Shadow stacks for userspace
Subsystems (44)
v8 cover Shadow stacks for userspace
Hi,
This series implements Shadow Stacks for userspace using x86's Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET). CET consists of two related security features:
shadow stacks and indirect branch tracking. This series implements just the shadow stack part of this feature, and just for userspace.
The main use case for shadow stack is providing protection against return oriented programming attacks. It works by maintaining a secondary (shadow) stack using a special memory type that has protections against modification. When executing a CALL instruction, the processor pushes the return address to both the normal stack and to the special permission shadow stack. Upon RET, the processor pops the shadow stack copy and compares it to the normal stack copy. For more details, see the coverletter from v1 [0].
The comments on the last version were mainly code style and verbiage. There was also some late but great questions on the overall design, raised by people starting to look at implementing non-x86 shadow stack features. After discussion on the history and purpose of the design choices, the changes that ultimately came out of the discussion were documentation updates. Some of the concerns were eventually found to be based on misunderstandings of the x86 shadow stack HW limitations. Others were taken as future enhancements. There was a fair amount of discussion on adding the map_shadow_stack syscall instead of building new behaviors into mmap(). Ultimately, since there was no consensus and it was agreed that there wasn't impact on other archs, this was left as well.
Lastly, per Dave, the author for most of the the patches from the old series has been swapped to me from Yu-cheng, so potential bisecters can find help better. Previously these patches had me just as Co-developed-by.
At this point, I think we have a pretty good initial shadow stack implementation here. I'd like to start with the basics and let real world usage inform the enhancements if we can. Unless anyone sees any likely ABI trap we are walking into.
I left tags in place.
Previous version [1].
Thanks,
Rick
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Mike Rapoport (1):
x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK
Rick Edgecombe (36):
Documentation/x86: Add CET shadow stack description x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate
x86/traps: Move control protection handler to separate file x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file
mm: Introduce pte_mkwrite_kernel()
s390/mm: Introduce pmd_mkwrite_kernel()
mm: Make pte_mkwrite() take a VMA
x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY
x86/mm: Update ptep/pmdp_set_wrprotect() for _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY x86/mm: Start actually marking _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY x86/mm: Check shadow stack page fault errors
x86/mm: Teach pte_mkwrite() about stack memory
mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack.
mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting
mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory x86/mm: Introduce MAP_ABOVE4G
mm: Warn on shadow stack memory in wrong vma
x86/mm: Warn if create Write=0,Dirty=1 with raw prot
x86: Introduce userspace API for shadow stack x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace
x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test
x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS
Yu-cheng Yu (3):
mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38
mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory
mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap()
Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst | 1 + Documentation/mm/arch_pgtable_helpers.rst | 9 +- Documentation/x86/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/x86/shstk.rst | 179 +++++ arch/alpha/include/asm/pgtable.h | 6 +- arch/arc/include/asm/hugepage.h | 2 +- arch/arc/include/asm/pgtable-bits-arcv2.h | 7 +- arch/arm/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h | 7 +- arch/arm/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +- arch/arm/kernel/signal.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 9 +- arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/signal32.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/mm/trans_pgd.c | 4 +- arch/csky/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +- arch/hexagon/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +- arch/ia64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +- arch/loongarch/include/asm/pgtable.h | 4 +- arch/m68k/include/asm/mcf_pgtable.h | 2 +- arch/m68k/include/asm/motorola_pgtable.h | 6 +- arch/m68k/include/asm/sun3_pgtable.h | 6 +- arch/microblaze/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +- arch/mips/include/asm/pgtable.h | 6 +- arch/nios2/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +- arch/openrisc/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +- arch/parisc/include/asm/pgtable.h | 6 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/32/pgtable.h | 2 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h | 4 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/32/pgtable.h | 2 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/32/pte-8xx.h | 2 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/64/pgtable.h | 2 +- arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h | 6 +- arch/s390/include/asm/hugetlb.h | 4 +- arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h | 14 +- arch/s390/mm/pageattr.c | 4 +- arch/sh/include/asm/pgtable_32.h | 10 +- arch/sparc/include/asm/pgtable_32.h | 2 +- arch/sparc/include/asm/pgtable_64.h | 6 +- arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c | 2 +- arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c | 2 +- arch/um/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +- arch/x86/Kconfig | 24 + arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler | 5 + arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 16 +- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h | 9 + arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/regset.h | 7 +- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/sched.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h | 16 +- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h | 6 +- arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 322 +++++++- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 56 +- arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 8 + arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h | 38 + arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h | 13 + arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 12 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 4 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h | 12 + arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 4 + arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 152 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 35 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/proc.c | 23 + arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 54 +- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c | 78 ++ arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 90 ++- arch/x86/kernel/idt.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 21 +- arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 9 +- arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c | 12 + arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 499 +++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/signal.c | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/signal_32.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/signal_64.c | 8 +- arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c | 6 +- arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 87 --- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 22 + arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 4 +- arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 38 + arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c | 2 +- arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c | 2 +- arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S | 2 +- arch/xtensa/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +- fs/aio.c | 2 +- fs/proc/array.c | 6 + fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 + include/asm-generic/hugetlb.h | 4 +- include/linux/mm.h | 65 +- include/linux/mman.h | 4 + include/linux/pgtable.h | 14 + include/linux/proc_fs.h | 2 + include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 + include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h | 3 +- include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 2 +- include/uapi/linux/elf.h | 2 + ipc/shm.c | 2 +- kernel/sys_ni.c | 1 + mm/debug_vm_pgtable.c | 16 +- mm/gup.c | 2 +- mm/huge_memory.c | 7 +- mm/hugetlb.c | 4 +- mm/internal.h | 4 +- mm/memory.c | 5 +- mm/migrate_device.c | 2 +- mm/mmap.c | 10 +- mm/mprotect.c | 2 +- mm/nommu.c | 4 +- mm/userfaultfd.c | 2 +- mm/util.c | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile | 2 +- .../testing/selftests/x86/test_shadow_stack.c | 695 ++++++++++++++++++ 116 files changed, 2612 insertions(+), 314 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/shstk.rst create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_shadow_stack.c
base-commit: eeac8ede17557680855031c6f305ece2378af326
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 1/40 Documentation/x86: Add CET shadow stack description
Introduce a new document on Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET).
---
v8:
- Add more details to docs (Szabolcs Nagy)
- More doc tweaks (Dave Hansen)
v5:
- Literal format tweaks (Bagas Sanjaya)
- Update EOPNOTSUPP text due to unification after comment from (Kees)
- Update 32 bit signal support with new behavior
- Remove capitalization on shadow stack (Boris)
- Fix typo
v4:
- Drop clearcpuid piece (Boris)
- Add some info about 32 bit
v3:
- Clarify kernel IBT is supported by the kernel. (Kees, Andrew Cooper)
- Clarify which arch_prctl's can take multiple bits. (Kees)
- Describe ASLR characteristics of thread shadow stacks. (Kees)
- Add exec section. (Andrew Cooper)
- Fix some capitalization (Bagas Sanjaya)
- Update new location of enablement status proc.
- Add info about new user_shstk software capability.
- Add more info about what the kernel pushes to the shadow stack on signal.
--- Documentation/x86/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/x86/shstk.rst | 169 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 170 insertions(+) create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/shstk.rst
Documentation/x86/index.rst +1 -0
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ x86-specific Documentation mtrr pat intel-hfi + shstk iommu intel_txt amd-memory-encryption
Documentation/x86/shstk.rst new file +169 -0
169 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 2/40 x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack
In reply to Rick EdgecombeShadow stack provides protection for applications against function return address corruption. It is active when the processor supports it, the kernel has CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK enabled, and the application is built for the feature. This is only implemented for the 64-bit kernel. When it is enabled, legacy non-shadow stack applications continue to work, but without protection.
Since there is another feature that utilizes CET (Kernel IBT) that will share implementation with shadow stacks, create CONFIG_CET to signify that at least one CET feature is configured.
---
v5:
- Remove capitalization of shadow stack (Boris)
v3:
- Add X86_CET (Kees)
- Add back WRUSS dependency (Kees)
- Fix verbiage (Dave)
- Change from promt to bool (Kirill)
- Add more to commit log
v2:
- Remove already wrong kernel size increase info (tlgx)
- Change prompt to remove "Intel" (tglx)
- Update line about what CPUs are supported (Dave)
Yu-cheng v25:
- Remove X86_CET and use X86_SHADOW_STACK directly.
--- arch/x86/Kconfig | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+)
arch/x86/Kconfig +24 -0
@@ -1851,6 +1851,11 @@ config CC_HAS_IBT (CC_IS_CLANG && CLANG_VERSION >= 140000)) && \ $(as-instr,endbr64) +config X86_CET + def_bool n + help + CET features configured (Shadow stack or IBT) + config X86_KERNEL_IBT prompt "Indirect Branch Tracking" def_bool y
@@ -1858,6 +1863,7 @@ config X86_KERNEL_IBT # https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/9d7001eba9c4cb311e03cd8cdc231f9e579f2d0f depends on !LD_IS_LLD || LLD_VERSION >= 140000 select OBJTOOL + select X86_CET help Build the kernel with support for Indirect Branch Tracking, a hardware support course-grain forward-edge Control Flow Integrity
@@ -1952,6 +1958,24 @@ config X86_SGX If unsure, say N. +config X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK + bool "X86 userspace shadow stack" + depends on AS_WRUSS + depends on X86_64 + select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS + select X86_CET + help + Shadow stack protection is a hardware feature that detects function + return address corruption. This helps mitigate ROP attacks. + Applications must be enabled to use it, and old userspace does not + get protection "for free". + + CPUs supporting shadow stacks were first released in 2020. + + See Documentation/x86/shstk.rst for more information. + + If unsure, say N. + config EFI bool "EFI runtime service support" depends on ACPI
arch/x86/Kconfig.assembler +5 -0
@@ -24,3 +24,8 @@ config AS_GFNI def_bool $(as-instr,vgf2p8mulb %xmm0$(comma)%xmm1$(comma)%xmm2) help Supported by binutils >= 2.30 and LLVM integrated assembler + +config AS_WRUSS + def_bool $(as-instr,wrussq %rax$(comma)(%rbx)) + help + Supported by binutils >= 2.31 and LLVM integrated assembler
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 3/40 x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks
In reply to Rick EdgecombeThe Control-Flow Enforcement Technology contains two related features, one of which is Shadow Stacks. Future patches will utilize this feature for shadow stack support in KVM, so add a CPU feature flags for Shadow Stacks (CPUID.(EAX=7,ECX=0):ECX[bit 7]).
To protect shadow stack state from malicious modification, the registers are only accessible in supervisor mode. This implementation context-switches the registers with XSAVES. Make X86_FEATURE_SHSTK depend on XSAVES.
The shadow stack feature, enumerated by the CPUID bit described above, encompasses both supervisor and userspace support for shadow stack. In near future patches, only userspace shadow stack will be enabled. In expectation of future supervisor shadow stack support, create a software CPU capability to enumerate kernel utilization of userspace shadow stack support. This user shadow stack bit should depend on the HW "shstk" capability and that logic will be implemented in future patches.
---
v5:
- Drop "shstk" from cpuinfo (Boris)
- Remove capitalization on shadow stack (Boris)
v3:
- Add user specific shadow stack cpu cap (Andrew Cooper)
- Drop reviewed-bys from Boris and Kees due to the above change.
v2:
- Remove IBT reference in commit log (Kees)
- Describe xsaves dependency using text from (Dave)
v1:
- Remove IBT, can be added in a follow on IBT series.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +++++++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +2 -0
@@ -309,6 +309,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_MSR_TSX_CTRL (11*32+20)/* "" MSR IA32_TSX_CTRL (Intel) implemented */ #define X86_FEATURE_SMBA (11*32+21)/* "" Slow Memory Bandwidth Allocation */ #define X86_FEATURE_BMEC (11*32+22)/* "" Bandwidth Monitoring Event Configuration */ +#define X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK (11*32+23)/* Shadow stack support for user mode applications */ /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4)/* AVX VNNI instructions */
@@ -378,6 +379,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_OSPKE (16*32+ 4)/* OS Protection Keys Enable */ #define X86_FEATURE_WAITPKG (16*32+ 5)/* UMONITOR/UMWAIT/TPAUSE Instructions */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VBMI2 (16*32+ 6)/* Additional AVX512 Vector Bit Manipulation Instructions */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SHSTK (16*32+ 7)/* "" Shadow stack */ #define X86_FEATURE_GFNI (16*32+ 8)/* Galois Field New Instructions */ #define X86_FEATURE_VAES (16*32+ 9)/* Vector AES */ #define X86_FEATURE_VPCLMULQDQ (16*32+10)/* Carry-Less Multiplication Double Quadword */
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +7 -1
@@ -99,6 +99,12 @@# define DISABLE_TDX_GUEST (1 << (X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST & 31))#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK +#define DISABLE_USER_SHSTK 0 +#else +#define DISABLE_USER_SHSTK (1 << (X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK & 31)) +#endif +/* * Make sure to add features to the correct mask */
@@ -114,7 +120,7 @@#define DISABLED_MASK9 (DISABLE_SGX)#define DISABLED_MASK10 0#define DISABLED_MASK11 (DISABLE_RETPOLINE|DISABLE_RETHUNK|DISABLE_UNRET| \ - DISABLE_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING) + DISABLE_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING|DISABLE_USER_SHSTK)#define DISABLED_MASK12 0#define DISABLED_MASK13 0#define DISABLED_MASK14 0
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c +1 -0
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_dep cpuid_deps[] = { { X86_FEATURE_XFD, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES }, { X86_FEATURE_XFD, X86_FEATURE_XGETBV1 }, { X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE, X86_FEATURE_XFD }, + { X86_FEATURE_SHSTK, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES }, {} };
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 4/40 x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack
In reply to Rick EdgecombeSetting CR4.CET is a prerequisite for utilizing any CET features, most of which also require setting MSRs.
Kernel IBT already enables the CET CR4 bit when it detects IBT HW support and is configured with kernel IBT. However, future patches that enable userspace shadow stack support will need the bit set as well. So change the logic to enable it in either case.
Clear MSR_IA32_U_CET in cet_disable() so that it can't live to see userspace in a new kexec-ed kernel that has CR4.CET set from kernel IBT.
---
v5:
- Drop "shstk" from cpuinfo (Boris)
- Remove capitalization on shadow stack (Boris)
v3:
- Add user specific shadow stack cpu cap (Andrew Cooper)
- Drop reviewed-bys from Boris and Kees due to the above change.
v2:
- Remove IBT reference in commit log (Kees)
- Describe xsaves dependency using text from (Dave)
v1:
- Remove IBT, can be added in a follow on IBT series.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +27 -8
@@ -600,27 +600,43 @@ __noendbr void ibt_restore(u64 save) static __always_inline void setup_cet(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { -u64 msr =CET_ENDBR_EN ; +bool user_shstk, kernel_ibt; -if (!HAS_KERNEL_IBT || - !cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_IBT )) +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_X86_CET ))return ; -wrmsrl (MSR_IA32_S_CET , msr); + kernel_ibt =HAS_KERNEL_IBT &&cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_IBT ); + user_shstk =cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && +IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK ); + +if (!kernel_ibt && !user_shstk) +return ; + +if (user_shstk) +set_cpu_cap (c,X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK ); + +if (kernel_ibt) +wrmsrl (MSR_IA32_S_CET ,CET_ENDBR_EN ); +else +wrmsrl (MSR_IA32_S_CET ,0 ); +cr4_set_bits (X86_CR4_CET ); -if (!ibt_selftest ()) { +if (kernel_ibt && !ibt_selftest ()) {pr_err ("IBT selftest: Failed!\n" );wrmsrl (MSR_IA32_S_CET ,0 );setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_IBT ); -return ; } } __noendbr void cet_disable(void) { -if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_IBT )) -wrmsrl (MSR_IA32_S_CET ,0 ); +if (!(cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_IBT ) || +cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ))) +return ; + +wrmsrl (MSR_IA32_S_CET ,0 ); +wrmsrl (MSR_IA32_U_CET ,0 ); }/*
@@ -1482,6 +1498,9 @@ static void __init cpu_parse_early_param(void)if (cmdline_find_option_bool (boot_command_line,"noxsaves" ))setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_XSAVES ); +if (cmdline_find_option_bool (boot_command_line,"nousershstk" )) +setup_clear_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK ); + arglen =cmdline_find_option (boot_command_line,"clearcpuid" , arg,sizeof (arg));if (arglen <=0 )return ;
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 5/40 x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states
In reply to Rick EdgecombeShadow stack register state can be managed with XSAVE. The registers can logically be separated into two groups:
* Registers controlling user-mode operation
* Registers controlling kernel-mode operation
The architecture has two new XSAVE state components: one for each group of those groups of registers. This lets an OS manage them separately if it chooses. Future patches for host userspace and KVM guests will only utilize the user-mode registers, so only configure XSAVE to save user-mode registers. This state will add 16 bytes to the xsave buffer size.
Future patches will use the user-mode XSAVE area to save guest user-mode CET state. However, VMCS includes new fields for guest CET supervisor states. KVM can use these to save and restore guest supervisor state, so host supervisor XSAVE support is not required.
Adding this exacerbates the already unwieldy if statement in check_xstate_against_struct() that handles warning about un-implemented xfeatures. So refactor these check's by having XCHECK_SZ() set a bool when it actually check's the xfeature. This ends up exceeding 80 chars, but was better on balance than other options explored. Pass the bool as pointer to make it clear that XCHECK_SZ() can change the variable.
While configuring user-mode XSAVE, clarify kernel-mode registers are not managed by XSAVE by defining the xfeature in XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_UNSUPPORTED, like is done for XFEATURE_MASK_PT. This serves more of a documentation as code purpose, and functionally, only enables a few safety checks.
Both XSAVE state components are supervisor states, even the state controlling user-mode operation. This is a departure from earlier features like protection keys where the PKRU state is a normal user (non-supervisor) state. Having the user state be supervisor-managed ensures there is no direct, unprivileged access to it, making it harder for an attacker to subvert CET.
To facilitate this privileged access, define the two user-mode CET MSRs, and the bits defined in those MSRs relevant to future shadow stack enablement patches.
---
v5:
- Move comments from end of lines in cet_user_state struct (Boris)
v3:
- Add missing "is" in commit log (Boris)
- Change to case statement for struct size checking (Boris)
- Adjust commas on xfeature_names (Kees, Boris)
v2:
- Change name to XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL_UNUSED (peterz)
KVM refresh:
- Reword commit log using some verbiage posted by Dave Hansen
- Remove unlikely to be used supervisor cet xsave struct
- Clarify that supervisor cet state is not saved by xsave
- Remove unused supervisor MSRs
--- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h | 16 +++++- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h | 6 ++- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c | 90 +++++++++++++++---------------- 3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/types.h +14 -2
@@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ enum xfeature {XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR ,XFEATURE_PKRU ,XFEATURE_PASID , -XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_11 , -XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_12 , +XFEATURE_CET_USER , +XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL_UNUSED ,XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_13 ,XFEATURE_RSRVD_COMP_14 , XFEATURE_LBR,
@@ -138,6 +138,8 @@ enum xfeature {#define XFEATURE_MASK_PT (1 << XFEATURE_PT_UNIMPLEMENTED_SO_FAR)#define XFEATURE_MASK_PKRU (1 << XFEATURE_PKRU)#define XFEATURE_MASK_PASID (1 << XFEATURE_PASID) +#define XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER (1 << XFEATURE_CET_USER) +#define XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL (1 << XFEATURE_CET_KERNEL_UNUSED)#define XFEATURE_MASK_LBR (1 << XFEATURE_LBR)#define XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE_CFG (1 << XFEATURE_XTILE_CFG)#define XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE_DATA (1 << XFEATURE_XTILE_DATA)
@@ -252,6 +254,16 @@ struct pkru_state {u32 pad; } __packed; +/* +* State component 11 is Control-flow Enforcement user states +*/ +struct cet_user_state { +/* user control-flow settings */ +u64 user_cet; +/* user shadow stack pointer */ +u64 user_ssp; +}; +/* * State component 15: Architectural LBR configuration state. * The size of Arch LBR state depends on the number of LBRs (lbr_depth).
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/xstate.h +4 -2
@@ -50,7 +50,8 @@#define XFEATURE_MASK_USER_DYNAMIC XFEATURE_MASK_XTILE_DATA/* All currently supported supervisor features */ -#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PASID) +#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PASID | \ + XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER)/* * A supervisor state component may not always contain valuable information,
@@ -77,7 +78,8 @@* Unsupported supervisor features. When a supervisor feature in this mask is * supported in the future, move it to the supported supervisor feature mask. */ -#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_UNSUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PT) +#define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_UNSUPPORTED (XFEATURE_MASK_PT | \ + XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL)/* All supervisor states including supported and unsupported states. */ #define XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_ALL (XFEATURE_MASK_SUPERVISOR_SUPPORTED | \
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c +43 -47
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Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 6/40 x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate
In reply to Rick EdgecombeJust like user xfeatures, supervisor xfeatures can be active in the registers or present in the task FPU buffer. If the registers are active, the registers can be modified directly. If the registers are not active, the modification must be performed on the task FPU buffer.
When the state is not active, the kernel could perform modifications directly to the buffer. But in order for it to do that, it needs to know where in the buffer the specific state it wants to modify is located. Doing this is not robust against optimizations that compact the FPU buffer, as each access would require computing where in the buffer it is.
