landlock: truncate support
Subsystems (7)
v10 cover landlock: truncate support
The goal of these patches is to work towards a more complete coverage of file system operations that are restrictable with Landlock.
Motivation
----------
The known set of currently unsupported file system operations in Landlock is described at [1]. Out of the operations listed there, truncate is the only one that modifies file contents, so these patches should make it possible to prevent the direct modification of file contents with Landlock.
Apart from Landlock, file truncation can also be restricted using seccomp-bpf, but it is more difficult to use (requires BPF, requires keeping up-to-date syscall lists) and it is not configurable by file hierarchy, as Landlock is. The simplicity and flexibility of the Landlock approach makes it worthwhile adding.
Implementation overview
-----------------------
The patch introduces the truncation restriction feature as an additional bit in the access_mask_t bitmap, in line with the existing supported operations.
The truncation flag covers both the truncate(2) and ftruncate(2) families of syscalls, as well as open(2) with the O_TRUNC flag. This includes usages of creat() in the case where existing regular files are overwritten.
Additionally, this patch set introduces a new Landlock security blob associated with opened files, to track the available Landlock access rights at the time of opening the file. This is in line with Unix's general approach of checking the read and write permissions during open(), and associating this previously checked authorization with the opened file.
In order to treat truncate(2) and ftruncate(2) calls differently in an LSM hook, we split apart the existing security_path_truncate hook into security_path_truncate (for truncation by path) and security_file_truncate (for truncation of previously opened files).
We also implement the file_alloc_security hook, in order to override the access rights in the file security blob, in cases where the file is opened by other means than open(2), but where the opened file still supports ftruncate(2). This is also demonstrated in a selftest, using memfd_create(2).
Relationship between "truncate" and "write" rights
--------------------------------------------------
While it's possible to use the "write file" and "truncate" rights independent of each other, it simplifies the mental model for userspace callers to always use them together.
Specifically, the following behaviours might be surprising for users when using these independently:
* The commonly creat() syscall requires the truncate right when overwriting existing files, as it is equivalent to open(2) with O_TRUNC|O_CREAT|O_WRONLY.
* The "write file" right is not always required to truncate a file, even through the open(2) syscall (when using O_RDONLY|O_TRUNC).
Nevertheless, keeping the two flags separate is the correct approach to guarantee backwards compatibility for existing Landlock users.
When the "truncate" right is checked for ftruncate(2)
-----------------------------------------------------
Notably, for the purpose of ftruncate(2), the Landlock truncation access right is looked up when *opening* the file, not when calling ftruncate(). The availability of the truncate right is associated with the opened file and is later checked to authorize ftruncate(2) operations.
This is similar to how the write mode gets remembered after a open(..., O_WRONLY) to authorize later write() operations.
These opened file descriptors can also be passed between processes and will continue to enforce their truncation properties when these processes attempt an ftruncate().
These patches are based on v6.1-rc1.
Best regards,
Günther
[1] https://docs.kernel.org/userspace-api/landlock.html#filesystem-flags
Past discussions:
V1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
V2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
V3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
V4: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
V5: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
V6: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
V7: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
V8: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
V9: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Changelog:
V10:
* Align security blob offsets in security/security.c
Bug spotted by Nathan Chancellor. (Thanks!!)
As suggested by Mickaël Salaün, the bugfix is part of change 4/11.
* Small wording and formatting fixes in comments
Merged from Mickaël Salaün's fixes on his -next branch.
V9:
* Implement file_alloc_security hook
* Needs to grant all Landlock rights by default for use cases where files are opened by other means than open(2), i.e. memfd_create(2)
* Discovered and fixed by Mickaël Salaün on his -next branch
* Add a selftest for the memfd_create(2) example
* file_open_hook: Reorder the logic a bit as discussed in review
* selftests: Return -errno from recv_fd() and send_fd()
* Rebase to master branch
* Reorder __maybe_unused patch before its use
* Various small formatting and documentation fixes in code, documentation and commit messages
V8:
* landlock: Refactor check_access_path_dual() into is_access_to_paths_allowed(), as suggested by Mickaël Salaün on the v7 review. Added this as a separate commit.
* landlock truncate feature: inline get_path_access()
* Documentation: update documentation date to October 2022
* selftests: locally #define __maybe_unused (checkpatch started complaining about it, but the header where it's defined is not usable from selftests)
V7:
* security: Create file_truncate hook
* Fix the build on kernels without CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH (fixed by Mickaël Salaün)
* lsm_hooks.h: Document file_truncate hook
* fs/open.c: undo accidental indentation changes
* landlock: Support file truncation
* Use the init_layer_masks() result as input for check_access_path_dual()
* Naming
* Rename the landlock_file_security.allowed_access field (previously called "rights")
* Rename get_path_access_rights() to get_path_access()
* Rename get_file_access() to get_required_file_open_access() to avoid confusion with get_path_access()
* Use "access_request" for access_mask_t variables, access_req for unsigned long
* Documentation:
* Fixed some comments according to review
* Added comments to get_required_file_open_access() and init_layer_masks()
* selftests:
* remove unused variables
* rename fd0,...,fd3 to fd_layer0,...,fd_layer3.
* test_ftruncate: define layers on top and inline the helper function
* New tests (both added as separate commits)
* More exhaustive ftruncate test: Add open_and_ftruncate test that exercises ftruncate more thoroughly with fixture variants
* FD-passing test: exercise restricted file descriptors getting passed between processes, also using the same fixture variants
* Documentation: integrate review comments by Mickaël Salaün
* do not use contraptions (don't)
* use double backquotes in all touched lines
* add the read/write open() analogy to the truncation docs
* in code example, check for abi<0 explicitly and fix indentation
V6:
* LSM hooks: create file_truncate hook in addition to path_truncate. Use it in the existing path_truncate call sites where appropriate.
* landlock: check LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE right during open(), and associate that right with the opened struct file in a security blob. Introduce get_path_access_rights() helper function.
* selftests: test ftruncate in a separate test, to exercise that the rights are associated with the file descriptor.
* Documentation: Rework documentation to reflect new ftruncate() semantics.
* Applied small fixes by Mickaël Salaün which he added on top of V5, in
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux.git/log/?h=next
(I hope I found them all.)
V5:
* Documentation
* Fix wording in userspace-api headers and in landlock.rst.
* Move the truncation limitation section one to the bottom.
* Move all .rst changes into the documentation commit.
* selftests
* Remove _metadata argument from helpers where it became unnecessary.
* Open writable file descriptors at the top of both tests, before Landlock is enabled, to exercise ftruncate() independently from open().
* Simplify test_ftruncate and decouple it from exercising open().
* test_creat(): Return errno on close() failure (it does not conflict).
* Fix /* comment style */
* Reorder blocks of EXPECT_EQ checks to be consistent within a test.
* Add missing |O_TRUNC to a check in one test.
* Put the truncate_unhandled test before the other.
V4:
* Documentation
* Clarify wording and syntax as discussed in review.
* Use a less confusing error message in the example.
* selftests:
* Stop using ASSERT_EQ in test helpers, return EBADFD instead. (This is an intentionally uncommon error code, so that the source of the error is clear and the test can distinguish test setup failures from failures in the actual system call under test.)
* samples/Documentation:
* Use additional clarifying comments in the kernel backwards compatibility logic.
V3:
* selftests:
* Explicitly test ftruncate with readonly file descriptors (returns EINVAL).
* Extract test_ftruncate, test_truncate, test_creat helpers, which simplified the previously mixed usage of EXPECT/ASSERT.
* Test creat() behaviour as part of the big truncation test.
* Stop testing the truncate64(2) and ftruncate64(2) syscalls. This simplifies the tests a bit. The kernel implementations are the same as for truncate(2) and ftruncate(2), so there is little benefit from testing them exhaustively. (We aren't testing all open(2) variants either.)
* samples/landlock/sandboxer.c:
* Use switch() to implement best effort mode.
* Documentation:
* Give more background on surprising truncation behaviour.
* Use switch() in the example too, to stay in-line with the sample tool.
* Small fixes in header file to address previous comments.
* misc:
* Fix some typos and const usages.
V2:
* Documentation: Mention the truncation flag where needed.
* Documentation: Point out connection between truncation and file writing.
* samples: Add file truncation to the landlock/sandboxer.c sample tool.
* selftests: Exercise open(2) with O_TRUNC and creat(2) exhaustively.
* selftests: Exercise truncation syscalls when the truncate right is not handled by Landlock.
Günther Noack (11):
security: Create file_truncate hook from path_truncate hook
landlock: Refactor check_access_path_dual() into
is_access_to_paths_allowed()
landlock: Document init_layer_masks() helper
landlock: Support file truncation
selftests/landlock: Test file truncation support selftests/landlock: Test open() and ftruncate() in multiple scenarios selftests/landlock: Locally define __maybe_unused selftests/landlock: Test FD passing from restricted to unrestricted
processes
selftests/landlock: Test ftruncate on FDs created by memfd_create(2) samples/landlock: Extend sample tool to support
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
landlock: Document Landlock's file truncation support
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 67 ++- fs/namei.c | 2 +- fs/open.c | 2 +- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 10 +- include/linux/security.h | 6 + include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 21 +- samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 12 +- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 6 + security/landlock/fs.c | 206 ++++++-- security/landlock/fs.h | 24 + security/landlock/limits.h | 2 +- security/landlock/setup.c | 1 + security/landlock/syscalls.c | 2 +- security/security.c | 16 +- security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 13 + tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 38 +- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h | 85 +++- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 468 ++++++++++++++++++- 19 files changed, 862 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)
base-commit: 9abf2313adc1ca1b6180c508c25f22f9395cc780
Signature · 1 line
2.38.0
PATCH v10 1/11 security: Create file_truncate hook from path_truncate hook
Like path_truncate, the file_truncate hook also restricts file truncation, but is called in the cases where truncation is attempted on an already-opened file.
