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Reduce overhead of LSMs with static calls

PATCH Superseded KP Singh 5 participants 20 messages Nov 10, 2023 – Dec 8, 2023

Subsystems (4)

v8 of 15 Superseded Latest is v15 →

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KP Singh

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

v8 cover Reduce overhead of LSMs with static calls

# Background

LSM hooks (callbacks) are currently invoked as indirect function calls. These callbacks are registered into a linked list at boot time as the order of the LSMs can be configured on the kernel command line with the "lsm=" command line parameter.

Indirect function calls have a high overhead due to retpoline mitigation for various speculative execution attacks.

Retpolines remain relevant even with newer generation CPUs as recently discovered speculative attacks, like Spectre BHB need Retpolines to mitigate against branch history injection and still need to be used in combination with newer mitigation features like eIBRS.

This overhead is especially significant for the "bpf" LSM which allows the user to implement LSM functionality with eBPF program. In order to facilitate this the "bpf" LSM provides a default callback for all LSM hooks. When enabled, the "bpf" LSM incurs an unnecessary / avoidable indirect call. This is especially bad in OS hot paths (e.g. in the networking stack). This overhead prevents the adoption of bpf LSM on performance critical systems, and also, in general, slows down all LSMs.

Since we know the address of the enabled LSM callbacks at compile time and only the order is determined at boot time, the LSM framework can allocate static calls for each of the possible LSM callbacks and these calls can be updated once the order is determined at boot.

This series is a respin of the RFC proposed by Paul Renauld ([email protected]) and Brendan Jackman ([email protected]) [1]

# Performance improvement

With this patch-set some syscalls with lots of LSM hooks in their path benefitted at an average of ~3% and I/O and Pipe based system calls benefitting the most.

Here are the results of the relevant Unixbench system benchmarks with BPF LSM and SELinux enabled with default policies enabled with and without these patches.

Benchmark Delta(%): (+ is better)
===============================================================================

Execl Throughput                                             +1.9356
File Write 1024 bufsize 2000 maxblocks                       +6.5953
Pipe Throughput                                              +9.5499
Pipe-based Context Switching                                 +3.0209
Process Creation                                             +2.3246
Shell Scripts (1 concurrent)                                 +1.4975
System Call Overhead                                         +2.7815
System Benchmarks Index Score (Partial Only):                +3.4859

In the best case, some syscalls like eventfd_create benefitted to about ~10%. The full analysis can be viewed at https://kpsingh.ch/lsm-perf

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/[email protected]/

# BPF LSM Side effects

Patch 4 of the series also addresses the issues with the side effects of the default value return values of the BPF LSM callbacks and also removes the overheads associated with them making it deployable at hyperscale.

# v7 to v8

* Addressed Andrii's feedback
* Rebased (this seems to have removed the syscall changes). v7 has the required conflict resolution incase the conflicts need to be resolved again.

# v6 -> v7

* Rebased with latest LSM id changes merged

NOTE: The warning shown by the kernel test bot is spurious, there is no flex array and it seems to come from an older tool chain.

https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/

# v5 -> v6

* Fix a bug in BPF LSM hook toggle logic.

# v4 -> v5

* Rebase to linux-next/master
* Fixed the case where MAX_LSM_COUNT comes to zero when just CONFIG_SECURITY is compiled in without any other LSM enabled as reported here:

https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]

# v3 -> v4

* Refactor LSM count macros to use COUNT_ARGS
* Change CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY likely's default value to be based on the LSM enabled and have it depend on CONFIG_EXPERT. There are a lot of subtle options behind CONFIG_EXPERT and this should, hopefully alleviate concerns about yet another knob.
* __randomize_layout for struct lsm_static_call and, in addition to the cover letter add performance numbers to 3rd patch and some minor commit message updates.
* Rebase to linux-next.

# v2 -> v3

* Fixed a build issue on archs which don't have static calls and enable CONFIG_SECURITY.
* Updated the LSM_COUNT macros based on Andrii's suggestions.
* Changed the security_ prefix to lsm_prefix based on Casey's suggestion.
* Inlined static_branch_maybe into lsm_for_each_hook on Kees' feedback.

# v1 -> v2 (based on linux-next, next-20230614)

* Incorporated suggestions from Kees
* Changed the way MAX_LSMs are counted from a binary based generator to a clever header.
* Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY to configure the likelihood of LSM hooks.

KP Singh (5):
kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling
security: Count the LSMs enabled at compile time
security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls
bpf: Only enable BPF LSM hooks when an LSM program is attached
security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY

 include/linux/bpf_lsm.h   |   5 +
 include/linux/lsm_count.h | 114 +++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h |  81 +++++++++++++--
 include/linux/unroll.h    |  36 +++++++
 kernel/bpf/trampoline.c   |  24 +++++
 security/Kconfig          |  11 ++
 security/bpf/hooks.c      |  25 ++++-
 security/security.c       | 209 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 8 files changed, 425 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/linux/lsm_count.h
 create mode 100644 include/linux/unroll.h
Signature · 1 line
2.42.0.869.gea05f2083d-goog
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH v8 1/5 kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling

This helps in easily initializing blocks of code (e.g. static calls and keys).

