Check codeSigning extended key usage extension
Subsystems (5)
v9 cover Check codeSigning extended key usage extension
NIAP PP_OS certification requests that OS need to validate the CodeSigning extended key usage extension field for integrity verifiction of exectable code:
https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/PP/-442-/ FIA_X509_EXT.1.1
This patchset adds the logic for parsing the codeSigning EKU extension field in X.509. And checking the CodeSigning EKU when verifying signature of kernel module or kexec PE binary in PKCS#7.
v9:
- Rename the eku element in public_key structure to ext_key_usage.
- Fix selftest.c
v8:
- Fixed the bug of is_key_on_revocation_list() when CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST is not set.
v7:
- Fixed the broken function call in is_key_on_revocation_list(). (be found by kernel test robot)
- Use a general name check_eku_by_usage() instead of check_codesign_eku().
v6:
- Add more length checking when parsing extKeyUsage and EKU's OID blob.
- Add 'usage' parameter to the comment of pkcs7_validate_trust function.
v5:
Fixed the wording in module-signing.rst.
v4:
Fixed the wording in patch description.
v3:
- Add codeSigning EKU to x509.genkey key generation config.
- Add openssl command option example for generating CodeSign EKU to module-signing.rst document.
v2:
Changed the help wording in the Kconfig.
Lee, Chun-Yi (4):
X.509: Add CodeSigning extended key usage parsing PKCS#7: Check codeSigning EKU for kernel module and kexec pe
verification
modsign: Add codeSigning EKU when generating X.509 key generation
config
Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst: add openssl command
option example for CodeSign EKU
Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst | 6 +++ certs/blacklist.c | 5 ++- certs/default_x509.genkey | 1 + certs/system_keyring.c | 4 +- crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 9 ++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++-- crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest.c | 2 +- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 25 ++++++++++++ include/crypto/pkcs7.h | 4 +- include/crypto/public_key.h | 1 + include/keys/system_keyring.h | 7 +++- include/linux/oid_registry.h | 5 +++ 12 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH v9 1/4 X.509: Add CodeSigning extended key usage parsing
This patch adds the logic for parsing the CodeSign extended key usage extension in X.509. The parsing result will be set to the ext_key_usage flag which is carried by public key. It can be used in the PKCS#7 verification.
--- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/public_key.h | 1 + include/linux/oid_registry.h | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c +25 -0
@@ -554,6 +554,8 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;const unsigned char *v = value; +int i =0 ; +enum OID oid;pr_debug ("Extension: %u\n" , ctx->last_oid);
@@ -583,6 +585,29 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,return 0 ; } +if (ctx->last_oid == OID_extKeyUsage) { +if (vlen <2 || + v[0 ] != ((ASN1_UNIV <<6 ) |ASN1_CONS_BIT |ASN1_SEQ ) || + v[1 ] != vlen -2 ) +return -EBADMSG ; + i +=2 ; + +while (i < vlen) { +/* A 10 bytes EKU OID Octet blob = +* ASN1_OID + size byte + 8 bytes OID */ +if ((i +10 ) > vlen || v[i] !=ASN1_OID || v[i +1 ] !=8 ) +return -EBADMSG ; + + oid =look_up_OID (v + i +2 , v[i +1 ]); +if (oid == OID_codeSigning) { + ctx->cert->pub->ext_key_usage |= EKU_codeSigning; + } + i +=10 ; + } +pr_debug ("extKeyUsage: %d\n" , ctx->cert->pub->ext_key_usage); +return 0 ; + } +return 0 ; }
include/crypto/public_key.h +1 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ struct public_key {bool key_is_private;const char *id_type;const char *pkey_algo; + unsigned int ext_key_usage : 9; /* Extended Key Usage (9-bit) */ };extern void public_key_free (struct public_key *key);
include/linux/oid_registry.h +5 -0
@@ -140,9 +140,14 @@ enum OID { OID_TPMImportableKey,/* 2.23.133.10.1.4 */ OID_TPMSealedData,/* 2.23.133.10.1.5 */ +/* Extended key purpose OIDs [RFC 5280] */ + OID_codeSigning,/* 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3 */ + OID__NR }; +#define EKU_codeSigning (1 << 2) +extern enum OID look_up_OID (const void *data,size_t datasize);extern int parse_OID (const void *data,size_t datasize,enum OID *oid);extern int sprint_oid (const void *,size_t ,char *,size_t );
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerRe: [PATCH v9,1/4] X.509: Add CodeSigning extended key usage parsing
Quoted 1 line · Chun-Yi
This patch adds the logic for parsing the CodeSign extended key usage
It's *not* a patch once it is applied.