This is required in a subsequent commit to handle ftruncate() operations differently to truncate() operations.
--- fs/namei.c | 2 +- fs/open.c | 2 +- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 10 +++++++++- include/linux/security.h | 6 ++++++ security/apparmor/lsm.c | 6 ++++++ security/security.c | 5 +++++ security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 8 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/namei.c +1 -1
@@ -3211,7 +3211,7 @@ static int handle_truncate(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct file *filp)if (error)return error; - error =security_path_truncate (path); + error =security_file_truncate (filp);if (!error) { error = do_truncate(mnt_userns, path->dentry, 0, ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME|ATTR_OPEN,
fs/open.c +1 -1
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ long do_sys_ftruncate(unsigned int fd, loff_t length, int small)if (IS_APPEND (file_inode (f.file))) goto out_putf;sb_start_write (inode->i_sb); - error =security_path_truncate (&f.file->f_path); + error =security_file_truncate (f.file);if (!error) error =do_truncate (file_mnt_user_ns (f.file), dentry, length,ATTR_MTIME |ATTR_CTIME , f.file);
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +1 -0
@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_send_sigiotask, struct task_struct *tsk, struct fown_struct *fown, int sig) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_receive, struct file *file) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_open, struct file *file) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, file_truncate, struct file *file) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_alloc, struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_free, struct task_struct *task)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +9 -1
@@ -409,7 +409,9 @@* @attr is the iattr structure containing the new file attributes. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @path_truncate: -* Check permission before truncating a file. +* Check permission before truncating the file indicated by path. +* Note that truncation permissions may also be checked based on +* already opened files, using the @file_truncate hook. * @path contains the path structure for the file. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * @inode_getattr:
@@ -598,6 +600,12 @@* to receive an open file descriptor via socket IPC. * @file contains the file structure being received. * Return 0 if permission is granted. +* @file_truncate: +* Check permission before truncating a file, i.e. using ftruncate. +* Note that truncation permission may also be checked based on the path, +* using the @path_truncate hook. +* @file contains the file structure for the file. +* Return 0 if permission is granted. * @file_open: * Save open-time permission checking state for later use upon * file_permission, and recheck access if anything has changed
include/linux/security.h +6 -0
@@ -396,6 +396,7 @@ int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, struct fown_struct *fown, int sig);int security_file_receive (struct file *file);int security_file_open (struct file *file); +int security_file_truncate (struct file *file);int security_task_alloc (struct task_struct *task,unsigned long clone_flags);void security_task_free (struct task_struct *task);int security_cred_alloc_blank (struct cred *cred,gfp_t gfp);
@@ -1014,6 +1015,11 @@ static inline int security_file_open(struct file *file)return 0 ; } +static inline int security_file_truncate (struct file *file) +{ +return 0 ; +} +static inline int security_task_alloc (struct task_struct *task,unsigned long clone_flags) {
security/apparmor/lsm.c +6 -0
@@ -329,6 +329,11 @@ static int apparmor_path_truncate(const struct path *path)return common_perm_cond (OP_TRUNC , path,MAY_WRITE |AA_MAY_SETATTR ); } +static int apparmor_file_truncate (struct file *file) +{ +return apparmor_path_truncate (&file->f_path); +} +static int apparmor_path_symlink (const struct path *dir,struct dentry *dentry,const char *old_name) {
@@ -1232,6 +1237,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (mmap_file, apparmor_mmap_file),LSM_HOOK_INIT (file_mprotect, apparmor_file_mprotect),LSM_HOOK_INIT (file_lock, apparmor_file_lock), +LSM_HOOK_INIT (file_truncate, apparmor_file_truncate),LSM_HOOK_INIT (getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
security/security.c +5 -0
@@ -1652,6 +1652,11 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file)return fsnotify_perm (file,MAY_OPEN ); } +int security_file_truncate (struct file *file) +{ +return call_int_hook (file_truncate,0 , file); +} +int security_task_alloc (struct task_struct *task,unsigned long clone_flags) {int rc =lsm_task_alloc (task);
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c +13 -0
@@ -134,6 +134,18 @@ static int tomoyo_path_truncate(const struct path *path)return tomoyo_path_perm (TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE , path,NULL ); } +/** +* tomoyo_file_truncate - Target for security_file_truncate(). +* +* @file: Pointer to "struct file". +* +* Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise. +*/ +static int tomoyo_file_truncate (struct file *file) +{ +return tomoyo_path_truncate (&file->f_path); +} +/** * tomoyo_path_unlink - Target for security_path_unlink(). *
@@ -545,6 +557,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list tomoyo_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (bprm_check_security, tomoyo_bprm_check_security),LSM_HOOK_INIT (file_fcntl, tomoyo_file_fcntl),LSM_HOOK_INIT (file_open, tomoyo_file_open), +LSM_HOOK_INIT (file_truncate, tomoyo_file_truncate),LSM_HOOK_INIT (path_truncate, tomoyo_path_truncate),LSM_HOOK_INIT (path_unlink, tomoyo_path_unlink), LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, tomoyo_path_mkdir),
Signature · 1 line
2.38.0
PATCH v10 2/11 landlock: Refactor check_access_path_dual() into is_access_to_paths_allowed()
In reply to Günther NoackRename check_access_path_dual() to is_access_to_paths_allowed().
Make it return true iff the access is allowed.
Calculate the EXDEV/EACCES error code in the one place where it's needed.
--- security/landlock/fs.c | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
security/landlock/fs.c +44 -45
@@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ is_eacces(const layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS], }/** -* check_access_path_dual - Check accesses for requests with a common path +* is_access_to_paths_allowed - Check accesses for requests with a common path * * @domain: Domain to check against. * @path: File hierarchy to walk through.
@@ -465,14 +465,10 @@ is_eacces(const layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS],* allow the request. * * Returns: -* - 0 if the access request is granted; -* - -EACCES if it is denied because of access right other than -* LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER; -* - -EXDEV if the renaming or linking would be a privileged escalation -* (according to each layered policies), or if LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER is -* not allowed by the source or the destination. +* - true if the access request is granted; +* - false otherwise. */ -static int check_access_path_dual( +static bool is_access_to_paths_allowed( const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain, const struct path *const path, const access_mask_t access_request_parent1,
@@ -492,17 +488,17 @@ static int check_access_path_dual( (*layer_masks_child2)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS ] =NULL ;if (!access_request_parent1 && !access_request_parent2) -return 0 ; +return true;if (WARN_ON_ONCE (!domain || !path)) -return 0 ; +return true;if (is_nouser_or_private (path->dentry)) -return 0 ; +return true;if (WARN_ON_ONCE (domain->num_layers <1 || !layer_masks_parent1)) -return -EACCES ; +return false;if (unlikely (layer_masks_parent2)) {if (WARN_ON_ONCE (!dentry_child1)) -return -EACCES ; +return false;/* * For a double request, first check for potential privilege * escalation by looking at domain handled accesses (which are
@@ -513,7 +509,7 @@ static int check_access_path_dual( is_dom_check = true; }else {if (WARN_ON_ONCE (dentry_child1 || dentry_child2)) -return -EACCES ; +return false;/* For a simple request, only check for requested accesses. */ access_masked_parent1 = access_request_parent1; access_masked_parent2 = access_request_parent2;
@@ -622,24 +618,7 @@ static int check_access_path_dual( }path_put (&walker_path); -if (allowed_parent1 && allowed_parent2) -return 0 ; - -/* -* This prioritizes EACCES over EXDEV for all actions, including -* renames with RENAME_EXCHANGE. -*/ -if (likely (is_eacces (layer_masks_parent1, access_request_parent1) || -is_eacces (layer_masks_parent2, access_request_parent2))) -return -EACCES ; - -/* -* Gracefully forbids reparenting if the destination directory -* hierarchy is not a superset of restrictions of the source directory -* hierarchy, or if LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER is not allowed by the -* source or the destination. -*/ -return -EXDEV ; +return allowed_parent1 && allowed_parent2; } static inline int check_access_path(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
@@ -649,8 +628,10 @@ static inline int check_access_path(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS ] = {}; access_request =init_layer_masks (domain, access_request, &layer_masks); -return check_access_path_dual (domain, path, access_request, - &layer_masks,NULL ,0 ,NULL ,NULL ); +if (is_access_to_paths_allowed (domain, path, access_request, + &layer_masks,NULL ,0 ,NULL ,NULL )) +return 0 ; +return -EACCES ; } static inline int current_check_access_path(const struct path *const path,
@@ -711,8 +692,9 @@ static inline access_mask_t maybe_remove(const struct dentry *const dentry)* file. While walking from @dir to @mnt_root, we record all the domain's * allowed accesses in @layer_masks_dom. * -* This is similar to check_access_path_dual() but much simpler because it only -* handles walking on the same mount point and only checks one set of accesses. +* This is similar to is_access_to_paths_allowed() but much simpler because it +* only handles walking on the same mount point and only checks one set of +* accesses. * * Returns: * - true if all the domain access rights are allowed for @dir;
@@ -857,10 +839,11 @@ static int current_check_refer_path(struct dentry *const old_dentry, access_request_parent1 =init_layer_masks ( dom, access_request_parent1 | access_request_parent2, &layer_masks_parent1); -return check_access_path_dual (dom, new_dir, - access_request_parent1, - &layer_masks_parent1,NULL ,0 , -NULL ,NULL ); +if (is_access_to_paths_allowed ( + dom, new_dir, access_request_parent1, + &layer_masks_parent1,NULL ,0 ,NULL ,NULL )) +return 0 ; +return -EACCES ; } access_request_parent1 |=LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER ;
@@ -886,11 +869,27 @@ static int current_check_refer_path(struct dentry *const old_dentry,* parent access rights. This will be useful to compare with the * destination parent access rights. */ -return check_access_path_dual (dom, &mnt_dir, access_request_parent1, - &layer_masks_parent1, old_dentry, - access_request_parent2, - &layer_masks_parent2, - exchange ? new_dentry :NULL ); +if (is_access_to_paths_allowed ( + dom, &mnt_dir, access_request_parent1, &layer_masks_parent1, + old_dentry, access_request_parent2, &layer_masks_parent2, + exchange ? new_dentry :NULL )) +return 0 ; + +/* +* This prioritizes EACCES over EXDEV for all actions, including +* renames with RENAME_EXCHANGE. +*/ +if (likely (is_eacces (&layer_masks_parent1, access_request_parent1) || +is_eacces (&layer_masks_parent2, access_request_parent2))) +return -EACCES ; + +/* +* Gracefully forbids reparenting if the destination directory +* hierarchy is not a superset of restrictions of the source directory +* hierarchy, or if LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER is not allowed by the +* source or the destination. +*/ +return -EXDEV ; }/* Inode hooks */
Signature · 1 line
2.38.0
PATCH v10 3/11 landlock: Document init_layer_masks() helper
In reply to Günther NoackAdd kernel-doc to the init_layer_masks() function.
