nfsd: inherit required unset default acls from effective set
Subsystems (3)
Jeff Layton
maintainerPATCH 1/1 nfsd: inherit required unset default acls from effective set
A well-formed NFSv4 ACL will always contain OWNER@/GROUP@/EVERYONE@ ACEs, but there is no requirement for inheritable entries for those entities. POSIX ACLs must always have owner/group/other entries, even for a default ACL.
nfsd builds the default ACL from inheritable ACEs, but the current code just leaves any unspecified ACEs zeroed out. The result is that adding a default user or group ACE to an inode can leave it with unwanted deny entries.
For instance, a newly created directory with no acl will look something like this:
# NFSv4 translation by server A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy # POSIX ACL of underlying file user::rwx group::r-x other::r-x
...if I then add new v4 ACE:
nfs4_setfacl -a A:fd:1000:rwx /mnt/local/test
...I end up with a result like this today:
user::rwx user:1000:rwx group::r-x mask::rwx other::r-x default:user::--- default:user:1000:rwx default:group::--- default:mask::rwx default:other::--- A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::1000:rwaDxtcy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy D:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDx A:fdi:OWNER@:tTcCy A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy A:fdi:GROUP@:tcy A:fdi:EVERYONE@:tcy
...which is not at all expected. Adding a single inheritable allow ACE should not result in everyone else losing access.
The setfacl command solves a silimar issue by copying owner/group/other entries from the effective ACL when none of them are set:
"If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains no
owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL.
Having nfsd do the same provides a more sane result (with no deny ACEs in the resulting set):
user::rwx user:1000:rwx group::r-x mask::rwx other::r-x default:user::rwx default:user:1000:rwx default:group::r-x default:mask::rwx default:other::r-x A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::1000:rwaDxtcy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy A:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy A:fdi:GROUP@:rxtcy A:fdi:EVERYONE@:rxtcy
--- fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +29 -3
@@ -441,7 +441,8 @@ struct posix_ace_state_array {* calculated so far: */ struct posix_acl_state { -int empty; +bool empty; +unsigned char valid;struct posix_ace_state owner;struct posix_ace_state group;struct posix_ace_state other;
@@ -457,7 +458,7 @@ init_state(struct posix_acl_state *state, int cnt)int alloc;memset (state,0 ,sizeof (struct posix_acl_state )); - state->empty =1 ; + state->empty = true;/* * In the worst case, each individual acl could be for a distinct * named user or group, but we don't know which, so we allocate
@@ -624,7 +625,7 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state,u32 mask = ace->access_mask;int i; - state->empty =0 ; + state->empty = false;switch (ace2type (ace)) {case ACL_USER_OBJ :
@@ -633,6 +634,7 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state, }else {deny_bits (&state->owner, mask); } + state->valid |=ACL_USER_OBJ ;break ;case ACL_USER : i =find_uid (state, ace->who_uid);
@@ -655,6 +657,7 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state,deny_bits_array (state->users, mask);deny_bits_array (state->groups, mask); } + state->valid |=ACL_GROUP_OBJ ;break ;case ACL_GROUP : i =find_gid (state, ace->who_gid);
@@ -686,6 +689,7 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state,deny_bits_array (state->users, mask);deny_bits_array (state->groups, mask); } + state->valid |=ACL_OTHER ; } }
@@ -726,6 +730,28 @@ static int nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(struct nfs4_acl *acl,if (!(ace->flag &NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE ))process_one_v4_ace (&effective_acl_state, ace); } + +/* +* At this point, the default ACL may have zeroed-out entries for owner, +* group and other. That usually results in a non-sensical resulting ACL +* that denies all access except to any ACE that was explicitly added. +* +* The setfacl command solves a similar problem with this logic: +* +* "If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains +* no owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL +* owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL." +* +* If none of the requisite ACEs were set, and some explicit user or group +* ACEs were, copy the requisite entries from the effective set. +*/ +if (!default_acl_state.valid && + (default_acl_state.users->n || default_acl_state.groups->n)) { + default_acl_state.owner = effective_acl_state.owner; + default_acl_state.group = effective_acl_state.group; + default_acl_state.other = effective_acl_state.other; + } + *pacl =posix_state_to_acl (&effective_acl_state, flags);if (IS_ERR (*pacl)) { ret =PTR_ERR (*pacl);
---
base-commit: 9d985ab8ed33176c3c0380b7de589ea2ae51a48d
change-id: 20230719-nfsd-acl-5ab61537e4e6
Best regards,
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Quoted 87 lines · Jeff Layton
A well-formed NFSv4 ACL will always contain OWNER@/GROUP@/EVERYONE@ ACEs, but there is no requirement for inheritable entries for those entities. POSIX ACLs must always have owner/group/other entries, even for a default ACL.