And isn't the identifier actually "codeSign", not "CodeSign"? Please, format identifier correctly in order not to cause confusion.
So, how I would rewrite the first sentence, would be:
Add the logic for parsing codeSign extended key usage field, as described in RFC2459, section "4.2.1.13 Extended key usage field.
E.g. it took me 15 minutes to review the commit message alone because I could not remember the RFC number off top of my head.
Quoted 17 lines
extension in X.509. The parsing result will be set to the
ext_key_usage
flag which is carried by public key. It can be used in the PKCS#7 verification.Signed-off-by "Lee, Chun-Yi" <[email protected]>--- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/public_key.h | 1 + include/linux/oid_registry.h | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+)crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c +0
-0
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen, · line 558
Quoted 5 lines
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c +2
-0@@ -554,6 +554,8 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;const unsigned char *v = value; +int i =0 ; +enum OID oid;
I'd reorder the declarations (suggestion).
Quoted 67 lines
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c +23
-0pr_debug ("Extension: %u\n" , ctx->last_oid);@@ -583,6 +585,29 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,return 0 ; } +if (ctx->last_oid == OID_extKeyUsage) { +if (vlen <2 || + v[0 ] != ((ASN1_UNIV <<6 ) |ASN1_CONS_BIT |ASN1_SEQ ) || + v[1 ] != vlen -2 ) +return -EBADMSG ; + i +=2 ; + +while (i < vlen) { +/* A 10 bytes EKU OID Octet blob = +* ASN1_OID + size byte + 8 bytes OID */ +if ((i +10 ) > vlen || v[i] !=ASN1_OID || v[i +1 ] !=8 ) +return -EBADMSG ; + + oid =look_up_OID (v + i +2 , v[i +1 ]); +if (oid == OID_codeSigning) { + ctx->cert->pub->ext_key_usage |= EKU_codeSigning; + } + i +=10 ; + } +pr_debug ("extKeyUsage: %d\n" , ctx->cert->pub->ext_key_usage); +return 0 ; + } +return 0 ; }include/crypto/public_key.h +1
-0@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ struct public_key {bool key_is_private;const char *id_type;const char *pkey_algo; + unsigned int ext_key_usage : 9; /* Extended Key Usage (9-bit) */ };extern void public_key_free (struct public_key *key);include/linux/oid_registry.h +5
-0@@ -140,9 +140,14 @@ enum OID { OID_TPMImportableKey,/* 2.23.133.10.1.4 */ OID_TPMSealedData,/* 2.23.133.10.1.5 */ +/* Extended key purpose OIDs [RFC 5280] */ + OID_codeSigning,/* 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3 */ + OID__NR }; +#define EKU_codeSigning (1 << 2) +extern enum OID look_up_OID (const void *data,size_t datasize);extern int parse_OID (const void *data,size_t datasize,enum OID *oid);extern int sprint_oid (const void *,size_t ,char *,size_t );Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
BR, Jarkko
Re: [PATCH v9,1/4] X.509: Add CodeSigning extended key usage parsing
Hi Jarkko,
Thanks for your review!
Quoted 8 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 1 line · Chun-Yi
This patch adds the logic for parsing the CodeSign extended key usage
It's *not* a patch once it is applied.
And isn't the identifier actually "codeSign", not "CodeSign"? Please, format identifier correctly in order not to cause confusion.
Quoted 9 lines
So, how I would rewrite the first sentence, would be:
Add the logic for parsing codeSign extended key usage field, as described in RFC2459, section "4.2.1.13 Extended key usage field.
E.g. it took me 15 minutes to review the commit message alone because I could not remember the RFC number off top of my head.
Thanks for your suggestion. As your rewrited sentence, Adding RFC2459 and section is better for reader of patch descriptor.
I will change the patch descriptor.
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 12 lines
extension in X.509. The parsing result will be set to the
ext_key_usage
flag which is carried by public key. It can be used in the PKCS#7 verification.Signed-off-by "Lee, Chun-Yi" <[email protected]>--- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++ include/crypto/public_key.h | 1 + include/linux/oid_registry.h | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
Quoted 13 lines
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen, · line 558
Quoted 10 lines
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c +2
-0@@ -554,6 +554,8 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;const unsigned char *v = value; +int i =0 ; +enum OID oid;I'd reorder the declarations (suggestion).
