi.patch \ + file://0037-loader-bsd-Check-for-NULL-arg-up-front.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 38/46 grub: add a fix for a memory leak
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch adds a fix for a memory leak in grub's loader/xnu. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- .../0038-loader-xnu-Fix-memory-leak.patch | 38 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0038-loader-xnu-Fix-memory-leak.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0038-loader-xnu-Fix-memory-leak.patch new file +38 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +From 0a4aa7c16f65cdfaa1013f0796afa929f8d6dc1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2020 12:53:10 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] loader/xnu: Fix memory leak + +The code here is finished with the memory stored in name, but it only +frees it if there curvalue is valid, while it could actually free it +regardless. + +The fix is a simple relocation of the grub_free() to before the test +of curvalue. + +Fixes: CID 96646 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=bcb59ece3263d118510c4440c4da0950f224bb7f] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/loader/xnu.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/loader/xnu.c b/grub-core/loader/xnu.c +index 07232d2..b3029a8 100644 +--- a/grub-core/loader/xnu.c ++++ b/grub-core/loader/xnu.c +@@ -1388,9 +1388,9 @@ grub_xnu_fill_devicetree (void) + name[len] = 0; + + curvalue = grub_xnu_create_value (curkey, name); ++ grub_free (name); + if (!curvalue) + return grub_errno; +- grub_free (name); + + data = grub_malloc (grub_strlen (var->value) + 1); + if (!data)
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0035-video-readers-jpeg-Test-for-an-invalid-next-marker-r.patch \ file://0036-gfxmenu-gui_list-Remove-code-that-coverity-is-flaggi.patch \ file://0037-loader-bsd-Check-for-NULL-arg-up-front.patch \ + file://0038-loader-xnu-Fix-memory-leak.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 39/46 grub: avoid a memory leak
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch fixes a memory leak in grub's loader/xnu when an error is detected in grub_xnu_writetree_toheap(). It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...driverkey-data-when-an-error-is-dete.patch | 77 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 78 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0039-loader-xnu-Free-driverkey-data-when-an-error-is-dete.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0039-loader-xnu-Free-driverkey-data-when-an-error-is-dete.patch new file +77 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +From 81117a77a9e945ee5e7c1f12bd5667e2a16cbe32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Marco A Benatto <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2020 12:18:24 -0300 +Subject: [PATCH] loader/xnu: Free driverkey data when an error is detected in + grub_xnu_writetree_toheap() + +... to avoid memory leaks. + +Fixes: CID 96640 + +Signed-off-by: Marco A Benatto <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=4b4027b6b1c877d7ab467896b04c7bd1aadcfa15] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/loader/xnu.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/loader/xnu.c b/grub-core/loader/xnu.c +index b3029a8..39ceff8 100644 +--- a/grub-core/loader/xnu.c ++++ b/grub-core/loader/xnu.c +@@ -224,26 +224,33 @@ grub_xnu_writetree_toheap (grub_addr_t *target, grub_size_t *size) + if (! memorymap) + return grub_errno; + +- driverkey = (struct grub_xnu_devtree_key *) grub_malloc (sizeof (*driverkey)); ++ driverkey = (struct grub_xnu_devtree_key *) grub_zalloc (sizeof (*driverkey)); + if (! driverkey) + return grub_errno; + driverkey->name = grub_strdup ("DeviceTree"); + if (! driverkey->name) +- return grub_errno; ++ { ++ err = grub_errno; ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ + driverkey->datasize = sizeof (*extdesc); + driverkey->next = memorymap->first_child; + memorymap->first_child = driverkey; + driverkey->data = extdesc + = (struct grub_xnu_extdesc *) grub_malloc (sizeof (*extdesc)); + if (! driverkey->data) +- return grub_errno; ++ { ++ err = grub_errno; ++ goto fail; ++ } + + /* Allocate the space based on the size with dummy value. */ + *size = grub_xnu_writetree_get_size (grub_xnu_devtree_root, "/"); + err = grub_xnu_heap_malloc (ALIGN_UP (*size + 1, GRUB_XNU_PAGESIZE), + &src, target); + if (err) +- return err; ++ goto fail; + + /* Put real data in the dummy. */ + extdesc->addr = *target; +@@ -252,6 +259,15 @@ grub_xnu_writetree_toheap (grub_addr_t *target, grub_size_t *size) + /* Write the tree to heap. */ + grub_xnu_writetree_toheap_real (src, grub_xnu_devtree_root, "/"); + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++ ++ fail: ++ memorymap->first_child = NULL; ++ ++ grub_free (driverkey->data); ++ grub_free (driverkey->name); ++ grub_free (driverkey); ++ ++ return err; + } + + /* Find a key or value in parent key. */
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0036-gfxmenu-gui_list-Remove-code-that-coverity-is-flaggi.patch \ file://0037-loader-bsd-Check-for-NULL-arg-up-front.patch \ file://0038-loader-xnu-Fix-memory-leak.patch \ + file://0039-loader-xnu-Free-driverkey-data-when-an-error-is-dete.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 40/46 grub: add a check for a NULL pointer