The easiest way to modify supervisor xfeature data is to force restore the registers and write directly to the MSRs. Often times this is just fine anyway as the registers need to be restored before returning to userspace. Do this for now, leaving buffer writing optimizations for the future.
Add a new function fpregs_lock_and_load() that can simultaneously call fpregs_lock() and do this restore. Also perform some extra sanity checks in this function since this will be used in non-fpu focused code.
---
v6:
- Drop "but appear to work" (Boris)
v5:
- Fix spelling error (Boris)
- Don't export fpregs_lock_and_load() (Boris)
v3:
- Rename to fpregs_lock_and_load() to match the unlocking fpregs_unlock(). (Kees)
- Elaborate in comment about helper. (Dave)
v2:
- Drop optimization of writing directly the buffer, and change API accordingly.
- fpregs_lock_and_load() suggested by tglx
- Some commit log verbiage from dhansen
--- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h | 9 +++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/api.h +9 -0
@@ -82,6 +82,15 @@ static inline void fpregs_unlock(void)preempt_enable (); } +/* +* FPU state gets lazily restored before returning to userspace. So when in the +* kernel, the valid FPU state may be kept in the buffer. This function will force +* restore all the fpu state to the registers early if needed, and lock them from +* being automatically saved/restored. Then FPU state can be modified safely in the +* registers, before unlocking with fpregs_unlock(). +*/ +void fpregs_lock_and_load (void ); +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU extern void fpregs_assert_state_consistent (void );#else
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c +18 -0
@@ -753,6 +753,24 @@ void switch_fpu_return(void) }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (switch_fpu_return); +void fpregs_lock_and_load (void ) +{ +/* +* fpregs_lock() only disables preemption (mostly). So modifying state +* in an interrupt could screw up some in progress fpregs operation. +* Warn about it. +*/ +WARN_ON_ONCE (!irq_fpu_usable ()); +WARN_ON_ONCE (current->flags &PF_KTHREAD ); + +fpregs_lock (); + +fpregs_assert_state_consistent (); + +if (test_thread_flag (TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD )) +fpregs_restore_userregs (); +} +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU /* * If current FPU state according to its tracking (loaded FPU context on this
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 7/40 x86/traps: Move control protection handler to separate file
In reply to Rick EdgecombeToday the control protection handler is defined in traps.c and used only for the kernel IBT feature. To reduce ifdeffery, move it to it's own file. In future patches, functionality will be added to make this handler also handle user shadow stack faults. So name the file cet.c.
No functional change.
---
v8:
- Add "x86/traps" to log (Boris)
v6:
- Split move to cet.c and shadow stack enhancements to fault handler to separate files. (Kees)
--- arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 75 --------------------------------------- 3 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cet.c
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -144,6 +144,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CFI_CLANG) += cfi.o obj-$(CONFIG_CALL_THUNKS) += callthunks.o +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_CET) += cet.o + ### # 64 bit specific files ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
arch/x86/kernel/cet.c new file +76 -0
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arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +0 -75
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Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 8/40 x86/shstk: Add user control-protection fault handler
In reply to Rick EdgecombeA control-protection fault is triggered when a control-flow transfer attempt violates Shadow Stack or Indirect Branch Tracking constraints. For example, the return address for a RET instruction differs from the copy on the shadow stack.
There already exists a control-protection fault handler for handling kernel IBT faults. Refactor this fault handler into separate user and kernel handlers, like the page fault handler. Add a control-protection handler for usermode. To avoid ifdeffery, put them both in a new file cet.c, which is compiled in the case of either of the two CET features supported in the
kernel: kernel IBT or user mode shadow stack. Move some static inline functions from traps.c into a header so they can be used in cet.c.
Opportunistically fix a comment in the kernel IBT part of the fault handler that is on the end of the line instead of preceding it.
Keep the same behavior for the kernel side of the fault handler, except for converting a BUG to a WARN in the case of a #CP happening when the feature is missing. This unifies the behavior with the new shadow stack code, and also prevents the kernel from crashing under this situation which is potentially recoverable.
The control-protection fault handler works in a similar way as the general protection fault handler. It provides the si_code SEGV_CPERR to the signal handler.
---
v7:
- Adjust alignment of WARN statement
v6:
- Split into separate patches (Kees)
- Change to "x86/shstk" in commit log (Boris)
v5:
- Move to separate file to avoid ifdeffery (Boris)
- Improvements to commit log (Boris)
- Rename control_protection_err (Boris)
- Move comment from end of line in IBT fault handler (Boris)
v3:
- Shorten user/kernel #CP handler function names (peterz)
- Restore CP_ENDBR check to kernel handler (peterz)
- Utilize CONFIG_X86_CET (Kees)
- Unify "unexpected" warnings (Andrew Cooper)
- Use 2d array for error code chars (Andrew Cooper)
- Add comment about why to read SSP MSR before enabling interrupts
v2:
- Integrate with kernel IBT fault handler
- Update printed messages. (Dave)
- Remove array_index_nospec() usage. (Dave)
- Remove IBT messages. (Dave)
- Add enclave error code bit processing it case it can get triggered somehow.
- Add extra "unknown" in control_protection_err.
--- arch/arm/kernel/signal.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c | 2 +- arch/arm64/kernel/signal32.c | 2 +- arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c | 2 +- arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 8 +- arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 12 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cet.c | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/kernel/idt.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/signal_32.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/signal_64.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 12 --- arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c | 2 +- arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S | 2 +- include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h | 3 +- 16 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
arch/arm/kernel/signal.c +1 -1
@@ -681,7 +681,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_rseq_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs)*/ static_assert (NSIGILL ==11 );static_assert (NSIGFPE ==15 ); -static_assert (NSIGSEGV ==9 ); +static_assert (NSIGSEGV ==10 );static_assert (NSIGBUS ==5 );static_assert (NSIGTRAP ==6 );static_assert (NSIGCHLD ==6 );
arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c +1 -1
@@ -1341,7 +1341,7 @@ void __init minsigstksz_setup(void)*/ static_assert (NSIGILL ==11 );static_assert (NSIGFPE ==15 ); -static_assert (NSIGSEGV ==9 ); +static_assert (NSIGSEGV ==10 );static_assert (NSIGBUS ==5 );static_assert (NSIGTRAP ==6 );static_assert (NSIGCHLD ==6 );
arch/arm64/kernel/signal32.c +1 -1
@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ void compat_setup_restart_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs)*/ static_assert (NSIGILL ==11 );static_assert (NSIGFPE ==15 ); -static_assert (NSIGSEGV ==9 ); +static_assert (NSIGSEGV ==10 );static_assert (NSIGBUS ==5 );static_assert (NSIGTRAP ==6 );static_assert (NSIGCHLD ==6 );
arch/sparc/kernel/signal32.c +1 -1
@@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ asmlinkage int do_sys32_sigstack(u32 u_ssptr, u32 u_ossptr, unsigned long sp)*/ static_assert (NSIGILL ==11 );static_assert (NSIGFPE ==15 ); -static_assert (NSIGSEGV ==9 ); +static_assert (NSIGSEGV ==10 );static_assert (NSIGBUS ==5 );static_assert (NSIGTRAP ==6 );static_assert (NSIGCHLD ==6 );
arch/sparc/kernel/signal_64.c +1 -1
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ void do_notify_resume(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long orig_i0, unsigned long*/ static_assert (NSIGILL ==11 );static_assert (NSIGFPE ==15 ); -static_assert (NSIGSEGV ==9 ); +static_assert (NSIGSEGV ==10 );static_assert (NSIGBUS ==5 );static_assert (NSIGTRAP ==6 );static_assert (NSIGCHLD ==6 );
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +7 -1
@@ -105,6 +105,12 @@#define DISABLE_USER_SHSTK (1 << (X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK & 31))#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT +#define DISABLE_IBT 0 +#else +#define DISABLE_IBT (1 << (X86_FEATURE_IBT & 31)) +#endif +/* * Make sure to add features to the correct mask */
@@ -128,7 +134,7 @@#define DISABLED_MASK16 (DISABLE_PKU|DISABLE_OSPKE|DISABLE_LA57|DISABLE_UMIP| \ DISABLE_ENQCMD)#define DISABLED_MASK17 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK18 0 +#define DISABLED_MASK18 (DISABLE_IBT)#define DISABLED_MASK19 0#define DISABLED_MASK20 0#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 21)
arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h +1 -1
@@ -614,7 +614,7 @@ DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW_ERRORCODE(X86_TRAP_DF, xenpv_exc_double_fault);#endif /* #CP */ -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET DECLARE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE (X86_TRAP_CP , exc_control_protection);#endif
arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h +12 -0
@@ -47,4 +47,16 @@ void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(struct pt_regs *regs, struct stack_info *info);#endif +static inline void cond_local_irq_enable (struct pt_regs *regs) +{ +if (regs->flags &X86_EFLAGS_IF ) +local_irq_enable (); +} + +static inline void cond_local_irq_disable (struct pt_regs *regs) +{ +if (regs->flags &X86_EFLAGS_IF ) +local_irq_disable (); +} +#endif /* _ASM_X86_TRAPS_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cet.c +85 -9
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arch/x86/kernel/idt.c +1 -1
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static const __initconst struct idt_data def_idts[] = { ISTG(X86_TRAP_MC, asm_exc_machine_check, IST_INDEX_MCE),#endif -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET INTG(X86_TRAP_CP, asm_exc_control_protection),#endif
arch/x86/kernel/signal_32.c +1 -1
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ int ia32_setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs)*/ static_assert (NSIGILL ==11 );static_assert (NSIGFPE ==15 ); -static_assert (NSIGSEGV ==9 ); +static_assert (NSIGSEGV ==10 );static_assert (NSIGBUS ==5 );static_assert (NSIGTRAP ==6 );static_assert (NSIGCHLD ==6 );
arch/x86/kernel/signal_64.c +1 -1
@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ void sigaction_compat_abi(struct k_sigaction *act, struct k_sigaction *oact)*/ static_assert (NSIGILL ==11 );static_assert (NSIGFPE ==15 ); -static_assert (NSIGSEGV ==9 ); +static_assert (NSIGSEGV ==10 );static_assert (NSIGBUS ==5 );static_assert (NSIGTRAP ==6 );static_assert (NSIGCHLD ==6 );
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +0 -12
@@ -77,18 +77,6 @@DECLARE_BITMAP (system_vectors,NR_VECTORS ); -static inline void cond_local_irq_enable (struct pt_regs *regs) -{ -if (regs->flags &X86_EFLAGS_IF ) -local_irq_enable (); -} - -static inline void cond_local_irq_disable (struct pt_regs *regs) -{ -if (regs->flags &X86_EFLAGS_IF ) -local_irq_disable (); -} - __always_inline int is_valid_bugaddr(unsigned long addr) {if (addr <TASK_SIZE_MAX )
arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c +1 -1
@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ static struct trap_array_entry trap_array[] = {TRAP_ENTRY (exc_coprocessor_error, false ),TRAP_ENTRY (exc_alignment_check, false ),TRAP_ENTRY (exc_simd_coprocessor_error, false ), -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET TRAP_ENTRY(exc_control_protection, false ), #endif };
arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S +1 -1
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ xen_pv_trap asm_exc_page_fault xen_pv_trap asm_exc_spurious_interrupt_bug xen_pv_trap asm_exc_coprocessor_error xen_pv_trap asm_exc_alignment_check -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_CET xen_pv_trap asm_exc_control_protection #endif #ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
include/uapi/asm-generic/siginfo.h +2 -1
@@ -242,7 +242,8 @@ typedef struct siginfo {#define SEGV_ADIPERR 7/* Precise MCD exception */ #define SEGV_MTEAERR 8/* Asynchronous ARM MTE error */ #define SEGV_MTESERR 9/* Synchronous ARM MTE exception */ -#define NSIGSEGV 9 +#define SEGV_CPERR 10/* Control protection fault */ +#define NSIGSEGV 10/* * SIGBUS si_codes
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 9/40 x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages
In reply to Rick EdgecombeNew processors that support Shadow Stack regard Write=0,Dirty=1 PTEs as shadow stack pages.
In normal cases, it can be helpful to create Write=1 PTEs as also Dirty=1 if HW dirty tracking is not needed, because if the Dirty bit is not already set the CPU has to set Dirty=1 when the memory gets written to. This creates additional work for the CPU. So traditional wisdom was to simply set the Dirty bit whenever you didn't care about it. However, it was never really very helpful for read-only kernel memory.
When CR4.CET=1 and IA32_S_CET.SH_STK_EN=1, some instructions can write to such supervisor memory. The kernel does not set IA32_S_CET.SH_STK_EN, so avoiding kernel Write=0,Dirty=1 memory is not strictly needed for any functional reason. But having Write=0,Dirty=1 kernel memory doesn't have any functional benefit either, so to reduce ambiguity between shadow stack and regular Write=0 pages, remove Dirty=1 from any kernel Write=0 PTEs.
---
v6:
- Also remove dirty from newly added set_memory_rox()
v5:
- Spelling and grammar in commit log (Boris)
v3:
- Update commit log (Andrew Cooper, Peterz)
v2:
- Normalize PTE bit descriptions between patches
--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 6 +++--- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h +3 -3
@@ -192,10 +192,10 @@ enum page_cache_mode {#define _KERNPG_TABLE (__PP|__RW| 0|___A| 0|___D| 0| 0| _ENC)#define _PAGE_TABLE_NOENC (__PP|__RW|_USR|___A| 0|___D| 0| 0)#define _PAGE_TABLE (__PP|__RW|_USR|___A| 0|___D| 0| 0| _ENC) -#define __PAGE_KERNEL_RO (__PP| 0| 0|___A|__NX|___D| 0|___G) -#define __PAGE_KERNEL_ROX (__PP| 0| 0|___A| 0|___D| 0|___G) +#define __PAGE_KERNEL_RO (__PP| 0| 0|___A|__NX| 0| 0|___G) +#define __PAGE_KERNEL_ROX (__PP| 0| 0|___A| 0| 0| 0|___G)#define __PAGE_KERNEL_NOCACHE (__PP|__RW| 0|___A|__NX|___D| 0|___G| __NC) -#define __PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR (__PP| 0|_USR|___A|__NX|___D| 0|___G) +#define __PAGE_KERNEL_VVAR (__PP| 0|_USR|___A|__NX| 0| 0|___G)#define __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE (__PP|__RW| 0|___A|__NX|___D|_PSE|___G)#define __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC (__PP|__RW| 0|___A| 0|___D|_PSE|___G)#define __PAGE_KERNEL_WP (__PP|__RW| 0|___A|__NX|___D| 0|___G| __WP)
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +2 -2
@@ -2073,12 +2073,12 @@ int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages)int set_memory_ro (unsigned long addr,int numpages) { -return change_page_attr_clear (&addr, numpages,__pgprot (_PAGE_RW),0 ); +return change_page_attr_clear (&addr, numpages,__pgprot (_PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY),0 ); }int set_memory_rox (unsigned long addr,int numpages) { -pgprot_t clr =__pgprot (_PAGE_RW); +pgprot_t clr =__pgprot (_PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY);if (__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX) clr.pgprot |= _PAGE_NX;
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 10/40 x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file
In reply to Rick EdgecombeTo prepare the introduction of _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY, move pmd_write() and pud_write() up in the file, so that they can be used by other helpers below. No functional changes.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 24 ++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +12 -12
@@ -160,6 +160,18 @@ static inline int pte_write(pte_t pte)return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_RW; } +#define pmd_write pmd_write +static inline int pmd_write (pmd_t pmd) +{ +return pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_RW; +} + +#define pud_write pud_write +static inline int pud_write (pud_t pud) +{ +return pud_flags (pud) & _PAGE_RW; +} +static inline int pte_huge (pte_t pte) {return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_PSE;
@@ -1120,12 +1132,6 @@ extern int pmdp_clear_flush_young(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address, pmd_t *pmdp); -#define pmd_write pmd_write -static inline int pmd_write (pmd_t pmd) -{ -return pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_RW; -} -#define __HAVE_ARCH_PMDP_HUGE_GET_AND_CLEARstatic inline pmd_t pmdp_huge_get_and_clear (struct mm_struct *mm,unsigned long addr,pmd_t *pmdp)
@@ -1155,12 +1161,6 @@ static inline void pmdp_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm,clear_bit (_PAGE_BIT_RW, (unsigned long *)pmdp); } -#define pud_write pud_write -static inline int pud_write (pud_t pud) -{ -return pud_flags (pud) & _PAGE_RW; -} -#ifndef pmdp_establish#define pmdp_establish pmdp_establish static inline pmd_t pmdp_establish(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 11/40 mm: Introduce pte_mkwrite_kernel()
In reply to Rick EdgecombeThe x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function properly.
One of these changes is to allow for pte_mkwrite() to create different types of writable memory (the existing conventionally writable type and also the new shadow stack type). Future patches will convert pte_mkwrite() to take a VMA in order to facilitate this, however there are places in the kernel where pte_mkwrite() is called outside of the context of a VMA. These are for kernel memory. So create a new variant called pte_mkwrite_kernel() and switch the kernel users over to it. Have pte_mkwrite() and pte_mkwrite_kernel() be the same for now. Future patches will introduce changes to make pte_mkwrite() take a VMA.
Only do this for architectures that need it because they call pte_mkwrite() in arch code without an associated VMA. Since it will only currently be used in arch code, so do not include it in arch_pgtable_helpers.rst.
---
Hi Non-x86 Arch’s,
x86 has a feature that allows for the creation of a special type of writable memory (shadow stack) that is only writable in limited specific ways. Previously, changes were proposed to core MM code to teach it to decide when to create normally writable memory or the special shadow stack writable memory, but David Hildenbrand suggested[0] to change pXX_mkwrite() to take a VMA, so awareness of shadow stack memory can be moved into x86 code.
Since pXX_mkwrite() is defined in every arch, it requires some tree-wide changes. So that is why you are seeing some patches out of a big x86 series pop up in your arch mailing list. There is no functional change. After this refactor, the shadow stack series goes on to use the arch helpers to push shadow stack memory details inside arch/x86.
Testing was just 0-day build testing.
Hopefully that is enough context. Thanks!
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
v6:
- New patch
--- arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 7 ++++++- arch/arm64/mm/trans_pgd.c | 4 ++-- arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h | 7 ++++++- arch/s390/mm/pageattr.c | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 7 ++++++- arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h +6 -1
@@ -180,13 +180,18 @@ static inline pmd_t set_pmd_bit(pmd_t pmd, pgprot_t prot)return pmd; } -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite_kernel (pte_t pte) { pte =set_pte_bit (pte,__pgprot (PTE_WRITE )); pte =clear_pte_bit (pte,__pgprot (PTE_RDONLY ));return pte; } +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +{ +return pte_mkwrite_kernel (pte); +} +static inline pte_t pte_mkclean (pte_t pte) { pte =clear_pte_bit (pte,__pgprot (PTE_DIRTY ));
arch/arm64/mm/trans_pgd.c +2 -2
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ static void _copy_pte(pte_t *dst_ptep, pte_t *src_ptep, unsigned long addr)* read only (code, rodata). Clear the RDONLY bit from * the temporary mappings we use during restore. */ -set_pte (dst_ptep,pte_mkwrite (pte)); +set_pte (dst_ptep,pte_mkwrite_kernel (pte)); }else if (debug_pagealloc_enabled () && !pte_none (pte)) {/* * debug_pagealloc will removed the PTE_VALID bit if
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static void _copy_pte(pte_t *dst_ptep, pte_t *src_ptep, unsigned long addr)*/ BUG_ON (!pfn_valid (pte_pfn (pte))); -set_pte (dst_ptep,pte_mkpresent (pte_mkwrite (pte))); +set_pte (dst_ptep,pte_mkpresent (pte_mkwrite_kernel (pte))); } }
arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h +6 -1
@@ -1005,7 +1005,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_wrprotect(pte_t pte)return set_pte_bit (pte,__pgprot (_PAGE_PROTECT)); } -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite_kernel (pte_t pte) { pte =set_pte_bit (pte,__pgprot (_PAGE_WRITE));if (pte_val (pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY)
@@ -1013,6 +1013,11 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite(pte_t pte)return pte; } +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +{ +return pte_mkwrite_kernel (pte); +} +static inline pte_t pte_mkclean (pte_t pte) { pte =clear_pte_bit (pte,__pgprot (_PAGE_DIRTY));
arch/s390/mm/pageattr.c +1 -1
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ static int walk_pte_level(pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long addr, unsigned long end,if (flags &SET_MEMORY_RO ) new =pte_wrprotect (new);else if (flags &SET_MEMORY_RW ) - new =pte_mkwrite (pte_mkdirty (new)); + new =pte_mkwrite_kernel (pte_mkdirty (new));if (flags &SET_MEMORY_NX ) new =set_pte_bit (new,__pgprot (_PAGE_NOEXEC));else if (flags &SET_MEMORY_X )
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +6 -1
@@ -364,11 +364,16 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkyoung(pte_t pte)return pte_set_flags (pte, _PAGE_ACCESSED); } -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite_kernel (pte_t pte) {return pte_set_flags (pte, _PAGE_RW); } +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +{ +return pte_mkwrite_kernel (pte); +} +static inline pte_t pte_mkhuge (pte_t pte) {return pte_set_flags (pte, _PAGE_PSE);
arch/x86/xen/mmu_pv.c +1 -1
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ void make_lowmem_page_readwrite(void *vaddr)if (pte ==NULL )return ;/* vaddr missing */ - ptev =pte_mkwrite (*pte); + ptev =pte_mkwrite_kernel (*pte);if (HYPERVISOR_update_va_mapping (address, ptev,0 ))BUG ();
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 12/40 s390/mm: Introduce pmd_mkwrite_kernel()
In reply to Rick EdgecombeThe x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function properly.
