Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests
Subsystems (4)
v3 cover Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests
Secure TSC allows guests to securely use RDTSC/RDTSCP instructions as the parameters being used cannot be changed by hypervisor once the guest is launched. More details in the AMD64 APM Vol 2, Section "Secure TSC".
During the boot-up of the secondary cpus, SecureTSC enabled guests need to query TSC info from AMD Security Processor. This communication channel is encrypted between the AMD Security Processor and the guest, the hypervisor is just the conduit to deliver the guest messages to the AMD Security Processor. Each message is protected with an AEAD (AES-256 GCM). See "SEV Secure Nested Paging Firmware ABI Specification" document (currently at
https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/56860.pdf) section "TSC Info"
Use a minimal GCM library to encrypt/decrypt SNP Guest messages to communicate with the AMD Security Processor which is available at early boot.
SEV-guest driver has the implementation for guest and AMD Security Processor communication. As the TSC_INFO needs to be initialized during early boot before smp cpus are started, move most of the sev-guest driver code to kernel/sev.c and provide well defined APIs to the sev-guest driver to use the interface to avoid code-duplication.
Patches:
01-07: Preparation and movement of sev-guest driver code 08-14: SecureTSC enablement patches.
Testing SecureTSC
-----------------
SecureTSC hypervisor patches based on top of SEV-SNP UPM series:
https://github.com/nikunjad/linux/tree/snp-host-latest-securetsc
QEMU changes:
https://github.com/nikunjad/qemu/tree/snp_securetsc
QEMU commandline SEV-SNP-UPM with SecureTSC:
qemu-system-x86_64 -cpu EPYC-Milan-v2,+secure-tsc \
-object memory-backend-memfd-private,id=ram1,size=1G,share=true \
-object sev-snp-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=51,reduced-phys-bits=1,secure-tsc=on \
-machine q35,confidential-guest-support=sev0,memory-backend=ram1,kvm-type=protected \
...Changelog:
----------
v3:
* Updated commit messages
* Made snp_setup_psp_messaging() generic that is accessed by both the kernel and the driver
* Moved most of the context information to sev.c, sev-guest driver does not need to know the secrets page layout anymore
* Add CC_ATTR_GUEST_SECURE_TSC early in the series therefore it can be used in later patches.
* Removed data_gpa and data_npages from struct snp_req_data, as certs_data and its size is passed to handle_guest_request_ext()
* Make vmpck_id as unsigned int
* Dropped unnecessary usage of memzero_explicit()
* Cache secrets_pa instead of remapping the cc_blob always
* Rebase on top of v6.4 kernel
v2:
* Rebased on top of v6.3-rc3 that has Boris's sev-guest cleanup series
https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
Nikunj A Dadhania (14):
virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library
virt: sev-guest: Move mutex to SNP guest device structure
virt: sev-guest: Replace pr_debug with dev_dbg
virt: sev-guest: Add SNP guest request structure
virt: sev-guest: Add vmpck_id to snp_guest_dev struct x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address
x86/sev: Move and reorganize sev guest request api x86/mm: Add generic guest initialization hook
x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception for Secure TSC enabled
guests
x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available x86/tsc: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource x86/sev: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 2 +- arch/x86/coco/core.c | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/sev-guest.h | 175 +++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 19 +- arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 6 +- arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 7 + arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 631 +++++++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c | 2 + arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 13 +- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 6 + drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/Kconfig | 2 - drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 638 +++--------------------- drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.h | 63 --- include/linux/cc_platform.h | 8 + 18 files changed, 882 insertions(+), 700 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/sev-guest.h delete mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.h
base-commit: 6995e2de6891c724bfeb2db33d7b87775f913ad1
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v3 1/14 virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library
The sev-guest driver encryption code uses Crypto API for SNP guest messaging to interact with AMD Security processor. For enabling SecureTSC, SEV-SNP guests need to send a TSC_INFO request guest message before the smpboot phase starts. Details from the TSC_INFO response will be used to program the VMSA before the secondary CPUs are brought up. The Crypto API is not available this early in the boot phase.
In preparation of moving the encryption code out of sev-guest driver to support SecureTSC and make reviewing the diff easier, start using AES GCM library implementation instead of Crypto API.
--- drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/Kconfig | 3 +- drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 172 +++++++----------------- drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.h | 3 + 3 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 125 deletions(-)
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/Kconfig +1 -2
@@ -2,8 +2,7 @@ config SEV_GUEST tristate "AMD SEV Guest driver" default m depends on AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT - select CRYPTO_AEAD2 - select CRYPTO_GCM + select CRYPTO_LIB_AESGCM help SEV-SNP firmware provides the guest a mechanism to communicate with the PSP without risk from a malicious hypervisor who wishes to read,
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +49 -123
305 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.h +3 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@#include <linux/types.h> #define MAX_AUTHTAG_LEN 32 +#define AUTHTAG_LEN 16 +#define AAD_LEN 48 +#define MSG_HDR_VER 1/* See SNP spec SNP_GUEST_REQUEST section for the structure */ enum msg_type {
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH v3 01/14] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library
Quoted 7 lines · Nikunj A Dadhania
The sev-guest driver encryption code uses Crypto API for SNP guest messaging to interact with AMD Security processor. For enabling SecureTSC, SEV-SNP guests need to send a
TSC_INFOrequest guest message before the smpboot phase starts. Details from theTSC_INFOresponse will be used to program the VMSA before the secondary CPUs are brought up. The Crypto API is not available this early in the boot phase.
Quoted 7 lines
In preparation of moving the encryption code out of sev-guest driver to support SecureTSC and make reviewing the diff easier, start using AES GCM library implementation instead of Crypto API.
CC Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Nikunj A Dadhania <[email protected]>
Quoted 6 lines
--- drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/Kconfig | 3 +- drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 172 +++++++----------------- drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.h | 3 + 3 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 125 deletions(-)
PATCH v3 2/14 virt: sev-guest: Move mutex to SNP guest device structure
In reply to Nikunj A DadhaniaIn preparation for providing a new API to the sev-guest driver for sending an SNP guest message, move the SNP command mutex to the snp_guest_dev structure.
--- drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 21 +++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +11 -10
@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ struct snp_guest_dev {struct device *dev;struct miscdevice misc; +/* Mutex to serialize the shared buffer access and command handling. */ +struct mutex cmd_mutex; +void *certs_data;struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx;/* request and response are in unencrypted memory */
@@ -56,9 +59,6 @@ static u32 vmpck_id;module_param (vmpck_id, uint,0444 );MODULE_PARM_DESC (vmpck_id,"The VMPCK ID to use when communicating with the PSP." ); -/* Mutex to serialize the shared buffer access and command handling. */ -static DEFINE_MUTEX (snp_cmd_mutex); -static inline unsigned int get_ctx_authsize (struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) {if (snp_dev && snp_dev->ctx)
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static inline u64 __snp_get_msg_seqno(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) {u64 count; -lockdep_assert_held (&snp_cmd_mutex); +lockdep_assert_held (&snp_dev->cmd_mutex);/* Read the current message sequence counter from secrets pages */ count = *snp_dev->os_area_msg_seqno;
@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ static int get_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_iostruct snp_report_req req;int rc, resp_len; -lockdep_assert_held (&snp_cmd_mutex); +lockdep_assert_held (&snp_dev->cmd_mutex);if (!arg->req_data || !arg->resp_data)return -EINVAL ;
@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ static int get_derived_key(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reque/* Response data is 64 bytes and max authsize for GCM is 16 bytes. */ u8 buf[64 +16 ]; -lockdep_assert_held (&snp_cmd_mutex); +lockdep_assert_held (&snp_dev->cmd_mutex);if (!arg->req_data || !arg->resp_data)return -EINVAL ;
@@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ static int get_ext_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_requesstruct snp_report_resp *resp;int ret, npages =0 , resp_len; -lockdep_assert_held (&snp_cmd_mutex); +lockdep_assert_held (&snp_dev->cmd_mutex);if (!arg->req_data || !arg->resp_data)return -EINVAL ;
@@ -566,12 +566,12 @@ static long snp_guest_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned longif (!input.msg_version)return -EINVAL ; -mutex_lock (&snp_cmd_mutex); +mutex_lock (&snp_dev->cmd_mutex);/* Check if the VMPCK is not empty */ if (is_vmpck_empty (snp_dev)) {dev_err_ratelimited (snp_dev->dev,"VMPCK is disabled\n" ); -mutex_unlock (&snp_cmd_mutex); +mutex_unlock (&snp_dev->cmd_mutex);return -ENOTTY ; }
@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ static long snp_guest_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned longbreak ; } -mutex_unlock (&snp_cmd_mutex); +mutex_unlock (&snp_dev->cmd_mutex);if (input.exitinfo2 &©_to_user (argp, &input,sizeof (input)))return -EFAULT ;
@@ -708,6 +708,7 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) goto e_unmap; } +mutex_init (&snp_dev->cmd_mutex);platform_set_drvdata (pdev, snp_dev); snp_dev->dev = dev; snp_dev->layout = layout;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v3 3/14 virt: sev-guest: Replace pr_debug with dev_dbg
In reply to Nikunj A DadhaniaIn preparation of moving code to arch/x86/kernel/sev.c, replace dev_dbg with pr_debug.
--- drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +5 -4
@@ -206,8 +206,9 @@ static int verify_and_dec_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, void *payload,struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *resp_hdr = &resp->hdr;struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx = snp_dev->ctx; -dev_dbg (snp_dev->dev,"response [seqno %lld type %d version %d sz %d]\n" , - resp_hdr->msg_seqno, resp_hdr->msg_type, resp_hdr->msg_version, resp_hdr->msg_sz); +pr_debug ("response [seqno %lld type %d version %d sz %d]\n" , + resp_hdr->msg_seqno, resp_hdr->msg_type, resp_hdr->msg_version, + resp_hdr->msg_sz);/* Copy response from shared memory to encrypted memory. */ memcpy (resp, snp_dev->response,sizeof (*resp));
@@ -253,8 +254,8 @@ static int enc_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 seqno, int version, u8if (!hdr->msg_seqno)return -ENOSR ; -dev_dbg (snp_dev->dev,"request [seqno %lld type %d version %d sz %d]\n" , - hdr->msg_seqno, hdr->msg_type, hdr->msg_version, hdr->msg_sz); +pr_debug ("request [seqno %lld type %d version %d sz %d]\n" , + hdr->msg_seqno, hdr->msg_type, hdr->msg_version, hdr->msg_sz);return __enc_payload (snp_dev->ctx, req, payload, sz); }
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH v3 03/14] virt: sev-guest: Replace pr_debug with dev_dbg
Quoted 4 lines · Nikunj A Dadhania
In preparation of moving code to
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c, replacedev_dbgwithpr_debug.Signed-off-by Nikunj A Dadhania <[email protected]>
The subject is backwards, you're replacing dev_dbg with pr_debug. With that:
Quoted 31 lines
--- drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +5
-4@@ -206,8 +206,9 @@ static int verify_and_dec_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, void *payload,struct snp_guest_msg_hdr *resp_hdr = &resp->hdr;struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx = snp_dev->ctx; -dev_dbg (snp_dev->dev,"response [seqno %lld type %d version %d sz %d]\n" , - resp_hdr->msg_seqno, resp_hdr->msg_type, resp_hdr->msg_version, resp_hdr->msg_sz); +pr_debug ("response [seqno %lld type %d version %d sz %d]\n" , + resp_hdr->msg_seqno, resp_hdr->msg_type, resp_hdr->msg_version, + resp_hdr->msg_sz);/* Copy response from shared memory to encrypted memory. */ memcpy (resp, snp_dev->response,sizeof (*resp));@@ -253,8 +254,8 @@ static int enc_payload(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 seqno, int version, u8if (!hdr->msg_seqno)return -ENOSR ; -dev_dbg (snp_dev->dev,"request [seqno %lld type %d version %d sz %d]\n" , - hdr->msg_seqno, hdr->msg_type, hdr->msg_version, hdr->msg_sz); +pr_debug ("request [seqno %lld type %d version %d sz %d]\n" , + hdr->msg_seqno, hdr->msg_type, hdr->msg_version, hdr->msg_sz);return __enc_payload (snp_dev->ctx, req, payload, sz); }
Re: [PATCH v3 03/14] virt: sev-guest: Replace pr_debug with dev_dbg
Quoted 6 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 4 lines
In preparation of moving code to
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c, replacedev_dbgwithpr_debug.Signed-off-by Nikunj A Dadhania <[email protected]>The subject is backwards, you're replacing
dev_dbgwithpr_debug. With that:
Sure, will fix the subject.
Quoted 2 lines
Reviewed-by Tom Lendacky <[email protected]>
Thanks,
Nikunj
PATCH v3 4/14 virt: sev-guest: Add SNP guest request structure
In reply to Nikunj A DadhaniaAdd a snp_guest_req structure to simplify the function arguments. The structure will be used to call the SNP Guest message request API instead of passing a long list of parameters.
Add two helper functions for filling up the parameters:handle_guest_request() and handle_guest_request_ext(). GET_EXT_REPORT queries for certs_data from the AMD Security processor. handle_guest_request_ext() provides those extra parameters for receiving certs_data from the AMD security processor.
