5.10.133-rc1 review

@@ -297,6 +297,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE		(11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE	(11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK		(11*32+14) /* "" Use REturn THUNK */
+#define X86_FEATURE_UNRET		(11*32+15) /* "" AMD BTB untrain return */
 
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16		(12*32+ 5) /* AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */

@@ -61,7 +61,8 @@
 #else
 # define DISABLE_RETPOLINE	((1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE & 31)) | \
 				 (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31)) | \
-				 (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31)))
+				 (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31)) | \
+				 (1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31)))
 #endif
 
 /* Force disable because it's broken beyond repair */

@@ -112,6 +112,22 @@
 #endif
 .endm
 
+/*
+ * Mitigate RETBleed for AMD/Hygon Zen uarch. Requires KERNEL CR3 because the
+ * return thunk isn't mapped into the userspace tables (then again, AMD
+ * typically has NO_MELTDOWN).
+ *
+ * Doesn't clobber any registers but does require a stable stack.
+ *
+ * As such, this must be placed after every *SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 at a point
+ * where we have a stack but before any RET instruction.
+ */
+.macro UNTRAIN_RET
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+	ALTERNATIVE "", "call zen_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET
+#endif
+.endm
+
 #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #define ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE					\

@@ -121,6 +137,7 @@
 	".popsection\n\t"
 
 extern void __x86_return_thunk(void);
+extern void zen_untrain_ret(void);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
 

@@ -1082,7 +1082,7 @@ static void add_retpoline_call(struct ob
 	annotate_call_site(file, insn, false);
 }
 
-static void add_return_call(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn)
+static void add_return_call(struct objtool_file *file, struct instruction *insn, bool add)
 {
 	/*
 	 * Return thunk tail calls are really just returns in disguise,

@@ -1092,7 +1092,7 @@ static void add_return_call(struct objto
 	insn->retpoline_safe = true;
 
 	/* Skip the non-text sections, specially .discard ones */
-	if (insn->sec->text)
+	if (add && insn->sec->text)
 		list_add_tail(&insn->call_node, &file->return_thunk_list);
 }
 

@@ -1121,7 +1121,7 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct
 			add_retpoline_call(file, insn);
 			continue;
 		} else if (reloc->sym->return_thunk) {
-			add_return_call(file, insn);
+			add_return_call(file, insn, true);
 			continue;
 		} else if (insn->func) {
 			/* internal or external sibling call (with reloc) */

@@ -1138,6 +1138,7 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct
 
 		insn->jump_dest = find_insn(file, dest_sec, dest_off);
 		if (!insn->jump_dest) {
+			struct symbol *sym = find_symbol_by_offset(dest_sec, dest_off);
 
 			/*
 			 * This is a special case where an alt instruction

@@ -1147,6 +1148,19 @@ static int add_jump_destinations(struct
 			if (!strcmp(insn->sec->name, ".altinstr_replacement"))
 				continue;
 
+			/*
+			 * This is a special case for zen_untrain_ret().
+			 * It jumps to __x86_return_thunk(), but objtool
+			 * can't find the thunk's starting RET
+			 * instruction, because the RET is also in the
+			 * middle of another instruction.  Objtool only
+			 * knows about the outer instruction.
+			 */
+			if (sym && sym->return_thunk) {
+				add_return_call(file, insn, false);
+				continue;
+			}
+
 			WARN_FUNC("can't find jump dest instruction at %s+0x%lx",
 				  insn->sec, insn->offset, dest_sec->name,
 				  dest_off);

@@ -426,5 +426,6 @@
 #define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT		X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
 #define X86_BUG_SRBDS			X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
 #define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA		X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
+#define X86_BUG_RETBLEED		X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */

@@ -1917,6 +1917,11 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *bu
 	return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
 }
 
+static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
+
 static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 			       char *buf, unsigned int bug)
 {

@@ -1962,6 +1967,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct de
 	case X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA:
 		return mmio_stale_data_show_state(buf);
 
+	case X86_BUG_RETBLEED:
+		return retbleed_show_state(buf);
+
 	default:
 		break;
 	}

@@ -2018,4 +2026,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct
 {
 	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
 }
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
+}
 #endif

@@ -1092,16 +1092,27 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_
 	{}
 };
 
+#define VULNBL(vendor, family, model, blacklist)	\
+	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, model, blacklist)
+
 #define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(model, steppings, issues)		   \
 	X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(INTEL, 6,		   \
 					    INTEL_FAM6_##model, steppings, \
 					    X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues)
 
+#define VULNBL_AMD(family, blacklist)		\
+	VULNBL(AMD, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, blacklist)
+
+#define VULNBL_HYGON(family, blacklist)		\
+	VULNBL(HYGON, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, blacklist)
+
 #define SRBDS		BIT(0)
 /* CPU is affected by X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */
 #define MMIO		BIT(1)
 /* CPU is affected by Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS), a variant of X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */
 #define MMIO_SBDS	BIT(2)
+/* CPU is affected by RETbleed, speculating where you would not expect it */
+#define RETBLEED	BIT(3)
 
 static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),

@@ -1134,6 +1145,11 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+
+	VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED),
 	{}
 };
 

@@ -1235,6 +1251,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
 	    !arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
 
+	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED))
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
+
 	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 

@@ -572,6 +572,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(
 	return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n");
 }
 
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev,
+				 struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
 static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);

@@ -582,6 +588,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(tsx_async_abort, 0444
 static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(srbds, 0444, cpu_show_srbds, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(mmio_stale_data, 0444, cpu_show_mmio_stale_data, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(retbleed, 0444, cpu_show_retbleed, NULL);
 
 static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,

@@ -594,6 +601,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulner
 	&dev_attr_itlb_multihit.attr,
 	&dev_attr_srbds.attr,
 	&dev_attr_mmio_stale_data.attr,
+	&dev_attr_retbleed.attr,
 	NULL
 };
 

@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct dev
 extern ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev,
 					struct device_attribute *attr,
 					char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev,
+				 struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
 
 extern __printf(4, 5)
 struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,