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch adds a check for a NULL pointer before use in grub's loader/xnu. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...k-if-pointer-is-NULL-before-using-it.patch | 42 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0040-loader-xnu-Check-if-pointer-is-NULL-before-using-it.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0040-loader-xnu-Check-if-pointer-is-NULL-before-using-it.patch new file +42 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From 778a3fffd19229e5650a1abfb06c974949991cd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2020 10:36:00 -0300 +Subject: [PATCH] loader/xnu: Check if pointer is NULL before using it + +Fixes: CID 73654 + +Signed-off-by: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=7c8a2b5d1421a0f2a33d33531f7561f3da93b844] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/loader/xnu.c | 8 ++++---- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/loader/xnu.c b/grub-core/loader/xnu.c +index 39ceff8..adc048c 100644 +--- a/grub-core/loader/xnu.c ++++ b/grub-core/loader/xnu.c +@@ -667,6 +667,9 @@ grub_xnu_load_driver (char *infoplistname, grub_file_t binaryfile, + char *name, *nameend; + int namelen; + ++ if (infoplistname == NULL) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME, N_("missing p-list filename")); ++ + name = get_name_ptr (infoplistname); + nameend = grub_strchr (name, '/'); + +@@ -698,10 +701,7 @@ grub_xnu_load_driver (char *infoplistname, grub_file_t binaryfile, + else + macho = 0; + +- if (infoplistname) +- infoplist = grub_file_open (infoplistname, GRUB_FILE_TYPE_XNU_INFO_PLIST); +- else +- infoplist = 0; ++ infoplist = grub_file_open (infoplistname, GRUB_FILE_TYPE_XNU_INFO_PLIST); + grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; + if (infoplist) + {
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0037-loader-bsd-Check-for-NULL-arg-up-front.patch \ file://0038-loader-xnu-Fix-memory-leak.patch \ file://0039-loader-xnu-Free-driverkey-data-when-an-error-is-dete.patch \ + file://0040-loader-xnu-Check-if-pointer-is-NULL-before-using-it.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 41/46 grub: add a fix for NULL pointer dereference
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch adds a fix for a NULL pointer dereference in grub's util/grub-install. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...nstall-Fix-NULL-pointer-dereferences.patch | 41 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0041-util-grub-install-Fix-NULL-pointer-dereferences.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0041-util-grub-install-Fix-NULL-pointer-dereferences.patch new file +41 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From 5d2dd0052474a882a22e47cc8c3ed87a01819f6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 25 Feb 2021 18:35:01 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] util/grub-install: Fix NULL pointer dereferences + +Two grub_device_open() calls does not have associated NULL checks +for returned values. Fix that and appease the Coverity. + +Fixes: CID 314583 + +Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=8b3a95655b4391122e7b0315d8cc6f876caf8183] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + util/grub-install.c | 4 ++++ + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/util/grub-install.c b/util/grub-install.c +index a82725f..367350f 100644 +--- a/util/grub-install.c ++++ b/util/grub-install.c +@@ -1775,6 +1775,8 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[]) + fill_core_services (core_services); + + ins_dev = grub_device_open (install_drive); ++ if (ins_dev == NULL) ++ grub_util_error ("%s", grub_errmsg); + + bless (ins_dev, core_services, 0); + +@@ -1875,6 +1877,8 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[]) + fill_core_services(core_services); + + ins_dev = grub_device_open (install_drive); ++ if (ins_dev == NULL) ++ grub_util_error ("%s", grub_errmsg); + + bless (ins_dev, boot_efi, 1); + if (!removable && update_nvram)
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0038-loader-xnu-Fix-memory-leak.patch \ file://0039-loader-xnu-Free-driverkey-data-when-an-error-is-dete.patch \ file://0040-loader-xnu-Check-if-pointer-is-NULL-before-using-it.patch \ + file://0041-util-grub-install-Fix-NULL-pointer-dereferences.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 42/46 grub: add a fix for an incorrect cast
