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Shadow VirtQueue Fixes

PATCH New Eugenio Pérez 1 participant 7 messages May 12, 2022

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#0 lore raw

cover Shadow VirtQueue Fixes

Random fixes found while developing control virtqueue + multiqueue but the last one, found by coverity. The previous one is a patch created by Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>, send as a RFC in another series but already acked.

All but Philippe's ones are bugs non-triggable, since there is still no possibility to enable SVQ unless we manually add code to master.

Comments are welcome.

Eugenio Pérez (5):
vhost: Track descriptor chain in private at SVQ
vhost: Fix device's used descriptor dequeue
vdpa: Fix bad index calculus at vhost_vdpa_get_vring_base
vdpa: Fix index calculus at vhost_vdpa_svqs_start
vhost: Fix element in vhost_svq_add failure

Philippe Mathieu-Daudé (1):
hw/virtio: Replace g_memdup() by g_memdup2()

 hw/virtio/vhost-shadow-virtqueue.h |  6 +++++
 hw/net/virtio-net.c                |  3 ++-
 hw/virtio/vhost-shadow-virtqueue.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 hw/virtio/vhost-vdpa.c             |  6 ++---
 hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c          |  6 ++---
 5 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

--
2.27.0

#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/6 vhost: Track descriptor chain in private at SVQ

The device could have access to modify them, and it definitely have access when we implement packed vq. Harden SVQ maintaining a private copy of the descriptor chain. Other fields like buffer addresses are already maintained sepparatedly.

---
 hw/virtio/vhost-shadow-virtqueue.h |  6 ++++++
 hw/virtio/vhost-shadow-virtqueue.c | 12 +++++++-----
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
hw/virtio/vhost-shadow-virtqueue.h +6 -0
index e5e24c536d..c132c994e9 100644
@@ -53,6 +53,12 @@ typedef struct VhostShadowVirtqueue {
     /* Next VirtQueue element that guest made available */
     VirtQueueElement *next_guest_avail_elem;
 
+    /*
+     * Backup next field for each descriptor so we can recover securely, not
+     * needing to trust the device access.
+     */
+    uint16_t *desc_next;
+
     /* Next head to expose to the device */
     uint16_t shadow_avail_idx;
 
hw/virtio/vhost-shadow-virtqueue.c +7 -5
index 1e5cfe2af6..1d6552b0fe 100644
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ static void vhost_vring_write_descs(VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq, hwaddr *sg,
     for (n = 0; n < num; n++) {
         if (more_descs || (n + 1 < num)) {
             descs[i].flags = flags | cpu_to_le16(VRING_DESC_F_NEXT);
+            descs[i].next = cpu_to_le16(svq->desc_next[i]);
         } else {
             descs[i].flags = flags;
         }
@@ -145,10 +146,10 @@ static void vhost_vring_write_descs(VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq, hwaddr *sg,
         descs[i].len = cpu_to_le32(iovec[n].iov_len);
 
         last = i;
-        i = cpu_to_le16(descs[i].next);
+        i = cpu_to_le16(svq->desc_next[i]);
     }
 
-    svq->free_head = le16_to_cpu(descs[last].next);
+    svq->free_head = le16_to_cpu(svq->desc_next[last]);
 }
 
 static bool vhost_svq_add_split(VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq,
@@ -336,7 +337,6 @@ static void vhost_svq_disable_notification(VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq)
 static VirtQueueElement *vhost_svq_get_buf(VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq,
                                            uint32_t *len)
 {
-    vring_desc_t *descs = svq->vring.desc;
     const vring_used_t *used = svq->vring.used;
     vring_used_elem_t used_elem;
     uint16_t last_used;
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ static VirtQueueElement *vhost_svq_get_buf(VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq,
         return NULL;
     }
 
-    descs[used_elem.id].next = svq->free_head;
+    svq->desc_next[used_elem.id] = svq->free_head;
     svq->free_head = used_elem.id;
 
