landlock: truncate support
Subsystems (4)
v4 cover landlock: truncate support
The goal of these patches is to work towards a more complete coverage of file system operations that are restrictable with Landlock.
The known set of currently unsupported file system operations in Landlock is described at [1]. Out of the operations listed there, truncate is the only one that modifies file contents, so these patches should make it possible to prevent the direct modification of file contents with Landlock.
The patch introduces the truncation restriction feature as an additional bit in the access_mask_t bitmap, in line with the existing supported operations.
The truncation flag covers both the truncate(2) and ftruncate(2) families of syscalls, as well as open(2) with the O_TRUNC flag. This includes usages of creat() in the case where existing regular files are overwritten.
Apart from Landlock, file truncation can also be restricted using seccomp-bpf, but it is more difficult to use (requires BPF, requires keeping up-to-date syscall lists) and it is not configurable by file hierarchy, as Landlock is. The simplicity and flexibility of the Landlock approach makes it worthwhile adding.
While it's possible to use the "write file" and "truncate" rights independent of each other, it simplifies the mental model for userspace callers to always use them together.
Specifically, the following behaviours might be surprising for users when using these independently:
* The commonly creat() syscall requires the truncate right when overwriting existing files, as it is equivalent to open(2) with O_TRUNC|O_CREAT|O_WRONLY.
* The "write file" right is not always required to truncate a file, even through the open(2) syscall (when using O_RDONLY|O_TRUNC).
Nevertheless, keeping the two flags separate is the correct approach to guarantee backwards compatibility for existing Landlock users.
These patches are based on version 5.19.
Best regards,
Günther
[1] https://docs.kernel.org/userspace-api/landlock.html#filesystem-flags
History:
v4:
* Documentation
* Clarify wording and syntax as discussed in review.
* Use a less confusing error message in the example.
* selftests:
* Stop using ASSERT_EQ in test helpers, return EBADFD instead. (This is an intentionally uncommon error code, so that the source of the error is clear and the test can distinguish test setup failures from failures in the actual system call under test.)
* samples/Documentation:
* Use additional clarifying comments in the kernel backwards compatibility logic.
v3:
* selftests:
* Explicitly test ftruncate with readonly file descriptors (returns EINVAL).
* Extract test_ftruncate, test_truncate, test_creat helpers, which simplified the previously mixed usage of EXPECT/ASSERT.
* Test creat() behaviour as part of the big truncation test.
* Stop testing the truncate64(2) and ftruncate64(2) syscalls. This simplifies the tests a bit. The kernel implementations are the same as for truncate(2) and ftruncate(2), so there is little benefit from testing them exhaustively. (We aren't testing all open(2) variants either.)
* samples/landlock/sandboxer.c:
* Use switch() to implement best effort mode.
* Documentation:
* Give more background on surprising truncation behaviour.
* Use switch() in the example too, to stay in-line with the sample tool.
* Small fixes in header file to address previous comments.
* misc:
* Fix some typos and const usages.
v2:
* Documentation: Mention the truncation flag where needed.
* Documentation: Point out connection between truncation and file writing.
* samples: Add file truncation to the landlock/sandboxer.c sample tool.
* selftests: Exercise open(2) with O_TRUNC and creat(2) exhaustively.
* selftests: Exercise truncation syscalls when the truncate right is not handled by Landlock.
Previous versions:
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Günther Noack (4):
landlock: Support file truncation selftests/landlock: Selftests for file truncation support samples/landlock: Extend sample tool to support
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
landlock: Document Landlock's file truncation support
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 52 ++++- include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 17 +- samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 23 +- security/landlock/fs.c | 9 +- security/landlock/limits.h | 2 +- security/landlock/syscalls.c | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 226 ++++++++++++++++++- 8 files changed, 305 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
base-commit: 3d7cb6b04c3f3115719235cc6866b10326de34cd --
2.37.2
PATCH v4 1/4 landlock: Support file truncation
Introduce the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE flag for file truncation.
This flag hooks into the path_truncate LSM hook and covers file truncation using truncate(2), ftruncate(2), open(2) with O_TRUNC, as well as creat().
This change also increments the Landlock ABI version, updates corresponding selftests, and includes minor documentation changes to document the flag.
--- Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 10 ++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 17 ++++++++++++----- security/landlock/fs.c | 9 ++++++++- security/landlock/limits.h | 2 +- security/landlock/syscalls.c | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 7 ++++--- 7 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst +10 -0
@@ -380,6 +380,16 @@ by the Documentation/admin-guide/cgroup-v1/memory.rst. Previous limitations ==================== +File truncation (ABI < 3) +------------------------- + +File truncation could not be denied before the third Landlock ABI, so it is +always allowed when using a kernel that only supports the first or second ABI. + +Starting with the Landlock ABI version 3, it is now possible to securely +control truncation thanks to the new `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE` access +right. + File renaming and linking (ABI 1) ---------------------------------
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h +12 -5
@@ -95,8 +95,15 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {* A file can only receive these access rights: * * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE: Execute a file. -* - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE: Open a file with write access. +* - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE: Open a file with write access. Note that +* you might additionally need the `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE` right in +* order to overwrite files with :manpage:`open(2)` using `O_TRUNC` or +* :manpage:`creat(2)`. * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE: Open a file with read access. +* - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE: Truncate a file through file truncation APIs +* like :manpage:`truncate(2)`, :manpage:`ftruncate(2)`, or +* :manpage:`open(2)` with `O_TRUNC` or :manpage:`creat(2)`. This access right +* is available since the third version of the Landlock ABI. * * A directory can receive access rights related to files or directories. The * following access right is applied to the directory itself, and the
@@ -139,10 +146,9 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {* * It is currently not possible to restrict some file-related actions * accessible through these syscall families: :manpage:`chdir(2)`, -* :manpage:`truncate(2)`, :manpage:`stat(2)`, :manpage:`flock(2)`, -* :manpage:`chmod(2)`, :manpage:`chown(2)`, :manpage:`setxattr(2)`, -* :manpage:`utime(2)`, :manpage:`ioctl(2)`, :manpage:`fcntl(2)`, -* :manpage:`access(2)`. +* :manpage:`stat(2)`, :manpage:`flock(2)`, :manpage:`chmod(2)`, +* :manpage:`chown(2)`, :manpage:`setxattr(2)`, :manpage:`utime(2)`, +* :manpage:`ioctl(2)`, :manpage:`fcntl(2)`, :manpage:`access(2)`. * Future Landlock evolutions will enable to restrict them. */ /* clang-format off */
@@ -160,6 +166,7 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK (1ULL << 11)#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM (1ULL << 12)#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER (1ULL << 13) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE (1ULL << 14)/* clang-format on */ #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */
security/landlock/fs.c +8 -1
@@ -146,7 +146,8 @@ static struct landlock_object *get_inode_object(struct inode *const inode)#define ACCESS_FILE ( \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \ - LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE) + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)/* clang-format on */ /*
@@ -1140,6 +1141,11 @@ static int hook_path_rmdir(const struct path *const dir,return current_check_access_path (dir,LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR ); } +static int hook_path_truncate (const struct path *const path) +{ +return current_check_access_path (path,LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE ); +} +/* File hooks */ static inline access_mask_t get_file_access (const struct file *const file)
@@ -1192,6 +1198,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (path_symlink, hook_path_symlink),LSM_HOOK_INIT (path_unlink, hook_path_unlink),LSM_HOOK_INIT (path_rmdir, hook_path_rmdir), +LSM_HOOK_INIT (path_truncate, hook_path_truncate), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, hook_file_open), };
security/landlock/limits.h +1 -1
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@#define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS 16#define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES U32_MAX -#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER +#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE#define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS << 1) - 1)#define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS)
security/landlock/syscalls.c +1 -1
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = { .write = fop_dummy_write, }; -#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 2 +#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 3/** * sys_landlock_create_ruleset - Create a new ruleset
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c +1 -1
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ TEST(abi_version)const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = { .handled_access_fs =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE , }; -ASSERT_EQ (2 ,landlock_create_ruleset (NULL ,0 , +ASSERT_EQ (3 ,landlock_create_ruleset (NULL ,0 ,LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION )); ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, 0,
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +4 -3
@@ -399,9 +399,10 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, inval)#define ACCESS_FILE ( \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \ - LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE) + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE) -#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER +#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE#define ACCESS_ALL ( \ ACCESS_FILE | \
@@ -415,7 +416,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, inval)LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO | \LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | \LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM | \ - ACCESS_LAST) + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER)/* clang-format on */
Signature · 1 line
2.37.2
Mickaël Salaün
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 1/4] landlock: Support file truncation
Quoted 29 lines · Günther Noack
Introduce the
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATEflag for file truncation.This flag hooks into the
path_truncateLSM hook and covers file truncation using truncate(2), ftruncate(2), open(2) withO_TRUNC, as well ascreat().This change also increments the Landlock ABI version, updates corresponding selftests, and includes minor documentation changes to document the flag.