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87 lines not on this page · raw message

@@ -254,6 +254,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_predi
 
 /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
 extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val);
 
 /*
  * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction

@@ -48,12 +48,30 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation
 static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
 
-/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */
+/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */
 u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+
+/* The current value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR with task-specific bits set */
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current);
+
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex);
 
 /*
+ * Keep track of the SPEC_CTRL MSR value for the current task, which may differ
+ * from x86_spec_ctrl_base due to STIBP/SSB in __speculation_ctrl_update().
+ */
+void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val)
+{
+	if (this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current) == val)
+		return;
+
+	this_cpu_write(x86_spec_ctrl_current, val);
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val);
+}
+
+/*
  * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in
  * x86_spec_ctrl_base.
  */

@@ -1235,7 +1253,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
 	if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) {
 		/* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
 		x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
-		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+		write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 	}
 
 	switch (mode) {

@@ -1290,7 +1308,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
 
 static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused)
 {
-	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+	write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 }
 
 /* Update x86_spec_ctrl_base in case SMT state changed. */

@@ -1533,7 +1551,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_
 			x86_amd_ssb_disable();
 		} else {
 			x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
-			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+			write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 		}
 	}
 

@@ -1751,7 +1769,7 @@ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task
 void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
 {
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
-		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+		write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 
 	if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE)
 		x86_amd_ssb_disable();

@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ static __always_inline void __speculatio
 	}
 
 	if (updmsr)
-		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msr);
+		write_spec_ctrl_current(msr);
 }
 
 static unsigned long speculation_ctrl_update_tif(struct task_struct *tsk)

@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
 #include <asm/percpu.h>
 #include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
 #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 
 /*
 

@@ -309,6 +311,62 @@ For 32-bit we have the following convent
 #endif
 
 /*
+ * IBRS kernel mitigation for Spectre_v2.
+ *
+ * Assumes full context is established (PUSH_REGS, CR3 and GS) and it clobbers
+ * the regs it uses (AX, CX, DX). Must be called before the first RET
+ * instruction (NOTE! UNTRAIN_RET includes a RET instruction)
+ *
+ * The optional argument is used to save/restore the current value,
+ * which is used on the paranoid paths.
+ *
+ * Assumes x86_spec_ctrl_{base,current} to have SPEC_CTRL_IBRS set.
+ */
+.macro IBRS_ENTER save_reg
+	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS
+	movl	$MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
+
+.ifnb \save_reg
+	rdmsr
+	shl	$32, %rdx
+	or	%rdx, %rax
+	mov	%rax, \save_reg
+	test	$SPEC_CTRL_IBRS, %eax
+	jz	.Ldo_wrmsr_\@
+	lfence
+	jmp	.Lend_\@
+.Ldo_wrmsr_\@:
+.endif
+
+	movq	PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %rdx
+	movl	%edx, %eax
+	shr	$32, %rdx
+	wrmsr
+.Lend_\@:
+.endm
+
+/*
+ * Similar to IBRS_ENTER, requires KERNEL GS,CR3 and clobbers (AX, CX, DX)
+ * regs. Must be called after the last RET.
+ */
+.macro IBRS_EXIT save_reg
+	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS
+	movl	$MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
+
+.ifnb \save_reg
+	mov	\save_reg, %rdx
+.else
+	movq	PER_CPU_VAR(x86_spec_ctrl_current), %rdx
+	andl	$(~SPEC_CTRL_IBRS), %edx
+.endif
+
+	movl	%edx, %eax
+	shr	$32, %rdx
+	wrmsr
+.Lend_\@:
+.endm
+
+/*
  * Mitigate Spectre v1 for conditional swapgs code paths.
  *
  * FENCE_SWAPGS_USER_ENTRY is used in the user entry swapgs code path, to

@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK	( 7*32+ 9) /* AMD ProcFeedbackInterface */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SME			( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PTI			( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */
-/* FREE!				( 7*32+12) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS		( 7*32+12) /* "" Set/clear IBRS on kernel entry/exit */
 /* FREE!				( 7*32+13) */
 #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN		( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
 #define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2		( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */

@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_predi
 
 /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
 extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
-extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val);
+extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force);
 
 /*
  * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction

@@ -62,13 +62,19 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex);
  * Keep track of the SPEC_CTRL MSR value for the current task, which may differ
  * from x86_spec_ctrl_base due to STIBP/SSB in __speculation_ctrl_update().
  */
-void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val)
+void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force)
 {
 	if (this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current) == val)
 		return;
 
 	this_cpu_write(x86_spec_ctrl_current, val);
-	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val);
+
+	/*
+	 * When KERNEL_IBRS this MSR is written on return-to-user, unless
+	 * forced the update can be delayed until that time.
+	 */
+	if (force || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS))
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val);
 }
 
 /*

@@ -1253,7 +1259,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
 	if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) {
 		/* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
 		x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
-		write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+		write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
 	}
 
 	switch (mode) {

@@ -1308,7 +1314,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
 
 static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused)
 {
-	write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+	write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
 }
 
 /* Update x86_spec_ctrl_base in case SMT state changed. */

@@ -1551,7 +1557,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_
 			x86_amd_ssb_disable();
 		} else {
 			x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
-			write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+			write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
 		}
 	}
 

@@ -1769,7 +1775,7 @@ int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task
 void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
 {
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
-		write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+		write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
 
 	if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE)
 		x86_amd_ssb_disable();

@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ static __always_inline void __speculatio
 	}
 
 	if (updmsr)
-		write_spec_ctrl_current(msr);
+		write_spec_ctrl_current(msr, false);
 }
 
 static unsigned long speculation_ctrl_update_tif(struct task_struct *tsk)

@@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
 	SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS,
 	SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,
 	SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
 };
 
 /* The indirect branch speculation control variants */

148 lines not on this page · raw message

@@ -37,8 +37,9 @@
 #include "cpu.h"
 
 static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
-static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);