nfsd builds the default ACL from inheritable ACEs, but the current code just leaves any unspecified ACEs zeroed out. The result is that adding a default user or group ACE to an inode can leave it with unwanted deny entries.
For instance, a newly created directory with no acl will look something like this:
# NFSv4 translation by server
A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
A::GROUP@:rxtcy
A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy# POSIX ACL of underlying file
user::rwx
group::r-x
other::r-x...if I then add new v4 ACE:
nfs4_setfacl-a A:fd:1000:rwx/mnt/local/test...I end up with a result like this today:
user::rwx
user:1000:rwx
group::r-xmask::rwx
other::r-x
default:user::---
default:user:1000:rwx
default:group::---
default:mask::rwx
default:other::---A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
A::1000:rwaDxtcy
A::GROUP@:rxtcy
A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy
D:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDx
A:fdi:OWNER@:tTcCy
A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy
A:fdi:GROUP@:tcy
A:fdi:EVERYONE@:tcy...which is not at all expected. Adding a single inheritable allow ACE should not result in everyone else losing access.
The setfacl command solves a silimar issue by copying owner/group/other entries from the effective ACL when none of them are set:
"If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains no
owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL.Having nfsd do the same provides a more sane result (with no deny ACEs in the resulting set):
user::rwx
user:1000:rwx
group::r-xmask::rwx
other::r-x
default:user::rwx
default:user:1000:rwx
default:group::r-x
default:mask::rwx
default:other::r-xA::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
A::1000:rwaDxtcy
A::GROUP@:rxtcy
A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy
A:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy
A:fdi:GROUP@:rxtcy
A:fdi:EVERYONE@:rxtcy
Quoted 4 lines
Reported-by Ondrej Valousek <[email protected]>Suggested-by Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
As you pointed out in the bug report, there is not much testing infrastructure for NFSv4 ACLs. It will be hard to tell in advance if this change results in a behavior regression.
On the other hand, I'm not sure we have a large cohort of NFSv4 ACL users on Linux.
I can certainly apply this to nfsd-next at least for a few weeks to see if anyone yelps.
