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Support FT-8021X-SHA384

PATCH Applied James Prestwood 2 participants 13 messages Apr 10, 2023 – Apr 16, 2023

v1 of 2 Applied Latest is v2 →

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#0 lore raw

cover Support FT-8021X-SHA384

When investigating PMKID derivation issues with older hostapd versions it looked like SHA384 was never supported for deriving the PMKID. This was easy enough to add, but in order to test it some AKM needed to be used that required SHA384 and still used the normal PMKID derivation APIs (i.e. not FILS). To do this support for the FT-8021X-SHA384 AKM has been added.

James Prestwood (9):
crypto: modify crypto_derive_pmkid to take the hash/key length
handshake: include additional sha256 AKMs for PMKID generation
crypto: add hmac_sha384 support for PMKID derivation
eapol: add support for FT-8021X-SHA384
handshake: support FT-8021X-SHA384
handshake: remove hardcoded kek_len for FTE decode
common: add FT-8021X-SHA384 to AKM_IS_8021X
wiphy: add FT-8021X-SHA384 to supported AKMs
auto-t: update testFT-8021x-roam with SHA384 test

 .../testFT-8021x-roam/connection_test.py      | 18 ++++++-
 src/common.c                                  |  1 +
 src/crypto.c                                  | 20 +++++---
 src/crypto.h                                  |  5 +-
 src/eapol.c                                   | 13 ++++-
 src/handshake.c                               | 49 ++++++++++++++-----
 src/wiphy.c                                   |  6 +++
 7 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/9 crypto: modify crypto_derive_pmkid to take the hash/key length

The existing API was limited to SHA1 or SHA256 and assumed a key length of 32 bytes. Since other AKMs plan to be added update this to take the checksum/length directly for better flexibility.

---
 src/crypto.c    | 18 ++++++++++++------
 src/crypto.h    |  5 +++--
 src/eapol.c     |  4 ++--
 src/handshake.c | 11 ++++++-----
 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
src/crypto.c +12 -6
index 840d9ee4..f8aba7d8 100644
@@ -1116,9 +1116,10 @@ exit:
 }
 
 /* Defined in 802.11-2012, Section 11.6.1.3 Pairwise Key Hierarchy */
-bool crypto_derive_pmkid(const uint8_t *pmk,
+bool crypto_derive_pmkid(const uint8_t *pmk, size_t key_len,
 				const uint8_t *addr1, const uint8_t *addr2,
-				uint8_t *out_pmkid, bool use_sha256)
+				uint8_t *out_pmkid,
+				enum l_checksum_type checksum)
 {
 	uint8_t data[20];
 
@@ -1126,10 +1127,15 @@ bool crypto_derive_pmkid(const uint8_t *pmk,
 	memcpy(data + 8, addr2, 6);
 	memcpy(data + 14, addr1, 6);
 
-	if (use_sha256)
-		return hmac_sha256(pmk, 32, data, 20, out_pmkid, 16);
-	else
-		return hmac_sha1(pmk, 32, data, 20, out_pmkid, 16);
+	switch (checksum) {
+	case L_CHECKSUM_SHA1:
+		return hmac_sha1(pmk, key_len, data, 20, out_pmkid, 16);
+	case L_CHECKSUM_SHA256:
+		return hmac_sha256(pmk, key_len, data, 20, out_pmkid, 16);
+	default:
+		l_error("Checksum type %u is not valid", checksum);
+		return false;
+	}
 }
 
 enum l_checksum_type crypto_sae_hash_from_ecc_prime_len(enum crypto_sae type,
src/crypto.h +3 -2
index ed430abb..d2a96655 100644
@@ -154,9 +154,10 @@ bool crypto_derive_ft_ptk(const uint8_t *pmk_r1, const uint8_t *pmk_r1_name,
 				bool sha384, uint8_t *out_ptk, size_t ptk_len,
 				uint8_t *out_ptk_name);
 