@@ -137,13 +138,19 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 
 	/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
 	spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
+	spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
+	/*
+	 * retbleed_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by
+	 * spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); specifically it wants to know about
+	 * spectre_v2=ibrs.
+	 */
 	retbleed_select_mitigation();
 	/*
-	 * spectre_v2_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by
+	 * spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by
 	 * retbleed_select_mitigation(); specifically the STIBP selection is
 	 * forced for UNRET.
 	 */
-	spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
+	spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation();
 	ssb_select_mitigation();
 	l1tf_select_mitigation();
 	md_clear_select_mitigation();

@@ -969,13 +976,15 @@ static void __init spec_v2_user_print_co
 		pr_info("spectre_v2_user=%s forced on command line.\n", reason);
 }
 
+static __ro_after_init enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd spectre_v2_cmd;
+
 static enum spectre_v2_user_cmd __init
-spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
+spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void)
 {
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
 
-	switch (v2_cmd) {
+	switch (spectre_v2_cmd) {
 	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
 		return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE;
 	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:

@@ -1010,7 +1019,7 @@ static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mo
 }
 
 static void __init
-spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
+spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void)
 {
 	enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
 	bool smt_possible = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP);

@@ -1023,7 +1032,7 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum s
 	    cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED)
 		smt_possible = false;
 
-	cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(v2_cmd);
+	cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline();
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE:
 		goto set_mode;

@@ -1347,7 +1356,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
 	}
 
 	/* Set up IBPB and STIBP depending on the general spectre V2 command */
-	spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(cmd);
+	spectre_v2_cmd = cmd;
 }
 
 static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused)

@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@
 #define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	0x0000010a
 #define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO		BIT(0)	/* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
 #define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL		BIT(1)	/* Enhanced IBRS support */
+#define ARCH_CAP_RSBA			BIT(2)	/* RET may use alternative branch predictors */
 #define ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH	BIT(3)	/* Skip L1D flush on vmentry */
 #define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO			BIT(4)	/*
 						 * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass

@@ -746,12 +746,17 @@ static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(c
 }
 early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline);
 
+static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
+	SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "RETBleed: " fmt
 
 enum retbleed_mitigation {
 	RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE,
 	RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET,
+	RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS,
+	RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS,
 };
 
 enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd {

@@ -763,6 +768,8 @@ enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd {
 const char * const retbleed_strings[] = {
 	[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE]	= "Vulnerable",
 	[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET]	= "Mitigation: untrained return thunk",
+	[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS]	= "Mitigation: IBRS",
+	[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS]	= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
 };
 
 static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init =

@@ -805,6 +812,7 @@ early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_c
 
 #define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n"
 #define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler!\n"
+#define RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG "WARNING: Spectre v2 mitigation leaves CPU vulnerable to RETBleed attacks, data leaks possible!\n"
 
 static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
 {

@@ -821,12 +829,15 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitig
 
 	case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO:
 	default:
-		if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED))
-			break;
-
 		if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
 		    boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
 			retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
+
+		/*
+		 * The Intel mitigation (IBRS) was already selected in
+		 * spectre_v2_select_mitigation().
+		 */
+
 		break;
 	}
 

@@ -856,15 +867,31 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitig
 		break;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Let IBRS trump all on Intel without affecting the effects of the
+	 * retbleed= cmdline option.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
+		switch (spectre_v2_enabled) {
+		case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
+			retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS;
+			break;
+		case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
+		case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
+		case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+			retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS;
+			break;
+		default:
+			pr_err(RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG);
+		}
+	}
+
 	pr_info("%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]);
 }
 
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V2 : " fmt
 
-static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
-	SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
-
 static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_stibp __ro_after_init =
 	SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
 static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_ibpb __ro_after_init =

@@ -1124,24 +1124,24 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_G,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3),	SRBDS | MMIO),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3),	SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X,	BIT(3) | BIT(4) | BIT(6) |
-						BIT(7) | BIT(0xB),              MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE,		X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3),	SRBDS | MMIO),
+						BIT(7) | BIT(0xB),              MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE,		X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3),	SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC),	SRBDS | MMIO),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC),	SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8),	SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD),	SRBDS | MMIO),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD),	SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8),	SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x4, 0x6),	MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE,	BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0),	MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE,	BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0),	MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO | RETBLEED),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),

@@ -1251,7 +1251,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
 	    !arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
 
-	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED))
+	if ((cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED) || (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RSBA)))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
 
 	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))

@@ -256,6 +256,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_predi
 /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
 extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force);
+extern u64 spec_ctrl_current(void);
 
 /*
  * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction

@@ -78,6 +78,12 @@ void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bo
 		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val);
 }
 
+u64 spec_ctrl_current(void)
+{
+	return this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spec_ctrl_current);
+
 /*
  * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in
  * x86_spec_ctrl_base.

108 lines not on this page · raw message

@@ -76,6 +76,12 @@
 .endm
 
 /*
+ * (ab)use RETPOLINE_SAFE on RET to annotate away 'bare' RET instructions
+ * vs RETBleed validation.
+ */
+#define ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
+
+/*
  * JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple
  * indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2
  * attack.

@@ -1799,8 +1799,9 @@ static int read_retpoline_hints(struct o
 		}
 
 		if (insn->type != INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC &&
-		    insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC) {
-			WARN_FUNC("retpoline_safe hint not an indirect jump/call",
+		    insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC &&
+		    insn->type != INSN_RETURN) {
+			WARN_FUNC("retpoline_safe hint not an indirect jump/call/ret",
 				  insn->sec, insn->offset);
 			return -1;
 		}

@@ -3051,7 +3052,8 @@ static int validate_retpoline(struct obj
 
 	for_each_insn(file, insn) {
 		if (insn->type != INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC &&
-		    insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC)
+		    insn->type != INSN_CALL_DYNAMIC &&
+		    insn->type != INSN_RETURN)
 			continue;
 
 		if (insn->retpoline_safe)

@@ -3066,9 +3068,14 @@ static int validate_retpoline(struct obj
 		if (!strcmp(insn->sec->name, ".init.text") && !module)
 			continue;
 
