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BPF: Reproducible triggering of BUG() from userspace PoC

REPORT Lee Jones 2 participants 3 messages Nov 8, 2023 – Nov 21, 2023

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Networking Network drivers x86 BPF +2 more subsystems
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Lee Jones

author
#0 lore raw

Good afternoon,

After coming across a recent Syzkaller report [0] I thought I'd take some time to firstly reproduce the issue, then see if there was a trivial way to mitigate it. The report suggests that a BUG() in prog_array_map_poke_run() [1] can be trivially and reliably triggered from userspace using the PoC provided [2].

        ret = bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_bypass,
                                 BPF_MOD_JUMP,
                                 old_bypass_addr,
                                 poke->bypass_addr);
        BUG_ON(ret < 0 && ret != -EINVAL);

Indeed the PoC does seem to be able to consistently trigger the BUG(), not only on the reported kernel (v6.1), but also on linux-next. I went to the trouble of checking LORE, but failed to find any patches which may be attempting to fix this.

    kernel BUG at kernel/bpf/arraymap.c:1094!
    invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
    CPU: 5 PID: 45 Comm: kworker/5:0 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3-next-20230929-dirty #74
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
    Workqueue: events prog_array_map_clear_deferred
    RIP: 0010:prog_array_map_poke_run+0x6b4/0x6d0
    Code: ff 0f 0b e8 1e 27 e1 ff 48 c7 c7 60 80 93 85 48 c7 c6 00 7f 93 85 48 c7 c2 bb c2 39 86 b9 45 04 00 00 45 89 f8 e8 9c 890
    RSP: 0018:ffffc9000036fb50 EFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000044 RBX: ffff88811f337490 RCX: 63af48a1314f9900
    RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
    RBP: ffffc9000036fbe8 R08: ffffffff815c23c5 R09: 1ffff11084c14eba
    R10: dfffe91084c14ebc R11: ffffed1084c14ebb R12: ffff888116517800
    R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff888125a1a400 R15: 00000000fffffff0
    FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888426080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    CR2: 00000000004ab678 CR3: 0000000122ac4000 CR4: 0000000000350eb0
    DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
    DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
    Call Trace:
     <TASK>
     ? __die_body+0x92/0xf0
     ? die+0xa2/0xe0
     ? do_trap+0x12f/0x370
     ? handle_invalid_op+0xa6/0x140
     ? handle_invalid_op+0xdf/0x140
     ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0x6b4/0x6d0
     ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0x6b4/0x6d0
     ? exc_invalid_op+0x32/0x50
     ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20
     ? __wake_up_klogd+0xd5/0x110
     ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0x6b4/0x6d0
     ? bpf_prog_6781ebc2dae4bad9+0xb/0x53
     fd_array_map_delete_elem+0x152/0x250
     prog_array_map_clear_deferred+0xf6/0x210
     ? __bpf_array_map_seq_show+0xa40/0xa40
     ? kick_pool+0x164/0x350
     ? process_one_work+0x57a/0xd00
     process_one_work+0x5e4/0xd00
     worker_thread+0x9cf/0xea0
     kthread+0x2b4/0x350
     ? pr_cont_work+0x580/0x580
     ? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0
     ret_from_fork+0x4a/0x80
     ? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0
     ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
     </TASK>
    Modules linked in:
    ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

However, with my very limited BPF subsystem knowledge I was unable to trivially fix the issue. Hopefully some knowledgable person would be kind enough to provide me with some pointers.

bpf_arch_text_poke() seems to be returning -EBUSY due to a negative memcmp() result from [3].

        ret = -EBUSY;
        mutex_lock(&text_mutex);
        if (memcmp(ip, old_insn, X86_PATCH_SIZE)) {
                goto out;
        [...]