Signed-off-by Günther Noack <[email protected]>--- Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 10 ++++++++++ include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 17 ++++++++++++----- security/landlock/fs.c | 9 ++++++++- security/landlock/limits.h | 2 +- security/landlock/syscalls.c | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 7 ++++--- 7 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst +0
-0@@ -380,6 +380,16 @@ by the Documentation/admin-guide/cgroup-v1/memory.rst. Previous limitations ====================
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst by the Documentation/admin-guide/cgroup-v1/memory.rst. · line 392
Quoted 10 lines
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst +10
-0+File truncation (ABI < 3) +------------------------- + +File truncation could not be denied before the third Landlock ABI, so it is +always allowed when using a kernel that only supports the first or second ABI. + +Starting with the Landlock ABI version 3, it is now possible to securely +control truncation thanks to the new `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE` access +right. +
This should be in the forth patch, below the file renaming and linking section.
Quoted 9 lines
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst +0
-0File renaming and linking (ABI 1) ---------------------------------include/uapi/linux/landlock.h +0
-0@@ -95,8 +95,15 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {* A file can only receive these access rights:
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h struct landlock_path_beneath_attr { · line 104
Quoted 10 lines
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h +6
-1* * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE: Execute a file. -* - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE: Open a file with write access. +* - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE: Open a file with write access. Note that +* you might additionally need the `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE` right in +* order to overwrite files with :manpage:`open(2)` using `O_TRUNC` or +* :manpage:`creat(2)`. * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE: Open a file with read access. +* - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE: Truncate a file through file truncation APIs +* like :manpage:`truncate(2)`, :manpage:`ftruncate(2)`, or
s/through file truncation APIs like/with/
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h struct landlock_path_beneath_attr { · line 105
Quoted 1 line
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h +1
-0+* :manpage:`open(2)` with `O_TRUNC` or :manpage:`creat(2)`. This access right
:manpage:creat(2), or :manpage:open(2) using O_TRUNC.
With only one "or".
Quoted 125 lines
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h +5
-4+* is available since the third version of the Landlock ABI. * * A directory can receive access rights related to files or directories. The * following access right is applied to the directory itself, and the @@ -139,10 +146,9 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {* * It is currently not possible to restrict some file-related actions * accessible through these syscall families: :manpage:`chdir(2)`, -* :manpage:`truncate(2)`, :manpage:`stat(2)`, :manpage:`flock(2)`, -* :manpage:`chmod(2)`, :manpage:`chown(2)`, :manpage:`setxattr(2)`, -* :manpage:`utime(2)`, :manpage:`ioctl(2)`, :manpage:`fcntl(2)`, -* :manpage:`access(2)`. +* :manpage:`stat(2)`, :manpage:`flock(2)`, :manpage:`chmod(2)`, +* :manpage:`chown(2)`, :manpage:`setxattr(2)`, :manpage:`utime(2)`, +* :manpage:`ioctl(2)`, :manpage:`fcntl(2)`, :manpage:`access(2)`. * Future Landlock evolutions will enable to restrict them. */ /* clang-format off */ @@ -160,6 +166,7 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK (1ULL << 11)#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM (1ULL << 12)#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER (1ULL << 13) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE (1ULL << 14)/* clang-format on */ #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */ security/landlock/fs.c +8
-1@@ -146,7 +146,8 @@ static struct landlock_object *get_inode_object(struct inode *const inode)#define ACCESS_FILE ( \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \ - LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE) + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)/* clang-format on */ /* @@ -1140,6 +1141,11 @@ static int hook_path_rmdir(const struct path *const dir,return current_check_access_path (dir,LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR ); } +static int hook_path_truncate (const struct path *const path) +{ +return current_check_access_path (path,LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE ); +} +/* File hooks */ static inline access_mask_t get_file_access (const struct file *const file)@@ -1192,6 +1198,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (path_symlink, hook_path_symlink),LSM_HOOK_INIT (path_unlink, hook_path_unlink),LSM_HOOK_INIT (path_rmdir, hook_path_rmdir), +LSM_HOOK_INIT (path_truncate, hook_path_truncate), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, hook_file_open), };security/landlock/limits.h +1
-1@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@#define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS 16#define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES U32_MAX -#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER +#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE#define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS << 1) - 1)#define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS)security/landlock/syscalls.c +1
-1@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = { .write = fop_dummy_write, }; -#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 2 +#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 3/** * sys_landlock_create_ruleset - Create a new ruleset tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c +1
-1@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ TEST(abi_version)const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = { .handled_access_fs =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE , }; -ASSERT_EQ (2 ,landlock_create_ruleset (NULL ,0 , +ASSERT_EQ (3 ,landlock_create_ruleset (NULL ,0 ,LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION )); ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, 0,tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +4
-3@@ -399,9 +399,10 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, inval)#define ACCESS_FILE ( \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \ - LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE) + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE) -#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER +#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE#define ACCESS_ALL ( \ ACCESS_FILE | \@@ -415,7 +416,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, inval)LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO | \LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | \LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM | \ - ACCESS_LAST) + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER)/* clang-format on */
Re: [PATCH v4 1/4] landlock: Support file truncation
Quoted 13 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 12 lines · Günther Noack
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst +5
-0@@ -380,6 +380,16 @@ by the Documentation/admin-guide/cgroup-v1/memory.rst. Previous limitations ==================== +File truncation (ABI < 3) +------------------------- + +File truncation could not be denied before the third Landlock ABI, so it is +always allowed when using a kernel that only supports the first or second ABI.
Quoted 8 lines
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst by the Documentation/admin-guide/cgroup-v1/memory.rst. · line 392
Quoted 5 lines
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst +5
-0+ +Starting with the Landlock ABI version 3, it is now possible to securely +control truncation thanks to the new `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE` access +right. +This should be in the forth patch, below the file renaming and linking section.
Good point, moved.
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h +1
-1@@ -95,8 +95,15 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {* A file can only receive these access rights: * * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE: Execute a file. -* - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE: Open a file with write access. +* - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE: Open a file with write access. Note that
Quoted 8 lines
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h struct landlock_path_beneath_attr { · line 104
Quoted 6 lines
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h +5
-0+* you might additionally need the `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE` right in +* order to overwrite files with :manpage:`open(2)` using `O_TRUNC` or +* :manpage:`creat(2)`. * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE: Open a file with read access. +* - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE: Truncate a file through file truncation APIs +* like :manpage:`truncate(2)`, :manpage:`ftruncate(2)`, or s/through file truncation APIs like/with/
Done.
Quoted 7 lines
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h struct landlock_path_beneath_attr { · line 105
Quoted 3 lines
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h +1
-0+* :manpage:`open(2)` with `O_TRUNC` or :manpage:`creat(2)`. This access right :manpage:
creat(2), or :manpage:open(2)usingO_TRUNC.With only one "or".
Done.
Thanks for the attention to detail in the review!
—Günther
--
PATCH v4 2/4 selftests/landlock: Selftests for file truncation support
In reply to Günther NoackThese tests exercise the following truncation operations:
* truncate() (truncate by path)
* ftruncate() (truncate by file descriptor)
* open with the O_TRUNC flag
* special case: creat(), which is open with O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC.
in the following scenarios:
* Files with read, write and truncate rights.
