Add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
Subsystems (2)
v2 cover Add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
Over the last few years we've seen many critical vulnerabilities in io_uring[1] which could be exploited by an unprivileged process to gain control over the kernel. This patch introduces a new sysctl which disables the creation of new io_uring instances system-wide.
The goal of this patch is to give distros, system admins, and cloud providers a way to reduce the risk of privilege escalation through io_uring where disabling it with seccomp or at compile time is not practical. For example a distro or cloud provider might want to disable io_uring by default and have users enable it again if they need to run a program that requires it. The new sysctl is designed to let a user with root on the machine enable and disable io_uring systemwide at runtime without requiring a kernel recompilation or a reboot.
[1] Link: https://goo.gle/limit-iouring
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v2:
* Documentation style fixes
* Add a third level that only disables io_uring for unprivileged processes
Matteo Rizzo (1):
Add a new sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 19 +++++++++++++ io_uring/io_uring.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+)
Signature · 1 line
2.41.0.162.gfafddb0af9-goog
PATCH v2 1/1 Add a new sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
Introduce a new sysctl (io_uring_disabled) which can be either 0, 1, or 2. When 0 (the default), all processes are allowed to create io_uring instances, which is the current behavior. When 1, all calls to io_uring_setup fail with -EPERM unless the calling process has CAP_SYS_ADMIN. When 2, calls to io_uring_setup fail with -EPERM regardless of privilege.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 19 +++++++++++++ io_uring/io_uring.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+)
Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst +19 -0
@@ -450,6 +450,25 @@ this allows system administrators to override the ``IA64_THREAD_UAC_NOPRINT`` ``prctl`` and avoid logs being flooded. +io_uring_disabled +================= + +Prevents all processes from creating new io_uring instances. Enabling this +shrinks the kernel's attack surface. + += ================================================================== +0 All processes can create io_uring instances as normal. This is the + default setting. +1 io_uring creation is disabled for unprivileged processes. + io_uring_setup fails with -EPERM unless the calling process is + privileged (CAP_SYS_ADMIN). Existing io_uring instances can + still be used. +2 io_uring creation is disabled for all processes. io_uring_setup + always fails with -EPERM. Existing io_uring instances can still be + used. += ================================================================== + + kexec_load_disabled ===================
io_uring/io_uring.c +30 -0
@@ -153,6 +153,22 @@ static __cold void io_fallback_tw(struct io_uring_task *tctx);struct kmem_cache *req_cachep; +static int __read_mostly sysctl_io_uring_disabled; +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL +static struct ctl_table kernel_io_uring_disabled_table[] = { + { + .procname ="io_uring_disabled" , + .data = &sysctl_io_uring_disabled, + .maxlen =sizeof (sysctl_io_uring_disabled), + .mode =0644 , + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 =SYSCTL_ZERO , + .extra2 =SYSCTL_TWO , + }, + {}, +}; +#endif +struct sock *io_uring_get_socket (struct file *file) {#if defined(CONFIG_UNIX )
@@ -4000,9 +4016,18 @@ static long io_uring_setup(u32 entries, struct io_uring_params __user *params)return io_uring_create (entries, &p, params); } +static inline bool io_uring_allowed (void ) +{ +return sysctl_io_uring_disabled ==0 || + (sysctl_io_uring_disabled ==1 &&capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )); +} +SYSCALL_DEFINE2 (io_uring_setup, u32, entries, struct io_uring_params __user *, params) { +if (!io_uring_allowed ()) +return -EPERM ; +return io_uring_setup (entries, params); }
@@ -4577,6 +4602,11 @@ static int __init io_uring_init(void) req_cachep =KMEM_CACHE (io_kiocb,SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN |SLAB_PANIC |SLAB_ACCOUNT |SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU ); + +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL +register_sysctl_init ("kernel" , kernel_io_uring_disabled_table); +#endif +return 0 ; };__initcall (io_uring_init);
Signature · 1 line
2.41.0.162.gfafddb0af9-goog
Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add a new sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
Quoted 1 line · Matteo Rizzo
+static int
__read_mostlysysctl_io_uring_disabled;
Shouldn't this be a static key instead of an int in order to minimize the performance impact on the io_uring_setup() system call? See also Documentation/staging/static-keys.rst.
Thanks,
Bart.
Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add a new sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
Quoted 11 lines · Bart Van Assche
Quoted 1 line · Matteo Rizzo
+static int
__read_mostlysysctl_io_uring_disabled;Shouldn't this be a static key instead of an int in order to minimize the performance impact on the
io_uring_setup()system call? See alsoDocumentation/staging/static-keys.rst.Thanks,
Bart.
Is io_uring_setup in any hot path? io_uring_create is marked as __cold.