When spitting out the memory at those locations, this is the result:

    ip:        e9 06 00 00 00
    old_insn:  0f 1f 44 00 00
    nop_insn:  0f 1f 44 00 00

As you can see, the information stored in 'ip' does not match that of the data stored in 'old_insn', causing bpf_arch_text_poke() to return early with the error -EBUSY, suggesting that the data pointed to by 'old_insn', and by extension 'prog' should have been changed when emit_call()ing, to the value of 'ip', but wasn't.

It's possible for me to see what is happening, but I'm afraid finding possible causes of corruption became too time consuming on this occasion. Would anyone be able to chime in to provide their take on possible causes please?

Any help would be gratefully received.

[0] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=97a4fe20470e9bc30810
[1] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c#L1092
[2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=ReproC&x=1397180f680000
[3] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c#L387

Signature · 1 line
Lee Jones [李琼斯]
#1 lore raw
Quoted 87 lines · Lee Jones

Good afternoon,

After coming across a recent Syzkaller report [0] I thought I'd take some time to firstly reproduce the issue, then see if there was a trivial way to mitigate it. The report suggests that a BUG() in prog_array_map_poke_run() [1] can be trivially and reliably triggered from userspace using the PoC provided [2].

        ret = bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_bypass,
                                 BPF_MOD_JUMP,
                                 old_bypass_addr,
                                 poke->bypass_addr);
        BUG_ON(ret < 0 && ret != -EINVAL);

Indeed the PoC does seem to be able to consistently trigger the BUG(), not only on the reported kernel (v6.1), but also on linux-next. I went to the trouble of checking LORE, but failed to find any patches which may be attempting to fix this.

    kernel BUG at kernel/bpf/arraymap.c:1094!
    invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
    CPU: 5 PID: 45 Comm: kworker/5:0 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3-next-20230929-dirty #74
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
    Workqueue: events prog_array_map_clear_deferred
    RIP: 0010:prog_array_map_poke_run+0x6b4/0x6d0
    Code: ff 0f 0b e8 1e 27 e1 ff 48 c7 c7 60 80 93 85 48 c7 c6 00 7f 93 85 48 c7 c2 bb c2 39 86 b9 45 04 00 00 45 89 f8 e8 9c 890
    RSP: 0018:ffffc9000036fb50 EFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000044 RBX: ffff88811f337490 RCX: 63af48a1314f9900
    RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
    RBP: ffffc9000036fbe8 R08: ffffffff815c23c5 R09: 1ffff11084c14eba
    R10: dfffe91084c14ebc R11: ffffed1084c14ebb R12: ffff888116517800
    R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff888125a1a400 R15: 00000000fffffff0
    FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888426080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    CR2: 00000000004ab678 CR3: 0000000122ac4000 CR4: 0000000000350eb0
    DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
    DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
    Call Trace:
     <TASK>
     ? __die_body+0x92/0xf0
     ? die+0xa2/0xe0
     ? do_trap+0x12f/0x370
     ? handle_invalid_op+0xa6/0x140
     ? handle_invalid_op+0xdf/0x140
     ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0x6b4/0x6d0
     ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0x6b4/0x6d0
     ? exc_invalid_op+0x32/0x50
     ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20
     ? __wake_up_klogd+0xd5/0x110
     ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0x6b4/0x6d0
     ? bpf_prog_6781ebc2dae4bad9+0xb/0x53
     fd_array_map_delete_elem+0x152/0x250
     prog_array_map_clear_deferred+0xf6/0x210
     ? __bpf_array_map_seq_show+0xa40/0xa40
     ? kick_pool+0x164/0x350
     ? process_one_work+0x57a/0xd00
     process_one_work+0x5e4/0xd00
     worker_thread+0x9cf/0xea0
     kthread+0x2b4/0x350
     ? pr_cont_work+0x580/0x580
     ? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0
     ret_from_fork+0x4a/0x80
     ? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0
     ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
     </TASK>
    Modules linked in:
    ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

However, with my very limited BPF subsystem knowledge I was unable to trivially fix the issue. Hopefully some knowledgable person would be kind enough to provide me with some pointers.

bpf_arch_text_poke() seems to be returning -EBUSY due to a negative memcmp() result from [3].

        ret = -EBUSY;
        mutex_lock(&text_mutex);
        if (memcmp(ip, old_insn, X86_PATCH_SIZE)) {
                goto out;
        [...]