* Files with read and truncate rights.
* Files with the truncate right.
* Files without the truncate right.
In particular, the following scenarios are enforced with the test:
* The truncate right is required to use ftruncate,
even when the thread already has the right to write to the file.
* open() with O_TRUNC requires the truncate right, if it truncates a file. open() already checks security_path_truncate() in this case, and it required no additional check in the Landlock LSM's file_open hook.
* creat() requires the truncate right
when called with an existing filename.
* creat() does *not* require the truncate right
when it's creating a new file.
--- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 219 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 219 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +219 -0
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ static const char file1_s2d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s2d1/s2d2/s2d3/f1";static const char file2_s2d3[] =TMP_DIR "/s2d1/s2d2/s2d3/f2" ;static const char dir_s3d1[] =TMP_DIR "/s3d1" ; +static const char file1_s3d1[] =TMP_DIR "/s3d1/f1" ;/* dir_s3d2 is a mount point. */ static const char dir_s3d2[] =TMP_DIR "/s3d1/s3d2" ;static const char dir_s3d3[] =TMP_DIR "/s3d1/s3d2/s3d3" ;
@@ -83,6 +84,7 @@ static const char dir_s3d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s3d1/s3d2/s3d3";* │ ├── f1 * │ └── f2 * └── s3d1 +* ├── f1 * └── s3d2 * └── s3d3 */
@@ -208,6 +210,7 @@ static void create_layout1(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata)create_file (_metadata, file1_s2d3);create_file (_metadata, file2_s2d3); +create_file (_metadata, file1_s3d1);create_directory (_metadata, dir_s3d2);set_cap (_metadata,CAP_SYS_ADMIN );ASSERT_EQ (0 ,mount ("tmp" , dir_s3d2,"tmpfs" ,0 ,"size=4m,mode=700" ));
@@ -230,6 +233,7 @@ static void remove_layout1(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata)EXPECT_EQ (0 ,remove_path (file1_s2d2));EXPECT_EQ (0 ,remove_path (file1_s2d1)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,remove_path (file1_s3d1));EXPECT_EQ (0 ,remove_path (dir_s3d3));set_cap (_metadata,CAP_SYS_ADMIN );umount (dir_s3d2);
@@ -3023,6 +3027,221 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe)ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (pipe_fds[1 ])); } +/* +* Opens the file and invokes ftruncate(2). +* +* Returns the errno of ftruncate if ftruncate() fails. +* Returns EBADFD if open() or close() fail (should not happen). +* Returns 0 if ftruncate(), open() and close() were successful. +*/ +static int test_ftruncate (struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, +const char *const path,int flags) +{ +int res, err, fd; + + fd =open (path, flags |O_CLOEXEC ); +if (fd <0 ) +return EBADFD ; + + res =ftruncate (fd,10 ); + err = errno; + +if (close (fd) !=0 ) +return EBADFD ; + +if (res <0 ) +return err; +return 0 ; +} + +/* Invokes truncate(2) and returns the errno or 0. */ +static int test_truncate (const char *const path) +{ +if (truncate (path,10 ) <0 ) +return errno; +return 0 ; +} + +/* +* Invokes creat(2) and returns its errno or 0. +* Closes the opened file descriptor on success. +* Returns EBADFD if close() returns an error (should not happen). +*/ +static int test_creat (struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, +const char *const path,mode_t mode) +{ +int fd =creat (path, mode); + +if (fd <0 ) +return errno; + +if (close (fd) <0 ) +return EBADFD ; +return 0 ; +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, truncate) +{ +const char *const file_rwt = file1_s1d1; +const char *const file_rw = file2_s1d1; +const char *const file_rt = file1_s1d2; +const char *const file_t = file2_s1d2; +const char *const file_none = file1_s1d3; +const char *const dir_t = dir_s2d1; +const char *const file_in_dir_t = file1_s2d1; +const char *const dir_w = dir_s3d1; +const char *const file_in_dir_w = file1_s3d1; +const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = file_rwt, + .access =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | +LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | +LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE , + }, + { + .path = file_rw, + .access =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | +LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE , + }, + { + .path = file_rt, + .access =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | +LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE , + }, + { + .path = file_t, + .access =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE , + }, +// Implicitly: No access rights for file_none. + { + .path = dir_t, + .access =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE , + }, + { + .path = dir_w, + .access =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE , + }, + {}, + }; +const __u64 handled =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | +LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | +LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE ; +const int ruleset_fd =create_ruleset (_metadata, handled, rules); + +ASSERT_LE (0 , ruleset_fd); +enforce_ruleset (_metadata, ruleset_fd); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (ruleset_fd)); + +/* +* Checks read, write and truncate rights: truncation works. +* +* Note: Independent of Landlock, ftruncate(2) on read-only +* file descriptors never works. +*/ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_ftruncate (_metadata, file_rwt,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EINVAL ,test_ftruncate (_metadata, file_rwt,O_RDONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_rwt)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_rwt,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_rwt,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); + +/* Checks read and write rights: no truncate variant works. */ +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_ftruncate (_metadata, file_rw,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EINVAL ,test_ftruncate (_metadata, file_rw,O_RDONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_truncate (file_rw)); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_rw,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_rw,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); + +/* +* Checks read and truncate rights: truncation works. +* +* Note: Files opened in O_RDONLY can get truncated as part of +* the same operation. +*/ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_rt,O_RDONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_rt,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_rt,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_rt,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_rt)); + +/* Checks truncate right: truncate works, but can't open file. */ +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_t,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_t,O_RDONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_t,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_t,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_t)); + +/* Checks "no rights" case: No form of truncation works. */ +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_RDONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_truncate (file_none)); + +/* Checks truncate right on directory: truncate works on contained files */ +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_in_dir_t,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_in_dir_t,O_RDONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_in_dir_t,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_in_dir_t,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_in_dir_t)); + +/* +* Checks creat in dir_w: This requires the truncate right +* when overwriting an existing file, but does not require it +* when the file is new. +*/ +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_creat (_metadata, file_in_dir_w,0600 )); + +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,unlink (file_in_dir_w)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_creat (_metadata, file_in_dir_w,0600 )); +} + +/* +* Exercises file truncation when it's not restricted, +* as it was the case before LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE existed. +*/ +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, truncate_unhandled) +{ +const char *const file_r = file1_s1d1; +const char *const file_w = file2_s1d1; +const char *const file_none = file1_s1d2; +const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = file_r, + .access =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE , + }, + { + .path = file_w, + .access =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE , + }, +// Implicitly: No rights for file_none. + {}, + }; +const __u64 handled =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | +LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE ; +const int ruleset_fd =create_ruleset (_metadata, handled, rules); + +ASSERT_LE (0 , ruleset_fd); +enforce_ruleset (_metadata, ruleset_fd); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (ruleset_fd)); + +/* Checks read right: truncation should work through truncate and open. */ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_r)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_r,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_r,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); + +/* Checks write right: truncation should work through truncate, ftruncate and open. */ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_w)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_ftruncate (_metadata, file_w,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_w,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_w,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); + +/* Checks "no rights" case: truncate works but all open attempts fail. */ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_none)); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_WRONLY )); +} +/* clang-format off */ FIXTURE (layout1_bind) {};/* clang-format on */
Signature · 1 line
2.37.2
Mickaël Salaün
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 2/4] selftests/landlock: Selftests for file truncation support
Quoted 69 lines · Günther Noack
These tests exercise the following truncation operations:
*
truncate()(truncate by path)
*ftruncate()(truncate by file descriptor)
* open with theO_TRUNCflag
* special case:creat(), which is open with O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC.in the following scenarios:
* Files with read, write and truncate rights.
* Files with read and truncate rights.
* Files with the truncate right.
* Files without the truncate right.In particular, the following scenarios are enforced with the test:
* The truncate right is required to use ftruncate,
even when the thread already has the right to write to the file.
