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Add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide

PATCH Superseded Matteo Rizzo 4 participants 8 messages Jun 29, 2023 – Jun 30, 2023

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v2 of 3 Superseded Latest is v3 →

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#0 lore raw

v2 cover Add a sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide

Over the last few years we've seen many critical vulnerabilities in io_uring[1] which could be exploited by an unprivileged process to gain control over the kernel. This patch introduces a new sysctl which disables the creation of new io_uring instances system-wide.

The goal of this patch is to give distros, system admins, and cloud providers a way to reduce the risk of privilege escalation through io_uring where disabling it with seccomp or at compile time is not practical. For example a distro or cloud provider might want to disable io_uring by default and have users enable it again if they need to run a program that requires it. The new sysctl is designed to let a user with root on the machine enable and disable io_uring systemwide at runtime without requiring a kernel recompilation or a reboot.

[1] Link: https://goo.gle/limit-iouring

---
v2:
* Documentation style fixes
* Add a third level that only disables io_uring for unprivileged processes

Matteo Rizzo (1):
Add a new sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide

 Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 19 +++++++++++++
 io_uring/io_uring.c                         | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+)
Signature · 1 line
2.41.0.162.gfafddb0af9-goog
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 Add a new sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide

Introduce a new sysctl (io_uring_disabled) which can be either 0, 1, or 2. When 0 (the default), all processes are allowed to create io_uring instances, which is the current behavior. When 1, all calls to io_uring_setup fail with -EPERM unless the calling process has CAP_SYS_ADMIN. When 2, calls to io_uring_setup fail with -EPERM regardless of privilege.

---
 Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 19 +++++++++++++
 io_uring/io_uring.c                         | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+)
Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst +19 -0
index 3800fab1619b..ee65f7aeb0cf 100644
@@ -450,6 +450,25 @@ this allows system administrators to override the
 ``IA64_THREAD_UAC_NOPRINT`` ``prctl`` and avoid logs being flooded.
 
 
+io_uring_disabled
+=================
+
+Prevents all processes from creating new io_uring instances. Enabling this
+shrinks the kernel's attack surface.
+
+= ==================================================================
+0 All processes can create io_uring instances as normal. This is the
+  default setting.
+1 io_uring creation is disabled for unprivileged processes.
+  io_uring_setup fails with -EPERM unless the calling process is
+  privileged (CAP_SYS_ADMIN). Existing io_uring instances can
+  still be used.
+2 io_uring creation is disabled for all processes. io_uring_setup
+  always fails with -EPERM. Existing io_uring instances can still be
+  used.
+= ==================================================================
+
+
 kexec_load_disabled
 ===================
 
io_uring/io_uring.c +30 -0
index 1b53a2ab0a27..2343ae518546 100644
@@ -153,6 +153,22 @@ static __cold void io_fallback_tw(struct io_uring_task *tctx);
 
 struct kmem_cache *req_cachep;
 
+static int __read_mostly sysctl_io_uring_disabled;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+static struct ctl_table kernel_io_uring_disabled_table[] = {
+	{
+		.procname	= "io_uring_disabled",
+		.data		= &sysctl_io_uring_disabled,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(sysctl_io_uring_disabled),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1		= SYSCTL_ZERO,
+		.extra2		= SYSCTL_TWO,
+	},
+	{},
+};
+#endif
+
 struct sock *io_uring_get_socket(struct file *file)
 {
 #if defined(CONFIG_UNIX)
@@ -4000,9 +4016,18 @@ static long io_uring_setup(u32 entries, struct io_uring_params __user *params)
 	return io_uring_create(entries, &p, params);
 }
 
+static inline bool io_uring_allowed(void)
+{
+	return sysctl_io_uring_disabled == 0 ||
+		(sysctl_io_uring_disabled == 1 && capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN));
+}
+
 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(io_uring_setup, u32, entries,
 		struct io_uring_params __user *, params)
 {
+	if (!io_uring_allowed())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	return io_uring_setup(entries, params);
 }
 
@@ -4577,6 +4602,11 @@ static int __init io_uring_init(void)
 
 	req_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(io_kiocb, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_PANIC |
 				SLAB_ACCOUNT | SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+	register_sysctl_init("kernel", kernel_io_uring_disabled_table);
+#endif
+
 	return 0;
 };
 __initcall(io_uring_init);
Signature · 1 line
2.41.0.162.gfafddb0af9-goog
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add a new sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide

Quoted 1 line · Matteo Rizzo

+static int __read_mostly sysctl_io_uring_disabled;

Shouldn't this be a static key instead of an int in order to minimize the performance impact on the io_uring_setup() system call? See also Documentation/staging/static-keys.rst.

Thanks,

Bart.

#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add a new sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide

Quoted 11 lines · Bart Van Assche
Quoted 1 line · Matteo Rizzo

+static int __read_mostly sysctl_io_uring_disabled;

Shouldn't this be a static key instead of an int in order to minimize the performance impact on the io_uring_setup() system call? See also Documentation/staging/static-keys.rst.

Thanks,

Bart.

Is io_uring_setup in any hot path? io_uring_create is marked as __cold.