When spitting out the memory at those locations, this is the result:

    ip:        e9 06 00 00 00
    old_insn:  0f 1f 44 00 00
    nop_insn:  0f 1f 44 00 00
Quoted 5 lines

As you can see, the information stored in 'ip' does not match that of the data stored in 'old_insn', causing bpf_arch_text_poke() to return early with the error -EBUSY, suggesting that the data pointed to by 'old_insn', and by extension 'prog' should have been changed when emit_call()ing, to the value of 'ip', but wasn't.

hi,
thanks for the report.. I can reproduce that easily with [2]

AFAICS it looks like previous update fails because we use bpf_arch_text_poke, which can't find poke->tailcall_bypass value as bpf program symbol and fails with -EINVAL

then the following update fails to find expected jmp/nop because it was never updated.. I think we should use __bpf_arch_text_poke like we do in bpf_tail_call_direct_fixup and skip the bpf symbol check

with the patch below I can't reproduce the issue anymore, I'll do some more checking though

jirka

---

arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +2 -2
index 8c10d9abc239..35c2988caf29 100644
@@ -391,8 +391,8 @@ static int emit_jump(u8 **pprog, void *func, void *ip)
 	return emit_patch(pprog, func, ip, 0xE9);
 }
 
-static int __bpf_arch_text_poke(void *ip, enum bpf_text_poke_type t,
-				void *old_addr, void *new_addr)
+int __bpf_arch_text_poke(void *ip, enum bpf_text_poke_type t,
+			 void *old_addr, void *new_addr)
 {
 	const u8 *nop_insn = x86_nops[5];
 	u8 old_insn[X86_PATCH_SIZE];
include/linux/bpf.h +2 -0
index eb84caf133df..0d7b8311fada 100644
@@ -3172,6 +3172,8 @@ enum bpf_text_poke_type {
 
 int bpf_arch_text_poke(void *ip, enum bpf_text_poke_type t,
 		       void *addr1, void *addr2);
+int __bpf_arch_text_poke(void *ip, enum bpf_text_poke_type t,
+			 void *old_addr, void *new_addr);
 
 void *bpf_arch_text_copy(void *dst, void *src, size_t len);
 int bpf_arch_text_invalidate(void *dst, size_t len);
kernel/bpf/arraymap.c +7 -7
index 2058e89b5ddd..4ab5864746ce 100644
@@ -1073,33 +1073,33 @@ static void prog_array_map_poke_run(struct bpf_map *map, u32 key,
 			new_addr = new ? (u8 *)new->bpf_func + poke->adj_off : NULL;
 
 			if (new) {
-				ret = bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_target,
+				ret = __bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_target,
 							 BPF_MOD_JUMP,
 							 old_addr, new_addr);
 				BUG_ON(ret < 0 && ret != -EINVAL);
 				if (!old) {
-					ret = bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_bypass,
+					ret = __bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_bypass,
 								 BPF_MOD_JUMP,
 								 poke->bypass_addr,
 								 NULL);
-					BUG_ON(ret < 0 && ret != -EINVAL);
+					BUG_ON(ret < 0);
 				}
 			} else {
-				ret = bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_bypass,
+				ret = __bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_bypass,
 							 BPF_MOD_JUMP,
 							 old_bypass_addr,
 							 poke->bypass_addr);
-				BUG_ON(ret < 0 && ret != -EINVAL);
+				BUG_ON(ret < 0);
 				/* let other CPUs finish the execution of program
 				 * so that it will not possible to expose them
 				 * to invalid nop, stack unwind, nop state
 				 */
 				if (!ret)
 					synchronize_rcu();
-				ret = bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_target,
+				ret = __bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_target,
 							 BPF_MOD_JUMP,
 							 old_addr, NULL);
-				BUG_ON(ret < 0 && ret != -EINVAL);
+				BUG_ON(ret < 0);
 			}
 		}
 	}
author Tested-by
#2 lore raw
Quoted 101 lines · Jiri Olsa
Quoted 87 lines · Lee Jones

