BPF: Reproducible triggering of BUG() from userspace PoC
Subsystems (6)
Good afternoon,
After coming across a recent Syzkaller report [0] I thought I'd take some time to firstly reproduce the issue, then see if there was a trivial way to mitigate it. The report suggests that a BUG() in prog_array_map_poke_run() [1] can be trivially and reliably triggered from userspace using the PoC provided [2].
ret = bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_bypass,
BPF_MOD_JUMP,
old_bypass_addr,
poke->bypass_addr);
BUG_ON(ret < 0 && ret != -EINVAL);Indeed the PoC does seem to be able to consistently trigger the BUG(), not only on the reported kernel (v6.1), but also on linux-next. I went to the trouble of checking LORE, but failed to find any patches which may be attempting to fix this.
kernel BUG at kernel/bpf/arraymap.c:1094!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 5 PID: 45 Comm: kworker/5:0 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3-next-20230929-dirty #74
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events prog_array_map_clear_deferred
RIP: 0010:prog_array_map_poke_run+0x6b4/0x6d0
Code: ff 0f 0b e8 1e 27 e1 ff 48 c7 c7 60 80 93 85 48 c7 c6 00 7f 93 85 48 c7 c2 bb c2 39 86 b9 45 04 00 00 45 89 f8 e8 9c 890
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000036fb50 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000044 RBX: ffff88811f337490 RCX: 63af48a1314f9900
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc9000036fbe8 R08: ffffffff815c23c5 R09: 1ffff11084c14eba
R10: dfffe91084c14ebc R11: ffffed1084c14ebb R12: ffff888116517800
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff888125a1a400 R15: 00000000fffffff0
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888426080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004ab678 CR3: 0000000122ac4000 CR4: 0000000000350eb0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die_body+0x92/0xf0
? die+0xa2/0xe0
? do_trap+0x12f/0x370
? handle_invalid_op+0xa6/0x140
? handle_invalid_op+0xdf/0x140
? prog_array_map_poke_run+0x6b4/0x6d0
? prog_array_map_poke_run+0x6b4/0x6d0
? exc_invalid_op+0x32/0x50
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20
? __wake_up_klogd+0xd5/0x110
? prog_array_map_poke_run+0x6b4/0x6d0
? bpf_prog_6781ebc2dae4bad9+0xb/0x53
fd_array_map_delete_elem+0x152/0x250
prog_array_map_clear_deferred+0xf6/0x210
? __bpf_array_map_seq_show+0xa40/0xa40
? kick_pool+0x164/0x350
? process_one_work+0x57a/0xd00
process_one_work+0x5e4/0xd00
worker_thread+0x9cf/0xea0
kthread+0x2b4/0x350
? pr_cont_work+0x580/0x580
? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0
ret_from_fork+0x4a/0x80
? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---However, with my very limited BPF subsystem knowledge I was unable to trivially fix the issue. Hopefully some knowledgable person would be kind enough to provide me with some pointers.
bpf_arch_text_poke() seems to be returning -EBUSY due to a negative memcmp() result from [3].
ret = -EBUSY;
mutex_lock(&text_mutex);
if (memcmp(ip, old_insn, X86_PATCH_SIZE)) {
goto out;
[...]When spitting out the memory at those locations, this is the result:
ip: e9 06 00 00 00
old_insn: 0f 1f 44 00 00
nop_insn: 0f 1f 44 00 00As you can see, the information stored in 'ip' does not match that of the data stored in 'old_insn', causing bpf_arch_text_poke() to return early with the error -EBUSY, suggesting that the data pointed to by 'old_insn', and by extension 'prog' should have been changed when emit_call()ing, to the value of 'ip', but wasn't.
It's possible for me to see what is happening, but I'm afraid finding possible causes of corruption became too time consuming on this occasion. Would anyone be able to chime in to provide their take on possible causes please?
Any help would be gratefully received.