     *len = used_elem.len;
@@ -540,8 +540,9 @@ void vhost_svq_start(VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq, VirtIODevice *vdev,
     svq->vring.used = qemu_memalign(qemu_real_host_page_size(), device_size);
     memset(svq->vring.used, 0, device_size);
     svq->ring_id_maps = g_new0(VirtQueueElement *, svq->vring.num);
+    svq->desc_next = g_new0(uint16_t, svq->vring.num);
     for (unsigned i = 0; i < svq->vring.num - 1; i++) {
-        svq->vring.desc[i].next = cpu_to_le16(i + 1);
+        svq->desc_next[i] = cpu_to_le16(i + 1);
     }
 }
 
@@ -574,6 +575,7 @@ void vhost_svq_stop(VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq)
         virtqueue_detach_element(svq->vq, next_avail_elem, 0);
     }
     svq->vq = NULL;
+    g_free(svq->desc_next);
     g_free(svq->ring_id_maps);
     qemu_vfree(svq->vring.desc);
     qemu_vfree(svq->vring.used);

--
2.27.0

#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/6 vhost: Fix device's used descriptor dequeue

In reply to Eugenio Pérez

Only the first one of them were properly enqueued back.

Fixes 100890f7ca ("vhost: Shadow virtqueue buffers forwarding")
---
 hw/virtio/vhost-shadow-virtqueue.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
hw/virtio/vhost-shadow-virtqueue.c +15 -2
index 1d6552b0fe..a8376ef82b 100644
@@ -334,12 +334,22 @@ static void vhost_svq_disable_notification(VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq)
     svq->vring.avail->flags |= cpu_to_le16(VRING_AVAIL_F_NO_INTERRUPT);
 }
 
+static uint16_t vhost_svq_last_desc_of_chain(const VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq,
+                                             uint16_t num, uint16_t i)
+{
+    for (uint16_t j = 0; j < (num - 1); ++j) {
+        i = le16_to_cpu(svq->desc_next[i]);
+    }
+
+    return i;
+}
+
 static VirtQueueElement *vhost_svq_get_buf(VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq,
                                            uint32_t *len)
 {
     const vring_used_t *used = svq->vring.used;
     vring_used_elem_t used_elem;
-    uint16_t last_used;
+    uint16_t last_used, last_used_chain, num;
 
     if (!vhost_svq_more_used(svq)) {
         return NULL;
@@ -365,7 +375,10 @@ static VirtQueueElement *vhost_svq_get_buf(VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq,
         return NULL;
     }
 
-    svq->desc_next[used_elem.id] = svq->free_head;
+    num = svq->ring_id_maps[used_elem.id]->in_num +
+          svq->ring_id_maps[used_elem.id]->out_num;
+    last_used_chain = vhost_svq_last_desc_of_chain(svq, num, used_elem.id);
+    svq->desc_next[last_used_chain] = svq->free_head;
     svq->free_head = used_elem.id;
 
     *len = used_elem.len;
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/6 vdpa: Fix bad index calculus at vhost_vdpa_get_vring_base

In reply to Eugenio Pérez
Fixes 6d0b222666 ("vdpa: Adapt vhost_vdpa_get_vring_base to SVQ")
---
 hw/virtio/vhost-vdpa.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
hw/virtio/vhost-vdpa.c +2 -2
index a30510ed17..493269b0b5 100644
@@ -1172,11 +1172,11 @@ static int vhost_vdpa_get_vring_base(struct vhost_dev *dev,
                                        struct vhost_vring_state *ring)
 {
     struct vhost_vdpa *v = dev->opaque;
+    int vdpa_idx = ring->index - dev->vq_index;
     int ret;
 
     if (v->shadow_vqs_enabled) {
-        VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq = g_ptr_array_index(v->shadow_vqs,
-                                                      ring->index);
+        VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq = g_ptr_array_index(v->shadow_vqs, vdpa_idx);
 
         /*
          * Setting base as last used idx, so destination will see as available
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/6 vdpa: Fix index calculus at vhost_vdpa_svqs_start

In reply to Eugenio Pérez

With the introduction of MQ the index of the vq needs to be calculated with the device model vq_index.