--- security/landlock/fs.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
security/landlock/fs.c +13 -0
@@ -297,6 +297,19 @@ get_handled_accesses(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain)return access_dom &LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS ; } +/** +* init_layer_masks - Initialize layer masks from an access request +* +* Populates @layer_masks such that for each access right in @access_request, +* the bits for all the layers are set where this access right is handled. +* +* @domain: The domain that defines the current restrictions. +* @access_request: The requested access rights to check. +* @layer_masks: The layer masks to populate. +* +* Returns: An access mask where each access right bit is set which is handled +* in any of the active layers in @domain. +*/ static inline access_mask_t init_layer_masks(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain, const access_mask_t access_request,
Signature · 1 line
2.38.0
PATCH v10 4/11 landlock: Support file truncation
In reply to Günther NoackIntroduce the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE flag for file truncation.
This flag hooks into the path_truncate, file_truncate and file_alloc_security LSM hooks and covers file truncation using truncate(2), ftruncate(2), open(2) with O_TRUNC, as well as creat().
This change also increments the Landlock ABI version, updates corresponding selftests, and updates code documentation to document the flag.
In security/security.c, allocate security blobs at pointer-aligned offsets. This fixes the problem where one LSM's security blob can shift another LSM's security blob to an unaligned address. (Reported by Nathan Chancellor)
The following operations are restricted:
open(2): requires the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE right if a file gets implicitly truncated as part of the open() (e.g. using O_TRUNC).
Notable special cases:
* open(..., O_RDONLY|O_TRUNC) can truncate files as well in Linux
* open() with O_TRUNC does *not* need the TRUNCATE right when it creates a new file.
truncate(2) (on a path): requires the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE right.
ftruncate(2) (on a file): requires that the file had the TRUNCATE right when it was previously opened. File descriptors acquired by other means than open(2) (e.g. memfd_create(2)) continue to support truncation with ftruncate(2).
--- include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 21 +++- security/landlock/fs.c | 104 ++++++++++++++++++- security/landlock/fs.h | 24 +++++ security/landlock/limits.h | 2 +- security/landlock/setup.c | 1 + security/landlock/syscalls.c | 2 +- security/security.c | 11 +- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 7 +- 9 files changed, 153 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h +16 -5
@@ -95,8 +95,19 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {* A file can only receive these access rights: * * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE: Execute a file. -* - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE: Open a file with write access. +* - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE: Open a file with write access. Note that +* you might additionally need the %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE right in order +* to overwrite files with :manpage:`open(2)` using ``O_TRUNC`` or +* :manpage:`creat(2)`. * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE: Open a file with read access. +* - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE: Truncate a file with :manpage:`truncate(2)`, +* :manpage:`ftruncate(2)`, :manpage:`creat(2)`, or :manpage:`open(2)` with +* ``O_TRUNC``. Whether an opened file can be truncated with +* :manpage:`ftruncate(2)` is determined during :manpage:`open(2)`, in the +* same way as read and write permissions are checked during +* :manpage:`open(2)` using %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE and +* %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE. This access right is available since the +* third version of the Landlock ABI. * * A directory can receive access rights related to files or directories. The * following access right is applied to the directory itself, and the
@@ -139,10 +150,9 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {* * It is currently not possible to restrict some file-related actions * accessible through these syscall families: :manpage:`chdir(2)`, -* :manpage:`truncate(2)`, :manpage:`stat(2)`, :manpage:`flock(2)`, -* :manpage:`chmod(2)`, :manpage:`chown(2)`, :manpage:`setxattr(2)`, -* :manpage:`utime(2)`, :manpage:`ioctl(2)`, :manpage:`fcntl(2)`, -* :manpage:`access(2)`. +* :manpage:`stat(2)`, :manpage:`flock(2)`, :manpage:`chmod(2)`, +* :manpage:`chown(2)`, :manpage:`setxattr(2)`, :manpage:`utime(2)`, +* :manpage:`ioctl(2)`, :manpage:`fcntl(2)`, :manpage:`access(2)`. * Future Landlock evolutions will enable to restrict them. */ /* clang-format off */
@@ -160,6 +170,7 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK (1ULL << 11)#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM (1ULL << 12)#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER (1ULL << 13) +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE (1ULL << 14)/* clang-format on */ #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */
security/landlock/fs.c +99 -5
142 lines not on this page · raw message
security/landlock/fs.h +24 -0
@@ -36,6 +36,24 @@ struct landlock_inode_security {struct landlock_object __rcu *object; }; +/** +* struct landlock_file_security - File security blob +* +* This information is populated when opening a file in hook_file_open, and +* tracks the relevant Landlock access rights that were available at the time +* of opening the file. Other LSM hooks use these rights in order to authorize +* operations on already opened files. +*/ +struct landlock_file_security { +/** +* @allowed_access: Access rights that were available at the time of +* opening the file. This is not necessarily the full set of access +* rights available at that time, but it's the necessary subset as +* needed to authorize later operations on the open file. +*/ +access_mask_t allowed_access; +}; +/** * struct landlock_superblock_security - Superblock security blob *
@@ -50,6 +68,12 @@ struct landlock_superblock_security {atomic_long_t inode_refs; }; +static inline struct landlock_file_security * +landlock_file (const struct file *const file) +{ +return file->f_security + landlock_blob_sizes.lbs_file; +} +static inline struct landlock_inode_security *landlock_inode (const struct inode *const inode) {
security/landlock/limits.h +1 -1
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@#define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS 16#define LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES U32_MAX -#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER +#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE#define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS << 1) - 1)#define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS)
security/landlock/setup.c +1 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ bool landlock_initialized __lsm_ro_after_init = false; struct lsm_blob_sizes landlock_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_cred =sizeof (struct landlock_cred_security ), + .lbs_file =sizeof (struct landlock_file_security ), .lbs_inode =sizeof (struct landlock_inode_security ), .lbs_superblock =sizeof (struct landlock_superblock_security ), };
security/landlock/syscalls.c +1 -1
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = { .write = fop_dummy_write, }; -#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 2 +#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 3/** * sys_landlock_create_ruleset - Create a new ruleset
security/security.c +6 -5
@@ -185,11 +185,12 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_size(int *need, int *lbs) {int offset; -if (*need >0 ) { - offset = *lbs; - *lbs += *need; - *need = offset; - } +if (*need <=0 ) +return ; + + offset =ALIGN (*lbs,sizeof (void *)); + *lbs = offset + *need; + *need = offset; }static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes (struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c +1 -1
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ TEST(abi_version)const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = { .handled_access_fs =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE , }; -ASSERT_EQ (2 ,landlock_create_ruleset (NULL ,0 , +ASSERT_EQ (3 ,landlock_create_ruleset (NULL ,0 ,LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION )); ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, 0,
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +4 -3
@@ -406,9 +406,10 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, inval)#define ACCESS_FILE ( \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \ - LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE) + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE) -#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER +#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE#define ACCESS_ALL ( \ ACCESS_FILE | \
@@ -422,7 +423,7 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, inval)LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO | \LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | \LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM | \ - ACCESS_LAST) + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER)/* clang-format on */
Signature · 1 line
2.38.0
Re: [PATCH v10 04/11] landlock: Support file truncation
To simplify the review - let me highlight the part that is new in V10 and which fixes the bug which Nathan spotted on ARM64.