UNROLL(N, MACRO, __VA_ARGS__) calls MACRO N times with the first argument as the index of the iteration. This allows string pasting to create unique tokens for variable names, function calls etc.

As an example:

	#include <linux/unroll.h>

	#define MACRO(N, a, b)            \
		int add_##N(int a, int b) \
		{                         \
			return a + b + N; \
		}

	UNROLL(2, MACRO, x, y)

expands to:

	int add_0(int x, int y)
	{
		return x + y + 0;
	}

	int add_1(int x, int y)
	{
		return x + y + 1;
	}
---
 include/linux/unroll.h | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 include/linux/unroll.h
include/linux/unroll.h new file +36 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d42fd6366373
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2023 Google LLC.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __UNROLL_H
+#define __UNROLL_H
+
+#include <linux/args.h>
+
+#define UNROLL(N, MACRO, args...) CONCATENATE(__UNROLL_, N)(MACRO, args)
+
+#define __UNROLL_0(MACRO, args...)
+#define __UNROLL_1(MACRO, args...)  __UNROLL_0(MACRO, args)  MACRO(0, args)
+#define __UNROLL_2(MACRO, args...)  __UNROLL_1(MACRO, args)  MACRO(1, args)
+#define __UNROLL_3(MACRO, args...)  __UNROLL_2(MACRO, args)  MACRO(2, args)
+#define __UNROLL_4(MACRO, args...)  __UNROLL_3(MACRO, args)  MACRO(3, args)
+#define __UNROLL_5(MACRO, args...)  __UNROLL_4(MACRO, args)  MACRO(4, args)
+#define __UNROLL_6(MACRO, args...)  __UNROLL_5(MACRO, args)  MACRO(5, args)
+#define __UNROLL_7(MACRO, args...)  __UNROLL_6(MACRO, args)  MACRO(6, args)
+#define __UNROLL_8(MACRO, args...)  __UNROLL_7(MACRO, args)  MACRO(7, args)
+#define __UNROLL_9(MACRO, args...)  __UNROLL_8(MACRO, args)  MACRO(8, args)
+#define __UNROLL_10(MACRO, args...) __UNROLL_9(MACRO, args)  MACRO(9, args)
+#define __UNROLL_11(MACRO, args...) __UNROLL_10(MACRO, args) MACRO(10, args)
+#define __UNROLL_12(MACRO, args...) __UNROLL_11(MACRO, args) MACRO(11, args)
+#define __UNROLL_13(MACRO, args...) __UNROLL_12(MACRO, args) MACRO(12, args)
+#define __UNROLL_14(MACRO, args...) __UNROLL_13(MACRO, args) MACRO(13, args)
+#define __UNROLL_15(MACRO, args...) __UNROLL_14(MACRO, args) MACRO(14, args)
+#define __UNROLL_16(MACRO, args...) __UNROLL_15(MACRO, args) MACRO(15, args)
+#define __UNROLL_17(MACRO, args...) __UNROLL_16(MACRO, args) MACRO(16, args)
+#define __UNROLL_18(MACRO, args...) __UNROLL_17(MACRO, args) MACRO(17, args)
+#define __UNROLL_19(MACRO, args...) __UNROLL_18(MACRO, args) MACRO(18, args)
+#define __UNROLL_20(MACRO, args...) __UNROLL_19(MACRO, args) MACRO(19, args)
+
+#endif /* __UNROLL_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.42.0.869.gea05f2083d-goog
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH v8 2/5 security: Count the LSMs enabled at compile time

In reply to KP Singh

These macros are a clever trick to determine a count of the number of LSMs that are enabled in the config to ascertain the maximum number of static calls that need to be configured per LSM hook.

Without this one would need to generate static calls for the total number of LSMs in the kernel (even if they are not compiled) times the number of LSM hooks which ends up being quite wasteful.