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch adds a fix for incorrect casting from signed to unsigned in grub's util/grub-editenv. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...v-Fix-incorrect-casting-of-a-signed-.patch | 46 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 47 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0042-util-grub-editenv-Fix-incorrect-casting-of-a-signed-.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0042-util-grub-editenv-Fix-incorrect-casting-of-a-signed-.patch new file +46 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +From 3d68daf2567aace4b52bd238cfd4a8111af3bc04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2020 14:33:50 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] util/grub-editenv: Fix incorrect casting of a signed value + +The return value of ftell() may be negative (-1) on error. While it is +probably unlikely to occur, we should not blindly cast to an unsigned +value without first testing that it is not negative. + +Fixes: CID 73856 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=5dc41edc4eba259c6043ae7698c245ec1baaacc6] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + util/grub-editenv.c | 8 +++++++- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/util/grub-editenv.c b/util/grub-editenv.c +index f3662c9..db6f187 100644 +--- a/util/grub-editenv.c ++++ b/util/grub-editenv.c +@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ open_envblk_file (const char *name) + { + FILE *fp; + char *buf; ++ long loc; + size_t size; + grub_envblk_t envblk; + +@@ -143,7 +144,12 @@ open_envblk_file (const char *name) + grub_util_error (_("cannot seek `%s': %s"), name, + strerror (errno)); + +- size = (size_t) ftell (fp); ++ loc = ftell (fp); ++ if (loc < 0) ++ grub_util_error (_("cannot get file location `%s': %s"), name, ++ strerror (errno)); ++ ++ size = (size_t) loc; + + if (fseek (fp, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0) + grub_util_error (_("cannot seek `%s': %s"), name,
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0039-loader-xnu-Free-driverkey-data-when-an-error-is-dete.patch \ file://0040-loader-xnu-Check-if-pointer-is-NULL-before-using-it.patch \ file://0041-util-grub-install-Fix-NULL-pointer-dereferences.patch \ + file://0042-util-grub-editenv-Fix-incorrect-casting-of-a-signed-.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 43/46 grub: fix incorrect use of a negative value
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch adds a fix for an incorrect use of a negative value in grub's util/glue-efi. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...x-incorrect-use-of-a-possibly-negati.patch | 50 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0043-util-glue-efi-Fix-incorrect-use-of-a-possibly-negati.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0043-util-glue-efi-Fix-incorrect-use-of-a-possibly-negati.patch new file +50 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From e301a0f38a2130eb80f346c31e43bf5089af583c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 15:04:28 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] util/glue-efi: Fix incorrect use of a possibly negative value + +It is possible for the ftell() function to return a negative value, +although it is fairly unlikely here, we should be checking for +a negative value before we assign it to an unsigned value. + +Fixes: CID 73744 + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=1641d74e16f9d1ca35ba1a87ee4a0bf3afa48e72] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + util/glue-efi.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/util/glue-efi.c b/util/glue-efi.c +index 68f5316..de0fa6d 100644 +--- a/util/glue-efi.c ++++ b/util/glue-efi.c +@@ -39,13 +39,23 @@ write_fat (FILE *in32, FILE *in64, FILE *out, const char *out_filename, + struct grub_macho_fat_header head; + struct grub_macho_fat_arch arch32, arch64; + grub_uint32_t size32, size64; ++ long size; + char *buf; + + fseek (in32, 0, SEEK_END); +- size32 = ftell (in32); ++ size = ftell (in32); ++ if (size < 0) ++ grub_util_error ("cannot get end of input file '%s': %s", ++ name32, strerror (errno)); ++ size32 = (grub_uint32_t) size; + fseek (in32, 0, SEEK_SET); ++ + fseek (in64, 0, SEEK_END); +- size64 = ftell (in64); ++ size = ftell (in64); ++ if (size < 0) ++ grub_util_error ("cannot get end of input file '%s': %s", ++ name64, strerror (errno)); ++ size64 = (grub_uint64_t) size; + fseek (in64, 0, SEEK_SET); + + head.magic = grub_cpu_to_le32_compile_time (GRUB_MACHO_FAT_EFI_MAGIC);
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0040-loader-xnu-Check-if-pointer-is-NULL-before-using-it.patch \ file://0041-util-grub-install-Fix-NULL-pointer-dereferences.patch \ file://0042-util-grub-editenv-Fix-incorrect-casting-of-a-signed-.patch \ + file://0043-util-glue-efi-Fix-incorrect-use-of-a-possibly-negati.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 44/46 grub: add a fix for a NULL pointer dereference
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch adds a fix for a NULL pointer dereference in grub's script/execute. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...ix-NULL-dereference-in-grub_script_e.patch | 28 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0044-script-execute-Fix-NULL-dereference-in-grub_script_e.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0044-script-execute-Fix-NULL-dereference-in-grub_script_e.patch new file +28 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +From f5fb56954e5926ced42a980c3e0842ffd5fea2aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 3 Apr 2020 23:05:13 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] script/execute: Fix NULL dereference in + grub_script_execute_cmdline() + +Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=41ae93b2e6c75453514629bcfe684300e3aec0ce] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/script/execute.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/script/execute.c b/grub-core/script/execute.c +index 7e028e1..5ea2aef 100644 +--- a/grub-core/script/execute.c ++++ b/grub-core/script/execute.c +@@ -940,7 +940,7 @@ grub_script_execute_cmdline (struct grub_script_cmd *cmd) + struct grub_script_argv argv = { 0, 0, 0 }; + + /* Lookup the command. */ +- if (grub_script_arglist_to_argv (cmdline->arglist, &argv) || ! argv.args[0]) ++ if (grub_script_arglist_to_argv (cmdline->arglist, &argv) || ! argv.args || ! argv.args[0]) + return grub_errno; + + for (i = 0; i < argv.argc; i++)