(The other changes in V10 are only changes to documentation pulled from Mickaël's -next branch.)
Quoted 6 lines · Günther Noack
Introduce the
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATEflag for file truncation.
...
Insecurity/security.c, allocate security blobs at pointer-aligned offsets. This fixes the problem where one LSM's security blob can shift another LSM's security blob to an unaligned address. (Reported by Nathan Chancellor)
The corresponding implementation is:
Quoted 10 lines
security/security.c +0
-2@@ -185,11 +185,12 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_size(int *need, int *lbs) {int offset; -if (*need >0 ) { - offset = *lbs;
security/security.c static void __init lsm_set_blob_size(int *need, int *lbs) · line 194
Quoted 10 lines
security/security.c +6
-3- *lbs += *need; - *need = offset; - } +if (*need <=0 ) +return ; + + offset =ALIGN (*lbs,sizeof (void *)); + *lbs = offset + *need; + *need = offset; }
(As discussed previously in
https://lore.kernel.org/all/Y07rP%2FYNYxvQzOei@nuc/)
—Günther
Re: [PATCH v10 04/11] landlock: Support file truncation
In reply to Günther NoackQuoted 36 lines · Günther Noack
Introduce the
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATEflag for file truncation.This flag hooks into the
path_truncate,file_truncateandfile_alloc_securityLSM hooks and covers file truncation using truncate(2), ftruncate(2), open(2) withO_TRUNC, as well ascreat().This change also increments the Landlock ABI version, updates corresponding selftests, and updates code documentation to document the flag.
In
security/security.c, allocate security blobs at pointer-aligned offsets. This fixes the problem where one LSM's security blob can shift another LSM's security blob to an unaligned address. (Reported by Nathan Chancellor)The following operations are restricted:
open(2): requires the
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATEright if a file gets implicitly truncated as part of theopen()(e.g. usingO_TRUNC).Notable special cases:
*open(..., O_RDONLY|O_TRUNC)can truncate files as well in Linux
*open()withO_TRUNCdoes *not* need the TRUNCATE right when it creates a new file.truncate(2) (on a path): requires the
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATEright.ftruncate(2) (on a file): requires that the file had the TRUNCATE right when it was previously opened. File descriptors acquired by other means than open(2) (e.g.
memfd_create(2)) continue to support truncation with ftruncate(2).Reported-by Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Günther Noack <[email protected]>
Quoted 11 lines
--- include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 21 +++- security/landlock/fs.c | 104 ++++++++++++++++++- security/landlock/fs.h | 24 +++++ security/landlock/limits.h | 2 +- security/landlock/setup.c | 1 + security/landlock/syscalls.c | 2 +- security/security.c | 11 +- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 7 +- 9 files changed, 153 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
Thanks for the LSM security blob allocator fixes Günther!
Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
PATCH v10 5/11 selftests/landlock: Test file truncation support
In reply to Günther NoackThese tests exercise the following truncation operations:
* truncate() (truncate by path)
* ftruncate() (truncate by file descriptor)
* open with the O_TRUNC flag
* special case: creat(), which is open with O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_TRUNC.
in the following scenarios:
* Files with read, write and truncate rights.
* Files with read and truncate rights.
* Files with the truncate right.
* Files without the truncate right.
In particular, the following scenarios are enforced with the test:
* open() with O_TRUNC requires the truncate right, if it truncates a file. open() already checks security_path_truncate() in this case, and it required no additional check in the Landlock LSM's file_open hook.
* creat() requires the truncate right
when called with an existing filename.
* creat() does *not* require the truncate right
when it's creating a new file.
* ftruncate() requires that the file was opened by a thread that had the truncate right for the file at the time of open(). (The rights are carried along with the opened file.)
--- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 287 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 287 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +287 -0
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ static const char file1_s2d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s2d1/s2d2/s2d3/f1";static const char file2_s2d3[] =TMP_DIR "/s2d1/s2d2/s2d3/f2" ;static const char dir_s3d1[] =TMP_DIR "/s3d1" ; +static const char file1_s3d1[] =TMP_DIR "/s3d1/f1" ;/* dir_s3d2 is a mount point. */ static const char dir_s3d2[] =TMP_DIR "/s3d1/s3d2" ;static const char dir_s3d3[] =TMP_DIR "/s3d1/s3d2/s3d3" ;
@@ -83,6 +84,7 @@ static const char dir_s3d3[] = TMP_DIR "/s3d1/s3d2/s3d3";* │ ├── f1 * │ └── f2 * └── s3d1 +* ├── f1 * └── s3d2 * └── s3d3 */
@@ -208,6 +210,7 @@ static void create_layout1(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata)create_file (_metadata, file1_s2d3);create_file (_metadata, file2_s2d3); +create_file (_metadata, file1_s3d1);create_directory (_metadata, dir_s3d2);set_cap (_metadata,CAP_SYS_ADMIN );ASSERT_EQ (0 ,mount ("tmp" , dir_s3d2,"tmpfs" ,0 ,"size=4m,mode=700" ));
@@ -230,6 +233,7 @@ static void remove_layout1(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata)EXPECT_EQ (0 ,remove_path (file1_s2d2));EXPECT_EQ (0 ,remove_path (file1_s2d1)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,remove_path (file1_s3d1));EXPECT_EQ (0 ,remove_path (dir_s3d3));set_cap (_metadata,CAP_SYS_ADMIN );umount (dir_s3d2);
@@ -3158,6 +3162,289 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_pipe)ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (pipe_fds[1 ])); } +/* Invokes truncate(2) and returns its errno or 0. */ +static int test_truncate (const char *const path) +{ +if (truncate (path,10 ) <0 ) +return errno; +return 0 ; +} + +/* +* Invokes creat(2) and returns its errno or 0. +* Closes the opened file descriptor on success. +*/ +static int test_creat (const char *const path) +{ +int fd =creat (path,0600 ); + +if (fd <0 ) +return errno; + +/* +* Mixing error codes from close(2) and creat(2) should not lead to any +* (access type) confusion for this test. +*/ +if (close (fd) <0 ) +return errno; +return 0 ; +} + +/* +* Exercises file truncation when it's not restricted, +* as it was the case before LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE existed. +*/ +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, truncate_unhandled) +{ +const char *const file_r = file1_s1d1; +const char *const file_w = file2_s1d1; +const char *const file_none = file1_s1d2; +const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = file_r, + .access =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE , + }, + { + .path = file_w, + .access =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE , + }, +/* Implicitly: No rights for file_none. */ + {}, + }; + +const __u64 handled =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | +LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE ; +int ruleset_fd; + +/* Enable Landlock. */ + ruleset_fd =create_ruleset (_metadata, handled, rules); + +ASSERT_LE (0 , ruleset_fd); +enforce_ruleset (_metadata, ruleset_fd); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (ruleset_fd)); + +/* +* Checks read right: truncate and open with O_TRUNC work, unless the +* file is attempted to be opened for writing. +*/ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_r)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_r,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_r,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_creat (file_r)); + +/* +* Checks write right: truncate and open with O_TRUNC work, unless the +* file is attempted to be opened for reading. +*/ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_w)); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_w,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_w,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_creat (file_w)); + +/* +* Checks "no rights" case: truncate works but all open attempts fail, +* including creat. +*/ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_none)); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_creat (file_none)); +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, truncate) +{ +const char *const file_rwt = file1_s1d1; +const char *const file_rw = file2_s1d1; +const char *const file_rt = file1_s1d2; +const char *const file_t = file2_s1d2; +const char *const file_none = file1_s1d3; +const char *const dir_t = dir_s2d1; +const char *const file_in_dir_t = file1_s2d1; +const char *const dir_w = dir_s3d1; +const char *const file_in_dir_w = file1_s3d1; +const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = file_rwt, + .access =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | +LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | +LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE , + }, + { + .path = file_rw, + .access =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | +LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE , + }, + { + .path = file_rt, + .access =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | +LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE , + }, + { + .path = file_t, + .access =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE , + }, +/* Implicitly: No access rights for file_none. */ + { + .path = dir_t, + .access =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE , + }, + { + .path = dir_w, + .access =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE , + }, + {}, + }; +const __u64 handled =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | +LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | +LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE ; +int ruleset_fd; + +/* Enable Landlock. */ + ruleset_fd =create_ruleset (_metadata, handled, rules); + +ASSERT_LE (0 , ruleset_fd); +enforce_ruleset (_metadata, ruleset_fd); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (ruleset_fd)); + +/* Checks read, write and truncate rights: truncation works. */ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_rwt)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_rwt,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_rwt,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); + +/* Checks read and write rights: no truncate variant works. */ +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_truncate (file_rw)); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_rw,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_rw,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); + +/* +* Checks read and truncate rights: truncation works. +* +* Note: Files can get truncated using open() even with