iommu/vt-d: Force snooping improvement
Subsystems (2)
Lu Baolu
maintainerv3 cover iommu/vt-d: Force snooping improvement
Hi folks,
Previously, the IOMMU capability of enforcing cache coherency was queried through iommu_capable(IOMMU_CAP_CACHE_COHERENCY). This is a global capability, hence the IOMMU driver reports support for this capability only when all IOMMUs in the system has this support.
Commit 6043257b1de06 ("iommu: Introduce the domain op enforce_cache_coherency()") converts this into a per-domain test-and-set option, and the previous iommu_capable(IOMMU_CAP_CACHE_COHERENCY) is deprecated.
This is a follow-up series which improves the Intel IOMMU driver to support the per-domain scheme better.
Best regards,
baolu
Change log:
v3:
- Hold the device_domain_lock when check and set force snooping.
- Refind the commit messages.
v2:
- https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iommu/[email protected]/
- Check whether force_snooping has already been set in intel_iommu_enforce_cache_coherency().
- Set PGSNP pasid bit field during domain attaching if forcing_snooping
is set.
- Remove redundant list_empty() checks.
- Add dmar_domain->set_pte_snp and set it if force snooping is enforced
on a domain with 2nd-level translation.
v1:
- https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iommu/[email protected]
- Initial post.
Lu Baolu (4):
iommu/vt-d: Block force-snoop domain attaching if no SC support iommu/vt-d: Check domain force_snooping against attached devices iommu/vt-d: Remove domain_update_iommu_snooping() iommu/vt-d: Remove hard coding PGSNP bit in PASID entries
include/linux/intel-iommu.h | 1 + drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h | 2 + drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 90 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c | 26 +++++++++-- 4 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
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Lu Baolu
maintainerPATCH v3 1/4 iommu/vt-d: Block force-snoop domain attaching if no SC support
In the attach_dev callback of the default domain ops, if the domain has been set force_snooping, but the iommu hardware of the device does not support SC(Snoop Control) capability, the callback should block it and return a corresponding error code.
--- drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +3 -0
@@ -4367,6 +4367,9 @@ static int prepare_domain_attach_device(struct iommu_domain *domain,if (!iommu)return -ENODEV ; +if (dmar_domain->force_snooping && !ecap_sc_support (iommu->ecap)) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +/* check if this iommu agaw is sufficient for max mapped address */ addr_width =agaw_to_width (iommu->agaw);if (addr_width >cap_mgaw (iommu->cap))
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Lu Baolu
maintainerPATCH v3 2/4 iommu/vt-d: Check domain force_snooping against attached devices
In reply to Lu BaoluAs domain->force_snooping only impacts the devices attached with the domain, there's no need to check against all IOMMU units. On the other hand, force_snooping could be set on a domain no matter whether it has been attached or not, and once set it is an immutable flag. If no device attached, the operation always succeeds. Then this empty domain can be only attached to a device of which the IOMMU supports snoop control.
--- include/linux/intel-iommu.h | 1 + drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h | 2 ++ drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/linux/intel-iommu.h +1 -0
@@ -540,6 +540,7 @@ struct dmar_domain { u8 has_iotlb_device: 1; u8 iommu_coherency: 1; /* indicate coherency of iommu access */ u8 force_snooping : 1; /* Create IOPTEs with snoop control */ + u8 set_pte_snp:1;struct list_head devices;/* all devices' list */ struct iova_domain iovad;/* iova's that belong to this domain */
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.h +2 -0
@@ -123,4 +123,6 @@ void intel_pasid_tear_down_entry(struct intel_iommu *iommu, bool fault_ignore);int vcmd_alloc_pasid (struct intel_iommu *iommu,u32 *pasid);void vcmd_free_pasid (struct intel_iommu *iommu,u32 pasid); +void intel_pasid_setup_page_snoop_control (struct intel_iommu *iommu, +struct device *dev,u32 pasid);#endif /* __INTEL_PASID_H */
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +50 -3
77 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +23 -0
@@ -762,3 +762,26 @@ int intel_pasid_setup_pass_through(struct intel_iommu *iommu,return 0 ; } + +/* +* Set the page snoop control for a pasid entry which has been set up. +*/ +void intel_pasid_setup_page_snoop_control (struct intel_iommu *iommu, +struct device *dev,u32 pasid) +{ +struct pasid_entry *pte; +u16 did; + +spin_lock (&iommu->lock); + pte =intel_pasid_get_entry (dev, pasid); +if (WARN_ON (!pte || !pasid_pte_is_present (pte))) { +spin_unlock (&iommu->lock); +return ; + } + +pasid_set_pgsnp (pte); + did =pasid_get_domain_id (pte); +spin_unlock (&iommu->lock); + +pasid_flush_caches (iommu, pte, pasid, did); +}
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RE: [PATCH v3 2/4] iommu/vt-d: Check domain force_snooping against attached devices
Quoted 15 lines
From: Lu Baolu <[email protected]>
Sent: Friday, May 6, 2022 1:27 PMdrivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +13
-0+ +/* +* Set the page snoop control for a pasid entry which has been set up. +*/ +void intel_pasid_setup_page_snoop_control (struct intel_iommu *iommu, +struct device *dev,u32 pasid) +{ +struct pasid_entry *pte; +u16 did; + +spin_lock (&iommu->lock); + pte =intel_pasid_get_entry (dev, pasid); +if (WARN_ON (!pte || !pasid_pte_is_present (pte))) {
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c int intel_pasid_setup_pass_through(struct intel_iommu *iommu, · line 787
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +10
-0+spin_unlock (&iommu->lock); +return ; + } + +pasid_set_pgsnp (pte); + did =pasid_get_domain_id (pte); +spin_unlock (&iommu->lock); + +pasid_flush_caches (iommu, pte, pasid, did); +}
The comment of pasid_flush_caches() says:
/*
* This function flushes cache for a newly setup pasid table entry.
