net: usb: aqc111: Fix out-of-bounds accesses in RX fixup
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 net: usb: aqc111: Fix out-of-bounds accesses in RX fixup
aqc111_rx_fixup() contains several out-of-bounds accesses that can be triggered by a malicious (or defective) USB device, in particular:
- The metadata array (desc_offset..desc_offset+2*pkt_count) can be out of bounds, causing OOB reads and (on big-endian systems) OOB endianness flips.
- A packet can overlap the metadata array, causing a later OOB endianness flip to corrupt data used by a cloned SKB that has already been handed off into the network stack.
- A packet SKB can be constructed whose tail is far beyond its end, causing out-of-bounds heap data to be considered part of the SKB's data.
Found doing variant analysis. Tested it with another driver (ax88179_178a), since I don't have a aqc111 device to test it, but the code looks very similar.
--- drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/usb/aqc111.c +7 -2
@@ -1102,10 +1102,15 @@ static int aqc111_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb)if (start_of_descs != desc_offset) goto err; -/* self check desc_offset from header*/ -if (desc_offset >= skb_len) +/* self check desc_offset from header and make sure that the +* bounds of the metadata array are inside the SKB +*/ +if (pkt_count *2 + desc_offset >= skb_len) goto err; +/* Packets must not overlap the metadata array */ +skb_trim (skb, desc_offset); +if (pkt_count ==0 ) goto err;
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (master) by David S. Miller <[email protected]>:
Hello:
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (master)
by David S. Miller <[email protected]>:
Quoted 12 lines · On Wed, 6 Apr 2022 10:05:37 +0200 you wrote:
aqc111_rx_fixup()contains several out-of-bounds accesses that can be triggered by a malicious (or defective) USB device, in particular:- The metadata array (desc_offset..desc_offset+2*pkt_count) can be out of bounds, causing OOB reads and (on big-endian systems) OOB endianness flips.
- A packet can overlap the metadata array, causing a later OOB endianness flip to corrupt data used by a cloned SKB that has already been handed off into the network stack.
- A packet SKB can be constructed whose tail is far beyond its end, causing out-of-bounds heap data to be considered part of the SKB's data.
Quoted 1 line
[...]
Here is the summary with links:
- net: usb: aqc111: Fix out-of-bounds accesses in RX fixup
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/afb8e2465275
You are awesome, thank you!
Signature · 2 lines
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