O_RDONLY. +*/ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_rt)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_open (file_rt,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_rt,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); + +/* Checks truncate right: truncate works, but can't open file. */ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_t)); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_t,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_t,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); + +/* Checks "no rights" case: No form of truncation works. */ +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_truncate (file_none)); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_none,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); + +/* +* Checks truncate right on directory: truncate works on contained +* files. +*/ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_truncate (file_in_dir_t)); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_in_dir_t,O_RDONLY |O_TRUNC )); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_open (file_in_dir_t,O_WRONLY |O_TRUNC )); + +/* +* Checks creat in dir_w: This requires the truncate right when +* overwriting an existing file, but does not require it when the file +* is new. +*/ +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_creat (file_in_dir_w)); + +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,unlink (file_in_dir_w)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_creat (file_in_dir_w)); +} + +/* Invokes ftruncate(2) and returns its errno or 0. */ +static int test_ftruncate (int fd) +{ +if (ftruncate (fd,10 ) <0 ) +return errno; +return 0 ; +} + +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, ftruncate) +{ +/* +* This test opens a new file descriptor at different stages of +* Landlock restriction: +* +* without restriction: ftruncate works +* something else but truncate restricted: ftruncate works +* truncate restricted and permitted: ftruncate works +* truncate restricted and not permitted: ftruncate fails +* +* Whether this works or not is expected to depend on the time when the +* FD was opened, not to depend on the time when ftruncate() was +* called. +*/ +const char *const path = file1_s1d1; +const __u64 handled1 =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | +LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE ; +const struct rule layer1[] = { + { + .path = path, + .access =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE , + }, + {}, + }; +const __u64 handled2 =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE ; +const struct rule layer2[] = { + { + .path = path, + .access =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE , + }, + {}, + }; +const __u64 handled3 =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE | +LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE ; +const struct rule layer3[] = { + { + .path = path, + .access =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE , + }, + {}, + }; +int fd_layer0, fd_layer1, fd_layer2, fd_layer3, ruleset_fd; + + fd_layer0 =open (path,O_WRONLY ); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_ftruncate (fd_layer0)); + + ruleset_fd =create_ruleset (_metadata, handled1, layer1); +ASSERT_LE (0 , ruleset_fd); +enforce_ruleset (_metadata, ruleset_fd); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (ruleset_fd)); + + fd_layer1 =open (path,O_WRONLY ); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_ftruncate (fd_layer0)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_ftruncate (fd_layer1)); + + ruleset_fd =create_ruleset (_metadata, handled2, layer2); +ASSERT_LE (0 , ruleset_fd); +enforce_ruleset (_metadata, ruleset_fd); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (ruleset_fd)); + + fd_layer2 =open (path,O_WRONLY ); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_ftruncate (fd_layer0)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_ftruncate (fd_layer1)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_ftruncate (fd_layer2)); + + ruleset_fd =create_ruleset (_metadata, handled3, layer3); +ASSERT_LE (0 , ruleset_fd); +enforce_ruleset (_metadata, ruleset_fd); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (ruleset_fd)); + + fd_layer3 =open (path,O_WRONLY ); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_ftruncate (fd_layer0)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_ftruncate (fd_layer1)); +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_ftruncate (fd_layer2)); +EXPECT_EQ (EACCES ,test_ftruncate (fd_layer3)); + +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (fd_layer0)); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (fd_layer1)); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (fd_layer2)); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (fd_layer3)); +} +/* clang-format off */ FIXTURE (layout1_bind) {};/* clang-format on */
Signature · 1 line
2.38.0
PATCH v10 6/11 selftests/landlock: Test open() and ftruncate() in multiple scenarios
In reply to Günther NoackThis test uses multiple fixture variants to exercise a broader set of scnenarios.
--- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 96 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +96 -0
@@ -3445,6 +3445,102 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout1, ftruncate)ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (fd_layer3)); } +/* clang-format off */ +FIXTURE (ftruncate) {}; +/* clang-format on */ + +FIXTURE_SETUP (ftruncate) +{ +prepare_layout (_metadata); +create_file (_metadata, file1_s1d1); +} + +FIXTURE_TEARDOWN (ftruncate) +{ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,remove_path (file1_s1d1)); +cleanup_layout (_metadata); +} + +FIXTURE_VARIANT (ftruncate) +{ +const __u64 handled; +const __u64 permitted; +const int expected_open_result; +const int expected_ftruncate_result; +}; + +/* clang-format off */ +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(ftruncate, w_w) { +/* clang-format on */ + .handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, + .permitted = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, + .expected_open_result = 0, + .expected_ftruncate_result =0 , +}; + +/* clang-format off */ +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(ftruncate, t_t) { +/* clang-format on */ + .handled =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE , + .permitted = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE, + .expected_open_result = 0, + .expected_ftruncate_result = 0, +}; + +/* clang-format off */ +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(ftruncate, wt_w) { +/* clang-format on */ + .handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE, + .permitted = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE, + .expected_open_result = 0, + .expected_ftruncate_result =EACCES , +}; + +/* clang-format off */ +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(ftruncate, wt_wt) { +/* clang-format on */ + .handled =LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE |LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE , + .permitted = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | +LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE , + .expected_open_result = 0, + .expected_ftruncate_result = 0, +}; + +/* clang-format off */ +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(ftruncate, wt_t) { +/* clang-format on */ + .handled = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE, + .permitted = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE, + .expected_open_result =EACCES , +}; + +TEST_F_FORK(ftruncate, open_and_ftruncate) +{ +const char *const path = file1_s1d1; +const struct rule rules[] = { + { + .path = path, + .access = variant->permitted, + }, + {}, + }; +int fd, ruleset_fd; + +/* Enable Landlock. */ + ruleset_fd =create_ruleset (_metadata, variant->handled, rules); +ASSERT_LE (0 , ruleset_fd); +enforce_ruleset (_metadata, ruleset_fd); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (ruleset_fd)); + + fd =open (path,O_WRONLY ); +EXPECT_EQ (variant->expected_open_result, (fd <0 ? errno :0 )); +if (fd >=0 ) { +EXPECT_EQ (variant->expected_ftruncate_result, +test_ftruncate (fd)); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (fd)); + } +} +/* clang-format off */ FIXTURE (layout1_bind) {};/* clang-format on */
Signature · 1 line
2.38.0
PATCH v10 7/11 selftests/landlock: Locally define __maybe_unused
In reply to Günther NoackThe checkpatch tool started to flag __attribute__(__unused__), which we previously used. The header where this is normally defined is not currently compatible with selftests.
This is the same approach as used in selftests/net/psock_lib.h.
--- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h | 18 ++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h +10 -8
@@ -17,6 +17,10 @@#include "../kselftest_harness.h" +#ifndef __maybe_unused +#define __maybe_unused __attribute__((__unused__)) +#endif +/* * TEST_F_FORK() is useful when a test drop privileges but the corresponding * FIXTURE_TEARDOWN() requires them (e.g. to remove files from a directory
@@ -140,14 +144,12 @@ static void _init_caps(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, bool drop_all) }/* We cannot put such helpers in a library because of kselftest_harness.h . */ -__attribute__((__unused__))static void -disable_caps (struct __test_metadata *const _metadata) +static void __maybe_unused disable_caps (struct __test_metadata *const _metadata) {_init_caps (_metadata, false); } -__attribute__((__unused__))static void -drop_caps (struct __test_metadata *const _metadata) +static void __maybe_unused drop_caps (struct __test_metadata *const _metadata) {_init_caps (_metadata, true); }
@@ -176,14 +178,14 @@ static void _effective_cap(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, } } -__attribute__((__unused__))static void -set_cap (struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,const cap_value_t caps) +static void __maybe_unused set_cap (struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, +const cap_value_t caps) {_effective_cap (_metadata, caps,CAP_SET ); } -__attribute__((__unused__))static void -clear_cap (struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,const cap_value_t caps) +static void __maybe_unused clear_cap (struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, +const cap_value_t caps) {_effective_cap (_metadata, caps,CAP_CLEAR ); }
Signature · 1 line
2.38.0
PATCH v10 8/11 selftests/landlock: Test FD passing from restricted to unrestricted processes
In reply to Günther NoackA file descriptor created in a restricted process carries Landlock restrictions with it which will apply even if the same opened file is used from an unrestricted process.
This change extracts suitable FD-passing helpers from base_test.c and moves them to common.h. We use the fixture variants from the ftruncate fixture to exercise the same scenarios as in the open_and_ftruncate test, but doing the Landlock restriction and open() in a different process than the ftruncate() call.
--- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 36 +---------- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h | 67 ++++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 132 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c +3 -33
@@ -263,23 +263,6 @@ TEST(ruleset_fd_transfer) .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR, };int ruleset_fd_tx, dir_fd; -union { -/* Aligned ancillary data buffer. */ -char buf[CMSG_SPACE (sizeof (ruleset_fd_tx))]; -struct cmsghdr _align; - } cmsg_tx = {}; -char data_tx ='.' ; -struct iovec io = { - .iov_base = &data_tx, - .iov_len =sizeof (data_tx), - }; -struct msghdr msg = { - .msg_iov = &io, - .msg_iovlen =1 , - .msg_control = &cmsg_tx.buf, - .msg_controllen =sizeof (cmsg_tx.buf), - }; -struct cmsghdr *cmsg;int socket_fds[2 ];pid_t child;int status;
@@ -298,33 +281,20 @@ TEST(ruleset_fd_transfer) &path_beneath_attr, 0));ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (path_beneath_attr.parent_fd)); - cmsg =CMSG_FIRSTHDR (&msg); -ASSERT_NE (NULL , cmsg); - cmsg->cmsg_len =CMSG_LEN (sizeof (ruleset_fd_tx)); - cmsg->cmsg_level =SOL_SOCKET ; - cmsg->cmsg_type =SCM_RIGHTS ; -memcpy (CMSG_DATA (cmsg), &ruleset_fd_tx,sizeof (ruleset_fd_tx)); -/* Sends the ruleset FD over a socketpair and then close it. */ ASSERT_EQ (0 ,socketpair (AF_UNIX ,SOCK_STREAM |SOCK_CLOEXEC ,0 , socket_fds)); -ASSERT_EQ (sizeof (data_tx),sendmsg (socket_fds[0 ], &msg,0 )); +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,send_fd (socket_fds[0 ], ruleset_fd_tx));ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (socket_fds[0 ]));ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (ruleset_fd_tx)); child =fork ();ASSERT_LE (0 , child);if (child ==0 ) { -int ruleset_fd_rx; +const int ruleset_fd_rx =recv_fd (socket_fds[1 ]); - *(char *)msg.msg_iov->iov_base ='\0' ; -ASSERT_EQ (sizeof (data_tx), -recvmsg (socket_fds[1 ], &msg,MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC )); -ASSERT_EQ ('.' , *(char *)msg.msg_iov->iov_base); +ASSERT_LE (0 , ruleset_fd_rx);ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (socket_fds[1 ])); - cmsg =CMSG_FIRSTHDR (&msg); -ASSERT_EQ (cmsg->cmsg_len,CMSG_LEN (sizeof (ruleset_fd_tx))); -memcpy (&ruleset_fd_rx,CMSG_DATA (cmsg),sizeof (ruleset_fd_tx));/* Enforces the received ruleset on the child. */ ASSERT_EQ (0 ,prctl (PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS ,1 ,0 ,0 ,0 ));
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h +67 -0
76 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +62 -0
68 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.38.0
PATCH v10 9/11 selftests/landlock: Test ftruncate on FDs created by memfd_create(2)
In reply to Günther NoackAll file descriptors that are truncatable need to have the Landlock access rights set correctly on the file's Landlock security blob. This is also the case for files that are opened by other means than open(2).
--- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c +16 -0
@@ -3603,6 +3603,22 @@ TEST_F_FORK(ftruncate, open_and_ftruncate_in_different_processes)ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (socket_fds[1 ])); } +TEST (memfd_ftruncate) +{ +int fd; + + fd =memfd_create ("name" ,MFD_CLOEXEC ); +ASSERT_LE (0 , fd); + +/* +* Checks that ftruncate is permitted on file descriptors that are +* created in ways other than open(2). +*/ +EXPECT_EQ (0 ,test_ftruncate (fd)); + +ASSERT_EQ (0 ,close (fd)); +} +/* clang-format off */ FIXTURE (layout1_bind) {};/* clang-format on */
Signature · 1 line
2.38.0
PATCH v10 10/11 samples/landlock: Extend sample tool to support LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
In reply to Günther NoackUpdate the sandboxer sample to restrict truncate actions. This is automatically enabled by default if the running kernel supports LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE, except for the paths listed in the LL_FS_RW environment variable.
--- samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 12 +++++++++--- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
samples/landlock/sandboxer.c +9 -3
@@ -76,7 +76,8 @@ static int parse_path(char *env_path, const char ***const path_list)#define ACCESS_FILE ( \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \ - LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE) + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)/* clang-format on */
@@ -160,11 +161,12 @@ static int populate_ruleset(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM | \ - LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER) + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)/* clang-format on */ -#define LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST 2 +#define LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST 3int main (const int argc,char *const argv[],char *const *const envp) {
@@ -234,6 +236,10 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)case 1 :/* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER for ABI < 2 */ ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER ; + __attribute__((fallthrough)); +case 2 : +/* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE for ABI < 3 */ + ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE ;fprintf (stderr, "Hint: You should update the running kernel "
Signature · 1 line
2.38.0
PATCH v10 11/11 landlock: Document Landlock's file truncation support
In reply to Günther NoackUse the LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE flag in the tutorial.
Adapt the backwards compatibility example and discussion to remove the truncation flag where needed.
Point out potential surprising behaviour related to truncate.
--- Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 60 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst +60 -7
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ Landlock: unprivileged access control ===================================== :Author: Mickaël Salaün -:Date: September 2022 +:Date: October 2022 The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g. global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock is a stackable
@@ -60,7 +60,8 @@ the need to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights. LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM | - LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER, + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER | + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE, }; Because we may not know on which kernel version an application will be
@@ -69,16 +70,28 @@ should try to protect users as much as possible whatever the kernel they are using. To avoid binary enforcement (i.e. either all security features or none), we can leverage a dedicated Landlock command to get the current version of the Landlock ABI and adapt the handled accesses. Let's check if we should -remove the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER`` access right which is only supported -starting with the second version of the ABI. +remove the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER`` or ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE`` +access rights, which are only supported starting with the second and third +version of the ABI. .. code-block:: c int abi; abi = landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0, LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION); - if (abi < 2) { + if (abi < 0) { + /* Degrades gracefully if Landlock is not handled. */ + perror("The running kernel does not enable to use Landlock"); + return 0; + } + switch (abi) { + case 1: + /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER for ABI < 2 */ ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER; + __attribute__((fallthrough)); + case 2: + /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE for ABI < 3 */ + ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE; } This enables to create an inclusive ruleset that will contain our rules.
@@ -127,8 +140,8 @@ descriptor. It may also be required to create rules following the same logic as explained for the ruleset creation, by filtering access rights according to the Landlock -ABI version. In this example, this is not required because -``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER`` is not allowed by any rule. +ABI version. In this example, this is not required because all of the requested +``allowed_access`` rights are already available in ABI 1. We now have a ruleset with one rule allowing read access to ``/usr`` while denying all other handled accesses for the filesystem. The next step is to
@@ -252,6 +265,37 @@ To be allowed to use :manpage:`ptrace(2)` and related syscalls on a target process, a sandboxed process should have a subset of the target process rules, which means the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer. +Truncating files +---------------- + +The operations covered by ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE`` and +``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE`` both change the contents of a file and sometimes +overlap in non-intuitive ways. It is recommended to always specify both of +these together. + +A particularly surprising example is :manpage:`creat(2)`. The name suggests +that this system call requires the rights to create and write files. However, +it also requires the truncate right if an existing file under the same name is +already present. + +It should also be noted that truncating files does not require the +``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE`` right. Apart from the :manpage:`truncate(2)` +system call, this can also be done through :manpage:`open(2)` with the flags +``O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC``. + +When opening a file, the availability of the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE`` +right is associated with the newly created file descriptor and will be used for +subsequent truncation attempts using :manpage:`ftruncate(2)`. The behavior is +similar to opening a file for reading or writing, where permissions are checked +during :manpage:`open(2)`, but not during the subsequent :manpage:`read(2)` and +:manpage:`write(2)` calls. + +As a consequence, it is possible to have multiple open file descriptors for the +same file, where one grants the right to truncate the file and the other does +not. It is also possible to pass such file descriptors between processes, +keeping their Landlock properties, even when these processes do not have an +enforced Landlock ruleset. + Compatibility =============
@@ -398,6 +442,15 @@ Starting with the Landlock ABI version 2, it is now possible to securely control renaming and linking thanks to the new ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER`` access right. +File truncation (ABI < 3) +------------------------- + +File truncation could not be denied before the third Landlock ABI, so it is +always allowed when using a kernel that only supports the first or second ABI. + +Starting with the Landlock ABI version 3, it is now possible to securely control +truncation thanks to the new ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE`` access right. + .. _kernel_support: Kernel support
Signature · 1 line
2.38.0
Hi Günther,
Quoted 101 lines · Günther Noack
The goal of these patches is to work towards a more complete coverage of file system operations that are restrictable with Landlock.
Motivation
----------The known set of currently unsupported file system operations in Landlock is described at [1]. Out of the operations listed there, truncate is the only one that modifies file contents, so these patches should make it possible to prevent the direct modification of file contents with Landlock.
Apart from Landlock, file truncation can also be restricted using seccomp-bpf, but it is more difficult to use (requires BPF, requires keeping up-to-date syscall lists) and it is not configurable by file hierarchy, as Landlock is. The simplicity and flexibility of the Landlock approach makes it worthwhile adding.
Implementation overview
-----------------------The patch introduces the truncation restriction feature as an additional bit in the
access_mask_tbitmap, in line with the existing supported operations.The truncation flag covers both the truncate(2) and ftruncate(2) families of syscalls, as well as open(2) with the
O_TRUNCflag. This includes usages ofcreat()in the case where existing regular files are overwritten.Additionally, this patch set introduces a new Landlock security blob associated with opened files, to track the available Landlock access rights at the time of opening the file. This is in line with Unix's general approach of checking the read and write permissions during
open(), and associating this previously checked authorization with the opened file.In order to treat truncate(2) and ftruncate(2) calls differently in an LSM hook, we split apart the existing
security_path_truncatehook intosecurity_path_truncate(for truncation by path) andsecurity_file_truncate(for truncation of previously opened files).We also implement the
file_alloc_securityhook, in order to override the access rights in the file security blob, in cases where the file is opened by other means than open(2), but where the opened file still supports ftruncate(2). This is also demonstrated in a selftest, usingmemfd_create(2).Relationship between "truncate" and "write" rights
--------------------------------------------------While it's possible to use the "write file" and "truncate" rights independent of each other, it simplifies the mental model for userspace callers to always use them together.