*open()withO_TRUNCrequires the truncate right, if it truncates a file.open()already checkssecurity_path_truncate()in this case, and it required no additional check in the Landlock LSM'sfile_openhook.
*creat()requires the truncate right
when called with an existing filename.
*creat()does *not* require the truncate right
when it's creating a new file.Signed-off-by Günther Noack <[email protected]>--- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 219 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 219 insertions(+)tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +4
-0@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ static const char file1_s2d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s2d1/s2d2/s2d3/f1";static const char file2_s2d3[] =TMP_DIR "/s2d1/s2d2/s2d3/f2" ;static const char dir_s3d1[] =TMP_DIR "/s3d1" ; +static const char file1_s3d1[] =TMP_DIR "/s3d1/f1" ;/* dir_s3d2 is a mount point. */ static const char dir_s3d2[] =TMP_DIR "/s3d1/s3d2" ;static const char dir_s3d3[] =TMP_DIR "/s3d1/s3d2/s3d3" ;@@ -83,6 +84,7 @@ static const char dir_s3d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s3d1/s3d2/s3d3";* │ ├── f1 * │ └── f2 * └── s3d1 +* ├── f1 * └── s3d2 * └── s3d3 */ @@ -208,6 +210,7 @@ static void create_layout1(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata)create_file (_metadata, file1_s2d3);create_file (_metadata, file2_s2d3); +create_file (_metadata, file1_s3d1);create_directory (_metadata, dir_s3d2);set_cap (_metadata,CAP_SYS_ADMIN );ASSERT_EQ (0 ,mount ("tmp" , dir_s3d2,"tmpfs" ,0 ,"size=4m,mode=700" ));@@ -230,6 +233,7 @@ static void remove_layout1(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata)EXPECT_EQ (0 ,remove_path (file1_s2d2));EXPECT_EQ (0 ,remove_path (file1_s2d1)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,remove_path (file1_s3d1));EXPECT_EQ (0 ,remove_path (dir_s3d3));set_cap (_metadata,CAP_SYS_ADMIN );umount (dir_s3d2);@@ -3023,6 +3027,221 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe)ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (pipe_fds[1 ]));
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3037
Quoted 10 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +8
-0} +/* +* Opens the file and invokes ftruncate(2). +* +* Returns the errno of ftruncate if ftruncate() fails. +* Returns EBADFD if open() or close() fail (should not happen). +* Returns 0 if ftruncate(), open() and close() were successful. +*/ +static int test_ftruncate(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
_metadata is no longer needed. Same for test_creat().
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3044
Quoted 7 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +7
-0+ const char *const path, int flags) +{ + int res, err, fd; + + fd =open (path, flags |O_CLOEXEC ); +if (fd <0 ) +return EBADFD ;
Instead of EBADFD, which is a valid open(2) error, you can use ENOSYS and add a comment explaining that we are not interested by this open(2) error code but only the ftruncate(2) one because we are sure opening such path is allowed or because open(2) is already tested before calls to test_ftruncate().
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3050
Quoted 6 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +6
-0+ + res =ftruncate (fd,10 ); + err = errno; + +if (close (fd) !=0 ) +return EBADFD ;
Why not returning errno? See test_open_rel() comments.
Quoted 19 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +19
-0+ +if (res <0 ) +return err; +return 0 ; +} + +/* Invokes truncate(2) and returns the errno or 0. */ +static int test_truncate (const char *const path) +{ +if (truncate (path,10 ) <0 ) +return errno; +return 0 ; +} + +/* +* Invokes creat(2) and returns its errno or 0. +* Closes the opened file descriptor on success. +* Returns EBADFD if close() returns an error (should not happen). +*/
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3079
Quoted 10 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +10
-0+static int test_creat (struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, +const char *const path,mode_t mode) +{ +int fd =creat (path, mode); + +if (fd <0 ) +return errno; + +if (close (fd) <0 ) +return EBADFD ;
Why not returning errno?
Quoted 26 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +26
-0+return 0 ; +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, truncate) +{ +const char *const file_rwt = file1_s1d1; +const char *const file_rw = file2_s1d1; +const char *const file_rt = file1_s1d2; +const char *const file_t = file2_s1d2; +const char *const file_none = file1_s1d3; +const char *const dir_t = dir_s2d1; +const char *const file_in_dir_t = file1_s2d1; +const char *const dir_w = dir_s3d1; +const char *const file_in_dir_w = file1_s3d1; +const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = file_rwt, + .access =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | +LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | +LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE , + }, + { + .path = file_rw, + .access =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | +LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE , + },
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3115
Quoted 10 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +10
-0+ { + .path = file_rt, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE, + }, + { + .path = file_t, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE, + }, + // Implicitly: No access rights for file_none.
Please use /* */ comments everywhere.
Quoted 19 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +19
-0+ { + .path = dir_t, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE, + }, + { + .path = dir_w, + .access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, + }, + {}, + }; +const __u64 handled =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | +LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | +LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE ; +const int ruleset_fd =create_ruleset (_metadata, handled, rules); + +ASSERT_LE (0 , ruleset_fd); +enforce_ruleset (_metadata, ruleset_fd); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (ruleset_fd)); +
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3144
Quoted 10 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +10
-0+/* +* Checks read, write and truncate rights: truncation works. +* +* Note: Independent of Landlock, ftruncate(2) on read-only +* file descriptors never works. +*/ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_ftruncate (_metadata, file_rwt,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EINVAL ,test_ftruncate (_metadata, file_rwt,O_RDONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_rwt)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_rwt,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC ));
Could you please interleave the test_open() and test_ftruncate() with the same open flags, and start with test_open() to make sure assumptions are correct (cf. previous comment about test_ftruncate)? Like this (everywhere):
EXPECT_EQ(0, test_open(file_rwt, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC)); EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, test_ftruncate(file_rwt, O_RDONLY)); EXPECT_EQ(0, test_open(file_rwt, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC)); EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(file_rwt, O_WRONLY)); EXPECT_EQ(0, test_truncate(file_rwt));
Quoted 7 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +7
-0+EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_rwt,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); + +/* Checks read and write rights: no truncate variant works. */ +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_ftruncate (_metadata, file_rw,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EINVAL ,test_ftruncate (_metadata, file_rw,O_RDONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_truncate (file_rw)); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_rw,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC ));
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3161
Quoted 10 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +10
-0+EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_rw,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); + +/* +* Checks read and truncate rights: truncation works. +* +* Note: Files opened in O_RDONLY can get truncated as part of +* the same operation. +*/ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_rt,O_RDONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_rt,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC ));
Why not a test_ftruncate() check here?
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3163
Quoted 2 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +2
-0+EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_rt,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_rt,O_WRONLY ));
There is a missing "| O_TRUNC"
Quoted 29 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +29
-0+EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_rt)); + +/* Checks truncate right: truncate works, but can't open file. */ +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_t,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_t,O_RDONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_t,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_t,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_t)); + +/* Checks "no rights" case: No form of truncation works. */ +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_RDONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_truncate (file_none)); + +/* Checks truncate right on directory: truncate works on contained files */ +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_in_dir_t,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_in_dir_t,O_RDONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_in_dir_t,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_in_dir_t,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_in_dir_t)); + +/* +* Checks creat in dir_w: This requires the truncate right +* when overwriting an existing file, but does not require it +* when the file is new. +*/ +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_creat (_metadata, file_in_dir_w,0600 ));
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3202
Quoted 10 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +10
-0+ +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,unlink (file_in_dir_w)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_creat (_metadata, file_in_dir_w,0600 )); +} + +/* +* Exercises file truncation when it's not restricted, +* as it was the case before LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE existed. +*/ +TEST_F_FORK (layout1, truncate_unhandled)
Can you move layout1.truncate_unhandled tests before layout1.truncate?