---
 hw/virtio/vhost-vdpa.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
hw/virtio/vhost-vdpa.c +1 -1
index 493269b0b5..ed106bff47 100644
@@ -1018,7 +1018,7 @@ static bool vhost_vdpa_svqs_start(struct vhost_dev *dev)
         VirtQueue *vq = virtio_get_queue(dev->vdev, dev->vq_index + i);
         VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq = g_ptr_array_index(v->shadow_vqs, i);
         struct vhost_vring_addr addr = {
-            .index = i,
+            .index = dev->vq_index + i,
         };
         int r;
         bool ok = vhost_vdpa_svq_setup(dev, svq, i, &err);
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/6 hw/virtio: Replace g_memdup() by g_memdup2()

In reply to Eugenio Pérez

From: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>

Per https://discourse.gnome.org/t/port-your-module-from-g-memdup-to-g-memdup2-now/5538

The old API took the size of the memory to duplicate as a guint, whereas most memory functions take memory sizes as a gsize. This made it easy to accidentally pass a gsize to g_memdup(). For large values, that would lead to a silent truncation of the size from 64 to 32 bits, and result in a heap area being returned which is significantly smaller than what the caller expects. This can likely be exploited in various modules to cause a heap buffer overflow.

Replace g_memdup() by the safer g_memdup2() wrapper.

---
 hw/net/virtio-net.c       | 3 ++-
 hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c | 6 +++---
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
hw/net/virtio-net.c +2 -1
index 1067e72b39..e4748a7e6c 100644
@@ -1443,7 +1443,8 @@ static void virtio_net_handle_ctrl(VirtIODevice *vdev, VirtQueue *vq)
         }
 
         iov_cnt = elem->out_num;
-        iov2 = iov = g_memdup(elem->out_sg, sizeof(struct iovec) * elem->out_num);
+        iov2 = iov = g_memdup2(elem->out_sg,
+                               sizeof(struct iovec) * elem->out_num);
         s = iov_to_buf(iov, iov_cnt, 0, &ctrl, sizeof(ctrl));
         iov_discard_front(&iov, &iov_cnt, sizeof(ctrl));
         if (s != sizeof(ctrl)) {
hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c +3 -3
index dcd80b904d..0e31e3cc04 100644
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static void virtio_crypto_handle_ctrl(VirtIODevice *vdev, VirtQueue *vq)
         }
 
         out_num = elem->out_num;
-        out_iov_copy = g_memdup(elem->out_sg, sizeof(out_iov[0]) * out_num);
+        out_iov_copy = g_memdup2(elem->out_sg, sizeof(out_iov[0]) * out_num);
         out_iov = out_iov_copy;
 
         in_num = elem->in_num;
@@ -605,11 +605,11 @@ virtio_crypto_handle_request(VirtIOCryptoReq *request)
     }
 
     out_num = elem->out_num;
-    out_iov_copy = g_memdup(elem->out_sg, sizeof(out_iov[0]) * out_num);
+    out_iov_copy = g_memdup2(elem->out_sg, sizeof(out_iov[0]) * out_num);
     out_iov = out_iov_copy;
 
     in_num = elem->in_num;
-    in_iov_copy = g_memdup(elem->in_sg, sizeof(in_iov[0]) * in_num);
+    in_iov_copy = g_memdup2(elem->in_sg, sizeof(in_iov[0]) * in_num);
     in_iov = in_iov_copy;
 
     if (unlikely(iov_to_buf(out_iov, out_num, 0, &req, sizeof(req))
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0
#6 lore raw

PATCH 6/6 vhost: Fix element in vhost_svq_add failure

In reply to Eugenio Pérez

Coverity rightly reports that is not free in that case.

Fixes Coverity CID 1487559
Fixes 100890f7ca ("vhost: Shadow virtqueue buffers forwarding")
---
 hw/virtio/vhost-shadow-virtqueue.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
hw/virtio/vhost-shadow-virtqueue.c +8 -0
index a8376ef82b..56c96ebd13 100644
@@ -199,11 +199,19 @@ static bool vhost_svq_add_split(VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq,
     return true;
 }
 
+/**
+ * Add an element to a SVQ.
+ *
+ * The caller must check that there is enough slots for the new element. It
+ * takes ownership of the element: In case of failure, it is free and the SVQ
+ * is considered broken.
+ */
 static bool vhost_svq_add(VhostShadowVirtqueue *svq, VirtQueueElement *elem)
 {
     unsigned qemu_head;
     bool ok = vhost_svq_add_split(svq, elem, &qemu_head);
     if (unlikely(!ok)) {
+        g_free(elem);
         return false;
     }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.27.0