Shadow VirtQueue Fixes
cover Shadow VirtQueue Fixes
Random fixes found while developing control virtqueue + multiqueue but the last one, found by coverity. The previous one is a patch created by Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>, send as a RFC in another series but already acked.
All but Philippe's ones are bugs non-triggable, since there is still no possibility to enable SVQ unless we manually add code to master.
Comments are welcome.
Eugenio Pérez (5):
vhost: Track descriptor chain in private at SVQ
vhost: Fix device's used descriptor dequeue
vdpa: Fix bad index calculus at vhost_vdpa_get_vring_base
vdpa: Fix index calculus at vhost_vdpa_svqs_start
vhost: Fix element in vhost_svq_add failure
Philippe Mathieu-Daudé (1):
hw/virtio: Replace g_memdup() by g_memdup2()
hw/virtio/vhost-shadow-virtqueue.h | 6 +++++ hw/net/virtio-net.c | 3 ++- hw/virtio/vhost-shadow-virtqueue.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----- hw/virtio/vhost-vdpa.c | 6 ++--- hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c | 6 ++--- 5 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--
2.27.0
PATCH 1/6 vhost: Track descriptor chain in private at SVQ
The device could have access to modify them, and it definitely have access when we implement packed vq. Harden SVQ maintaining a private copy of the descriptor chain. Other fields like buffer addresses are already maintained sepparatedly.
--- hw/virtio/vhost-shadow-virtqueue.h | 6 ++++++ hw/virtio/vhost-shadow-virtqueue.c | 12 +++++++----- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
hw/virtio/vhost-shadow-virtqueue.h +6 -0
@@ -53,6 +53,12 @@ typedef struct VhostShadowVirtqueue {/* Next VirtQueue element that guest made available */ VirtQueueElement *next_guest_avail_elem; +/* +* Backup next field for each descriptor so we can recover securely, not +* needing to trust the device access. +*/ +uint16_t *desc_next; +/* Next head to expose to the device */ uint16_t shadow_avail_idx;
hw/virtio/vhost-shadow-virtqueue.c +7 -5
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ static void vhost_vring_write_descs(VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq, hwaddr *sg,for (n =0 ; n < num; n++) {if (more_descs || (n +1 < num)) { descs[i].flags = flags |cpu_to_le16 (VRING_DESC_F_NEXT ); + descs[i].next =cpu_to_le16 (svq->desc_next[i]); }else { descs[i].flags = flags; }
@@ -145,10 +146,10 @@ static void vhost_vring_write_descs(VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq, hwaddr *sg, descs[i].len =cpu_to_le32 (iovec[n].iov_len); last = i; - i =cpu_to_le16 (descs[i].next); + i =cpu_to_le16 (svq->desc_next[i]); } - svq->free_head =le16_to_cpu (descs[last].next); + svq->free_head =le16_to_cpu (svq->desc_next[last]); } static bool vhost_svq_add_split(VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq,
@@ -336,7 +337,6 @@ static void vhost_svq_disable_notification(VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq)static VirtQueueElement *vhost_svq_get_buf (VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq,uint32_t *len) { -vring_desc_t *descs = svq->vring.desc;const vring_used_t *used = svq->vring.used;vring_used_elem_t used_elem;uint16_t last_used;
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ static VirtQueueElement *vhost_svq_get_buf(VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq,return NULL ; } - descs[used_elem.id].next = svq->free_head; + svq->desc_next[used_elem.id] = svq->free_head; svq->free_head = used_elem.id; *len = used_elem.len;
@@ -540,8 +540,9 @@ void vhost_svq_start(VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq, VirtIODevice *vdev, svq->vring.used =qemu_memalign (qemu_real_host_page_size (), device_size);memset (svq->vring.used,0 , device_size); svq->ring_id_maps = g_new0(VirtQueueElement *, svq->vring.num); + svq->desc_next =g_new0 (uint16_t, svq->vring.num);for (unsigned i =0 ; i < svq->vring.num -1 ; i++) { - svq->vring.desc[i].next =cpu_to_le16 (i +1 ); + svq->desc_next[i] =cpu_to_le16 (i +1 ); } }
@@ -574,6 +575,7 @@ void vhost_svq_stop(VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq)virtqueue_detach_element (svq->vq, next_avail_elem,0 ); } svq->vq =NULL ; +g_free (svq->desc_next);g_free (svq->ring_id_maps);qemu_vfree (svq->vring.desc);qemu_vfree (svq->vring.used);
--
2.27.0
PATCH 2/6 vhost: Fix device's used descriptor dequeue
In reply to Eugenio PérezOnly the first one of them were properly enqueued back.