One of these changes is to allow for pmd_mkwrite() to create different types of writable memory (the existing conventionally writable type and also the new shadow stack type). Future patches will convert pmd_mkwrite() to take a VMA in order to facilitate this, however there are places in the kernel where pmd_mkwrite() is called outside of the context of a VMA. These are for kernel memory. So create a new variant called pmd_mkwrite_kernel() and switch the kernel users over to it. Have pmd_mkwrite() and pmd_mkwrite_kernel() be the same for now. Future patches will introduce changes to make pmd_mkwrite() take a VMA.
Only do this for architectures that need it because they call pmd_mkwrite() in arch code without an associated VMA. Since it will only currently be used in arch code, so do not include it in arch_pgtable_helpers.rst.
---
Hi Non-x86 Arch’s,
x86 has a feature that allows for the creation of a special type of writable memory (shadow stack) that is only writable in limited specific ways. Previously, changes were proposed to core MM code to teach it to decide when to create normally writable memory or the special shadow stack writable memory, but David Hildenbrand suggested[0] to change pXX_mkwrite() to take a VMA, so awareness of shadow stack memory can be moved into x86 code.
Since pXX_mkwrite() is defined in every arch, it requires some tree-wide changes. So that is why you are seeing some patches out of a big x86 series pop up in your arch mailing list. There is no functional change. After this refactor, the shadow stack series goes on to use the arch helpers to push shadow stack memory details inside arch/x86.
Testing was just 0-day build testing.
Hopefully that is enough context. Thanks!
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
v6:
- New patch
--- arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h | 7 ++++++- arch/s390/mm/pageattr.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h +6 -1
@@ -1491,7 +1491,7 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_wrprotect(pmd_t pmd)return set_pmd_bit (pmd,__pgprot (_SEGMENT_ENTRY_PROTECT)); } -static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd) +static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite_kernel (pmd_t pmd) { pmd =set_pmd_bit (pmd,__pgprot (_SEGMENT_ENTRY_WRITE));if (pmd_val (pmd) & _SEGMENT_ENTRY_DIRTY)
@@ -1499,6 +1499,11 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite(pmd_t pmd)return pmd; } +static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd) +{ +return pmd_mkwrite_kernel (pmd); +} +static inline pmd_t pmd_mkclean (pmd_t pmd) { pmd =clear_pmd_bit (pmd,__pgprot (_SEGMENT_ENTRY_DIRTY));
arch/s390/mm/pageattr.c +1 -1
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ static void modify_pmd_page(pmd_t *pmdp, unsigned long addr,if (flags &SET_MEMORY_RO ) new =pmd_wrprotect (new);else if (flags &SET_MEMORY_RW ) - new =pmd_mkwrite (pmd_mkdirty (new)); + new =pmd_mkwrite_kernel (pmd_mkdirty (new));if (flags &SET_MEMORY_NX ) new =set_pmd_bit (new,__pgprot (_SEGMENT_ENTRY_NOEXEC));else if (flags &SET_MEMORY_X )
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 13/40 mm: Make pte_mkwrite() take a VMA
In reply to Rick EdgecombeThe x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function properly.
One of these unusual properties is that shadow stack memory is writable, but only in limited ways. These limits are applied via a specific PTE bit combination. Nevertheless, the memory is writable, and core mm code will need to apply the writable permissions in the typical paths that call pte_mkwrite().
In addition to VM_WRITE, the shadow stack VMA's will have a flag denoting that they are special shadow stack flavor of writable memory. So make pte_mkwrite() take a VMA, so that the x86 implementation of it can know to create regular writable memory or shadow stack memory.
Apply the same changes for pmd_mkwrite() and huge_pte_mkwrite().
No functional change.
---
Hi Non-x86 Arch’s,
x86 has a feature that allows for the creation of a special type of writable memory (shadow stack) that is only writable in limited specific ways. Previously, changes were proposed to core MM code to teach it to decide when to create normally writable memory or the special shadow stack writable memory, but David Hildenbrand suggested[0] to change pXX_mkwrite() to take a VMA, so awareness of shadow stack memory can be moved into x86 code.
Since pXX_mkwrite() is defined in every arch, it requires some tree-wide changes. So that is why you are seeing some patches out of a big x86 series pop up in your arch mailing list. There is no functional change. After this refactor, the shadow stack series goes on to use the arch helpers to push shadow stack memory details inside arch/x86.
Testing was just 0-day build testing.
Hopefully that is enough context. Thanks!
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
v6:
- New patch
--- Documentation/mm/arch_pgtable_helpers.rst | 9 ++++++--- arch/alpha/include/asm/pgtable.h | 6 +++++- arch/arc/include/asm/hugepage.h | 2 +- arch/arc/include/asm/pgtable-bits-arcv2.h | 7 ++++++- arch/arm/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h | 7 ++++++- arch/arm/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +- arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 4 ++-- arch/csky/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +- arch/hexagon/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +- arch/ia64/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +- arch/loongarch/include/asm/pgtable.h | 4 ++-- arch/m68k/include/asm/mcf_pgtable.h | 2 +- arch/m68k/include/asm/motorola_pgtable.h | 6 +++++- arch/m68k/include/asm/sun3_pgtable.h | 6 +++++- arch/microblaze/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +- arch/mips/include/asm/pgtable.h | 6 +++--- arch/nios2/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +- arch/openrisc/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +- arch/parisc/include/asm/pgtable.h | 6 +++++- arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/32/pgtable.h | 2 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h | 4 ++-- arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/32/pgtable.h | 2 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/32/pte-8xx.h | 2 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/64/pgtable.h | 2 +- arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h | 6 +++--- arch/s390/include/asm/hugetlb.h | 4 ++-- arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h | 4 ++-- arch/sh/include/asm/pgtable_32.h | 10 ++++++++-- arch/sparc/include/asm/pgtable_32.h | 2 +- arch/sparc/include/asm/pgtable_64.h | 6 +++--- arch/um/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 6 ++++-- arch/xtensa/include/asm/pgtable.h | 2 +- include/asm-generic/hugetlb.h | 4 ++-- include/linux/mm.h | 2 +- mm/debug_vm_pgtable.c | 16 ++++++++-------- mm/huge_memory.c | 6 +++--- mm/hugetlb.c | 4 ++-- mm/memory.c | 4 ++-- mm/migrate_device.c | 2 +- mm/mprotect.c | 2 +- mm/userfaultfd.c | 2 +- 42 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
Documentation/mm/arch_pgtable_helpers.rst +6 -3
@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ PTE Page Table Helpers +---------------------------+--------------------------------------------------+ | pte_mkclean | Creates a clean PTE | +---------------------------+--------------------------------------------------+ -| pte_mkwrite | Creates a writable PTE | +| pte_mkwrite | Creates a writable PTE of the type specified by | +| | the VMA. | +---------------------------+--------------------------------------------------+ | pte_wrprotect | Creates a write protected PTE | +---------------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
@@ -118,7 +119,8 @@ PMD Page Table Helpers +---------------------------+--------------------------------------------------+ | pmd_mkclean | Creates a clean PMD | +---------------------------+--------------------------------------------------+ -| pmd_mkwrite | Creates a writable PMD | +| pmd_mkwrite | Creates a writable PMD of the type specified by | +| | the VMA. | +---------------------------+--------------------------------------------------+ | pmd_wrprotect | Creates a write protected PMD | +---------------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
@@ -222,7 +224,8 @@ HugeTLB Page Table Helpers +---------------------------+--------------------------------------------------+ | huge_pte_mkdirty | Creates a dirty HugeTLB | +---------------------------+--------------------------------------------------+ -| huge_pte_mkwrite | Creates a writable HugeTLB | +| huge_pte_mkwrite | Creates a writable HugeTLB of the type specified | +| | by the VMA. | +---------------------------+--------------------------------------------------+ | huge_pte_wrprotect | Creates a write protected HugeTLB | +---------------------------+--------------------------------------------------+
arch/alpha/include/asm/pgtable.h +5 -1
@@ -256,9 +256,13 @@ extern inline int pte_young(pte_t pte) { return pte_val(pte) & _PAGE_ACCESSED;extern inline pte_t pte_wrprotect (pte_t pte) {pte_val (pte) |= _PAGE_FOW;return pte; }extern inline pte_t pte_mkclean (pte_t pte) {pte_val (pte) &= ~(__DIRTY_BITS);return pte; }extern inline pte_t pte_mkold (pte_t pte) {pte_val (pte) &= ~(__ACCESS_BITS);return pte; } -extern inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) {pte_val (pte) &= ~_PAGE_FOW;return pte; }extern inline pte_t pte_mkdirty (pte_t pte) {pte_val (pte) |= __DIRTY_BITS;return pte; }extern inline pte_t pte_mkyoung (pte_t pte) {pte_val (pte) |= __ACCESS_BITS;return pte; } +extern inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +pte_val (pte) &= ~_PAGE_FOW; +return pte; +}/* * The smp_rmb() in the following functions are required to order the load of
arch/arc/include/asm/hugepage.h +1 -1
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ static inline pmd_t pte_pmd(pte_t pte) }#define pmd_wrprotect (pmd) pte_pmd(pte_wrprotect(pmd_pte(pmd))) -#define pmd_mkwrite (pmd) pte_pmd(pte_mkwrite(pmd_pte(pmd))) +#define pmd_mkwrite (pmd, vma) pte_pmd(pte_mkwrite(pmd_pte(pmd), (vma)))#define pmd_mkdirty (pmd) pte_pmd(pte_mkdirty(pmd_pte(pmd)))#define pmd_mkold (pmd) pte_pmd(pte_mkold(pmd_pte(pmd)))#define pmd_mkyoung (pmd) pte_pmd(pte_mkyoung(pmd_pte(pmd)))
arch/arc/include/asm/pgtable-bits-arcv2.h +6 -1
@@ -87,7 +87,6 @@ PTE_BIT_FUNC(mknotpresent, &= ~(_PAGE_PRESENT)); PTE_BIT_FUNC(wrprotect, &= ~(_PAGE_WRITE)); -PTE_BIT_FUNC(mkwrite, |= (_PAGE_WRITE)); PTE_BIT_FUNC(mkclean, &= ~(_PAGE_DIRTY)); PTE_BIT_FUNC(mkdirty, |= (_PAGE_DIRTY)); PTE_BIT_FUNC(mkold, &= ~(_PAGE_ACCESSED));
@@ -95,6 +94,12 @@ PTE_BIT_FUNC(mkyoung, |= (_PAGE_ACCESSED)); PTE_BIT_FUNC(mkspecial, |= (_PAGE_SPECIAL)); PTE_BIT_FUNC(mkhuge, |= (_PAGE_HW_SZ)); +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +pte_val (pte) |= (_PAGE_WRITE); +return pte; +} +static inline pte_t pte_modify (pte_t pte,pgprot_t newprot) {return __pte ((pte_val (pte) & _PAGE_CHG_MASK) |pgprot_val (newprot));
arch/arm/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h +6 -1
@@ -202,11 +202,16 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_##fn(pmd_t pmd) { pmd_val(pmd) op; return pmd; } PMD_BIT_FUNC(wrprotect, |= L_PMD_SECT_RDONLY); PMD_BIT_FUNC(mkold, &= ~PMD_SECT_AF); -PMD_BIT_FUNC(mkwrite, &= ~L_PMD_SECT_RDONLY); PMD_BIT_FUNC(mkdirty, |= L_PMD_SECT_DIRTY); PMD_BIT_FUNC(mkclean, &= ~L_PMD_SECT_DIRTY); PMD_BIT_FUNC(mkyoung, |= PMD_SECT_AF); +static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd,struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +pmd_val (pmd) |=L_PMD_SECT_RDONLY ; +return pmd; +} +#define pmd_mkhuge (pmd) (__pmd(pmd_val(pmd) & ~PMD_TABLE_BIT))#define pmd_pfn (pmd) (((pmd_val(pmd) & PMD_MASK) & PHYS_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT)
arch/arm/include/asm/pgtable.h +1 -1
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_wrprotect(pte_t pte)return set_pte_bit (pte,__pgprot (L_PTE_RDONLY )); } -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {return clear_pte_bit (pte,__pgprot (L_PTE_RDONLY )); }
arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable.h +2 -2
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite_kernel(pte_t pte)return pte; } -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {return pte_mkwrite_kernel (pte); }
@@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ static inline int pmd_trans_huge(pmd_t pmd)#define pmd_cont (pmd) pte_cont(pmd_pte(pmd))#define pmd_wrprotect (pmd) pte_pmd(pte_wrprotect(pmd_pte(pmd)))#define pmd_mkold (pmd) pte_pmd(pte_mkold(pmd_pte(pmd))) -#define pmd_mkwrite (pmd) pte_pmd(pte_mkwrite(pmd_pte(pmd))) +#define pmd_mkwrite (pmd, vma) pte_pmd(pte_mkwrite(pmd_pte(pmd), (vma)))#define pmd_mkclean (pmd) pte_pmd(pte_mkclean(pmd_pte(pmd)))#define pmd_mkdirty (pmd) pte_pmd(pte_mkdirty(pmd_pte(pmd)))#define pmd_mkyoung (pmd) pte_pmd(pte_mkyoung(pmd_pte(pmd)))
arch/csky/include/asm/pgtable.h +1 -1
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkold(pte_t pte)return pte; } -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {pte_val (pte) |= _PAGE_WRITE;if (pte_val (pte) & _PAGE_MODIFIED)
arch/hexagon/include/asm/pgtable.h +1 -1
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_wrprotect(pte_t pte) }/* pte_mkwrite - mark page as writable */ -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {pte_val (pte) |= _PAGE_WRITE;return pte;
arch/ia64/include/asm/pgtable.h +1 -1
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ ia64_phys_addr_valid (unsigned long addr)* access rights: */ #define pte_wrprotect (pte) (__pte(pte_val(pte) & ~_PAGE_AR_RW)) -#define pte_mkwrite (pte) (__pte(pte_val(pte) | _PAGE_AR_RW)) +#define pte_mkwrite (pte, vma) (__pte(pte_val(pte) | _PAGE_AR_RW))#define pte_mkold (pte) (__pte(pte_val(pte) & ~_PAGE_A))#define pte_mkyoung (pte) (__pte(pte_val(pte) | _PAGE_A))#define pte_mkclean (pte) (__pte(pte_val(pte) & ~_PAGE_D))
arch/loongarch/include/asm/pgtable.h +2 -2
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkdirty(pte_t pte)return pte; } -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {pte_val (pte) |= _PAGE_WRITE;if (pte_val (pte) & _PAGE_MODIFIED)
@@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ static inline int pmd_write(pmd_t pmd)return !!(pmd_val (pmd) & _PAGE_WRITE); } -static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd) +static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {pmd_val (pmd) |= _PAGE_WRITE;if (pmd_val (pmd) & _PAGE_MODIFIED)
arch/m68k/include/asm/mcf_pgtable.h +1 -1
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkold(pte_t pte)return pte; } -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {pte_val (pte) |=CF_PAGE_WRITABLE ;return pte;
arch/m68k/include/asm/motorola_pgtable.h +5 -1
@@ -155,7 +155,6 @@ static inline int pte_young(pte_t pte) { return pte_val(pte) & _PAGE_ACCESSED;static inline pte_t pte_wrprotect (pte_t pte) {pte_val (pte) |= _PAGE_RONLY;return pte; }static inline pte_t pte_mkclean (pte_t pte) {pte_val (pte) &= ~_PAGE_DIRTY;return pte; }static inline pte_t pte_mkold (pte_t pte) {pte_val (pte) &= ~_PAGE_ACCESSED;return pte; } -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) {pte_val (pte) &= ~_PAGE_RONLY;return pte; }static inline pte_t pte_mkdirty (pte_t pte) {pte_val (pte) |= _PAGE_DIRTY;return pte; }static inline pte_t pte_mkyoung (pte_t pte) {pte_val (pte) |= _PAGE_ACCESSED;return pte; }static inline pte_t pte_mknocache (pte_t pte)
@@ -168,6 +167,11 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkcache(pte_t pte)pte_val (pte) = (pte_val (pte) & _CACHEMASK040) | m68k_supervisor_cachemode;return pte; } +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +pte_val (pte) &= ~_PAGE_RONLY; +return pte; +}#define swapper_pg_dir kernel_pg_dirextern pgd_t kernel_pg_dir[128 ];
arch/m68k/include/asm/sun3_pgtable.h +5 -1
@@ -143,10 +143,14 @@ static inline int pte_young(pte_t pte) { return pte_val(pte) & SUN3_PAGE_ACCESSstatic inline pte_t pte_wrprotect (pte_t pte) {pte_val (pte) &= ~SUN3_PAGE_WRITEABLE ;return pte; }static inline pte_t pte_mkclean (pte_t pte) {pte_val (pte) &= ~SUN3_PAGE_MODIFIED ;return pte; }static inline pte_t pte_mkold (pte_t pte) {pte_val (pte) &= ~SUN3_PAGE_ACCESSED ;return pte; } -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) {pte_val (pte) |=SUN3_PAGE_WRITEABLE ;return pte; }static inline pte_t pte_mkdirty (pte_t pte) {pte_val (pte) |=SUN3_PAGE_MODIFIED ;return pte; }static inline pte_t pte_mkyoung (pte_t pte) {pte_val (pte) |=SUN3_PAGE_ACCESSED ;return pte; }static inline pte_t pte_mknocache (pte_t pte) {pte_val (pte) |=SUN3_PAGE_NOCACHE ;return pte; } +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +pte_val (pte) |=SUN3_PAGE_WRITEABLE ; +return pte; +}// use this version when caches work... //static inline pte_t pte_mkcache(pte_t pte) { pte_val(pte) &= SUN3_PAGE_NOCACHE; return pte; } // until then, use:
arch/microblaze/include/asm/pgtable.h +1 -1
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkread(pte_t pte) \ {pte_val (pte) |= _PAGE_USER;return pte; }static inline pte_t pte_mkexec (pte_t pte) \ {pte_val (pte) |= _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_EXEC;return pte; } -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) \ +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) \ {pte_val (pte) |= _PAGE_RW;return pte; }static inline pte_t pte_mkdirty (pte_t pte) \ {pte_val (pte) |= _PAGE_DIRTY;return pte; }
arch/mips/include/asm/pgtable.h +3 -3
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkold(pte_t pte)return pte; } -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) { pte.pte_low |= _PAGE_WRITE;if (pte.pte_low & _PAGE_MODIFIED) {
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkold(pte_t pte)return pte; } -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {pte_val (pte) |= _PAGE_WRITE;if (pte_val (pte) & _PAGE_MODIFIED)
@@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_wrprotect(pmd_t pmd)return pmd; } -static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd) +static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {pmd_val (pmd) |= _PAGE_WRITE;if (pmd_val (pmd) & _PAGE_MODIFIED)
arch/nios2/include/asm/pgtable.h +1 -1
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkold(pte_t pte)return pte; } -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {pte_val (pte) |= _PAGE_WRITE;return pte;
arch/openrisc/include/asm/pgtable.h +1 -1
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkold(pte_t pte)return pte; } -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {pte_val (pte) |= _PAGE_WRITE;return pte;
arch/parisc/include/asm/pgtable.h +5 -1
@@ -331,8 +331,12 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkold(pte_t pte) { pte_val(pte) &= ~_PAGE_ACCESSED; retustatic inline pte_t pte_wrprotect (pte_t pte) {pte_val (pte) &= ~_PAGE_WRITE;return pte; }static inline pte_t pte_mkdirty (pte_t pte) {pte_val (pte) |= _PAGE_DIRTY;return pte; }static inline pte_t pte_mkyoung (pte_t pte) {pte_val (pte) |= _PAGE_ACCESSED;return pte; } -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) {pte_val (pte) |= _PAGE_WRITE;return pte; }static inline pte_t pte_mkspecial (pte_t pte) {pte_val (pte) |= _PAGE_SPECIAL;return pte; } +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +pte_val (pte) |= _PAGE_WRITE; +return pte; +}/* * Huge pte definitions.