Quoted 16 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +16
-0+{ +const char *const file_r = file1_s1d1; +const char *const file_w = file2_s1d1; +const char *const file_none = file1_s1d2; +const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = file_r, + .access =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE , + }, + { + .path = file_w, + .access =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE , + }, +// Implicitly: No rights for file_none. + {}, + };
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3228
Quoted 10 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +10
-0+const __u64 handled =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | +LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE ; +const int ruleset_fd =create_ruleset (_metadata, handled, rules); + +ASSERT_LE (0 , ruleset_fd); +enforce_ruleset (_metadata, ruleset_fd); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (ruleset_fd)); + +/* Checks read right: truncation should work through truncate and open. */ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_r));
We should be consistent to also check with test_ftruncate() (and order the EXPECT checks appropriately).
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3232
Quoted 4 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +4
-0+EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_r,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_r,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); + +/* Checks write right: truncation should work through truncate, ftruncate and open. */
Please align to 80 columns.
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3242
Quoted 10 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +10
-0+EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_w)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_ftruncate (_metadata, file_w,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_w,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_w,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); + +/* Checks "no rights" case: truncate works but all open attempts fail. */ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_none)); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_WRONLY ));
Can you test with test_creat() here?
Quoted 5 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +2
-0+} +/* clang-format off */ FIXTURE (layout1_bind) {};/* clang-format on */
Re: [PATCH v4 2/4] selftests/landlock: Selftests for file truncation support
Quoted 11 lines · Mickaël Salaün
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3037
Quoted 8 lines · Günther Noack
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +8
-0+/* +* Opens the file and invokes ftruncate(2). +* +* Returns the errno of ftruncate if ftruncate() fails. +* Returns EBADFD if open() or close() fail (should not happen). +* Returns 0 if ftruncate(), open() and close() were successful. +*/ +static int test_ftruncate(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
_metadatais no longer needed. Same fortest_creat().
Thanks, well spotted!
Quoted 15 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3044
Quoted 9 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +7
-0+ const char *const path, int flags) +{ + int res, err, fd; + + fd =open (path, flags |O_CLOEXEC ); +if (fd <0 ) +return EBADFD ;Instead of EBADFD, which is a valid open(2) error, you can use ENOSYS and add a comment explaining that we are not interested by this open(2) error code but only the ftruncate(2) one because we are sure opening such path is allowed or because open(2) is already tested before calls to
test_ftruncate().
Changed to ENOSYS and added a comment in the code and as function documentation.
The explanation follows the reasoning that callers must guarantee that open() and close() will work, in order to test ftruncate() correctly. If open() or close() fail, we return ENOSYS.
Technically EBADFD does not get returned by open(2) according to the man page, but I changed it to ENOSYS anyway (EBADF and EBADFD are easy to mix up).
Quoted 8 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3050
Quoted 6 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +6
-0+ + res =ftruncate (fd,10 ); + err = errno; + +if (close (fd) !=0 ) +return EBADFD ;Why not returning errno? See
test_open_rel()comments.
OK, changed to return errno for consistency, with the same comment.
Quoted 25 lines
Quoted 25 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +23
-0+ +if (res <0 ) +return err; +return 0 ; +} + +/* Invokes truncate(2) and returns the errno or 0. */ +static int test_truncate (const char *const path) +{ +if (truncate (path,10 ) <0 ) +return errno; +return 0 ; +} + +/* +* Invokes creat(2) and returns its errno or 0. +* Closes the opened file descriptor on success. +* Returns EBADFD if close() returns an error (should not happen). +*/ +static int test_creat (struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, +const char *const path,mode_t mode) +{ +int fd =creat (path, mode);
Quoted 8 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3079
Quoted 6 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +6
-0+ +if (fd <0 ) +return errno; + +if (close (fd) <0 ) +return EBADFD ;Why not returning errno?
Done. (Same)
Quoted 3 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3115
Quoted 1 line
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +1
-0+// Implicitly: No access rights for file_none. Please use /* */ comments everywhere.
Done. (in both places)
Quoted 15 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3144
Quoted 10 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +10
-0+/* +* Checks read, write and truncate rights: truncation works. +* +* Note: Independent of Landlock, ftruncate(2) on read-only +* file descriptors never works. +*/ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_ftruncate (_metadata, file_rwt,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EINVAL ,test_ftruncate (_metadata, file_rwt,O_RDONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_rwt)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_rwt,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC ));Could you please interleave the
test_open()andtest_ftruncate()with the same open flags, and start withtest_open()to make sure assumptions are correct (cf. previous comment abouttest_ftruncate)? Like this (everywhere):
Quoted 5 lines
EXPECT_EQ(0, test_open(file_rwt, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC));EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, test_ftruncate(file_rwt, O_RDONLY));EXPECT_EQ(0, test_open(file_rwt, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC));EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(file_rwt, O_WRONLY));EXPECT_EQ(0, test_truncate(file_rwt));
OK, I ordered it like that.
When calling
EXPECT_EQ(foo, test_ftruncate(...));
and "foo" is not ENOSYS (which it should never be!), then that alone is enough to guarantee that the open() in test_ftruncate worked, so in a sense this is already tested implicitly.
The only thing to make sure is to never *expect* ENOSYS from test_ftruncate(), but I documented in test_ftruncate() now that it is better to use test_open() for testing the result of open().
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 13 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +11
-0+EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_rwt,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); + +/* Checks read and write rights: no truncate variant works. */ +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_ftruncate (_metadata, file_rw,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EINVAL ,test_ftruncate (_metadata, file_rw,O_RDONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_truncate (file_rw)); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_rw,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_rw,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); + +/* +* Checks read and truncate rights: truncation works.
Quoted 8 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3161
Quoted 6 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +6
-0+* +* Note: Files opened in O_RDONLY can get truncated as part of +* the same operation. +*/ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_rt,O_RDONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_rt,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC ));Why not a
test_ftruncate()check here?
The twist here is, althrough truncate() works, ftruncate() cannot truncate the file in this case:
(a) when trying to open the file for writing, Landlock policy keeps you from doing that (tested with test_open).
(b) when opening the file read-only, that works, but read-only fds can never be ftruncated (explained in the man page).
It's slightly surprising when just glancing over the test, so I added the check for extra clarity:
EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, test_ftruncate(file_rt, O_RDONLY));
The check for test_open with O_WRONLY was already there.
Quoted 4 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3163
Quoted 2 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +2
-0+EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_rt,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_rt,O_WRONLY ));There is a missing "|
O_TRUNC"
Well spotted! Fixed.
Quoted 33 lines
Quoted 33 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +33
-0+EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_rt)); + +/* Checks truncate right: truncate works, but can't open file. */ +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_t,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_t,O_RDONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_t,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_t,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_t)); + +/* Checks "no rights" case: No form of truncation works. */ +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_RDONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_truncate (file_none)); + +/* Checks truncate right on directory: truncate works on contained files */ +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_in_dir_t,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_in_dir_t,O_RDONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_in_dir_t,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_in_dir_t,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_in_dir_t)); + +/* +* Checks creat in dir_w: This requires the truncate right +* when overwriting an existing file, but does not require it +* when the file is new. +*/ +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_creat (_metadata, file_in_dir_w,0600 )); + +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,unlink (file_in_dir_w)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_creat (_metadata, file_in_dir_w,0600 )); +}
Quoted 8 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3202
Quoted 6 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +6
-0+ +/* +* Exercises file truncation when it's not restricted, +* as it was the case before LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE existed. +*/ +TEST_F_FORK (layout1, truncate_unhandled)Can you move layout1.truncate_unhandled tests before layout1.truncate?
Done.
Quoted 23 lines
Quoted 23 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +21
-0+{ +const char *const file_r = file1_s1d1; +const char *const file_w = file2_s1d1; +const char *const file_none = file1_s1d2; +const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = file_r, + .access =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE , + }, + { + .path = file_w, + .access =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE , + }, +// Implicitly: No rights for file_none. + {}, + }; +const __u64 handled =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | +LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE ; +const int ruleset_fd =create_ruleset (_metadata, handled, rules); + +ASSERT_LE (0 , ruleset_fd);
Quoted 8 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3228
Quoted 5 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +5
-0+enforce_ruleset (_metadata, ruleset_fd); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (ruleset_fd)); + +/* Checks read right: truncation should work through truncate and open. */ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_r));We should be consistent to also check with
test_ftruncate()(and order the EXPECT checks appropriately).