I will change the order.
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
PATCH v9 2/4 PKCS#7: Check codeSigning EKU for kernel module and kexec pe verification
In reply to Lee, Chun-YiThis patch adds the logic for checking the CodeSigning extended key usage when verifying signature of kernel module or kexec PE binary in PKCS#7.
--- certs/blacklist.c | 5 ++-- certs/system_keyring.c | 4 +-- crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 9 ++++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest.c | 2 +- include/crypto/pkcs7.h | 4 ++- include/keys/system_keyring.h | 7 +++-- 7 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
certs/blacklist.c +3 -2
@@ -282,11 +282,12 @@ int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size)* is_key_on_revocation_list - Determine if the key for a PKCS#7 message is revoked * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to check */ -int is_key_on_revocation_list (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) +int is_key_on_revocation_list (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, +enum key_being_used_for usage) {int ret; - ret =pkcs7_validate_trust (pkcs7, blacklist_keyring); + ret =pkcs7_validate_trust (pkcs7, blacklist_keyring, usage, false);if (ret ==0 )return -EKEYREJECTED ;
certs/system_keyring.c +2 -2
@@ -263,13 +263,13 @@ int verify_pkcs7_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len, goto error; } - ret =is_key_on_revocation_list (pkcs7); + ret =is_key_on_revocation_list (pkcs7, usage);if (ret != -ENOKEY ) {pr_devel ("PKCS#7 platform key is on revocation list\n" ); goto error; } } - ret =pkcs7_validate_trust (pkcs7, trusted_keys); + ret =pkcs7_validate_trust (pkcs7, trusted_keys, usage, true);if (ret <0 ) {if (ret == -ENOKEY )pr_devel ("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n" );
crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig +9 -0
@@ -85,4 +85,13 @@ config FIPS_SIGNATURE_SELFTEST depends on ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER +config CHECK_CODESIGN_EKU + bool "Check codeSigning extended key usage" + depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=y + depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + help + This option provides support for checking the codeSigning extended + key usage when verifying the signature in PKCS#7. It affects kernel + module verification and kexec PE binary verification. + endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c +40 -3
78 lines not on this page · raw message
crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest.c +1 -1
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ int __init fips_signature_selftest(void)if (ret <0 )panic ("Certs selftest %d: pkcs7_verify() = %d\n" , i, ret); - ret =pkcs7_validate_trust (pkcs7, keyring); + ret =pkcs7_validate_trust (pkcs7, keyring,VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE , false);if (ret <0 )panic ("Certs selftest %d: pkcs7_validate_trust() = %d\n" , i, ret);
include/crypto/pkcs7.h +3 -1
@@ -30,7 +30,9 @@ extern int pkcs7_get_content_data(const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,* pkcs7_trust.c */ extern int pkcs7_validate_trust (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, -struct key *trust_keyring); +struct key *trust_keyring, +enum key_being_used_for usage, +bool check_eku);/* * pkcs7_verify.c
include/keys/system_keyring.h +5 -2
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#define _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H#include <linux/key.h> +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> enum blacklist_hash_type {/* TBSCertificate hash */
@@ -81,13 +82,15 @@ static inline int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len)#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST extern int add_key_to_revocation_list (const char *data,size_t size); -extern int is_key_on_revocation_list (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7); +extern int is_key_on_revocation_list (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, +enum key_being_used_for usage);#else static inline int add_key_to_revocation_list (const char *data,size_t size) {return 0 ; } -static inline int is_key_on_revocation_list (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) +static inline int is_key_on_revocation_list (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, +enum key_being_used_for usage) {return -ENOKEY ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerRe: [PATCH v9,2/4] PKCS#7: Check codeSigning EKU for kernel module and kexec pe verification
Quoted 3 lines · Chun-Yi
This patch adds the logic for checking the CodeSigning extended key usage when verifying signature of kernel module or kexec PE binary in PKCS#7.
Pretty much the same feedback as for 1/4.
Quoted 116 lines
Signed-off-by "Lee, Chun-Yi" <[email protected]>--- certs/blacklist.c | 5 ++-- certs/system_keyring.c | 4 +-- crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 9 ++++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest.c | 2 +- include/crypto/pkcs7.h | 4 ++- include/keys/system_keyring.h | 7 +++-- 7 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)certs/blacklist.c +3
-2@@ -282,11 +282,12 @@ int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size)* is_key_on_revocation_list - Determine if the key for a PKCS#7 message is revoked * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to check */ -int is_key_on_revocation_list (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) +int is_key_on_revocation_list (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, +enum key_being_used_for usage) {int ret; - ret =pkcs7_validate_trust (pkcs7, blacklist_keyring); + ret =pkcs7_validate_trust (pkcs7, blacklist_keyring, usage, false);if (ret ==0 )return -EKEYREJECTED ;certs/system_keyring.c +2
-2@@ -263,13 +263,13 @@ int verify_pkcs7_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len, goto error; } - ret =is_key_on_revocation_list (pkcs7); + ret =is_key_on_revocation_list (pkcs7, usage);if (ret != -ENOKEY ) {pr_devel ("PKCS#7 platform key is on revocation list\n" ); goto error; } } - ret =pkcs7_validate_trust (pkcs7, trusted_keys); + ret =pkcs7_validate_trust (pkcs7, trusted_keys, usage, true);if (ret <0 ) {if (ret == -ENOKEY )pr_devel ("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n" );crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig +9
-0@@ -85,4 +85,13 @@ config FIPS_SIGNATURE_SELFTEST depends on ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER +config CHECK_CODESIGN_EKU + bool "Check codeSigning extended key usage" + depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=y + depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + help + This option provides support for checking the codeSigning extended + key usage when verifying the signature in PKCS#7. It affects kernel + module verification and kexec PE binary verification. + endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPEcrypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c +29
-1@@ -16,12 +16,40 @@#include <crypto/public_key.h> #include "pkcs7_parser.h" +#ifdef CONFIG_CHECK_CODESIGN_EKU +static bool check_eku_by_usage (struct key *key,enum key_being_used_for usage) +{ +struct public_key *public_key = key->payload.data[asym_crypto]; +bool ret = true; + +switch (usage) { +case VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE : +case VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE : + ret = !!(public_key->ext_key_usage & EKU_codeSigning); +if (!ret) +pr_warn ("The signer '%s' key is not CodeSigning\n" , + key->description); +break ; +default : +break ; + } +return ret; +} +#else +static bool check_eku_by_usage (struct key *key,enum key_being_used_for usage) +{ +return true; +} +#endif +/* * Check the trust on one PKCS#7 SignedInfo block. */ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo, -struct key *trust_keyring) +struct key *trust_keyring, +enum key_being_used_for usage, +bool check_eku) {struct public_key_signature *sig = sinfo->sig;struct x509_certificate *x509, *last =NULL , *p;
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, · line 146
Quoted 7 lines
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c +4
-0@@ -112,6 +140,10 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,return -ENOKEY ; matched: +if (check_eku && !check_eku_by_usage (key, usage)) { +key_put (key); +return -ENOKEY ; + }
Why you don't just open code this to those rare call sites where it is needed?
I counted that there is exactly one call site.