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0041-util-grub-install-Fix-NULL-pointer-dereferences.patch \ file://0042-util-grub-editenv-Fix-incorrect-casting-of-a-signed-.patch \ file://0043-util-glue-efi-Fix-incorrect-use-of-a-possibly-negati.patch \ + file://0044-script-execute-Fix-NULL-dereference-in-grub_script_e.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 45/46 grub: avoid a NULL pointer dereference
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch adds a fix for a NULL pointer dereference in grub's commands/ls. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...ire-device_name-is-not-NULL-before-p.patch | 33 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0045-commands-ls-Require-device_name-is-not-NULL-before-p.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0045-commands-ls-Require-device_name-is-not-NULL-before-p.patch new file +33 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +From dd82f98fa642907817f59aeaf3761b786898df85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2021 16:57:37 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] commands/ls: Require device_name is not NULL before printing + +This can be triggered with: + ls -l (0 0*) +and causes a NULL deref in grub_normal_print_device_info(). + +I'm not sure if there's any implication with the IEEE 1275 platform. + +Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=6afbe6063c95b827372f9ec310c9fc7461311eb1] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/commands/ls.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/commands/ls.c b/grub-core/commands/ls.c +index 5b7491a..326d2d6 100644 +--- a/grub-core/commands/ls.c ++++ b/grub-core/commands/ls.c +@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ grub_ls_list_files (char *dirname, int longlist, int all, int human) + goto fail; + } + +- if (! *path) ++ if (! *path && device_name) + { + if (grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_FS) + grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0042-util-grub-editenv-Fix-incorrect-casting-of-a-signed-.patch \ file://0043-util-glue-efi-Fix-incorrect-use-of-a-possibly-negati.patch \ file://0044-script-execute-Fix-NULL-dereference-in-grub_script_e.patch \ + file://0045-commands-ls-Require-device_name-is-not-NULL-before-p.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
PATCH 46/46 grub: add a fix for a crash in scripts
In reply to Marta RybczynskaThis patch adds a fix for a crash in grub's script handling. It is a part of a security series [1].
[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
--- ...void-crash-when-using-outside-a-func.patch | 37 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0046-script-execute-Avoid-crash-when-using-outside-a-func.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0046-script-execute-Avoid-crash-when-using-outside-a-func.patch new file +37 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From df2505c4c3cf42b0c419c99a5f9e1ce63e5a5938 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2021 17:30:42 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] script/execute: Avoid crash when using "$#" outside a + function scope + +"$#" represents the number of arguments to a function. It is only +defined in a function scope, where "scope" is non-NULL. Currently, +if we attempt to evaluate "$#" outside a function scope, "scope" will +be NULL and we will crash with a NULL pointer dereference. + +Do not attempt to count arguments for "$#" if "scope" is NULL. This +will result in "$#" being interpreted as an empty string if evaluated +outside a function scope. + +Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]> + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=fe0586347ee46f927ae27bb9673532da9f5dead5] +Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]> +--- + grub-core/script/execute.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/script/execute.c b/grub-core/script/execute.c +index 5ea2aef..23d34bd 100644 +--- a/grub-core/script/execute.c ++++ b/grub-core/script/execute.c +@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ gettext_putvar (const char *str, grub_size_t len, + return 0; + + /* Enough for any number. */ +- if (len == 1 && str[0] == '#') ++ if (len == 1 && str[0] == '#' && scope != NULL) + { + grub_snprintf (*ptr, 30, "%u", scope->argv.argc); + *ptr += grub_strlen (*ptr);
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0043-util-glue-efi-Fix-incorrect-use-of-a-possibly-negati.patch \ file://0044-script-execute-Fix-NULL-dereference-in-grub_script_e.patch \ file://0045-commands-ls-Require-device_name-is-not-NULL-before-p.patch \ + file://0046-script-execute-Avoid-crash-when-using-outside-a-func.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934" SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0