-bool crypto_derive_pmkid(const uint8_t *pmk,
+bool crypto_derive_pmkid(const uint8_t *pmk, size_t key_len,
 				const uint8_t *addr1, const uint8_t *addr2,
-				uint8_t *out_pmkid, bool use_sha256);
+				uint8_t *out_pmkid,
+				enum l_checksum_type checksum);
 
 enum crypto_sae {
 	CRYPTO_SAE_LOOPING,
src/eapol.c +2 -2
index 9471d13e..9e8f7c34 100644
@@ -1103,8 +1103,8 @@ static void eapol_send_ptk_1_of_4(struct eapol_sm *sm)
 	memcpy(ek->key_nonce, sm->handshake->anonce, sizeof(ek->key_nonce));
 
 	/* Write the PMKID KDE into Key Data field unencrypted */
-	crypto_derive_pmkid(sm->handshake->pmk, sm->handshake->spa, aa,
-			pmkid, false);
+	crypto_derive_pmkid(sm->handshake->pmk, 32, sm->handshake->spa, aa,
+			pmkid, L_CHECKSUM_SHA1);
 
 	eapol_key_data_append(ek, sm->mic_len, HANDSHAKE_KDE_PMKID, pmkid, 16);
 
src/handshake.c +6 -5
index 734e997c..39a650c5 100644
@@ -736,7 +736,8 @@ void handshake_state_set_pmkid(struct handshake_state *s, const uint8_t *pmkid)
 
 bool handshake_state_get_pmkid(struct handshake_state *s, uint8_t *out_pmkid)
 {
-	bool use_sha256;
+	enum l_checksum_type sha;
+	size_t key_len = 32;
 
 	/* SAE exports pmkid */
 	if (s->have_pmkid) {
@@ -757,12 +758,12 @@ bool handshake_state_get_pmkid(struct handshake_state *s, uint8_t *out_pmkid)
 
 	if (s->akm_suite & (IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_8021X_SHA256 |
 			IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_PSK_SHA256))
-		use_sha256 = true;
+		sha = L_CHECKSUM_SHA256;
 	else
-		use_sha256 = false;
+		sha = L_CHECKSUM_SHA1;
 
-	return crypto_derive_pmkid(s->pmk, s->spa, s->aa, out_pmkid,
-					use_sha256);
+	return crypto_derive_pmkid(s->pmk, key_len, s->spa, s->aa, out_pmkid,
+					sha);
 }
 
 void handshake_state_set_gtk(struct handshake_state *s, const uint8_t *key,
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 1/9] crypto: modify crypto_derive_pmkid to take the hash/key length

Hi James,

Quoted 10 lines · James Prestwood

The existing API was limited to SHA1 or SHA256 and assumed a key length of 32 bytes. Since other AKMs plan to be added update this to take the checksum/length directly for better flexibility.

---
  src/crypto.c    | 18 ++++++++++++------
  src/crypto.h    |  5 +++--
  src/eapol.c     |  4 ++--
  src/handshake.c | 11 ++++++-----
  4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

<snip>

Quoted 7 lines
src/crypto.c +0 -3
@@ -1126,10 +1127,15 @@ bool crypto_derive_pmkid(const uint8_t *pmk,
  	memcpy(data + 8, addr2, 6);
  	memcpy(data + 14, addr1, 6);
 
-	if (use_sha256)
-		return hmac_sha256(pmk, 32, data, 20, out_pmkid, 16);
-	else

src/crypto.c bool crypto_derive_pmkid(const uint8_t *pmk, · line 1138

Quoted 10 lines
src/crypto.c +9 -1
-		return hmac_sha1(pmk, 32, data, 20, out_pmkid, 16);
+	switch (checksum) {
+	case L_CHECKSUM_SHA1:
+		return hmac_sha1(pmk, key_len, data, 20, out_pmkid, 16);
+	case L_CHECKSUM_SHA256:
+		return hmac_sha256(pmk, key_len, data, 20, out_pmkid, 16);
+	default:
+		l_error("Checksum type %u is not valid", checksum);
+		return false;
+	}

Just use l_checksum_new_hmac directly and avoid the switch/case. That way patch 3 is unnecessary.

Regards,
-Denis

#3 lore raw

PATCH 2/9 handshake: include additional sha256 AKMs for PMKID generation

In reply to James Prestwood

The 802.11 spec defines what AKMs should use sha256 to derive the PMKID. Hostapd commit b6d3fd05e3 changed the PMKID derivation in accordance with 802.11-2020 which then breaks PMKID validation in IWD. This breaks FT-PSK/8021x AKMs in IWD if the AP uses this hostapd version.