Added.
Quoted 8 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3232
Quoted 6 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +4
-0+EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_r,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_r,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); + +/* Checks write right: truncation should work through truncate, ftruncate and open. */ Please align to 80 columns.
Done.
Quoted 14 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3242
Quoted 12 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +10
-0+EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_w)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_ftruncate (_metadata, file_w,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_w,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_w,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); + +/* Checks "no rights" case: truncate works but all open attempts fail. */ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_none)); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_WRONLY ));Can you test with
test_creat()here?
Added.
Thanks for the careful review!
—Günther
--
Re: [PATCH v4 2/4] selftests/landlock: Selftests for file truncation support
Quoted 33 lines · Günther Noack
Quoted 11 lines · Mickaël Salaün
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3037
Quoted 8 lines · Günther Noack
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +8
-0+/* +* Opens the file and invokes ftruncate(2). +* +* Returns the errno of ftruncate if ftruncate() fails. +* Returns EBADFD if open() or close() fail (should not happen). +* Returns 0 if ftruncate(), open() and close() were successful. +*/ +static int test_ftruncate(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
_metadatais no longer needed. Same fortest_creat().Thanks, well spotted!
Quoted 15 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3044
Quoted 9 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +7
-0+ const char *const path, int flags) +{ + int res, err, fd; + + fd =open (path, flags |O_CLOEXEC ); +if (fd <0 ) +return EBADFD ;Instead of EBADFD, which is a valid open(2) error, you can use ENOSYS and add a comment explaining that we are not interested by this open(2) error code but only the ftruncate(2) one because we are sure opening such path is allowed or because open(2) is already tested before calls to
test_ftruncate().Changed to ENOSYS and added a comment in the code and as function documentation.
Quoted 7 lines
The explanation follows the reasoning that callers must guarantee that
open()andclose()will work, in order to testftruncate()correctly. Ifopen()orclose()fail, we return ENOSYS.Technically EBADFD does not get returned by open(2) according to the man page, but I changed it to ENOSYS anyway (EBADF and EBADFD are easy to mix up).
The more I think about it, the more I feel that test_ftruncate() in its current form was a mistake:
* In reality, we just care about the ftruncate() result, not about open().
* The tests became slightly confusing and asymmetric because some places could call test_ftruncate() while others would call test_open()
* Trying open(..., O_RDONLY) + ftruncate() is also confusing in tests, because that never works anyway (ftruncate() only works on writable fds)
So: I'm contemplating to use a different approach instead:
* Open a writable FD for each file *before enforcing Landlock*.
* *Then* enforce Landlock (now some of these files can't be opened any more)
* Then try ftruncate() with the previously opened file descriptor.
As a result,
* we have some new repetitive but simple code for opening file descriptors
* we remove the long version of test_ftruncate() with all its error case complication and replace it with a trivial one that takes an already-opened file descriptor.
This way, each block in the test now checks the following things:
* check truncate(file)
* check ftruncate(file_fd) <--- passing the FD!
* check open(file, O_RDONLY|O_TRUNC)
* check open(file, O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC)
It's now easy to see in the tests that the result from truncate() and ftruncate() is always the same. The complication of worrying whether open() works before ftruncate() is also gone (so no more special open() checks needed before checking ftruncate()). I removed the testing of ftruncate() on read-only file descriptors, because that is forbidden in the ftruncate() manpage anyway and always returns EINVAL independent of Landlock.
I feel that this helps clarify the tests, even if it undoes some of your comments about expecting open() to work before ftruncate().
Does that approach look reasonable to you?
I might just send you a patch version with that variant I think - this might be clearer in code than in my textual description here. :)
—Günther
Quoted 238 lines
Quoted 9 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3050
Quoted 7 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +6
-0+ + res =ftruncate (fd,10 ); + err = errno; + +if (close (fd) !=0 ) +return EBADFD ;Why not returning errno? See
test_open_rel()comments.OK, changed to return errno for consistency, with the same comment.
Quoted 25 lines
Quoted 25 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +23
-0+ +if (res <0 ) +return err; +return 0 ; +} + +/* Invokes truncate(2) and returns the errno or 0. */ +static int test_truncate (const char *const path) +{ +if (truncate (path,10 ) <0 ) +return errno; +return 0 ; +} + +/* +* Invokes creat(2) and returns its errno or 0. +* Closes the opened file descriptor on success. +* Returns EBADFD if close() returns an error (should not happen). +*/ +static int test_creat (struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, +const char *const path,mode_t mode) +{ +int fd =creat (path, mode);Quoted 8 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3079
Quoted 6 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +6
-0+ +if (fd <0 ) +return errno; + +if (close (fd) <0 ) +return EBADFD ;Why not returning errno?
Done. (Same)
Quoted 3 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3115
Quoted 1 line
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +1
-0+// Implicitly: No access rights for file_none. Please use /* */ comments everywhere.
Done. (in both places)
Quoted 15 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3144
Quoted 10 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +10
-0+/* +* Checks read, write and truncate rights: truncation works. +* +* Note: Independent of Landlock, ftruncate(2) on read-only +* file descriptors never works. +*/ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_ftruncate (_metadata, file_rwt,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EINVAL ,test_ftruncate (_metadata, file_rwt,O_RDONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_rwt)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_rwt,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC ));Could you please interleave the
test_open()andtest_ftruncate()with the same open flags, and start withtest_open()to make sure assumptions are correct (cf. previous comment abouttest_ftruncate)? Like this (everywhere):Quoted 5 lines
EXPECT_EQ(0, test_open(file_rwt, O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC));EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, test_ftruncate(file_rwt, O_RDONLY));EXPECT_EQ(0, test_open(file_rwt, O_WRONLY | O_TRUNC));EXPECT_EQ(0, test_ftruncate(file_rwt, O_WRONLY));EXPECT_EQ(0, test_truncate(file_rwt));OK, I ordered it like that.
When calling
EXPECT_EQ(foo, test_ftruncate(...));and "foo" is not ENOSYS (which it should never be!), then that alone is enough to guarantee that the
open()intest_ftruncateworked, so in a sense this is already tested implicitly.The only thing to make sure is to never *expect* ENOSYS from
test_ftruncate(), but I documented intest_ftruncate()now that it is better to usetest_open()for testing the result ofopen().Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 13 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +11
-0+EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_rwt,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); + +/* Checks read and write rights: no truncate variant works. */ +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_ftruncate (_metadata, file_rw,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EINVAL ,test_ftruncate (_metadata, file_rw,O_RDONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_truncate (file_rw)); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_rw,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_rw,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); + +/* +* Checks read and truncate rights: truncation works. Quoted 8 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3161
Quoted 6 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +6
-0+* +* Note: Files opened in O_RDONLY can get truncated as part of +* the same operation. +*/ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_rt,O_RDONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_rt,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC ));Why not a
test_ftruncate()check here?The twist here is, althrough
truncate()works,ftruncate()cannot truncate the file in this case:(a) when trying to open the file for writing, Landlock policy keeps you from doing that (tested with
test_open).(b) when opening the file read-only, that works, but read-only fds can never be ftruncated (explained in the man page).
It's slightly surprising when just glancing over the test, so I added the check for extra clarity:
EXPECT_EQ(EINVAL, test_ftruncate(file_rt, O_RDONLY));The check for
test_openwithO_WRONLYwas already there.Quoted 4 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3163
Quoted 2 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +2
-0+EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_rt,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_rt,O_WRONLY ));There is a missing "|
O_TRUNC"Well spotted! Fixed.
Quoted 33 lines
Quoted 33 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +33
-0+EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_rt)); + +/* Checks truncate right: truncate works, but can't open file. */ +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_t,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_t,O_RDONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_t,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_t,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_t)); + +/* Checks "no rights" case: No form of truncation works. */ +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_RDONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_truncate (file_none)); + +/* Checks truncate right on directory: truncate works on contained files */ +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_in_dir_t,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_in_dir_t,O_RDONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_in_dir_t,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_in_dir_t,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_in_dir_t)); + +/* +* Checks creat in dir_w: This requires the truncate right +* when overwriting an existing file, but does not require it +* when the file is new. +*/ +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_creat (_metadata, file_in_dir_w,0600 )); + +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,unlink (file_in_dir_w)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_creat (_metadata, file_in_dir_w,0600 )); +}Quoted 8 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3202
Quoted 6 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +6
-0+ +/* +* Exercises file truncation when it's not restricted, +* as it was the case before LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE existed. +*/ +TEST_F_FORK (layout1, truncate_unhandled)Can you move layout1.truncate_unhandled tests before layout1.truncate?
Done.
Quoted 23 lines
Quoted 23 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +21
-0+{ +const char *const file_r = file1_s1d1; +const char *const file_w = file2_s1d1; +const char *const file_none = file1_s1d2; +const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = file_r, + .access =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE , + }, + { + .path = file_w, + .access =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE , + }, +// Implicitly: No rights for file_none. + {}, + }; +const __u64 handled =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | +LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE ; +const int ruleset_fd =create_ruleset (_metadata, handled, rules); + +ASSERT_LE (0 , ruleset_fd);Quoted 8 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3228
Quoted 5 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +5
-0+enforce_ruleset (_metadata, ruleset_fd); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (ruleset_fd)); + +/* Checks read right: truncation should work through truncate and open. */ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_r));We should be consistent to also check with
test_ftruncate()(and order the EXPECT checks appropriately).Added.
Quoted 8 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3232
Quoted 6 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +4
-0+EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_r,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_r,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); + +/* Checks write right: truncation should work through truncate, ftruncate and open. */ Please align to 80 columns.
Done.
Quoted 14 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3242
Quoted 12 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +10
-0+EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_w)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_ftruncate (_metadata, file_w,O_WRONLY )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_w,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_w,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); + +/* Checks "no rights" case: truncate works but all open attempts fail. */ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_none)); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_WRONLY ));Can you test with
test_creat()here?
Quoted 6 lines
Added.
Thanks for the careful review!
—Günther--
--
Mickaël Salaün
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 2/4] selftests/landlock: Selftests for file truncation support
Quoted 78 lines · Günther Noack
Quoted 33 lines · Günther Noack
Quoted 11 lines · Mickaël Salaün
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3037
Quoted 8 lines · Günther Noack
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +8
-0+/* +* Opens the file and invokes ftruncate(2). +* +* Returns the errno of ftruncate if ftruncate() fails. +* Returns EBADFD if open() or close() fail (should not happen). +* Returns 0 if ftruncate(), open() and close() were successful. +*/ +static int test_ftruncate(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
_metadatais no longer needed. Same fortest_creat().Thanks, well spotted!
Quoted 15 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe) · line 3044
Quoted 9 lines
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +7
-0+ const char *const path, int flags) +{ + int res, err, fd; + + fd =open (path, flags |O_CLOEXEC ); +if (fd <0 ) +return EBADFD ;Instead of EBADFD, which is a valid open(2) error, you can use ENOSYS and add a comment explaining that we are not interested by this open(2) error code but only the ftruncate(2) one because we are sure opening such path is allowed or because open(2) is already tested before calls to
test_ftruncate().Changed to ENOSYS and added a comment in the code and as function documentation.
Quoted 7 lines
The explanation follows the reasoning that callers must guarantee that
open()andclose()will work, in order to testftruncate()correctly. Ifopen()orclose()fail, we return ENOSYS.Technically EBADFD does not get returned by open(2) according to the man page, but I changed it to ENOSYS anyway (EBADF and EBADFD are easy to mix up).
The more I think about it, the more I feel that
test_ftruncate()in its current form was a mistake:* In reality, we just care about the
ftruncate()result, not aboutopen().
* The tests became slightly confusing and asymmetric because some places could calltest_ftruncate()while others would calltest_open()
* Tryingopen(..., O_RDONLY)+ftruncate()is also confusing in tests, because that never works anyway (ftruncate()only works on writable fds)So: I'm contemplating to use a different approach instead:
* Open a writable FD for each file *before enforcing Landlock*.
* *Then* enforce Landlock (now some of these files can't be opened any more)
* Then tryftruncate()with the previously opened file descriptor.As a result,
* we have some new repetitive but simple code for opening file descriptors
* we remove the long version oftest_ftruncate()with all its error case complication and replace it with a trivial one that takes an already-opened file descriptor.This way, each block in the test now checks the following things:
* check truncate(file)
* checkftruncate(file_fd)<--- passing the FD!
* checkopen(file, O_RDONLY|O_TRUNC)
* checkopen(file, O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC)It's now easy to see in the tests that the result from
truncate()andftruncate()is always the same. The complication of worrying whetheropen()works beforeftruncate()is also gone (so no more specialopen()checks needed before checkingftruncate()). I removed the testing offtruncate()on read-only file descriptors, because that is forbidden in theftruncate()manpage anyway and always returns EINVAL independent of Landlock.
Quoted 7 lines
I feel that this helps clarify the tests, even if it undoes some of your comments about expecting
open()to work beforeftruncate().Does that approach look reasonable to you?
I might just send you a patch version with that variant I think - this might be clearer in code than in my textual description here. :)
The FD from the pre-landlocked state is the right approach, thanks!
PATCH v4 3/4 samples/landlock: Extend sample tool to support LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
In reply to Günther NoackUpdate the sandboxer sample to restrict truncate actions. This is automatically enabled by default if the running kernel supports LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE, expect for the paths listed in the LL_FS_RW environment variable.
--- samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 23 ++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
samples/landlock/sandboxer.c +14 -9
@@ -76,7 +76,8 @@ static int parse_path(char *env_path, const char ***const path_list)#define ACCESS_FILE ( \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \ - LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE) + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)/* clang-format on */
@@ -160,10 +161,8 @@ static int populate_ruleset(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd,LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO | \LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | \LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM | \ - LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER) - -#define ACCESS_ABI_2 ( \ -LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER ) +LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)/* clang-format on */
@@ -226,11 +225,17 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)return 1 ; }/* Best-effort security. */ -if (abi <2 ) { - ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~ACCESS_ABI_2 ; - access_fs_ro &= ~ACCESS_ABI_2 ; - access_fs_rw &= ~ACCESS_ABI_2 ; +switch (abi) { +case 1 : +/* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER for ABI < 2 */ + ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER ; + __attribute__((fallthrough)); +case 2 : +/* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE for ABI < 3 */ + ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE ; } + access_fs_ro &= ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs; + access_fs_rw &= ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs; ruleset_fd =landlock_create_ruleset (&ruleset_attr,sizeof (ruleset_attr),0 );
Signature · 1 line
2.37.2
PATCH v4 4/4 landlock: Document Landlock's file truncation support
In reply to Günther NoackUse the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE flag in the tutorial.
Adapt the backwards compatibility example and discussion to remove the truncation flag where needed.
Point out potential surprising behaviour related to truncate.
--- Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 48 +++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst +38 -10
@@ -60,7 +60,8 @@ the need to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights. LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM | - LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER, + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE, }; Because we may not know on which kernel version an application will be
@@ -69,16 +70,26 @@ should try to protect users as much as possible whatever the kernel they are using. To avoid binary enforcement (i.e. either all security features or none), we can leverage a dedicated Landlock command to get the current version of the Landlock ABI and adapt the handled accesses. Let's check if we should -remove the `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER` access right which is only supported -starting with the second version of the ABI. +remove the `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER` and `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE` access +rights, which are only supported starting with the second and third version of +the ABI. .. code-block:: c int abi; abi = landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0, LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION); - if (abi < 2) { - ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER; + switch (abi) { + case -1: + perror("The running kernel does not enable to use Landlock"); + return 1; + case 1: + /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER for ABI < 2 */ + ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER; + __attribute__((fallthrough)); + case 2: + /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE for ABI < 3 */ + ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE; } This enables to create an inclusive ruleset that will contain our rules.