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/32/pgtable.h +1 -1
@@ -498,7 +498,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkpte(pte_t pte)return pte; } -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {return __pte (pte_val (pte) | _PAGE_RW); }
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h +2 -2
@@ -600,7 +600,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkexec(pte_t pte)return __pte_raw (pte_raw (pte) |cpu_to_be64 (_PAGE_EXEC)); } -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {/* * write implies read, hence set both
@@ -1071,7 +1071,7 @@ static inline pte_t *pmdp_ptep(pmd_t *pmd)#define pmd_mkdirty (pmd) pte_pmd(pte_mkdirty(pmd_pte(pmd)))#define pmd_mkclean (pmd) pte_pmd(pte_mkclean(pmd_pte(pmd)))#define pmd_mkyoung (pmd) pte_pmd(pte_mkyoung(pmd_pte(pmd))) -#define pmd_mkwrite (pmd) pte_pmd(pte_mkwrite(pmd_pte(pmd))) +#define pmd_mkwrite (pmd, vma) pte_pmd(pte_mkwrite(pmd_pte(pmd), (vma)))#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY #define pmd_soft_dirty (pmd) pte_soft_dirty(pmd_pte(pmd))
arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/32/pgtable.h +1 -1
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ void unmap_kernel_page(unsigned long va); do { pte_update(mm, addr, ptep, ~0, 0, 0); } while (0)#ifndef pte_mkwrite -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {return __pte (pte_val (pte) | _PAGE_RW); }
arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/32/pte-8xx.h +1 -1
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static inline int pte_write(pte_t pte)#define pte_write pte_write -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {return __pte (pte_val (pte) & ~_PAGE_RO); }
arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/64/pgtable.h +1 -1
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__/* pte_clear moved to later in this file */ -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {return __pte (pte_val (pte) | _PAGE_RW); }
arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h +3 -3
@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_wrprotect(pte_t pte)/* static inline pte_t pte_mkread(pte_t pte) */ -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {return __pte (pte_val (pte) | _PAGE_WRITE); }
@@ -624,9 +624,9 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkyoung(pmd_t pmd)return pte_pmd (pte_mkyoung (pmd_pte (pmd))); } -static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd) +static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd,struct vm_area_struct *vma) { -return pte_pmd (pte_mkwrite (pmd_pte (pmd))); +return pte_pmd (pte_mkwrite (pmd_pte (pmd), vma)); }static inline pmd_t pmd_wrprotect (pmd_t pmd)
arch/s390/include/asm/hugetlb.h +2 -2
@@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ static inline int huge_pte_dirty(pte_t pte)return pte_dirty (pte); } -static inline pte_t huge_pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +static inline pte_t huge_pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) { -return pte_mkwrite (pte); +return pte_mkwrite (pte, vma); }static inline pte_t huge_pte_mkdirty (pte_t pte)
arch/s390/include/asm/pgtable.h +2 -2
@@ -1013,7 +1013,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite_kernel(pte_t pte)return pte; } -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {return pte_mkwrite_kernel (pte); }
@@ -1499,7 +1499,7 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite_kernel(pmd_t pmd)return pmd; } -static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd) +static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {return pmd_mkwrite_kernel (pmd); }
arch/sh/include/asm/pgtable_32.h +8 -2
@@ -351,6 +351,12 @@ static inline void set_pte(pte_t *ptep, pte_t pte)#define PTE_BIT_FUNC (h,fn,op) \ static inline pte_t pte_##fn(pte_t pte) { pte.pte_##h op; return pte; } +#define PTE_BIT_FUNC_VMA (h,fn,op) \ +static inline pte_t pte_##fn(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma) \ +{ \ + pte.pte_##h op; \ + return pte; \ +}#ifdef CONFIG_X2TLB /*
@@ -359,11 +365,11 @@ static inline pte_t pte_##fn(pte_t pte) { pte.pte_##h op; return pte; }* kernel permissions), we attempt to couple them a bit more sanely here. */ PTE_BIT_FUNC(high, wrprotect, &= ~(_PAGE_EXT_USER_WRITE | _PAGE_EXT_KERN_WRITE)); -PTE_BIT_FUNC(high, mkwrite, |= _PAGE_EXT_USER_WRITE | _PAGE_EXT_KERN_WRITE); +PTE_BIT_FUNC_VMA(high, mkwrite, |= _PAGE_EXT_USER_WRITE | _PAGE_EXT_KERN_WRITE); PTE_BIT_FUNC(high, mkhuge, |= _PAGE_SZHUGE);#else PTE_BIT_FUNC(low, wrprotect, &= ~_PAGE_RW); -PTE_BIT_FUNC(low, mkwrite, |= _PAGE_RW); +PTE_BIT_FUNC_VMA(low, mkwrite, |= _PAGE_RW); PTE_BIT_FUNC(low, mkhuge, |= _PAGE_SZHUGE);#endif
arch/sparc/include/asm/pgtable_32.h +1 -1
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkold(pte_t pte)return __pte (pte_val (pte) & ~SRMMU_REF ); } -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {return __pte (pte_val (pte) |SRMMU_WRITE ); }
arch/sparc/include/asm/pgtable_64.h +3 -3
@@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkclean(pte_t pte)return __pte (val); } -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {unsigned long val =pte_val (pte), mask;
@@ -756,11 +756,11 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkyoung(pmd_t pmd)return __pmd (pte_val (pte)); } -static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd) +static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {pte_t pte =__pte (pmd_val (pmd)); - pte =pte_mkwrite (pte); + pte =pte_mkwrite (pte, vma);return __pmd (pte_val (pte)); }
arch/um/include/asm/pgtable.h +1 -1
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkyoung(pte_t pte)return (pte); } -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {if (unlikely (pte_get_bits (pte, _PAGE_RW)))return pte;
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +4 -2
@@ -369,7 +369,9 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite_kernel(pte_t pte)return pte_set_flags (pte, _PAGE_RW); } -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +struct vm_area_struct ; + +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {return pte_mkwrite_kernel (pte); }
@@ -470,7 +472,7 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkyoung(pmd_t pmd)return pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_ACCESSED); } -static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd) +static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {return pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_RW); }
arch/xtensa/include/asm/pgtable.h +1 -1
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkdirty(pte_t pte) {pte_val (pte) |= _PAGE_DIRTY;return pte; }static inline pte_t pte_mkyoung (pte_t pte) {pte_val (pte) |= _PAGE_ACCESSED;return pte; } -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {pte_val (pte) |= _PAGE_WRITABLE;return pte; }#define pgprot_noncached (prot) \
include/asm-generic/hugetlb.h +2 -2
@@ -20,9 +20,9 @@ static inline unsigned long huge_pte_dirty(pte_t pte)return pte_dirty (pte); } -static inline pte_t huge_pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte) +static inline pte_t huge_pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) { -return pte_mkwrite (pte); +return pte_mkwrite (pte, vma); }#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_PTE_WRPROTECT
include/linux/mm.h +1 -1
@@ -1163,7 +1163,7 @@ void free_compound_page(struct page *page);static inline pte_t maybe_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {if (likely (vma->vm_flags &VM_WRITE )) - pte =pte_mkwrite (pte); + pte =pte_mkwrite (pte, vma);return pte; }
mm/debug_vm_pgtable.c +8 -8
@@ -109,10 +109,10 @@ static void __init pte_basic_tests(struct pgtable_debug_args *args, int idx)WARN_ON (!pte_same (pte, pte));WARN_ON (!pte_young (pte_mkyoung (pte_mkold (pte))));WARN_ON (!pte_dirty (pte_mkdirty (pte_mkclean (pte)))); -WARN_ON (!pte_write (pte_mkwrite (pte_wrprotect (pte)))); +WARN_ON (!pte_write (pte_mkwrite (pte_wrprotect (pte), args->vma)));WARN_ON (pte_young (pte_mkold (pte_mkyoung (pte))));WARN_ON (pte_dirty (pte_mkclean (pte_mkdirty (pte)))); -WARN_ON (pte_write (pte_wrprotect (pte_mkwrite (pte)))); +WARN_ON (pte_write (pte_wrprotect (pte_mkwrite (pte, args->vma))));WARN_ON (pte_dirty (pte_wrprotect (pte_mkclean (pte))));WARN_ON (!pte_dirty (pte_wrprotect (pte_mkdirty (pte)))); }
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ static void __init pte_advanced_tests(struct pgtable_debug_args *args) pte =pte_mkclean (pte);set_pte_at (args->mm, args->vaddr, args->ptep, pte);flush_dcache_page (page); - pte =pte_mkwrite (pte); + pte =pte_mkwrite (pte, args->vma); pte =pte_mkdirty (pte);ptep_set_access_flags (args->vma, args->vaddr, args->ptep, pte,1 ); pte =ptep_get (args->ptep);
@@ -199,10 +199,10 @@ static void __init pmd_basic_tests(struct pgtable_debug_args *args, int idx)WARN_ON (!pmd_same (pmd, pmd));WARN_ON (!pmd_young (pmd_mkyoung (pmd_mkold (pmd))));WARN_ON (!pmd_dirty (pmd_mkdirty (pmd_mkclean (pmd)))); -WARN_ON (!pmd_write (pmd_mkwrite (pmd_wrprotect (pmd)))); +WARN_ON (!pmd_write (pmd_mkwrite (pmd_wrprotect (pmd), args->vma)));WARN_ON (pmd_young (pmd_mkold (pmd_mkyoung (pmd))));WARN_ON (pmd_dirty (pmd_mkclean (pmd_mkdirty (pmd)))); -WARN_ON (pmd_write (pmd_wrprotect (pmd_mkwrite (pmd)))); +WARN_ON (pmd_write (pmd_wrprotect (pmd_mkwrite (pmd, args->vma))));WARN_ON (pmd_dirty (pmd_wrprotect (pmd_mkclean (pmd))));WARN_ON (!pmd_dirty (pmd_wrprotect (pmd_mkdirty (pmd))));/*
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ static void __init pmd_advanced_tests(struct pgtable_debug_args *args) pmd =pmd_mkclean (pmd);set_pmd_at (args->mm, vaddr, args->pmdp, pmd);flush_dcache_page (page); - pmd =pmd_mkwrite (pmd); + pmd =pmd_mkwrite (pmd, args->vma); pmd =pmd_mkdirty (pmd);pmdp_set_access_flags (args->vma, vaddr, args->pmdp, pmd,1 ); pmd =READ_ONCE (*args->pmdp);
@@ -928,8 +928,8 @@ static void __init hugetlb_basic_tests(struct pgtable_debug_args *args) pte =mk_huge_pte (page, args->page_prot);WARN_ON (!huge_pte_dirty (huge_pte_mkdirty (pte))); -WARN_ON (!huge_pte_write (huge_pte_mkwrite (huge_pte_wrprotect (pte)))); -WARN_ON (huge_pte_write (huge_pte_wrprotect (huge_pte_mkwrite (pte)))); +WARN_ON (!huge_pte_write (huge_pte_mkwrite (huge_pte_wrprotect (pte), args->vma))); +WARN_ON (huge_pte_write (huge_pte_wrprotect (huge_pte_mkwrite (pte, args->vma))));#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_GENERAL_HUGETLB pte =pfn_pte (args->fixed_pmd_pfn, args->page_prot);
mm/huge_memory.c +3 -3
@@ -555,7 +555,7 @@ __setup("transparent_hugepage=", setup_transparent_hugepage);pmd_t maybe_pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd,struct vm_area_struct *vma) {if (likely (vma->vm_flags &VM_WRITE )) - pmd =pmd_mkwrite (pmd); + pmd =pmd_mkwrite (pmd, vma);return pmd; }
@@ -1580,7 +1580,7 @@ vm_fault_t do_huge_pmd_numa_page(struct vm_fault *vmf) pmd =pmd_modify (oldpmd, vma->vm_page_prot); pmd =pmd_mkyoung (pmd);if (writable) - pmd =pmd_mkwrite (pmd); + pmd =pmd_mkwrite (pmd, vma);set_pmd_at (vma->vm_mm, haddr, vmf->pmd, pmd);update_mmu_cache_pmd (vma, vmf->address, vmf->pmd);spin_unlock (vmf->ptl);
@@ -1926,7 +1926,7 @@ int change_huge_pmd(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *vma,/* See change_pte_range(). */ if ((cp_flags &MM_CP_TRY_CHANGE_WRITABLE ) && !pmd_write (entry) &&can_change_pmd_writable (vma, addr, entry)) - entry =pmd_mkwrite (entry); + entry =pmd_mkwrite (entry, vma); ret =HPAGE_PMD_NR ;set_pmd_at (mm, addr, pmd, entry);
mm/hugetlb.c +2 -2
@@ -4900,7 +4900,7 @@ static pte_t make_huge_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct page *page,if (writable) { entry =huge_pte_mkwrite (huge_pte_mkdirty (mk_huge_pte (page, - vma->vm_page_prot))); + vma->vm_page_prot)), vma); }else { entry =huge_pte_wrprotect (mk_huge_pte (page, vma->vm_page_prot));
@@ -4916,7 +4916,7 @@ static void set_huge_ptep_writable(struct vm_area_struct *vma, {pte_t entry; - entry =huge_pte_mkwrite (huge_pte_mkdirty (huge_ptep_get (ptep))); + entry =huge_pte_mkwrite (huge_pte_mkdirty (huge_ptep_get (ptep)), vma);if (huge_ptep_set_access_flags (vma, address, ptep, entry,1 ))update_mmu_cache (vma, address, ptep); }
mm/memory.c +2 -2
@@ -4067,7 +4067,7 @@ static vm_fault_t do_anonymous_page(struct vm_fault *vmf) entry =mk_pte (&folio->page, vma->vm_page_prot); entry =pte_sw_mkyoung (entry);if (vma->vm_flags &VM_WRITE ) - entry =pte_mkwrite (pte_mkdirty (entry)); + entry =pte_mkwrite (pte_mkdirty (entry), vma); vmf->pte =pte_offset_map_lock (vma->vm_mm, vmf->pmd, vmf->address, &vmf->ptl);
@@ -4755,7 +4755,7 @@ static vm_fault_t do_numa_page(struct vm_fault *vmf) pte =pte_modify (old_pte, vma->vm_page_prot); pte =pte_mkyoung (pte);if (writable) - pte =pte_mkwrite (pte); + pte =pte_mkwrite (pte, vma);ptep_modify_prot_commit (vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte, old_pte, pte);update_mmu_cache (vma, vmf->address, vmf->pte);pte_unmap_unlock (vmf->pte, vmf->ptl);
mm/migrate_device.c +1 -1
@@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ static void migrate_vma_insert_page(struct migrate_vma *migrate, } entry =mk_pte (page, vma->vm_page_prot);if (vma->vm_flags &VM_WRITE ) - entry =pte_mkwrite (pte_mkdirty (entry)); + entry =pte_mkwrite (pte_mkdirty (entry), vma); } ptep =pte_offset_map_lock (mm, pmdp, addr, &ptl);
mm/mprotect.c +1 -1
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ static long change_pte_range(struct mmu_gather *tlb,if ((cp_flags &MM_CP_TRY_CHANGE_WRITABLE ) && !pte_write (ptent) &&can_change_pte_writable (vma, addr, ptent)) - ptent =pte_mkwrite (ptent); + ptent =pte_mkwrite (ptent, vma);ptep_modify_prot_commit (vma, addr, pte, oldpte, ptent);if (pte_needs_flush (oldpte, ptent))
mm/userfaultfd.c +1 -1
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ int mfill_atomic_install_pte(struct mm_struct *dst_mm, pmd_t *dst_pmd,if (page_in_cache && !vm_shared) writable = false;if (writable) - _dst_pte =pte_mkwrite (_dst_pte); + _dst_pte =pte_mkwrite (_dst_pte, dst_vma);if (wp_copy) _dst_pte =pte_mkuffd_wp (_dst_pte);
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 14/40 x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY
In reply to Rick EdgecombeSome OSes have a greater dependence on software available bits in PTEs than Linux. That left the hardware architects looking for a way to represent a new memory type (shadow stack) within the existing bits. They chose to repurpose a lightly-used state: Write=0,Dirty=1. So in order to support shadow stack memory, Linux should avoid creating memory with this PTE bit combination unless it intends for it to be shadow stack.
The reason it's lightly used is that Dirty=1 is normally set by HW _before_ a write. A write with a Write=0 PTE would typically only generate a fault, not set Dirty=1. Hardware can (rarely) both set Dirty=1 *and* generate the fault, resulting in a Write=0,Dirty=1 PTE. Hardware which supports shadow stacks will no longer exhibit this oddity.
So that leaves Write=0,Dirty=1 PTEs created in software. To avoid inadvertently created shadow stack memory, in places where Linux normally creates Write=0,Dirty=1, it can use the software-defined _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY in place of the hardware _PAGE_DIRTY. In other words, whenever Linux needs to create Write=0,Dirty=1, it instead creates Write=0,SavedDirty=1 except for shadow stack, which is Write=0,Dirty=1.
There are six bits left available to software in the 64-bit PTE after consuming a bit for _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY. No space is consumed in 32-bit kernels because shadow stacks are not enabled there.
Implement only the infrastructure for _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY. Changes to actually begin creating _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY PTEs will follow once other pieces are in place.
---
v8:
- Remove trailing whitespace (dhansen, Boris)
v7:
- Use lightly edited comment verbiage from (David Hildenbrand)
- Update commit log to reduce verbosity (David Hildenbrand)
v6:
- Rename _PAGE_COW to _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY (David Hildenbrand)
- Add _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY to _PAGE_CHG_MASK
v5:
- Fix log, comments and whitespace (Boris)
- Remove capitalization on shadow stack (Boris)
--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 50 +++++++++++++++--- arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 3 +- 3 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +79 -0
@@ -301,6 +301,45 @@ static inline pte_t pte_clear_flags(pte_t pte, pteval_t clear)return native_make_pte (v & ~clear); } +/* +* Write protection operations can result in Dirty=1,Write=0 PTEs. But in the +* case of X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK, the software SavedDirty bit is used, since +* the Dirty=1,Write=0 will result in the memory being treated as shadow stack +* by the HW. So when creating dirty, write-protected memory, a software bit is +* used _PAGE_BIT_SAVED_DIRTY. The following functions pte_mksaveddirty() and +* pte_clear_saveddirty() take a conventional dirty, write-protected PTE +* (Write=0,Dirty=1) and transition it to the shadow stack compatible +* version. (Write=0,SavedDirty=1). +*/ +static inline pte_t pte_mksaveddirty (pte_t pte) +{ +if (!cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK )) +return pte; + + pte =pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY); +return pte_set_flags (pte, _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY); +} + +static inline pte_t pte_clear_saveddirty (pte_t pte) +{ +/* +* _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY is unnecessary on !X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK kernels, +* since the HW dirty bit can be used without creating shadow stack +* memory. See the _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY definition for more details. +*/ +if (!cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK )) +return pte; + +/* +* PTE is getting copied-on-write, so it will be dirtied +* if writable, or made shadow stack if shadow stack and +* being copied on access. Set the dirty bit for both +* cases. +*/ + pte =pte_set_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY); +return pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY); +} +static inline pte_t pte_wrprotect (pte_t pte) {return pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_RW);
@@ -420,6 +459,26 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_clear_flags(pmd_t pmd, pmdval_t clear)return native_make_pmd (v & ~clear); } +/* See comments above pte_mksaveddirty() */ +static inline pmd_t pmd_mksaveddirty (pmd_t pmd) +{ +if (!cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK )) +return pmd; + + pmd =pmd_clear_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY); +return pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY); +} + +/* See comments above pte_mksaveddirty() */ +static inline pmd_t pmd_clear_saveddirty (pmd_t pmd) +{ +if (!cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK )) +return pmd; + + pmd =pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY); +return pmd_clear_flags (pmd, _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY); +} +static inline pmd_t pmd_wrprotect (pmd_t pmd) {return pmd_clear_flags (pmd, _PAGE_RW);
@@ -491,6 +550,26 @@ static inline pud_t pud_clear_flags(pud_t pud, pudval_t clear)return native_make_pud (v & ~clear); } +/* See comments above pte_mksaveddirty() */ +static inline pud_t pud_mksaveddirty (pud_t pud) +{ +if (!cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK )) +return pud; + + pud =pud_clear_flags (pud, _PAGE_DIRTY); +return pud_set_flags (pud, _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY); +} + +/* See comments above pte_mksaveddirty() */ +static inline pud_t pud_clear_saveddirty (pud_t pud) +{ +if (!cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK )) +return pud; + + pud =pud_set_flags (pud, _PAGE_DIRTY); +return pud_clear_flags (pud, _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY); +} +static inline pud_t pud_mkold (pud_t pud) {return pud_clear_flags (pud, _PAGE_ACCESSED);
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h +42 -8
82 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h +2 -1
@@ -273,7 +273,8 @@ static inline bool pte_flags_need_flush(unsigned long oldflags,const pteval_t flush_on_clear = _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED;const pteval_t software_flags = _PAGE_SOFTW1 | _PAGE_SOFTW2 | - _PAGE_SOFTW3 | _PAGE_SOFTW4; + _PAGE_SOFTW3 | _PAGE_SOFTW4 | + _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY;const pteval_t flush_on_change = _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER | _PAGE_PWT | _PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PSE | _PAGE_GLOBAL | _PAGE_PAT | _PAGE_PAT_LARGE | _PAGE_PKEY_BIT0 | _PAGE_PKEY_BIT1 |
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 15/40 x86/mm: Update ptep/pmdp_set_wrprotect() for _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY
In reply to Rick EdgecombeWhen shadow stack is in use, Write=0,Dirty=1 PTE are preserved for shadow stack. Copy-on-write PTEs then have Write=0,SavedDirty=1.
When a PTE goes from Write=1,Dirty=1 to Write=0,SavedDirty=1, it could become a transient shadow stack PTE in two cases:
1. Some processors can start a write but end up seeing a Write=0 PTE by the time they get to the Dirty bit, creating a transient shadow stack PTE. However, this will not occur on processors supporting shadow stack, and a TLB flush is not necessary.
2. When _PAGE_DIRTY is replaced with _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY non-atomically, a transient shadow stack PTE can be created as a result. Thus, prevent that with cmpxchg.
In the case of pmdp_set_wrprotect(), for nopmd configs the ->pmd operated on does not exist and the logic would need to be different. Although the extra functionality will normally be optimized out when user shadow stacks are not configured, also exclude it in the preprocessor stage so that it will still compile. User shadow stack is not supported there by Linux anyway. Leave the cpu_feature_enabled() check so that the functionality also gets disabled based on runtime detection of the feature.