Good afternoon,

After coming across a recent Syzkaller report [0] I thought I'd take some time to firstly reproduce the issue, then see if there was a trivial way to mitigate it. The report suggests that a BUG() in prog_array_map_poke_run() [1] can be trivially and reliably triggered from userspace using the PoC provided [2].

        ret = bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_bypass,
                                 BPF_MOD_JUMP,
                                 old_bypass_addr,
                                 poke->bypass_addr);
        BUG_ON(ret < 0 && ret != -EINVAL);

Indeed the PoC does seem to be able to consistently trigger the BUG(), not only on the reported kernel (v6.1), but also on linux-next. I went to the trouble of checking LORE, but failed to find any patches which may be attempting to fix this.

    kernel BUG at kernel/bpf/arraymap.c:1094!
    invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
    CPU: 5 PID: 45 Comm: kworker/5:0 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3-next-20230929-dirty #74
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
    Workqueue: events prog_array_map_clear_deferred
    RIP: 0010:prog_array_map_poke_run+0x6b4/0x6d0
    Code: ff 0f 0b e8 1e 27 e1 ff 48 c7 c7 60 80 93 85 48 c7 c6 00 7f 93 85 48 c7 c2 bb c2 39 86 b9 45 04 00 00 45 89 f8 e8 9c 890
    RSP: 0018:ffffc9000036fb50 EFLAGS: 00010246
    RAX: 0000000000000044 RBX: ffff88811f337490 RCX: 63af48a1314f9900
    RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
    RBP: ffffc9000036fbe8 R08: ffffffff815c23c5 R09: 1ffff11084c14eba
    R10: dfffe91084c14ebc R11: ffffed1084c14ebb R12: ffff888116517800
    R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff888125a1a400 R15: 00000000fffffff0
    FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888426080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    CR2: 00000000004ab678 CR3: 0000000122ac4000 CR4: 0000000000350eb0
    DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
    DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
    Call Trace:
     <TASK>
     ? __die_body+0x92/0xf0
     ? die+0xa2/0xe0
     ? do_trap+0x12f/0x370
     ? handle_invalid_op+0xa6/0x140
     ? handle_invalid_op+0xdf/0x140
     ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0x6b4/0x6d0
     ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0x6b4/0x6d0
     ? exc_invalid_op+0x32/0x50
     ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20
     ? __wake_up_klogd+0xd5/0x110
     ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0x6b4/0x6d0
     ? bpf_prog_6781ebc2dae4bad9+0xb/0x53
     fd_array_map_delete_elem+0x152/0x250
     prog_array_map_clear_deferred+0xf6/0x210
     ? __bpf_array_map_seq_show+0xa40/0xa40
     ? kick_pool+0x164/0x350
     ? process_one_work+0x57a/0xd00
     process_one_work+0x5e4/0xd00
     worker_thread+0x9cf/0xea0
     kthread+0x2b4/0x350
     ? pr_cont_work+0x580/0x580
     ? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0
     ret_from_fork+0x4a/0x80
     ? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0
     ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
     </TASK>
    Modules linked in:
    ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

However, with my very limited BPF subsystem knowledge I was unable to trivially fix the issue. Hopefully some knowledgable person would be kind enough to provide me with some pointers.

bpf_arch_text_poke() seems to be returning -EBUSY due to a negative memcmp() result from [3].

        ret = -EBUSY;
        mutex_lock(&text_mutex);
        if (memcmp(ip, old_insn, X86_PATCH_SIZE)) {
                goto out;
        [...]