---
.../x86/include/asm}/sev-guest.h | 11 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 7 --
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 15 ++-
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 107 ++++++++++++------
4 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
rename {drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest => arch/x86/include/asm}/sev-guest.h (80%)arch/x86/include/asm/sev-guest.h renamed from drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.h +11 -0
@@ -63,4 +63,15 @@ struct snp_guest_msg { u8 payload[4000]; } __packed; +struct snp_guest_req { +void *req_buf, *resp_buf, *data; +size_t req_sz, resp_sz, *data_npages; +u64 exit_code; +unsigned int vmpck_id; +u8 msg_version; +u8 msg_type; +}; + +int snp_issue_guest_request (struct snp_guest_req *req,struct snp_req_data *input, +struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio);#endif /* __VIRT_SEVGUEST_H__ */
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h +0 -7
@@ -92,8 +92,6 @@ extern bool handle_vc_boot_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs);struct snp_req_data {unsigned long req_gpa;unsigned long resp_gpa; -unsigned long data_gpa; -unsigned int data_npages; };struct sev_guest_platform_data {
@@ -201,7 +199,6 @@ void snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages);void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu (void );bool snp_init (struct boot_params *bp);void __init __noreturn snp_abort (void ); -int snp_issue_guest_request (u64 exit_code,struct snp_req_data *input,struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio);#else static inline void sev_es_ist_enter (struct pt_regs *regs) { }static inline void sev_es_ist_exit (void ) { }
@@ -221,10 +218,6 @@ static inline void snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npagstatic inline void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu (void ) { }static inline bool snp_init (struct boot_params *bp) {return false; }static inline void snp_abort (void ) { } -static inline int snp_issue_guest_request (u64 exit_code,struct snp_req_data *input,struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio) -{ -return -ENOTTY ; -}#endif #endif
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +11 -4
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@#include <asm/cpu_entry_area.h> #include <asm/stacktrace.h> #include <asm/sev.h> +#include <asm/sev-guest.h> #include <asm/insn-eval.h> #include <asm/fpu/xcr.h> #include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -2177,15 +2178,21 @@ static int __init init_sev_config(char *str) }__setup ("sev=" , init_sev_config); -int snp_issue_guest_request (u64 exit_code,struct snp_req_data *input,struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio) +int snp_issue_guest_request (struct snp_guest_req *req,struct snp_req_data *input, +struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio) {struct ghcb_state state;struct es_em_ctxt ctxt;unsigned long flags;struct ghcb *ghcb; +u64 exit_code;int ret; rio->exitinfo2 =SEV_RET_NO_FW_CALL ; +if (!req) +return -EINVAL ; + + exit_code = req->exit_code;/* * __sev_get_ghcb() needs to run with IRQs disabled because it is using
@@ -2202,8 +2209,8 @@ int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *input, struct snvc_ghcb_invalidate (ghcb);if (exit_code ==SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST ) { -ghcb_set_rax (ghcb, input->data_gpa); -ghcb_set_rbx (ghcb, input->data_npages); +ghcb_set_rax (ghcb,__pa (req->data)); +ghcb_set_rbx (ghcb, *req->data_npages); } ret =sev_es_ghcb_hv_call (ghcb, &ctxt, exit_code, input->req_gpa, input->resp_gpa);
@@ -2222,7 +2229,7 @@ int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *input, struct sncase SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR (SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR_INVALID_LEN ):/* Number of expected pages are returned in RBX */ if (exit_code ==SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST ) { - input->data_npages =ghcb_get_rbx (ghcb); + *req->data_npages =ghcb_get_rbx (ghcb); ret = -ENOSPC ;break ; }
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +71 -36
222 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH v3 04/14] virt: sev-guest: Add SNP guest request structure
Quoted 53 lines · Nikunj A Dadhania
Add a
snp_guest_reqstructure to simplify the function arguments. The structure will be used to call the SNP Guest message request API instead of passing a long list of parameters.Add two helper functions for filling up the parameters:
handle_guest_request()andhandle_guest_request_ext().GET_EXT_REPORTqueries forcerts_datafrom the AMD Security processor.handle_guest_request_ext()provides those extra parameters for receivingcerts_datafrom the AMD security processor.Signed-off-by Nikunj A Dadhania <[email protected]>--- .../x86/include/asm}/sev-guest.h | 11 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 7 -- arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 15 ++- drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 107 ++++++++++++------ 4 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)rename {
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest=>arch/x86/include/asm}/sev-guest.h(80%)drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +29
-0@@ -398,6 +393,46 @@ static int handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code,return 0 ; } +static int handle_guest_request (struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev,u64 exit_code, +struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio,u8 type, +void *req_buf,size_t req_sz,void *resp_buf, +u32 resp_sz) +{ +struct snp_guest_req guest_req = { + .msg_version = rio->msg_version, + .msg_type = type, + .vmpck_id = vmpck_id, + .req_buf = req_buf, + .req_sz = req_sz, + .resp_buf = resp_buf, + .resp_sz = resp_sz, + .exit_code = exit_code, + }; + +return snp_send_guest_request (snp_dev, &guest_req, rio); +} + +static int handle_guest_request_ext (struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev,u64 exit_code, +struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio,u8 type, +void *req_buf,size_t req_sz,void *resp_buf, +u32 resp_sz,void *certs_data,size_t *npages) +{ +struct snp_guest_req guest_req = { + .msg_version = rio->msg_version, + .msg_type = type, + .vmpck_id = vmpck_id, + .req_buf = req_buf,
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c static int handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code, · line 434
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +10
-0+ .req_sz = req_sz, + .resp_buf = resp_buf, + .resp_sz = resp_sz, + .exit_code = exit_code, + .data = certs_data, + .data_npages = npages, + }; + +return snp_send_guest_request (snp_dev, &guest_req, rio); +}
I'm not sure these intermediate funcitons are really necessary. Can't you create/build the struct in get_report() and get_ext_report() and then just call snp_send_guest_request() directly from those functions?
Thanks,
Tom
Quoted 34 lines
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +8
-6+static int get_report (struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev,struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *arg) {struct snp_report_resp *resp;@@ -480,7 +515,8 @@ static int get_ext_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reques {struct snp_ext_report_req req;struct snp_report_resp *resp; -int ret, npages =0 , resp_len; +int ret, resp_len; +size_t npages =0 ;lockdep_assert_held (&snp_dev->cmd_mutex);@@ -520,14 +556,14 @@ static int get_ext_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_requesif (!resp)return -ENOMEM ; - snp_dev->input.data_npages = npages; - ret =handle_guest_request (snp_dev,SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST , arg, -SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ , &req.data, -sizeof (req.data), resp->data, resp_len); + ret =handle_guest_request_ext (snp_dev,SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST , + arg,SNP_MSG_REPORT_REQ , &req.data, +sizeof (req.data), resp->data, resp_len, + snp_dev->certs_data, &npages);/* If certs length is invalid then copy the returned length */ if (arg->vmm_error ==SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR_INVALID_LEN ) { - req.certs_len = snp_dev->input.data_npages <<PAGE_SHIFT ; + req.certs_len = npages <<PAGE_SHIFT ;if (copy_to_user ((void __user *)arg->req_data, &req,sizeof (req))) ret = -EFAULT ;
Re: [PATCH v3 04/14] virt: sev-guest: Add SNP guest request structure
Quoted 57 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 56 lines · Nikunj A Dadhania
Add a
snp_guest_reqstructure to simplify the function arguments. The structure will be used to call the SNP Guest message request API instead of passing a long list of parameters.Add two helper functions for filling up the parameters:
handle_guest_request()andhandle_guest_request_ext().GET_EXT_REPORTqueries forcerts_datafrom the AMD Security processor.handle_guest_request_ext()provides those extra parameters for receivingcerts_datafrom the AMD security processor.Signed-off-by Nikunj A Dadhania <[email protected]>---
.../x86/include/asm}/sev-guest.h | 11 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 7 -- arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 15 ++- drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 107 ++++++++++++------4 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)rename {
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest=>arch/x86/include/asm}/sev-guest.h(80%)drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +32
-0@@ -398,6 +393,46 @@ static int handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code, return 0; } +static int handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code, + struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio, u8 type, + void *req_buf, size_t req_sz, void *resp_buf, + u32 resp_sz) +{ + struct snp_guest_req guest_req = { + .msg_version = rio->msg_version, + .msg_type = type, + .vmpck_id = vmpck_id, + .req_buf = req_buf, + .req_sz = req_sz, + .resp_buf = resp_buf, + .resp_sz = resp_sz, + .exit_code = exit_code, + }; + + return snp_send_guest_request(snp_dev, &guest_req, rio); +} + +static int handle_guest_request_ext (struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev,u64 exit_code, + struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio, u8 type, + void *req_buf, size_t req_sz, void *resp_buf, + u32 resp_sz, void *certs_data, size_t *npages) +{ + struct snp_guest_req guest_req = { + .msg_version = rio->msg_version, + .msg_type = type, + .vmpck_id = vmpck_id, + .req_buf = req_buf, + .req_sz = req_sz, + .resp_buf = resp_buf, + .resp_sz = resp_sz, + .exit_code = exit_code,
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c static int handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code, · line 434
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +6
-0+ .data = certs_data, + .data_npages = npages, + }; + + return snp_send_guest_request(snp_dev, &guest_req, rio); +}I'm not sure these intermediate funcitons are really necessary. Can't you create/build the struct in
get_report()andget_ext_report()and then just callsnp_send_guest_request()directly from those functions?
