nfsd: inherit required unset default acls from effective set
Subsystems (3)
Jeff Layton
maintainerPATCH v2 1/1 nfsd: inherit required unset default acls from effective set
A well-formed NFSv4 ACL will always contain OWNER@/GROUP@/EVERYONE@ ACEs, but there is no requirement for inheritable entries for those entities. POSIX ACLs must always have owner/group/other entries, even for a default ACL.
nfsd builds the default ACL from inheritable ACEs, but the current code just leaves any unspecified ACEs zeroed out. The result is that adding a default user or group ACE to an inode can leave it with unwanted deny entries.
For instance, a newly created directory with no acl will look something like this:
# NFSv4 translation by server A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy # POSIX ACL of underlying file user::rwx group::r-x other::r-x
...if I then add new v4 ACE:
nfs4_setfacl -a A:fd:1000:rwx /mnt/local/test
...I end up with a result like this today:
user::rwx user:1000:rwx group::r-x mask::rwx other::r-x default:user::--- default:user:1000:rwx default:group::--- default:mask::rwx default:other::--- A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::1000:rwaDxtcy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy D:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDx A:fdi:OWNER@:tTcCy A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy A:fdi:GROUP@:tcy A:fdi:EVERYONE@:tcy
...which is not at all expected. Adding a single inheritable allow ACE should not result in everyone else losing access.
The setfacl command solves a silimar issue by copying owner/group/other entries from the effective ACL when none of them are set:
"If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains no
owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL.
Having nfsd do the same provides a more sane result (with no deny ACEs in the resulting set):
user::rwx user:1000:rwx group::r-x mask::rwx other::r-x default:user::rwx default:user:1000:rwx default:group::r-x default:mask::rwx default:other::r-x A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::1000:rwaDxtcy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy A:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy A:fdi:GROUP@:rxtcy A:fdi:EVERYONE@:rxtcy
---
Changes in v2:
- always set missing ACEs whenever default ACL has any ACEs that are explicitly set. This better conforms to how setfacl works.
- drop now-unneeded "empty" boolean
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
--- fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +28 -4
@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ struct posix_ace_state_array {* calculated so far: */ struct posix_acl_state { -int empty; +unsigned char valid;struct posix_ace_state owner;struct posix_ace_state group;struct posix_ace_state other;
@@ -457,7 +457,6 @@ init_state(struct posix_acl_state *state, int cnt)int alloc;memset (state,0 ,sizeof (struct posix_acl_state )); - state->empty =1 ;/* * In the worst case, each individual acl could be for a distinct * named user or group, but we don't know which, so we allocate
@@ -500,7 +499,7 @@ posix_state_to_acl(struct posix_acl_state *state, unsigned int flags)* and effective cases: when there are no inheritable ACEs, * calls ->set_acl with a NULL ACL structure. */ -if (state->empty && (flags &NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT )) +if (!state->valid && (flags &NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT ))return NULL ;/*
@@ -622,9 +621,10 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state, struct nfs4_ace *ace) {u32 mask = ace->access_mask; +short type =ace2type (ace);int i; - state->empty =0 ; + state->valid |= type;switch (ace2type (ace)) {case ACL_USER_OBJ :
@@ -726,6 +726,30 @@ static int nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(struct nfs4_acl *acl,if (!(ace->flag &NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE ))process_one_v4_ace (&effective_acl_state, ace); } + +/* +* At this point, the default ACL may have zeroed-out entries for owner, +* group and other. That usually results in a non-sensical resulting ACL +* that denies all access except to any ACE that was explicitly added. +* +* The setfacl command solves a similar problem with this logic: +* +* "If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains +* no owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL +* owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL." +* +* Copy any missing ACEs from the effective set, if any ACEs were +* explicitly set. +*/ +if (default_acl_state.valid) { +if (!(default_acl_state.valid &ACL_USER_OBJ )) + default_acl_state.owner = effective_acl_state.owner; +if (!(default_acl_state.valid &ACL_GROUP_OBJ )) + default_acl_state.group = effective_acl_state.group; +if (!(default_acl_state.valid &ACL_OTHER )) + default_acl_state.other = effective_acl_state.other; + } + *pacl =posix_state_to_acl (&effective_acl_state, flags);if (IS_ERR (*pacl)) { ret =PTR_ERR (*pacl);
---
base-commit: 7bfb36a2ee1d329a501ba4781db4145dc951c798
change-id: 20230719-nfsd-acl-5ab61537e4e6
Best regards,
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Quoted 128 lines · Jeff Layton
A well-formed NFSv4 ACL will always contain OWNER@/GROUP@/EVERYONE@ ACEs, but there is no requirement for inheritable entries for those entities. POSIX ACLs must always have owner/group/other entries, even for a default ACL.
nfsd builds the default ACL from inheritable ACEs, but the current code just leaves any unspecified ACEs zeroed out. The result is that adding a default user or group ACE to an inode can leave it with unwanted deny entries.