Quoted 94 lines
---
fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c| 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +4
-3@@ -441,7 +441,8 @@ struct posix_ace_state_array {* calculated so far: */ struct posix_acl_state { -int empty; +bool empty; +unsigned char valid;struct posix_ace_state owner;struct posix_ace_state group;struct posix_ace_state other;@@ -457,7 +458,7 @@ init_state(struct posix_acl_state *state, int cnt)int alloc;memset (state,0 ,sizeof (struct posix_acl_state )); - state->empty =1 ; + state->empty = true;/* * In the worst case, each individual acl could be for a distinct * named user or group, but we don't know which, so we allocate @@ -624,7 +625,7 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state,u32 mask = ace->access_mask;int i; - state->empty =0 ; + state->empty = false;switch (ace2type (ace)) {case
ACL_USER_OBJ:fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +1
-0@@ -633,6 +634,7 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state, }else {deny_bits (&state->owner, mask); } + state->valid |=ACL_USER_OBJ ;break ;case
ACL_USER:
i =find_uid(state, ace->who_uid);fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +1
-0@@ -655,6 +657,7 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state,deny_bits_array (state->users, mask);deny_bits_array (state->groups, mask); } + state->valid |=ACL_GROUP_OBJ ;break ;case
ACL_GROUP:
i =find_gid(state, ace->who_gid);fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +23
-1@@ -686,6 +689,7 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state,deny_bits_array (state->users, mask);deny_bits_array (state->groups, mask); } + state->valid |=ACL_OTHER ; } }@@ -726,6 +730,28 @@ static int nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(struct nfs4_acl *acl,if (!(ace->flag &NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE ))process_one_v4_ace (&effective_acl_state, ace); } + +/* +* At this point, the default ACL may have zeroed-out entries for owner, +* group and other. That usually results in a non-sensical resulting ACL +* that denies all access except to any ACE that was explicitly added. +* +* The setfacl command solves a similar problem with this logic: +* +* "If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains +* no owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL +* owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL." +* +* If none of the requisite ACEs were set, and some explicit user or group +* ACEs were, copy the requisite entries from the effective set. +*/ +if (!default_acl_state.valid && + (default_acl_state.users->n || default_acl_state.groups->n)) { + default_acl_state.owner = effective_acl_state.owner; + default_acl_state.group = effective_acl_state.group; + default_acl_state.other = effective_acl_state.other; + } + *pacl =posix_state_to_acl (&effective_acl_state, flags);if (IS_ERR (*pacl)) { ret =PTR_ERR (*pacl); ---base-commit:
9d985ab8ed33176c3c0380b7de589ea2ae51a48d
change-id: 20230719-nfsd-acl-5ab61537e4e6
Quoted 4 lines
Best regards,
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
--
Chuck Lever
Jeff Layton
maintainerQuoted 95 lines · Chuck Lever III
Quoted 86 lines · Jeff Layton
A well-formed NFSv4 ACL will always contain OWNER@/GROUP@/EVERYONE@ ACEs, but there is no requirement for inheritable entries for those entities. POSIX ACLs must always have owner/group/other entries, even for a default ACL.
nfsd builds the default ACL from inheritable ACEs, but the current code just leaves any unspecified ACEs zeroed out. The result is that adding a default user or group ACE to an inode can leave it with unwanted deny entries.
For instance, a newly created directory with no acl will look something like this:
# NFSv4 translation by server
A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
A::GROUP@:rxtcy
A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy# POSIX ACL of underlying file
user::rwx
group::r-x
other::r-x...if I then add new v4 ACE:
nfs4_setfacl-a A:fd:1000:rwx/mnt/local/test...I end up with a result like this today:
user::rwx
user:1000:rwx
group::r-xmask::rwx
other::r-x
default:user::---
default:user:1000:rwx
default:group::---
default:mask::rwx
default:other::---A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
A::1000:rwaDxtcy
A::GROUP@:rxtcy
A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy
D:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDx
A:fdi:OWNER@:tTcCy
A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy
A:fdi:GROUP@:tcy
A:fdi:EVERYONE@:tcy...which is not at all expected. Adding a single inheritable allow ACE should not result in everyone else losing access.
The setfacl command solves a silimar issue by copying owner/group/other entries from the effective ACL when none of them are set:
"If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains no
owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL.Having nfsd do the same provides a more sane result (with no deny ACEs in the resulting set):
user::rwx
user:1000:rwx
group::r-xmask::rwx
other::r-x
default:user::rwx
default:user:1000:rwx
default:group::r-x
default:mask::rwx
default:other::r-xA::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
A::1000:rwaDxtcy
A::GROUP@:rxtcy
A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy
A:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy
A:fdi:GROUP@:rxtcy
A:fdi:EVERYONE@:rxtcyQuoted 4 lines
Reported-by Ondrej Valousek <[email protected]>Suggested-by Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>As you pointed out in the bug report, there is not much testing infrastructure for NFSv4 ACLs. It will be hard to tell in advance if this change results in a behavior regression.