-		WARN_FUNC("indirect %s found in RETPOLINE build",
-			  insn->sec, insn->offset,
-			  insn->type == INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC ? "jump" : "call");
+		if (insn->type == INSN_RETURN) {
+			WARN_FUNC("'naked' return found in RETPOLINE build",
+				  insn->sec, insn->offset);
+		} else {
+			WARN_FUNC("indirect %s found in RETPOLINE build",
+				  insn->sec, insn->offset,
+				  insn->type == INSN_JUMP_DYNAMIC ? "jump" : "call");
+		}
 
 		warnings++;
 	}

@@ -922,7 +922,7 @@ void xen_enable_sysenter(void)
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(sysenter_feature))
 		return;
 
-	ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_sysenter, xen_sysenter_target);
+	ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_sysenter, xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat);
 	if(ret != 0)
 		setup_clear_cpu_cap(sysenter_feature);
 }

@@ -931,7 +931,7 @@ void xen_enable_syscall(void)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_syscall, xen_syscall_target);
+	ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_syscall, xen_entry_SYSCALL_64);
 	if (ret != 0) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "Failed to set syscall callback: %d\n", ret);
 		/* Pretty fatal; 64-bit userspace has no other

@@ -940,7 +940,7 @@ void xen_enable_syscall(void)
 
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32)) {
 		ret = register_callback(CALLBACKTYPE_syscall32,
-					xen_syscall32_target);
+					xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat);
 		if (ret != 0)
 			setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32);
 	}

@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@
 /* These are code, but not functions.  Defined in entry.S */
 extern const char xen_failsafe_callback[];
 
-void xen_sysenter_target(void);
+void xen_entry_SYSENTER_compat(void);
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-void xen_syscall_target(void);
-void xen_syscall32_target(void);
+void xen_entry_SYSCALL_64(void);
+void xen_entry_SYSCALL_compat(void);
 #endif
 
 extern void *xen_initial_gdt;

@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA	(11*32+ 7) /* "" Per-thread Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
 /* FREE!				(11*32+ 8) */
 /* FREE!				(11*32+ 9) */
-/* FREE!				(11*32+10) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB		(11*32+10) /* "" Issue an IBPB on kernel entry */
 /* FREE!				(11*32+11) */
 #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE		(11*32+12) /* "" Generic Retpoline mitigation for Spectre variant 2 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE	(11*32+13) /* "" Use LFENCE for Spectre variant 2 */

@@ -123,14 +123,17 @@
  * return thunk isn't mapped into the userspace tables (then again, AMD
  * typically has NO_MELTDOWN).
  *
- * Doesn't clobber any registers but does require a stable stack.
+ * While zen_untrain_ret() doesn't clobber anything but requires stack,
+ * entry_ibpb() will clobber AX, CX, DX.
  *
  * As such, this must be placed after every *SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 at a point
  * where we have a stack but before any RET instruction.
  */
 .macro UNTRAIN_RET
 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
-	ALTERNATIVE "", "call zen_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET
+	ALTERNATIVE_2 "",						\
+	              "call zen_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET,	\
+		      "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB
 #endif
 .endm
 

@@ -144,6 +147,7 @@
 
 extern void __x86_return_thunk(void);
 extern void zen_untrain_ret(void);
+extern void entry_ibpb(void);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
 

105 lines not on this page · raw message

@@ -847,18 +847,13 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitig
 	case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO:
 	default:
 		if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
-		    boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) {
-
-			if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) &&
-			    IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK))
-				retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
-			else
-				retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB;
-		}
+		    boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
+			retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
 
 		/*
-		 * The Intel mitigation (IBRS) was already selected in
-		 * spectre_v2_select_mitigation().
+		 * The Intel mitigation (IBRS or eIBRS) was already selected in
+		 * spectre_v2_select_mitigation().  'retbleed_mitigation' will
+		 * be set accordingly below.
 		 */
 
 		break;

@@ -82,6 +82,17 @@
 #define ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
 
 /*
+ * Abuse ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE on a NOP to indicate UNRET_END, should
+ * eventually turn into it's own annotation.
+ */
+.macro ANNOTATE_UNRET_END
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY
+	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
+	nop
+#endif
+.endm
+
+/*
  * JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple
  * indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2
  * attack.

@@ -131,6 +142,7 @@
  */
 .macro UNTRAIN_RET
 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+	ANNOTATE_UNRET_END
 	ALTERNATIVE_2 "",						\
 	              "call zen_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET,	\
 		      "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB

@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@
 	UNWIND_HINT sp_reg=ORC_REG_UNDEFINED type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL end=1
 .endm
 
+.macro UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY
+	UNWIND_HINT sp_reg=ORC_REG_UNDEFINED type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY end=1
+.endm
+
 .macro UNWIND_HINT_REGS base=%rsp offset=0 indirect=0 extra=1 partial=0
 	.if \base == %rsp
 		.if \indirect

@@ -32,11 +32,14 @@ struct unwind_hint {
  *
  * UNWIND_HINT_FUNC: Generate the unwind metadata of a callable function.
  * Useful for code which doesn't have an ELF function annotation.
+ *
+ * UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY: machine entry without stack, SYSCALL/SYSENTER etc.
  */
 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL		0
 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS		1
 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL	2
 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC		3
+#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY		4
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION
 

@@ -32,11 +32,14 @@ struct unwind_hint {
  *
  * UNWIND_HINT_FUNC: Generate the unwind metadata of a callable function.
  * Useful for code which doesn't have an ELF function annotation.
+ *
+ * UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY: machine entry without stack, SYSCALL/SYSENTER etc.
  */
 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL		0
 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS		1
 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL	2
 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC		3
+#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY		4
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION
 

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 #include "objtool.h"
 
 bool no_fp, no_unreachable, retpoline, module, backtrace, uaccess, stats,
-     validate_dup, vmlinux, sls;
+     validate_dup, vmlinux, sls, unret;
 
 static const char * const check_usage[] = {
 	"objtool check [<options>] file.o",