@@ -127,8 +138,8 @@ descriptor. It may also be required to create rules following the same logic as explained for the ruleset creation, by filtering access rights according to the Landlock -ABI version. In this example, this is not required because -`LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER` is not allowed by any rule. +ABI version. In this example, this is not required because all of the requested +``allowed_access`` rights are already available in ABI 1. We now have a ruleset with one rule allowing read access to ``/usr`` while denying all other handled accesses for the filesystem. The next step is to
@@ -251,6 +262,24 @@ To be allowed to use :manpage:`ptrace(2)` and related syscalls on a target process, a sandboxed process should have a subset of the target process rules, which means the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer. +Truncating files +---------------- + +The operations covered by `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE` and +`LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE` both change the contents of a file and sometimes +overlap in non-intuitive ways. It is recommended to always specify both of +these together. + +A particularly surprising example is :manpage:`creat(2)`. The name suggests +that this system call requires the rights to create and write files. However, +it also requires the truncate right if an existing file under the same name is +already present. + +It should also be noted that truncating files does not necessarily require the +`LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE` right. Apart from the obvious +:manpage:`truncate(2)` system call, this can also be done through +:manpage:`open(2)` with the flags `O_RDONLY` and `O_TRUNC`. + Compatibility =============
@@ -386,9 +415,8 @@ File truncation (ABI < 3) File truncation could not be denied before the third Landlock ABI, so it is always allowed when using a kernel that only supports the first or second ABI. -Starting with the Landlock ABI version 3, it is now possible to securely -control truncation thanks to the new `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE` access -right. +Starting with the Landlock ABI version 3, it is now possible to securely control +truncation thanks to the new `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE` access right. File renaming and linking (ABI 1) ---------------------------------
Signature · 1 line
2.37.2
Mickaël Salaün
maintainerRe: [PATCH v4 4/4] landlock: Document Landlock's file truncation support
Quoted 27 lines · Günther Noack
Use the
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATEflag in the tutorial.Adapt the backwards compatibility example and discussion to remove the truncation flag where needed.
Point out potential surprising behaviour related to truncate.
Signed-off-by Günther Noack <[email protected]>--- Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 48 +++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst +2
-1@@ -60,7 +60,8 @@ the need to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights. LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM | - LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER, + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE, }; Because we may not know on which kernel version an application will be
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst should try to protect users as much as possible whatever the kernel they are · line 73
Quoted 6 lines
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst +1
-2@@ -69,16 +70,26 @@ should try to protect users as much as possible whatever the kernel they are using. To avoid binary enforcement (i.e. either all security features or none), we can leverage a dedicated Landlock command to get the current version of the Landlock ABI and adapt the handled accesses. Let's check if we should -remove the `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER` access right which is only supported -starting with the second version of the ABI. +remove the `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER` and `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE` access
s/and/or/
Quoted 43 lines
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst +19
-4+rights, which are only supported starting with the second and third version of +the ABI. .. code-block:: c int abi; abi = landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0, LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION); - if (abi < 2) { - ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER; + switch (abi) { + case -1: + perror("The running kernel does not enable to use Landlock"); + return 1; + case 1: + /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER for ABI < 2 */ + ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER; + __attribute__((fallthrough)); + case 2: + /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE for ABI < 3 */ + ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE; } This enables to create an inclusive ruleset that will contain our rules.@@ -127,8 +138,8 @@ descriptor. It may also be required to create rules following the same logic as explained for the ruleset creation, by filtering access rights according to the Landlock -ABI version. In this example, this is not required because -`LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER` is not allowed by any rule. +ABI version. In this example, this is not required because all of the requested +``allowed_access`` rights are already available in ABI 1. We now have a ruleset with one rule allowing read access to ``/usr`` while denying all other handled accesses for the filesystem. The next step is to@@ -251,6 +262,24 @@ To be allowed to use :manpage:`ptrace(2)` and related syscalls on a target process, a sandboxed process should have a subset of the target process rules, which means the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer. +Truncating files +---------------- + +The operations covered by `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE` and
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst To be allowed to use :manpage:`ptrace(2)` and related syscalls on a target · line 278
Quoted 10 lines
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst +10
-0+`LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE` both change the contents of a file and sometimes +overlap in non-intuitive ways. It is recommended to always specify both of +these together. + +A particularly surprising example is :manpage:`creat(2)`. The name suggests +that this system call requires the rights to create and write files. However, +it also requires the truncate right if an existing file under the same name is +already present. + +It should also be noted that truncating files does not necessarily require the
I think "necessarily" is superfluous here.
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst To be allowed to use :manpage:`ptrace(2)` and related syscalls on a target · line 281
Quoted 3 lines
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst +3
-0+`LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE` right. Apart from the obvious +:manpage:`truncate(2)` system call, this can also be done through +:manpage:`open(2)` with the flags `O_RDONLY` and `O_TRUNC`.
O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC.
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst File truncation (ABI < 3) · line 419
Quoted 13 lines
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst +3
-3+ Compatibility =============@@ -386,9 +415,8 @@ File truncation (ABI < 3) File truncation could not be denied before the third Landlock ABI, so it is always allowed when using a kernel that only supports the first or second ABI. -Starting with the Landlock ABI version 3, it is now possible to securely -control truncation thanks to the new `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE` access -right. +Starting with the Landlock ABI version 3, it is now possible to securely control +truncation thanks to the new `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE` access right.
This is an inconsistent hunk, patching the first patch.
Please also move this "File truncation" section below the "File renaming and linking".
Quoted 3 lines
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst +0
-0File renaming and linking (ABI 1) ---------------------------------
Re: [PATCH v4 4/4] landlock: Document Landlock's file truncation support
Quoted 15 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst should try to protect users as much as possible whatever the kernel they are · line 73
Quoted 12 lines · Günther Noack
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst +1
-2Because we may not know on which kernel version an application will be@@ -69,16 +70,26 @@ should try to protect users as much as possible whatever the kernel they are using. To avoid binary enforcement (i.e. either all security features or none), we can leverage a dedicated Landlock command to get the current version of the Landlock ABI and adapt the handled accesses. Let's check if we should -remove the `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER` access right which is only supported -starting with the second version of the ABI. +remove the `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER` and `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE` accesss/and/or/
Done.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst +8
-0+Truncating files +---------------- + +The operations covered by `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE` and +`LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE` both change the contents of a file and sometimes +overlap in non-intuitive ways. It is recommended to always specify both of +these together. +
Quoted 8 lines
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst To be allowed to use :manpage:`ptrace(2)` and related syscalls on a target · line 278
Quoted 6 lines
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst +6
-0+A particularly surprising example is :manpage:`creat(2)`. The name suggests +that this system call requires the rights to create and write files. However, +it also requires the truncate right if an existing file under the same name is +already present. + +It should also be noted that truncating files does not necessarily require theI think "necessarily" is superfluous here.
Done. I dropped the "obvious" too.
Quoted 7 lines
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst To be allowed to use :manpage:`ptrace(2)` and related syscalls on a target · line 281
Quoted 5 lines
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst +3
-0+`LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE` right. Apart from the obvious +:manpage:`truncate(2)` system call, this can also be done through +:manpage:`open(2)` with the flags `O_RDONLY` and `O_TRUNC`.
O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC.
Done.
Quoted 13 lines
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst File truncation (ABI < 3) · line 418
Quoted 10 lines
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst +2
-3Compatibility =============@@ -386,9 +415,8 @@ File truncation (ABI < 3) File truncation could not be denied before the third Landlock ABI, so it is always allowed when using a kernel that only supports the first or second ABI. -Starting with the Landlock ABI version 3, it is now possible to securely -control truncation thanks to the new `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE` access -right. +Starting with the Landlock ABI version 3, it is now possible to securely control +truncation thanks to the new `LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE` access right.This is an inconsistent hunk, patching the first patch.
Quoted 2 lines
Please also move this "File truncation" section below the "File renaming and linking".
Thanks, fixed the ordering of commits and moved the truncation section below "File Renaming and Linking".
—Günther
--