[0] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=97a4fe20470e9bc30810
[1] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/kernel/bpf/arraymap.c#L1092
[2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=ReproC&x=1397180f680000
[3] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c#L387
Signature · 1 line
Lee Jones [李琼斯]
Quoted 87 lines · Lee Jones
Good afternoon,
After coming across a recent Syzkaller report [0] I thought I'd take some time to firstly reproduce the issue, then see if there was a trivial way to mitigate it. The report suggests that a
BUG()inprog_array_map_poke_run()[1] can be trivially and reliably triggered from userspace using the PoC provided [2].ret = bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_bypass, BPF_MOD_JUMP, old_bypass_addr, poke->bypass_addr); BUG_ON(ret < 0 && ret != -EINVAL);Indeed the PoC does seem to be able to consistently trigger the
BUG(), not only on the reported kernel (v6.1), but also on linux-next. I went to the trouble of checking LORE, but failed to find any patches which may be attempting to fix this.kernel BUG at kernel/bpf/arraymap.c:1094! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 5 PID: 45 Comm: kworker/5:0 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3-next-20230929-dirty #74 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events prog_array_map_clear_deferred RIP: 0010:prog_array_map_poke_run+0x6b4/0x6d0 Code: ff 0f 0b e8 1e 27 e1 ff 48 c7 c7 60 80 93 85 48 c7 c6 00 7f 93 85 48 c7 c2 bb c2 39 86 b9 45 04 00 00 45 89 f8 e8 9c 890 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000036fb50 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000044 RBX: ffff88811f337490 RCX: 63af48a1314f9900 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffc9000036fbe8 R08: ffffffff815c23c5 R09: 1ffff11084c14eba R10: dfffe91084c14ebc R11: ffffed1084c14ebb R12: ffff888116517800 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff888125a1a400 R15: 00000000fffffff0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888426080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000004ab678 CR3: 0000000122ac4000 CR4: 0000000000350eb0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body+0x92/0xf0 ? die+0xa2/0xe0 ? do_trap+0x12f/0x370 ? handle_invalid_op+0xa6/0x140 ? handle_invalid_op+0xdf/0x140 ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0x6b4/0x6d0 ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0x6b4/0x6d0 ? exc_invalid_op+0x32/0x50 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 ? __wake_up_klogd+0xd5/0x110 ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0x6b4/0x6d0 ? bpf_prog_6781ebc2dae4bad9+0xb/0x53 fd_array_map_delete_elem+0x152/0x250 prog_array_map_clear_deferred+0xf6/0x210 ? __bpf_array_map_seq_show+0xa40/0xa40 ? kick_pool+0x164/0x350 ? process_one_work+0x57a/0xd00 process_one_work+0x5e4/0xd00 worker_thread+0x9cf/0xea0 kthread+0x2b4/0x350 ? pr_cont_work+0x580/0x580 ? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0 ret_from_fork+0x4a/0x80 ? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 </TASK> Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---However, with my very limited BPF subsystem knowledge I was unable to trivially fix the issue. Hopefully some knowledgable person would be kind enough to provide me with some pointers.
bpf_arch_text_poke()seems to be returning-EBUSYdue to a negativememcmp()result from [3].ret = -EBUSY; mutex_lock(&text_mutex); if (memcmp(ip, old_insn, X86_PATCH_SIZE)) { goto out; [...]When spitting out the memory at those locations, this is the result:
ip: e9 06 00 00 00 old_insn: 0f 1f 44 00 00 nop_insn: 0f 1f 44 00 00
Quoted 5 lines
As you can see, the information stored in 'ip' does not match that of the data stored in '
old_insn', causingbpf_arch_text_poke()to return early with the error-EBUSY, suggesting that the data pointed to by 'old_insn', and by extension 'prog' should have been changed when emit_call()ing, to the value of 'ip', but wasn't.