Updating IWD to use sha256 in these cases will now break backwards compatibility with *older* APs, but this will be worked around in future commits.

---
 src/handshake.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
src/handshake.c +14 -1
index 39a650c5..82e0c1c2 100644
@@ -754,10 +754,23 @@ bool handshake_state_get_pmkid(struct handshake_state *s, uint8_t *out_pmkid)
 	 * preauthentication, the AKM has not yet been negotiated. In this
 	 * case, the HMAC-SHA1-128 based derivation is used for the PMKID
 	 * calculation."
+	 *
+	 * 802.11-2020 Table 9-151 defines the hashing algorithm to use
+	 * for various AKM's. SHA256 should be used for the following
+	 * AKM's (for this API context):
+	 *
+	 * 00-0F-AC:3 (FT-8021X)
+	 * 00-0F-AC:4 (FT-PSK)
+	 * 00-0F-AC:5 (8021X-SHA256)
+	 * 00-0F-AC:6 (PSK-SHA256)
+	 *
+	 * (Note SAE/FILS were left out as they generate their own PMKID)
 	 */
 
 	if (s->akm_suite & (IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_8021X_SHA256 |
-			IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_PSK_SHA256))
+			IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_PSK_SHA256 |
+			IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X |
+			IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_USING_PSK))
 		sha = L_CHECKSUM_SHA256;
 	else
 		sha = L_CHECKSUM_SHA1;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#4 lore raw

PATCH 3/9 crypto: add hmac_sha384 support for PMKID derivation

In reply to James Prestwood

SHA384 is required by several AKMs

---
 src/crypto.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
src/crypto.c +2 -0
index f8aba7d8..6b8a7b1e 100644
@@ -1132,6 +1132,8 @@ bool crypto_derive_pmkid(const uint8_t *pmk, size_t key_len,
 		return hmac_sha1(pmk, key_len, data, 20, out_pmkid, 16);
 	case L_CHECKSUM_SHA256:
 		return hmac_sha256(pmk, key_len, data, 20, out_pmkid, 16);
+	case L_CHECKSUM_SHA384:
+		return hmac_sha384(pmk, key_len, data, 20, out_pmkid, 16);
 	default:
 		l_error("Checksum type %u is not valid", checksum);
 		return false;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#5 lore raw

PATCH 4/9 eapol: add support for FT-8021X-SHA384

In reply to James Prestwood

The SHA384 variant was not being checked for in any of the MIC calculations/verifications or for EAPoL decryption.

---
 src/eapol.c | 9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
src/eapol.c +9 -0
index 9e8f7c34..f290f40a 100644
@@ -110,6 +110,9 @@ bool eapol_calculate_mic(enum ie_rsn_akm_suite akm, const uint8_t *kck,
 		case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_OSEN:
 			return cmac_aes(kck, 16, frame, frame_len,
 						mic, mic_len);
+		case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X_SHA384:
+			return hmac_sha384(kck, 24, frame, frame_len,
+						mic, mic_len);
 		case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_OWE:
 			switch (mic_len) {
 			case 16:
@@ -164,6 +167,10 @@ bool eapol_verify_mic(enum ie_rsn_akm_suite akm, const uint8_t *kck,
 		case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_OSEN:
 			checksum = l_checksum_new_cmac_aes(kck, 16);
 			break;
+		case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X_SHA384:
+			checksum = l_checksum_new_hmac(L_CHECKSUM_SHA384,
+							kck, 24);
+			break;
 		case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_OWE:
 			switch (mic_len) {
 			case 16:
@@ -270,6 +277,7 @@ uint8_t *eapol_decrypt_key_data(enum ie_rsn_akm_suite akm, const uint8_t *kek,
 		case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_SAE_SHA256:
 		case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_OWE:
 		case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_OSEN:
+		case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X_SHA384:
 			if (key_data_len < 24 || key_data_len % 8)
 				return NULL;
 
@@ -315,6 +323,7 @@ uint8_t *eapol_decrypt_key_data(enum ie_rsn_akm_suite akm, const uint8_t *kek,
 	case EAPOL_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_VERSION_AKM_DEFINED:
 		switch (akm) {
 		case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_OWE:
+		case IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X_SHA384:
 			switch (mic_len) {
 			case 16:
 				kek_len = 16;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#6 lore raw

PATCH 5/9 handshake: support FT-8021X-SHA384

In reply to James Prestwood

This adds the AKM to various places in handshake.c when deriving keys to support this AKM.