* Caller of it should not modify the in-use pasid table entries. */
Can you check whether that comment still hold?
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Baolu Lu
maintainerRe: [PATCH v3 2/4] iommu/vt-d: Check domain force_snooping against attached devices
Quoted 28 lines · Kevin
Quoted 15 lines
From: Lu Baolu <[email protected]>
Sent: Friday, May 6, 2022 1:27 PM(quoted diff) +13
-0+ +/* + * Set the page snoop control for a pasid entry which has been set up. + */ +void intel_pasid_setup_page_snoop_control(struct intel_iommu *iommu, + struct device *dev, u32 pasid) +{ + struct pasid_entry *pte; + u16 did; + + spin_lock(&iommu->lock); + pte = intel_pasid_get_entry(dev, pasid); + if (WARN_ON(!pte || !pasid_pte_is_present(pte))) {Review
Quoted 10 lines
(quoted diff) +10
-0+ spin_unlock(&iommu->lock); + return; + } + + pasid_set_pgsnp(pte); + did = pasid_get_domain_id(pte); + spin_unlock(&iommu->lock); + + pasid_flush_caches(iommu, pte, pasid, did); +}The comment of
pasid_flush_caches()says:
Quoted 6 lines
/*
* This function flushes cache for a newly setup pasid table entry.
* Caller of it should not modify the in-use pasid table entries. */Can you check whether that comment still hold?
I am sorry that I overlooked this. Very appreciated for pointing this out!
How about below additional changes?
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +20 -1
@@ -782,5 +782,24 @@ void intel_pasid_setup_page_snoop_control(struct intel_iommu *iommu, did =pasid_get_domain_id (pte);spin_unlock (&iommu->lock); -pasid_flush_caches (iommu, pte, pasid, did); +if (!ecap_coherent (iommu->ecap)) +clflush_cache_range (pte,sizeof (*pte)); + +/* +* VT-d spec 3.4 table23 states guides for cache invalidation: +* +* - PASID-selective-within-Domain PASID-cache invalidation +* - PASID-selective PASID-based IOTLB invalidation +* - If (pasid is RID_PASID) +* - Global Device-TLB invalidation to affected functions +* Else +* - PASID-based Device-TLB invalidation (with S=1 and +* Addr[63:12]=0x7FFFFFFF_FFFFF) to affected functions +*/ +pasid_cache_invalidation_with_pasid (iommu, did, pasid); +qi_flush_piotlb (iommu, did, pasid,0 ,-1 ,0 ); + +/* Device IOTLB doesn't need to be flushed in caching mode. */ +if (!cap_caching_mode (iommu->cap)) +devtlb_invalidation_with_pasid (iommu, dev, pasid); }
Best regards,
baolu
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Lu Baolu
maintainerPATCH v3 3/4 iommu/vt-d: Remove domain_update_iommu_snooping()
In reply to Lu BaoluThe IOMMU force snooping capability is not required to be consistent among all the IOMMUs anymore. Remove force snooping capability check in the IOMMU hot-add path and domain_update_iommu_snooping() becomes a dead code now.
--- drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c | 34 +--------------------------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 33 deletions(-)
drivers/iommu/intel/iommu.c +1 -33
@@ -533,33 +533,6 @@ static void domain_update_iommu_coherency(struct dmar_domain *domain)rcu_read_unlock (); } -static bool domain_update_iommu_snooping (struct intel_iommu *skip) -{ -struct dmar_drhd_unit *drhd; -struct intel_iommu *iommu; -bool ret = true; - -rcu_read_lock (); -for_each_active_iommu (iommu, drhd) { -if (iommu != skip) { -/* -* If the hardware is operating in the scalable mode, -* the snooping control is always supported since we -* always set PASID-table-entry.PGSNP bit if the domain -* is managed outside (UNMANAGED). -*/ -if (!sm_supported (iommu) && - !ecap_sc_support (iommu->ecap)) { - ret = false; -break ; - } - } - } -rcu_read_unlock (); - -return ret; -} -static int domain_update_iommu_superpage (struct dmar_domain *domain,struct intel_iommu *skip) {
@@ -3606,12 +3579,7 @@ static int intel_iommu_add(struct dmar_drhd_unit *dmaru) iommu->name);return -ENXIO ; } -if (!ecap_sc_support (iommu->ecap) && -domain_update_iommu_snooping (iommu)) { -pr_warn ("%s: Doesn't support snooping.\n" , - iommu->name); -return -ENXIO ; - } + sp =domain_update_iommu_superpage (NULL , iommu) -1 ;if (sp >=0 && !(cap_super_page_val (iommu->cap) & (1 << sp))) { pr_warn("%s: Doesn't support large page.\n",
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Lu Baolu
maintainerPATCH v3 4/4 iommu/vt-d: Remove hard coding PGSNP bit in PASID entries
In reply to Lu BaoluAs enforce_cache_coherency has been introduced into the iommu_domain_ops, the kernel component which owns the iommu domain is able to opt-in its requirement for force snooping support. The iommu driver has no need to hard code the page snoop control bit in the PASID table entries anymore.
--- drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
drivers/iommu/intel/pasid.c +0 -3
@@ -710,9 +710,6 @@ int intel_pasid_setup_second_level(struct intel_iommu *iommu,pasid_set_fault_enable (pte);pasid_set_page_snoop (pte, !!ecap_smpwc (iommu->ecap)); -if (domain->domain.type ==IOMMU_DOMAIN_UNMANAGED ) -pasid_set_pgsnp (pte); -/* * Since it is a second level only translation setup, we should * set SRE bit as well (addresses are expected to be GPAs).
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