hi,
thanks for the report.. I can reproduce that easily with [2]
AFAICS it looks like previous update fails because we use bpf_arch_text_poke, which can't find poke->tailcall_bypass value as bpf program symbol and fails with -EINVAL
then the following update fails to find expected jmp/nop because it was never updated.. I think we should use __bpf_arch_text_poke like we do in bpf_tail_call_direct_fixup and skip the bpf symbol check
with the patch below I can't reproduce the issue anymore, I'll do some more checking though
jirka
---
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +2 -2
@@ -391,8 +391,8 @@ static int emit_jump(u8 **pprog, void *func, void *ip)return emit_patch (pprog, func, ip,0xE9 ); } -static int __bpf_arch_text_poke (void *ip,enum bpf_text_poke_type t, -void *old_addr,void *new_addr) +int __bpf_arch_text_poke (void *ip,enum bpf_text_poke_type t, +void *old_addr,void *new_addr) {const u8 *nop_insn = x86_nops[5 ];u8 old_insn[X86_PATCH_SIZE ];
include/linux/bpf.h +2 -0
@@ -3172,6 +3172,8 @@ enum bpf_text_poke_type {int bpf_arch_text_poke (void *ip,enum bpf_text_poke_type t,void *addr1,void *addr2); +int __bpf_arch_text_poke (void *ip,enum bpf_text_poke_type t, +void *old_addr,void *new_addr);void *bpf_arch_text_copy (void *dst,void *src,size_t len);int bpf_arch_text_invalidate (void *dst,size_t len);
kernel/bpf/arraymap.c +7 -7
@@ -1073,33 +1073,33 @@ static void prog_array_map_poke_run(struct bpf_map *map, u32 key, new_addr = new ? (u8 *)new->bpf_func + poke->adj_off :NULL ;if (new) { - ret =bpf_arch_text_poke (poke->tailcall_target, + ret =__bpf_arch_text_poke (poke->tailcall_target,BPF_MOD_JUMP , old_addr, new_addr);BUG_ON (ret <0 && ret != -EINVAL );if (!old) { - ret =bpf_arch_text_poke (poke->tailcall_bypass, + ret =__bpf_arch_text_poke (poke->tailcall_bypass,BPF_MOD_JUMP , poke->bypass_addr,NULL ); -BUG_ON (ret <0 && ret != -EINVAL ); +BUG_ON (ret <0 ); } }else { - ret =bpf_arch_text_poke (poke->tailcall_bypass, + ret =__bpf_arch_text_poke (poke->tailcall_bypass,BPF_MOD_JUMP , old_bypass_addr, poke->bypass_addr); -BUG_ON (ret <0 && ret != -EINVAL ); +BUG_ON (ret <0 );/* let other CPUs finish the execution of program * so that it will not possible to expose them * to invalid nop, stack unwind, nop state */ if (!ret)synchronize_rcu (); - ret =bpf_arch_text_poke (poke->tailcall_target, + ret =__bpf_arch_text_poke (poke->tailcall_target,BPF_MOD_JUMP , old_addr,NULL ); -BUG_ON (ret <0 && ret != -EINVAL ); +BUG_ON (ret <0 ); } } }
Lee Jones
Tested-byQuoted 101 lines · Jiri Olsa
Quoted 87 lines · Lee Jones
Good afternoon,
After coming across a recent Syzkaller report [0] I thought I'd take some time to firstly reproduce the issue, then see if there was a trivial way to mitigate it. The report suggests that a
BUG()inprog_array_map_poke_run()[1] can be trivially and reliably triggered from userspace using the PoC provided [2].ret = bpf_arch_text_poke(poke->tailcall_bypass, BPF_MOD_JUMP, old_bypass_addr, poke->bypass_addr); BUG_ON(ret < 0 && ret != -EINVAL);Indeed the PoC does seem to be able to consistently trigger the
BUG(), not only on the reported kernel (v6.1), but also on linux-next. I went to the trouble of checking LORE, but failed to find any patches which may be attempting to fix this.kernel BUG at kernel/bpf/arraymap.c:1094! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 5 PID: 45 Comm: kworker/5:0 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3-next-20230929-dirty #74 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events prog_array_map_clear_deferred RIP: 0010:prog_array_map_poke_run+0x6b4/0x6d0 Code: ff 0f 0b e8 1e 27 e1 ff 48 c7 c7 60 80 93 85 48 c7 c6 00 7f 93 85 48 c7 c2 bb c2 39 86 b9 45 04 00 00 45 89 f8 e8 9c 890 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000036fb50 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000044 RBX: ffff88811f337490 RCX: 63af48a1314f9900 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffc9000036fbe8 R08: ffffffff815c23c5 R09: 1ffff11084c14eba R10: dfffe91084c14ebc R11: ffffed1084c14ebb R12: ffff888116517800 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff888125a1a400 R15: 00000000fffffff0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888426080000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000004ab678 CR3: 0000000122ac4000 CR4: 0000000000350eb0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body+0x92/0xf0 ? die+0xa2/0xe0 ? do_trap+0x12f/0x370 ? handle_invalid_op+0xa6/0x140 ? handle_invalid_op+0xdf/0x140 ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0x6b4/0x6d0 ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0x6b4/0x6d0 ? exc_invalid_op+0x32/0x50 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 ? __wake_up_klogd+0xd5/0x110 ? prog_array_map_poke_run+0x6b4/0x6d0 ? bpf_prog_6781ebc2dae4bad9+0xb/0x53 fd_array_map_delete_elem+0x152/0x250 prog_array_map_clear_deferred+0xf6/0x210 ? __bpf_array_map_seq_show+0xa40/0xa40 ? kick_pool+0x164/0x350 ? process_one_work+0x57a/0xd00 process_one_work+0x5e4/0xd00 worker_thread+0x9cf/0xea0 kthread+0x2b4/0x350 ? pr_cont_work+0x580/0x580 ? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0 ret_from_fork+0x4a/0x80 ? kthread_blkcg+0xd0/0xd0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 </TASK> Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---However, with my very limited BPF subsystem knowledge I was unable to trivially fix the issue. Hopefully some knowledgable person would be kind enough to provide me with some pointers.