---
 src/handshake.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
src/handshake.c +22 -5
index 82e0c1c2..362ff58a 100644
@@ -505,6 +505,7 @@ bool handshake_state_derive_ptk(struct handshake_state *s)
 			return false;
 
 	if ((s->akm_suite & (IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X |
+				IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X_SHA384 |
 				IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_USING_PSK |
 				IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_SAE_SHA256 |
 				IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA256 |
@@ -524,7 +525,8 @@ bool handshake_state_derive_ptk(struct handshake_state *s)
 		else
 			return false;
 	} else if (s->akm_suite & (IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FILS_SHA384 |
-			IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA384))
+			IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA384 |
+			IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X_SHA384))
 		type = L_CHECKSUM_SHA384;
 	else if (s->akm_suite & (IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_8021X_SHA256 |
 			IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_PSK_SHA256 |
@@ -540,6 +542,7 @@ bool handshake_state_derive_ptk(struct handshake_state *s)
 	ptk_size = handshake_state_get_ptk_size(s);
 
 	if (s->akm_suite & (IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X |
+				IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X_SHA384 |
 				IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_USING_PSK |
 				IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_SAE_SHA256 |
 				IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA256 |
@@ -549,7 +552,8 @@ bool handshake_state_derive_ptk(struct handshake_state *s)
 		const uint8_t *xxkey = s->pmk;
 		size_t xxkey_len = 32;
 		bool sha384 = (s->akm_suite &
-					IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA384);
+					(IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA384 |
+					IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X_SHA384));
 
 		/*
 		 * In a Fast Transition initial mobility domain association
@@ -562,7 +566,10 @@ bool handshake_state_derive_ptk(struct handshake_state *s)
 		 */
 		if (s->akm_suite == IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X)
 			xxkey = s->pmk + 32;
-		else if (s->akm_suite & (IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA256 |
+		else if (s->akm_suite == IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X_SHA384) {
+			xxkey = s->pmk;
+			xxkey_len = s->pmk_len;
+		} else if (s->akm_suite & (IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA256 |
 				IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA384)) {
 			xxkey = s->fils_ft;
 			xxkey_len = s->fils_ft_len;
@@ -626,7 +633,8 @@ const uint8_t *handshake_state_get_kck(struct handshake_state *s)
 
 size_t handshake_state_get_kck_len(struct handshake_state *s)
 {
-	if (s->akm_suite & IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA384)
+	if (s->akm_suite & (IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA384 |
+			IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X_SHA384))
 		return 24;
 
 	return 16;
@@ -767,7 +775,16 @@ bool handshake_state_get_pmkid(struct handshake_state *s, uint8_t *out_pmkid)
 	 * (Note SAE/FILS were left out as they generate their own PMKID)
 	 */
 
-	if (s->akm_suite & (IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_8021X_SHA256 |
+	if (s->akm_suite & IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X_SHA384) {
+		sha = L_CHECKSUM_SHA384;
+		/*
+		 * According to 12.7.1.6.3 the key length should be:
+		 * "the first 384 bits of the MSK". Unfortunately hostapd uses
+		 * the PMK length directly which can vary depending on the EAP
+		 * method...
+		 */
+		key_len = s->pmk_len;
+	} else if (s->akm_suite & (IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_8021X_SHA256 |
 			IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_PSK_SHA256 |
 			IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X |
 			IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_USING_PSK))
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#7 lore raw

PATCH 6/9 handshake: remove hardcoded kek_len for FTE decode

In reply to James Prestwood

The KEK length should be obtained with the getter to ensure the AKM is taken into account