Similarly, compile it out in ptep_set_wrprotect() due to a clang warning on i386. Like above, the code path should get optimized out on i386 since shadow stack is not supported on 32 bit kernels, but this makes the compiler happy.
Dave Hansen, Jann Horn, Andy Lutomirski, and Peter Zijlstra provided many insights to the issue. Jann Horn provided the cmpxchg solution.
---
v6:
- Fix comment and log to update for _PAGE_COW being replaced with _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY.
v5:
- Commit log verbiage and formatting (Boris)
- Remove capitalization on shadow stack (Boris)
- Fix i386 warning on recent clang
v3:
- Remove unnecessary #ifdef (Dave Hansen)
v2:
- Compile out some code due to clang build error
- Clarify commit log (dhansen)
- Normalize PTE bit descriptions between patches (dhansen)
- Update comment with text from (dhansen)
--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +35 -0
@@ -1192,6 +1192,23 @@ static inline pte_t ptep_get_and_clear_full(struct mm_struct *mm,static inline void ptep_set_wrprotect (struct mm_struct *mm,unsigned long addr,pte_t *ptep) { +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK +/* +* Avoid accidentally creating shadow stack PTEs +* (Write=0,Dirty=1). Use cmpxchg() to prevent races with +* the hardware setting Dirty=1. +*/ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK )) { +pte_t old_pte, new_pte; + + old_pte =READ_ONCE (*ptep); +do { + new_pte =pte_wrprotect (old_pte); + }while (!try_cmpxchg (&ptep->pte, &old_pte.pte, new_pte.pte)); + +return ; + } +#endif clear_bit (_PAGE_BIT_RW, (unsigned long *)&ptep->pte); }
@@ -1244,6 +1261,24 @@ static inline pud_t pudp_huge_get_and_clear(struct mm_struct *mm,static inline void pmdp_set_wrprotect (struct mm_struct *mm,unsigned long addr,pmd_t *pmdp) { +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK +/* +* Avoid accidentally creating shadow stack PTEs +* (Write=0,Dirty=1). Use cmpxchg() to prevent races with +* the hardware setting Dirty=1. +*/ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK )) { +pmd_t old_pmd, new_pmd; + + old_pmd =READ_ONCE (*pmdp); +do { + new_pmd =pmd_wrprotect (old_pmd); + }while (!try_cmpxchg (&pmdp->pmd, &old_pmd.pmd, new_pmd.pmd)); + +return ; + } +#endif +clear_bit (_PAGE_BIT_RW, (unsigned long *)pmdp); }
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 16/40 x86/mm: Start actually marking _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY
In reply to Rick EdgecombeThe recently introduced _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY should be used instead of the HW Dirty bit whenever a PTE is Write=0, in order to not inadvertently create shadow stack PTEs. Update pte_mk*() helpers to do this, and apply the same changes to pmd and pud.
For pte_modify() this is a bit trickier. It takes a "raw" pgprot_t which was not necessarily created with any of the existing PTE bit helpers. That means that it can return a pte_t with Write=0,Dirty=1, a shadow stack PTE, when it did not intend to create one.
Modify it to also move _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY. To avoid creating Write=0,Dirty=1 PTEs, pte_modify() needs to avoid:
1. Marking Write=0 PTEs Dirty=1
2. Marking Dirty=1 PTEs Write=0
The first case cannot happen as the existing behavior of pte_modify() is to filter out any Dirty bit passed in newprot. Handle the second case by shifting _PAGE_DIRTY=1 to _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY=1 if the PTE was write protected by the pte_modify() call. Apply the same changes to pmd_modify().
---
v6:
- Rename _PAGE_COW to _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY (David Hildenbrand)
- Open code _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY part in pte_modify() (Boris)
- Change the logic so the open coded part is not too ugly
- Merge pte_modify() patch with this one because of the above
v4:
- Break part patch for better bisectability
--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 168 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 145 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +145 -23
@@ -124,9 +124,17 @@ extern pmdval_t early_pmd_flags;* The following only work if pte_present() is true. * Undefined behaviour if not.. */ -static inline int pte_dirty (pte_t pte) +static inline bool pte_dirty (pte_t pte) { -return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY; +return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS; +} + +static inline bool pte_shstk (pte_t pte) +{ +if (!cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK )) +return false; + +return (pte_flags (pte) & (_PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY)) == _PAGE_DIRTY; }static inline int pte_young (pte_t pte)
@@ -134,9 +142,18 @@ static inline int pte_young(pte_t pte)return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_ACCESSED; } -static inline int pmd_dirty (pmd_t pmd) +static inline bool pmd_dirty (pmd_t pmd) { -return pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_DIRTY; +return pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS; +} + +static inline bool pmd_shstk (pmd_t pmd) +{ +if (!cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK )) +return false; + +return (pmd_flags (pmd) & (_PAGE_RW | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_PSE)) == + (_PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_PSE); }#define pmd_young pmd_young
@@ -145,9 +162,9 @@ static inline int pmd_young(pmd_t pmd)return pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_ACCESSED; } -static inline int pud_dirty (pud_t pud) +static inline bool pud_dirty (pud_t pud) { -return pud_flags (pud) & _PAGE_DIRTY; +return pud_flags (pud) & _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS; }static inline int pud_young (pud_t pud)
@@ -157,13 +174,21 @@ static inline int pud_young(pud_t pud)static inline int pte_write (pte_t pte) { -return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_RW; +/* +* Shadow stack pages are logically writable, but do not have +* _PAGE_RW. Check for them separately from _PAGE_RW itself. +*/ +return (pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_RW) ||pte_shstk (pte); }#define pmd_write pmd_writestatic inline int pmd_write (pmd_t pmd) { -return pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_RW; +/* +* Shadow stack pages are logically writable, but do not have +* _PAGE_RW. Check for them separately from _PAGE_RW itself. +*/ +return (pmd_flags (pmd) & _PAGE_RW) ||pmd_shstk (pmd); }#define pud_write pud_write
@@ -342,7 +367,16 @@ static inline pte_t pte_clear_saveddirty(pte_t pte)static inline pte_t pte_wrprotect (pte_t pte) { -return pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_RW); + pte =pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_RW); + +/* +* Blindly clearing _PAGE_RW might accidentally create +* a shadow stack PTE (Write=0,Dirty=1). Move the hardware +* dirty value to the software bit. +*/ +if (pte_dirty (pte)) + pte =pte_mksaveddirty (pte); +return pte; }#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_WP
@@ -380,7 +414,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_clear_uffd_wp(pte_t pte)static inline pte_t pte_mkclean (pte_t pte) { -return pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY); +return pte_clear_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS); }static inline pte_t pte_mkold (pte_t pte)
@@ -395,7 +429,19 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkexec(pte_t pte)static inline pte_t pte_mkdirty (pte_t pte) { -return pte_set_flags (pte, _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +pteval_t dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY; + +/* Avoid creating Dirty=1,Write=0 PTEs */ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK ) && !pte_write (pte)) + dirty = _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY; + +return pte_set_flags (pte, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +} + +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite_shstk (pte_t pte) +{ +/* pte_clear_saveddirty() also sets Dirty=1 */ +return pte_clear_saveddirty (pte); }static inline pte_t pte_mkyoung (pte_t pte)
@@ -412,7 +458,12 @@ struct vm_area_struct;static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) { -return pte_mkwrite_kernel (pte); + pte =pte_mkwrite_kernel (pte); + +if (pte_dirty (pte)) + pte =pte_clear_saveddirty (pte); + +return pte; }static inline pte_t pte_mkhuge (pte_t pte)
@@ -481,7 +532,15 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_clear_saveddirty(pmd_t pmd)static inline pmd_t pmd_wrprotect (pmd_t pmd) { -return pmd_clear_flags (pmd, _PAGE_RW); + pmd =pmd_clear_flags (pmd, _PAGE_RW); +/* +* Blindly clearing _PAGE_RW might accidentally create +* a shadow stack PMD (RW=0, Dirty=1). Move the hardware +* dirty value to the software bit. +*/ +if (pmd_dirty (pmd)) + pmd =pmd_mksaveddirty (pmd); +return pmd; }#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_WP
@@ -508,12 +567,23 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkold(pmd_t pmd)static inline pmd_t pmd_mkclean (pmd_t pmd) { -return pmd_clear_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY); +return pmd_clear_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS); }static inline pmd_t pmd_mkdirty (pmd_t pmd) { -return pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +pmdval_t dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY; + +/* Avoid creating (HW)Dirty=1, Write=0 PMDs */ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK ) && !pmd_write (pmd)) + dirty = _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY; + +return pmd_set_flags (pmd, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +} + +static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite_shstk (pmd_t pmd) +{ +return pmd_clear_saveddirty (pmd); }static inline pmd_t pmd_mkdevmap (pmd_t pmd)
@@ -533,7 +603,12 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkyoung(pmd_t pmd)static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd,struct vm_area_struct *vma) { -return pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_RW); + pmd =pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_RW); + +if (pmd_dirty (pmd)) + pmd =pmd_clear_saveddirty (pmd); + +return pmd; }static inline pud_t pud_set_flags (pud_t pud,pudval_t set)
@@ -577,17 +652,32 @@ static inline pud_t pud_mkold(pud_t pud)static inline pud_t pud_mkclean (pud_t pud) { -return pud_clear_flags (pud, _PAGE_DIRTY); +return pud_clear_flags (pud, _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS); }static inline pud_t pud_wrprotect (pud_t pud) { -return pud_clear_flags (pud, _PAGE_RW); + pud =pud_clear_flags (pud, _PAGE_RW); + +/* +* Blindly clearing _PAGE_RW might accidentally create +* a shadow stack PUD (RW=0, Dirty=1). Move the hardware +* dirty value to the software bit. +*/ +if (pud_dirty (pud)) + pud =pud_mksaveddirty (pud); +return pud; }static inline pud_t pud_mkdirty (pud_t pud) { -return pud_set_flags (pud, _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); +pudval_t dirty = _PAGE_DIRTY; + +/* Avoid creating (HW)Dirty=1, Write=0 PUDs */ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK ) && !pud_write (pud)) + dirty = _PAGE_SAVED_DIRTY; + +return pud_set_flags (pud, dirty | _PAGE_SOFT_DIRTY); }static inline pud_t pud_mkdevmap (pud_t pud)
@@ -607,7 +697,11 @@ static inline pud_t pud_mkyoung(pud_t pud)static inline pud_t pud_mkwrite (pud_t pud) { -return pud_set_flags (pud, _PAGE_RW); + pud =pud_set_flags (pud, _PAGE_RW); + +if (pud_dirty (pud)) + pud =pud_clear_saveddirty (pud); +return pud; }#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY
@@ -724,6 +818,8 @@ static inline u64 flip_protnone_guard(u64 oldval, u64 val, u64 mask);static inline pte_t pte_modify (pte_t pte,pgprot_t newprot) {pteval_t val =pte_val (pte), oldval = val; +bool wr_protected; +pte_t pte_result;/* * Chop off the NX bit (if present), and add the NX portion of
@@ -732,17 +828,43 @@ static inline pte_t pte_modify(pte_t pte, pgprot_t newprot) val &= _PAGE_CHG_MASK; val |=check_pgprot (newprot) & ~_PAGE_CHG_MASK; val =flip_protnone_guard (oldval, val,PTE_PFN_MASK ); -return __pte (val); + + pte_result =__pte (val); + +/* +* Do the saveddirty fixup if the PTE was just write protected and +* it's dirty. +*/ + wr_protected = (oldval & _PAGE_RW) && !(val & _PAGE_RW); +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK ) && wr_protected && + (val & _PAGE_DIRTY)) + pte_result =pte_mksaveddirty (pte_result); + +return pte_result; }static inline pmd_t pmd_modify (pmd_t pmd,pgprot_t newprot) {pmdval_t val =pmd_val (pmd), oldval = val; +bool wr_protected; +pmd_t pmd_result; - val &= _HPAGE_CHG_MASK; + val &= (_HPAGE_CHG_MASK & ~_PAGE_DIRTY); val |=check_pgprot (newprot) & ~_HPAGE_CHG_MASK; val =flip_protnone_guard (oldval, val,PHYSICAL_PMD_PAGE_MASK ); -return __pmd (val); + + pmd_result =__pmd (val); + +/* +* Do the saveddirty fixup if the PMD was just write protected and +* it's dirty. +*/ + wr_protected = (oldval & _PAGE_RW) && !(val & _PAGE_RW); +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK ) && wr_protected && + (val & _PAGE_DIRTY)) + pmd_result =pmd_mksaveddirty (pmd_result); + +return pmd_result; }/*
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 17/40 mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38
In reply to Rick EdgecombeFrom: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
The x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function properly.
Future patches will introduce a new VM flag VM_SHADOW_STACK that will be VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_5. VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_1 through VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4 are bits 32-36, and bit 37 is the unrelated VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT. For the sake of order, make all VM_HIGH_ARCH_BITs stay together by moving VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38. This will allow VM_SHADOW_STACK to be introduced as 37.
--- include/linux/mm.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/mm.h +1 -1
@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);#endif #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR -# define VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT 37 +# define VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT 38# define VM_UFFD_MINOR BIT(VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT)/* UFFD minor faults */ #else /* !CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR */ # define VM_UFFD_MINOR VM_NONE
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [PATCH v8 17/40] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38
Quoted 24 lines · Rick Edgecombe
From: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
The x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function properly.
Future patches will introduce a new VM flag
VM_SHADOW_STACKthat will beVM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_5.VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_1throughVM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4are bits 32-36, and bit 37 is the unrelatedVM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT. For the sake of order, make allVM_HIGH_ARCH_BITsstay together by movingVM_UFFD_MINOR_BITfrom 37 to 38. This will allowVM_SHADOW_STACKto be introduced as 37.Co-developed-by Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Axel Rasmussen <[email protected]>Acked-by Peter Xu <[email protected]>Tested-by Pengfei Xu <[email protected]>Tested-by John Allen <[email protected]>Tested-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Quoted 1 line
---
Signature · 3 lines
Thanks, David / dhildenb
PATCH v8 18/40 mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory
In reply to Rick EdgecombeFrom: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
New hardware extensions implement support for shadow stack memory, such as x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET). Add a new VM flag to identify these areas, for example, to be used to properly indicate shadow stack PTEs to the hardware.
Shadow stack VMA creation will be tightly controlled and limited to anonymous memory to make the implementation simpler and since that is all that is required. The solution will rely on pte_mkwrite() to create the shadow stack PTEs, so it will not be required for vm_get_page_prot() to learn how to create shadow stack memory. For this reason document that VM_SHADOW_STACK should not be mixed with VM_SHARED.
---
v7:
- Use lightly edited commit log verbiage from (David Hildenbrand)
- Add explanation for VM_SHARED limitation (David Hildenbrand)
v6:
- Add comment about VM_SHADOW_STACK not being allowed with VM_SHARED (David Hildenbrand)
v3:
- Drop arch specific change in arch_vma_name(). The memory can show as anonymous (Kirill)
- Change CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SHADOW_STACK to CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK in show_smap_vma_flags() (Boris)
--- Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst | 1 + fs/proc/task_mmu.c | 3 +++ include/linux/mm.h | 8 ++++++++ 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst +1 -0
@@ -564,6 +564,7 @@ encoded manner. The codes are the following: mt arm64 MTE allocation tags are enabled um userfaultfd missing tracking uw userfaultfd wr-protect tracking + ss shadow stack page == ======================================= Note that there is no guarantee that every flag and associated mnemonic will
fs/proc/task_mmu.c +3 -0
@@ -711,6 +711,9 @@ static void show_smap_vma_flags(struct seq_file *m, struct vm_area_struct *vma) #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR [ilog2(VM_UFFD_MINOR)] = "ui",#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_USERFAULTFD_MINOR */ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK + [ilog2(VM_SHADOW_STACK)] = "ss", +#endif };size_t i;
include/linux/mm.h +8 -0
@@ -326,11 +326,13 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2 34/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */ #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3 35/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */ #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4 36/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */ +#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_5 37/* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */ #define VM_HIGH_ARCH_0 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0)#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_1 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_1)#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_2 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2)#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_3 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3)#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_4 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4) +#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_5 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_5)#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS */ #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
@@ -346,6 +348,12 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);#endif #endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK +# define VM_SHADOW_STACK VM_HIGH_ARCH_5/* Should not be set with VM_SHARED */ +#else +# define VM_SHADOW_STACK VM_NONE +#endif +#if defined(CONFIG_X86 )# define VM_PAT VM_ARCH_1/* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */ #elif defined(CONFIG_PPC )
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [PATCH v8 18/40] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory
Quoted 23 lines · Rick Edgecombe
From: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
New hardware extensions implement support for shadow stack memory, such as x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET). Add a new VM flag to identify these areas, for example, to be used to properly indicate shadow stack PTEs to the hardware.
Shadow stack VMA creation will be tightly controlled and limited to anonymous memory to make the implementation simpler and since that is all that is required. The solution will rely on
pte_mkwrite()to create the shadow stack PTEs, so it will not be required forvm_get_page_prot()to learn how to create shadow stack memory. For this reason document thatVM_SHADOW_STACKshould not be mixed withVM_SHARED.Co-developed-by Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>Tested-by Pengfei Xu <[email protected]>Tested-by John Allen <[email protected]>Tested-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Quoted 1 line
---
Signature · 3 lines
Thanks, David / dhildenb
PATCH v8 19/40 x86/mm: Check shadow stack page fault errors
In reply to Rick EdgecombeThe CPU performs "shadow stack accesses" when it expects to encounter shadow stack mappings. These accesses can be implicit (via CALL/RET instructions) or explicit (instructions like WRSS).
Shadow stack accesses to shadow-stack mappings can result in faults in normal, valid operation just like regular accesses to regular mappings. Shadow stacks need some of the same features like delayed allocation, swap and copy-on-write. The kernel needs to use faults to implement those features.
The architecture has concepts of both shadow stack reads and shadow stack writes. Any shadow stack access to non-shadow stack memory will generate a fault with the shadow stack error code bit set.
This means that, unlike normal write protection, the fault handler needs to create a type of memory that can be written to (with instructions that generate shadow stack writes), even to fulfill a read access. So in the case of COW memory, the COW needs to take place even with a shadow stack read. Otherwise the page will be left (shadow stack) writable in userspace. So to trigger the appropriate behavior, set FAULT_FLAG_WRITE for shadow stack accesses, even if the access was a shadow stack read.
For the purpose of making this clearer, consider the following example. If a process has a shadow stack, and forks, the shadow stack PTEs will become read-only due to COW. If the CPU in one process performs a shadow stack read access to the shadow stack, for example executing a RET and causing the CPU to read the shadow stack copy of the return address, then in order for the fault to be resolved the PTE will need to be set with shadow stack permissions. But then the memory would be changeable from userspace (from CALL, RET, WRSS, etc). So this scenario needs to trigger COW, otherwise the shared page would be changeable from both processes.
Shadow stack accesses can also result in errors, such as when a shadow stack overflows, or if a shadow stack access occurs to a non-shadow-stack mapping. Also, generate the errors for invalid shadow stack accesses.
---
v8:
- Further tweak commit log (dhansen, Boris)
v7:
- Update comment in fault handler (David Hildenbrand)
v6:
- Update comment due to rename of Cow bit to SavedDirty
v5:
- Add description of COW example (Boris)
- Replace "permissioned" (Boris)
- Remove capitalization of shadow stack (Boris)
--- arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/trap_pf.h +2 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@* bit 3 == 1: use of reserved bit detected * bit 4 == 1: fault was an instruction fetch * bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access +* bit 6 == 1: shadow stack access fault * bit 15 == 1: SGX MMU page-fault */ enum x86_pf_error_code {
@@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code {X86_PF_RSVD =1 <<3 ,X86_PF_INSTR =1 <<4 ,X86_PF_PK =1 <<5 , +X86_PF_SHSTK =1 <<6 , X86_PF_SGX = 1 << 15, };
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +22 -0
@@ -1117,8 +1117,22 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma) (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR), foreign))return 1 ; +/* +* Shadow stack accesses (PF_SHSTK=1) are only permitted to +* shadow stack VMAs. All other accesses result in an error. +*/ +if (error_code &X86_PF_SHSTK ) { +if (unlikely (!(vma->vm_flags &VM_SHADOW_STACK ))) +return 1 ; +if (unlikely (!(vma->vm_flags &VM_WRITE ))) +return 1 ; +return 0 ; + } +if (error_code &X86_PF_WRITE ) {/* write, present and write, not present: */ +if (unlikely (vma->vm_flags &VM_SHADOW_STACK )) +return 1 ;if (unlikely (!(vma->vm_flags &VM_WRITE )))return 1 ;return 0 ;
@@ -1310,6 +1324,14 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,perf_sw_event (PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS ,1 , regs, address); +/* +* Read-only permissions can not be expressed in shadow stack PTEs. +* Treat all shadow stack accesses as WRITE faults. This ensures +* that the MM will prepare everything (e.g., break COW) such that +* maybe_mkwrite() can create a proper shadow stack PTE. +*/ +if (error_code &X86_PF_SHSTK ) + flags |=FAULT_FLAG_WRITE ;if (error_code &X86_PF_WRITE ) flags |=FAULT_FLAG_WRITE ;if (error_code &X86_PF_INSTR )
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 20/40 x86/mm: Teach pte_mkwrite() about stack memory
In reply to Rick EdgecombeIf a VMA has the VM_SHADOW_STACK flag, it is shadow stack memory. So when it is made writable with pte_mkwrite(), it should create shadow stack memory, not conventionally writable memory. Now that all the places where shadow stack memory might be created pass a VMA into pte_mkwrite(), it can know when it should do this.