No particular preference, for tsc_info in sev.c I have build the structure directly and called snp_send_guest_request() directly. I will remove the above helper functions.
Regards,
Nikunj
PATCH v3 5/14 virt: sev-guest: Add vmpck_id to snp_guest_dev struct
In reply to Nikunj A DadhaniaDrop vmpck and os_area_msg_seqno pointers so that secret page layout does not need to be exposed to the sev-guest driver after the rework. Instead, add helper APIs to access vmpck and os_area_msg_seqno when needed.
--- drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 84 +++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +43 -41
@@ -50,8 +50,7 @@ struct snp_guest_dev {struct snp_secrets_page_layout *layout;struct snp_req_data input; -u32 *os_area_msg_seqno; -u8 *vmpck; +unsigned int vmpck_id; };static u32 vmpck_id;
@@ -67,12 +66,23 @@ static inline unsigned int get_ctx_authsize(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)return 0 ; } -static bool is_vmpck_empty (struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) +static inline u8 *snp_get_vmpck (struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) +{ +return snp_dev->layout->vmpck0 + snp_dev->vmpck_id *VMPCK_KEY_LEN ; +} + +static inline u32 *snp_get_os_area_msg_seqno (struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) +{ +return &snp_dev->layout->os_area.msg_seqno_0 + snp_dev->vmpck_id; +} + +static bool snp_is_vmpck_empty (struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) {char zero_key[VMPCK_KEY_LEN ] = {0 }; +u8 *key =snp_get_vmpck (snp_dev); -if (snp_dev->vmpck) -return !memcmp (snp_dev->vmpck, zero_key,VMPCK_KEY_LEN ); +if (key) +return !memcmp (key, zero_key,VMPCK_KEY_LEN );return true; }
@@ -96,20 +106,22 @@ static bool is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)*/ static void snp_disable_vmpck (struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) { +u8 *key =snp_get_vmpck (snp_dev); +dev_alert (snp_dev->dev,"Disabling vmpck_id %d to prevent IV reuse.\n" , - vmpck_id); -memzero_explicit (snp_dev->vmpck,VMPCK_KEY_LEN ); - snp_dev->vmpck =NULL ; + snp_dev->vmpck_id); +memzero_explicit (key,VMPCK_KEY_LEN ); }static inline u64 __snp_get_msg_seqno (struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) { +u32 *os_area_msg_seqno =snp_get_os_area_msg_seqno (snp_dev);u64 count;lockdep_assert_held (&snp_dev->cmd_mutex);/* Read the current message sequence counter from secrets pages */ - count = *snp_dev->os_area_msg_seqno; + count = *os_area_msg_seqno;return count +1 ; }
@@ -137,11 +149,13 @@ static u64 snp_get_msg_seqno(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)static void snp_inc_msg_seqno (struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) { +u32 *os_area_msg_seqno =snp_get_os_area_msg_seqno (snp_dev); +/* * The counter is also incremented by the PSP, so increment it by 2 * and save in secrets page. */ - *snp_dev->os_area_msg_seqno +=2 ; + *os_area_msg_seqno +=2 ; }static inline struct snp_guest_dev *to_snp_dev (struct file *file)
@@ -151,15 +165,22 @@ static inline struct snp_guest_dev *to_snp_dev(struct file *file) return container_of(dev, struct snp_guest_dev, misc); } -static struct aesgcm_ctx *snp_init_crypto (u8 *key,size_t keylen) +static struct aesgcm_ctx *snp_init_crypto (struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) {struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx; +u8 *key; + +if (snp_is_vmpck_empty (snp_dev)) { +pr_err ("SNP: vmpck id %d is null\n" , snp_dev->vmpck_id); +return NULL ; + } ctx =kzalloc (sizeof (*ctx),GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT );if (!ctx)return NULL ; -if (aesgcm_expandkey (ctx, key, keylen,AUTHTAG_LEN )) { + key =snp_get_vmpck (snp_dev); +if (aesgcm_expandkey (ctx, key,VMPCK_KEY_LEN ,AUTHTAG_LEN )) {pr_err ("SNP: crypto init failed\n" );kfree (ctx);return NULL ;
@@ -606,7 +627,7 @@ static long snp_guest_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned longmutex_lock (&snp_dev->cmd_mutex);/* Check if the VMPCK is not empty */ -if (is_vmpck_empty (snp_dev)) { +if (snp_is_vmpck_empty (snp_dev)) {dev_err_ratelimited (snp_dev->dev,"VMPCK is disabled\n" );mutex_unlock (&snp_dev->cmd_mutex);return -ENOTTY ;
@@ -676,32 +697,14 @@ static const struct file_operations snp_guest_fops = { .unlocked_ioctl = snp_guest_ioctl, }; -static u8 *get_vmpck (int id,struct snp_secrets_page_layout *layout,u32 **seqno) +bool snp_assign_vmpck (struct snp_guest_dev *dev,int vmpck_id) { -u8 *key =NULL ; +if (WARN_ON (vmpck_id >3 )) +return false; -switch (id) { -case 0 : - *seqno = &layout->os_area.msg_seqno_0; - key = layout->vmpck0; -break ; -case 1 : - *seqno = &layout->os_area.msg_seqno_1; - key = layout->vmpck1; -break ; -case 2 : - *seqno = &layout->os_area.msg_seqno_2; - key = layout->vmpck2; -break ; -case 3 : - *seqno = &layout->os_area.msg_seqno_3; - key = layout->vmpck3; -break ; -default : -break ; - } + dev->vmpck_id = vmpck_id; -return key; +return true; }static int __init sev_guest_probe (struct platform_device *pdev)
@@ -733,14 +736,14 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) goto e_unmap; ret = -EINVAL ; - snp_dev->vmpck =get_vmpck (vmpck_id, layout, &snp_dev->os_area_msg_seqno); -if (!snp_dev->vmpck) { + snp_dev->layout = layout; +if (!snp_assign_vmpck (snp_dev, vmpck_id)) {dev_err (dev,"invalid vmpck id %d\n" , vmpck_id); goto e_unmap; }/* Verify that VMPCK is not zero. */ -if (is_vmpck_empty (snp_dev)) { +if (snp_is_vmpck_empty (snp_dev)) {dev_err (dev,"vmpck id %d is null\n" , vmpck_id); goto e_unmap; }
@@ -748,7 +751,6 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)mutex_init (&snp_dev->cmd_mutex);platform_set_drvdata (pdev, snp_dev); snp_dev->dev = dev; - snp_dev->layout = layout;/* Allocate the shared page used for the request and response message. */ snp_dev->request =alloc_shared_pages (dev,sizeof (struct snp_guest_msg ));
@@ -764,7 +766,7 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) goto e_free_response; ret = -EIO ; - snp_dev->ctx =snp_init_crypto (snp_dev->vmpck,VMPCK_KEY_LEN ); + snp_dev->ctx =snp_init_crypto (snp_dev);if (!snp_dev->ctx) goto e_free_cert_data;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH v3 05/14] virt: sev-guest: Add vmpck_id to snp_guest_dev struct
Quoted 30 lines · Nikunj A Dadhania
Drop vmpck and
os_area_msg_seqnopointers so that secret page layout does not need to be exposed to the sev-guest driver after the rework. Instead, add helper APIs to access vmpck andos_area_msg_seqnowhen needed.Signed-off-by Nikunj A Dadhania <[email protected]>--- drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 84 +++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +2
-3@@ -50,8 +50,7 @@ struct snp_guest_dev {struct snp_secrets_page_layout *layout;struct snp_req_data input; -u32 *os_area_msg_seqno; -u8 *vmpck; +unsigned int vmpck_id; };static u32 vmpck_id;@@ -67,12 +66,23 @@ static inline unsigned int get_ctx_authsize(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)return 0 ; } -static bool is_vmpck_empty (struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) +static inline u8 *snp_get_vmpck (struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c static inline unsigned int get_ctx_authsize(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) · line 79
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +10
-0+{ +return snp_dev->layout->vmpck0 + snp_dev->vmpck_id *VMPCK_KEY_LEN ; +} + +static inline u32 *snp_get_os_area_msg_seqno (struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) +{ +return &snp_dev->layout->os_area.msg_seqno_0 + snp_dev->vmpck_id; +} + +static bool snp_is_vmpck_empty (struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
I noticed this name change from is_vmpck_empty() to snp_is_vmpck_empty(). Is that in prep for moving, too? Is so, maybe call that out in the commit message.