---
 src/handshake.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
src/handshake.c +1 -1
index 362ff58a..70aeda37 100644
@@ -1035,7 +1035,7 @@ bool handshake_decode_fte_key(struct handshake_state *s, const uint8_t *wrapped,
 				size_t key_len, uint8_t *key_out)
 {
 	const uint8_t *kek;
-	size_t kek_len = 16;
+	size_t kek_len = handshake_state_get_kek_len(s);
 	size_t padded_len = key_len < 16 ? 16 : align_len(key_len, 8);
 
 	if (s->akm_suite & (IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA256 |
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 6/9] handshake: remove hardcoded kek_len for FTE decode

Hi James,

Quoted 6 lines · James Prestwood

The KEK length should be obtained with the getter to ensure the AKM is taken into account

---
  src/handshake.c | 2 +-
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

Applied, thanks.

Regards,
-Denis

#9 lore raw

PATCH 7/9 common: add FT-8021X-SHA384 to AKM_IS_8021X

In reply to James Prestwood

Without this the AKM shows up as WEP.

---
 src/common.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
src/common.c +1 -0
index ea7b0ca0..91979423 100644
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ bool security_from_str(const char *str, enum security *security)
 	akm & (IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_8021X |					\
 		IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_8021X_SHA256 |				\
 		IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X |			\
+		IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X_SHA384 |			\
 		IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FILS_SHA256 |				\
 		IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FILS_SHA384 |				\
 		IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_FILS_SHA256 |			\
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 7/9] common: add FT-8021X-SHA384 to AKM_IS_8021X

Hi James,

Quoted 5 lines · James Prestwood

Without this the AKM shows up as WEP.

---
  src/common.c | 1 +
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

Applied, thanks.

Regards,
-Denis

#11 lore raw

PATCH 8/9 wiphy: add FT-8021X-SHA384 to supported AKMs

In reply to James Prestwood

This AKM is now possible to choose from the list.

---
 src/wiphy.c | 6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
src/wiphy.c +6 -0
index 2db2d2cd..40ab0a0b 100644
@@ -281,6 +281,12 @@ enum ie_rsn_akm_suite wiphy_select_akm(struct wiphy *wiphy,
 				return IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FILS_SHA256;
 		}
 
+		if ((info->akm_suites &
+				IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X_SHA384) &&
+				bss->rsne && bss->mde_present &&
+				wiphy->support_cmds_auth_assoc)
+			return IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X_SHA384;
+
 		if ((info->akm_suites & IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_FT_OVER_8021X) &&
 				bss->rsne && bss->mde_present &&
 				wiphy->support_cmds_auth_assoc)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
#12 lore raw

PATCH 9/9 auto-t: update testFT-8021x-roam with SHA384 test

In reply to James Prestwood
---
 autotests/testFT-8021x-roam/connection_test.py | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
autotests/testFT-8021x-roam/connection_test.py +17 -1
index 356a9af2..2a4fe9e1 100644
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ from hostapd import HostapdCLI
 import testutil
 
 class Test(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_roam_success(self):
+    def validate(self):
         wd = IWD(True)
 
         device = wd.list_devices(1)[0]
@@ -50,6 +50,22 @@ class Test(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertRaises(Exception, testutil.test_ifaces_connected,
                           (self.bss_hostapd[0].ifname, device.name, True, True))
 
+    def test_ft_8021x_sha256(self):
+        self.bss_hostapd[0].set_value('wpa_key_mgmt', 'FT-EAP')
+        self.bss_hostapd[0].reload()
+        self.bss_hostapd[1].set_value('wpa_key_mgmt', 'FT-EAP')
+        self.bss_hostapd[1].reload()
+
+        self.validate()
+
+    def test_ft_8021x_sha3846(self):
+        self.bss_hostapd[0].set_value('wpa_key_mgmt', 'FT-EAP-SHA384')
+        self.bss_hostapd[0].reload()
+        self.bss_hostapd[1].set_value('wpa_key_mgmt', 'FT-EAP-SHA384')
+        self.bss_hostapd[1].reload()
+
+        self.validate()
+
     def tearDown(self):
         os.system('ip link set "' + self.bss_hostapd[0].ifname + '" down')
         os.system('ip link set "' + self.bss_hostapd[1].ifname + '" down')
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1