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ const struct option check_options[] = {
 	OPT_BOOLEAN('f', "no-fp", &no_fp, "Skip frame pointer validation"),
 	OPT_BOOLEAN('u', "no-unreachable", &no_unreachable, "Skip 'unreachable instruction' warnings"),
 	OPT_BOOLEAN('r', "retpoline", &retpoline, "Validate retpoline assumptions"),
+	OPT_BOOLEAN(0,   "unret", &unret, "validate entry unret placement"),
 	OPT_BOOLEAN('m', "module", &module, "Indicates the object will be part of a kernel module"),
 	OPT_BOOLEAN('b', "backtrace", &backtrace, "unwind on error"),
 	OPT_BOOLEAN('a', "uaccess", &uaccess, "enable uaccess checking"),

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 
 extern const struct option check_options[];
 extern bool no_fp, no_unreachable, retpoline, module, backtrace, uaccess, stats,
-            validate_dup, vmlinux, sls;
+            validate_dup, vmlinux, sls, unret;
 
 extern int cmd_check(int argc, const char **argv);
 extern int cmd_orc(int argc, const char **argv);

202 lines not on this page · raw message

@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ struct instruction {
 	bool dead_end, ignore, ignore_alts;
 	bool hint;
 	bool retpoline_safe;
+	bool entry;
 	s8 instr;
 	u8 visited;
 	struct alt_group *alt_group;

@@ -62,6 +63,11 @@ struct instruction {
 	struct cfi_state *cfi;
 };
 
+#define VISITED_BRANCH		0x01
+#define VISITED_BRANCH_UACCESS	0x02
+#define VISITED_BRANCH_MASK	0x03
+#define VISITED_ENTRY		0x04
+
 static inline bool is_static_jump(struct instruction *insn)
 {
 	return insn->type == INSN_JUMP_CONDITIONAL ||

@@ -508,6 +508,9 @@
 /* Fam 17h MSRs */
 #define MSR_F17H_IRPERF			0xc00000e9
 
+#define MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN	0xc00110e3
+#define MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN_BIT	BIT_ULL(1)
+
 /* Fam 16h MSRs */
 #define MSR_F16H_L2I_PERF_CTL		0xc0010230
 #define MSR_F16H_L2I_PERF_CTR		0xc0010231

@@ -914,6 +914,26 @@ static void init_amd_bd(struct cpuinfo_x
 	clear_rdrand_cpuid_bit(c);
 }
 
+void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+	u64 value;
+
+	/*
+	 * On Zen2 we offer this chicken (bit) on the altar of Speculation.
+	 *
+	 * This suppresses speculation from the middle of a basic block, i.e. it
+	 * suppresses non-branch predictions.
+	 *
+	 * We use STIBP as a heuristic to filter out Zen2 from the rest of F17H
+	 */
+	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) && cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) {
+		if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN, &value)) {
+			value |= MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN_BIT;
+			wrmsrl_safe(MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN, value);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
 static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN);

@@ -959,7 +979,8 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86
 	case 0x12: init_amd_ln(c); break;
 	case 0x15: init_amd_bd(c); break;
 	case 0x16: init_amd_jg(c); break;
-	case 0x17: fallthrough;
+	case 0x17: init_spectral_chicken(c);
+		   fallthrough;
 	case 0x19: init_amd_zn(c); break;
 	}
 

@@ -60,6 +60,8 @@ extern void tsx_disable(void);
 static inline void tsx_init(void) { }
 #endif /* CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL */
 
+extern void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+
 extern void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
 extern void get_cpu_address_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
 extern void cpu_detect_cache_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);

@@ -318,6 +318,12 @@ static void init_hygon(struct cpuinfo_x8
 	/* get apicid instead of initial apic id from cpuid */
 	c->apicid = hard_smp_processor_id();
 
+	/*
+	 * XXX someone from Hygon needs to confirm this DTRT
+	 *
+	init_spectral_chicken(c);
+	 */
+
 	set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN);
 	set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB);
 

@@ -122,11 +122,9 @@
   * monstrosity above, manually.
   */
 .macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
 	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", "", \ftr
 	__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)
 .Lskip_rsb_\@:
-#endif
 .endm
 
 /*

@@ -286,18 +286,16 @@ extern u64 spec_ctrl_current(void);
  */
 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start()			\
 do {									\
-	u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;			\
-									\
 	preempt_disable();						\
-	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val,			\
+	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,			\
+			      spec_ctrl_current() | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS,	\
 			      X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);			\
 } while (0)
 
 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end()			\
 do {									\
-	u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base;					\
-									\
-	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val,			\
+	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,			\
+			      spec_ctrl_current(),			\
 			      X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);			\
 	preempt_enable();						\
 } while (0)

@@ -1414,7 +1414,8 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
 
 static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused)
 {
-	write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
+	u64 val = spec_ctrl_current() | (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP);
+	write_spec_ctrl_current(val, true);
 }
 
 /* Update x86_spec_ctrl_base in case SMT state changed. */

@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 void
 x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
 {
-	u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+	u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = spec_ctrl_current();
 	struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
 
 	/* Is MSR_SPEC_CTRL implemented ? */

@@ -212,15 +212,6 @@ x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl,
 		guestval = hostval & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
 		guestval |= guest_spec_ctrl & x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
 
-		/* SSBD controlled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL */
-		if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
-		    static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
-			hostval |= ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
-
-		/* Conditional STIBP enabled? */
-		if (static_branch_unlikely(&switch_to_cond_stibp))
-			hostval |= stibp_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
-
 		if (hostval != guestval) {
 			msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval;
 			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval);

@@ -1353,7 +1344,6 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
 		pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);
 
 	if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) {
-		/* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
 		x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
 		write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
 	}

@@ -85,12 +85,6 @@ u64 spec_ctrl_current(void)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spec_ctrl_current);
 
 /*
- * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in
- * x86_spec_ctrl_base.
- */
-static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_mask = SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
-
-/*
  * AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control.
  * x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu().
  */