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c static inline unsigned int get_ctx_authsize(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) · line 85
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +3
-2{char zero_key[VMPCK_KEY_LEN ] = {0 }; +u8 *key =snp_get_vmpck (snp_dev); -if (snp_dev->vmpck) -return !memcmp (snp_dev->vmpck, zero_key,VMPCK_KEY_LEN ); +if (key) +return !memcmp (key, zero_key,VMPCK_KEY_LEN );
I believe key can't be NULL, so this check isn't required.
Thanks,
Tom
Quoted 3 lines
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +0
-0return true; }
Re: [PATCH v3 05/14] virt: sev-guest: Add vmpck_id to snp_guest_dev struct
Quoted 32 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 31 lines · Nikunj A Dadhania
Drop vmpck and
os_area_msg_seqnopointers so that secret page layout does not need to be exposed to the sev-guest driver after the rework. Instead, add helper APIs to access vmpck andos_area_msg_seqnowhen needed.Signed-off-by Nikunj A Dadhania <[email protected]>---
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c| 84 +++++++++++++------------1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +6
-2@@ -50,8 +50,7 @@ struct snp_guest_dev { struct snp_secrets_page_layout *layout; struct snp_req_data input; - u32 *os_area_msg_seqno; - u8 *vmpck; + unsigned int vmpck_id; }; static u32 vmpck_id;@@ -67,12 +66,23 @@ static inline unsigned int get_ctx_authsize(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) return 0; } -static bool is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) +static inline u8 *snp_get_vmpck(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) +{ + return snp_dev->layout->vmpck0 + snp_dev->vmpck_id * VMPCK_KEY_LEN; +} +
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c static inline unsigned int get_ctx_authsize(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) · line 79
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +6
-0+static inline u32 *snp_get_os_area_msg_seqno (struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) +{ + return &snp_dev->layout->os_area.msg_seqno_0 + snp_dev->vmpck_id; +} + +static bool snp_is_vmpck_empty (struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)I noticed this name change from
is_vmpck_empty()tosnp_is_vmpck_empty(). Is that in prep for moving, too? Is so, maybe call that out in the commit message.
Yes, will add to the commit.
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c static inline unsigned int get_ctx_authsize(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) · line 85
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +3
-1{ char zero_key[VMPCK_KEY_LEN] = {0}; + u8 *key = snp_get_vmpck(snp_dev); - if (snp_dev->vmpck) - return !memcmp(snp_dev->vmpck, zero_key, VMPCK_KEY_LEN); + if (key) + return !memcmp(key, zero_key, VMPCK_KEY_LEN);I believe key can't be NULL, so this check isn't required.
Sure, will update.
Regards
Nikunj
Re: [PATCH v3 05/14] virt: sev-guest: Add vmpck_id to snp_guest_dev struct
Quoted 53 lines · Nikunj A. Dadhania
Quoted 32 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 31 lines · Nikunj A Dadhania
Drop vmpck and
os_area_msg_seqnopointers so that secret page layout does not need to be exposed to the sev-guest driver after the rework. Instead, add helper APIs to access vmpck andos_area_msg_seqnowhen needed.Signed-off-by Nikunj A Dadhania <[email protected]>--- drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 84 +++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +6
-2@@ -50,8 +50,7 @@ struct snp_guest_dev { struct snp_secrets_page_layout *layout; struct snp_req_data input; - u32 *os_area_msg_seqno; - u8 *vmpck; + unsigned int vmpck_id; }; static u32 vmpck_id;@@ -67,12 +66,23 @@ static inline unsigned int get_ctx_authsize(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) return 0; } -static bool is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) +static inline u8 *snp_get_vmpck(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) +{ + return snp_dev->layout->vmpck0 + snp_dev->vmpck_id * VMPCK_KEY_LEN; +} +Quoted 8 lines
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c static inline unsigned int get_ctx_authsize(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) · line 79
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +6
-0+static inline u32 *snp_get_os_area_msg_seqno (struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) +{ + return &snp_dev->layout->os_area.msg_seqno_0 + snp_dev->vmpck_id; +} + +static bool snp_is_vmpck_empty (struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)I noticed this name change from
is_vmpck_empty()tosnp_is_vmpck_empty(). Is that in prep for moving, too? Is so, maybe call that out in the commit message.Yes, will add to the commit.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +3
-1{ char zero_key[VMPCK_KEY_LEN] = {0}; + u8 *key = snp_get_vmpck(snp_dev); - if (snp_dev->vmpck) - return !memcmp(snp_dev->vmpck, zero_key, VMPCK_KEY_LEN); + if (key) + return !memcmp(key, zero_key, VMPCK_KEY_LEN);
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
I believe key can't be NULL, so this check isn't required.
Sure, will update.
Ah, although I noticed that when the various functions are moved over to the other file, the key return value can be NULL, so probably not worth changing here.