Specifically, the following behaviours might be surprising for users when using these independently:
* The commonly
creat()syscall requires the truncate right when overwriting existing files, as it is equivalent to open(2) with O_TRUNC|O_CREAT|O_WRONLY.
* The "write file" right is not always required to truncate a file, even through the open(2) syscall (when using O_RDONLY|O_TRUNC).Nevertheless, keeping the two flags separate is the correct approach to guarantee backwards compatibility for existing Landlock users.
When the "truncate" right is checked for ftruncate(2)
-----------------------------------------------------Notably, for the purpose of ftruncate(2), the Landlock truncation access right is looked up when *opening* the file, not when calling
ftruncate(). The availability of the truncate right is associated with the opened file and is later checked to authorize ftruncate(2) operations.This is similar to how the write mode gets remembered after a
open(..., O_WRONLY)to authorize laterwrite()operations.These opened file descriptors can also be passed between processes and will continue to enforce their truncation properties when these processes attempt an
ftruncate().These patches are based on v6.1-rc1.
Best regards,
Günther[1] https://docs.kernel.org/userspace-api/landlock.html#filesystem-flags
Past discussions:
V1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
V2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
V3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
V4: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
V5: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
V6: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
V7: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
V8: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
V9: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Quoted 5 lines
Changelog:
V10:
* Align security blob offsets insecurity/security.cBug spotted by Nathan Chancellor. (Thanks!!)
I can confirm v10 works for me on top of next-20221018. Thanks a lot for digging into it and getting it resolved quickly!
Cheers,
Nathan
Quoted 176 lines
As suggested by Mickaël Salaün, the bugfix is part of change 4/11.
* Small wording and formatting fixes in comments
Merged from Mickaël Salaün's fixes on his -next branch.V9:
* Implementfile_alloc_securityhook
* Needs to grant all Landlock rights by default for use cases where files are opened by other means than open(2), i.e.memfd_create(2)
* Discovered and fixed by Mickaël Salaün on his -next branch
* Add a selftest for thememfd_create(2)example
*file_open_hook: Reorder the logic a bit as discussed in review
* selftests: Return -errno fromrecv_fd()andsend_fd()
* Rebase to master branch
* Reorder__maybe_unusedpatch before its use
* Various small formatting and documentation fixes in code, documentation and commit messagesV8:
* landlock: Refactorcheck_access_path_dual()intois_access_to_paths_allowed(), as suggested by Mickaël Salaün on the v7 review. Added this as a separate commit.
* landlock truncate feature: inlineget_path_access()
* Documentation: update documentation date to October 2022
* selftests: locally #define__maybe_unused(checkpatch started complaining about it, but the header where it's defined is not usable from selftests)V7:
* security: Createfile_truncatehook
* Fix the build on kernels withoutCONFIG_SECURITY_PATH(fixed by Mickaël Salaün)
*lsm_hooks.h: Documentfile_truncatehook
*fs/open.c: undo accidental indentation changes
* landlock: Support file truncation
* Use theinit_layer_masks()result as input forcheck_access_path_dual()
* Naming
* Rename the landlock_file_security.allowed_access field (previously called "rights")
* Renameget_path_access_rights()toget_path_access()
* Renameget_file_access()toget_required_file_open_access()to avoid confusion withget_path_access()
* Use "access_request" foraccess_mask_tvariables,access_reqfor unsigned long
* Documentation:
* Fixed some comments according to review
* Added comments toget_required_file_open_access()andinit_layer_masks()
* selftests:
* remove unused variables
* rename fd0,...,fd3 to fd_layer0,...,fd_layer3.
*test_ftruncate: define layers on top and inline the helper function
* New tests (both added as separate commits)
* More exhaustive ftruncate test: Addopen_and_ftruncatetest that exercises ftruncate more thoroughly with fixture variants
* FD-passing test: exercise restricted file descriptors getting passed between processes, also using the same fixture variants
* Documentation: integrate review comments by Mickaël Salaün
* do not use contraptions (don't)
* use double backquotes in all touched lines
* add the read/writeopen()analogy to the truncation docs
* in code example, check for abi<0 explicitly and fix indentationV6:
* LSM hooks: createfile_truncatehook in addition topath_truncate. Use it in the existingpath_truncatecall sites where appropriate.
* landlock: checkLANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATEright duringopen(), and associate that right with the opened struct file in a security blob. Introduceget_path_access_rights()helper function.
* selftests: test ftruncate in a separate test, to exercise that the rights are associated with the file descriptor.
* Documentation: Rework documentation to reflect newftruncate()semantics.
* Applied small fixes by Mickaël Salaün which he added on top of V5, in
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux.git/log/?h=next
(I hope I found them all.)V5:
* Documentation
* Fix wording in userspace-api headers and inlandlock.rst.
* Move the truncation limitation section one to the bottom.
* Move all .rst changes into the documentation commit.
* selftests
* Remove_metadataargument from helpers where it became unnecessary.
* Open writable file descriptors at the top of both tests, before Landlock is enabled, to exerciseftruncate()independently fromopen().
* Simplifytest_ftruncateand decouple it from exercisingopen().
*test_creat(): Return errno onclose()failure (it does not conflict).
* Fix /* comment style */
* Reorder blocks ofEXPECT_EQchecks to be consistent within a test.
* Add missing |O_TRUNC to a check in one test.
* Put thetruncate_unhandledtest before the other.V4:
* Documentation
* Clarify wording and syntax as discussed in review.
* Use a less confusing error message in the example.
* selftests:
* Stop usingASSERT_EQin test helpers, return EBADFD instead. (This is an intentionally uncommon error code, so that the source of the error is clear and the test can distinguish test setup failures from failures in the actual system call under test.)
*samples/Documentation:
* Use additional clarifying comments in the kernel backwards compatibility logic.V3:
* selftests:
* Explicitly test ftruncate with readonly file descriptors (returns EINVAL).
* Extracttest_ftruncate,test_truncate,test_creathelpers, which simplified the previously mixed usage of EXPECT/ASSERT.
* Testcreat()behaviour as part of the big truncation test.
* Stop testing the truncate64(2) and ftruncate64(2) syscalls. This simplifies the tests a bit. The kernel implementations are the same as for truncate(2) and ftruncate(2), so there is little benefit from testing them exhaustively. (We aren't testing all open(2) variants either.)
*samples/landlock/sandboxer.c:
* Useswitch()to implement best effort mode.
* Documentation:
* Give more background on surprising truncation behaviour.
* Useswitch()in the example too, to stay in-line with the sample tool.
* Small fixes in header file to address previous comments.
* misc:
* Fix some typos and const usages.V2:
* Documentation: Mention the truncation flag where needed.
* Documentation: Point out connection between truncation and file writing.
* samples: Add file truncation to thelandlock/sandboxer.csample tool.
* selftests: Exercise open(2) withO_TRUNCand creat(2) exhaustively.
* selftests: Exercise truncation syscalls when the truncate right is not handled by Landlock.Günther Noack (11):
security: Createfile_truncatehook frompath_truncatehook
landlock: Refactorcheck_access_path_dual()into
is_access_to_paths_allowed()
landlock: Documentinit_layer_masks()helper
landlock: Support file truncation
selftests/landlock: Test file truncation support selftests/landlock: Testopen()andftruncate()in multiple scenarios selftests/landlock: Locally define__maybe_unusedselftests/landlock: Test FD passing from restricted to unrestricted
processes
selftests/landlock: Test ftruncate on FDs created bymemfd_create(2)samples/landlock: Extend sample tool to support
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
landlock: Document Landlock's file truncation supportDocumentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 67 ++- fs/namei.c | 2 +- fs/open.c | 2 +- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 10 +- include/linux/security.h | 6 + include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 21 +- samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 12 +- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 6 + security/landlock/fs.c | 206 ++++++-- security/landlock/fs.h | 24 + security/landlock/limits.h | 2 +- security/landlock/setup.c | 1 + security/landlock/syscalls.c | 2 +- security/security.c | 16 +- security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 13 + tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 38 +- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h | 85 +++- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 468 ++++++++++++++++++- 19 files changed, 862 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)base-commit:
9abf2313adc1ca1b6180c508c25f22f9395cc780Signature · 1 line
2.38.0
Mickaël Salaün
maintainerThanks Günther! This is now in -next.
Quoted 279 lines · Günther Noack
The goal of these patches is to work towards a more complete coverage of file system operations that are restrictable with Landlock.
Motivation
----------The known set of currently unsupported file system operations in Landlock is described at [1]. Out of the operations listed there, truncate is the only one that modifies file contents, so these patches should make it possible to prevent the direct modification of file contents with Landlock.
Apart from Landlock, file truncation can also be restricted using seccomp-bpf, but it is more difficult to use (requires BPF, requires keeping up-to-date syscall lists) and it is not configurable by file hierarchy, as Landlock is. The simplicity and flexibility of the Landlock approach makes it worthwhile adding.