@@ -138,10 +132,6 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
 		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 
-	/* Allow STIBP in MSR_SPEC_CTRL if supported */
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
-		x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
-
 	/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
 	spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
 	spectre_v2_select_mitigation();

@@ -199,19 +189,10 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 void
 x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
 {
-	u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = spec_ctrl_current();
+	u64 msrval, guestval = guest_spec_ctrl, hostval = spec_ctrl_current();
 	struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
 
-	/* Is MSR_SPEC_CTRL implemented ? */
 	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) {
-		/*
-		 * Restrict guest_spec_ctrl to supported values. Clear the
-		 * modifiable bits in the host base value and or the
-		 * modifiable bits from the guest value.
-		 */
-		guestval = hostval & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
-		guestval |= guest_spec_ctrl & x86_spec_ctrl_mask;
-
 		if (hostval != guestval) {
 			msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval;
 			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval);

@@ -1622,16 +1603,6 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * If SSBD is controlled by the SPEC_CTRL MSR, then set the proper
-	 * bit in the mask to allow guests to use the mitigation even in the
-	 * case where the host does not enable it.
-	 */
-	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
-	    static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
-		x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
-	}
-
-	/*
 	 * We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here:
 	 *  - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible.
 	 *  - X86_FEATURE_SSBD - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass

@@ -8,11 +8,11 @@
 #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
 
 .macro UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY
-	UNWIND_HINT sp_reg=ORC_REG_UNDEFINED type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL end=1
+	UNWIND_HINT type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_CALL end=1
 .endm
 
 .macro UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY
-	UNWIND_HINT sp_reg=ORC_REG_UNDEFINED type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY end=1
+	UNWIND_HINT type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY end=1
 .endm
 
 .macro UNWIND_HINT_REGS base=%rsp offset=0 indirect=0 extra=1 partial=0

@@ -56,6 +56,14 @@
 	UNWIND_HINT sp_reg=ORC_REG_SP sp_offset=8 type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC
 .endm
 
+.macro UNWIND_HINT_SAVE
+	UNWIND_HINT type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_SAVE
+.endm
+
+.macro UNWIND_HINT_RESTORE
+	UNWIND_HINT type=UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_RESTORE
+.endm
+
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_UNWIND_HINTS_H */

@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ struct unwind_hint {
 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL	2
 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC		3
 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY		4
+#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_SAVE		5
+#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_RESTORE	6
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION
 

@@ -102,7 +104,7 @@ struct unwind_hint {
  * the debuginfo as necessary.  It will also warn if it sees any
  * inconsistencies.
  */
-.macro UNWIND_HINT sp_reg:req sp_offset=0 type:req end=0
+.macro UNWIND_HINT type:req sp_reg=0 sp_offset=0 end=0
 .Lunwind_hint_ip_\@:
 	.pushsection .discard.unwind_hints
 		/* struct unwind_hint */

@@ -126,7 +128,7 @@ struct unwind_hint {
 #define STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD(func)
 #else
 #define ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL
-.macro UNWIND_HINT sp_reg:req sp_offset=0 type:req end=0
+.macro UNWIND_HINT type:req sp_reg=0 sp_offset=0 end=0
 .endm
 #endif
 

@@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ struct unwind_hint {
 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL	2
 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_FUNC		3
 #define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_ENTRY		4
+#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_SAVE		5
+#define UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_RESTORE	6
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION
 

@@ -102,7 +104,7 @@ struct unwind_hint {
  * the debuginfo as necessary.  It will also warn if it sees any
  * inconsistencies.
  */
-.macro UNWIND_HINT sp_reg:req sp_offset=0 type:req end=0
+.macro UNWIND_HINT type:req sp_reg=0 sp_offset=0 end=0
 .Lunwind_hint_ip_\@:
 	.pushsection .discard.unwind_hints
 		/* struct unwind_hint */

@@ -126,7 +128,7 @@ struct unwind_hint {
 #define STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD(func)
 #else
 #define ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL
-.macro UNWIND_HINT sp_reg:req sp_offset=0 type:req end=0
+.macro UNWIND_HINT type:req sp_reg=0 sp_offset=0 end=0
 .endm
 #endif
 

@@ -1752,6 +1752,17 @@ static int read_unwind_hints(struct objt
 
 		insn->hint = true;
 
+		if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_SAVE) {
+			insn->hint = false;
+			insn->save = true;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_RESTORE) {
+			insn->restore = true;
+			continue;
+		}
+
 		if (hint->type == UNWIND_HINT_TYPE_REGS_PARTIAL) {
 			struct symbol *sym = find_symbol_by_offset(insn->sec, insn->offset);
 

@@ -2847,6 +2858,35 @@ static int validate_branch(struct objtoo
 			state.instr += insn->instr;
 
 		if (insn->hint) {
+			if (insn->restore) {
+				struct instruction *save_insn, *i;
+
+				i = insn;
+				save_insn = NULL;
+
+				sym_for_each_insn_continue_reverse(file, func, i) {
+					if (i->save) {
+						save_insn = i;
+						break;
+					}
+				}
+
+				if (!save_insn) {
+					WARN_FUNC("no corresponding CFI save for CFI restore",
+						  sec, insn->offset);
+					return 1;
+				}
+
+				if (!save_insn->visited) {
+					WARN_FUNC("objtool isn't smart enough to handle this CFI save/restore combo",
+						  sec, insn->offset);
+					return 1;
+				}
+
+				insn->cfi = save_insn->cfi;
+				nr_cfi_reused++;
+			}
+
 			state.cfi = *insn->cfi;
 		} else {
 			/* XXX track if we actually changed state.cfi */

@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ struct instruction {
 	unsigned long immediate;
 	bool dead_end, ignore, ignore_alts;
 	bool hint;
+	bool save, restore;
 	bool retpoline_safe;
 	bool entry;
 	s8 instr;

@@ -3077,7 +3077,7 @@ static int nested_vmx_check_vmentry_hw(s
 	}
 
 	vm_fail = __vmx_vcpu_run(vmx, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs,
-				 vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched);
+				 __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx));
 
 	if (vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr)
 		vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr);

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H
+#define __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H
+
+#define VMX_RUN_VMRESUME	(1 << 0)
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H */

@@ -936,6 +936,16 @@ static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct
 	return true;
 }
 
+unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+{
+	unsigned int flags = 0;
+
+	if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched)
+		flags |= VMX_RUN_VMRESUME;
+
+	return flags;
+}
+
 static void clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
 		unsigned long entry, unsigned long exit)
 {

@@ -6688,7 +6698,8 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_exit_handlers_fast
 }
 
 static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
-					struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
+					struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
+					unsigned long flags)
 {
 	/*
 	 * VMENTER enables interrupts (host state), but the kernel state is

@@ -6725,7 +6736,7 @@ static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(
 		native_write_cr2(vcpu->arch.cr2);
 
 	vmx->fail = __vmx_vcpu_run(vmx, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs,
-				   vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched);
+				   flags);
 
 	vcpu->arch.cr2 = native_read_cr2();
 

@@ -6824,7 +6835,7 @@ reenter_guest:
 	x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0);
 
 	/* The actual VMENTER/EXIT is in the .noinstr.text section. */
-	vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, vmx);
+	vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, vmx, __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx));
 
 	/*
 	 * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include "vmcs.h"
 #include "vmx_ops.h"
 #include "cpuid.h"
+#include "run_flags.h"
 
 extern const u32 vmx_msr_index[];
 

@@ -365,7 +366,9 @@ void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kv
 struct vmx_uret_msr *vmx_find_uret_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr);
 void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp);
-bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs, bool launched);
+unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx);
+bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs,
+		    unsigned int flags);
 int vmx_find_loadstore_msr_slot(struct vmx_msrs *m, u32 msr);
 void vmx_ept_load_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 

@@ -275,6 +275,7 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_predi
 
 /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
 extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_current;
 extern void write_spec_ctrl_current(u64 val, bool force);
 extern u64 spec_ctrl_current(void);
 

@@ -186,6 +186,10 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
 #endif
 }
 
+/*
+ * NOTE: For VMX, this function is not called in the vmexit path.
+ * It uses vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host() instead.
+ */
 void
 x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
 {

@@ -3,5 +3,6 @@
 #define __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H
 
 #define VMX_RUN_VMRESUME	(1 << 0)
+#define VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL	(1 << 1)
 
 #endif /* __KVM_X86_VMX_RUN_FLAGS_H */

66 lines not on this page · raw message

@@ -366,6 +366,7 @@ void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kv
 struct vmx_uret_msr *vmx_find_uret_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr);
 void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 void vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp);
+void vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned int flags);
 unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx);
 bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs,
 		    unsigned int flags);

@@ -6706,8 +6706,13 @@ void noinstr vmx_spec_ctrl_restore_host(
 
 	/*
 	 * If the guest/host SPEC_CTRL values differ, restore the host value.
+	 *
+	 * For legacy IBRS, the IBRS bit always needs to be written after
+	 * transitioning from a less privileged predictor mode, regardless of
+	 * whether the guest/host values differ.
 	 */
-	if (vmx->spec_ctrl != hostval)
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS) ||
+	    vmx->spec_ctrl != hostval)
 		native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, hostval);
 
 	barrier_nospec();

@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_SME			( 7*32+10) /* AMD Secure Memory Encryption */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PTI			( 7*32+11) /* Kernel Page Table Isolation enabled */
 #define X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS		( 7*32+12) /* "" Set/clear IBRS on kernel entry/exit */
-/* FREE!				( 7*32+13) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT		( 7*32+13) /* "" Fill RSB on VM-Exit */
 #define X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN		( 7*32+14) /* Intel Processor Inventory Number */
 #define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2		( 7*32+15) /* Code and Data Prioritization L2 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL	( 7*32+16) /* "" MSR SPEC_CTRL is implemented */

75 lines not on this page · raw message

@@ -1119,32 +1119,27 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_G,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_X,	BIT(2) | BIT(4),		MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_D,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x5),	MMIO),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_X,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_D,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_G,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3),	SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X,	BIT(3) | BIT(4) | BIT(6) |
-						BIT(7) | BIT(0xB),              MMIO | RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE,		X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3),	SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC),	SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8),	SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD),	SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8),	SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x4, 0x6),	MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE,	BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0),	MMIO | RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO | RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
 
 	VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED),
 	VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED),

@@ -316,6 +316,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD		(13*32+24) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 #define X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD		(13*32+25) /* Virtualized Speculative Store Bypass Disable */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO		(13*32+26) /* "" Speculative Store Bypass is fixed in hardware. */
+#define X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO		(13*32+29) /* "" Not vulnerable to Branch Type Confusion */
 
 /* Thermal and Power Management Leaf, CPUID level 0x00000006 (EAX), word 14 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_DTHERM		(14*32+ 0) /* Digital Thermal Sensor */

@@ -942,12 +942,21 @@ static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x
 	node_reclaim_distance = 32;
 #endif
 
-	/*
-	 * Fix erratum 1076: CPB feature bit not being set in CPUID.
-	 * Always set it, except when running under a hypervisor.
-	 */
-	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB))
-		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB);
+	/* Fix up CPUID bits, but only if not virtualised. */
+	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+
+		/* Erratum 1076: CPB feature bit not being set in CPUID. */
+		if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB))
+			set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB);
+
+		/*
+		 * Zen3 (Fam19 model < 0x10) parts are not susceptible to
+		 * Branch Type Confusion, but predate the allocation of the
+		 * BTC_NO bit.
+		 */
+		if (c->x86 == 0x19 && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO))
+			set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO);
+	}
 }
 
 static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)

@@ -1246,8 +1246,10 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(stru
 	    !arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
 
-	if ((cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED) || (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RSBA)))
-		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
+	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO)) {
+		if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED) || (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RSBA))
+			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
+	}
 
 	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;

@@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following convent
  * Assumes x86_spec_ctrl_{base,current} to have SPEC_CTRL_IBRS set.
  */
 .macro IBRS_ENTER save_reg
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY
 	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS
 	movl	$MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
 

@@ -343,6 +344,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following convent
 	shr	$32, %rdx
 	wrmsr
 .Lend_\@:
+#endif
 .endm
 
 /*

@@ -350,6 +352,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following convent
  * regs. Must be called after the last RET.
  */
 .macro IBRS_EXIT save_reg
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY
 	ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS
 	movl	$MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
 

@@ -364,6 +367,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following convent
 	shr	$32, %rdx
 	wrmsr
 .Lend_\@:
+#endif
 .endm
 
 /*

@@ -60,9 +60,19 @@
 # define DISABLE_RETPOLINE	0
 #else
 # define DISABLE_RETPOLINE	((1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE & 31)) | \
-				 (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31)) | \
-				 (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31)) | \
-				 (1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31)))
+				 (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31)))
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+# define DISABLE_RETHUNK	0
+#else
+# define DISABLE_RETHUNK	(1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31))
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+# define DISABLE_UNRET		0
+#else
+# define DISABLE_UNRET		(1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31))
 #endif
 
 /* Force disable because it's broken beyond repair */

@@ -82,7 +92,7 @@
 #define DISABLED_MASK8	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK9	(DISABLE_SMAP)
 #define DISABLED_MASK10	0
-#define DISABLED_MASK11	(DISABLE_RETPOLINE)
+#define DISABLED_MASK11	(DISABLE_RETPOLINE|DISABLE_RETHUNK|DISABLE_UNRET)
 #define DISABLED_MASK12	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK13	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK14	0

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 #define __ALIGN_STR	__stringify(__ALIGN)
 #endif
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
+#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
 #define RET	jmp __x86_return_thunk
 #else /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
 #ifdef CONFIG_SLS

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
 
 #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
+#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
 #define ASM_RET	"jmp __x86_return_thunk\n\t"
 #else /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
 #ifdef CONFIG_SLS

@@ -127,6 +127,12 @@
 .Lskip_rsb_\@:
 .endm
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+#define CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET	"call zen_untrain_ret"
+#else
+#define CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET	""
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Mitigate RETBleed for AMD/Hygon Zen uarch. Requires KERNEL CR3 because the
  * return thunk isn't mapped into the userspace tables (then again, AMD

@@ -139,10 +145,10 @@
  * where we have a stack but before any RET instruction.
  */
 .macro UNTRAIN_RET
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)
 	ANNOTATE_UNRET_END
 	ALTERNATIVE_2 "",						\
-	              "call zen_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_UNRET,	\
+	              CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET,		\
 		      "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB
 #endif
 .endm

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
 #define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, func)			\
 	__ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, ".byte 0xe9; .long " #func " - (. + 4)")
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
 #define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP(name)			\
 	__ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, "jmp __x86_return_thunk")
 #else

@@ -662,6 +662,7 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_ret
 	}
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
 /*
  * Rewrite the compiler generated return thunk tail-calls.
  *

@@ -723,6 +724,10 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_ret
 		}
 	}
 }
+#else
+void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) { }
+#endif /* CONFIG_RETHUNK */
+
 #else /* !RETPOLINES || !CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION */
 
 void __init_or_module noinline apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end) { }

@@ -916,6 +916,7 @@ static void init_amd_bd(struct cpuinfo_x
 
 void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
 	u64 value;
 
 	/*

@@ -932,6 +933,7 @@ void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinf
 			wrmsrl_safe(MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN, value);
 		}
 	}
+#endif
 }
 
 static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)

86 lines not on this page · raw message

@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ void arch_static_call_transform(void *si
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_static_call_transform);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
 /*
  * This is called by apply_returns() to fix up static call trampolines,
  * specifically ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP which is recorded as

@@ -435,10 +435,10 @@ static int fastop(struct x86_emulate_ctx
  * Depending on .config the SETcc functions look like:
  *
  * SETcc %al			[3 bytes]
- * RET | JMP __x86_return_thunk	[1,5 bytes; CONFIG_RETPOLINE]
+ * RET | JMP __x86_return_thunk	[1,5 bytes; CONFIG_RETHUNK]
  * INT3				[1 byte; CONFIG_SLS]
  */
-#define RET_LENGTH	(1 + (4 * IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) + \
+#define RET_LENGTH	(1 + (4 * IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETHUNK)) + \
 			 IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
 #define SETCC_LENGTH	(3 + RET_LENGTH)
 #define SETCC_ALIGN	(4 << ((SETCC_LENGTH > 4) & 1) << ((SETCC_LENGTH > 8) & 1))

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 #include "objtool.h"
 
 bool no_fp, no_unreachable, retpoline, module, backtrace, uaccess, stats,
-     validate_dup, vmlinux, sls, unret;
+     validate_dup, vmlinux, sls, unret, rethunk;
 
 static const char * const check_usage[] = {
 	"objtool check [<options>] file.o",

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ const struct option check_options[] = {
 	OPT_BOOLEAN('f', "no-fp", &no_fp, "Skip frame pointer validation"),
 	OPT_BOOLEAN('u', "no-unreachable", &no_unreachable, "Skip 'unreachable instruction' warnings"),
 	OPT_BOOLEAN('r', "retpoline", &retpoline, "Validate retpoline assumptions"),
+	OPT_BOOLEAN(0,   "rethunk", &rethunk, "validate and annotate rethunk usage"),
 	OPT_BOOLEAN(0,   "unret", &unret, "validate entry unret placement"),
 	OPT_BOOLEAN('m', "module", &module, "Indicates the object will be part of a kernel module"),
 	OPT_BOOLEAN('b', "backtrace", &backtrace, "unwind on error"),

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 
 extern const struct option check_options[];
 extern bool no_fp, no_unreachable, retpoline, module, backtrace, uaccess, stats,
-            validate_dup, vmlinux, sls, unret;
+            validate_dup, vmlinux, sls, unret, rethunk;
 
 extern int cmd_check(int argc, const char **argv);
 extern int cmd_orc(int argc, const char **argv);