So make pte_mkwrite() create shadow stack memory when the VMA has the VM_SHADOW_STACK flag. Do the same thing for pmd_mkwrite().
This requires referencing VM_SHADOW_STACK in these functions, which are currently defined in pgtable.h, however mm.h (where VM_SHADOW_STACK is located) can't be pulled in without causing problems for files that reference pgtable.h. So also move pte/pmd_mkwrite() into pgtable.c, where they can safely reference VM_SHADOW_STACK.
---
v8:
- Update commit log verbiage (Boris)
v6:
- New patch
--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 20 ++------------------ arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +2 -18
@@ -456,15 +456,7 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite_kernel(pte_t pte)struct vm_area_struct ; -static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) -{ - pte =pte_mkwrite_kernel (pte); - -if (pte_dirty (pte)) - pte =pte_clear_saveddirty (pte); - -return pte; -} +pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma);static inline pte_t pte_mkhuge (pte_t pte) {
@@ -601,15 +593,7 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkyoung(pmd_t pmd)return pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_ACCESSED); } -static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd,struct vm_area_struct *vma) -{ - pmd =pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_RW); - -if (pmd_dirty (pmd)) - pmd =pmd_clear_saveddirty (pmd); - -return pmd; -} +pmd_t pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd,struct vm_area_struct *vma);static inline pud_t pud_set_flags (pud_t pud,pudval_t set) {
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c +26 -0
@@ -880,3 +880,29 @@ int pmd_free_pte_page(pmd_t *pmd, unsigned long addr)#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ #endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP */ + +pte_t pte_mkwrite (pte_t pte,struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +if (vma->vm_flags &VM_SHADOW_STACK ) +return pte_mkwrite_shstk (pte); + + pte =pte_mkwrite_kernel (pte); + +if (pte_dirty (pte)) + pte =pte_clear_saveddirty (pte); + +return pte; +} + +pmd_t pmd_mkwrite (pmd_t pmd,struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +if (vma->vm_flags &VM_SHADOW_STACK ) +return pmd_mkwrite_shstk (pmd); + + pmd =pmd_set_flags (pmd, _PAGE_RW); + +if (pmd_dirty (pmd)) + pmd =pmd_clear_saveddirty (pmd); + +return pmd; +}
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 21/40 mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack.
In reply to Rick EdgecombeThe x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function properly.
The architecture of shadow stack constrains the ability of userspace to move the shadow stack pointer (SSP) in order to prevent corrupting or switching to other shadow stacks. The RSTORSSP instruction can move the SSP to different shadow stacks, but it requires a specially placed token in order to do this. However, the architecture does not prevent incrementing the stack pointer to wander onto an adjacent shadow stack. To prevent this in software, enforce guard pages at the beginning of shadow stack VMAs, such that there will always be a gap between adjacent shadow stacks.
Make the gap big enough so that no userspace SSP changing operations (besides RSTORSSP), can move the SSP from one stack to the next. The SSP can be incremented or decremented by CALL, RET and INCSSP. CALL and RET can move the SSP by a maximum of 8 bytes, at which point the shadow stack would be accessed.
The INCSSP instruction can also increment the shadow stack pointer. It is the shadow stack analog of an instruction like:
addq $0x80, %rsp
However, there is one important difference between an ADD on %rsp and INCSSP. In addition to modifying SSP, INCSSP also reads from the memory of the first and last elements that were "popped". It can be thought of as acting like this:
READ_ONCE(ssp); // read+discard top element on stack
ssp += nr_to_pop * 8; // move the shadow stackREAD_ONCE(ssp-8); // read+discard last popped stack element
The maximum distance INCSSP can move the SSP is 2040 bytes, before it would read the memory. Therefore, a single page gap will be enough to prevent any operation from shifting the SSP to an adjacent stack, since it would have to land in the gap at least once, causing a fault.
This could be accomplished by using VM_GROWSDOWN, but this has a downside. The behavior would allow shadow stacks to grow, which is unneeded and adds a strange difference to how most regular stacks work.
---
v8:
- Update commit log verbiage (Boris)
- Move and update comment (Boris, David Hildenbrand)
v5:
- Fix typo in commit log
v4:
- Drop references to 32 bit instructions
- Switch to generic code to drop __weak (Peterz)
v2:
- Use __weak instead of #ifdef (Dave Hansen)
- Only have start gap on shadow stack (Andy Luto)
- Create stack_guard_start_gap() to not duplicate code in an arch version of vm_start_gap() (Dave Hansen)
- Improve commit log partly with verbiage from (Dave Hansen)
--- include/linux/mm.h | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
include/linux/mm.h +46 -6
@@ -349,7 +349,36 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS */ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK -# define VM_SHADOW_STACK VM_HIGH_ARCH_5/* Should not be set with VM_SHARED */ +/* +* This flag should not be set with VM_SHARED because of lack of support +* core mm. It will also get a guard page. This helps userspace protect +* itself from attacks. The reasoning is as follows: +* +* The shadow stack pointer(SSP) is moved by CALL, RET, and INCSSPQ. The +* INCSSP instruction can increment the shadow stack pointer. It is the +* shadow stack analog of an instruction like: +* +* addq $0x80, %rsp +* +* However, there is one important difference between an ADD on %rsp +* and INCSSP. In addition to modifying SSP, INCSSP also reads from the +* memory of the first and last elements that were "popped". It can be +* thought of as acting like this: +* +* READ_ONCE(ssp); // read+discard top element on stack +* ssp += nr_to_pop * 8; // move the shadow stack +* READ_ONCE(ssp-8); // read+discard last popped stack element +* +* The maximum distance INCSSP can move the SSP is 2040 bytes, before +* it would read the memory. Therefore a single page gap will be enough +* to prevent any operation from shifting the SSP to an adjacent stack, +* since it would have to land in the gap at least once, causing a +* fault. +* +* Prevent using INCSSP to move the SSP between shadow stacks by +* having a PAGE_SIZE guard gap. +*/ +# define VM_SHADOW_STACK VM_HIGH_ARCH_5#else # define VM_SHADOW_STACK VM_NONE#endif
@@ -3107,15 +3136,26 @@ struct vm_area_struct *vma_lookup(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr)return mtree_load (&mm->mm_mt, addr); } +static inline unsigned long stack_guard_start_gap (struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ +if (vma->vm_flags &VM_GROWSDOWN ) +return stack_guard_gap; + +/* See reasoning around the VM_SHADOW_STACK definition */ +if (vma->vm_flags &VM_SHADOW_STACK ) +return PAGE_SIZE ; + +return 0 ; +} +static inline unsigned long vm_start_gap (struct vm_area_struct *vma) { +unsigned long gap =stack_guard_start_gap (vma);unsigned long vm_start = vma->vm_start; -if (vma->vm_flags &VM_GROWSDOWN ) { - vm_start -= stack_guard_gap; -if (vm_start > vma->vm_start) - vm_start =0 ; - } + vm_start -= gap; +if (vm_start > vma->vm_start) + vm_start =0 ;return vm_start; }
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 22/40 mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting
In reply to Rick EdgecombeThe x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function properly.
---
v8:
- Update commit log verbaige (Boris)
- Update comment around is_stack_mapping() (David Hildenbrand)
v7:
- Change is_stack_mapping() to know about VM_SHADOW_STACK so the additions in vm_stat_account() can be dropped. (David Hildenbrand)
v3:
- Remove unneeded VM_SHADOW_STACK check in accountable_mapping() (Kirill)
v2:
- Remove is_shadow_stack_mapping() and just change it to directly bitwise and VM_SHADOW_STACK.
--- mm/internal.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
mm/internal.h +2 -2
@@ -491,14 +491,14 @@ static inline bool is_exec_mapping(vm_flags_t flags) }/* -* Stack area - automatically grows in one direction +* Stack area (including shadow stacks) * * VM_GROWSUP / VM_GROWSDOWN VMAs are always private anonymous: * do_mmap() forbids all other combinations. */ static inline bool is_stack_mapping (vm_flags_t flags) { -return (flags &VM_STACK ) ==VM_STACK ; +return ((flags &VM_STACK ) ==VM_STACK ) || (flags &VM_SHADOW_STACK ); }/*
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 23/40 mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap()
In reply to Rick EdgecombeFrom: Yu-cheng Yu <[email protected]>
There was no more caller passing vm_flags to do_mmap(), and vm_flags was removed from the function's input by:
commit 45e55300f114 ("mm: remove unnecessary wrapper function do_mmap_pgoff()").
There is a new user now. Shadow stack allocation passes VM_SHADOW_STACK to do_mmap(). Thus, re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap().
--- fs/aio.c | 2 +- include/linux/mm.h | 3 ++- ipc/shm.c | 2 +- mm/mmap.c | 10 +++++----- mm/nommu.c | 4 ++-- mm/util.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
fs/aio.c +1 -1
@@ -558,7 +558,7 @@ static int aio_setup_ring(struct kioctx *ctx, unsigned int nr_events) ctx->mmap_base =do_mmap (ctx->aio_ring_file,0 , ctx->mmap_size,PROT_READ |PROT_WRITE , -MAP_SHARED ,0 , &unused,NULL ); +MAP_SHARED ,0 ,0 , &unused,NULL );mmap_write_unlock (mm);if (IS_ERR ((void *)ctx->mmap_base)) { ctx->mmap_size =0 ;
include/linux/mm.h +2 -1
@@ -3043,7 +3043,8 @@ extern unsigned long mmap_region(struct file *file, unsigned long addr, struct list_head *uf);extern unsigned long do_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long addr,unsigned long len,unsigned long prot,unsigned long flags, -unsigned long pgoff,unsigned long *populate,struct list_head *uf); +vm_flags_t vm_flags,unsigned long pgoff,unsigned long *populate, +struct list_head *uf);extern int do_vmi_munmap (struct vma_iterator *vmi,struct mm_struct *mm,unsigned long start,size_t len,struct list_head *uf,bool downgrade);
ipc/shm.c +1 -1
@@ -1662,7 +1662,7 @@ long do_shmat(int shmid, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg, goto invalid; } - addr =do_mmap (file, addr, size, prot, flags,0 , &populate,NULL ); + addr =do_mmap (file, addr, size, prot, flags,0 ,0 , &populate,NULL ); *raddr = addr; err =0 ;if (IS_ERR_VALUE (addr))
mm/mmap.c +5 -5
@@ -1191,11 +1191,11 @@ static inline bool file_mmap_ok(struct file *file, struct inode *inode,*/ unsigned long do_mmap (struct file *file,unsigned long addr,unsigned long len,unsigned long prot, -unsigned long flags,unsigned long pgoff, -unsigned long *populate,struct list_head *uf) +unsigned long flags,vm_flags_t vm_flags, +unsigned long pgoff,unsigned long *populate, +struct list_head *uf) {struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; -vm_flags_t vm_flags;int pkey =0 ;validate_mm (mm);
@@ -1256,7 +1256,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,* to. we assume access permissions have been handled by the open * of the memory object, so we don't do any here. */ - vm_flags =calc_vm_prot_bits (prot, pkey) |calc_vm_flag_bits (flags) | + vm_flags |=calc_vm_prot_bits (prot, pkey) |calc_vm_flag_bits (flags) | mm->def_flags |VM_MAYREAD |VM_MAYWRITE |VM_MAYEXEC ;if (flags &MAP_LOCKED )
@@ -2829,7 +2829,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, unsigned long, size, file =get_file (vma->vm_file); ret =do_mmap (vma->vm_file, start, size, - prot, flags, pgoff, &populate,NULL ); + prot, flags,0 , pgoff, &populate,NULL );fput (file); out:mmap_write_unlock (mm);
mm/nommu.c +2 -2
@@ -1002,6 +1002,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,unsigned long len, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, + vm_flags_t vm_flags, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long *populate, struct list_head *uf)
@@ -1009,7 +1010,6 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,struct vm_area_struct *vma;struct vm_region *region;struct rb_node *rb; -vm_flags_t vm_flags;unsigned long capabilities, result;int ret;VMA_ITERATOR (vmi, current->mm,0 );
@@ -1029,7 +1029,7 @@ unsigned long do_mmap(struct file *file,/* we've determined that we can make the mapping, now translate what we * now know into VMA flags */ - vm_flags =determine_vm_flags (file, prot, flags, capabilities); + vm_flags |=determine_vm_flags (file, prot, flags, capabilities);/* we're going to need to record the mapping */
mm/util.c +1 -1
@@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ unsigned long vm_mmap_pgoff(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,if (!ret) {if (mmap_write_lock_killable (mm))return -EINTR ; - ret =do_mmap (file, addr, len, prot, flag, pgoff, &populate, + ret =do_mmap (file, addr, len, prot, flag,0 , pgoff, &populate, &uf);mmap_write_unlock (mm);userfaultfd_unmap_complete (mm, &uf);
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 24/40 mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory
In reply to Rick EdgecombeThe x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function properly.
In userspace, shadow stack memory is writable only in very specific, controlled ways. However, since userspace can, even in the limited ways, modify shadow stack contents, the kernel treats it as writable memory. As a result, without additional work there would remain many ways for userspace to trigger the kernel to write arbitrary data to shadow stacks via get_user_pages(, FOLL_WRITE) based operations. To help userspace protect their shadow stacks, make this a little less exposed by blocking writable get_user_pages() operations for shadow stack VMAs.
Still allow FOLL_FORCE to write through shadow stack protections, as it does for read-only protections. This is required for debugging use cases.
---
v8:
- Update commit log verbiage (Boris, AndyL)
v3:
- Add comment in __pte_access_permitted() (Dave)
- Remove unneeded shadow stack specific check in
__pte_access_permitted() (Jann)
--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 5 +++++ mm/gup.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +5 -0
@@ -1638,6 +1638,11 @@ static inline bool __pte_access_permitted(unsigned long pteval, bool write) {unsigned long need_pte_bits = _PAGE_PRESENT|_PAGE_USER; +/* +* Write=0,Dirty=1 PTEs are shadow stack, which the kernel +* shouldn't generally allow access to, but since they +* are already Write=0, the below logic covers both cases. +*/ if (write) need_pte_bits |= _PAGE_RW;
mm/gup.c +1 -1
@@ -978,7 +978,7 @@ static int check_vma_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long gup_flags)return -EFAULT ;if (write) { -if (!(vm_flags &VM_WRITE )) { +if (!(vm_flags &VM_WRITE ) || (vm_flags &VM_SHADOW_STACK )) {if (!(gup_flags &FOLL_FORCE ))return -EFAULT ;/* hugetlb does not support FOLL_FORCE|FOLL_WRITE. */
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 25/40 x86/mm: Introduce MAP_ABOVE4G
In reply to Rick EdgecombeThe x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some unusual properties, which require some core mm changes to function properly.
One of the properties is that the shadow stack pointer (SSP), which is a CPU register that points to the shadow stack like the stack pointer points to the stack, can't be pointing outside of the 32 bit address space when the CPU is executing in 32 bit mode. It is desirable to prevent executing in 32 bit mode when shadow stack is enabled because the kernel can't easily support 32 bit signals.
On x86 it is possible to transition to 32 bit mode without any special interaction with the kernel, by doing a "far call" to a 32 bit segment. So the shadow stack implementation can use this address space behavior as a feature, by enforcing that shadow stack memory is always mapped outside of the 32 bit address space. This way userspace will trigger a
general protection fault which will in turn trigger a segfault if it
tries to transition to 32 bit mode with shadow stack enabled.
This provides a clean error generating border for the user if they try attempt to do 32 bit mode shadow stack, rather than leave the kernel in a half working state for userspace to be surprised by.
So to allow future shadow stack enabling patches to map shadow stacks out of the 32 bit address space, introduce MAP_ABOVE4G. The behavior is pretty much like MAP_32BIT, except that it has the opposite address range. The are a few differences though.
If both MAP_32BIT and MAP_ABOVE4G are provided, the kernel will use the MAP_ABOVE4G behavior. Like MAP_32BIT, MAP_ABOVE4G is ignored in a 32 bit syscall.
Since the default search behavior is top down, the normal kaslr base can be used for MAP_ABOVE4G. This is unlike MAP_32BIT which has to add its own randomization in the bottom up case.
For MAP_32BIT, only the bottom up search path is used. For MAP_ABOVE4G both are potentially valid, so both are used. In the bottomup search path, the default behavior is already consistent with MAP_ABOVE4G since mmap base should be above 4GB.
Without MAP_ABOVE4G, the shadow stack will already normally be above 4GB. So without introducing MAP_ABOVE4G, trying to transition to 32 bit mode with shadow stack enabled would usually segfault anyway. This is already pretty decent guard rails. But the addition of MAP_ABOVE4G is some small complexity spent to make it make it more complete.
---
v8:
- Update commit log verbiage (Boris)
- Use SZ_4G (Boris)
v5:
- New patch
--- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c | 6 +++++- include/linux/mman.h | 4 ++++ 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h +1 -0
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@#define _ASM_X86_MMAN_H#define MAP_32BIT 0x40/* only give out 32bit addresses */ +#define MAP_ABOVE4G 0x80/* only map above 4GB */ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS #define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits (prot, key) ( \
arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c +5 -1
@@ -193,7 +193,11 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *filp, const unsigned long addr0, info.flags =VM_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN ; info.length = len; - info.low_limit =PAGE_SIZE ; +if (!in_32bit_syscall () && (flags &MAP_ABOVE4G )) + info.low_limit =SZ_4G ; +else + info.low_limit =PAGE_SIZE ; + info.high_limit =get_mmap_base (0 );/*
include/linux/mman.h +4 -0
@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@#ifndef MAP_32BIT #define MAP_32BIT 0#endif +#ifndef MAP_ABOVE4G +#define MAP_ABOVE4G 0 +#endif #ifndef MAP_HUGE_2MB #define MAP_HUGE_2MB 0#endif
@@ -50,6 +53,7 @@ | MAP_STACK \ |MAP_HUGETLB \ |MAP_32BIT \ + |MAP_ABOVE4G \ |MAP_HUGE_2MB \ | MAP_HUGE_1GB)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 26/40 mm: Warn on shadow stack memory in wrong vma
In reply to Rick EdgecombeThe x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function properly.
One sharp edge is that PTEs that are both Write=0 and Dirty=1 are treated as shadow by the CPU, but this combination used to be created by the kernel on x86. Previous patches have changed the kernel to now avoid creating these PTEs unless they are for shadow stack memory. In case any missed corners of the kernel are still creating PTEs like this for non-shadow stack memory, and to catch any re-introductions of the logic, warn if any shadow stack PTEs (Write=0, Dirty=1) are found in non-shadow stack VMAs when they are being zapped. This won't catch transient cases but should have decent coverage. It will be compiled out when shadow stack is not configured.
In order to check if a PTE is shadow stack in core mm code, add two arch breakouts arch_check_zapped_pte/pmd(). This will allow shadow stack specific code to be kept in arch/x86.
---
v8:
- Update commit log verbaige (Boris)
v6:
- Add arch breakout to remove shstk from core MM code.
v5:
- Fix typo in commit log
v3:
- New patch
--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 6 ++++++ arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 12 ++++++++++++ include/linux/pgtable.h | 14 ++++++++++++++ mm/huge_memory.c | 1 + mm/memory.c | 1 + 5 files changed, 34 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +6 -0
@@ -1684,6 +1684,12 @@ static inline bool arch_has_hw_pte_young(void)return true; } +#define arch_check_zapped_pte arch_check_zapped_pte +void arch_check_zapped_pte (struct vm_area_struct *vma,pte_t pte); + +#define arch_check_zapped_pmd arch_check_zapped_pmd +void arch_check_zapped_pmd (struct vm_area_struct *vma,pmd_t pmd); +#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV #define arch_has_hw_nonleaf_pmd_young arch_has_hw_nonleaf_pmd_youngstatic inline bool arch_has_hw_nonleaf_pmd_young (void )
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c +12 -0
@@ -906,3 +906,15 @@ pmd_t pmd_mkwrite(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma)return pmd; } + +void arch_check_zapped_pte (struct vm_area_struct *vma,pte_t pte) +{ +VM_WARN_ON_ONCE (!(vma->vm_flags &VM_SHADOW_STACK ) && +pte_shstk (pte)); +} + +void arch_check_zapped_pmd (struct vm_area_struct *vma,pmd_t pmd) +{ +VM_WARN_ON_ONCE (!(vma->vm_flags &VM_SHADOW_STACK ) && +pmd_shstk (pmd)); +}
include/linux/pgtable.h +14 -0
@@ -291,6 +291,20 @@ static inline bool arch_has_hw_pte_young(void) }#endif +#ifndef arch_check_zapped_pte +static inline void arch_check_zapped_pte (struct vm_area_struct *vma, +pte_t pte) +{ +} +#endif + +#ifndef arch_check_zapped_pmd +static inline void arch_check_zapped_pmd (struct vm_area_struct *vma, +pmd_t pmd) +{ +} +#endif +#ifndef __HAVE_ARCH_PTEP_GET_AND_CLEAR static inline pte_t ptep_get_and_clear(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address,
mm/huge_memory.c +1 -0
@@ -1689,6 +1689,7 @@ int zap_huge_pmd(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct vm_area_struct *vma,*/ orig_pmd =pmdp_huge_get_and_clear_full (vma, addr, pmd, tlb->fullmm); +arch_check_zapped_pmd (vma, orig_pmd);tlb_remove_pmd_tlb_entry (tlb, pmd, addr);if (vma_is_special_huge (vma)) {if (arch_needs_pgtable_deposit ())
mm/memory.c +1 -0
@@ -1389,6 +1389,7 @@ static unsigned long zap_pte_range(struct mmu_gather *tlb,continue ; ptent =ptep_get_and_clear_full (mm, addr, pte, tlb->fullmm); +arch_check_zapped_pte (vma, ptent);tlb_remove_tlb_entry (tlb, pte, addr);zap_install_uffd_wp_if_needed (vma, addr, pte, details, ptent);
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [PATCH v8 26/40] mm: Warn on shadow stack memory in wrong vma
Quoted 20 lines · Rick Edgecombe
The x86 Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) feature includes a new type of memory called shadow stack. This shadow stack memory has some unusual properties, which requires some core mm changes to function properly.