Quoted 6 lines
On the other hand, I'm not sure we have a large cohort of NFSv4 ACL users on Linux.
I can certainly apply this to nfsd-next at least for a few weeks to see if anyone yelps.
Thanks, that's probably the best we can do, given the state of v4 ACL test coverage.
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Hi Jeff,
this patch seems useful, thanks.
Am Mi., 19. Juli 2023 um 19:56 Uhr schrieb Jeff Layton <[email protected]>:
Quoted 4 lines
A well-formed NFSv4 ACL will always contain OWNER@/GROUP@/EVERYONE@ ACEs, but there is no requirement for inheritable entries for those entities. POSIX ACLs must always have owner/group/other entries, even for a default ACL.
NFSv4 ACLs actually don't *need* to have OWNER@/GROUP@/EVERYONE@ entries; that's merely a result of translating POSIX ACLs (or file modes) to NFSv4 ACLs.
Quoted 69 lines
nfsd builds the default ACL from inheritable ACEs, but the current code just leaves any unspecified ACEs zeroed out. The result is that adding a default user or group ACE to an inode can leave it with unwanted deny entries.
For instance, a newly created directory with no acl will look something like this:
# NFSv4 translation by server A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy # POSIX ACL of underlying file user::rwx group::r-x other::r-x...if I then add new v4 ACE:
nfs4_setfacl -a A:fd:1000:rwx /mnt/local/test...I end up with a result like this today:
user::rwx user:1000:rwx group::r-x mask::rwx other::r-x default:user::--- default:user:1000:rwx default:group::--- default:mask::rwx default:other::--- A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::1000:rwaDxtcy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy D:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDx A:fdi:OWNER@:tTcCy A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy A:fdi:GROUP@:tcy A:fdi:EVERYONE@:tcy...which is not at all expected. Adding a single inheritable allow ACE should not result in everyone else losing access.
The setfacl command solves a silimar issue by copying owner/group/other entries from the effective ACL when none of them are set:
"If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains no
owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL.Having nfsd do the same provides a more sane result (with no deny ACEs in the resulting set):
user::rwx user:1000:rwx group::r-x mask::rwx other::r-x default:user::rwx default:user:1000:rwx default:group::r-x default:mask::rwx default:other::r-x
Quoted 8 lines
A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
A::1000:rwaDxtcy
A::GROUP@:rxtcy
A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy
A:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy
A:fdi:GROUP@:rxtcy
A:fdi:EVERYONE@:rxtcyThis resulting NFSv4 ACL is still rather dull; we end up with an inherit-only entry for each effective entry. Those could all be combined, resulting in:
A:fd:OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy
A:fd:1000:rwaDxtcy
A:fd:GROUP@:rxtcy
A:fd:EVERYONE@:rxtcyThis will be the common case, so maybe matching entry pairs can either be recombined or not generated in the first place as a further improvement.
Quoted 13 lines
Reported-by Ondrej Valousek <[email protected]>Suggested-by Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +0
-0
fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c struct posix_ace_state_array { · line 445
Quoted 6 lines
fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +2
-1@@ -441,7 +441,8 @@ struct posix_ace_state_array {* calculated so far: */ struct posix_acl_state { -int empty; +bool empty; +unsigned char valid;
Hmm, "valid" is a bitmask here but it only matters whether it is zero. Shouldn't a bool be good enough? Also, this variable indicates whether special "who" values are present (and which), so the name "valid" probably isn't the best choice.
Quoted 79 lines
fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +27
-3struct posix_ace_state owner;struct posix_ace_state group;struct posix_ace_state other;@@ -457,7 +458,7 @@ init_state(struct posix_acl_state *state, int cnt)int alloc;memset (state,0 ,sizeof (struct posix_acl_state )); - state->empty =1 ; + state->empty = true;/* * In the worst case, each individual acl could be for a distinct * named user or group, but we don't know which, so we allocate @@ -624,7 +625,7 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state,u32 mask = ace->access_mask;int i; - state->empty =0 ; + state->empty = false;switch (ace2type (ace)) {case ACL_USER_OBJ :@@ -633,6 +634,7 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state, }else {deny_bits (&state->owner, mask); } + state->valid |=ACL_USER_OBJ ;break ;case ACL_USER : i =find_uid (state, ace->who_uid);@@ -655,6 +657,7 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state,deny_bits_array (state->users, mask);deny_bits_array (state->groups, mask); } + state->valid |=ACL_GROUP_OBJ ;break ;case ACL_GROUP : i =find_gid (state, ace->who_gid);@@ -686,6 +689,7 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state,deny_bits_array (state->users, mask);deny_bits_array (state->groups, mask); } + state->valid |=ACL_OTHER ; } }@@ -726,6 +730,28 @@ static int nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(struct nfs4_acl *acl,if (!(ace->flag &NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE ))process_one_v4_ace (&effective_acl_state, ace); } + +/* +* At this point, the default ACL may have zeroed-out entries for owner, +* group and other. That usually results in a non-sensical resulting ACL +* that denies all access except to any ACE that was explicitly added. +* +* The setfacl command solves a similar problem with this logic: +* +* "If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains +* no owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL +* owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL." +* +* If none of the requisite ACEs were set, and some explicit user or group +* ACEs were, copy the requisite entries from the effective set. +*/ +if (!default_acl_state.valid && + (default_acl_state.users->n || default_acl_state.groups->n)) { + default_acl_state.owner = effective_acl_state.owner; + default_acl_state.group = effective_acl_state.group; + default_acl_state.other = effective_acl_state.other; + } + *pacl =posix_state_to_acl (&effective_acl_state, flags);if (IS_ERR (*pacl)) { ret =PTR_ERR (*pacl); ---base-commit:
9d985ab8ed33176c3c0380b7de589ea2ae51a48d
change-id: 20230719-nfsd-acl-5ab61537e4e6
Quoted 3 lines
Best regards,
--
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Thanks,
Andreas
Am Mi., 19. Juli 2023 um 23:22 Uhr schrieb Andreas Grünbacher <[email protected]>:
Quoted 194 lines
Hi Jeff,
this patch seems useful, thanks.
Am Mi., 19. Juli 2023 um 19:56 Uhr schrieb Jeff Layton <[email protected]>:
Quoted 4 lines
A well-formed NFSv4 ACL will always contain OWNER@/GROUP@/EVERYONE@ ACEs, but there is no requirement for inheritable entries for those entities. POSIX ACLs must always have owner/group/other entries, even for a default ACL.
NFSv4 ACLs actually don't *need* to have OWNER@/GROUP@/EVERYONE@ entries; that's merely a result of translating POSIX ACLs (or file modes) to NFSv4 ACLs.
Quoted 69 lines
nfsd builds the default ACL from inheritable ACEs, but the current code just leaves any unspecified ACEs zeroed out. The result is that adding a default user or group ACE to an inode can leave it with unwanted deny entries.
For instance, a newly created directory with no acl will look something like this:
# NFSv4 translation by server A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy # POSIX ACL of underlying file user::rwx group::r-x other::r-x...if I then add new v4 ACE:
nfs4_setfacl -a A:fd:1000:rwx /mnt/local/test...I end up with a result like this today:
user::rwx user:1000:rwx group::r-x mask::rwx other::r-x default:user::--- default:user:1000:rwx default:group::--- default:mask::rwx default:other::--- A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::1000:rwaDxtcy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy D:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDx A:fdi:OWNER@:tTcCy A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy A:fdi:GROUP@:tcy A:fdi:EVERYONE@:tcy...which is not at all expected. Adding a single inheritable allow ACE should not result in everyone else losing access.
The setfacl command solves a silimar issue by copying owner/group/other entries from the effective ACL when none of them are set:
"If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains no
owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL.Having nfsd do the same provides a more sane result (with no deny ACEs in the resulting set):
user::rwx user:1000:rwx group::r-x mask::rwx other::r-x default:user::rwx default:user:1000:rwx default:group::r-x default:mask::rwx default:other::r-xQuoted 8 lines
A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::1000:rwaDxtcy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy A:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy A:fdi:GROUP@:rxtcy A:fdi:EVERYONE@:rxtcyThis resulting NFSv4 ACL is still rather dull; we end up with an inherit-only entry for each effective entry. Those could all be combined, resulting in:
A:fd:OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A:fd:1000:rwaDxtcy A:fd:GROUP@:rxtcy A:fd:EVERYONE@:rxtcyThis will be the common case, so maybe matching entry pairs can either be recombined or not generated in the first place as a further improvement.
Quoted 13 lines
Reported-by Ondrej Valousek <[email protected]>Suggested-by Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +0
-0fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c struct posix_ace_state_array { · line 445
Quoted 6 lines
fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +2
-1@@ -441,7 +441,8 @@ struct posix_ace_state_array {* calculated so far: */ struct posix_acl_state { -int empty; +bool empty; +unsigned char valid;Hmm, "valid" is a bitmask here but it only matters whether it is zero. Shouldn't a bool be good enough? Also, this variable indicates whether special "who" values are present (and which), so the name "valid" probably isn't the best choice.
Quoted 63 lines
fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +19
-2struct posix_ace_state owner;struct posix_ace_state group;struct posix_ace_state other;@@ -457,7 +458,7 @@ init_state(struct posix_acl_state *state, int cnt)int alloc;memset (state,0 ,sizeof (struct posix_acl_state )); - state->empty =1 ; + state->empty = true;/* * In the worst case, each individual acl could be for a distinct * named user or group, but we don't know which, so we allocate @@ -624,7 +625,7 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state,u32 mask = ace->access_mask;int i; - state->empty =0 ; + state->empty = false;switch (ace2type (ace)) {case ACL_USER_OBJ :@@ -633,6 +634,7 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state, }else {deny_bits (&state->owner, mask); } + state->valid |=ACL_USER_OBJ ;break ;case ACL_USER : i =find_uid (state, ace->who_uid);@@ -655,6 +657,7 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state,deny_bits_array (state->users, mask);deny_bits_array (state->groups, mask); } + state->valid |=ACL_GROUP_OBJ ;break ;case ACL_GROUP : i =find_gid (state, ace->who_gid);@@ -686,6 +689,7 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state,deny_bits_array (state->users, mask);deny_bits_array (state->groups, mask); } + state->valid |=ACL_OTHER ; } }@@ -726,6 +730,28 @@ static int nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(struct nfs4_acl *acl,if (!(ace->flag &NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE ))process_one_v4_ace (&effective_acl_state, ace); } + +/* +* At this point, the default ACL may have zeroed-out entries for owner, +* group and other. That usually results in a non-sensical resulting ACL +* that denies all access except to any ACE that was explicitly added. +* +* The setfacl command solves a similar problem with this logic: +* +* "If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains +* no owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL +* owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL." +* +* If none of the requisite ACEs were set, and some explicit user or group +* ACEs were, copy the requisite entries from the effective set.
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fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c static int nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(struct nfs4_acl *acl, · line 754
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fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +8
-0+*/ +if (!default_acl_state.valid && + (default_acl_state.users->n || default_acl_state.groups->n)) { + default_acl_state.owner = effective_acl_state.owner; + default_acl_state.group = effective_acl_state.group; + default_acl_state.other = effective_acl_state.other; + } +
The other thing I'm wondering about is whether it would make more sense to fake up for missing entries individually as setfacl does:
http://git.savannah.nongnu.org/cgit/acl.git/tree/tools/do_set.c#n368
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fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +0
-1*pacl =posix_state_to_acl (&effective_acl_state, flags);if (IS_ERR (*pacl)) { ret =PTR_ERR (*pacl); ---base-commit:
9d985ab8ed33176c3c0380b7de589ea2ae51a48d
change-id: 20230719-nfsd-acl-5ab61537e4e6Best regards,
--
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Thanks,
Andreas
Jeff Layton
maintainerQuoted 17 lines · Andreas Grünbacher
Am Mi., 19. Juli 2023 um 23:22 Uhr schrieb Andreas Grünbacher <[email protected]>:
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Hi Jeff,
this patch seems useful, thanks.