--
Matteo

#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add a new sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide

Quoted 10 lines · Matteo Rizzo
Quoted 8 lines · Bart Van Assche
Quoted 1 line · Matteo Rizzo

+static int __read_mostly sysctl_io_uring_disabled;

Shouldn't this be a static key instead of an int in order to minimize the performance impact on the io_uring_setup() system call? See also Documentation/staging/static-keys.rst.

Is io_uring_setup in any hot path? io_uring_create is marked as __cold.

I confused io_uring_setup() with io_uring_enter() so please ignore my comment.

Bart.

Reviewed-by on v2 1/1
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add a new sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide

In reply to Matteo Rizzo
Quoted 8 lines · Matteo Rizzo

Introduce a new sysctl (io_uring_disabled) which can be either 0, 1, or 2. When 0 (the default), all processes are allowed to create io_uring instances, which is the current behavior. When 1, all calls to io_uring_setup fail with -EPERM unless the calling process has CAP_SYS_ADMIN. When 2, calls to io_uring_setup fail with -EPERM regardless of privilege.

This looks good to me. You may also consider updating the io_uring_setup(2) man page (part of liburing) to reflect this new meaning for -EPERM.

Quoted 93 lines
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst | 19 +++++++++++++
 io_uring/io_uring.c                         | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 49 insertions(+)
Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst +19 -0
index 3800fab1619b..ee65f7aeb0cf 100644
@@ -450,6 +450,25 @@ this allows system administrators to override the
 ``IA64_THREAD_UAC_NOPRINT`` ``prctl`` and avoid logs being flooded.
 
 
+io_uring_disabled
+=================
+
+Prevents all processes from creating new io_uring instances. Enabling this
+shrinks the kernel's attack surface.
+
+= ==================================================================
+0 All processes can create io_uring instances as normal. This is the
+  default setting.
+1 io_uring creation is disabled for unprivileged processes.
+  io_uring_setup fails with -EPERM unless the calling process is
+  privileged (CAP_SYS_ADMIN). Existing io_uring instances can
+  still be used.
+2 io_uring creation is disabled for all processes. io_uring_setup
+  always fails with -EPERM. Existing io_uring instances can still be
+  used.
+= ==================================================================
+
+
 kexec_load_disabled
 ===================
 
io_uring/io_uring.c +30 -0
index 1b53a2ab0a27..2343ae518546 100644
@@ -153,6 +153,22 @@ static __cold void io_fallback_tw(struct io_uring_task *tctx);
 
 struct kmem_cache *req_cachep;
 
+static int __read_mostly sysctl_io_uring_disabled;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+static struct ctl_table kernel_io_uring_disabled_table[] = {
+	{
+		.procname	= "io_uring_disabled",
+		.data		= &sysctl_io_uring_disabled,
+		.maxlen		= sizeof(sysctl_io_uring_disabled),
+		.mode		= 0644,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax,
+		.extra1		= SYSCTL_ZERO,
+		.extra2		= SYSCTL_TWO,
+	},
+	{},
+};
+#endif
+
 struct sock *io_uring_get_socket(struct file *file)
 {
 #if defined(CONFIG_UNIX)
@@ -4000,9 +4016,18 @@ static long io_uring_setup(u32 entries, struct io_uring_params __user *params)
 	return io_uring_create(entries, &p, params);
 }
 
+static inline bool io_uring_allowed(void)
+{
+	return sysctl_io_uring_disabled == 0 ||
+		(sysctl_io_uring_disabled == 1 && capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN));
+}
+
 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(io_uring_setup, u32, entries,
 		struct io_uring_params __user *, params)
 {
+	if (!io_uring_allowed())
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	return io_uring_setup(entries, params);
 }
 
@@ -4577,6 +4602,11 @@ static int __init io_uring_init(void)
 
 	req_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(io_kiocb, SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN | SLAB_PANIC |
 				SLAB_ACCOUNT | SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+	register_sysctl_init("kernel", kernel_io_uring_disabled_table);
+#endif
+
 	return 0;
 };
 __initcall(io_uring_init);
Reviewed-by on v2 1/1
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add a new sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide

In reply to Matteo Rizzo
Quoted 9 lines · Matteo Rizzo

Introduce a new sysctl (io_uring_disabled) which can be either 0, 1, or 2. When 0 (the default), all processes are allowed to create io_uring instances, which is the current behavior. When 1, all calls to io_uring_setup fail with -EPERM unless the calling process has CAP_SYS_ADMIN. When 2, calls to io_uring_setup fail with -EPERM regardless of privilege.

---

Thanks for adding the extra level for root-only rings.

The patch looks good to me.

Signature · 1 line
Gabriel Krisman Bertazi
#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/1] Add a new sysctl to disable io_uring system-wide

Quoted 6 lines · Gabriel Krisman Bertazi

Thanks for adding the extra level for root-only rings.

The patch looks good to me.

Thanks everyone for the reviews! Unfortunately I forgot the subsystem name in the commit message. Jann also pointed out to me internally that the check in io_uring_allowed could race with another process that is trying to change the sysctl. I will send a v3 that fixes both issues.

Thanks,
--
Matteo