One sharp edge is that PTEs that are both Write=0 and Dirty=1 are treated as shadow by the CPU, but this combination used to be created by the kernel on x86. Previous patches have changed the kernel to now avoid creating these PTEs unless they are for shadow stack memory. In case any missed corners of the kernel are still creating PTEs like this for non-shadow stack memory, and to catch any re-introductions of the logic, warn if any shadow stack PTEs (Write=0, Dirty=1) are found in non-shadow stack VMAs when they are being zapped. This won't catch transient cases but should have decent coverage. It will be compiled out when shadow stack is not configured.
In order to check if a PTE is shadow stack in core mm code, add two arch breakouts arch_check_zapped_pte/pmd(). This will allow shadow stack specific code to be kept in
arch/x86.
Quoted 6 lines
Signed-off-by Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Tested-by Pengfei Xu <[email protected]>Tested-by John Allen <[email protected]>Tested-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Signature · 3 lines
Thanks, David / dhildenb
PATCH v8 27/40 x86/mm: Warn if create Write=0,Dirty=1 with raw prot
In reply to Rick EdgecombeWhen user shadow stack is in use, Write=0,Dirty=1 is treated by the CPU as shadow stack memory. So for shadow stack memory this bit combination is valid, but when Dirty=1,Write=1 (conventionally writable) memory is being write protected, the kernel has been taught to transition the Dirty=1 bit to SavedDirty=1, to avoid inadvertently creating shadow stack memory. It does this inside pte_wrprotect() because it knows the PTE is not intended to be a writable shadow stack entry, it is supposed to be write protected.
However, when a PTE is created by a raw prot using mk_pte(), mk_pte() can't know whether to adjust Dirty=1 to SavedDirty=1. It can't distinguish between the caller intending to create a shadow stack PTE or needing the SavedDirty shift.
The kernel has been updated to not do this, and so Write=0,Dirty=1 memory should only be created by the pte_mkfoo() helpers. Add a warning to make sure no new mk_pte() start doing this, like, for example, set_memory_rox() did.
---
v8:
- Update commit log verbiage (Boris)
v6:
- New patch (Note, this has already been a useful warning, it caught the newly added set_memory_rox() doing this)
--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +9 -1
@@ -1032,7 +1032,15 @@ static inline unsigned long pmd_page_vaddr(pmd_t pmd)* (Currently stuck as a macro because of indirect forward reference * to linux/mm.h:page_to_nid()) */ -#define mk_pte (page, pgprot) pfn_pte(page_to_pfn(page), (pgprot)) +#define mk_pte (page, pgprot) \ +({ \ + pgprot_t __pgprot = pgprot; \ + \ + WARN_ON_ONCE(cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_USER_SHSTK) && \ + (pgprot_val(__pgprot) & (_PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_RW)) == \ + _PAGE_DIRTY); \ + pfn_pte(page_to_pfn(page), __pgprot); \ +})static inline int pmd_bad (pmd_t pmd) {
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 28/40 x86: Introduce userspace API for shadow stack
In reply to Rick EdgecombeAdd three new arch_prctl() handles:
- ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE/DISABLE enables or disables the specified feature. Returns 0 on success or a negative value on error.
- ARCH_SHSTK_LOCK prevents future disabling or enabling of the specified feature. Returns 0 on success or a negative value on error.
The features are handled per-thread and inherited over fork(2)/clone(2), but reset on exec().
---
This is preparation patch. It does not implement any features. The {} are to make the diff in a future patch cleaner.
v8:
- Update commit log verbiage (Boris)
v4:
- Remove references to CET and replace with shadow stack (Peterz)
v3:
- Move shstk.c Makefile changes earlier (Kees)
- Add #ifdef around features_locked and features (Kees)
- Encapsulate features reset earlier in reset_thread_features() so features and features_locked are not referenced in code that would be compiled !CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK. (Kees)
- Fix typo in commit log (Kees)
- Switch arch_prctl() numbers to avoid conflict with LAM
v2:
- Only allow one enable/disable per call (tglx)
- Return error code like a normal arch_prctl() (Alexander Potapenko)
- Make CET only (tglx)
--- arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 6 +++++ arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h | 21 +++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h | 6 +++++ arch/x86/kernel/Makefile | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 7 ++++- arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +6 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ struct vm86;#include <asm/unwind_hints.h> #include <asm/vmxfeatures.h> #include <asm/vdso/processor.h> +#include <asm/shstk.h> #include <linux/personality.h> #include <linux/cache.h>
@@ -475,6 +476,11 @@ struct thread_struct {*/ u32 pkru; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK +unsigned long features; +unsigned long features_locked; +#endif +/* Floating point and extended processor state */ struct fpu fpu;/*
arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h new file +21 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef _ASM_X86_SHSTK_H +#define _ASM_X86_SHSTK_H + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ +#include <linux/types.h> + +struct task_struct ; + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK +long shstk_prctl (struct task_struct *task,int option,unsigned long features); +void reset_thread_features (void ); +#else +static inline long shstk_prctl (struct task_struct *task,int option, +unsigned long arg2) {return -EINVAL ; } +static inline void reset_thread_features (void ) {} +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK */ + +#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ + +#endif /* _ASM_X86_SHSTK_H */
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h +6 -0
@@ -20,4 +20,10 @@#define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_32 0x2002#define ARCH_MAP_VDSO_64 0x2003 +/* Don't use 0x3001-0x3004 because of old glibcs */ + +#define ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE 0x5001 +#define ARCH_SHSTK_DISABLE 0x5002 +#define ARCH_SHSTK_LOCK 0x5003 +#endif /* _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H */
arch/x86/kernel/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -146,6 +146,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CALL_THUNKS) += callthunks.o obj-$(CONFIG_X86_CET) += cet.o +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK) += shstk.o + ### # 64 bit specific files ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +6 -1
@@ -514,6 +514,8 @@ start_thread_common(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long new_ip,load_gs_index (__USER_DS); } +reset_thread_features (); +loadsegment (fs,0 );loadsegment (es, _ds);loadsegment (ds, _ds);
@@ -830,7 +832,10 @@ long do_arch_prctl_64(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2)case ARCH_MAP_VDSO_64 :return prctl_map_vdso (&vdso_image_64, arg2);#endif - +case ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE : +case ARCH_SHSTK_DISABLE : +case ARCH_SHSTK_LOCK : +return shstk_prctl (task, option, arg2);default : ret = -EINVAL ;break ;
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c new file +44 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 29/40 x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support
In reply to Rick EdgecombeIntroduce basic shadow stack enabling/disabling/allocation routines. A task's shadow stack is allocated from memory with VM_SHADOW_STACK flag and has a fixed size of min(RLIMIT_STACK, 4GB).
Keep the task's shadow stack address and size in thread_struct. This will be copied when cloning new threads, but needs to be cleared during exec, so add a function to do this.
32 bit shadow stack is not expected to have many users and it will complicate the signal implementation. So do not support IA32 emulation or x32.
---
v7:
- Add explanation for not supporting 32 bit in commit log (Boris)
v5:
- Switch to EOPNOTSUPP
- Use MAP_ABOVE4G
- Move set_clr_bits_msrl() to patch where it is first used
v4:
- Just set MSR_IA32_U_CET when disabling shadow stack, since we don't have IBT yet. (Peterz)
v3:
- Use define for set_clr_bits_msrl() (Kees)
- Make some functions static (Kees)
- Change feature_foo() to features_foo() (Kees)
- Centralize shadow stack size rlimit checks (Kees)
- Disable x32 support
--- arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h | 7 ++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h | 3 + arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 145 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 157 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +2 -0
@@ -479,6 +479,8 @@ struct thread_struct {#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK unsigned long features;unsigned long features_locked; + +struct thread_shstk shstk;#endif /* Floating point and extended processor state */
arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h +7 -0
@@ -8,12 +8,19 @@struct task_struct ;#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK +struct thread_shstk { +u64 base; +u64 size; +}; +long shstk_prctl (struct task_struct *task,int option,unsigned long features);void reset_thread_features (void ); +void shstk_free (struct task_struct *p);#else static inline long shstk_prctl (struct task_struct *task,int option,unsigned long arg2) {return -EINVAL ; }static inline void reset_thread_features (void ) {} +static inline void shstk_free (struct task_struct *p) {}#endif /* CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK */ #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h +3 -0
@@ -26,4 +26,7 @@#define ARCH_SHSTK_DISABLE 0x5002#define ARCH_SHSTK_LOCK 0x5003 +/* ARCH_SHSTK_ features bits */ +#define ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK (1ULL << 0) +#endif /* _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H */
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c +145 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 30/40 x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
In reply to Rick EdgecombeWhen a process is duplicated, but the child shares the address space with the parent, there is potential for the threads sharing a single stack to cause conflicts for each other. In the normal non-CET case this is handled in two ways.
With regular CLONE_VM a new stack is provided by userspace such that the parent and child have different stacks.
For vfork, the parent is suspended until the child exits. So as long as the child doesn't return from the vfork()/CLONE_VFORK calling function and sticks to a limited set of operations, the parent and child can share the same stack.
For shadow stack, these scenarios present similar sharing problems. For the CLONE_VM case, the child and the parent must have separate shadow stacks. Instead of changing clone to take a shadow stack, have the kernel just allocate one and switch to it.
Use stack_size passed from clone3() syscall for thread shadow stack size. A compat-mode thread shadow stack size is further reduced to 1/4. This allows more threads to run in a 32-bit address space. The clone() does not pass stack_size, which was added to clone3(). In that case, use RLIMIT_STACK size and cap to 4 GB.
For shadow stack enabled vfork(), the parent and child can share the same shadow stack, like they can share a normal stack. Since the parent is suspended until the child terminates, the child will not interfere with the parent while executing as long as it doesn't return from the vfork() and overwrite up the shadow stack. The child can safely overwrite down the shadow stack, as the parent can just overwrite this later. So CET does not add any additional limitations for vfork().
Free the shadow stack on thread exit by doing it in mm_release(). Skip this when exiting a vfork() child since the stack is shared in the parent.
During this operation, the shadow stack pointer of the new thread needs to be updated to point to the newly allocated shadow stack. Since the ability to do this is confined to the FPU subsystem, change fpu_clone() to take the new shadow stack pointer, and update it internally inside the FPU subsystem. This part was suggested by Thomas Gleixner.
---
v8:
- Update commit log verbiage (Boris)
- Move ifdef inside update_fpu_shstk() (Boris)
- Change shstk_alloc_thread_stack() return value to simplify caller (Boris)
- Remove extra info about glibc's vfork() implementation from log (Szabolcs Nagy)
v3:
- Fix update_fpu_shstk() stub (Mike Rapoport)
- Fix chunks around alloc_shstk() in wrong patch (Kees)
- Fix stack_size/flags swap (Kees)
- Use centralized stack size logic (Kees)
v2:
- Have fpu_clone() take new shadow stack pointer and update SSP in xsave buffer for new task. (tglx)
v1:
- Expand commit log.
- Add more comments.
- Switch to xsave helpers.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/sched.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h | 5 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 21 ++++++++++++++- arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 6 files changed, 103 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/sched.h +2 -1
@@ -11,7 +11,8 @@extern void save_fpregs_to_fpstate (struct fpu *fpu);extern void fpu__drop (struct fpu *fpu); -extern int fpu_clone (struct task_struct *dst,unsigned long clone_flags,bool minimal); +extern int fpu_clone (struct task_struct *dst,unsigned long clone_flags,bool minimal, +unsigned long shstk_addr);extern void fpu_flush_thread (void );/*
arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h +2 -0
@@ -147,6 +147,8 @@ do { \#else #define deactivate_mm (tsk, mm) \ do { \ + if (!tsk->vfork_done) \ + shstk_free(tsk); \ load_gs_index(0); \ loadsegment(fs, 0); \ } while (0)
arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h +5 -0
@@ -15,11 +15,16 @@ struct thread_shstk {long shstk_prctl (struct task_struct *task,int option,unsigned long features);void reset_thread_features (void ); +unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack (struct task_struct *p,unsigned long clone_flags, +unsigned long stack_size);void shstk_free (struct task_struct *p);#else static inline long shstk_prctl (struct task_struct *task,int option,unsigned long arg2) {return -EINVAL ; }static inline void reset_thread_features (void ) {} +static inline unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack (struct task_struct *p, +unsigned long clone_flags, +unsigned long stack_size) {return 0 ; }static inline void shstk_free (struct task_struct *p) {}#endif /* CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK */
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c +35 -1
@@ -552,8 +552,36 @@ static inline void fpu_inherit_perms(struct fpu *dst_fpu) } } +/* A passed ssp of zero will not cause any update */ +static int update_fpu_shstk (struct task_struct *dst,unsigned long ssp) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK +struct cet_user_state *xstate; + +/* If ssp update is not needed. */ +if (!ssp) +return 0 ; + + xstate =get_xsave_addr (&dst->thread.fpu.fpstate->regs.xsave, +XFEATURE_CET_USER ); + +/* +* If there is a non-zero ssp, then 'dst' must be configured with a shadow +* stack and the fpu state should be up to date since it was just copied +* from the parent in fpu_clone(). So there must be a valid non-init CET +* state location in the buffer. +*/ +if (WARN_ON_ONCE (!xstate)) +return 1 ; + + xstate->user_ssp = (u64 )ssp; +#endif +return 0 ; +} +/* Clone current's FPU state on fork */ -int fpu_clone (struct task_struct *dst,unsigned long clone_flags,bool minimal) +int fpu_clone (struct task_struct *dst,unsigned long clone_flags,bool minimal, +unsigned long ssp) {struct fpu *src_fpu = ¤t->thread.fpu;struct fpu *dst_fpu = &dst->thread.fpu;
@@ -613,6 +641,12 @@ int fpu_clone(struct task_struct *dst, unsigned long clone_flags, bool minimal)if (use_xsave ()) dst_fpu->fpstate->regs.xsave.header.xfeatures &= ~XFEATURE_MASK_PASID ; +/* +* Update shadow stack pointer, in case it changed during clone. +*/ +if (update_fpu_shstk (dst, ssp)) +return 1 ; +trace_x86_fpu_copy_src (src_fpu);trace_x86_fpu_copy_dst (dst_fpu);
arch/x86/kernel/process.c +20 -1
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@#include <asm/frame.h> #include <asm/unwind.h> #include <asm/tdx.h> +#include <asm/shstk.h> #include "process.h"
@@ -119,6 +120,7 @@ void exit_thread(struct task_struct *tsk)free_vm86 (t); +shstk_free (tsk);fpu__drop (fpu); }
@@ -140,6 +142,7 @@ int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)struct inactive_task_frame *frame;struct fork_frame *fork_frame;struct pt_regs *childregs; +unsigned long new_ssp;int ret =0 ; childregs =task_pt_regs (p);
@@ -174,7 +177,16 @@ int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args) frame->flags =X86_EFLAGS_FIXED ;#endif -fpu_clone (p, clone_flags, args->fn); +/* +* Allocate a new shadow stack for thread if needed. If shadow stack, +* is disabled, new_ssp will remain 0, and fpu_clone() will know not to +* update it. +*/ + new_ssp =shstk_alloc_thread_stack (p, clone_flags, args->stack_size); +if (IS_ERR_VALUE (new_ssp)) +return PTR_ERR ((void *)new_ssp); + +fpu_clone (p, clone_flags, args->fn, new_ssp);/* Kernel thread ? */ if (unlikely (p->flags &PF_KTHREAD )) {
@@ -220,6 +232,13 @@ int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct kernel_clone_args *args)if (!ret &&unlikely (test_tsk_thread_flag (current,TIF_IO_BITMAP )))io_bitmap_share (p); +/* +* If copy_thread() if failing, don't leak the shadow stack possibly +* allocated in shstk_alloc_thread_stack() above. +*/ +if (ret) +shstk_free (p); +return ret; }
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c +39 -2
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Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 31/40 x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk
In reply to Rick EdgecombeShadow stacks are normally written to via CALL/RET or specific CET instructions like RSTORSSP/SAVEPREVSSP. However, sometimes the kernel will need to write to the shadow stack directly using the ring-0 only WRUSS instruction.
A shadow stack restore token marks a restore point of the shadow stack, and the address in a token must point directly above the token, which is within the same shadow stack. This is distinctively different from other pointers on the shadow stack, since those pointers point to executable code area.
Introduce token setup and verify routines. Also introduce WRUSS, which is a kernel-mode instruction but writes directly to user shadow stack.
In future patches that enable shadow stack to work with signals, the kernel will need something to denote the point in the stack where sigreturn may be called. This will prevent attackers calling sigreturn at arbitrary places in the stack, in order to help prevent SROP attacks.
To do this, something that can only be written by the kernel needs to be placed on the shadow stack. This can be accomplished by setting bit 63 in the frame written to the shadow stack. Userspace return addresses can't have this bit set as it is in the kernel range. It also can't be a valid restore token.
---
v8:
- Update commit log verbiage (Boris)
- Use define instead of magic BIT(63) (Boris)
v5:
- Fix typo in commit log
v3:
- Drop shstk_check_rstor_token()
- Fail put_shstk_data() if bit 63 is set in the data (Kees)
- Add comment in create_rstor_token() (Kees)
- Pull in create_rstor_token() changes from future patch (Kees)
v2:
- Add data helpers for writing to shadow stack.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h | 13 +++++ arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 88 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/special_insns.h +13 -0
@@ -202,6 +202,19 @@ static inline void clwb(volatile void *__p) : [pax] "a" (p)); } +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK +static inline int write_user_shstk_64 (u64 __user *addr,u64 val) +{ + asm_volatile_goto("1: wrussq %[val], (%[addr])\n" + _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fail]) + :: [addr] "r" (addr), [val] "r" (val) + :: fail); +return 0 ; +fail: +return -EFAULT ; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK */ +#define nop () asm volatile ("nop")static inline void serialize (void )
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c +75 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 32/40 x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
In reply to Rick EdgecombeWhen a signal is handled, the context is pushed to the stack before handling it. For shadow stacks, since the shadow stack only tracks return addresses, there isn't any state that needs to be pushed. However, there are still a few things that need to be done. These things are visible to userspace and which will be kernel ABI for shadow stacks.
One is to make sure the restorer address is written to shadow stack, since the signal handler (if not changing ucontext) returns to the restorer, and the restorer calls sigreturn. So add the restorer on the shadow stack before handling the signal, so there is not a conflict when the signal handler returns to the restorer.
The other thing to do is to place some type of checkable token on the thread's shadow stack before handling the signal and check it during sigreturn. This is an extra layer of protection to hamper attackers calling sigreturn manually as in SROP-like attacks.
For this token the shadow stack data format defined earlier can be used. Have the data pushed be the previous SSP. In the future the sigreturn might want to return back to a different stack. Storing the SSP (instead of a restore offset or something) allows for future functionality that may want to restore to a different stack.
So, when handling a signal push
- the SSP pointing in the shadow stack data format
- the restorer address below the restore token.
In sigreturn, verify SSP is stored in the data format and pop the shadow stack.
---
v8:
- Update commit log verbiage (Boris)
- Remove duplicate alignment check (Boris)
v3:
- Drop shstk_setup_rstor_token() (Kees)
- Drop x32 signal support, since x32 support is dropped
v2:
- Switch to new shstk signal format
v1:
- Use xsave helpers.