Quoted 94 lines
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c +7
-2ret =verify_signature (key, sig);key_put (key);if (ret <0 ) {@@ -135,6 +167,8 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,* pkcs7_validate_trust - Validate PKCS#7 trust chain * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 certificate to validate * @trust_keyring: Signing certificates to use as starting points +* @usage: The use to which the key is being put. +* @check_eku: Check EKU (Extended Key Usage) * * Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message intersects * keys we already know and trust. @@ -156,7 +190,9 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,* May also return -ENOMEM. */ int pkcs7_validate_trust (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, -struct key *trust_keyring) +struct key *trust_keyring, +enum key_being_used_for usage, +bool check_eku) {struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;struct x509_certificate *p;@@ -167,7 +203,8 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, p->seen = false;for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) { - ret =pkcs7_validate_trust_one (pkcs7, sinfo, trust_keyring); + ret =pkcs7_validate_trust_one (pkcs7, sinfo, trust_keyring, + usage, check_eku);switch (ret) {case -ENOKEY :continue ;crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest.c +1
-1@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ int __init fips_signature_selftest(void)if (ret <0 )panic ("Certs selftest %d: pkcs7_verify() = %d\n" , i, ret); - ret =pkcs7_validate_trust (pkcs7, keyring); + ret =pkcs7_validate_trust (pkcs7, keyring,VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE , false);if (ret <0 )panic ("Certs selftest %d: pkcs7_validate_trust() = %d\n" , i, ret);include/crypto/pkcs7.h +3
-1@@ -30,7 +30,9 @@ extern int pkcs7_get_content_data(const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,* pkcs7_trust.c */ extern int pkcs7_validate_trust (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, -struct key *trust_keyring); +struct key *trust_keyring, +enum key_being_used_for usage, +bool check_eku);/* * pkcs7_verify.c include/keys/system_keyring.h +5
-2@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#define _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H#include <linux/key.h> +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> enum blacklist_hash_type {/* TBSCertificate hash */ @@ -81,13 +82,15 @@ static inline int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len)#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST extern int add_key_to_revocation_list (const char *data,size_t size); -extern int is_key_on_revocation_list (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7); +extern int is_key_on_revocation_list (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, +enum key_being_used_for usage);#else static inline int add_key_to_revocation_list (const char *data,size_t size) {return 0 ; } -static inline int is_key_on_revocation_list (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) +static inline int is_key_on_revocation_list (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, +enum key_being_used_for usage) {return -ENOKEY ; }Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
BR, Jarkko
Re: [PATCH v9,2/4] PKCS#7: Check codeSigning EKU for kernel module and kexec pe verification
Hi Jarkko,
Quoted 7 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 3 lines · Chun-Yi
This patch adds the logic for checking the CodeSigning extended key usage when verifying signature of kernel module or kexec PE binary in PKCS#7.
Pretty much the same feedback as for 1/4.
I will also change this description.
Thanks
Joey Lee
Quoted 225 lines
Quoted 116 lines
Signed-off-by "Lee, Chun-Yi" <[email protected]>--- certs/blacklist.c | 5 ++-- certs/system_keyring.c | 4 +-- crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig | 9 ++++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest.c | 2 +- include/crypto/pkcs7.h | 4 ++- include/keys/system_keyring.h | 7 +++-- 7 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)certs/blacklist.c +3
-2@@ -282,11 +282,12 @@ int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size)* is_key_on_revocation_list - Determine if the key for a PKCS#7 message is revoked * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to check */ -int is_key_on_revocation_list (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) +int is_key_on_revocation_list (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, +enum key_being_used_for usage) {int ret; - ret =pkcs7_validate_trust (pkcs7, blacklist_keyring); + ret =pkcs7_validate_trust (pkcs7, blacklist_keyring, usage, false);if (ret ==0 )return -EKEYREJECTED ;certs/system_keyring.c +2
-2@@ -263,13 +263,13 @@ int verify_pkcs7_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len, goto error; } - ret =is_key_on_revocation_list (pkcs7); + ret =is_key_on_revocation_list (pkcs7, usage);if (ret != -ENOKEY ) {pr_devel ("PKCS#7 platform key is on revocation list\n" ); goto error; } } - ret =pkcs7_validate_trust (pkcs7, trusted_keys); + ret =pkcs7_validate_trust (pkcs7, trusted_keys, usage, true);if (ret <0 ) {if (ret == -ENOKEY )pr_devel ("PKCS#7 signature not signed with a trusted key\n" );crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig +9
-0@@ -85,4 +85,13 @@ config FIPS_SIGNATURE_SELFTEST depends on ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER +config CHECK_CODESIGN_EKU + bool "Check codeSigning extended key usage" + depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=y + depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION + help + This option provides support for checking the codeSigning extended + key usage when verifying the signature in PKCS#7. It affects kernel + module verification and kexec PE binary verification. + endif # ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPEcrypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c +29
-1@@ -16,12 +16,40 @@#include <crypto/public_key.h> #include "pkcs7_parser.h" +#ifdef CONFIG_CHECK_CODESIGN_EKU +static bool check_eku_by_usage (struct key *key,enum key_being_used_for usage) +{ +struct public_key *public_key = key->payload.data[asym_crypto]; +bool ret = true; + +switch (usage) { +case VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE : +case VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE : + ret = !!(public_key->ext_key_usage & EKU_codeSigning); +if (!ret) +pr_warn ("The signer '%s' key is not CodeSigning\n" , + key->description); +break ; +default : +break ; + } +return ret; +} +#else +static bool check_eku_by_usage (struct key *key,enum key_being_used_for usage) +{ +return true; +} +#endif +/* * Check the trust on one PKCS#7 SignedInfo block. */ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo, -struct key *trust_keyring) +struct key *trust_keyring, +enum key_being_used_for usage, +bool check_eku) {struct public_key_signature *sig = sinfo->sig;struct x509_certificate *x509, *last =NULL , *p;crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, · line 146
Quoted 7 lines
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c +4
-0@@ -112,6 +140,10 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,return -ENOKEY ; matched: +if (check_eku && !check_eku_by_usage (key, usage)) { +key_put (key); +return -ENOKEY ; + }Why you don't just open code this to those rare call sites where it is needed?
I counted that there is exactly one call site.
Quoted 94 lines
crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c +7
-2ret =verify_signature (key, sig);key_put (key);if (ret <0 ) {@@ -135,6 +167,8 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,* pkcs7_validate_trust - Validate PKCS#7 trust chain * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 certificate to validate * @trust_keyring: Signing certificates to use as starting points +* @usage: The use to which the key is being put. +* @check_eku: Check EKU (Extended Key Usage) * * Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message intersects * keys we already know and trust. @@ -156,7 +190,9 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,* May also return -ENOMEM. */ int pkcs7_validate_trust (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, -struct key *trust_keyring) +struct key *trust_keyring, +enum key_being_used_for usage, +bool check_eku) {struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;struct x509_certificate *p;@@ -167,7 +203,8 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, p->seen = false;for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) { - ret =pkcs7_validate_trust_one (pkcs7, sinfo, trust_keyring); + ret =pkcs7_validate_trust_one (pkcs7, sinfo, trust_keyring, + usage, check_eku);switch (ret) {case -ENOKEY :continue ;crypto/asymmetric_keys/selftest.c +1
-1@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ int __init fips_signature_selftest(void)if (ret <0 )panic ("Certs selftest %d: pkcs7_verify() = %d\n" , i, ret); - ret =pkcs7_validate_trust (pkcs7, keyring); + ret =pkcs7_validate_trust (pkcs7, keyring,VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE , false);if (ret <0 )panic ("Certs selftest %d: pkcs7_validate_trust() = %d\n" , i, ret);include/crypto/pkcs7.h +3
-1@@ -30,7 +30,9 @@ extern int pkcs7_get_content_data(const struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,* pkcs7_trust.c */ extern int pkcs7_validate_trust (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, -struct key *trust_keyring); +struct key *trust_keyring, +enum key_being_used_for usage, +bool check_eku);/* * pkcs7_verify.c include/keys/system_keyring.h +5
-2@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#define _KEYS_SYSTEM_KEYRING_H#include <linux/key.h> +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h> enum blacklist_hash_type {/* TBSCertificate hash */ @@ -81,13 +82,15 @@ static inline int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len)#ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST extern int add_key_to_revocation_list (const char *data,size_t size); -extern int is_key_on_revocation_list (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7); +extern int is_key_on_revocation_list (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, +enum key_being_used_for usage);#else static inline int add_key_to_revocation_list (const char *data,size_t size) {return 0 ; } -static inline int is_key_on_revocation_list (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) +static inline int is_key_on_revocation_list (struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, +enum key_being_used_for usage) {return -ENOKEY ; }Signature · 1 line
2.26.2BR, Jarkko
PATCH v9 3/4 modsign: Add codeSigning EKU to the default
In reply to Lee, Chun-YiAdd codeSigning EKU to the default X.509 key generation config for the build time autogenerated kernel key.
--- certs/default_x509.genkey | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
certs/default_x509.genkey +1 -0
@@ -15,3 +15,4 @@ basicConstraints=critical,CA:FALSE keyUsage=digitalSignature subjectKeyIdentifier=hash authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid +extendedKeyUsage=codeSigning
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH v9 4/4 Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst: add openssl command option example for CodeSign EKU
In reply to Lee, Chun-YiAdd an openssl command option example for generating CodeSign extended key usage in X.509 when CONFIG_CHECK_CODESIGN_EKU is enabled.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst +6 -0
@@ -170,6 +170,12 @@ generate the public/private key files:: -config x509.genkey -outform PEM -out kernel_key.pem \ -keyout kernel_key.pem +When ``CONFIG_CHECK_CODESIGN_EKU`` option is enabled, the following openssl +command option should be added where for generating CodeSign extended key usage +in X.509:: + + -addext "extendedKeyUsage=codeSigning" + The full pathname for the resulting kernel_key.pem file can then be specified in the ``CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY`` option, and the certificate and key therein will be used instead of an autogenerated keypair.