For instance, a newly created directory with no acl will look something like this:
# NFSv4 translation by server A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy # POSIX ACL of underlying file user::rwx group::r-x other::r-x...if I then add new v4 ACE:
nfs4_setfacl -a A:fd:1000:rwx /mnt/local/test...I end up with a result like this today:
user::rwx user:1000:rwx group::r-x mask::rwx other::r-x default:user::--- default:user:1000:rwx default:group::--- default:mask::rwx default:other::--- A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::1000:rwaDxtcy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy D:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDx A:fdi:OWNER@:tTcCy A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy A:fdi:GROUP@:tcy A:fdi:EVERYONE@:tcy...which is not at all expected. Adding a single inheritable allow ACE should not result in everyone else losing access.
The setfacl command solves a silimar issue by copying owner/group/other entries from the effective ACL when none of them are set:
"If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains no
owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL.Having nfsd do the same provides a more sane result (with no deny ACEs in the resulting set):
user::rwx user:1000:rwx group::r-x mask::rwx other::r-x default:user::rwx default:user:1000:rwx default:group::r-x default:mask::rwx default:other::r-x A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::1000:rwaDxtcy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy A:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy A:fdi:GROUP@:rxtcy A:fdi:EVERYONE@:rxtcyReported-by Ondrej Valousek <[email protected]>Suggested-by Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>---
Changes in v2:
- always set missing ACEs whenever default ACL has any ACEs that are explicitly set. This better conforms to how setfacl works.
- drop now-unneeded "empty" boolean
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]--- fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +2
-3@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ struct posix_ace_state_array {* calculated so far: */ struct posix_acl_state { -int empty; +unsigned char valid;struct posix_ace_state owner;struct posix_ace_state group;struct posix_ace_state other;@@ -457,7 +457,6 @@ init_state(struct posix_acl_state *state, int cnt)int alloc;memset (state,0 ,sizeof (struct posix_acl_state )); - state->empty =1 ;/* * In the worst case, each individual acl could be for a distinct * named user or group, but we don't know which, so we allocate @@ -500,7 +499,7 @@ posix_state_to_acl(struct posix_acl_state *state, unsigned int flags)* and effective cases: when there are no inheritable ACEs, * calls ->set_acl with a NULL ACL structure. */ -if (state->empty && (flags &NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT )) +if (!state->valid && (flags &NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT ))return NULL ;/*
fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state, · line 629
Quoted 10 lines
fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +2
-1@@ -622,9 +621,10 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state, struct nfs4_ace *ace) {u32 mask = ace->access_mask; +short type =ace2type (ace);int i; - state->empty =0 ; + state->valid |= type;switch (ace2type (ace)) {
Mechanical issue: the patch adds @type, but uses it just once. The switch here also wants the value of ace2type(ace).
Quoted 41 lines
fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +24
-1case ACL_USER_OBJ :@@ -726,6 +726,30 @@ static int nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(struct nfs4_acl *acl,if (!(ace->flag &NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE ))process_one_v4_ace (&effective_acl_state, ace); } + +/* +* At this point, the default ACL may have zeroed-out entries for owner, +* group and other. That usually results in a non-sensical resulting ACL +* that denies all access except to any ACE that was explicitly added. +* +* The setfacl command solves a similar problem with this logic: +* +* "If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains +* no owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL +* owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL." +* +* Copy any missing ACEs from the effective set, if any ACEs were +* explicitly set. +*/ +if (default_acl_state.valid) { +if (!(default_acl_state.valid &ACL_USER_OBJ )) + default_acl_state.owner = effective_acl_state.owner; +if (!(default_acl_state.valid &ACL_GROUP_OBJ )) + default_acl_state.group = effective_acl_state.group; +if (!(default_acl_state.valid &ACL_OTHER )) + default_acl_state.other = effective_acl_state.other; + } + *pacl =posix_state_to_acl (&effective_acl_state, flags);if (IS_ERR (*pacl)) { ret =PTR_ERR (*pacl); ---base-commit:
7bfb36a2ee1d329a501ba4781db4145dc951c798
change-id: 20230719-nfsd-acl-5ab61537e4e6Best regards,
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signature · 1 line
Chuck Lever
Jeff Layton
maintainerQuoted 135 lines · Chuck Lever
Quoted 134 lines · Jeff Layton
A well-formed NFSv4 ACL will always contain OWNER@/GROUP@/EVERYONE@ ACEs, but there is no requirement for inheritable entries for those entities. POSIX ACLs must always have owner/group/other entries, even for a default ACL.
nfsd builds the default ACL from inheritable ACEs, but the current code just leaves any unspecified ACEs zeroed out. The result is that adding a default user or group ACE to an inode can leave it with unwanted deny entries.
For instance, a newly created directory with no acl will look something like this:
# NFSv4 translation by server A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy # POSIX ACL of underlying file user::rwx group::r-x other::r-x...if I then add new v4 ACE:
nfs4_setfacl -a A:fd:1000:rwx /mnt/local/test...I end up with a result like this today:
user::rwx user:1000:rwx group::r-x mask::rwx other::r-x default:user::--- default:user:1000:rwx default:group::--- default:mask::rwx default:other::--- A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::1000:rwaDxtcy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy D:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDx A:fdi:OWNER@:tTcCy A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy A:fdi:GROUP@:tcy A:fdi:EVERYONE@:tcy...which is not at all expected. Adding a single inheritable allow ACE should not result in everyone else losing access.
The setfacl command solves a silimar issue by copying owner/group/other entries from the effective ACL when none of them are set:
"If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains no
owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL.Having nfsd do the same provides a more sane result (with no deny ACEs in the resulting set):
user::rwx user:1000:rwx group::r-x mask::rwx other::r-x default:user::rwx default:user:1000:rwx default:group::r-x default:mask::rwx default:other::r-x A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::1000:rwaDxtcy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy A:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy A:fdi:GROUP@:rxtcy A:fdi:EVERYONE@:rxtcyReported-by Ondrej Valousek <[email protected]>Suggested-by Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>---
Changes in v2:
- always set missing ACEs whenever default ACL has any ACEs that are explicitly set. This better conforms to how setfacl works.
- drop now-unneeded "empty" boolean
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]--- fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +3
-3@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ struct posix_ace_state_array {* calculated so far: */ struct posix_acl_state { -int empty; +unsigned char valid;struct posix_ace_state owner;struct posix_ace_state group;struct posix_ace_state other;@@ -457,7 +457,6 @@ init_state(struct posix_acl_state *state, int cnt)int alloc;memset (state,0 ,sizeof (struct posix_acl_state )); - state->empty =1 ;/* * In the worst case, each individual acl could be for a distinct * named user or group, but we don't know which, so we allocate @@ -500,7 +499,7 @@ posix_state_to_acl(struct posix_acl_state *state, unsigned int flags)* and effective cases: when there are no inheritable ACEs, * calls ->set_acl with a NULL ACL structure. */ -if (state->empty && (flags &NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT )) +if (!state->valid && (flags &NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT ))return NULL ;/* @@ -622,9 +621,10 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state, struct nfs4_ace *ace) {u32 mask = ace->access_mask; +short type =ace2type (ace);int i;
Quoted 9 lines
fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state, · line 629
Quoted 4 lines
fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +1
-1- state->empty =0 ; + state->valid |= type;switch (ace2type (ace)) {Mechanical issue: the patch adds @type, but uses it just once. The switch here also wants the value of ace2type(ace).
Doh! I had that fixed in one version of the patch, but had to rework the branch and lost that delta. I can respin, or if you just want to fix that in place, then that would be fine too.
Quoted 42 lines
Quoted 41 lines
fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +24
-1case ACL_USER_OBJ :@@ -726,6 +726,30 @@ static int nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(struct nfs4_acl *acl,if (!(ace->flag &NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE ))process_one_v4_ace (&effective_acl_state, ace); } + +/* +* At this point, the default ACL may have zeroed-out entries for owner, +* group and other. That usually results in a non-sensical resulting ACL +* that denies all access except to any ACE that was explicitly added. +* +* The setfacl command solves a similar problem with this logic: +* +* "If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains +* no owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL +* owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL." +* +* Copy any missing ACEs from the effective set, if any ACEs were +* explicitly set. +*/ +if (default_acl_state.valid) { +if (!(default_acl_state.valid &ACL_USER_OBJ )) + default_acl_state.owner = effective_acl_state.owner; +if (!(default_acl_state.valid &ACL_GROUP_OBJ )) + default_acl_state.group = effective_acl_state.group; +if (!(default_acl_state.valid &ACL_OTHER )) + default_acl_state.other = effective_acl_state.other; + } + *pacl =posix_state_to_acl (&effective_acl_state, flags);if (IS_ERR (*pacl)) { ret =PTR_ERR (*pacl); ---base-commit:
7bfb36a2ee1d329a501ba4781db4145dc951c798
change-id: 20230719-nfsd-acl-5ab61537e4e6Best regards,
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Quoted 146 lines · Jeff Layton
Quoted 135 lines · Chuck Lever
Quoted 134 lines · Jeff Layton
A well-formed NFSv4 ACL will always contain OWNER@/GROUP@/EVERYONE@ ACEs, but there is no requirement for inheritable entries for those entities. POSIX ACLs must always have owner/group/other entries, even for a default ACL.
nfsd builds the default ACL from inheritable ACEs, but the current code just leaves any unspecified ACEs zeroed out. The result is that adding a default user or group ACE to an inode can leave it with unwanted deny entries.
For instance, a newly created directory with no acl will look something like this:
# NFSv4 translation by server A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy # POSIX ACL of underlying file user::rwx group::r-x other::r-x...if I then add new v4 ACE:
nfs4_setfacl -a A:fd:1000:rwx /mnt/local/test...I end up with a result like this today:
user::rwx user:1000:rwx group::r-x mask::rwx other::r-x default:user::--- default:user:1000:rwx default:group::--- default:mask::rwx default:other::--- A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::1000:rwaDxtcy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy D:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDx A:fdi:OWNER@:tTcCy A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy A:fdi:GROUP@:tcy A:fdi:EVERYONE@:tcy...which is not at all expected. Adding a single inheritable allow ACE should not result in everyone else losing access.
The setfacl command solves a silimar issue by copying owner/group/other entries from the effective ACL when none of them are set:
"If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains no
owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL.Having nfsd do the same provides a more sane result (with no deny ACEs in the resulting set):
user::rwx user:1000:rwx group::r-x mask::rwx other::r-x default:user::rwx default:user:1000:rwx default:group::r-x default:mask::rwx default:other::r-x A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::1000:rwaDxtcy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy A:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy A:fdi:GROUP@:rxtcy A:fdi:EVERYONE@:rxtcyReported-by Ondrej Valousek <[email protected]>Suggested-by Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>---
Changes in v2:
- always set missing ACEs whenever default ACL has any ACEs that are explicitly set. This better conforms to how setfacl works.
- drop now-unneeded "empty" boolean
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]--- fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +3
-3@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ struct posix_ace_state_array {* calculated so far: */ struct posix_acl_state { -int empty; +unsigned char valid;struct posix_ace_state owner;struct posix_ace_state group;struct posix_ace_state other;@@ -457,7 +457,6 @@ init_state(struct posix_acl_state *state, int cnt)int alloc;memset (state,0 ,sizeof (struct posix_acl_state )); - state->empty =1 ;/* * In the worst case, each individual acl could be for a distinct * named user or group, but we don't know which, so we allocate @@ -500,7 +499,7 @@ posix_state_to_acl(struct posix_acl_state *state, unsigned int flags)* and effective cases: when there are no inheritable ACEs, * calls ->set_acl with a NULL ACL structure. */ -if (state->empty && (flags &NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT )) +if (!state->valid && (flags &NFS4_ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT ))return NULL ;/* @@ -622,9 +621,10 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state, struct nfs4_ace *ace) {u32 mask = ace->access_mask; +short type =ace2type (ace);int i;Quoted 9 lines
fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state, · line 629
Quoted 4 lines
fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +1
-1- state->empty =0 ; + state->valid |= type;switch (ace2type (ace)) {Mechanical issue: the patch adds @type, but uses it just once. The switch here also wants the value of ace2type(ace).
Quoted 3 lines
Doh! I had that fixed in one version of the patch, but had to rework the branch and lost that delta. I can respin, or if you just want to fix that in place, then that would be fine too.
I've fixed it in my tree and applied it to nfsd-next. Let me know if I've done something wrong.
Quoted 45 lines
Quoted 42 lines
Quoted 41 lines
fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +24
-1case ACL_USER_OBJ :@@ -726,6 +726,30 @@ static int nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(struct nfs4_acl *acl,if (!(ace->flag &NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE ))process_one_v4_ace (&effective_acl_state, ace); } + +/* +* At this point, the default ACL may have zeroed-out entries for owner, +* group and other. That usually results in a non-sensical resulting ACL +* that denies all access except to any ACE that was explicitly added. +* +* The setfacl command solves a similar problem with this logic: +* +* "If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains +* no owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL +* owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL." +* +* Copy any missing ACEs from the effective set, if any ACEs were +* explicitly set. +*/ +if (default_acl_state.valid) { +if (!(default_acl_state.valid &ACL_USER_OBJ )) + default_acl_state.owner = effective_acl_state.owner; +if (!(default_acl_state.valid &ACL_GROUP_OBJ )) + default_acl_state.group = effective_acl_state.group; +if (!(default_acl_state.valid &ACL_OTHER )) + default_acl_state.other = effective_acl_state.other; + } + *pacl =posix_state_to_acl (&effective_acl_state, flags);if (IS_ERR (*pacl)) { ret =PTR_ERR (*pacl); ---base-commit:
7bfb36a2ee1d329a501ba4781db4145dc951c798
change-id: 20230719-nfsd-acl-5ab61537e4e6Best regards,
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signature · 1 line
Chuck Lever