- Expand commit log.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h | 5 ++ arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/signal.c | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/signal_64.c | 6 +++ 4 files changed, 107 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h +5 -0
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@#include <linux/types.h> struct task_struct ; +struct ksignal ;#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK struct thread_shstk {
@@ -18,6 +19,8 @@ void reset_thread_features(void);unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack (struct task_struct *p,unsigned long clone_flags,unsigned long stack_size);void shstk_free (struct task_struct *p); +int setup_signal_shadow_stack (struct ksignal *ksig); +int restore_signal_shadow_stack (void );#else static inline long shstk_prctl (struct task_struct *task,int option,unsigned long arg2) {return -EINVAL ; }
@@ -26,6 +29,8 @@ static inline unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long stack_size) { return 0; }static inline void shstk_free (struct task_struct *p) {} +static inline int setup_signal_shadow_stack (struct ksignal *ksig) {return 0 ; } +static inline int restore_signal_shadow_stack (void ) {return 0 ; }#endif /* CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK */ #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c +95 -0
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arch/x86/kernel/signal.c +1 -0
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@#include <asm/syscall.h> #include <asm/sigframe.h> #include <asm/signal.h> +#include <asm/shstk.h> static inline int is_ia32_compat_frame (struct ksignal *ksig) {
arch/x86/kernel/signal_64.c +6 -0
@@ -175,6 +175,9 @@ int x64_setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs) frame =get_sigframe (ksig, regs,sizeof (struct rt_sigframe ), &fp); uc_flags =frame_uc_flags (regs); +if (setup_signal_shadow_stack (ksig)) +return -EFAULT ; +if (!user_access_begin (frame,sizeof (*frame)))return -EFAULT ;
@@ -260,6 +263,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(rt_sigreturn)if (!restore_sigcontext (regs, &frame->uc.uc_mcontext, uc_flags)) goto badframe; +if (restore_signal_shadow_stack ()) + goto badframe; +if (restore_altstack (&frame->uc.uc_stack)) goto badframe;
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 33/40 x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall
In reply to Rick EdgecombeWhen operating with shadow stacks enabled, the kernel will automatically allocate shadow stacks for new threads, however in some cases userspace will need additional shadow stacks. The main example of this is the ucontext family of functions, which require userspace allocating and pivoting to userspace managed stacks.
Unlike most other user memory permissions, shadow stacks need to be provisioned with special data in order to be useful. They need to be setup with a restore token so that userspace can pivot to them via the RSTORSSP instruction. But, the security design of shadow stacks is that they should not be written to except in limited circumstances. This presents a problem for userspace, as to how userspace can provision this special data, without allowing for the shadow stack to be generally writable.
Previously, a new PROT_SHADOW_STACK was attempted, which could be mprotect()ed from RW permissions after the data was provisioned. This was found to not be secure enough, as other threads could write to the shadow stack during the writable window.
The kernel can use a special instruction, WRUSS, to write directly to userspace shadow stacks. So the solution can be that memory can be mapped as shadow stack permissions from the beginning (never generally writable in userspace), and the kernel itself can write the restore token.
First, a new madvise() flag was explored, which could operate on the PROT_SHADOW_STACK memory. This had a couple of downsides:
1. Extra checks were needed in mprotect() to prevent writable memory from ever becoming PROT_SHADOW_STACK.
2. Extra checks/vma state were needed in the new madvise() to prevent restore tokens being written into the middle of pre-used shadow stacks. It is ideal to prevent restore tokens being added at arbitrary locations, so the check was to make sure the shadow stack had never been written to.
3. It stood out from the rest of the madvise flags, as more of direct action than a hint at future desired behavior.
So rather than repurpose two existing syscalls (mmap, madvise) that don't quite fit, just implement a new map_shadow_stack syscall to allow userspace to map and setup new shadow stacks in one step. While ucontext is the primary motivator, userspace may have other unforeseen reasons to setup its own shadow stacks using the WRSS instruction. Towards this provide a flag so that stacks can be optionally setup securely for the common case of ucontext without enabling WRSS. Or potentially have the kernel set up the shadow stack in some new way.
The following example demonstrates how to create a new shadow stack with map_shadow_stack:
void *shstk = map_shadow_stack(addr, stack_size, SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN);
---
v8:
- Update commit log verbiage (Boris)
- Use SZ_4G (Boris)
- Return different error codes for each reason (Boris)
v5:
- Fix addr/mapped_addr (Kees)
- Switch to EOPNOTSUPP (Kees suggested ENOTSUPP, but checkpatch suggests this)
- Return error for addresses below 4G
v3:
- Change syscall common -> 64 (Kees)
- Use bit shift notation instead of 0x1 for uapi header (Kees)
- Call do_mmap() with MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE (Kees)
- Block unsupported flags (Kees)
- Require size >= 8 to set token (Kees)
v2:
- Change syscall to take address like mmap() for CRIU's usage
--- arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h | 3 ++ arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++---- include/linux/syscalls.h | 1 + include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 2 +- kernel/sys_ni.c | 1 + 6 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl +1 -0
@@ -372,6 +372,7 @@ 448 common process_mrelease sys_process_mrelease 449 common futex_waitv sys_futex_waitv 450 common set_mempolicy_home_node sys_set_mempolicy_home_node +451 64 map_shadow_stack sys_map_shadow_stack # # Due to a historical design error, certain syscalls are numbered differently
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h +3 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ ((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))#endif +/* Flags for map_shadow_stack(2) */ +#define SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN (1ULL << 0)/* Set up a restore token in the shadow stack */ +#include <asm-generic/mman.h> #endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c +51 -8
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include/linux/syscalls.h +1 -0
@@ -1058,6 +1058,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_memfd_secret(unsigned int flags);asmlinkage long sys_set_mempolicy_home_node (unsigned long start,unsigned long len,unsigned long home_node,unsigned long flags); +asmlinkage long sys_map_shadow_stack (unsigned long addr,unsigned long size,unsigned int flags);/* * Architecture-specific system calls
include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h +1 -1
@@ -887,7 +887,7 @@ __SYSCALL(__NR_futex_waitv, sys_futex_waitv) __SYSCALL(__NR_set_mempolicy_home_node, sys_set_mempolicy_home_node)#undef __NR_syscalls -#define __NR_syscalls 451 +#define __NR_syscalls 452/* * 32 bit systems traditionally used different
kernel/sys_ni.c +1 -0
@@ -381,6 +381,7 @@ COND_SYSCALL(vm86old);COND_SYSCALL (modify_ldt);COND_SYSCALL (vm86);COND_SYSCALL (kexec_file_load); +COND_SYSCALL (map_shadow_stack);/* s390 */ COND_SYSCALL (s390_pci_mmio_read);
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 34/40 x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace
In reply to Rick EdgecombeFor the current shadow stack implementation, shadow stacks contents can't easily be provisioned with arbitrary data. This property helps apps protect themselves better, but also restricts any potential apps that may want to do exotic things at the expense of a little security.
The x86 shadow stack feature introduces a new instruction, WRSS, which can be enabled to write directly to shadow stack memory from userspace. Allow it to get enabled via the prctl interface.
Only enable the userspace WRSS instruction, which allows writes to userspace shadow stacks from userspace. Do not allow it to be enabled independently of shadow stack, as HW does not support using WRSS when shadow stack is disabled.
From a fault handler perspective, WRSS will behave very similar to WRUSS, which is treated like a user access from a #PF err code perspective.
---
v8:
- Update commit log verbiage (Boris)
- Drop set_clr_bits_msrl() (Boris)
- Fix comments wrss->WRSS (Boris)
v6:
- Make set_clr_bits_msrl() avoid side effects in 'msr'
v5:
- Switch to EOPNOTSUPP
- Move set_clr_bits_msrl() to patch where it is first used
- Commit log formatting
v3:
- Make wrss_control() static
- Fix verbiage in commit log (Kees)
--- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h +1 -0
@@ -28,5 +28,6 @@/* ARCH_SHSTK_ features bits */ #define ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK (1ULL << 0) +#define ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS (1ULL << 1)#endif /* _ASM_X86_PRCTL_H */
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c +42 -1
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Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 35/40 x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status
In reply to Rick EdgecombeApplications and loaders can have logic to decide whether to enable shadow stack. They usually don't report whether shadow stack has been enabled or not, so there is no way to verify whether an application actually is protected by shadow stack.
Add two lines in /proc/$PID/status to report enabled and locked features.
Since, this involves referring to arch specific defines in asm/prctl.h, implement an arch breakout to emit the feature lines.
[Switched to CET, added to commit log]
---
v4:
- Remove "CET" references
v3:
- Move to /proc/pid/status (Kees)
v2:
- New patch
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/proc.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ fs/proc/array.c | 6 ++++++ include/linux/proc_fs.h | 2 ++ 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/proc.c +23 -0
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@#include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/seq_file.h> #include <linux/cpufreq.h> +#include <asm/prctl.h> +#include <linux/proc_fs.h> #include "cpu.h"
@@ -175,3 +177,24 @@ const struct seq_operations cpuinfo_op = { .stop = c_stop, .show = show_cpuinfo, }; + +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK +static void dump_x86_features (struct seq_file *m,unsigned long features) +{ +if (features &ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK ) +seq_puts (m,"shstk " ); +if (features &ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS ) +seq_puts (m,"wrss " ); +} + +void arch_proc_pid_thread_features (struct seq_file *m,struct task_struct *task) +{ +seq_puts (m,"x86_Thread_features:\t" ); +dump_x86_features (m, task->thread.features); +seq_putc (m,'\n' ); + +seq_puts (m,"x86_Thread_features_locked:\t" ); +dump_x86_features (m, task->thread.features_locked); +seq_putc (m,'\n' ); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK */
fs/proc/array.c +6 -0
@@ -423,6 +423,11 @@ static inline void task_thp_status(struct seq_file *m, struct mm_struct *mm)seq_printf (m,"THP_enabled:\t%d\n" , thp_enabled); } +__weak void arch_proc_pid_thread_features (struct seq_file *m, +struct task_struct *task) +{ +} +int proc_pid_status (struct seq_file *m,struct pid_namespace *ns,struct pid *pid,struct task_struct *task) {
@@ -446,6 +451,7 @@ int proc_pid_status(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,task_cpus_allowed (m, task);cpuset_task_status_allowed (m, task);task_context_switch_counts (m, task); +arch_proc_pid_thread_features (m, task);return 0 ; }
include/linux/proc_fs.h +2 -0
@@ -158,6 +158,8 @@ int proc_pid_arch_status(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task);#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_PID_ARCH_STATUS */ +void arch_proc_pid_thread_features (struct seq_file *m,struct task_struct *task); +#else /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */ static inline void proc_root_init (void )
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 36/40 x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface
In reply to Rick EdgecombeThe kernel now has the main shadow stack functionality to support applications. Wire in the WRSS and shadow stack enable/disable functions into the existing shadow stack API skeleton.
---
v4:
- Remove "CET" references
v2:
- Split from other patches
--- arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c +8 -0
@@ -472,9 +472,17 @@ long shstk_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long features)return -EINVAL ;if (option ==ARCH_SHSTK_DISABLE ) { +if (features &ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS ) +return wrss_control (false); +if (features &ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK ) +return shstk_disable ();return -EINVAL ; }/* Handle ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE */ +if (features &ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK ) +return shstk_setup (); +if (features &ARCH_SHSTK_WRSS ) +return wrss_control (true);return -EINVAL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 37/40 selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test
In reply to Rick EdgecombeAdd a simple selftest for exercising some shadow stack behavior:
- map_shadow_stack syscall and pivot
- Faulting in shadow stack memory
- Handling shadow stack violations
- GUP of shadow stack memory
- mprotect() of shadow stack memory
- Userfaultfd on shadow stack memory
- 32 bit segmentation
---
v7:
- Remove KHDR_INCLUDES and just add a copy of the defines (Boris)
v6:
- Tweak mprotect test
- Code style tweaks
v5:
- Update 32 bit signal test with new ABI and better asm
v4:
- Add test for 32 bit signal ABI blocking
--- tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile | 2 +- .../testing/selftests/x86/test_shadow_stack.c | 695 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 696 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_shadow_stack.c
tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ TARGETS_C_32BIT_ONLY := entry_from_vm86 test_syscall_vdso unwind_vdso \ test_FCMOV test_FCOMI test_FISTTP \ vdso_restorer TARGETS_C_64BIT_ONLY := fsgsbase sysret_rip syscall_numbering \ - corrupt_xstate_header amx + corrupt_xstate_header amx test_shadow_stack # Some selftests require 32bit support enabled also on 64bit systems TARGETS_C_32BIT_NEEDED := ldt_gdt ptrace_syscall
tools/testing/selftests/x86/test_shadow_stack.c new file +695 -0
695 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 38/40 x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack
In reply to Rick EdgecombeSome applications (like GDB) would like to tweak shadow stack state via ptrace. This allows for existing functionality to continue to work for seized shadow stack applications. Provide a regset interface for manipulating the shadow stack pointer (SSP).
There is already ptrace functionality for accessing xstate, but this does not include supervisor xfeatures. So there is not a completely clear place for where to put the shadow stack state. Adding it to the user xfeatures regset would complicate that code, as it currently shares logic with signals which should not have supervisor features.
Don't add a general supervisor xfeature regset like the user one, because it is better to maintain flexibility for other supervisor xfeatures to define their own interface. For example, an xfeature may decide not to expose all of it's state to userspace, as is actually the case for shadow stack ptrace functionality. A lot of enum values remain to be used, so just put it in dedicated shadow stack regset.
The only downside to not having a generic supervisor xfeature regset, is that apps need to be enlightened of any new supervisor xfeature exposed this way (i.e. they can't try to have generic save/restore logic). But maybe that is a good thing, because they have to think through each new xfeature instead of encountering issues when a new supervisor xfeature was added.
By adding a shadow stack regset, it also has the effect of including the shadow stack state in a core dump, which could be useful for debugging.
The shadow stack specific xstate includes the SSP, and the shadow stack and WRSS enablement status. Enabling shadow stack or WRSS in the kernel involves more than just flipping the bit. The kernel is made aware that it has to do extra things when cloning or handling signals. That logic is triggered off of separate feature enablement state kept in the task struct. So the flipping on HW shadow stack enforcement without notifying the kernel to change its behavior would severely limit what an application could do without crashing, and the results would depend on kernel internal implementation details. There is also no known use for controlling this state via ptrace today. So only expose the SSP, which is something that userspace already has indirect control over.
---
v8:
- Update commit log verbiage (Boris)
- Stop using init_xfeature() and just return an error if the init state is encountered, since it shouldn't be. (Boris)
v5:
- Check shadow stack enablement status for tracee (rppt)
- Fix typo in comment
v4:
- Make shadow stack only. Reduce to only supporting SSP register, and remove CET references (peterz)
- Add comment to not use 0x203, because binutils already looks for it in coredumps. (Christina Schimpe)
v3:
- Drop dependence on thread.shstk.size, and use thread.features bits
- Drop 32 bit support
--- arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/regset.h | 7 +-- arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c | 12 +++++ include/uapi/linux/elf.h | 2 + 4 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/fpu/regset.h +4 -3
@@ -7,11 +7,12 @@#include <linux/regset.h> -extern user_regset_active_fn regset_fpregs_active, regset_xregset_fpregs_active; +extern user_regset_active_fn regset_fpregs_active, regset_xregset_fpregs_active, + ssp_active;extern user_regset_get2_fn fpregs_get, xfpregs_get, fpregs_soft_get, - xstateregs_get; + xstateregs_get, ssp_get;extern user_regset_set_fn fpregs_set, xfpregs_set, fpregs_soft_set, - xstateregs_set; + xstateregs_set, ssp_set;/* * xstateregs_active == regset_fpregs_active. Please refer to the comment
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c +78 -0
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arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c +12 -0
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ enum x86_regset_64 {REGSET64_FP ,REGSET64_IOPERM ,REGSET64_XSTATE , + REGSET64_SSP, };#define REGSET_GENERAL \
@@ -1267,6 +1268,17 @@ static struct user_regset x86_64_regsets[] __ro_after_init = { .active = ioperm_active, .regset_get = ioperm_get }, +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_USER_SHADOW_STACK + [REGSET64_SSP] = { + .core_note_type = NT_X86_SHSTK, + .n = 1, + .size = sizeof(u64), + .align = sizeof(u64), + .active = ssp_active, + .regset_get = ssp_get, + .set = ssp_set + }, +#endif }; static const struct user_regset_view user_x86_64_view = {
include/uapi/linux/elf.h +2 -0
@@ -406,6 +406,8 @@ typedef struct elf64_shdr {#define NT_386_TLS 0x200/* i386 TLS slots (struct user_desc) */ #define NT_386_IOPERM 0x201/* x86 io permission bitmap (1=deny) */ #define NT_X86_XSTATE 0x202/* x86 extended state using xsave */ +/* Old binutils treats 0x203 as a CET state */ +#define NT_X86_SHSTK 0x204/* x86 SHSTK state */ #define NT_S390_HIGH_GPRS 0x300/* s390 upper register halves */ #define NT_S390_TIMER 0x301/* s390 timer register */ #define NT_S390_TODCMP 0x302/* s390 TOD clock comparator register */
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 39/40 x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK
In reply to Rick EdgecombeFrom: Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>
Userspace loaders may lock features before a CRIU restore operation has the chance to set them to whatever state is required by the process being restored. Allow a way for CRIU to unlock features. Add it as an arch_prctl() like the other shadow stack operations, but restrict it being called by the ptrace arch_pctl() interface.
[Merged into recent API changes, added commit log and docs]
---
v8:
- Remove Mike's ack from his own patch (Boris)
v4:
- Add to docs that it is ptrace only.
- Remove "CET" references
v3:
- Depend on CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE (Kees)
--- Documentation/x86/shstk.rst | 4 ++++ arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 9 +++++++-- 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/x86/shstk.rst +4 -0
@@ -75,6 +75,10 @@ arch_prctl(ARCH_SHSTK_LOCK, unsigned long features) are ignored. The mask is ORed with the existing value. So any feature bits set here cannot be enabled or disabled afterwards. +arch_prctl(ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK, unsigned long features) + Unlock features. 'features' is a mask of all features to unlock. All + bits set are processed, unset bits are ignored. Only works via ptrace. + The return values are as follows. On success, return 0. On error, errno can be::
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h +1 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@#define ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE 0x5001#define ARCH_SHSTK_DISABLE 0x5002#define ARCH_SHSTK_LOCK 0x5003 +#define ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK 0x5004/* ARCH_SHSTK_ features bits */ #define ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK (1ULL << 0)
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +1 -0
@@ -835,6 +835,7 @@ long do_arch_prctl_64(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2)case ARCH_SHSTK_ENABLE :case ARCH_SHSTK_DISABLE :case ARCH_SHSTK_LOCK : +case ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK :return shstk_prctl (task, option, arg2);default : ret = -EINVAL ;
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c +7 -2
@@ -459,9 +459,14 @@ long shstk_prctl(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long features)return 0 ; } -/* Don't allow via ptrace */ -if (task != current) +/* Only allow via ptrace */ +if (task != current) { +if (option ==ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK &&IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE )) { + task->thread.features_locked &= ~features; +return 0 ; + }return -EINVAL ; + }/* Do not allow to change locked features */ if (features & task->thread.features_locked)
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH v8 40/40 x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS
In reply to Rick EdgecombeCRIU and GDB need to get the current shadow stack and WRSS enablement status. This information is already available via /proc/pid/status, but this is inconvenient for CRIU because it involves parsing the text output in an area of the code where this is difficult. Provide a status arch_prctl(), ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS for retrieving the status. Have arg2 be a userspace address, and make the new arch_prctl simply copy the features out to userspace.
---
v5:
- Fix typo in commit log
v4:
- New patch
--- Documentation/x86/shstk.rst | 6 ++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c | 8 +++++++- 5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/x86/shstk.rst +6 -0
@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ arch_prctl(ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK, unsigned long features) Unlock features. 'features' is a mask of all features to unlock. All bits set are processed, unset bits are ignored. Only works via ptrace. +arch_prctl(ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS, unsigned long addr) + Copy the currently enabled features to the address passed in addr. The + features are described using the bits passed into the others in + 'features'. + The return values are as follows. On success, return 0. On error, errno can be::
@@ -86,6 +91,7 @@ be:: -ENOTSUPP if the feature is not supported by the hardware or kernel. -EINVAL arguments (non existing feature, etc) + -EFAULT if could not copy information back to userspace The feature's bits supported are::
arch/x86/include/asm/shstk.h +1 -1
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ struct thread_shstk {u64 size; }; -long shstk_prctl (struct task_struct *task,int option,unsigned long features); +long shstk_prctl (struct task_struct *task,int option,unsigned long arg2);void reset_thread_features (void );unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack (struct task_struct *p,unsigned long clone_flags,unsigned long stack_size);
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/prctl.h +1 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@#define ARCH_SHSTK_DISABLE 0x5002#define ARCH_SHSTK_LOCK 0x5003#define ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK 0x5004 +#define ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS 0x5005/* ARCH_SHSTK_ features bits */ #define ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK (1ULL << 0)
arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c +1 -0
@@ -836,6 +836,7 @@ long do_arch_prctl_64(struct task_struct *task, int option, unsigned long arg2)case ARCH_SHSTK_DISABLE :case ARCH_SHSTK_LOCK :case ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK : +case ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS :return shstk_prctl (task, option, arg2);default : ret = -EINVAL ;
arch/x86/kernel/shstk.c +7 -1
@@ -452,8 +452,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(map_shadow_stack, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, size, unsireturn alloc_shstk (addr, aligned_size, size, set_tok); } -long shstk_prctl (struct task_struct *task,int option,unsigned long features) +long shstk_prctl (struct task_struct *task,int option,unsigned long arg2) { +unsigned long features = arg2; + +if (option ==ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS ) { +return put_user (task->thread.features, (unsigned long __user *)arg2); + } +if (option ==ARCH_SHSTK_LOCK ) { task->thread.features_locked |= features;return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Quoted 3 lines · Rick Edgecombe
At this point, I think we have a pretty good initial shadow stack implementation here. I'd like to start with the basics and let real world usage inform the enhancements if we can.
Yes, finally!
That was loooong in the making. Thanks for the persistence and patience.
For the whole set:
Quoted 1 line
Unless anyone sees any likely ABI trap we are walking into.
Yeah, dhansen, let's queue this and run it on everything and as much as possible before the MW comes so that we can have a chance to catch any potential showstopper snafus we've missed.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette