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net: usb: aqc111: Fix out-of-bounds accesses in RX fixup

PATCH Applied Marcin Kozlowski 2 participants 2 messages Apr 6, 2022

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PATCH 1/1 net: usb: aqc111: Fix out-of-bounds accesses in RX fixup

aqc111_rx_fixup() contains several out-of-bounds accesses that can be triggered by a malicious (or defective) USB device, in particular:

- The metadata array (desc_offset..desc_offset+2*pkt_count) can be out of bounds, causing OOB reads and (on big-endian systems) OOB endianness flips.
- A packet can overlap the metadata array, causing a later OOB endianness flip to corrupt data used by a cloned SKB that has already been handed off into the network stack.
- A packet SKB can be constructed whose tail is far beyond its end, causing out-of-bounds heap data to be considered part of the SKB's data.

Found doing variant analysis. Tested it with another driver (ax88179_178a), since I don't have a aqc111 device to test it, but the code looks very similar.

---
 drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c | 9 +++++++--
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c +7 -2
index ea06d10e1c21..ca409d450a29 100644
@@ -1102,10 +1102,15 @@ static int aqc111_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (start_of_descs != desc_offset)
 		goto err;
 
-	/* self check desc_offset from header*/
-	if (desc_offset >= skb_len)
+	/* self check desc_offset from header and make sure that the
+	 * bounds of the metadata array are inside the SKB
+	 */
+	if (pkt_count * 2 + desc_offset >= skb_len)
 		goto err;
 
+	/* Packets must not overlap the metadata array */
+	skb_trim(skb, desc_offset);
+
 	if (pkt_count == 0)
 		goto err;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
#1 lore raw
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (master) by David S. Miller <[email protected]>:

Hello:

This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (master)
by David S. Miller <[email protected]>:

Quoted 12 lines · On Wed, 6 Apr 2022 10:05:37 +0200 you wrote:

aqc111_rx_fixup() contains several out-of-bounds accesses that can be triggered by a malicious (or defective) USB device, in particular:

- The metadata array (desc_offset..desc_offset+2*pkt_count) can be out of bounds, causing OOB reads and (on big-endian systems) OOB endianness flips.
- A packet can overlap the metadata array, causing a later OOB endianness flip to corrupt data used by a cloned SKB that has already been handed off into the network stack.
- A packet SKB can be constructed whose tail is far beyond its end, causing out-of-bounds heap data to be considered part of the SKB's data.

Quoted 1 line

[...]

Here is the summary with links:
- net: usb: aqc111: Fix out-of-bounds accesses in RX fixup

    https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/afb8e2465275

You are awesome, thank you!

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