Am Mi., 19. Juli 2023 um 19:56 Uhr schrieb Jeff Layton <[email protected]>:
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A well-formed NFSv4 ACL will always contain OWNER@/GROUP@/EVERYONE@ ACEs, but there is no requirement for inheritable entries for those entities. POSIX ACLs must always have owner/group/other entries, even for a default ACL.
NFSv4 ACLs actually don't *need* to have OWNER@/GROUP@/EVERYONE@ entries; that's merely a result of translating POSIX ACLs (or file modes) to NFSv4 ACLs.
RFC 8881, section 6.4 says:
"The server that supports both mode and ACL must take care to synchronize the MODE4_*USR, MODE4_*GRP, and MODE4_*OTH bits with the ACEs that have respective who fields of "OWNER@", "GROUP@", and "EVERYONE@". This way, the client can see if semantically equivalent access permissions exist whether the client asks for the owner, owner_group, and mode attributes or for just the ACL."
...so technically you're correct for a generic NFS server, but in the Linux nfsd case, we have to have them.
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nfsd builds the default ACL from inheritable ACEs, but the current code just leaves any unspecified ACEs zeroed out. The result is that adding a default user or group ACE to an inode can leave it with unwanted deny entries.
For instance, a newly created directory with no acl will look something like this:
# NFSv4 translation by server A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy # POSIX ACL of underlying file user::rwx group::r-x other::r-x...if I then add new v4 ACE:
nfs4_setfacl -a A:fd:1000:rwx /mnt/local/test...I end up with a result like this today:
user::rwx user:1000:rwx group::r-x mask::rwx other::r-x default:user::--- default:user:1000:rwx default:group::--- default:mask::rwx default:other::--- A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::1000:rwaDxtcy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy D:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDx A:fdi:OWNER@:tTcCy A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy A:fdi:GROUP@:tcy A:fdi:EVERYONE@:tcy...which is not at all expected. Adding a single inheritable allow ACE should not result in everyone else losing access.
The setfacl command solves a silimar issue by copying owner/group/other entries from the effective ACL when none of them are set:
"If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains no
owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL.Having nfsd do the same provides a more sane result (with no deny ACEs in the resulting set):
user::rwx user:1000:rwx group::r-x mask::rwx other::r-x default:user::rwx default:user:1000:rwx default:group::r-x default:mask::rwx default:other::r-xQuoted 8 lines
A::OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A::1000:rwaDxtcy A::GROUP@:rxtcy A::EVERYONE@:rxtcy A:fdi:OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A:fdi:1000:rwaDxtcy A:fdi:GROUP@:rxtcy A:fdi:EVERYONE@:rxtcyThis resulting NFSv4 ACL is still rather dull; we end up with an inherit-only entry for each effective entry. Those could all be combined, resulting in:
A:fd:OWNER@:rwaDxtTcCy A:fd:1000:rwaDxtcy A:fd:GROUP@:rxtcy A:fd:EVERYONE@:rxtcy
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This will be the common case, so maybe matching entry pairs can either be recombined or not generated in the first place as a further improvement.
To be clear, this patch fixes the NFSv4->POSIX ACL translation. The problem you're describing above is more with the POSIX->NFSv4 translation. I don't think we can make the resulting POSIX ACLs more concise.