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerRe: [PATCH v9,4/4] Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst: add openssl command option example for CodeSign EKU
Quoted 13 lines · Chun-Yi
Add an openssl command option example for generating CodeSign extended key usage in X.509 when
CONFIG_CHECK_CODESIGN_EKUis enabled.Signed-off-by "Lee, Chun-Yi" <[email protected]>--- Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst +0
-0
Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst generate the public/private key files:: · line 174
Quoted 5 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst +2
-0@@ -170,6 +170,12 @@ generate the public/private key files:: -config x509.genkey -outform PEM -out kernel_key.pem \ -keyout kernel_key.pem +When ``CONFIG_CHECK_CODESIGN_EKU`` option is enabled, the following openssl +command option should be added where for generating CodeSign extended key usage
You have:
1. codeSign
2. CodeSign
3. CodeSigning
Why this ambiguity?
Quoted 10 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst +4
-0+in X.509:: + + -addext "extendedKeyUsage=codeSigning" + The full pathname for the resulting kernel_key.pem file can then be specified in the ``CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY`` option, and the certificate and key therein will be used instead of an autogenerated keypair.Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
BR, Jarkko
Re: [PATCH v9,4/4] Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst: add openssl command option example for CodeSign EKU
Quoted 22 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 13 lines · Chun-Yi
Add an openssl command option example for generating CodeSign extended key usage in X.509 when
CONFIG_CHECK_CODESIGN_EKUis enabled.Signed-off-by "Lee, Chun-Yi" <[email protected]>--- Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst +0
-0Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst generate the public/private key files:: · line 174
Quoted 5 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst +2
-0@@ -170,6 +170,12 @@ generate the public/private key files:: -config x509.genkey -outform PEM -out kernel_key.pem \ -keyout kernel_key.pem +When ``CONFIG_CHECK_CODESIGN_EKU`` option is enabled, the following openssl +command option should be added where for generating CodeSign extended key usageYou have:
Quoted 6 lines
1. codeSign
2. CodeSign
3. CodeSigningWhy this ambiguity?
Sorry for the ambiguity. I will use codeSigning in document and patch description to sync with RFC2459 and openssl.
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 10 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst +4
-0+in X.509:: + + -addext "extendedKeyUsage=codeSigning" + The full pathname for the resulting kernel_key.pem file can then be specified in the ``CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY`` option, and the certificate and key therein will be used instead of an autogenerated keypair.Signature · 1 line
2.26.2BR, Jarkko
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerQuoted 10 lines · Chun-Yi
NIAP
PP_OScertification requests that OS need to validate the CodeSigning extended key usage extension field for integrity verifiction of exectable code:https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/PP/-442-/ FIA_X509_EXT.1.1This patchset adds the logic for parsing the codeSigning EKU extension field in X.509. And checking the CodeSigning EKU when verifying signature of kernel module or kexec PE binary in PKCS#7.
Might be cutting hairs here but you don't really explain why we want to support it. It's not a counter argument to add the feature. It's a counter argument against adding undocumented features.
BR, Jarkko
Hi Jarkko,
Quoted 8 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 7 lines · Chun-Yi
NIAP
PP_OScertification requests that OS need to validate the CodeSigning extended key usage extension field for integrity verifiction of exectable code:https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/PP/-442-/ FIA_X509_EXT.1.1
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 3 lines
This patchset adds the logic for parsing the codeSigning EKU extension field in X.509. And checking the CodeSigning EKU when verifying signature of kernel module or kexec PE binary in PKCS#7.
Might be cutting hairs here but you don't really explain why we want to support it. It's not a counter argument to add the feature. It's a counter argument against adding undocumented features.
In some cases, a organization may publish different certificates for difference purposes. When a certificate for a specific purpose is leaked, it will not affect other certificates.
The function for using a code signing certificate to verify kernel binary or module can restrict the purpose of the certificate to avoid attacker uses other leaked non-codeSigning certificate for signing.
Thanks a lot!
Joey Lee