bpf_arch_text_poke()seems to be returning-EBUSYdue to a negativememcmp()result from [3].ret = -EBUSY; mutex_lock(&text_mutex); if (memcmp(ip, old_insn, X86_PATCH_SIZE)) { goto out; [...]When spitting out the memory at those locations, this is the result:
ip: e9 06 00 00 00 old_insn: 0f 1f 44 00 00 nop_insn: 0f 1f 44 00 00Quoted 5 lines
As you can see, the information stored in 'ip' does not match that of the data stored in '
old_insn', causingbpf_arch_text_poke()to return early with the error-EBUSY, suggesting that the data pointed to by 'old_insn', and by extension 'prog' should have been changed when emit_call()ing, to the value of 'ip', but wasn't.hi,
thanks for the report.. I can reproduce that easily with [2]AFAICS it looks like previous update fails because we use
bpf_arch_text_poke, which can't findpoke->tailcall_bypassvalue as bpf program symbol and fails with-EINVAL
Quoted 6 lines
then the following update fails to find expected jmp/nop because it was never updated.. I think we should use
__bpf_arch_text_pokelike we do inbpf_tail_call_direct_fixupand skip the bpf symbol checkwith the patch below I can't reproduce the issue anymore, I'll do some more checking though
The patch below seems to be working for me also:
Quoted 74 lines
---
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +2
-2@@ -391,8 +391,8 @@ static int emit_jump(u8 **pprog, void *func, void *ip)return emit_patch (pprog, func, ip,0xE9 ); } -static int __bpf_arch_text_poke (void *ip,enum bpf_text_poke_type t, -void *old_addr,void *new_addr) +int __bpf_arch_text_poke (void *ip,enum bpf_text_poke_type t, +void *old_addr,void *new_addr) {const u8 *nop_insn = x86_nops[5 ];u8 old_insn[X86_PATCH_SIZE ];include/linux/bpf.h +2
-0@@ -3172,6 +3172,8 @@ enum bpf_text_poke_type {int bpf_arch_text_poke (void *ip,enum bpf_text_poke_type t,void *addr1,void *addr2); +int __bpf_arch_text_poke (void *ip,enum bpf_text_poke_type t, +void *old_addr,void *new_addr);void *bpf_arch_text_copy (void *dst,void *src,size_t len);int bpf_arch_text_invalidate (void *dst,size_t len);kernel/bpf/arraymap.c +7
-7@@ -1073,33 +1073,33 @@ static void prog_array_map_poke_run(struct bpf_map *map, u32 key, new_addr = new ? (u8 *)new->bpf_func + poke->adj_off :NULL ;if (new) { - ret =bpf_arch_text_poke (poke->tailcall_target, + ret =__bpf_arch_text_poke (poke->tailcall_target,BPF_MOD_JUMP , old_addr, new_addr);BUG_ON (ret <0 && ret != -EINVAL );if (!old) { - ret =bpf_arch_text_poke (poke->tailcall_bypass, + ret =__bpf_arch_text_poke (poke->tailcall_bypass,BPF_MOD_JUMP , poke->bypass_addr,NULL ); -BUG_ON (ret <0 && ret != -EINVAL ); +BUG_ON (ret <0 ); } }else { - ret =bpf_arch_text_poke (poke->tailcall_bypass, + ret =__bpf_arch_text_poke (poke->tailcall_bypass,BPF_MOD_JUMP , old_bypass_addr, poke->bypass_addr); -BUG_ON (ret <0 && ret != -EINVAL ); +BUG_ON (ret <0 );/* let other CPUs finish the execution of program * so that it will not possible to expose them * to invalid nop, stack unwind, nop state */ if (!ret)synchronize_rcu (); - ret =bpf_arch_text_poke (poke->tailcall_target, + ret =__bpf_arch_text_poke (poke->tailcall_target,BPF_MOD_JUMP , old_addr,NULL ); -BUG_ON (ret <0 && ret != -EINVAL ); +BUG_ON (ret <0 ); } } }
Signature · 1 line
Lee Jones [李琼斯]