Thanks,
Tom
Quoted 4 lines
Regards
Nikunj
Re: [PATCH v3 05/14] virt: sev-guest: Add vmpck_id to snp_guest_dev struct
Quoted 54 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 53 lines · Nikunj A. Dadhania
Quoted 32 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 31 lines · Nikunj A Dadhania
Drop vmpck and
os_area_msg_seqnopointers so that secret page layout does not need to be exposed to the sev-guest driver after the rework. Instead, add helper APIs to access vmpck andos_area_msg_seqnowhen needed.Signed-off-by Nikunj A Dadhania <[email protected]>---
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c| 84 +++++++++++++------------1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +6
-2@@ -50,8 +50,7 @@ struct snp_guest_dev { struct snp_secrets_page_layout *layout; struct snp_req_data input; - u32 *os_area_msg_seqno; - u8 *vmpck; + unsigned int vmpck_id; }; static u32 vmpck_id;@@ -67,12 +66,23 @@ static inline unsigned int get_ctx_authsize(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) return 0; } -static bool is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) +static inline u8 *snp_get_vmpck(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) +{ + return snp_dev->layout->vmpck0 + snp_dev->vmpck_id * VMPCK_KEY_LEN; +} +Quoted 8 lines
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c static inline unsigned int get_ctx_authsize(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) · line 79
Quoted 6 lines
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +6
-0+static inline u32 *snp_get_os_area_msg_seqno (struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) +{ + return &snp_dev->layout->os_area.msg_seqno_0 + snp_dev->vmpck_id; +} + +static bool snp_is_vmpck_empty (struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)I noticed this name change from
is_vmpck_empty()tosnp_is_vmpck_empty(). Is that in prep for moving, too? Is so, maybe call that out in the commit message.Yes, will add to the commit.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +3
-1{ char zero_key[VMPCK_KEY_LEN] = {0}; + u8 *key = snp_get_vmpck(snp_dev); - if (snp_dev->vmpck) - return !memcmp(snp_dev->vmpck, zero_key, VMPCK_KEY_LEN); + if (key) + return !memcmp(key, zero_key, VMPCK_KEY_LEN);
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
I believe key can't be NULL, so this check isn't required.
Sure, will update.
Ah, although I noticed that when the various functions are moved over to the other file, the key return value can be NULL, so probably not worth changing here.
I have removed the check in this patch, but the check is retained in the later patch where key can be NULL.
Regards
Nikunj
PATCH v3 6/14 x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address
In reply to Nikunj A DadhaniaSave the secrets page address during snp_init() from the CC blob. Use secrets_pa instead of calling get_secrets_page() that remaps the CC blob for getting the secrets page every time.
--- arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 52 +++++++++++++------------------------------ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +16 -36
@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ static struct ghcb *boot_ghcb __section(".data");/* Bitmap of SEV features supported by the hypervisor */ static u64 sev_hv_features__ro_after_init ; +/* Secrets page physical address from the CC blob */ +static u64 secrets_pa__ro_after_init ; +/* #VC handler runtime per-CPU data */ struct sev_es_runtime_data {struct ghcb ghcb_page;
@@ -561,45 +564,16 @@ void noinstr __sev_es_nmi_complete(void)__sev_put_ghcb (&state); } -static u64 __init get_secrets_page (void ) -{ -u64 pa_data = boot_params.cc_blob_address; -struct cc_blob_sev_info info; -void *map; - -/* -* The CC blob contains the address of the secrets page, check if the -* blob is present. -*/ -if (!pa_data) -return 0 ; - - map =early_memremap (pa_data,sizeof (info)); -if (!map) { -pr_err ("Unable to locate SNP secrets page: failed to map the Confidential Computing blob.\n" ); -return 0 ; - } -memcpy (&info, map,sizeof (info)); -early_memunmap (map,sizeof (info)); - -/* smoke-test the secrets page passed */ -if (!info.secrets_phys || info.secrets_len !=PAGE_SIZE ) -return 0 ; - -return info.secrets_phys; -} -static u64 __init get_snp_jump_table_addr (void ) {struct snp_secrets_page_layout *layout;void __iomem *mem; -u64 pa, addr; +u64 addr; - pa =get_secrets_page (); -if (!pa) +if (!secrets_pa)return 0 ; - mem =ioremap_encrypted (pa,PAGE_SIZE ); + mem =ioremap_encrypted (secrets_pa,PAGE_SIZE );if (!mem) {pr_err ("Unable to locate AP jump table address: failed to map the SNP secrets page.\n" );return 0 ;
@@ -2093,6 +2067,12 @@ static __init struct cc_blob_sev_info *find_cc_blob(struct boot_params *bp)return cc_info; } +static void __init set_secrets_pa (const struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info) +{ +if (cc_info && cc_info->secrets_phys && cc_info->secrets_len ==PAGE_SIZE ) + secrets_pa = cc_info->secrets_phys; +} +bool __init snp_init (struct boot_params *bp) {struct cc_blob_sev_info *cc_info;
@@ -2104,6 +2084,8 @@ bool __init snp_init(struct boot_params *bp)if (!cc_info)return false; +set_secrets_pa (cc_info); +setup_cpuid_table (cc_info);/*
@@ -2256,16 +2238,14 @@ static struct platform_device sev_guest_device = {static int __init snp_init_platform_device (void ) {struct sev_guest_platform_data data; -u64 gpa;if (!cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP ))return -ENODEV ; - gpa =get_secrets_page (); -if (!gpa) +if (!secrets_pa)return -ENODEV ; - data.secrets_gpa = gpa; + data.secrets_gpa = secrets_pa;if (platform_device_add_data (&sev_guest_device, &data,sizeof (data)))return -ENODEV ;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH v3 06/14] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address
Quoted 5 lines · Nikunj A Dadhania
Save the secrets page address during
snp_init()from the CC blob. Usesecrets_painstead of callingget_secrets_page()that remaps the CC blob for getting the secrets page every time.Signed-off-by Nikunj A Dadhania <[email protected]>
Quoted 4 lines
--- arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 52 +++++++++++++------------------------------ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
PATCH v3 7/14 x86/sev: Move and reorganize sev guest request api
In reply to Nikunj A DadhaniaFor enabling Secure TSC, SEV-SNP guests need to communicate with the AMD Security Processor early during boot. Many of the required functions are implemented in the sev-guest driver and therefore not available at early boot. Move the required functions and provide an API to the driver to assign key and send guest request.
--- arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/sev-guest.h | 84 +++- arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 10 - arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 466 +++++++++++++++++++++- drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/Kconfig | 1 - drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 493 +----------------------- 6 files changed, 557 insertions(+), 498 deletions(-)
arch/x86/Kconfig +1 -0
@@ -1546,6 +1546,7 @@ config AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT select INSTRUCTION_DECODER select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM select X86_MEM_ENCRYPT + select CRYPTO_LIB_AESGCM help Say yes to enable support for the encryption of system memory. This requires an AMD processor that supports Secure Memory
arch/x86/include/asm/sev-guest.h +82 -2
105 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h +0 -10
@@ -88,16 +88,6 @@ extern bool handle_vc_boot_ghcb(struct pt_regs *regs);#define RMPADJUST_VMSA_PAGE_BIT BIT(16) -/* SNP Guest message request */ -struct snp_req_data { -unsigned long req_gpa; -unsigned long resp_gpa; -}; - -struct sev_guest_platform_data { -u64 secrets_gpa; -}; -/* * The secrets page contains 96-bytes of reserved field that can be used by * the guest OS. The guest OS uses the area to save the message sequence
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +454 -12
499 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ config SEV_GUEST tristate "AMD SEV Guest driver" default m depends on AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT - select CRYPTO_LIB_AESGCM help SEV-SNP firmware provides the guest a mechanism to communicate with the PSP without risk from a malicious hypervisor who wishes to read,
drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +20 -473
584 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v3 8/14 x86/mm: Add generic guest initialization hook
In reply to Nikunj A DadhaniaAdd generic enc_init guest hook for performing any type of initialization that is vendor specific.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c | 2 ++ arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 3 +++ 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h +2 -0
@@ -148,12 +148,14 @@ struct x86_init_acpi {* @enc_status_change_finish Notify HV after the encryption status of a range is changed * @enc_tlb_flush_required Returns true if a TLB flush is needed before changing page encryption status * @enc_cache_flush_required Returns true if a cache flush is needed before changing page encryption status +* @enc_init Prepare and initialize encryption features */ struct x86_guest {void (*enc_status_change_prepare)(unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc);bool (*enc_status_change_finish)(unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc);bool (*enc_tlb_flush_required)(bool enc);bool (*enc_cache_flush_required)(void ); +void (*enc_init)(void ); };/**
arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c +2 -0
@@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ static bool enc_status_change_finish_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, boolstatic bool enc_tlb_flush_required_noop (bool enc) {return false; }static bool enc_cache_flush_required_noop (void ) {return false; }static bool is_private_mmio_noop (u64 addr) {return false; } +static void enc_init_noop (void ) { }struct x86_platform_ops x86_platform__ro_after_init = { .calibrate_cpu = native_calibrate_cpu_early,
@@ -157,6 +158,7 @@ struct x86_platform_ops x86_platform __ro_after_init = { .enc_status_change_finish = enc_status_change_finish_noop, .enc_tlb_flush_required = enc_tlb_flush_required_noop, .enc_cache_flush_required = enc_cache_flush_required_noop, + .enc_init = enc_init_noop, }, };
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +3 -0
@@ -84,5 +84,8 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)/* Call into SWIOTLB to update the SWIOTLB DMA buffers */ swiotlb_update_mem_attributes (); +if (x86_platform.guest.enc_init) + x86_platform.guest.enc_init (); +print_mem_encrypt_feature_info (); }
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v3 9/14 x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests
In reply to Nikunj A DadhaniaAdd support for Secure TSC in SNP enabled guests. Secure TSC allows guest to securely use RDTSC/RDTSCP instructions as the parameters being used cannot be changed by hypervisor once the guest is launched.