Implementation overview
-----------------------The patch introduces the truncation restriction feature as an additional bit in the
access_mask_tbitmap, in line with the existing supported operations.The truncation flag covers both the truncate(2) and ftruncate(2) families of syscalls, as well as open(2) with the
O_TRUNCflag. This includes usages ofcreat()in the case where existing regular files are overwritten.Additionally, this patch set introduces a new Landlock security blob associated with opened files, to track the available Landlock access rights at the time of opening the file. This is in line with Unix's general approach of checking the read and write permissions during
open(), and associating this previously checked authorization with the opened file.In order to treat truncate(2) and ftruncate(2) calls differently in an LSM hook, we split apart the existing
security_path_truncatehook intosecurity_path_truncate(for truncation by path) andsecurity_file_truncate(for truncation of previously opened files).We also implement the
file_alloc_securityhook, in order to override the access rights in the file security blob, in cases where the file is opened by other means than open(2), but where the opened file still supports ftruncate(2). This is also demonstrated in a selftest, usingmemfd_create(2).Relationship between "truncate" and "write" rights
--------------------------------------------------While it's possible to use the "write file" and "truncate" rights independent of each other, it simplifies the mental model for userspace callers to always use them together.
Specifically, the following behaviours might be surprising for users when using these independently:
* The commonly
creat()syscall requires the truncate right when overwriting existing files, as it is equivalent to open(2) with O_TRUNC|O_CREAT|O_WRONLY.
* The "write file" right is not always required to truncate a file, even through the open(2) syscall (when using O_RDONLY|O_TRUNC).Nevertheless, keeping the two flags separate is the correct approach to guarantee backwards compatibility for existing Landlock users.
When the "truncate" right is checked for ftruncate(2)
-----------------------------------------------------Notably, for the purpose of ftruncate(2), the Landlock truncation access right is looked up when *opening* the file, not when calling
ftruncate(). The availability of the truncate right is associated with the opened file and is later checked to authorize ftruncate(2) operations.This is similar to how the write mode gets remembered after a
open(..., O_WRONLY)to authorize laterwrite()operations.These opened file descriptors can also be passed between processes and will continue to enforce their truncation properties when these processes attempt an
ftruncate().These patches are based on v6.1-rc1.
Best regards,
Günther[1] https://docs.kernel.org/userspace-api/landlock.html#filesystem-flags
Past discussions:
V1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
V2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
V3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
V4: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
V5: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
V6: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
V7: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
V8: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
V9: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/Changelog:
V10:
* Align security blob offsets insecurity/security.c
Bug spotted by Nathan Chancellor. (Thanks!!)
As suggested by Mickaël Salaün, the bugfix is part of change 4/11.
* Small wording and formatting fixes in comments
Merged from Mickaël Salaün's fixes on his -next branch.V9:
* Implementfile_alloc_securityhook
* Needs to grant all Landlock rights by default for use cases where files are opened by other means than open(2), i.e.memfd_create(2)
* Discovered and fixed by Mickaël Salaün on his -next branch
* Add a selftest for thememfd_create(2)example
*file_open_hook: Reorder the logic a bit as discussed in review
* selftests: Return -errno fromrecv_fd()andsend_fd()
* Rebase to master branch
* Reorder__maybe_unusedpatch before its use
* Various small formatting and documentation fixes in code, documentation and commit messagesV8:
* landlock: Refactorcheck_access_path_dual()intois_access_to_paths_allowed(), as suggested by Mickaël Salaün on the v7 review. Added this as a separate commit.
* landlock truncate feature: inlineget_path_access()
* Documentation: update documentation date to October 2022
* selftests: locally #define__maybe_unused(checkpatch started complaining about it, but the header where it's defined is not usable from selftests)V7:
* security: Createfile_truncatehook
* Fix the build on kernels withoutCONFIG_SECURITY_PATH(fixed by Mickaël Salaün)
*lsm_hooks.h: Documentfile_truncatehook
*fs/open.c: undo accidental indentation changes
* landlock: Support file truncation
* Use theinit_layer_masks()result as input forcheck_access_path_dual()
* Naming
* Rename the landlock_file_security.allowed_access field (previously called "rights")
* Renameget_path_access_rights()toget_path_access()
* Renameget_file_access()toget_required_file_open_access()to avoid confusion withget_path_access()
* Use "access_request" foraccess_mask_tvariables,access_reqfor unsigned long
* Documentation:
* Fixed some comments according to review
* Added comments toget_required_file_open_access()andinit_layer_masks()
* selftests:
* remove unused variables
* rename fd0,...,fd3 to fd_layer0,...,fd_layer3.
*test_ftruncate: define layers on top and inline the helper function
* New tests (both added as separate commits)
* More exhaustive ftruncate test: Addopen_and_ftruncatetest that exercises ftruncate more thoroughly with fixture variants
* FD-passing test: exercise restricted file descriptors getting passed between processes, also using the same fixture variants
* Documentation: integrate review comments by Mickaël Salaün
* do not use contraptions (don't)
* use double backquotes in all touched lines
* add the read/writeopen()analogy to the truncation docs
* in code example, check for abi<0 explicitly and fix indentationV6:
* LSM hooks: createfile_truncatehook in addition topath_truncate. Use it in the existingpath_truncatecall sites where appropriate.
* landlock: checkLANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATEright duringopen(), and associate that right with the opened struct file in a security blob. Introduceget_path_access_rights()helper function.
* selftests: test ftruncate in a separate test, to exercise that the rights are associated with the file descriptor.
* Documentation: Rework documentation to reflect newftruncate()semantics.
* Applied small fixes by Mickaël Salaün which he added on top of V5, in
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux.git/log/?h=next
(I hope I found them all.)V5:
* Documentation
* Fix wording in userspace-api headers and inlandlock.rst.
* Move the truncation limitation section one to the bottom.
* Move all .rst changes into the documentation commit.
* selftests
* Remove_metadataargument from helpers where it became unnecessary.
* Open writable file descriptors at the top of both tests, before Landlock is enabled, to exerciseftruncate()independently fromopen().
* Simplifytest_ftruncateand decouple it from exercisingopen().
*test_creat(): Return errno onclose()failure (it does not conflict).
* Fix /* comment style */
* Reorder blocks ofEXPECT_EQchecks to be consistent within a test.
* Add missing |O_TRUNC to a check in one test.
* Put thetruncate_unhandledtest before the other.V4:
* Documentation
* Clarify wording and syntax as discussed in review.
* Use a less confusing error message in the example.
* selftests:
* Stop usingASSERT_EQin test helpers, return EBADFD instead. (This is an intentionally uncommon error code, so that the source of the error is clear and the test can distinguish test setup failures from failures in the actual system call under test.)
*samples/Documentation:
* Use additional clarifying comments in the kernel backwards compatibility logic.V3:
* selftests:
* Explicitly test ftruncate with readonly file descriptors (returns EINVAL).
* Extracttest_ftruncate,test_truncate,test_creathelpers, which simplified the previously mixed usage of EXPECT/ASSERT.
* Testcreat()behaviour as part of the big truncation test.
* Stop testing the truncate64(2) and ftruncate64(2) syscalls. This simplifies the tests a bit. The kernel implementations are the same as for truncate(2) and ftruncate(2), so there is little benefit from testing them exhaustively. (We aren't testing all open(2) variants either.)
*samples/landlock/sandboxer.c:
* Useswitch()to implement best effort mode.
* Documentation:
* Give more background on surprising truncation behaviour.
* Useswitch()in the example too, to stay in-line with the sample tool.
* Small fixes in header file to address previous comments.
* misc:
* Fix some typos and const usages.V2:
* Documentation: Mention the truncation flag where needed.
* Documentation: Point out connection between truncation and file writing.
* samples: Add file truncation to thelandlock/sandboxer.csample tool.
* selftests: Exercise open(2) withO_TRUNCand creat(2) exhaustively.
* selftests: Exercise truncation syscalls when the truncate right is not handled by Landlock.Günther Noack (11):
security: Createfile_truncatehook frompath_truncatehook
landlock: Refactorcheck_access_path_dual()into
is_access_to_paths_allowed()
landlock: Documentinit_layer_masks()helper
landlock: Support file truncation
selftests/landlock: Test file truncation support selftests/landlock: Testopen()andftruncate()in multiple scenarios selftests/landlock: Locally define__maybe_unusedselftests/landlock: Test FD passing from restricted to unrestricted
processes
selftests/landlock: Test ftruncate on FDs created bymemfd_create(2)samples/landlock: Extend sample tool to support
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
landlock: Document Landlock's file truncation supportDocumentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 67 ++- fs/namei.c | 2 +- fs/open.c | 2 +- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 10 +- include/linux/security.h | 6 + include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 21 +- samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 12 +- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 6 + security/landlock/fs.c | 206 ++++++-- security/landlock/fs.h | 24 + security/landlock/limits.h | 2 +- security/landlock/setup.c | 1 + security/landlock/syscalls.c | 2 +- security/security.c | 16 +- security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 13 + tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 38 +- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h | 85 +++- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 468 ++++++++++++++++++- 19 files changed, 862 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)base-commit:
9abf2313adc1ca1b6180c508c25f22f9395cc780