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Matteo
Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add a new sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
Quoted 10 lines · Matteo Rizzo
Quoted 8 lines · Bart Van Assche
Quoted 1 line · Matteo Rizzo
+static int
__read_mostlysysctl_io_uring_disabled;Shouldn't this be a static key instead of an int in order to minimize the performance impact on the
io_uring_setup()system call? See alsoDocumentation/staging/static-keys.rst.Is
io_uring_setupin any hot path?io_uring_createis marked as__cold.
I confused io_uring_setup() with io_uring_enter() so please ignore my comment.
Bart.
Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add a new sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
In reply to Matteo RizzoQuoted 8 lines · Matteo Rizzo
Introduce a new sysctl (
io_uring_disabled) which can be either 0, 1, or 2. When 0 (the default), all processes are allowed to createio_uringinstances, which is the current behavior. When 1, all calls toio_uring_setupfail with-EPERMunless the calling process hasCAP_SYS_ADMIN. When 2, calls toio_uring_setupfail with-EPERMregardless of privilege.Signed-off-by Matteo Rizzo <[email protected]>
This looks good to me. You may also consider updating the io_uring_setup(2) man page (part of liburing) to reflect this new meaning for -EPERM.
Quoted 93 lines
--- Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 19 +++++++++++++ io_uring/io_uring.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+)Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst +19
-0@@ -450,6 +450,25 @@ this allows system administrators to override the ``IA64_THREAD_UAC_NOPRINT`` ``prctl`` and avoid logs being flooded. +io_uring_disabled +================= + +Prevents all processes from creating new io_uring instances. Enabling this +shrinks the kernel's attack surface. + += ================================================================== +0 All processes can create io_uring instances as normal. This is the + default setting. +1 io_uring creation is disabled for unprivileged processes. + io_uring_setup fails with -EPERM unless the calling process is + privileged (CAP_SYS_ADMIN). Existing io_uring instances can + still be used. +2 io_uring creation is disabled for all processes. io_uring_setup + always fails with -EPERM. Existing io_uring instances can still be + used. += ================================================================== + + kexec_load_disabled ===================io_uring/io_uring.c +30
-0@@ -153,6 +153,22 @@ static __cold void io_fallback_tw(struct io_uring_task *tctx);struct kmem_cache *req_cachep; +static int __read_mostly sysctl_io_uring_disabled; +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL +static struct ctl_table kernel_io_uring_disabled_table[] = { + { + .procname ="io_uring_disabled" , + .data = &sysctl_io_uring_disabled, + .maxlen =sizeof (sysctl_io_uring_disabled), + .mode =0644 , + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, + .extra1 =SYSCTL_ZERO , + .extra2 =SYSCTL_TWO , + }, + {}, +}; +#endif +struct sock *io_uring_get_socket (struct file *file) {#if defined(CONFIG_UNIX )@@ -4000,9 +4016,18 @@ static long io_uring_setup(u32 entries, struct io_uring_params __user *params)return io_uring_create (entries, &p, params); } +static inline bool io_uring_allowed (void ) +{ +return sysctl_io_uring_disabled ==0 || + (sysctl_io_uring_disabled ==1 &&capable (CAP_SYS_ADMIN )); +} +SYSCALL_DEFINE2 (io_uring_setup, u32, entries, struct io_uring_params __user *, params) { +if (!io_uring_allowed ()) +return -EPERM ; +return io_uring_setup (entries, params); }@@ -4577,6 +4602,11 @@ static int __init io_uring_init(void) req_cachep =KMEM_CACHE (io_kiocb,SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN |SLAB_PANIC |SLAB_ACCOUNT |SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU ); + +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL +register_sysctl_init ("kernel" , kernel_io_uring_disabled_table); +#endif +return 0 ; };__initcall (io_uring_init);
Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add a new sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
In reply to Matteo RizzoQuoted 9 lines · Matteo Rizzo
Introduce a new sysctl (
io_uring_disabled) which can be either 0, 1, or 2. When 0 (the default), all processes are allowed to createio_uringinstances, which is the current behavior. When 1, all calls toio_uring_setupfail with-EPERMunless the calling process hasCAP_SYS_ADMIN. When 2, calls toio_uring_setupfail with-EPERMregardless of privilege.Signed-off-by Matteo Rizzo <[email protected]>---
Thanks for adding the extra level for root-only rings.
The patch looks good to me.
Signature · 1 line
Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add a new sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide
Quoted 6 lines · Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
Thanks for adding the extra level for root-only rings.
The patch looks good to me.
Reviewed-by Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <[email protected]>
Thanks everyone for the reviews! Unfortunately I forgot the subsystem name in the commit message. Jann also pointed out to me internally that the check in io_uring_allowed could race with another process that is trying to change the sysctl. I will send a v3 that fixes both issues.
Thanks,
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Matteo