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grub 2.04 security fixes

PATCH New Marta Rybczynska 1 participant 47 messages Feb 18, 2022 Zstd

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cover grub 2.04 security fixes

This series fixes a number of issues in grub 2.04. It is a part of a security series [1], except of the patch 5. The patch 5 is a dependency of patch 6, but also a bugfix on its own.

While none of them has an official CVE, they fix a number of NULL pointer dereferences, memory leaks and similar issues, so seem worth having.

Patches included here are also in Debian's backports [2].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html
[2] https://salsa.debian.org/grub-team/grub/-/tree/debian/2.04-20/debian/patches/2021-02-security

Marta Rybczynska (46):
grub: fix a memory leak
grub: add a fix for a possible NULL dereference
grub: fix a dangling memory pointer
grub: fix wrong handling of argc == 0
grub: add a fix for malformed device path handling
grub: fix memory leak at error in grub_efi_get_filename()
grub: add a fix for a possible NULL pointer dereference
grub: add a fix for unused variable in gnulib
grub: fix an unitialized token in gnulib
grub: add a fix a NULL pointer dereference in gnulib
grub: add a fix for NULL pointer dereference
grub: fix an unitialized re_token in gnulib
grub: add a fix for unnecessary assignements
grub: add structure initialization in zstd
grub: add a missing NULL check
grub: fix a memory leak
grub: fix a memory leak
grub: fix a memory leak
grub: fix an integer overflow
grub: add a fix for a length check
grub: add a fix for a possible negative shift
grub: add a fix for a memory leak
grub: add a fix for possible integer overflows
grub: fix an error check
grub: add a fix for a memory leak
grub: add a fix for a possible unintended sign extension
grub: add a fix for a possible NULL dereference
grub: add a fix for a memory leak
grub: add a fix for a memory leak
grub: fix a memory leak
grub: remove unneeded return value
grub: fix an integer overflow
grub: fix multiple integer overflows
grub: fix a possible integer overflow
grub: test for malformed jpeg files
grub: remove dead code
grub: fix checking for NULL
grub: add a fix for a memory leak
grub: avoid a memory leak
grub: add a check for a NULL pointer
grub: add a fix for NULL pointer dereference
grub: add a fix for an incorrect cast
grub: fix incorrect use of a negative value
grub: add a fix for a NULL pointer dereference
grub: avoid a NULL pointer dereference
grub: add a fix for a crash in scripts

 ...leak-when-iterating-over-mapped-memo.patch |  39 +++
 ...ible-dereference-to-of-a-NULL-pointe.patch |  39 +++
 ...net-tftp-Fix-dangling-memory-pointer.patch |  33 +++
 ...n-parser-Fix-resource-leak-if-argc-0.patch |  50 ++++
 ...formed-device-path-arithmetic-errors.patch | 235 ++++++++++++++++++
 ...-kern-efi-Fix-memory-leak-on-failure.patch |  30 +++
 ...ix-possible-NULL-pointer-dereference.patch |  65 +++++
 ...ulib-regexec-Resolve-unused-variable.patch |  59 +++++
 ...mp-Fix-uninitialized-token-structure.patch |  53 ++++
 ...-Fix-dereference-of-a-possibly-NULL-.patch |  52 ++++
 ...egexec-Fix-possible-null-dereference.patch |  53 ++++
 ...b-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-re_token.patch |  55 ++++
 ...e-unnecessary-self-assignment-errors.patch |  41 +++
 ...std-Initialize-seq_t-structure-fully.patch |  34 +++
 ...heck-for-NULL-before-dereferencing-i.patch |  43 ++++
 ...re-comp-data-is-freed-before-exiting.patch | 128 ++++++++++
 ...-If-failed-then-free-vg-variable-too.patch |  28 +++
 ...ory-leak-on-uninserted-lv-references.patch |  50 ++++
 ...odisk-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch |  50 ++++
 ...that-the-volume-name-length-is-valid.patch |  43 ++++
 ...ix-possible-negative-shift-operation.patch |  42 ++++
 ...source-leaks-while-constructing-path.patch | 121 +++++++++
 ...3-zfs-Fix-possible-integer-overflows.patch |  56 +++++
 ...-a-check-for-error-allocating-memory.patch |  35 +++
 .../files/0025-affs-Fix-memory-leaks.patch    |  82 ++++++
 ...x-possible-unintended-sign-extension.patch |  36 +++
 ...pt-mpi-Fix-possible-NULL-dereference.patch |  33 +++
 ...slinux-Fix-memory-leak-while-parsing.patch |  43 ++++
 ...n-Fix-leaking-of-memory-when-process.patch |  52 ++++
 ...0-commands-hashsum-Fix-a-memory-leak.patch |  56 +++++
 ...move-unnecessary-return-value-of-gru.patch |  94 +++++++
 ...bfill-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch |  78 ++++++
 ...eo_fb-Fix-multiple-integer-overflows.patch | 104 ++++++++
 ...deo_fb-Fix-possible-integer-overflow.patch |  39 +++
 ...eg-Test-for-an-invalid-next-marker-r.patch |  38 +++
 ...-Remove-code-that-coverity-is-flaggi.patch |  34 +++
 ...ader-bsd-Check-for-NULL-arg-up-front.patch |  47 ++++
 .../0038-loader-xnu-Fix-memory-leak.patch     |  38 +++
 ...driverkey-data-when-an-error-is-dete.patch |  77 ++++++
 ...k-if-pointer-is-NULL-before-using-it.patch |  42 ++++
 ...nstall-Fix-NULL-pointer-dereferences.patch |  41 +++
 ...v-Fix-incorrect-casting-of-a-signed-.patch |  46 ++++
 ...x-incorrect-use-of-a-possibly-negati.patch |  50 ++++
 ...ix-NULL-dereference-in-grub_script_e.patch |  28 +++
 ...ire-device_name-is-not-NULL-before-p.patch |  33 +++
 ...void-crash-when-using-outside-a-func.patch |  37 +++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  48 +++-
 47 files changed, 2609 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0001-mmap-Fix-memory-leak-when-iterating-over-mapped-memo.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0002-net-net-Fix-possible-dereference-to-of-a-NULL-pointe.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0003-net-tftp-Fix-dangling-memory-pointer.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0004-kern-parser-Fix-resource-leak-if-argc-0.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0005-efi-Fix-some-malformed-device-path-arithmetic-errors.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0006-kern-efi-Fix-memory-leak-on-failure.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0007-kern-efi-mm-Fix-possible-NULL-pointer-dereference.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0008-gnulib-regexec-Resolve-unused-variable.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0009-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-token-structure.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0010-gnulib-argp-help-Fix-dereference-of-a-possibly-NULL-.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0011-gnulib-regexec-Fix-possible-null-dereference.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0012-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-re_token.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0013-io-lzopio-Resolve-unnecessary-self-assignment-errors.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0014-zstd-Initialize-seq_t-structure-fully.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0015-kern-partition-Check-for-NULL-before-dereferencing-i.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0016-disk-ldm-Make-sure-comp-data-is-freed-before-exiting.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0017-disk-ldm-If-failed-then-free-vg-variable-too.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0018-disk-ldm-Fix-memory-leak-on-uninserted-lv-references.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0019-disk-cryptodisk-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0020-hfsplus-Check-that-the-volume-name-length-is-valid.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0021-zfs-Fix-possible-negative-shift-operation.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0022-zfs-Fix-resource-leaks-while-constructing-path.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0023-zfs-Fix-possible-integer-overflows.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0024-zfsinfo-Correct-a-check-for-error-allocating-memory.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0025-affs-Fix-memory-leaks.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0026-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-unintended-sign-extension.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0027-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-NULL-dereference.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0028-syslinux-Fix-memory-leak-while-parsing.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0029-normal-completion-Fix-leaking-of-memory-when-process.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0030-commands-hashsum-Fix-a-memory-leak.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0031-video-efi_gop-Remove-unnecessary-return-value-of-gru.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0032-video-fb-fbfill-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0033-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-multiple-integer-overflows.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0034-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-possible-integer-overflow.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0035-video-readers-jpeg-Test-for-an-invalid-next-marker-r.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0036-gfxmenu-gui_list-Remove-code-that-coverity-is-flaggi.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0037-loader-bsd-Check-for-NULL-arg-up-front.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0038-loader-xnu-Fix-memory-leak.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0039-loader-xnu-Free-driverkey-data-when-an-error-is-dete.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0040-loader-xnu-Check-if-pointer-is-NULL-before-using-it.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0041-util-grub-install-Fix-NULL-pointer-dereferences.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0042-util-grub-editenv-Fix-incorrect-casting-of-a-signed-.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0043-util-glue-efi-Fix-incorrect-use-of-a-possibly-negati.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0044-script-execute-Fix-NULL-dereference-in-grub_script_e.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0045-commands-ls-Require-device_name-is-not-NULL-before-p.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0046-script-execute-Avoid-crash-when-using-outside-a-func.patch
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/46 grub: fix a memory leak

Backport a fix for a memory leak in grub_mmap_iterate(). This patch is a part of a security series [1]

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...leak-when-iterating-over-mapped-memo.patch | 39 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  3 +-
 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0001-mmap-Fix-memory-leak-when-iterating-over-mapped-memo.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0001-mmap-Fix-memory-leak-when-iterating-over-mapped-memo.patch new file +39 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..eaaa7effae
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From 0900f11def2e7fbb4880efff0cd9c9b32f1cdb86 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 3 Dec 2020 14:39:45 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] mmap: Fix memory leak when iterating over mapped memory
+
+When returning from grub_mmap_iterate() the memory allocated to present
+is not being released causing it to leak.
+
+Fixes: CID 96655
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=8cb2848f9699642a698af84b12ba187cab722031]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/mmap/mmap.c | 2 ++
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/mmap/mmap.c b/grub-core/mmap/mmap.c
+index 7ebf32e..8bf235f 100644
+--- a/grub-core/mmap/mmap.c
++++ b/grub-core/mmap/mmap.c
+@@ -270,6 +270,7 @@ grub_mmap_iterate (grub_memory_hook_t hook, void *hook_data)
+ 		   hook_data))
+ 	{
+ 	  grub_free (ctx.scanline_events);
++	  grub_free (present);
+ 	  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -282,6 +283,7 @@ grub_mmap_iterate (grub_memory_hook_t hook, void *hook_data)
+     }
+ 
+   grub_free (ctx.scanline_events);
++  grub_free (present);
+   return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ }
+ 
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +2 -1
index 9b20e1c09b..a06beac5ef 100644
@@ -47,7 +47,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2020-27779_7.patch \
            file://CVE-2020-25632.patch \
            file://CVE-2020-25647.patch \
-"
+           file://0001-mmap-Fix-memory-leak-when-iterating-over-mapped-memo.patch \
+           "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/46 grub: add a fix for a possible NULL dereference

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This fix removes a possible NULL pointer dereference in grub networking code. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...ible-dereference-to-of-a-NULL-pointe.patch | 39 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0002-net-net-Fix-possible-dereference-to-of-a-NULL-pointe.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0002-net-net-Fix-possible-dereference-to-of-a-NULL-pointe.patch new file +39 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d00821f5c3
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From f216a75e884ed5e4e94bf86965000dde51148f94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 27 Nov 2020 15:10:26 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] net/net: Fix possible dereference to of a NULL pointer
+
+It is always possible that grub_zalloc() could fail, so we should check for
+a NULL return. Otherwise we run the risk of dereferencing a NULL pointer.
+
+Fixes: CID 296221
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=03f2515ae0c503406f1a99a2178405049c6555db]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/net/net.c | 9 +++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/net/net.c b/grub-core/net/net.c
+index 38f19df..7c2cdf2 100644
+--- a/grub-core/net/net.c
++++ b/grub-core/net/net.c
+@@ -86,8 +86,13 @@ grub_net_link_layer_add_address (struct grub_net_card *card,
+ 
+   /* Add sender to cache table.  */
+   if (card->link_layer_table == NULL)
+-    card->link_layer_table = grub_zalloc (LINK_LAYER_CACHE_SIZE
+-					  * sizeof (card->link_layer_table[0]));
++    {
++      card->link_layer_table = grub_zalloc (LINK_LAYER_CACHE_SIZE
++					    * sizeof (card->link_layer_table[0]));
++      if (card->link_layer_table == NULL)
++	return;
++    }
++
+   entry = &(card->link_layer_table[card->new_ll_entry]);
+   entry->avail = 1;
+   grub_memcpy (&entry->ll_address, ll, sizeof (entry->ll_address));
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index a06beac5ef..2c0bff8fd0 100644
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2020-25632.patch \
            file://CVE-2020-25647.patch \
            file://0001-mmap-Fix-memory-leak-when-iterating-over-mapped-memo.patch \
+           file://0002-net-net-Fix-possible-dereference-to-of-a-NULL-pointe.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/46 grub: fix a dangling memory pointer

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This change fixes a dangling memory pointer in the grub TFTP code. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...net-tftp-Fix-dangling-memory-pointer.patch | 33 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0003-net-tftp-Fix-dangling-memory-pointer.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0003-net-tftp-Fix-dangling-memory-pointer.patch new file +33 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3b4633507d
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 09cc0df477758b60f51fbc0da1dee2f5d54c333d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 19 Feb 2021 17:12:23 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] net/tftp: Fix dangling memory pointer
+
+The static code analysis tool, Parfait, reported that the valid of
+file->data was left referencing memory that was freed by the call to
+grub_free(data) where data was initialized from file->data.
+
+To ensure that there is no unintentional access to this memory
+referenced by file->data we should set the pointer to NULL.
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=0cb838b281a68b536a09681f9557ea6a7ac5da7a]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/net/tftp.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/net/tftp.c b/grub-core/net/tftp.c
+index 7d90bf6..f76b19f 100644
+--- a/grub-core/net/tftp.c
++++ b/grub-core/net/tftp.c
+@@ -468,6 +468,7 @@ tftp_close (struct grub_file *file)
+     }
+   destroy_pq (data);
+   grub_free (data);
++  file->data = NULL;
+   return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ }
+ 
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 2c0bff8fd0..678aa5c4e2 100644
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2020-25647.patch \
            file://0001-mmap-Fix-memory-leak-when-iterating-over-mapped-memo.patch \
            file://0002-net-net-Fix-possible-dereference-to-of-a-NULL-pointe.patch \
+           file://0003-net-tftp-Fix-dangling-memory-pointer.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/46 grub: fix wrong handling of argc == 0

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This change fixes wrong handling of argc == 0 causing a memory leak. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...n-parser-Fix-resource-leak-if-argc-0.patch | 50 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0004-kern-parser-Fix-resource-leak-if-argc-0.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0004-kern-parser-Fix-resource-leak-if-argc-0.patch new file +50 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..933416605c
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From 8861fa6226f7229105722ba669465e879b56ee2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 22 Jan 2021 12:32:41 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] kern/parser: Fix resource leak if argc == 0
+
+After processing the command-line yet arriving at the point where we are
+setting argv, we are allocating memory, even if argc == 0, which makes
+no sense since we never put anything into the allocated argv.
+
+The solution is to simply return that we've successfully processed the
+arguments but that argc == 0, and also ensure that argv is NULL when
+we're not allocating anything in it.
+
+There are only 2 callers of this function, and both are handling a zero
+value in argc assuming nothing is allocated in argv.
+
+Fixes: CID 96680
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=d06161b035dde4769199ad65aa0a587a5920012b]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/kern/parser.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/parser.c b/grub-core/kern/parser.c
+index 619db31..d1cf061 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/parser.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/parser.c
+@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@ grub_parser_split_cmdline (const char *cmdline,
+   int i;
+ 
+   *argc = 0;
++  *argv = NULL;
+   do
+     {
+       if (!rd || !*rd)
+@@ -207,6 +208,10 @@ grub_parser_split_cmdline (const char *cmdline,
+       (*argc)++;
+     }
+ 
++  /* If there are no args, then we're done. */
++  if (!*argc)
++    return 0;
++
+   /* Reserve memory for the return values.  */
+   args = grub_malloc (bp - buffer);
+   if (!args)
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 678aa5c4e2..2e4e6d7ac2 100644
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0001-mmap-Fix-memory-leak-when-iterating-over-mapped-memo.patch \
            file://0002-net-net-Fix-possible-dereference-to-of-a-NULL-pointe.patch \
            file://0003-net-tftp-Fix-dangling-memory-pointer.patch \
+           file://0004-kern-parser-Fix-resource-leak-if-argc-0.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/46 grub: add a fix for malformed device path handling

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This change fixes the malformed device paths in EFI handling. Device paths of length 4 or shorter could cause different kinds of unexpected behaviours.

This patch is NOT a part of [1], but is a dependency of one of the patches included in the series.

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...formed-device-path-arithmetic-errors.patch | 235 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |   1 +
 2 files changed, 236 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0005-efi-Fix-some-malformed-device-path-arithmetic-errors.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0005-efi-Fix-some-malformed-device-path-arithmetic-errors.patch new file +235 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..04748befc8
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+From 16a4d739b19f8680cf93a3c8fa0ae9fc1b1c310b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Jones <[email protected]>
+Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2020 16:53:27 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] efi: Fix some malformed device path arithmetic errors
+
+Several places we take the length of a device path and subtract 4 from
+it, without ever checking that it's >= 4. There are also cases where
+this kind of malformation will result in unpredictable iteration,
+including treating the length from one dp node as the type in the next
+node. These are all errors, no matter where the data comes from.
+
+This patch adds a checking macro, GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID(), which
+can be used in several places, and makes GRUB_EFI_NEXT_DEVICE_PATH()
+return NULL and GRUB_EFI_END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH() evaluate as true when
+the length is too small. Additionally, it makes several places in the
+code check for and return errors in these cases.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=d2cf823d0e31818d1b7a223daff6d5e006596543]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c           | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
+ grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c | 13 +++++-
+ grub-core/loader/i386/xnu.c        |  9 +++--
+ include/grub/efi/api.h             | 14 ++++---
+ 4 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c
+index ad170c7..6a38080 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c
+@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ grub_efi_get_filename (grub_efi_device_path_t *dp0)
+ 
+   dp = dp0;
+ 
+-  while (1)
++  while (dp)
+     {
+       grub_efi_uint8_t type = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE (dp);
+       grub_efi_uint8_t subtype = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE (dp);
+@@ -370,9 +370,15 @@ grub_efi_get_filename (grub_efi_device_path_t *dp0)
+       if (type == GRUB_EFI_MEDIA_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE
+ 	       && subtype == GRUB_EFI_FILE_PATH_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE)
+ 	{
+-	  grub_efi_uint16_t len;
+-	  len = ((GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (dp) - 4)
+-		 / sizeof (grub_efi_char16_t));
++	  grub_efi_uint16_t len = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (dp);
++
++	  if (len < 4)
++	    {
++	      grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE,
++			  "malformed EFI Device Path node has length=%d", len);
++	      return NULL;
++	    }
++	  len = (len - 4) / sizeof (grub_efi_char16_t);
+ 	  filesize += GRUB_MAX_UTF8_PER_UTF16 * len + 2;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -388,7 +394,7 @@ grub_efi_get_filename (grub_efi_device_path_t *dp0)
+   if (!name)
+     return NULL;
+ 
+-  while (1)
++  while (dp)
+     {
+       grub_efi_uint8_t type = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE (dp);
+       grub_efi_uint8_t subtype = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE (dp);
+@@ -404,8 +410,15 @@ grub_efi_get_filename (grub_efi_device_path_t *dp0)
+ 
+ 	  *p++ = '/';
+ 
+-	  len = ((GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (dp) - 4)
+-		 / sizeof (grub_efi_char16_t));
++	  len = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (dp);
++	  if (len < 4)
++	    {
++	      grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE,
++			  "malformed EFI Device Path node has length=%d", len);
++	      return NULL;
++	    }
++
++	  len = (len - 4) / sizeof (grub_efi_char16_t);
+ 	  fp = (grub_efi_file_path_device_path_t *) dp;
+ 	  /* According to EFI spec Path Name is NULL terminated */
+ 	  while (len > 0 && fp->path_name[len - 1] == 0)
+@@ -480,7 +493,26 @@ grub_efi_duplicate_device_path (const grub_efi_device_path_t *dp)
+        ;
+        p = GRUB_EFI_NEXT_DEVICE_PATH (p))
+     {
+-      total_size += GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (p);
++      grub_size_t len = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (p);
++
++      /*
++       * In the event that we find a node that's completely garbage, for
++       * example if we get to 0x7f 0x01 0x02 0x00 ... (EndInstance with a size
++       * of 2), GRUB_EFI_END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH() will be true and
++       * GRUB_EFI_NEXT_DEVICE_PATH() will return NULL, so we won't continue,
++       * and neither should our consumers, but there won't be any error raised
++       * even though the device path is junk.
++       *
++       * This keeps us from passing junk down back to our caller.
++       */
++      if (len < 4)
++	{
++	  grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE,
++		      "malformed EFI Device Path node has length=%d", len);
++	  return NULL;
++	}
++
++      total_size += len;
+       if (GRUB_EFI_END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH (p))
+ 	break;
+     }
+@@ -525,7 +557,7 @@ dump_vendor_path (const char *type, grub_efi_vendor_device_path_t *vendor)
+ void
+ grub_efi_print_device_path (grub_efi_device_path_t *dp)
+ {
+-  while (1)
++  while (GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp))
+     {
+       grub_efi_uint8_t type = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE (dp);
+       grub_efi_uint8_t subtype = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE (dp);
+@@ -937,7 +969,10 @@ grub_efi_compare_device_paths (const grub_efi_device_path_t *dp1,
+     /* Return non-zero.  */
+     return 1;
+ 
+-  while (1)
++  if (dp1 == dp2)
++    return 0;
++
++  while (GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp1) && GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp2))
+     {
+       grub_efi_uint8_t type1, type2;
+       grub_efi_uint8_t subtype1, subtype2;
+@@ -973,5 +1008,14 @@ grub_efi_compare_device_paths (const grub_efi_device_path_t *dp1,
+       dp2 = (grub_efi_device_path_t *) ((char *) dp2 + len2);
+     }
+ 
++  /*
++   * There's no "right" answer here, but we probably don't want to call a valid
++   * dp and an invalid dp equal, so pick one way or the other.
++   */
++  if (GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp1) && !GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp2))
++    return 1;
++  else if (!GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp1) && GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp2))
++    return -1;
++
+   return 0;
+ }
+diff --git a/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c b/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c
+index daf8c6b..a8d7b91 100644
+--- a/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c
++++ b/grub-core/loader/efi/chainloader.c
+@@ -156,9 +156,18 @@ make_file_path (grub_efi_device_path_t *dp, const char *filename)
+ 
+   size = 0;
+   d = dp;
+-  while (1)
++  while (d)
+     {
+-      size += GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (d);
++      grub_size_t len = GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (d);
++
++      if (len < 4)
++	{
++	  grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE,
++		      "malformed EFI Device Path node has length=%d", len);
++	  return NULL;
++	}
++
++      size += len;
+       if ((GRUB_EFI_END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH (d)))
+ 	break;
+       d = GRUB_EFI_NEXT_DEVICE_PATH (d);
+diff --git a/grub-core/loader/i386/xnu.c b/grub-core/loader/i386/xnu.c
+index b7d176b..c50cb54 100644
+--- a/grub-core/loader/i386/xnu.c
++++ b/grub-core/loader/i386/xnu.c
+@@ -516,14 +516,15 @@ grub_cmd_devprop_load (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)),
+ 
+       devhead = buf;
+       buf = devhead + 1;
+-      dpstart = buf;
++      dp = dpstart = buf;
+ 
+-      do
++      while (GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp) && buf < bufend)
+ 	{
+-	  dp = buf;
+ 	  buf = (char *) buf + GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (dp);
++	  if (GRUB_EFI_END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH (dp))
++	    break;
++	  dp = buf;
+ 	}
+-      while (!GRUB_EFI_END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH (dp) && buf < bufend);
+ 
+       dev = grub_xnu_devprop_add_device (dpstart, (char *) buf
+ 					 - (char *) dpstart);
+diff --git a/include/grub/efi/api.h b/include/grub/efi/api.h
+index addcbfa..cf1355a 100644
+--- a/include/grub/efi/api.h
++++ b/include/grub/efi/api.h
+@@ -625,6 +625,7 @@ typedef struct grub_efi_device_path grub_efi_device_path_protocol_t;
+ #define GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE(dp)		((dp)->type & 0x7f)
+ #define GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE(dp)	((dp)->subtype)
+ #define GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH(dp)		((dp)->length)
++#define GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID(dp)		((dp) != NULL && GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (dp) >= 4)
+ 
+ /* The End of Device Path nodes.  */
+ #define GRUB_EFI_END_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE			(0xff & 0x7f)
+@@ -633,13 +634,16 @@ typedef struct grub_efi_device_path grub_efi_device_path_protocol_t;
+ #define GRUB_EFI_END_THIS_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE		0x01
+ 
+ #define GRUB_EFI_END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH(dp)	\
+-  (GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE (dp) == GRUB_EFI_END_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE \
+-   && (GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE (dp) \
+-       == GRUB_EFI_END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE))
++  (!GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp) || \
++   (GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE (dp) == GRUB_EFI_END_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE \
++    && (GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE (dp) \
++	== GRUB_EFI_END_ENTIRE_DEVICE_PATH_SUBTYPE)))
+ 
+ #define GRUB_EFI_NEXT_DEVICE_PATH(dp)	\
+-  ((grub_efi_device_path_t *) ((char *) (dp) \
+-                               + GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (dp)))
++  (GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_VALID (dp) \
++   ? ((grub_efi_device_path_t *) \
++      ((char *) (dp) + GRUB_EFI_DEVICE_PATH_LENGTH (dp))) \
++   : NULL)
+ 
+ /* Hardware Device Path.  */
+ #define GRUB_EFI_HARDWARE_DEVICE_PATH_TYPE		1
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 2e4e6d7ac2..f7f2aa892f 100644
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0002-net-net-Fix-possible-dereference-to-of-a-NULL-pointe.patch \
            file://0003-net-tftp-Fix-dangling-memory-pointer.patch \
            file://0004-kern-parser-Fix-resource-leak-if-argc-0.patch \
+           file://0005-efi-Fix-some-malformed-device-path-arithmetic-errors.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#6 lore raw

PATCH 6/46 grub: fix memory leak at error in grub_efi_get_filename()

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This change fixes a memory leak on error in grub_efi_get_filename(). It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...-kern-efi-Fix-memory-leak-on-failure.patch | 30 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0006-kern-efi-Fix-memory-leak-on-failure.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0006-kern-efi-Fix-memory-leak-on-failure.patch new file +30 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9d7327cee6
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From d4fd0243920b71cc6e03cc0cadf23b4fe03c352f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2020 10:15:25 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] kern/efi: Fix memory leak on failure
+
+Free the memory allocated to name before returning on failure.
+
+Fixes: CID 296222
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=ed286ceba6015d37a9304f04602451c47bf195d7]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c
+index 6a38080..baeeef0 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/efi.c
+@@ -415,6 +415,7 @@ grub_efi_get_filename (grub_efi_device_path_t *dp0)
+ 	    {
+ 	      grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE,
+ 			  "malformed EFI Device Path node has length=%d", len);
++	      grub_free (name);
+ 	      return NULL;
+ 	    }
+ 
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index f7f2aa892f..04ed8b7b23 100644
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0003-net-tftp-Fix-dangling-memory-pointer.patch \
            file://0004-kern-parser-Fix-resource-leak-if-argc-0.patch \
            file://0005-efi-Fix-some-malformed-device-path-arithmetic-errors.patch \
+           file://0006-kern-efi-Fix-memory-leak-on-failure.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#7 lore raw

PATCH 7/46 grub: add a fix for a possible NULL pointer dereference

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This change fixes a possible NULL pointer dereference in grub's EFI support. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...ix-possible-NULL-pointer-dereference.patch | 65 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0007-kern-efi-mm-Fix-possible-NULL-pointer-dereference.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0007-kern-efi-mm-Fix-possible-NULL-pointer-dereference.patch new file +65 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d55709406b
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+From be03a18b8767be50f16a845c389fd5ed29aae055 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 11 Dec 2020 15:03:13 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] kern/efi/mm: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference
+
+The model of grub_efi_get_memory_map() is that if memory_map is NULL,
+then the purpose is to discover how much memory should be allocated to
+it for the subsequent call.
+
+The problem here is that with grub_efi_is_finished set to 1, there is no
+check at all that the function is being called with a non-NULL memory_map.
+
+While this MAY be true, we shouldn't assume it.
+
+The solution to this is to behave as expected, and if memory_map is NULL,
+then don't try to use it and allow memory_map_size to be filled in, and
+return 0 as is done later in the code if the buffer is too small (or NULL).
+
+Additionally, drop unneeded ret = 1.
+
+Fixes: CID 96632
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=6aee4bfd6973c714056fb7b56890b8d524e94ee1]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c | 19 ++++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c b/grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c
+index b02fab1..5afcef7 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/efi/mm.c
+@@ -328,15 +328,24 @@ grub_efi_get_memory_map (grub_efi_uintn_t *memory_map_size,
+   if (grub_efi_is_finished)
+     {
+       int ret = 1;
+-      if (*memory_map_size < finish_mmap_size)
++
++      if (memory_map != NULL)
+ 	{
+-	  grub_memcpy (memory_map, finish_mmap_buf, *memory_map_size);
+-	  ret = 0;
++	  if (*memory_map_size < finish_mmap_size)
++	    {
++	      grub_memcpy (memory_map, finish_mmap_buf, *memory_map_size);
++	      ret = 0;
++	    }
++          else
++	    grub_memcpy (memory_map, finish_mmap_buf, finish_mmap_size);
+ 	}
+       else
+ 	{
+-	  grub_memcpy (memory_map, finish_mmap_buf, finish_mmap_size);
+-	  ret = 1;
++	  /*
++	   * Incomplete, no buffer to copy into, same as
++	   * GRUB_EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL below.
++	   */
++	  ret = 0;
+ 	}
+       *memory_map_size = finish_mmap_size;
+       if (map_key)
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 04ed8b7b23..46d65d8609 100644
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0004-kern-parser-Fix-resource-leak-if-argc-0.patch \
            file://0005-efi-Fix-some-malformed-device-path-arithmetic-errors.patch \
            file://0006-kern-efi-Fix-memory-leak-on-failure.patch \
+           file://0007-kern-efi-mm-Fix-possible-NULL-pointer-dereference.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#8 lore raw

PATCH 8/46 grub: add a fix for unused variable in gnulib

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This changes adds a fix for an unused variable issue in gnulib. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...ulib-regexec-Resolve-unused-variable.patch | 59 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0008-gnulib-regexec-Resolve-unused-variable.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0008-gnulib-regexec-Resolve-unused-variable.patch new file +59 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..74ffb559e9
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+From 9d36bce5d516b6379ba3a0dd1a94a9c035838827 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2020 14:41:27 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] gnulib/regexec: Resolve unused variable
+
+This is a really minor issue where a variable is being assigned to but
+not checked before it is overwritten again.
+
+The reason for this issue is that we are not building with DEBUG set and
+this in turn means that the assert() that reads the value of the
+variable match_last is being processed out.
+
+The solution, move the assignment to match_last in to an ifdef DEBUG too.
+
+Fixes: CID 292459
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=a983d36bd9178d377d2072fd4b11c635fdc404b4]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ conf/Makefile.extra-dist                           |  1 +
+ .../lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch      | 14 ++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch
+
+diff --git a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
+index 46c4e95..9b01152 100644
+--- a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
++++ b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
+@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinit.sh
+ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinitheader.sh
+ 
+ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-deref.patch
++EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch
+ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-width.patch
+ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/no-abort.patch
+ 
+diff --git a/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..ba51f1b
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch
+@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
++--- a/lib/regexec.c	2020-10-21 14:25:35.310195912 +0000
+++++ b/lib/regexec.c	2020-10-21 14:32:07.961765604 +0000
++@@ -828,7 +828,11 @@
++ 		    break;
++ 		  if (__glibc_unlikely (err != REG_NOMATCH))
++ 		    goto free_return;
+++#ifdef DEBUG
+++		  /* Only used for assertion below when DEBUG is set, otherwise
+++		     it will be over-written when we loop around.  */
++ 		  match_last = -1;
+++#endif
++ 		}
++ 	      else
++ 		break; /* We found a match.  */
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 46d65d8609..d2a1502d56 100644
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0005-efi-Fix-some-malformed-device-path-arithmetic-errors.patch \
            file://0006-kern-efi-Fix-memory-leak-on-failure.patch \
            file://0007-kern-efi-mm-Fix-possible-NULL-pointer-dereference.patch \
+           file://0008-gnulib-regexec-Resolve-unused-variable.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#9 lore raw

PATCH 9/46 grub: fix an unitialized token in gnulib

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This change adds a fix for an unitialized token structure in gnulib. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...mp-Fix-uninitialized-token-structure.patch | 53 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0009-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-token-structure.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0009-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-token-structure.patch new file +53 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b6e3c7edbe
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+From 2af8df02cca7fd4b584575eac304cd03fa23f5cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 22 Oct 2020 13:54:06 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] gnulib/regcomp: Fix uninitialized token structure
+
+The code is assuming that the value of br_token.constraint was
+initialized to zero when it wasn't.
+
+While some compilers will ensure that, not all do, so it is better to
+fix this explicitly than leave it to chance.
+
+Fixes: CID 73749
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=75c3d3cec4f408848f575d6d5e30a95bd6313db0]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ conf/Makefile.extra-dist                              |  1 +
+ .../lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch     | 11 +++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch
+
+diff --git a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
+index 9b01152..9e55458 100644
+--- a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
++++ b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
+@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinit.sh
+ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinitheader.sh
+ 
+ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-deref.patch
++EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch
+ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch
+ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-width.patch
+ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/no-abort.patch
+diff --git a/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..7b4d9f6
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch
+@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
++--- a/lib/regcomp.c	2020-10-22 13:49:06.770168928 +0000
+++++ b/lib/regcomp.c	2020-10-22 13:50:37.026528298 +0000
++@@ -3662,7 +3662,7 @@
++   Idx alloc = 0;
++ #endif /* not RE_ENABLE_I18N */
++   reg_errcode_t ret;
++-  re_token_t br_token;
+++  re_token_t br_token = {0};
++   bin_tree_t *tree;
++ 
++   sbcset = (re_bitset_ptr_t) calloc (sizeof (bitset_t), 1);
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index d2a1502d56..df2c8b8a16 100644
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0006-kern-efi-Fix-memory-leak-on-failure.patch \
            file://0007-kern-efi-mm-Fix-possible-NULL-pointer-dereference.patch \
            file://0008-gnulib-regexec-Resolve-unused-variable.patch \
+           file://0009-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-token-structure.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#10 lore raw

PATCH 10/46 grub: add a fix a NULL pointer dereference in gnulib

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This change adds a fix for a NULL pointer dereference of state in gnulib. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...-Fix-dereference-of-a-possibly-NULL-.patch | 52 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0010-gnulib-argp-help-Fix-dereference-of-a-possibly-NULL-.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0010-gnulib-argp-help-Fix-dereference-of-a-possibly-NULL-.patch new file +52 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..102a494561
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From eaf9da8b5f8349c51cfc89dd8e39a1a61f89790a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 28 Oct 2020 14:43:01 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] gnulib/argp-help: Fix dereference of a possibly NULL state
+
+All other instances of call to __argp_failure() where there is
+a dgettext() call is first checking whether state is NULL before
+attempting to dereference it to get the root_argp->argp_domain.
+
+Fixes: CID 292436
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=3a37bf120a9194c373257c70175cdb5b337bc107]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ conf/Makefile.extra-dist                             |  1 +
+ .../lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch    | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch
+
+diff --git a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
+index 9e55458..96d7e69 100644
+--- a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
++++ b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
+@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinit.sh
+ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinitheader.sh
+ 
+ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-deref.patch
++EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch
+ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch
+ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch
+ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-width.patch
+diff --git a/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..813ec09
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch
+@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
++--- a/lib/argp-help.c	2020-10-28 14:32:19.189215988 +0000
+++++ b/lib/argp-help.c	2020-10-28 14:38:21.204673940 +0000
++@@ -145,7 +145,8 @@
++       if (*(int *)((char *)upptr + up->uparams_offs) >= upptr->rmargin)
++         {
++           __argp_failure (state, 0, 0,
++-                          dgettext (state->root_argp->argp_domain,
+++                          dgettext (state == NULL ? NULL
+++                                    : state->root_argp->argp_domain,
++                                     "\
++ ARGP_HELP_FMT: %s value is less than or equal to %s"),
++                           "rmargin", up->name);
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index df2c8b8a16..94873475c1 100644
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0007-kern-efi-mm-Fix-possible-NULL-pointer-dereference.patch \
            file://0008-gnulib-regexec-Resolve-unused-variable.patch \
            file://0009-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-token-structure.patch \
+           file://0010-gnulib-argp-help-Fix-dereference-of-a-possibly-NULL-.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#11 lore raw

PATCH 11/46 grub: add a fix for NULL pointer dereference

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

Add a fix for gnulib's regexec NULL pointer dereference. This patch a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...egexec-Fix-possible-null-dereference.patch | 53 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0011-gnulib-regexec-Fix-possible-null-dereference.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0011-gnulib-regexec-Fix-possible-null-dereference.patch new file +53 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4f43fcf7d5
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+From 244dc2b1f518635069a556c424b2e7627f0cf036 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2020 10:57:14 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] gnulib/regexec: Fix possible null-dereference
+
+It appears to be possible that the mctx->state_log field may be NULL,
+and the name of this function, clean_state_log_if_needed(), suggests
+that it should be checking that it is valid to be cleaned before
+assuming that it does.
+
+Fixes: CID 86720
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=0b7f347638153e403ee2dd518af3ce26f4f99647]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ conf/Makefile.extra-dist                             |  1 +
+ .../lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch  | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch
+
+diff --git a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
+index 96d7e69..d27d3a9 100644
+--- a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
++++ b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
+@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinitheader.sh
+ 
+ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-deref.patch
+ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch
++EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch
+ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch
+ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch
+ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-width.patch
+diff --git a/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..db6dac9
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch
+@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
++--- a/lib/regexec.c	2020-10-21 14:25:35.310195912 +0000
+++++ b/lib/regexec.c	2020-11-05 10:55:09.621542984 +0000
++@@ -1692,6 +1692,9 @@
++ {
++   Idx top = mctx->state_log_top;
++
+++  if (mctx->state_log == NULL)
+++    return REG_NOERROR;
+++
++   if ((next_state_log_idx >= mctx->input.bufs_len
++        && mctx->input.bufs_len < mctx->input.len)
++       || (next_state_log_idx >= mctx->input.valid_len
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 94873475c1..e7168e75ea 100644
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0008-gnulib-regexec-Resolve-unused-variable.patch \
            file://0009-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-token-structure.patch \
            file://0010-gnulib-argp-help-Fix-dereference-of-a-possibly-NULL-.patch \
+           file://0011-gnulib-regexec-Fix-possible-null-dereference.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#12 lore raw

PATCH 12/46 grub: fix an unitialized re_token in gnulib

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch adds a fix for an unitialized re_token in grub's gnulib. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...b-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-re_token.patch | 55 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0012-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-re_token.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0012-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-re_token.patch new file +55 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0507e0cd66
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+From 512b6bb380a77233b88c84b7a712896c70281d2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2020 18:04:22 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] gnulib/regcomp: Fix uninitialized re_token
+
+This issue has been fixed in the latest version of gnulib, so to
+maintain consistency, I've backported that change rather than doing
+something different.
+
+Fixes: CID 73828
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=03477085f9a33789ba6cca7cd49ab9326a1baa0e]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ conf/Makefile.extra-dist                          |  1 +
+ .../gnulib-patches/fix-regcomp-uninit-token.patch | 15 +++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regcomp-uninit-token.patch
+
+diff --git a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
+index d27d3a9..ffe6829 100644
+--- a/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
++++ b/conf/Makefile.extra-dist
+@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/genemuinitheader.sh
+ 
+ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-deref.patch
+ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-null-state-deref.patch
++EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regcomp-uninit-token.patch
+ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regexec-null-deref.patch
+ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-uninit-structure.patch
+ EXTRA_DIST += grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-unused-value.patch
+diff --git a/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regcomp-uninit-token.patch b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regcomp-uninit-token.patch
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..02e0631
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/grub-core/lib/gnulib-patches/fix-regcomp-uninit-token.patch
+@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
++--- a/lib/regcomp.c	2020-11-24 17:06:08.159223858 +0000
+++++ b/lib/regcomp.c	2020-11-24 17:06:15.630253923 +0000
++@@ -3808,11 +3808,7 @@
++ create_tree (re_dfa_t *dfa, bin_tree_t *left, bin_tree_t *right,
++ 	     re_token_type_t type)
++ {
++-  re_token_t t;
++-#if defined GCC_LINT || defined lint
++-  memset (&t, 0, sizeof t);
++-#endif
++-  t.type = type;
+++  re_token_t t = { .type = type };
++   return create_token_tree (dfa, left, right, &t);
++ }
++ 
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index e7168e75ea..4ddb9fc4f1 100644
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0009-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-token-structure.patch \
            file://0010-gnulib-argp-help-Fix-dereference-of-a-possibly-NULL-.patch \
            file://0011-gnulib-regexec-Fix-possible-null-dereference.patch \
+           file://0012-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-re_token.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#13 lore raw

PATCH 13/46 grub: add a fix for unnecessary assignements

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

Add a fix for unnecessary assignements grub's io/lzopio. This patch is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...e-unnecessary-self-assignment-errors.patch | 41 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0013-io-lzopio-Resolve-unnecessary-self-assignment-errors.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0013-io-lzopio-Resolve-unnecessary-self-assignment-errors.patch new file +41 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1190b0d090
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From c529ca446424f1a9c64f0007dfe31fa7645d13ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 21 Oct 2020 14:44:10 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] io/lzopio: Resolve unnecessary self-assignment errors
+
+These 2 assignments are unnecessary since they are just assigning
+to themselves.
+
+Fixes: CID 73643
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=59666e520f44177c97b82a44c169b3b315d63b42]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/io/lzopio.c | 4 ----
+ 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/io/lzopio.c b/grub-core/io/lzopio.c
+index 3014485..a7d4425 100644
+--- a/grub-core/io/lzopio.c
++++ b/grub-core/io/lzopio.c
+@@ -125,8 +125,6 @@ read_block_header (struct grub_lzopio *lzopio)
+ 			  sizeof (lzopio->block.ucheck)) !=
+ 	  sizeof (lzopio->block.ucheck))
+ 	return -1;
+-
+-      lzopio->block.ucheck = lzopio->block.ucheck;
+     }
+ 
+   /* Read checksum of compressed data.  */
+@@ -143,8 +141,6 @@ read_block_header (struct grub_lzopio *lzopio)
+ 			      sizeof (lzopio->block.ccheck)) !=
+ 	      sizeof (lzopio->block.ccheck))
+ 	    return -1;
+-
+-	  lzopio->block.ccheck = lzopio->block.ccheck;
+ 	}
+     }
+ 
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 4ddb9fc4f1..1906a28f30 100644
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0010-gnulib-argp-help-Fix-dereference-of-a-possibly-NULL-.patch \
            file://0011-gnulib-regexec-Fix-possible-null-dereference.patch \
            file://0012-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-re_token.patch \
+           file://0013-io-lzopio-Resolve-unnecessary-self-assignment-errors.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#14 lore raw

PATCH 14/46 grub: add structure initialization in zstd

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch adds initialization of a structure in grub's zstd, which might be left uninitialized by the compiler. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...std-Initialize-seq_t-structure-fully.patch | 34 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0014-zstd-Initialize-seq_t-structure-fully.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0014-zstd-Initialize-seq_t-structure-fully.patch new file +34 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..19d881c1ca
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From f55ffe6bd8b844a8cd9956702f42ac2eb96ad56f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2020 10:29:59 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] zstd: Initialize seq_t structure fully
+
+While many compilers will initialize this to zero, not all will, so it
+is better to be sure that fields not being explicitly set are at known
+values, and there is code that checks this fields value elsewhere in the
+code.
+
+Fixes: CID 292440
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=2777cf4466719921dbe4b30af358a75e7d76f217]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/lib/zstd/zstd_decompress.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/lib/zstd/zstd_decompress.c b/grub-core/lib/zstd/zstd_decompress.c
+index 711b5b6..e4b5670 100644
+--- a/grub-core/lib/zstd/zstd_decompress.c
++++ b/grub-core/lib/zstd/zstd_decompress.c
+@@ -1325,7 +1325,7 @@ typedef enum { ZSTD_lo_isRegularOffset, ZSTD_lo_isLongOffset=1 } ZSTD_longOffset
+ FORCE_INLINE_TEMPLATE seq_t
+ ZSTD_decodeSequence(seqState_t* seqState, const ZSTD_longOffset_e longOffsets)
+ {
+-    seq_t seq;
++    seq_t seq = {0};
+     U32 const llBits = seqState->stateLL.table[seqState->stateLL.state].nbAdditionalBits;
+     U32 const mlBits = seqState->stateML.table[seqState->stateML.state].nbAdditionalBits;
+     U32 const ofBits = seqState->stateOffb.table[seqState->stateOffb.state].nbAdditionalBits;
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 1906a28f30..7cf4d64149 100644
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0011-gnulib-regexec-Fix-possible-null-dereference.patch \
            file://0012-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-re_token.patch \
            file://0013-io-lzopio-Resolve-unnecessary-self-assignment-errors.patch \
+           file://0014-zstd-Initialize-seq_t-structure-fully.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#15 lore raw

PATCH 15/46 grub: add a missing NULL check

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This fix adds a missing check for NULL pointer from an external source in grub's kern/partition. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...heck-for-NULL-before-dereferencing-i.patch | 43 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0015-kern-partition-Check-for-NULL-before-dereferencing-i.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0015-kern-partition-Check-for-NULL-before-dereferencing-i.patch new file +43 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..af9fcd45cc
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 0da8ef2e03a8591586b53a29af92d2ace76a04e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2020 09:49:59 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] kern/partition: Check for NULL before dereferencing input
+ string
+
+There is the possibility that the value of str comes from an external
+source and continuing to use it before ever checking its validity is
+wrong. So, needs fixing.
+
+Additionally, drop unneeded part initialization.
+
+Fixes: CID 292444
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=bc9c468a2ce84bc767234eec888b71f1bc744fff]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/kern/partition.c | 5 ++++-
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/kern/partition.c b/grub-core/kern/partition.c
+index e499147..b10a184 100644
+--- a/grub-core/kern/partition.c
++++ b/grub-core/kern/partition.c
+@@ -109,11 +109,14 @@ grub_partition_map_probe (const grub_partition_map_t partmap,
+ grub_partition_t
+ grub_partition_probe (struct grub_disk *disk, const char *str)
+ {
+-  grub_partition_t part = 0;
++  grub_partition_t part;
+   grub_partition_t curpart = 0;
+   grub_partition_t tail;
+   const char *ptr;
+ 
++  if (str == NULL)
++    return 0;
++
+   part = tail = disk->partition;
+ 
+   for (ptr = str; *ptr;)
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 7cf4d64149..94b89aa643 100644
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0012-gnulib-regcomp-Fix-uninitialized-re_token.patch \
            file://0013-io-lzopio-Resolve-unnecessary-self-assignment-errors.patch \
            file://0014-zstd-Initialize-seq_t-structure-fully.patch \
+           file://0015-kern-partition-Check-for-NULL-before-dereferencing-i.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#16 lore raw

PATCH 16/46 grub: fix a memory leak

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

Add a fix for a memory leak in grub's disk/ldm. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...re-comp-data-is-freed-before-exiting.patch | 128 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |   1 +
 2 files changed, 129 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0016-disk-ldm-Make-sure-comp-data-is-freed-before-exiting.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0016-disk-ldm-Make-sure-comp-data-is-freed-before-exiting.patch new file +128 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c1687c75d0
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+From 0c5d0fd796e6cafba179321de396681a493c4158 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Marco A Benatto <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2020 11:53:03 -0300
+Subject: [PATCH] disk/ldm: Make sure comp data is freed before exiting from
+ make_vg()
+
+Several error handling paths in make_vg() do not free comp data before
+jumping to fail2 label and returning from the function. This will leak
+memory. So, let's fix all issues of that kind.
+
+Fixes: CID 73804
+
+Signed-off-by: Marco A Benatto <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=23e39f50ca7a107f6b66396ed4d177a914dee035]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/disk/ldm.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c
+index 58f8a53..428415f 100644
+--- a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c
++++ b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c
+@@ -554,7 +554,11 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk,
+ 	      comp->segments = grub_calloc (comp->segment_alloc,
+ 					    sizeof (*comp->segments));
+ 	      if (!comp->segments)
+-		goto fail2;
++		{
++		  grub_free (comp->internal_id);
++		  grub_free (comp);
++		  goto fail2;
++		}
+ 	    }
+ 	  else
+ 	    {
+@@ -562,7 +566,11 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk,
+ 	      comp->segment_count = 1;
+ 	      comp->segments = grub_malloc (sizeof (*comp->segments));
+ 	      if (!comp->segments)
+-		goto fail2;
++		{
++		  grub_free (comp->internal_id);
++		  grub_free (comp);
++		  goto fail2;
++		}
+ 	      comp->segments->start_extent = 0;
+ 	      comp->segments->extent_count = lv->size;
+ 	      comp->segments->layout = 0;
+@@ -574,15 +582,26 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk,
+ 		  comp->segments->layout = GRUB_RAID_LAYOUT_SYMMETRIC_MASK;
+ 		}
+ 	      else
+-		goto fail2;
++		{
++		  grub_free (comp->segments);
++		  grub_free (comp->internal_id);
++		  grub_free (comp);
++		  goto fail2;
++		}
+ 	      ptr += *ptr + 1;
+ 	      ptr++;
+ 	      if (!(vblk[i].flags & 0x10))
+-		goto fail2;
++		{
++		  grub_free (comp->segments);
++		  grub_free (comp->internal_id);
++		  grub_free (comp);
++		  goto fail2;
++		}
+ 	      if (ptr >= vblk[i].dynamic + sizeof (vblk[i].dynamic)
+ 		  || ptr + *ptr + 1 >= vblk[i].dynamic
+ 		  + sizeof (vblk[i].dynamic))
+ 		{
++		  grub_free (comp->segments);
+ 		  grub_free (comp->internal_id);
+ 		  grub_free (comp);
+ 		  goto fail2;
+@@ -592,6 +611,7 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk,
+ 	      if (ptr + *ptr + 1 >= vblk[i].dynamic
+ 		  + sizeof (vblk[i].dynamic))
+ 		{
++		  grub_free (comp->segments);
+ 		  grub_free (comp->internal_id);
+ 		  grub_free (comp);
+ 		  goto fail2;
+@@ -601,7 +621,12 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk,
+ 	      comp->segments->nodes = grub_calloc (comp->segments->node_alloc,
+ 						   sizeof (*comp->segments->nodes));
+ 	      if (!lv->segments->nodes)
+-		goto fail2;
++		{
++		  grub_free (comp->segments);
++		  grub_free (comp->internal_id);
++		  grub_free (comp);
++		  goto fail2;
++		}
+ 	    }
+ 
+ 	  if (lv->segments->node_alloc == lv->segments->node_count)
+@@ -611,11 +636,23 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk,
+ 
+ 	      if (grub_mul (lv->segments->node_alloc, 2, &lv->segments->node_alloc) ||
+ 		  grub_mul (lv->segments->node_alloc, sizeof (*lv->segments->nodes), &sz))
+-		goto fail2;
++		{
++		  grub_free (comp->segments->nodes);
++		  grub_free (comp->segments);
++		  grub_free (comp->internal_id);
++		  grub_free (comp);
++		  goto fail2;
++		}
+ 
+ 	      t = grub_realloc (lv->segments->nodes, sz);
+ 	      if (!t)
+-		goto fail2;
++		{
++		  grub_free (comp->segments->nodes);
++		  grub_free (comp->segments);
++		  grub_free (comp->internal_id);
++		  grub_free (comp);
++		  goto fail2;
++		}
+ 	      lv->segments->nodes = t;
+ 	    }
+ 	  lv->segments->nodes[lv->segments->node_count].pv = 0;
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 94b89aa643..479e2f71f2 100644
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0013-io-lzopio-Resolve-unnecessary-self-assignment-errors.patch \
            file://0014-zstd-Initialize-seq_t-structure-fully.patch \
            file://0015-kern-partition-Check-for-NULL-before-dereferencing-i.patch \
+           file://0016-disk-ldm-Make-sure-comp-data-is-freed-before-exiting.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#17 lore raw

PATCH 17/46 grub: fix a memory leak

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch adds a fix for a memory leak in grub's disk/ldm. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...-If-failed-then-free-vg-variable-too.patch | 28 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0017-disk-ldm-If-failed-then-free-vg-variable-too.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0017-disk-ldm-If-failed-then-free-vg-variable-too.patch new file +28 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ecdb230f76
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From 253485e8df3c9dedac848567e638157530184295 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2020 10:07:47 -0300
+Subject: [PATCH] disk/ldm: If failed then free vg variable too
+
+Fixes: CID 73809
+
+Signed-off-by: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=e0b83df5da538d2a38f770e60817b3a4b9d5b4d7]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/disk/ldm.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c
+index 428415f..54713f4 100644
+--- a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c
++++ b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c
+@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk,
+     {
+       grub_free (vg->uuid);
+       grub_free (vg->name);
++      grub_free (vg);
+       return NULL;
+     }
+   grub_memcpy (vg->uuid, label->group_guid, LDM_GUID_STRLEN);
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 479e2f71f2..a8ee0dd68a 100644
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0014-zstd-Initialize-seq_t-structure-fully.patch \
            file://0015-kern-partition-Check-for-NULL-before-dereferencing-i.patch \
            file://0016-disk-ldm-Make-sure-comp-data-is-freed-before-exiting.patch \
+           file://0017-disk-ldm-If-failed-then-free-vg-variable-too.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#18 lore raw

PATCH 18/46 grub: fix a memory leak

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

Add a fix for a memory leak in grub'd disk/ldm. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...ory-leak-on-uninserted-lv-references.patch | 50 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0018-disk-ldm-Fix-memory-leak-on-uninserted-lv-references.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0018-disk-ldm-Fix-memory-leak-on-uninserted-lv-references.patch new file +50 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..26932f674c
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From 3e1d2f1959acbe5152cdd5818d495f6455d1a158 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2020 10:00:51 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] disk/ldm: Fix memory leak on uninserted lv references
+
+The problem here is that the memory allocated to the variable lv is not
+yet inserted into the list that is being processed at the label fail2.
+
+As we can already see at line 342, which correctly frees lv before going
+to fail2, we should also be doing that at these earlier jumps to fail2.
+
+Fixes: CID 73824
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=156c281a1625dc73fd350530630c6f2d5673d4f6]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/disk/ldm.c | 10 ++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c
+index 54713f4..e82e989 100644
+--- a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c
++++ b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c
+@@ -321,7 +321,10 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk,
+ 	  lv->visible = 1;
+ 	  lv->segments = grub_zalloc (sizeof (*lv->segments));
+ 	  if (!lv->segments)
+-	    goto fail2;
++	    {
++	      grub_free (lv);
++	      goto fail2;
++	    }
+ 	  lv->segments->start_extent = 0;
+ 	  lv->segments->type = GRUB_DISKFILTER_MIRROR;
+ 	  lv->segments->node_count = 0;
+@@ -329,7 +332,10 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk,
+ 	  lv->segments->nodes = grub_calloc (lv->segments->node_alloc,
+ 					     sizeof (*lv->segments->nodes));
+ 	  if (!lv->segments->nodes)
+-	    goto fail2;
++	    {
++	      grub_free (lv);
++	      goto fail2;
++	    }
+ 	  ptr = vblk[i].dynamic;
+ 	  if (ptr + *ptr + 1 >= vblk[i].dynamic
+ 	      + sizeof (vblk[i].dynamic))
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index a8ee0dd68a..2fccdc2d62 100644
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0015-kern-partition-Check-for-NULL-before-dereferencing-i.patch \
            file://0016-disk-ldm-Make-sure-comp-data-is-freed-before-exiting.patch \
            file://0017-disk-ldm-If-failed-then-free-vg-variable-too.patch \
+           file://0018-disk-ldm-Fix-memory-leak-on-uninserted-lv-references.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#19 lore raw

PATCH 19/46 grub: fix an integer overflow

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch fixes a potential overflow in grub's disk/cryptodisk. It is a part of a security series [1]

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...odisk-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch | 50 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0019-disk-cryptodisk-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0019-disk-cryptodisk-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch new file +50 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dd7fda357d
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From 2550aaa0c23fdf8b6c54e00c6b838f2e3aa81fe2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 11:38:31 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] disk/cryptodisk: Fix potential integer overflow
+
+The encrypt and decrypt functions expect a grub_size_t. So, we need to
+ensure that the constant bit shift is using grub_size_t rather than
+unsigned int when it is performing the shift.
+
+Fixes: CID 307788
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=a201ad17caa430aa710654fdf2e6ab4c8166f031]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c | 8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c
+index 5037768..6883f48 100644
+--- a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c
++++ b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c
+@@ -311,10 +311,10 @@ grub_cryptodisk_endecrypt (struct grub_cryptodisk *dev,
+ 	case GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MODE_CBC:
+ 	  if (do_encrypt)
+ 	    err = grub_crypto_cbc_encrypt (dev->cipher, data + i, data + i,
+-					   (1U << dev->log_sector_size), iv);
++					   ((grub_size_t) 1 << dev->log_sector_size), iv);
+ 	  else
+ 	    err = grub_crypto_cbc_decrypt (dev->cipher, data + i, data + i,
+-					   (1U << dev->log_sector_size), iv);
++					   ((grub_size_t) 1 << dev->log_sector_size), iv);
+ 	  if (err)
+ 	    return err;
+ 	  break;
+@@ -322,10 +322,10 @@ grub_cryptodisk_endecrypt (struct grub_cryptodisk *dev,
+ 	case GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MODE_PCBC:
+ 	  if (do_encrypt)
+ 	    err = grub_crypto_pcbc_encrypt (dev->cipher, data + i, data + i,
+-					    (1U << dev->log_sector_size), iv);
++					    ((grub_size_t) 1 << dev->log_sector_size), iv);
+ 	  else
+ 	    err = grub_crypto_pcbc_decrypt (dev->cipher, data + i, data + i,
+-					    (1U << dev->log_sector_size), iv);
++					    ((grub_size_t) 1 << dev->log_sector_size), iv);
+ 	  if (err)
+ 	    return err;
+ 	  break;
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 2fccdc2d62..130f32551b 100644
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0016-disk-ldm-Make-sure-comp-data-is-freed-before-exiting.patch \
            file://0017-disk-ldm-If-failed-then-free-vg-variable-too.patch \
            file://0018-disk-ldm-Fix-memory-leak-on-uninserted-lv-references.patch \
+           file://0019-disk-cryptodisk-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#20 lore raw

PATCH 20/46 grub: add a fix for a length check

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch adds a fix for a volume name length check in grub's hfsplus. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...that-the-volume-name-length-is-valid.patch | 43 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0020-hfsplus-Check-that-the-volume-name-length-is-valid.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0020-hfsplus-Check-that-the-volume-name-length-is-valid.patch new file +43 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..eb459c547f
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From 7c1813eeec78892fa651046cc224ae4e80d0c94d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2020 17:09:31 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] hfsplus: Check that the volume name length is valid
+
+HFS+ documentation suggests that the maximum filename and volume name is
+255 Unicode characters in length.
+
+So, when converting from big-endian to little-endian, we should ensure
+that the name of the volume has a length that is between 0 and 255,
+inclusive.
+
+Fixes: CID 73641
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=2298f6e0d951251bb9ca97d891d1bc8b74515f8c]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c | 9 +++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c b/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c
+index dae43be..03c3c4c 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c
++++ b/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c
+@@ -1007,6 +1007,15 @@ grub_hfsplus_label (grub_device_t device, char **label)
+     grub_hfsplus_btree_recptr (&data->catalog_tree, node, ptr);
+ 
+   label_len = grub_be_to_cpu16 (catkey->namelen);
++
++  /* Ensure that the length is >= 0. */
++  if (label_len < 0)
++    label_len = 0;
++
++  /* Ensure label length is at most 255 Unicode characters. */
++  if (label_len > 255)
++    label_len = 255;
++
+   label_name = grub_calloc (label_len, sizeof (*label_name));
+   if (!label_name)
+     {
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 130f32551b..3c5274fd96 100644
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0017-disk-ldm-If-failed-then-free-vg-variable-too.patch \
            file://0018-disk-ldm-Fix-memory-leak-on-uninserted-lv-references.patch \
            file://0019-disk-cryptodisk-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch \
+           file://0020-hfsplus-Check-that-the-volume-name-length-is-valid.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#21 lore raw

PATCH 21/46 grub: add a fix for a possible negative shift

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch adds a fix for a possible negative shift in grub's zfs. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...ix-possible-negative-shift-operation.patch | 42 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0021-zfs-Fix-possible-negative-shift-operation.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0021-zfs-Fix-possible-negative-shift-operation.patch new file +42 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..12418858f9
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From c757779e5d09719666c3b155afd2421978a107bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 24 Nov 2020 16:41:49 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] zfs: Fix possible negative shift operation
+
+While it is possible for the return value from zfs_log2() to be zero
+(0), it is quite unlikely, given that the previous assignment to blksz
+is shifted up by SPA_MINBLOCKSHIFT (9) before 9 is subtracted at the
+assignment to epbs.
+
+But, while unlikely during a normal operation, it may be that a carefully
+crafted ZFS filesystem could result in a zero (0) value to the
+dn_datalbkszsec field, which means that the shift left does nothing
+and assigns zero (0) to blksz, resulting in a negative epbs value.
+
+Fixes: CID 73608
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=a02091834d3e167320d8a262ff04b8e83c5e616d]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
+index 36d0373..0c42cba 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
++++ b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
+@@ -2667,6 +2667,11 @@ dnode_get (dnode_end_t * mdn, grub_uint64_t objnum, grub_uint8_t type,
+   blksz = grub_zfs_to_cpu16 (mdn->dn.dn_datablkszsec, 
+ 			     mdn->endian) << SPA_MINBLOCKSHIFT;
+   epbs = zfs_log2 (blksz) - DNODE_SHIFT;
++
++  /* While this should never happen, we should check that epbs is not negative. */
++  if (epbs < 0)
++    epbs = 0;
++
+   blkid = objnum >> epbs;
+   idx = objnum & ((1 << epbs) - 1);
+ 
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 3c5274fd96..360e86685b 100644
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0018-disk-ldm-Fix-memory-leak-on-uninserted-lv-references.patch \
            file://0019-disk-cryptodisk-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch \
            file://0020-hfsplus-Check-that-the-volume-name-length-is-valid.patch \
+           file://0021-zfs-Fix-possible-negative-shift-operation.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#22 lore raw

PATCH 22/46 grub: add a fix for a memory leak

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch adds a fix for a memory leak in grub's path construction in zfs. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...source-leaks-while-constructing-path.patch | 121 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |   1 +
 2 files changed, 122 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0022-zfs-Fix-resource-leaks-while-constructing-path.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0022-zfs-Fix-resource-leaks-while-constructing-path.patch new file +121 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5ded5520e9
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+From 83fdffc07ec4586b375ab36189f255ffbd8f99c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2020 18:54:49 -0300
+Subject: [PATCH] zfs: Fix resource leaks while constructing path
+
+There are several exit points in dnode_get_path() that are causing possible
+memory leaks.
+
+In the while(1) the correct exit mechanism should not be to do a direct return,
+but to instead break out of the loop, setting err first if it is not already set.
+
+The reason behind this is that the dnode_path is a linked list, and while doing
+through this loop, it is being allocated and built up - the only way to
+correctly unravel it is to traverse it, which is what is being done at the end
+of the function outside of the loop.
+
+Several of the existing exit points correctly did a break, but not all so this
+change makes that more consistent and should resolve the leaking of memory as
+found by Coverity.
+
+Fixes: CID 73741
+
+Signed-off-by: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo <[email protected]>
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=89bdab965805e8d54d7f75349024e1a11cbe2eb8]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
+index 0c42cba..9087a72 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
++++ b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
+@@ -2836,8 +2836,8 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn,
+ 
+       if (dnode_path->dn.dn.dn_type != DMU_OT_DIRECTORY_CONTENTS)
+ 	{
+-	  grub_free (path_buf);
+-	  return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, N_("not a directory"));
++	  err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, N_("not a directory"));
++	  break;
+ 	}
+       err = zap_lookup (&(dnode_path->dn), cname, &objnum,
+ 			data, subvol->case_insensitive);
+@@ -2879,11 +2879,18 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn,
+ 		       << SPA_MINBLOCKSHIFT);
+ 
+ 	      if (blksz == 0)
+-		return grub_error(GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "0-sized block");
++                {
++                  err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "0-sized block");
++                  break;
++                }
+ 
+ 	      sym_value = grub_malloc (sym_sz);
+ 	      if (!sym_value)
+-		return grub_errno;
++		{
++		  err = grub_errno;
++		  break;
++		}
++
+ 	      for (block = 0; block < (sym_sz + blksz - 1) / blksz; block++)
+ 		{
+ 		  void *t;
+@@ -2893,7 +2900,7 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn,
+ 		  if (err)
+ 		    {
+ 		      grub_free (sym_value);
+-		      return err;
++		      break;
+ 		    }
+ 
+ 		  movesize = sym_sz - block * blksz;
+@@ -2903,6 +2910,8 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn,
+ 		  grub_memcpy (sym_value + block * blksz, t, movesize);
+ 		  grub_free (t);
+ 		}
++		if (err)
++		  break;
+ 	      free_symval = 1;
+ 	    }	    
+ 	  path = path_buf = grub_malloc (sym_sz + grub_strlen (oldpath) + 1);
+@@ -2911,7 +2920,8 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn,
+ 	      grub_free (oldpathbuf);
+ 	      if (free_symval)
+ 		grub_free (sym_value);
+-	      return grub_errno;
++	      err = grub_errno;
++	      break;
+ 	    }
+ 	  grub_memcpy (path, sym_value, sym_sz);
+ 	  if (free_symval)
+@@ -2949,11 +2959,12 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn,
+ 	      
+ 	      err = zio_read (bp, dnode_path->dn.endian, &sahdrp, NULL, data);
+ 	      if (err)
+-		return err;
++	        break;
+ 	    }
+ 	  else
+ 	    {
+-	      return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "filesystem is corrupt");
++	      err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "filesystem is corrupt");
++	      break;
+ 	    }
+ 
+ 	  hdrsize = SA_HDR_SIZE (((sa_hdr_phys_t *) sahdrp));
+@@ -2974,7 +2985,8 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn,
+ 	      if (!path_buf)
+ 		{
+ 		  grub_free (oldpathbuf);
+-		  return grub_errno;
++		  err = grub_errno;
++		  break;
+ 		}
+ 	      grub_memcpy (path, sym_value, sym_sz);
+ 	      path [sym_sz] = 0;
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 360e86685b..1630235edd 100644
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0019-disk-cryptodisk-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch \
            file://0020-hfsplus-Check-that-the-volume-name-length-is-valid.patch \
            file://0021-zfs-Fix-possible-negative-shift-operation.patch \
+           file://0022-zfs-Fix-resource-leaks-while-constructing-path.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#23 lore raw

PATCH 23/46 grub: add a fix for possible integer overflows

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch adds a fix for a possible integer overflows in grub's zfs. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...3-zfs-Fix-possible-integer-overflows.patch | 56 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0023-zfs-Fix-possible-integer-overflows.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0023-zfs-Fix-possible-integer-overflows.patch new file +56 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8df758b41f
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From ec35d862f3567671048aa0d0d8ad1ded1fd25336 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2020 22:17:04 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] zfs: Fix possible integer overflows
+
+In all cases the problem is that the value being acted upon by
+a left-shift is a 32-bit number which is then being used in the
+context of a 64-bit number.
+
+To avoid overflow we ensure that the number being shifted is 64-bit
+before the shift is done.
+
+Fixes: CID 73684, CID 73695, CID 73764
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=302c12ff5714bc455949117c1c9548ccb324d55b]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c | 8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
+index 9087a72..b078ccc 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
++++ b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c
+@@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ find_bestub (uberblock_phys_t * ub_array,
+       ubptr = (uberblock_phys_t *) ((grub_properly_aligned_t *) ub_array
+ 				    + ((i << ub_shift)
+ 				       / sizeof (grub_properly_aligned_t)));
+-      err = uberblock_verify (ubptr, offset, 1 << ub_shift);
++      err = uberblock_verify (ubptr, offset, (grub_size_t) 1 << ub_shift);
+       if (err)
+ 	{
+ 	  grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+@@ -1543,7 +1543,7 @@ read_device (grub_uint64_t offset, struct grub_zfs_device_desc *desc,
+ 
+ 	    high = grub_divmod64 ((offset >> desc->ashift) + c,
+ 				  desc->n_children, &devn);
+-	    csize = bsize << desc->ashift;
++	    csize = (grub_size_t) bsize << desc->ashift;
+ 	    if (csize > len)
+ 	      csize = len;
+ 
+@@ -1635,8 +1635,8 @@ read_device (grub_uint64_t offset, struct grub_zfs_device_desc *desc,
+ 
+ 	    while (len > 0)
+ 	      {
+-		grub_size_t csize;
+-		csize = ((s / (desc->n_children - desc->nparity))
++		grub_size_t csize = s;
++		csize = ((csize / (desc->n_children - desc->nparity))
+ 			 << desc->ashift);
+ 		if (csize > len)
+ 		  csize = len;
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 1630235edd..9158fc7f50 100644
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0020-hfsplus-Check-that-the-volume-name-length-is-valid.patch \
            file://0021-zfs-Fix-possible-negative-shift-operation.patch \
            file://0022-zfs-Fix-resource-leaks-while-constructing-path.patch \
+           file://0023-zfs-Fix-possible-integer-overflows.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#24 lore raw

PATCH 24/46 grub: fix an error check

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch fixes an error check in grub's zfsinfo. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...-a-check-for-error-allocating-memory.patch | 35 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0024-zfsinfo-Correct-a-check-for-error-allocating-memory.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0024-zfsinfo-Correct-a-check-for-error-allocating-memory.patch new file +35 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..555dc19168
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From b085da8efda9b81f94aa197ee045226563554fdf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2020 10:56:45 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] zfsinfo: Correct a check for error allocating memory
+
+While arguably the check for grub_errno is correct, we should really be
+checking the return value from the function since it is always possible
+that grub_errno was set elsewhere, making this code behave incorrectly.
+
+Fixes: CID 73668
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=7aab03418ec6a9b991aa44416cb2585aff4e7972]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/fs/zfs/zfsinfo.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfsinfo.c b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfsinfo.c
+index c8a28ac..bf29180 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfsinfo.c
++++ b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfsinfo.c
+@@ -358,8 +358,8 @@ grub_cmd_zfs_bootfs (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc,
+     return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, N_("one argument expected"));
+ 
+   devname = grub_file_get_device_name (args[0]);
+-  if (grub_errno)
+-    return grub_errno;
++  if (devname == NULL)
++    return GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ 
+   dev = grub_device_open (devname);
+   grub_free (devname);
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 9158fc7f50..a660c069db 100644
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0021-zfs-Fix-possible-negative-shift-operation.patch \
            file://0022-zfs-Fix-resource-leaks-while-constructing-path.patch \
            file://0023-zfs-Fix-possible-integer-overflows.patch \
+           file://0024-zfsinfo-Correct-a-check-for-error-allocating-memory.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#25 lore raw

PATCH 25/46 grub: add a fix for a memory leak

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch fixes a memory leak in grub's affs. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 .../files/0025-affs-Fix-memory-leaks.patch    | 82 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 83 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0025-affs-Fix-memory-leaks.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0025-affs-Fix-memory-leaks.patch new file +82 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..435130516c
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+From 929c2ce8214c53cb95abff57a89556cd18444097 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2020 12:48:07 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] affs: Fix memory leaks
+
+The node structure reference is being allocated but not freed if it
+reaches the end of the function. If any of the hooks had returned
+a non-zero value, then node would have been copied in to the context
+reference, but otherwise node is not stored and should be freed.
+
+Similarly, the call to grub_affs_create_node() replaces the allocated
+memory in node with a newly allocated structure, leaking the existing
+memory pointed by node.
+
+Finally, when dir->parent is set, then we again replace node with newly
+allocated memory, which seems unnecessary when we copy in the values
+from dir->parent immediately after.
+
+Fixes: CID 73759
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=178ac5107389f8e5b32489d743d6824a5ebf342a]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/fs/affs.c | 18 ++++++++----------
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/fs/affs.c b/grub-core/fs/affs.c
+index 220b371..230e26a 100644
+--- a/grub-core/fs/affs.c
++++ b/grub-core/fs/affs.c
+@@ -400,12 +400,12 @@ grub_affs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
+ {
+   unsigned int i;
+   struct grub_affs_file file;
+-  struct grub_fshelp_node *node = 0;
++  struct grub_fshelp_node *node, *orig_node;
+   struct grub_affs_data *data = dir->data;
+   grub_uint32_t *hashtable;
+ 
+   /* Create the directory entries for `.' and `..'.  */
+-  node = grub_zalloc (sizeof (*node));
++  node = orig_node = grub_zalloc (sizeof (*node));
+   if (!node)
+     return 1;
+     
+@@ -414,9 +414,6 @@ grub_affs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
+     return 1;
+   if (dir->parent)
+     {
+-      node = grub_zalloc (sizeof (*node));
+-      if (!node)
+-	return 1;
+       *node = *dir->parent;
+       if (hook ("..", GRUB_FSHELP_DIR, node, hook_data))
+ 	return 1;
+@@ -456,17 +453,18 @@ grub_affs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir,
+ 
+ 	  if (grub_affs_create_node (dir, hook, hook_data, &node, &hashtable,
+ 				     next, &file))
+-	    return 1;
++	    {
++	      /* Node has been replaced in function. */
++	      grub_free (orig_node);
++	      return 1;
++	    }
+ 
+ 	  next = grub_be_to_cpu32 (file.next);
+ 	}
+     }
+ 
+-  grub_free (hashtable);
+-  return 0;
+-
+  fail:
+-  grub_free (node);
++  grub_free (orig_node);
+   grub_free (hashtable);
+   return 0;
+ }
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index a660c069db..13e2b1600d 100644
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0022-zfs-Fix-resource-leaks-while-constructing-path.patch \
            file://0023-zfs-Fix-possible-integer-overflows.patch \
            file://0024-zfsinfo-Correct-a-check-for-error-allocating-memory.patch \
+           file://0025-affs-Fix-memory-leaks.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#26 lore raw

PATCH 26/46 grub: add a fix for a possible unintended sign extension

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch fixes a possible unintended sign extension in grub's libgcrypt/mpi. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...x-possible-unintended-sign-extension.patch | 36 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0026-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-unintended-sign-extension.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0026-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-unintended-sign-extension.patch new file +36 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f500f1a296
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+From 9b16d7bcad1c7fea7f26eb2fb3af1a5ca70ba34e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2020 16:43:37 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] libgcrypt/mpi: Fix possible unintended sign extension
+
+The array of unsigned char gets promoted to a signed 32-bit int before
+it is finally promoted to a size_t. There is the possibility that this
+may result in the signed-bit being set for the intermediate signed
+32-bit int. We should ensure that the promotion is to the correct type
+before we bitwise-OR the values.
+
+Fixes: CID 96697
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=e8814c811132a70f9b55418f7567378a34ad3883]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+
+---
+ grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c b/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c
+index a3435ed..7ecad27 100644
+--- a/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c
++++ b/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c
+@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ gcry_mpi_scan (struct gcry_mpi **ret_mpi, enum gcry_mpi_format format,
+       if (len && len < 4)
+         return gcry_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_SHORT);
+ 
+-      n = (s[0] << 24 | s[1] << 16 | s[2] << 8 | s[3]);
++      n = ((size_t)s[0] << 24 | (size_t)s[1] << 16 | (size_t)s[2] << 8 | (size_t)s[3]);
+       s += 4;
+       if (len)
+         len -= 4;
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 13e2b1600d..be35ac04ef 100644
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0023-zfs-Fix-possible-integer-overflows.patch \
            file://0024-zfsinfo-Correct-a-check-for-error-allocating-memory.patch \
            file://0025-affs-Fix-memory-leaks.patch \
+           file://0026-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-unintended-sign-extension.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#27 lore raw

PATCH 27/46 grub: add a fix for a possible NULL dereference

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch adds a fix for a possible NULL dereference in grub's libgcrypt/mpi. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...pt-mpi-Fix-possible-NULL-dereference.patch | 33 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0027-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-NULL-dereference.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0027-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-NULL-dereference.patch new file +33 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..08299d021e
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From d26c8771293637b0465f2cb67d97cb58bacc62da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2020 10:41:54 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] libgcrypt/mpi: Fix possible NULL dereference
+
+The code in gcry_mpi_scan() assumes that buffer is not NULL, but there
+is no explicit check for that, so we add one.
+
+Fixes: CID 73757
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=ae0f3fabeba7b393113d5dc185b6aff9b728136d]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c b/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c
+index 7ecad27..6fe3891 100644
+--- a/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c
++++ b/grub-core/lib/libgcrypt/mpi/mpicoder.c
+@@ -379,6 +379,9 @@ gcry_mpi_scan (struct gcry_mpi **ret_mpi, enum gcry_mpi_format format,
+   unsigned int len;
+   int secure = (buffer && gcry_is_secure (buffer));
+ 
++  if (!buffer)
++    return gcry_error (GPG_ERR_INV_ARG);
++
+   if (format == GCRYMPI_FMT_SSH)
+     len = 0;
+   else
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index be35ac04ef..ef409bdd6a 100644
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0024-zfsinfo-Correct-a-check-for-error-allocating-memory.patch \
            file://0025-affs-Fix-memory-leaks.patch \
            file://0026-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-unintended-sign-extension.patch \
+           file://0027-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-NULL-dereference.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#28 lore raw

PATCH 28/46 grub: add a fix for a memory leak

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch fixes a memory leak in grub's syslinux parsing. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...slinux-Fix-memory-leak-while-parsing.patch | 43 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0028-syslinux-Fix-memory-leak-while-parsing.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0028-syslinux-Fix-memory-leak-while-parsing.patch new file +43 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d8c21d88f7
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+From ea12feb69b6af93c7e2fa03df7ac3bd1f4edd599 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2020 15:31:53 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] syslinux: Fix memory leak while parsing
+
+In syslinux_parse_real() the 2 points where return is being called
+didn't release the memory stored in buf which is no longer required.
+
+Fixes: CID 176634
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=95bc016dba94cab3d398dd74160665915cd08ad6]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/lib/syslinux_parse.c | 6 +++++-
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/lib/syslinux_parse.c b/grub-core/lib/syslinux_parse.c
+index 4afa992..3acc6b4 100644
+--- a/grub-core/lib/syslinux_parse.c
++++ b/grub-core/lib/syslinux_parse.c
+@@ -737,7 +737,10 @@ syslinux_parse_real (struct syslinux_menu *menu)
+ 		  && grub_strncasecmp ("help", ptr3, ptr4 - ptr3) == 0))
+ 	    {
+ 	      if (helptext (ptr5, file, menu))
+-		return 1;
++		{
++		  grub_free (buf);
++		  return 1;
++		}
+ 	      continue;
+ 	    }
+ 
+@@ -757,6 +760,7 @@ syslinux_parse_real (struct syslinux_menu *menu)
+     }
+  fail:
+   grub_file_close (file);
++  grub_free (buf);
+   return err;
+ }
+ 
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index ef409bdd6a..c965f0fd15 100644
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0025-affs-Fix-memory-leaks.patch \
            file://0026-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-unintended-sign-extension.patch \
            file://0027-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-NULL-dereference.patch \
+           file://0028-syslinux-Fix-memory-leak-while-parsing.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#29 lore raw

PATCH 29/46 grub: add a fix for a memory leak

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch adds a fix for a memory leak in grub's normal/completion. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...n-Fix-leaking-of-memory-when-process.patch | 52 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0029-normal-completion-Fix-leaking-of-memory-when-process.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0029-normal-completion-Fix-leaking-of-memory-when-process.patch new file +52 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8a26e5bc5b
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From 2367049d2021e00d82d19cee923e06a4b04ebc30 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 18:56:48 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] normal/completion: Fix leaking of memory when processing a
+ completion
+
+It is possible for the code to reach the end of the function without
+freeing the memory allocated to argv and argc still to be 0.
+
+We should always call grub_free(argv). The grub_free() will handle
+a NULL argument correctly if it reaches that code without the memory
+being allocated.
+
+Fixes: CID 96672
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=9213575b7a95b514bce80be5964a28d407d7d56d]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/normal/completion.c | 10 ++++------
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/normal/completion.c b/grub-core/normal/completion.c
+index 5961028..46e473c 100644
+--- a/grub-core/normal/completion.c
++++ b/grub-core/normal/completion.c
+@@ -400,8 +400,8 @@ char *
+ grub_normal_do_completion (char *buf, int *restore,
+ 			   void (*hook) (const char *, grub_completion_type_t, int))
+ {
+-  int argc;
+-  char **argv;
++  int argc = 0;
++  char **argv = NULL;
+ 
+   /* Initialize variables.  */
+   match = 0;
+@@ -516,10 +516,8 @@ grub_normal_do_completion (char *buf, int *restore,
+ 
+  fail:
+   if (argc != 0)
+-    {
+-      grub_free (argv[0]);
+-      grub_free (argv);
+-    }
++    grub_free (argv[0]);
++  grub_free (argv);
+   grub_free (match);
+   grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ 
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index c965f0fd15..1460e559b9 100644
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0026-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-unintended-sign-extension.patch \
            file://0027-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-NULL-dereference.patch \
            file://0028-syslinux-Fix-memory-leak-while-parsing.patch \
+           file://0029-normal-completion-Fix-leaking-of-memory-when-process.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#30 lore raw

PATCH 30/46 grub: fix a memory leak

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

Add a fix of a memory leak in grub's commands/hashsum. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...0-commands-hashsum-Fix-a-memory-leak.patch | 56 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0030-commands-hashsum-Fix-a-memory-leak.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0030-commands-hashsum-Fix-a-memory-leak.patch new file +56 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e34a19e12c
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+From b136fa14d26d1833ffcb852f86e65da5960cfb99 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Chris Coulson <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 1 Dec 2020 23:41:24 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] commands/hashsum: Fix a memory leak
+
+check_list() uses grub_file_getline(), which allocates a buffer.
+If the hash list file contains invalid lines, the function leaks
+this buffer when it returns an error.
+
+Fixes: CID 176635
+
+Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=8b6f528e52e18b7a69f90b8dc3671d7b1147d9f3]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/commands/hashsum.c | 15 ++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/commands/hashsum.c b/grub-core/commands/hashsum.c
+index 456ba90..b8a22b0 100644
+--- a/grub-core/commands/hashsum.c
++++ b/grub-core/commands/hashsum.c
+@@ -128,11 +128,17 @@ check_list (const gcry_md_spec_t *hash, const char *hashfilename,
+ 	  high = hextoval (*p++);
+ 	  low = hextoval (*p++);
+ 	  if (high < 0 || low < 0)
+-	    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "invalid hash list");
++	    {
++	      grub_free (buf);
++	      return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "invalid hash list");
++	    }
+ 	  expected[i] = (high << 4) | low;
+ 	}
+       if ((p[0] != ' ' && p[0] != '\t') || (p[1] != ' ' && p[1] != '\t'))
+-	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "invalid hash list");
++	{
++	  grub_free (buf);
++	  return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "invalid hash list");
++	}
+       p += 2;
+       if (prefix)
+ 	{
+@@ -140,7 +146,10 @@ check_list (const gcry_md_spec_t *hash, const char *hashfilename,
+ 	  
+ 	  filename = grub_xasprintf ("%s/%s", prefix, p);
+ 	  if (!filename)
+-	    return grub_errno;
++	    {
++	      grub_free (buf);
++	      return grub_errno;
++	    }
+ 	  file = grub_file_open (filename, GRUB_FILE_TYPE_TO_HASH
+ 				 | (!uncompress ? GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NO_DECOMPRESS
+ 				    : GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NONE));
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 1460e559b9..d18e329b96 100644
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0027-libgcrypt-mpi-Fix-possible-NULL-dereference.patch \
            file://0028-syslinux-Fix-memory-leak-while-parsing.patch \
            file://0029-normal-completion-Fix-leaking-of-memory-when-process.patch \
+           file://0030-commands-hashsum-Fix-a-memory-leak.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#31 lore raw

PATCH 31/46 grub: remove unneeded return value

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch removes an uneeded return value in grub's (static) grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info(). It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...move-unnecessary-return-value-of-gru.patch | 94 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 95 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0031-video-efi_gop-Remove-unnecessary-return-value-of-gru.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0031-video-efi_gop-Remove-unnecessary-return-value-of-gru.patch new file +94 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7e4e951245
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+From 2a1e5659763790201a342f8a897c8c9d8d91b1cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2020 21:14:31 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] video/efi_gop: Remove unnecessary return value of
+ grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info()
+
+The return value of grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info() is never able to be
+anything other than GRUB_ERR_NONE. So, rather than continue to return
+a value and checking it each time, it is more correct to redefine the
+function to not return anything and remove checks of its return value
+altogether.
+
+Fixes: CID 96701
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=fc5951d3b1616055ef81a019a5affc09d13344d0]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/video/efi_gop.c | 25 ++++++-------------------
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/video/efi_gop.c b/grub-core/video/efi_gop.c
+index 7f9d1c2..db2ee98 100644
+--- a/grub-core/video/efi_gop.c
++++ b/grub-core/video/efi_gop.c
+@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ grub_video_gop_fill_real_mode_info (unsigned mode,
+   return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ }
+ 
+-static grub_err_t
++static void
+ grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (unsigned mode,
+ 			       struct grub_efi_gop_mode_info *in,
+ 			       struct grub_video_mode_info *out)
+@@ -252,8 +252,6 @@ grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (unsigned mode,
+   out->blit_format = GRUB_VIDEO_BLIT_FORMAT_BGRA_8888;
+   out->mode_type |= (GRUB_VIDEO_MODE_TYPE_DOUBLE_BUFFERED
+ 		     | GRUB_VIDEO_MODE_TYPE_UPDATING_SWAP);
+-
+-  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+@@ -266,7 +264,6 @@ grub_video_gop_iterate (int (*hook) (const struct grub_video_mode_info *info, vo
+       grub_efi_uintn_t size;
+       grub_efi_status_t status;
+       struct grub_efi_gop_mode_info *info = NULL;
+-      grub_err_t err;
+       struct grub_video_mode_info mode_info;
+ 	 
+       status = efi_call_4 (gop->query_mode, gop, mode, &size, &info);
+@@ -277,12 +274,7 @@ grub_video_gop_iterate (int (*hook) (const struct grub_video_mode_info *info, vo
+ 	  continue;
+ 	}
+ 
+-      err = grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (mode, info, &mode_info);
+-      if (err)
+-	{
+-	  grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+-	  continue;
+-	}
++      grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (mode, info, &mode_info);
+       if (hook (&mode_info, hook_arg))
+ 	return 1;
+     }
+@@ -466,13 +458,8 @@ grub_video_gop_setup (unsigned int width, unsigned int height,
+ 
+   info = gop->mode->info;
+ 
+-  err = grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (gop->mode->mode, info,
+-				       &framebuffer.mode_info);
+-  if (err)
+-    {
+-      grub_dprintf ("video", "GOP: couldn't fill mode info\n");
+-      return err;
+-    }
++  grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (gop->mode->mode, info,
++				 &framebuffer.mode_info);
+ 
+   framebuffer.ptr = (void *) (grub_addr_t) gop->mode->fb_base;
+   framebuffer.offscreen
+@@ -486,8 +473,8 @@ grub_video_gop_setup (unsigned int width, unsigned int height,
+     {
+       grub_dprintf ("video", "GOP: couldn't allocate shadow\n");
+       grub_errno = 0;
+-      err = grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (gop->mode->mode, info,
+-					   &framebuffer.mode_info);
++      grub_video_gop_fill_mode_info (gop->mode->mode, info,
++				     &framebuffer.mode_info);
+       buffer = framebuffer.ptr;
+     }
+     
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index d18e329b96..24a269d90d 100644
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0028-syslinux-Fix-memory-leak-while-parsing.patch \
            file://0029-normal-completion-Fix-leaking-of-memory-when-process.patch \
            file://0030-commands-hashsum-Fix-a-memory-leak.patch \
+           file://0031-video-efi_gop-Remove-unnecessary-return-value-of-gru.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#32 lore raw

PATCH 32/46 grub: fix an integer overflow

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch adds a fix for a potential integer overflow in grub's video/fb/fbfill. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...bfill-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch | 78 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 79 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0032-video-fb-fbfill-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0032-video-fb-fbfill-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch new file +78 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8165ea3f71
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+From 99ecf5a44b99d529a6405fe276bedcefa3657a0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2020 15:10:51 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] video/fb/fbfill: Fix potential integer overflow
+
+The multiplication of 2 unsigned 32-bit integers may overflow before
+promotion to unsigned 64-bit. We should ensure that the multiplication
+is done with overflow detection. Additionally, use grub_sub() for
+subtraction.
+
+Fixes: CID 73640, CID 73697, CID 73702, CID 73823
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Signed-off-by: Marco A Benatto <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=7ce3259f67ac2cd93acb0ec0080c24b3b69e66c6]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/video/fb/fbfill.c | 17 +++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/video/fb/fbfill.c b/grub-core/video/fb/fbfill.c
+index 11816d0..a37acd1 100644
+--- a/grub-core/video/fb/fbfill.c
++++ b/grub-core/video/fb/fbfill.c
+@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
+ #include <grub/fbfill.h>
+ #include <grub/fbutil.h>
+ #include <grub/types.h>
++#include <grub/safemath.h>
+ #include <grub/video.h>
+ 
+ /* Generic filler that works for every supported mode.  */
+@@ -61,7 +62,9 @@ grub_video_fbfill_direct32 (struct grub_video_fbblit_info *dst,
+ 
+   /* Calculate the number of bytes to advance from the end of one line
+      to the beginning of the next line.  */
+-  rowskip = dst->mode_info->pitch - dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel * width;
++  if (grub_mul (dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel, width, &rowskip) ||
++      grub_sub (dst->mode_info->pitch, rowskip, &rowskip))
++    return;
+ 
+   /* Get the start address.  */
+   dstptr = grub_video_fb_get_video_ptr (dst, x, y);
+@@ -98,7 +101,9 @@ grub_video_fbfill_direct24 (struct grub_video_fbblit_info *dst,
+ #endif
+   /* Calculate the number of bytes to advance from the end of one line
+      to the beginning of the next line.  */
+-  rowskip = dst->mode_info->pitch - dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel * width;
++  if (grub_mul (dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel, width, &rowskip) ||
++      grub_sub (dst->mode_info->pitch, rowskip, &rowskip))
++    return;
+ 
+   /* Get the start address.  */
+   dstptr = grub_video_fb_get_video_ptr (dst, x, y);
+@@ -131,7 +136,9 @@ grub_video_fbfill_direct16 (struct grub_video_fbblit_info *dst,
+ 
+   /* Calculate the number of bytes to advance from the end of one line
+      to the beginning of the next line.  */
+-  rowskip = (dst->mode_info->pitch - dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel * width);
++  if (grub_mul (dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel, width, &rowskip) ||
++      grub_sub (dst->mode_info->pitch, rowskip, &rowskip))
++    return;
+ 
+   /* Get the start address.  */
+   dstptr = grub_video_fb_get_video_ptr (dst, x, y);
+@@ -161,7 +168,9 @@ grub_video_fbfill_direct8 (struct grub_video_fbblit_info *dst,
+ 
+   /* Calculate the number of bytes to advance from the end of one line
+      to the beginning of the next line.  */
+-  rowskip = dst->mode_info->pitch - dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel * width;
++  if (grub_mul (dst->mode_info->bytes_per_pixel, width, &rowskip) ||
++      grub_sub (dst->mode_info->pitch, rowskip, &rowskip))
++    return;
+ 
+   /* Get the start address.  */
+   dstptr = grub_video_fb_get_video_ptr (dst, x, y);
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 24a269d90d..710ab5e361 100644
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0029-normal-completion-Fix-leaking-of-memory-when-process.patch \
            file://0030-commands-hashsum-Fix-a-memory-leak.patch \
            file://0031-video-efi_gop-Remove-unnecessary-return-value-of-gru.patch \
+           file://0032-video-fb-fbfill-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#33 lore raw

PATCH 33/46 grub: fix multiple integer overflows

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch adds a fix for multiple integer overflows in grub's video/fb/video_fb. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...eo_fb-Fix-multiple-integer-overflows.patch | 104 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |   1 +
 2 files changed, 105 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0033-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-multiple-integer-overflows.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0033-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-multiple-integer-overflows.patch new file +104 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..544e7f31ae
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+From 69b91f7466a5ad5fb85039a5b4118efb77ad6347 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2020 14:43:44 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] video/fb/video_fb: Fix multiple integer overflows
+
+The calculation of the unsigned 64-bit value is being generated by
+multiplying 2, signed or unsigned, 32-bit integers which may overflow
+before promotion to unsigned 64-bit. Fix all of them.
+
+Fixes: CID 73703, CID 73767, CID 73833
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=08e098b1dbf01e96376f594b337491bc4cfa48dd]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
+ 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c b/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c
+index 1a602c8..1c9a138 100644
+--- a/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c
++++ b/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
+ #include <grub/fbutil.h>
+ #include <grub/bitmap.h>
+ #include <grub/dl.h>
++#include <grub/safemath.h>
+ 
+ GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
+ 
+@@ -1417,15 +1418,23 @@ doublebuf_blit_update_screen (void)
+ {
+   if (framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line
+       <= framebuffer.current_dirty.last_line)
+-    grub_memcpy ((char *) framebuffer.pages[0]
+-		 + framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line
+-		 * framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch,
+-		 (char *) framebuffer.back_target->data
+-		 + framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line
+-		 * framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch,
+-		 framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch
+-		 * (framebuffer.current_dirty.last_line
+-		    - framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line));
++    {
++      grub_size_t copy_size;
++
++      if (grub_sub (framebuffer.current_dirty.last_line,
++		    framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line, &copy_size) ||
++	  grub_mul (framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch, copy_size, &copy_size))
++	{
++	  /* Shouldn't happen, but if it does we've a bug. */
++	  return GRUB_ERR_BUG;
++	}
++
++      grub_memcpy ((char *) framebuffer.pages[0] + framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line *
++		   framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch,
++		   (char *) framebuffer.back_target->data + framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line *
++		   framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch,
++		   copy_size);
++    }
+   framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line
+     = framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.height;
+   framebuffer.current_dirty.last_line = 0;
+@@ -1439,7 +1448,7 @@ grub_video_fb_doublebuf_blit_init (struct grub_video_fbrender_target **back,
+ 				   volatile void *framebuf)
+ {
+   grub_err_t err;
+-  grub_size_t page_size = mode_info.pitch * mode_info.height;
++  grub_size_t page_size = (grub_size_t) mode_info.pitch * mode_info.height;
+ 
+   framebuffer.offscreen_buffer = grub_zalloc (page_size);
+   if (! framebuffer.offscreen_buffer)
+@@ -1482,12 +1491,23 @@ doublebuf_pageflipping_update_screen (void)
+     last_line = framebuffer.previous_dirty.last_line;
+ 
+   if (first_line <= last_line)
+-    grub_memcpy ((char *) framebuffer.pages[framebuffer.render_page]
+-		 + first_line * framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch,
+-		 (char *) framebuffer.back_target->data
+-		 + first_line * framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch,
+-		 framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch
+-		 * (last_line - first_line));
++    {
++      grub_size_t copy_size;
++
++      if (grub_sub (last_line, first_line, &copy_size) ||
++	  grub_mul (framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch, copy_size, &copy_size))
++	{
++	  /* Shouldn't happen, but if it does we've a bug. */
++	  return GRUB_ERR_BUG;
++	}
++
++      grub_memcpy ((char *) framebuffer.pages[framebuffer.render_page] + first_line *
++		   framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch,
++		   (char *) framebuffer.back_target->data + first_line *
++		   framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.pitch,
++		   copy_size);
++    }
++
+   framebuffer.previous_dirty = framebuffer.current_dirty;
+   framebuffer.current_dirty.first_line
+     = framebuffer.back_target->mode_info.height;
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 710ab5e361..8b5b9e3b3e 100644
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0030-commands-hashsum-Fix-a-memory-leak.patch \
            file://0031-video-efi_gop-Remove-unnecessary-return-value-of-gru.patch \
            file://0032-video-fb-fbfill-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch \
+           file://0033-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-multiple-integer-overflows.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#34 lore raw

PATCH 34/46 grub: fix a possible integer overflow

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch adds a fix for a possible integer overflow in grub's video/fb/video_fb. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...deo_fb-Fix-possible-integer-overflow.patch | 39 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0034-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-possible-integer-overflow.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0034-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-possible-integer-overflow.patch new file +39 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c82b2c7df0
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+From aac5574ff340a665ccc78d4c3d61596ac67acbbe Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 14:51:30 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] video/fb/video_fb: Fix possible integer overflow
+
+It is minimal possibility that the values being used here will overflow.
+So, change the code to use the safemath function grub_mul() to ensure
+that doesn't happen.
+
+Fixes: CID 73761
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=08413f2f4edec0e2d9bf15f836f6ee5ca2e379cb]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c | 8 +++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c b/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c
+index 1c9a138..ae6b89f 100644
+--- a/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c
++++ b/grub-core/video/fb/video_fb.c
+@@ -1537,7 +1537,13 @@ doublebuf_pageflipping_init (struct grub_video_mode_info *mode_info,
+ 			     volatile void *page1_ptr)
+ {
+   grub_err_t err;
+-  grub_size_t page_size = mode_info->pitch * mode_info->height;
++  grub_size_t page_size = 0;
++
++  if (grub_mul (mode_info->pitch, mode_info->height, &page_size))
++    {
++      /* Shouldn't happen, but if it does we've a bug. */
++      return GRUB_ERR_BUG;
++    }
+ 
+   framebuffer.offscreen_buffer = grub_malloc (page_size);
+   if (! framebuffer.offscreen_buffer)
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 8b5b9e3b3e..04c9b4c092 100644
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0031-video-efi_gop-Remove-unnecessary-return-value-of-gru.patch \
            file://0032-video-fb-fbfill-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch \
            file://0033-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-multiple-integer-overflows.patch \
+           file://0034-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-possible-integer-overflow.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#35 lore raw

PATCH 35/46 grub: test for malformed jpeg files

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch adds a fix for handling malformed JPEG files in grub's video/readers/jpeg. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...eg-Test-for-an-invalid-next-marker-r.patch | 38 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0035-video-readers-jpeg-Test-for-an-invalid-next-marker-r.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0035-video-readers-jpeg-Test-for-an-invalid-next-marker-r.patch new file +38 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3fca2aecb5
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 88361a7fd4e481a76e1159a63c9014fa997ef29c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 15:39:00 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] video/readers/jpeg: Test for an invalid next marker reference
+ from a jpeg file
+
+While it may never happen, and potentially could be caught at the end of
+the function, it is worth checking up front for a bad reference to the
+next marker just in case of a maliciously crafted file being provided.
+
+Fixes: CID 73694
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=5f5eb7ca8e971227e95745abe541df3e1509360e]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
+index 31359a4..0b6ce3c 100644
+--- a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
++++ b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
+@@ -253,6 +253,12 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_quan_table (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
+   next_marker = data->file->offset;
+   next_marker += grub_jpeg_get_word (data);
+ 
++  if (next_marker > data->file->size)
++    {
++      /* Should never be set beyond the size of the file. */
++      return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "jpeg: invalid next reference");
++    }
++
+   while (data->file->offset + sizeof (data->quan_table[id]) + 1
+ 	 <= next_marker)
+     {
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 04c9b4c092..75782b7eb2 100644
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0032-video-fb-fbfill-Fix-potential-integer-overflow.patch \
            file://0033-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-multiple-integer-overflows.patch \
            file://0034-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-possible-integer-overflow.patch \
+           file://0035-video-readers-jpeg-Test-for-an-invalid-next-marker-r.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#36 lore raw

PATCH 36/46 grub: remove dead code

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch removes dead code from grub's gfxmenu/gui_list. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...-Remove-code-that-coverity-is-flaggi.patch | 34 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0036-gfxmenu-gui_list-Remove-code-that-coverity-is-flaggi.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0036-gfxmenu-gui_list-Remove-code-that-coverity-is-flaggi.patch new file +34 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..61e5e5797d
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 9433cb3a37c03f22c2fa769121f1f509fd031ae9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 7 Dec 2020 14:44:47 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] gfxmenu/gui_list: Remove code that coverity is flagging as
+ dead
+
+The test of value for NULL before calling grub_strdup() is not required,
+since the if condition prior to this has already tested for value being
+NULL and cannot reach this code if it is.
+
+Fixes: CID 73659
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=4a1aa5917595650efbd46b581368c470ebee42ab]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/gfxmenu/gui_list.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/gfxmenu/gui_list.c b/grub-core/gfxmenu/gui_list.c
+index 01477cd..df334a6 100644
+--- a/grub-core/gfxmenu/gui_list.c
++++ b/grub-core/gfxmenu/gui_list.c
+@@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ list_set_property (void *vself, const char *name, const char *value)
+         {
+           self->need_to_recreate_boxes = 1;
+           grub_free (self->selected_item_box_pattern);
+-          self->selected_item_box_pattern = value ? grub_strdup (value) : 0;
++          self->selected_item_box_pattern = grub_strdup (value);
+           self->selected_item_box_pattern_inherit = 0;
+         }
+     }
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 75782b7eb2..1a4be33fca 100644
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0033-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-multiple-integer-overflows.patch \
            file://0034-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-possible-integer-overflow.patch \
            file://0035-video-readers-jpeg-Test-for-an-invalid-next-marker-r.patch \
+           file://0036-gfxmenu-gui_list-Remove-code-that-coverity-is-flaggi.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#37 lore raw

PATCH 37/46 grub: fix checking for NULL

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch adds a fix for checking for NULL in grub's loader/bsd. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...ader-bsd-Check-for-NULL-arg-up-front.patch | 47 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0037-loader-bsd-Check-for-NULL-arg-up-front.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0037-loader-bsd-Check-for-NULL-arg-up-front.patch new file +47 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..34643e10ab
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+From 7899384c8fdf9ed96566978c49b0c6e40e70703d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2020 21:47:13 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] loader/bsd: Check for NULL arg up-front
+
+The code in the next block suggests that it is possible for .set to be
+true but .arg may still be NULL.
+
+This code assumes that it is never NULL, yet later is testing if it is
+NULL - that is inconsistent.
+
+So we should check first if .arg is not NULL, and remove this check that
+is being flagged by Coverity since it is no longer required.
+
+Fixes: CID 292471
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=5d5391b0a05abe76e04c1eb68dcc6cbef5326c4a]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c b/grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c
+index b92cbe9..8432283 100644
+--- a/grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c
++++ b/grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c
+@@ -1605,7 +1605,7 @@ grub_cmd_openbsd (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char *argv[])
+   kernel_type = KERNEL_TYPE_OPENBSD;
+   bootflags = grub_bsd_parse_flags (ctxt->state, openbsd_flags);
+ 
+-  if (ctxt->state[OPENBSD_ROOT_ARG].set)
++  if (ctxt->state[OPENBSD_ROOT_ARG].set && ctxt->state[OPENBSD_ROOT_ARG].arg != NULL)
+     {
+       const char *arg = ctxt->state[OPENBSD_ROOT_ARG].arg;
+       unsigned type, unit, part;
+@@ -1622,7 +1622,7 @@ grub_cmd_openbsd (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char *argv[])
+ 			   "unknown disk type name");
+ 
+       unit = grub_strtoul (arg, (char **) &arg, 10);
+-      if (! (arg && *arg >= 'a' && *arg <= 'z'))
++      if (! (*arg >= 'a' && *arg <= 'z'))
+ 	return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+ 			   "only device specifications of form "
+ 			   "<type><number><lowercase letter> are supported");
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 1a4be33fca..8b55afccbb 100644
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0034-video-fb-video_fb-Fix-possible-integer-overflow.patch \
            file://0035-video-readers-jpeg-Test-for-an-invalid-next-marker-r.patch \
            file://0036-gfxmenu-gui_list-Remove-code-that-coverity-is-flaggi.patch \
+           file://0037-loader-bsd-Check-for-NULL-arg-up-front.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#38 lore raw

PATCH 38/46 grub: add a fix for a memory leak

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch adds a fix for a memory leak in grub's loader/xnu. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 .../0038-loader-xnu-Fix-memory-leak.patch     | 38 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0038-loader-xnu-Fix-memory-leak.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0038-loader-xnu-Fix-memory-leak.patch new file +38 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..41f09a22fc
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 0a4aa7c16f65cdfaa1013f0796afa929f8d6dc1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2020 12:53:10 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] loader/xnu: Fix memory leak
+
+The code here is finished with the memory stored in name, but it only
+frees it if there curvalue is valid, while it could actually free it
+regardless.
+
+The fix is a simple relocation of the grub_free() to before the test
+of curvalue.
+
+Fixes: CID 96646
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=bcb59ece3263d118510c4440c4da0950f224bb7f]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/loader/xnu.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/loader/xnu.c b/grub-core/loader/xnu.c
+index 07232d2..b3029a8 100644
+--- a/grub-core/loader/xnu.c
++++ b/grub-core/loader/xnu.c
+@@ -1388,9 +1388,9 @@ grub_xnu_fill_devicetree (void)
+     name[len] = 0;
+ 
+     curvalue = grub_xnu_create_value (curkey, name);
++    grub_free (name);
+     if (!curvalue)
+       return grub_errno;
+-    grub_free (name);
+    
+     data = grub_malloc (grub_strlen (var->value) + 1);
+     if (!data)
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 8b55afccbb..c9e7a06a3f 100644
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0035-video-readers-jpeg-Test-for-an-invalid-next-marker-r.patch \
            file://0036-gfxmenu-gui_list-Remove-code-that-coverity-is-flaggi.patch \
            file://0037-loader-bsd-Check-for-NULL-arg-up-front.patch \
+           file://0038-loader-xnu-Fix-memory-leak.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#39 lore raw

PATCH 39/46 grub: avoid a memory leak

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch fixes a memory leak in grub's loader/xnu when an error is detected in grub_xnu_writetree_toheap(). It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...driverkey-data-when-an-error-is-dete.patch | 77 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 78 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0039-loader-xnu-Free-driverkey-data-when-an-error-is-dete.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0039-loader-xnu-Free-driverkey-data-when-an-error-is-dete.patch new file +77 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f9ad0fc34c
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+From 81117a77a9e945ee5e7c1f12bd5667e2a16cbe32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Marco A Benatto <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2020 12:18:24 -0300
+Subject: [PATCH] loader/xnu: Free driverkey data when an error is detected in
+ grub_xnu_writetree_toheap()
+
+... to avoid memory leaks.
+
+Fixes: CID 96640
+
+Signed-off-by: Marco A Benatto <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=4b4027b6b1c877d7ab467896b04c7bd1aadcfa15]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/loader/xnu.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/loader/xnu.c b/grub-core/loader/xnu.c
+index b3029a8..39ceff8 100644
+--- a/grub-core/loader/xnu.c
++++ b/grub-core/loader/xnu.c
+@@ -224,26 +224,33 @@ grub_xnu_writetree_toheap (grub_addr_t *target, grub_size_t *size)
+   if (! memorymap)
+     return grub_errno;
+ 
+-  driverkey = (struct grub_xnu_devtree_key *) grub_malloc (sizeof (*driverkey));
++  driverkey = (struct grub_xnu_devtree_key *) grub_zalloc (sizeof (*driverkey));
+   if (! driverkey)
+     return grub_errno;
+   driverkey->name = grub_strdup ("DeviceTree");
+   if (! driverkey->name)
+-    return grub_errno;
++    {
++      err = grub_errno;
++      goto fail;
++    }
++
+   driverkey->datasize = sizeof (*extdesc);
+   driverkey->next = memorymap->first_child;
+   memorymap->first_child = driverkey;
+   driverkey->data = extdesc
+     = (struct grub_xnu_extdesc *) grub_malloc (sizeof (*extdesc));
+   if (! driverkey->data)
+-    return grub_errno;
++    {
++      err = grub_errno;
++      goto fail;
++    }
+ 
+   /* Allocate the space based on the size with dummy value. */
+   *size = grub_xnu_writetree_get_size (grub_xnu_devtree_root, "/");
+   err = grub_xnu_heap_malloc (ALIGN_UP (*size + 1, GRUB_XNU_PAGESIZE),
+ 			      &src, target);
+   if (err)
+-    return err;
++    goto fail;
+ 
+   /* Put real data in the dummy. */
+   extdesc->addr = *target;
+@@ -252,6 +259,15 @@ grub_xnu_writetree_toheap (grub_addr_t *target, grub_size_t *size)
+   /* Write the tree to heap. */
+   grub_xnu_writetree_toheap_real (src, grub_xnu_devtree_root, "/");
+   return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
++
++ fail:
++  memorymap->first_child = NULL;
++
++  grub_free (driverkey->data);
++  grub_free (driverkey->name);
++  grub_free (driverkey);
++
++  return err;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Find a key or value in parent key. */
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index c9e7a06a3f..eebe9a7233 100644
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0036-gfxmenu-gui_list-Remove-code-that-coverity-is-flaggi.patch \
            file://0037-loader-bsd-Check-for-NULL-arg-up-front.patch \
            file://0038-loader-xnu-Fix-memory-leak.patch \
+           file://0039-loader-xnu-Free-driverkey-data-when-an-error-is-dete.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#40 lore raw

PATCH 40/46 grub: add a check for a NULL pointer

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch adds a check for a NULL pointer before use in grub's loader/xnu. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...k-if-pointer-is-NULL-before-using-it.patch | 42 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0040-loader-xnu-Check-if-pointer-is-NULL-before-using-it.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0040-loader-xnu-Check-if-pointer-is-NULL-before-using-it.patch new file +42 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8081f7763a
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From 778a3fffd19229e5650a1abfb06c974949991cd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 30 Nov 2020 10:36:00 -0300
+Subject: [PATCH] loader/xnu: Check if pointer is NULL before using it
+
+Fixes: CID 73654
+
+Signed-off-by: Paulo Flabiano Smorigo <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=7c8a2b5d1421a0f2a33d33531f7561f3da93b844]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/loader/xnu.c | 8 ++++----
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/loader/xnu.c b/grub-core/loader/xnu.c
+index 39ceff8..adc048c 100644
+--- a/grub-core/loader/xnu.c
++++ b/grub-core/loader/xnu.c
+@@ -667,6 +667,9 @@ grub_xnu_load_driver (char *infoplistname, grub_file_t binaryfile,
+   char *name, *nameend;
+   int namelen;
+ 
++  if (infoplistname == NULL)
++    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME, N_("missing p-list filename"));
++
+   name = get_name_ptr (infoplistname);
+   nameend = grub_strchr (name, '/');
+ 
+@@ -698,10 +701,7 @@ grub_xnu_load_driver (char *infoplistname, grub_file_t binaryfile,
+   else
+     macho = 0;
+ 
+-  if (infoplistname)
+-    infoplist = grub_file_open (infoplistname, GRUB_FILE_TYPE_XNU_INFO_PLIST);
+-  else
+-    infoplist = 0;
++  infoplist = grub_file_open (infoplistname, GRUB_FILE_TYPE_XNU_INFO_PLIST);
+   grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+   if (infoplist)
+     {
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index eebe9a7233..fad7415e0d 100644
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0037-loader-bsd-Check-for-NULL-arg-up-front.patch \
            file://0038-loader-xnu-Fix-memory-leak.patch \
            file://0039-loader-xnu-Free-driverkey-data-when-an-error-is-dete.patch \
+           file://0040-loader-xnu-Check-if-pointer-is-NULL-before-using-it.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#41 lore raw

PATCH 41/46 grub: add a fix for NULL pointer dereference

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch adds a fix for a NULL pointer dereference in grub's util/grub-install. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...nstall-Fix-NULL-pointer-dereferences.patch | 41 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 42 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0041-util-grub-install-Fix-NULL-pointer-dereferences.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0041-util-grub-install-Fix-NULL-pointer-dereferences.patch new file +41 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ea563a41a0
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+From 5d2dd0052474a882a22e47cc8c3ed87a01819f6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 25 Feb 2021 18:35:01 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] util/grub-install: Fix NULL pointer dereferences
+
+Two grub_device_open() calls does not have associated NULL checks
+for returned values. Fix that and appease the Coverity.
+
+Fixes: CID 314583
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=8b3a95655b4391122e7b0315d8cc6f876caf8183]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ util/grub-install.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/util/grub-install.c b/util/grub-install.c
+index a82725f..367350f 100644
+--- a/util/grub-install.c
++++ b/util/grub-install.c
+@@ -1775,6 +1775,8 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
+ 	  fill_core_services (core_services);
+ 
+ 	  ins_dev = grub_device_open (install_drive);
++	  if (ins_dev == NULL)
++	    grub_util_error ("%s", grub_errmsg);
+ 
+ 	  bless (ins_dev, core_services, 0);
+ 
+@@ -1875,6 +1877,8 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
+ 	  fill_core_services(core_services);
+ 
+ 	  ins_dev = grub_device_open (install_drive);
++	  if (ins_dev == NULL)
++	    grub_util_error ("%s", grub_errmsg);
+ 
+ 	  bless (ins_dev, boot_efi, 1);
+ 	  if (!removable && update_nvram)
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index fad7415e0d..7ca0b469e9 100644
@@ -87,6 +87,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0038-loader-xnu-Fix-memory-leak.patch \
            file://0039-loader-xnu-Free-driverkey-data-when-an-error-is-dete.patch \
            file://0040-loader-xnu-Check-if-pointer-is-NULL-before-using-it.patch \
+           file://0041-util-grub-install-Fix-NULL-pointer-dereferences.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#42 lore raw

PATCH 42/46 grub: add a fix for an incorrect cast

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch adds a fix for incorrect casting from signed to unsigned in grub's util/grub-editenv. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...v-Fix-incorrect-casting-of-a-signed-.patch | 46 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 47 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0042-util-grub-editenv-Fix-incorrect-casting-of-a-signed-.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0042-util-grub-editenv-Fix-incorrect-casting-of-a-signed-.patch new file +46 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0cd8ec3611
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From 3d68daf2567aace4b52bd238cfd4a8111af3bc04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2020 14:33:50 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] util/grub-editenv: Fix incorrect casting of a signed value
+
+The return value of ftell() may be negative (-1) on error. While it is
+probably unlikely to occur, we should not blindly cast to an unsigned
+value without first testing that it is not negative.
+
+Fixes: CID 73856
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=5dc41edc4eba259c6043ae7698c245ec1baaacc6]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ util/grub-editenv.c | 8 +++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/util/grub-editenv.c b/util/grub-editenv.c
+index f3662c9..db6f187 100644
+--- a/util/grub-editenv.c
++++ b/util/grub-editenv.c
+@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ open_envblk_file (const char *name)
+ {
+   FILE *fp;
+   char *buf;
++  long loc;
+   size_t size;
+   grub_envblk_t envblk;
+ 
+@@ -143,7 +144,12 @@ open_envblk_file (const char *name)
+     grub_util_error (_("cannot seek `%s': %s"), name,
+ 		     strerror (errno));
+ 
+-  size = (size_t) ftell (fp);
++  loc = ftell (fp);
++  if (loc < 0)
++    grub_util_error (_("cannot get file location `%s': %s"), name,
++		     strerror (errno));
++
++  size = (size_t) loc;
+ 
+   if (fseek (fp, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0)
+     grub_util_error (_("cannot seek `%s': %s"), name,
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 7ca0b469e9..a1fbc5e644 100644
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0039-loader-xnu-Free-driverkey-data-when-an-error-is-dete.patch \
            file://0040-loader-xnu-Check-if-pointer-is-NULL-before-using-it.patch \
            file://0041-util-grub-install-Fix-NULL-pointer-dereferences.patch \
+           file://0042-util-grub-editenv-Fix-incorrect-casting-of-a-signed-.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#43 lore raw

PATCH 43/46 grub: fix incorrect use of a negative value

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch adds a fix for an incorrect use of a negative value in grub's util/glue-efi. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...x-incorrect-use-of-a-possibly-negati.patch | 50 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 51 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0043-util-glue-efi-Fix-incorrect-use-of-a-possibly-negati.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0043-util-glue-efi-Fix-incorrect-use-of-a-possibly-negati.patch new file +50 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..66d7c0aa42
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From e301a0f38a2130eb80f346c31e43bf5089af583c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 4 Dec 2020 15:04:28 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] util/glue-efi: Fix incorrect use of a possibly negative value
+
+It is possible for the ftell() function to return a negative value,
+although it is fairly unlikely here, we should be checking for
+a negative value before we assign it to an unsigned value.
+
+Fixes: CID 73744
+
+Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=1641d74e16f9d1ca35ba1a87ee4a0bf3afa48e72]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ util/glue-efi.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/util/glue-efi.c b/util/glue-efi.c
+index 68f5316..de0fa6d 100644
+--- a/util/glue-efi.c
++++ b/util/glue-efi.c
+@@ -39,13 +39,23 @@ write_fat (FILE *in32, FILE *in64, FILE *out, const char *out_filename,
+   struct grub_macho_fat_header head;
+   struct grub_macho_fat_arch arch32, arch64;
+   grub_uint32_t size32, size64;
++  long size;
+   char *buf;
+ 
+   fseek (in32, 0, SEEK_END);
+-  size32 = ftell (in32);
++  size = ftell (in32);
++  if (size < 0)
++    grub_util_error ("cannot get end of input file '%s': %s",
++		     name32, strerror (errno));
++  size32 = (grub_uint32_t) size;
+   fseek (in32, 0, SEEK_SET);
++
+   fseek (in64, 0, SEEK_END);
+-  size64 = ftell (in64);
++  size = ftell (in64);
++  if (size < 0)
++    grub_util_error ("cannot get end of input file '%s': %s",
++		     name64, strerror (errno));
++  size64 = (grub_uint64_t) size;
+   fseek (in64, 0, SEEK_SET);
+ 
+   head.magic = grub_cpu_to_le32_compile_time (GRUB_MACHO_FAT_EFI_MAGIC);
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index a1fbc5e644..2f230065b2 100644
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0040-loader-xnu-Check-if-pointer-is-NULL-before-using-it.patch \
            file://0041-util-grub-install-Fix-NULL-pointer-dereferences.patch \
            file://0042-util-grub-editenv-Fix-incorrect-casting-of-a-signed-.patch \
+           file://0043-util-glue-efi-Fix-incorrect-use-of-a-possibly-negati.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#44 lore raw

PATCH 44/46 grub: add a fix for a NULL pointer dereference

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch adds a fix for a NULL pointer dereference in grub's script/execute. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...ix-NULL-dereference-in-grub_script_e.patch | 28 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0044-script-execute-Fix-NULL-dereference-in-grub_script_e.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0044-script-execute-Fix-NULL-dereference-in-grub_script_e.patch new file +28 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b279222fff
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From f5fb56954e5926ced42a980c3e0842ffd5fea2aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 3 Apr 2020 23:05:13 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] script/execute: Fix NULL dereference in
+ grub_script_execute_cmdline()
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=41ae93b2e6c75453514629bcfe684300e3aec0ce]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/script/execute.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/script/execute.c b/grub-core/script/execute.c
+index 7e028e1..5ea2aef 100644
+--- a/grub-core/script/execute.c
++++ b/grub-core/script/execute.c
+@@ -940,7 +940,7 @@ grub_script_execute_cmdline (struct grub_script_cmd *cmd)
+   struct grub_script_argv argv = { 0, 0, 0 };
+ 
+   /* Lookup the command.  */
+-  if (grub_script_arglist_to_argv (cmdline->arglist, &argv) || ! argv.args[0])
++  if (grub_script_arglist_to_argv (cmdline->arglist, &argv) || ! argv.args || ! argv.args[0])
+     return grub_errno;
+ 
+   for (i = 0; i < argv.argc; i++)
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 2f230065b2..84b8b8d1be 100644
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0041-util-grub-install-Fix-NULL-pointer-dereferences.patch \
            file://0042-util-grub-editenv-Fix-incorrect-casting-of-a-signed-.patch \
            file://0043-util-glue-efi-Fix-incorrect-use-of-a-possibly-negati.patch \
+           file://0044-script-execute-Fix-NULL-dereference-in-grub_script_e.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#45 lore raw

PATCH 45/46 grub: avoid a NULL pointer dereference

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch adds a fix for a NULL pointer dereference in grub's commands/ls. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...ire-device_name-is-not-NULL-before-p.patch | 33 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0045-commands-ls-Require-device_name-is-not-NULL-before-p.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0045-commands-ls-Require-device_name-is-not-NULL-before-p.patch new file +33 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5a327fe1d2
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From dd82f98fa642907817f59aeaf3761b786898df85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2021 16:57:37 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] commands/ls: Require device_name is not NULL before printing
+
+This can be triggered with:
+  ls -l (0 0*)
+and causes a NULL deref in grub_normal_print_device_info().
+
+I'm not sure if there's any implication with the IEEE 1275 platform.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=6afbe6063c95b827372f9ec310c9fc7461311eb1]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/commands/ls.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/commands/ls.c b/grub-core/commands/ls.c
+index 5b7491a..326d2d6 100644
+--- a/grub-core/commands/ls.c
++++ b/grub-core/commands/ls.c
+@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ grub_ls_list_files (char *dirname, int longlist, int all, int human)
+       goto fail;
+     }
+ 
+-  if (! *path)
++  if (! *path && device_name)
+     {
+       if (grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_FS)
+ 	grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 84b8b8d1be..0454b09d52 100644
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0042-util-grub-editenv-Fix-incorrect-casting-of-a-signed-.patch \
            file://0043-util-glue-efi-Fix-incorrect-use-of-a-possibly-negati.patch \
            file://0044-script-execute-Fix-NULL-dereference-in-grub_script_e.patch \
+           file://0045-commands-ls-Require-device_name-is-not-NULL-before-p.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0
#46 lore raw

PATCH 46/46 grub: add a fix for a crash in scripts

In reply to Marta Rybczynska

This patch adds a fix for a crash in grub's script handling. It is a part of a security series [1].

[1] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2021-03/msg00007.html

---
 ...void-crash-when-using-outside-a-func.patch | 37 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc               |  1 +
 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0046-script-execute-Avoid-crash-when-using-outside-a-func.patch
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/0046-script-execute-Avoid-crash-when-using-outside-a-func.patch new file +37 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..84117a9073
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+From df2505c4c3cf42b0c419c99a5f9e1ce63e5a5938 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>
+Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2021 17:30:42 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] script/execute: Avoid crash when using "$#" outside a
+ function scope
+
+"$#" represents the number of arguments to a function. It is only
+defined in a function scope, where "scope" is non-NULL. Currently,
+if we attempt to evaluate "$#" outside a function scope, "scope" will
+be NULL and we will crash with a NULL pointer dereference.
+
+Do not attempt to count arguments for "$#" if "scope" is NULL. This
+will result in "$#" being interpreted as an empty string if evaluated
+outside a function scope.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>
+Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <[email protected]>
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/commit/?id=fe0586347ee46f927ae27bb9673532da9f5dead5]
+Signed-off-by: Marta Rybczynska <[email protected]>
+---
+ grub-core/script/execute.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/grub-core/script/execute.c b/grub-core/script/execute.c
+index 5ea2aef..23d34bd 100644
+--- a/grub-core/script/execute.c
++++ b/grub-core/script/execute.c
+@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ gettext_putvar (const char *str, grub_size_t len,
+     return 0;
+ 
+   /* Enough for any number.  */
+-  if (len == 1 && str[0] == '#')
++  if (len == 1 && str[0] == '#' && scope != NULL)
+     {
+       grub_snprintf (*ptr, 30, "%u", scope->argv.argc);
+       *ptr += grub_strlen (*ptr);
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/grub2.inc +1 -0
index 0454b09d52..75ef31f249 100644
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/grub/grub-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://0043-util-glue-efi-Fix-incorrect-use-of-a-possibly-negati.patch \
            file://0044-script-execute-Fix-NULL-dereference-in-grub_script_e.patch \
            file://0045-commands-ls-Require-device_name-is-not-NULL-before-p.patch \
+           file://0046-script-execute-Avoid-crash-when-using-outside-a-func.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "5ce674ca6b2612d8939b9e6abed32934"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "f10c85ae3e204dbaec39ae22fa3c5e99f0665417e91c2cb49b7e5031658ba6ea"
Signature · 1 line
2.33.0