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Reported-by Ondrej Valousek <[email protected]>Suggested-by Andreas Gruenbacher <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jeff Layton <[email protected]>--- fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +0
-0@@ -441,7 +441,8 @@ struct posix_ace_state_array {* calculated so far: */
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fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c struct posix_ace_state_array { · line 445
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fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +2
-1struct posix_acl_state { -int empty; +bool empty; +unsigned char valid;Hmm, "valid" is a bitmask here but it only matters whether it is zero. Shouldn't a bool be good enough? Also, this variable indicates whether special "who" values are present (and which), so the name "valid" probably isn't the best choice.
Yep, a bool would be fine. This patch went through a bunch of different revisions and in one, I needed know which individual fields were set. I kept that here since the storage requirements are still the same, and it might be more useful for debugging purposes in the future.
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fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +19
-2struct posix_ace_state owner;struct posix_ace_state group;struct posix_ace_state other;@@ -457,7 +458,7 @@ init_state(struct posix_acl_state *state, int cnt)int alloc;memset (state,0 ,sizeof (struct posix_acl_state )); - state->empty =1 ; + state->empty = true;/* * In the worst case, each individual acl could be for a distinct * named user or group, but we don't know which, so we allocate @@ -624,7 +625,7 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state,u32 mask = ace->access_mask;int i; - state->empty =0 ; + state->empty = false;switch (ace2type (ace)) {case ACL_USER_OBJ :@@ -633,6 +634,7 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state, }else {deny_bits (&state->owner, mask); } + state->valid |=ACL_USER_OBJ ;break ;case ACL_USER : i =find_uid (state, ace->who_uid);@@ -655,6 +657,7 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state,deny_bits_array (state->users, mask);deny_bits_array (state->groups, mask); } + state->valid |=ACL_GROUP_OBJ ;break ;case ACL_GROUP : i =find_gid (state, ace->who_gid);@@ -686,6 +689,7 @@ static void process_one_v4_ace(struct posix_acl_state *state,deny_bits_array (state->users, mask);deny_bits_array (state->groups, mask); } + state->valid |=ACL_OTHER ; } }@@ -726,6 +730,28 @@ static int nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(struct nfs4_acl *acl,if (!(ace->flag &NFS4_ACE_INHERIT_ONLY_ACE ))process_one_v4_ace (&effective_acl_state, ace); } + +/* +* At this point, the default ACL may have zeroed-out entries for owner, +* group and other. That usually results in a non-sensical resulting ACL +* that denies all access except to any ACE that was explicitly added. +* +* The setfacl command solves a similar problem with this logic: +* +* "If a Default ACL entry is created, and the Default ACL contains +* no owner, owning group, or others entry, a copy of the ACL +* owner, owning group, or others entry is added to the Default ACL." +* +* If none of the requisite ACEs were set, and some explicit user or group +* ACEs were, copy the requisite entries from the effective set. Quoted 8 lines
fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c static int nfs4_acl_nfsv4_to_posix(struct nfs4_acl *acl, · line 754
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fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +8
-0+*/ +if (!default_acl_state.valid && + (default_acl_state.users->n || default_acl_state.groups->n)) { + default_acl_state.owner = effective_acl_state.owner; + default_acl_state.group = effective_acl_state.group; + default_acl_state.other = effective_acl_state.other; + } +The other thing I'm wondering about is whether it would make more sense to fake up for missing entries individually as setfacl does:
Oh, I was going by the description in the manpage which seemed to indicate that if any of those had been set in the effective ACL that we wouldn't try to fake up anything. I actually had an earlier version that did what you suggest here. I can change it if you think that's more correct. It might be good to revise that description in the setfacl manpage since it's a little unclear.
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fs/nfsd/nfs4acl.c +0
-1*pacl =posix_state_to_acl (&effective_acl_state, flags);if (IS_ERR (*pacl)) { ret =PTR_ERR (*pacl); ---base-commit:
9d985ab8ed33176c3c0380b7de589ea2ae51a48d
change-id: 20230719-nfsd-acl-5ab61537e4e6Best regards,
--
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>Thanks,
Andreas
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>