When spitting out the memory at those locations, this is the result:

    ip:        e9 06 00 00 00
    old_insn:  0f 1f 44 00 00
    nop_insn:  0f 1f 44 00 00
Quoted 5 lines

As you can see, the information stored in 'ip' does not match that of the data stored in 'old_insn', causing bpf_arch_text_poke() to return early with the error -EBUSY, suggesting that the data pointed to by 'old_insn', and by extension 'prog' should have been changed when emit_call()ing, to the value of 'ip', but wasn't.

hi,
thanks for the report.. I can reproduce that easily with [2]

AFAICS it looks like previous update fails because we use bpf_arch_text_poke, which can't find poke->tailcall_bypass value as bpf program symbol and fails with -EINVAL

Quoted 6 lines

then the following update fails to find expected jmp/nop because it was never updated.. I think we should use __bpf_arch_text_poke like we do in bpf_tail_call_direct_fixup and skip the bpf symbol check

with the patch below I can't reproduce the issue anymore, I'll do some more checking though

The patch below seems to be working for me also:

Quoted 74 lines

---

arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +2 -2
index 8c10d9abc239..35c2988caf29 100644
@@ -391,8 +391,8 @@ static int emit_jump(u8 **pprog, void *func, void *ip)
 	return emit_patch(pprog, func, ip, 0xE9);
 }
 
-static int __bpf_arch_text_poke(void *ip, enum bpf_text_poke_type t,
-				void *old_addr, void *new_addr)
+int __bpf_arch_text_poke(void *ip, enum bpf_text_poke_type t,
+			 void *old_addr, void *new_addr)
 {
 	const u8 *nop_insn = x86_nops[5];
 	u8 old_insn[X86_PATCH_SIZE];
include/linux/bpf.h +2 -0
index eb84caf133df..0d7b8311fada 100644
@@ -3172,6 +3172,8 @@ enum bpf_text_poke_type {
 
 int bpf_arch_text_poke(void *ip, enum bpf_text_poke_type t,
 		       void *addr1, void *addr2);
+int __bpf_arch_text_poke(void *ip, enum bpf_text_poke_type t,
+			 void *old_addr, void *new_addr);
 
 void *bpf_arch_text_copy(void *dst, void *src, size_t len);
 int bpf_arch_text_invalidate(void *dst, size_t len);
kernel/bpf/arraymap.c +7 -7
index 2058e89b5ddd..4ab5864746ce 100644
@@ -1073,33 +1073,33 @@ static void prog_array_map_poke_run(struct bpf_map *map, u32 key,
 			new_addr = new ? (u8 *)new->bpf_func + poke->adj_off : NULL;
 
 			if (new) {
-				ret = bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_target,
+				ret = __bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_target,
 							 BPF_MOD_JUMP,
 							 old_addr, new_addr);
 				BUG_ON(ret < 0 && ret != -EINVAL);
 				if (!old) {
-					ret = bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_bypass,
+					ret = __bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_bypass,
 								 BPF_MOD_JUMP,
 								 poke->bypass_addr,
 								 NULL);
-					BUG_ON(ret < 0 && ret != -EINVAL);
+					BUG_ON(ret < 0);
 				}
 			} else {
-				ret = bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_bypass,
+				ret = __bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_bypass,
 							 BPF_MOD_JUMP,
 							 old_bypass_addr,
 							 poke->bypass_addr);
-				BUG_ON(ret < 0 && ret != -EINVAL);
+				BUG_ON(ret < 0);
 				/* let other CPUs finish the execution of program
 				 * so that it will not possible to expose them
 				 * to invalid nop, stack unwind, nop state
 				 */
 				if (!ret)
 					synchronize_rcu();
-				ret = bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_target,
+				ret = __bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_target,
 							 BPF_MOD_JUMP,
 							 old_addr, NULL);
-				BUG_ON(ret < 0 && ret != -EINVAL);
+				BUG_ON(ret < 0);
 			}
 		}
 	}
Signature · 1 line
Lee Jones [李琼斯]