During the boot-up of the secondary cpus, SecureTSC enabled guests need to query TSC info from AMD Security Processor. This communication channel is encrypted between the AMD Security Processor and the guest, the hypervisor is just the conduit to deliver the guest messages to the AMD Security Processor. Each message is protected with an AEAD (AES-256 GCM). Use minimal AES GCM library to encrypt/decrypt SNP Guest messages to communicate with the PSP.
--- arch/x86/coco/core.c | 3 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/sev-guest.h | 18 +++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 6 ++- arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 6 +++ include/linux/cc_platform.h | 8 ++++ 7 files changed, 123 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/coco/core.c +3 -0
@@ -89,6 +89,9 @@ static bool amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)case CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP :return sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED ; +case CC_ATTR_GUEST_SECURE_TSC : +return sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC ; +default :return false; }
arch/x86/include/asm/sev-guest.h +18 -0
@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ enum msg_type {SNP_MSG_ABSORB_RSP ,SNP_MSG_VMRK_REQ ,SNP_MSG_VMRK_RSP , +SNP_MSG_TSC_INFO_REQ =17 , +SNP_MSG_TSC_INFO_RSP , SNP_MSG_TYPE_MAX };
@@ -111,6 +113,22 @@ struct snp_guest_req {u8 msg_type; }; +struct snp_tsc_info_req { +#define SNP_TSC_INFO_REQ_SZ 128 +/* Must be zero filled */ +u8 rsvd[SNP_TSC_INFO_REQ_SZ ]; +} __packed; + +struct snp_tsc_info_resp { +/* Status of TSC_INFO message */ +u32 status; +u32 rsvd1; +u64 tsc_scale; +u64 tsc_offset; +u32 tsc_factor; +u8 rsvd2[100 ]; +} __packed; +int snp_setup_psp_messaging (struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev);int snp_send_guest_request (struct snp_guest_dev *dev,struct snp_guest_req *req,struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *rio);
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h +2 -0
@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ void snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages);void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu (void );bool snp_init (struct boot_params *bp);void __init __noreturn snp_abort (void ); +void __init snp_secure_tsc_prepare (void );#else static inline void sev_es_ist_enter (struct pt_regs *regs) { }static inline void sev_es_ist_exit (void ) { }
@@ -208,6 +209,7 @@ static inline void snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npagstatic inline void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu (void ) { }static inline bool snp_init (struct boot_params *bp) {return false; }static inline void snp_abort (void ) { } +static inline void __init snp_secure_tsc_prepare (void ) { }#endif #endif
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h +4 -2
@@ -412,7 +412,9 @@ struct sev_es_save_area {u8 reserved_0x298[80 ];u32 pkru;u32 tsc_aux; -u8 reserved_0x2f0[24 ]; +u64 tsc_scale; +u64 tsc_offset; +u8 reserved_0x300[8 ];u64 rcx;u64 rdx;u64 rbx;
@@ -544,7 +546,7 @@ static inline void __unused_size_checks(void)BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET (sev_es_save_area,0x1c0 );BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET (sev_es_save_area,0x248 );BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET (sev_es_save_area,0x298 ); -BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET (sev_es_save_area,0x2f0 ); +BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET (sev_es_save_area,0x300 );BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET (sev_es_save_area,0x320 );BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET (sev_es_save_area,0x380 );BUILD_BUG_RESERVED_OFFSET (sev_es_save_area,0x3f0 );
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +82 -0
100 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c +6 -0
@@ -215,6 +215,11 @@ void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)__sme_early_map_unmap_mem (__va (cmdline_paddr),COMMAND_LINE_SIZE , true); } +void __init amd_enc_init (void ) +{ +snp_secure_tsc_prepare (); +} +void __init sev_setup_arch (void ) {phys_addr_t total_mem =memblock_phys_mem_size ();
@@ -501,6 +506,7 @@ void __init sme_early_init(void) x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish = amd_enc_status_change_finish; x86_platform.guest.enc_tlb_flush_required = amd_enc_tlb_flush_required; x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required = amd_enc_cache_flush_required; + x86_platform.guest.enc_init = amd_enc_init; }void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem (void )
include/linux/cc_platform.h +8 -0
@@ -90,6 +90,14 @@ enum cc_attr {* Examples include TDX Guest. */ CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED , + +/** +* @CC_ATTR_GUEST_SECURE_TSC: Secure TSC is active. +* +* The platform/OS is running as a guest/virtual machine and actively +* using AMD SEV-SNP Secure TSC feature. +*/ + CC_ATTR_GUEST_SECURE_TSC, };#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v3 10/14 x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests
In reply to Nikunj A DadhaniaSecure TSC enabled guests should not write MSR_IA32_TSC(10H) register as the subsequent TSC value reads are undefined. MSR_IA32_TSC related accesses should not exit to the hypervisor for such guests.
Accesses to MSR_IA32_TSC needs special handling in the #VC handler for the guests with Secure TSC enabled. Writes to MSR_IA32_TSC should be ignored, and reads of MSR_IA32_TSC should return the result of the RDTSC instruction.
--- arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +24 -0
@@ -1729,6 +1729,30 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_msr(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)/* Is it a WRMSR? */ exit_info_1 = (ctxt->insn.opcode.bytes[1 ] ==0x30 ) ?1 :0 ; +/* +* TSC related accesses should not exit to the hypervisor when a +* guest is executing with SecureTSC enabled, so special handling +* is required for accesses of MSR_IA32_TSC: +* +* Writes: Writing to MSR_IA32_TSC can cause subsequent reads +* of the TSC to return undefined values, so ignore all +* writes. +* Reads: Reads of MSR_IA32_TSC should return the current TSC +* value, use the value returned by RDTSC. +*/ +if (regs->cx ==MSR_IA32_TSC &&cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_SECURE_TSC )) { +u64 tsc; + +if (exit_info_1) +return ES_OK ; + + tsc =rdtsc (); + regs->ax =UINT_MAX & tsc; + regs->dx =UINT_MAX & (tsc >>32 ); + +return ES_OK ; + } +ghcb_set_rcx (ghcb, regs->cx);if (exit_info_1) {ghcb_set_rax (ghcb, regs->ax);
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v3 11/14 x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception for Secure TSC enabled guests
In reply to Nikunj A DadhaniaThe hypervisor should not be intercepting RDTSC/RDTSCP when Secure TSC is enabled. A #VC exception will be generated if the RDTSC/RDTSCP instructions are being intercepted. If this should occur and Secure TSC is enabled, terminate guest execution.
--- arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +7 -0
@@ -912,6 +912,13 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_rdtsc(struct ghcb *ghcb,bool rdtscp = (exit_code ==SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP );enum es_result ret; +/* +* RDTSC and RDTSCP should not be intercepted when Secure TSC is +* enabled. Terminate the SNP guest when the interception is enabled. +*/ +if (sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC ) +return ES_VMM_ERROR ; + ret =sev_es_ghcb_hv_call (ghcb, ctxt, exit_code,0 ,0 );if (ret !=ES_OK )return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v3 12/14 x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available
In reply to Nikunj A DadhaniaFor AMD SNP guests having Secure TSC enabled, skip using the kvmclock. The guest kernel will fallback and use Secure TSC based clocksource.
--- arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c +1 -1
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ void __init kvmclock_init(void) {u8 flags; -if (!kvm_para_available () || !kvmclock) +if (!kvm_para_available () || !kvmclock ||cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_SECURE_TSC ))return ;if (kvm_para_has_feature (KVM_FEATURE_CLOCKSOURCE2 )) {
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v3 13/14 x86/tsc: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource
In reply to Nikunj A DadhaniaAMD SNP guests may have Secure TSC feature enabled. Secure TSC as clocksource is wrongly marked as unstable, mark Secure TSC as reliable.
--- arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c +1 -1
@@ -1221,7 +1221,7 @@ static void __init check_system_tsc_reliable(void) tsc_clocksource_reliable = 1; }#endif -if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE )) +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE ) ||cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_SECURE_TSC )) tsc_clocksource_reliable =1 ;/*
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v3 14/14 x86/sev: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests
In reply to Nikunj A DadhaniaNow that all the required plumbing is done for enabling SNP Secure TSC feature, add Secure TSC to snp features present list.
The CC_ATTR_GUEST_SECURE_TSC can be used by the guest to query whether the SNP guest has Secure TSC feature active.
--- arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 2 +- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 10 ++++++++-- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c +1 -1
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ static void enforce_vmpl0(void)* by the guest kernel. As and when a new feature is implemented in the * guest kernel, a corresponding bit should be added to the mask. */ -#define SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT (0) +#define SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT (MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC)void snp_check_features (void ) {
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +8 -2
@@ -69,8 +69,14 @@ static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void)pr_cont (" SEV-ES" );/* Secure Nested Paging */ -if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP )) -pr_cont (" SEV-SNP" ); +if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP )) { +pr_cont (" SEV-SNP\n" ); +pr_cont ("SNP Features active: " ); + +/* SNP Secure TSC */ +if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_SECURE_TSC )) +pr_cont (" SECURE-TSC" ); + }pr_cont ("\n" ); }
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Quoted 21 lines · Nikunj A Dadhania
Secure TSC allows guests to securely use RDTSC/RDTSCP instructions as the parameters being used cannot be changed by hypervisor once the guest is launched. More details in the AMD64 APM Vol 2, Section "Secure TSC".
During the boot-up of the secondary cpus, SecureTSC enabled guests need to query TSC info from AMD Security Processor. This communication channel is encrypted between the AMD Security Processor and the guest, the hypervisor is just the conduit to deliver the guest messages to the AMD Security Processor. Each message is protected with an AEAD (AES-256 GCM). See "SEV Secure Nested Paging Firmware ABI Specification" document (currently at
https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/56860.pdf) section "TSC Info"Use a minimal GCM library to encrypt/decrypt SNP Guest messages to communicate with the AMD Security Processor which is available at early boot.
SEV-guest driver has the implementation for guest and AMD Security Processor communication. As the
TSC_INFOneeds to be initialized during early boot before smp cpus are started, move most of the sev-guest driver code tokernel/sev.cand provide well defined APIs to the sev-guest driver to use the interface to avoid code-duplication.
Quoted 3 lines
Patches:
01-07: Preparation and movement of sev-guest driver code 08-14: SecureTSC enablement patches.
A gentle reminder.
Thanks
Nikunj
Quoted 82 lines
Testing SecureTSC
-----------------SecureTSC hypervisor patches based on top of SEV-SNP UPM series:
https://github.com/nikunjad/linux/tree/snp-host-latest-securetscQEMU changes:
https://github.com/nikunjad/qemu/tree/snp_securetscQEMU commandline SEV-SNP-UPM with SecureTSC:
qemu-system-x86_64 -cpu EPYC-Milan-v2,+secure-tsc \ -object memory-backend-memfd-private,id=ram1,size=1G,share=true \ -object sev-snp-guest,id=sev0,cbitpos=51,reduced-phys-bits=1,secure-tsc=on \ -machine q35,confidential-guest-support=sev0,memory-backend=ram1,kvm-type=protected \ ...Changelog:
----------
v3:
* Updated commit messages
* Madesnp_setup_psp_messaging()generic that is accessed by both the kernel and the driver
* Moved most of the context information tosev.c, sev-guest driver does not need to know the secrets page layout anymore
* AddCC_ATTR_GUEST_SECURE_TSCearly in the series therefore it can be used in later patches.
* Removeddata_gpaanddata_npagesfrom structsnp_req_data, ascerts_dataand its size is passed tohandle_guest_request_ext()
* Makevmpck_idas unsigned int
* Dropped unnecessary usage ofmemzero_explicit()
* Cachesecrets_painstead of remapping thecc_blobalways
* Rebase on top of v6.4 kernelv2:
* Rebased on top of v6.3-rc3 that has Boris's sev-guest cleanup series
https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
Nikunj A Dadhania (14):
virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library
virt: sev-guest: Move mutex to SNP guest device structure
virt: sev-guest: Replacepr_debugwithdev_dbg
virt: sev-guest: Add SNP guest request structure
virt: sev-guest: Addvmpck_idtosnp_guest_devstruct x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address
x86/sev: Move and reorganize sev guest request api x86/mm: Add generic guest initialization hook
x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception for Secure TSC enabled
guests
x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available x86/tsc: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource x86/sev: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guestsarch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 2 +- arch/x86/coco/core.c | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/sev-guest.h | 175 +++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 19 +- arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 6 +- arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/kvmclock.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 7 + arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 631 +++++++++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/kernel/tsc.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c | 2 + arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 13 +- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 6 + drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/Kconfig | 2 - drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 638 +++--------------------- drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.h | 63 --- include/linux/cc_platform.h | 8 + 18 files changed, 882 insertions(+), 700 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/sev-guest.h delete mode 100644 drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.hbase-commit:
6995e2de6891c724bfeb2db33d7b87775f913ad1