--- hw/virtio/vhost-shadow-virtqueue.c | 17 +++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
hw/virtio/vhost-shadow-virtqueue.c +15 -2
@@ -334,12 +334,22 @@ static void vhost_svq_disable_notification(VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq) svq->vring.avail->flags |=cpu_to_le16 (VRING_AVAIL_F_NO_INTERRUPT ); } +static uint16_t vhost_svq_last_desc_of_chain (const VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq, +uint16_t num,uint16_t i) +{ +for (uint16_t j =0 ; j < (num -1 ); ++j) { + i =le16_to_cpu (svq->desc_next[i]); + } + +return i; +} +static VirtQueueElement *vhost_svq_get_buf (VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq,uint32_t *len) {const vring_used_t *used = svq->vring.used;vring_used_elem_t used_elem; -uint16_t last_used; +uint16_t last_used, last_used_chain, num;if (!vhost_svq_more_used (svq)) {return NULL ;
@@ -365,7 +375,10 @@ static VirtQueueElement *vhost_svq_get_buf(VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq,return NULL ; } - svq->desc_next[used_elem.id] = svq->free_head; + num = svq->ring_id_maps[used_elem.id]->in_num + + svq->ring_id_maps[used_elem.id]->out_num; + last_used_chain =vhost_svq_last_desc_of_chain (svq, num, used_elem.id); + svq->desc_next[last_used_chain] = svq->free_head; svq->free_head = used_elem.id; *len = used_elem.len;
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
PATCH 3/6 vdpa: Fix bad index calculus at vhost_vdpa_get_vring_base
In reply to Eugenio Pérez--- hw/virtio/vhost-vdpa.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
hw/virtio/vhost-vdpa.c +2 -2
@@ -1172,11 +1172,11 @@ static int vhost_vdpa_get_vring_base(struct vhost_dev *dev, struct vhost_vring_state *ring) {struct vhost_vdpa *v = dev->opaque; +int vdpa_idx = ring->index - dev->vq_index;int ret;if (v->shadow_vqs_enabled) { -VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq =g_ptr_array_index (v->shadow_vqs, - ring->index); +VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq =g_ptr_array_index (v->shadow_vqs, vdpa_idx);/* * Setting base as last used idx, so destination will see as available
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
PATCH 4/6 vdpa: Fix index calculus at vhost_vdpa_svqs_start
In reply to Eugenio PérezWith the introduction of MQ the index of the vq needs to be calculated with the device model vq_index.
--- hw/virtio/vhost-vdpa.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
hw/virtio/vhost-vdpa.c +1 -1
@@ -1018,7 +1018,7 @@ static bool vhost_vdpa_svqs_start(struct vhost_dev *dev)VirtQueue *vq =virtio_get_queue (dev->vdev, dev->vq_index + i);VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq =g_ptr_array_index (v->shadow_vqs, i);struct vhost_vring_addr addr = { - .index = i, + .index = dev->vq_index + i, };int r;bool ok =vhost_vdpa_svq_setup (dev, svq, i, &err);
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
PATCH 5/6 hw/virtio: Replace g_memdup() by g_memdup2()
In reply to Eugenio PérezFrom: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>
Per https://discourse.gnome.org/t/port-your-module-from-g-memdup-to-g-memdup2-now/5538
The old API took the size of the memory to duplicate as a guint, whereas most memory functions take memory sizes as a gsize. This made it easy to accidentally pass a gsize to g_memdup(). For large values, that would lead to a silent truncation of the size from 64 to 32 bits, and result in a heap area being returned which is significantly smaller than what the caller expects. This can likely be exploited in various modules to cause a heap buffer overflow.
Replace g_memdup() by the safer g_memdup2() wrapper.
--- hw/net/virtio-net.c | 3 ++- hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
hw/net/virtio-net.c +2 -1
@@ -1443,7 +1443,8 @@ static void virtio_net_handle_ctrl(VirtIODevice *vdev, VirtQueue *vq) } iov_cnt = elem->out_num; - iov2 = iov =g_memdup (elem->out_sg,sizeof (struct iovec ) * elem->out_num); + iov2 = iov =g_memdup2 (elem->out_sg, +sizeof (struct iovec ) * elem->out_num); s =iov_to_buf (iov, iov_cnt,0 , &ctrl,sizeof (ctrl));iov_discard_front (&iov, &iov_cnt,sizeof (ctrl));if (s !=sizeof (ctrl)) {
hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c +3 -3
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static void virtio_crypto_handle_ctrl(VirtIODevice *vdev, VirtQueue *vq) } out_num = elem->out_num; - out_iov_copy =g_memdup (elem->out_sg,sizeof (out_iov[0 ]) * out_num); + out_iov_copy =g_memdup2 (elem->out_sg,sizeof (out_iov[0 ]) * out_num); out_iov = out_iov_copy; in_num = elem->in_num;
@@ -605,11 +605,11 @@ virtio_crypto_handle_request(VirtIOCryptoReq *request) } out_num = elem->out_num; - out_iov_copy =g_memdup (elem->out_sg,sizeof (out_iov[0 ]) * out_num); + out_iov_copy =g_memdup2 (elem->out_sg,sizeof (out_iov[0 ]) * out_num); out_iov = out_iov_copy; in_num = elem->in_num; - in_iov_copy =g_memdup (elem->in_sg,sizeof (in_iov[0 ]) * in_num); + in_iov_copy =g_memdup2 (elem->in_sg,sizeof (in_iov[0 ]) * in_num); in_iov = in_iov_copy; if (unlikely(iov_to_buf(out_iov, out_num, 0, &req, sizeof(req))
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
PATCH 6/6 vhost: Fix element in vhost_svq_add failure
In reply to Eugenio PérezCoverity rightly reports that is not free in that case.
--- hw/virtio/vhost-shadow-virtqueue.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
hw/virtio/vhost-shadow-virtqueue.c +8 -0
@@ -199,11 +199,19 @@ static bool vhost_svq_add_split(VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq,return true; } +/** +* Add an element to a SVQ. +* +* The caller must check that there is enough slots for the new element. It +* takes ownership of the element: In case of failure, it is free and the SVQ +* is considered broken. +*/ static bool vhost_svq_add (VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq,VirtQueueElement *elem) {unsigned qemu_head;bool ok =vhost_svq_add_split (svq, elem, &qemu_head);if (unlikely (!ok)) { +g_free (elem);return false; }
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0