---
 include/linux/lsm_count.h | 114 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 114 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 include/linux/lsm_count.h
include/linux/lsm_count.h new file +114 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..dbb3c8573959
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2023 Google LLC.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __LINUX_LSM_COUNT_H
+#define __LINUX_LSM_COUNT_H
+
+#include <linux/args.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+
+/*
+ * Macros to count the number of LSMs enabled in the kernel at compile time.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Capabilities is enabled when CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled.
+ */
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY)
+#define CAPABILITIES_ENABLED 1,
+#else
+#define CAPABILITIES_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX)
+#define SELINUX_ENABLED 1,
+#else
+#define SELINUX_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK)
+#define SMACK_ENABLED 1,
+#else
+#define SMACK_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR)
+#define APPARMOR_ENABLED 1,
+#else
+#define APPARMOR_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO)
+#define TOMOYO_ENABLED 1,
+#else
+#define TOMOYO_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA)
+#define YAMA_ENABLED 1,
+#else
+#define YAMA_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN)
+#define LOADPIN_ENABLED 1,
+#else
+#define LOADPIN_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM)
+#define LOCKDOWN_ENABLED 1,
+#else
+#define LOCKDOWN_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID)
+#define SAFESETID_ENABLED 1,
+#else
+#define SAFESETID_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM)
+#define BPF_LSM_ENABLED 1,
+#else
+#define BPF_LSM_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK)
+#define LANDLOCK_ENABLED 1,
+#else
+#define LANDLOCK_ENABLED
+#endif
+
+/*
+ *  There is a trailing comma that we need to be accounted for. This is done by
+ *  using a skipped argument in __COUNT_LSMS
+ */
+#define __COUNT_LSMS(skipped_arg, args...) COUNT_ARGS(args...)
+#define COUNT_LSMS(args...) __COUNT_LSMS(args)
+
+#define MAX_LSM_COUNT			\
+	COUNT_LSMS(			\
+		CAPABILITIES_ENABLED	\
+		SELINUX_ENABLED		\
+		SMACK_ENABLED		\
+		APPARMOR_ENABLED	\
+		TOMOYO_ENABLED		\
+		YAMA_ENABLED		\
+		LOADPIN_ENABLED		\
+		LOCKDOWN_ENABLED	\
+		SAFESETID_ENABLED	\
+		BPF_LSM_ENABLED		\
+		LANDLOCK_ENABLED)
+
+#else
+
+#define MAX_LSM_COUNT 0
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
+
+#endif  /* __LINUX_LSM_COUNT_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.42.0.869.gea05f2083d-goog
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH v8 3/5 security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls

In reply to KP Singh

LSM hooks are currently invoked from a linked list as indirect calls which are invoked using retpolines as a mitigation for speculative attacks (Branch History / Target injection) and add extra overhead which is especially bad in kernel hot paths:

security_file_ioctl:
0xffffffff814f0320 <+0>: endbr64

   0xffffffff814f0324 <+4>:	push   %rbp
   0xffffffff814f0325 <+5>:	push   %r15
   0xffffffff814f0327 <+7>:	push   %r14
   0xffffffff814f0329 <+9>:	push   %rbx
   0xffffffff814f032a <+10>:	mov    %rdx,%rbx
   0xffffffff814f032d <+13>:	mov    %esi,%ebp
   0xffffffff814f032f <+15>:	mov    %rdi,%r14
   0xffffffff814f0332 <+18>:	mov    $0xffffffff834a7030,%r15
   0xffffffff814f0339 <+25>:	mov    (%r15),%r15
   0xffffffff814f033c <+28>:	test   %r15,%r15
   0xffffffff814f033f <+31>:	je     0xffffffff814f0358 <security_file_ioctl+56>
   0xffffffff814f0341 <+33>:	mov    0x18(%r15),%r11
   0xffffffff814f0345 <+37>:	mov    %r14,%rdi
   0xffffffff814f0348 <+40>:	mov    %ebp,%esi
   0xffffffff814f034a <+42>:	mov    %rbx,%rdx

0xffffffff814f034d <+45>: call 0xffffffff81f742e0 <__x86_indirect_thunk_array+352>
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Indirect calls that use retpolines leading to overhead, not just due to extra instruction but also branch misses.

   0xffffffff814f0352 <+50>:	test   %eax,%eax
   0xffffffff814f0354 <+52>:	je     0xffffffff814f0339 <security_file_ioctl+25>
   0xffffffff814f0356 <+54>:	jmp    0xffffffff814f035a <security_file_ioctl+58>
   0xffffffff814f0358 <+56>:	xor    %eax,%eax
   0xffffffff814f035a <+58>:	pop    %rbx
   0xffffffff814f035b <+59>:	pop    %r14
   0xffffffff814f035d <+61>:	pop    %r15
   0xffffffff814f035f <+63>:	pop    %rbp
   0xffffffff814f0360 <+64>:	jmp    0xffffffff81f747c4 <__x86_return_thunk>

The indirect calls are not really needed as one knows the addresses of enabled LSM callbacks at boot time and only the order can possibly change at boot time with the lsm= kernel command line parameter.

An array of static calls is defined per LSM hook and the static calls are updated at boot time once the order has been determined.

A static key guards whether an LSM static call is enabled or not, without this static key, for LSM hooks that return an int, the presence of the hook that returns a default value can create side-effects which has resulted in bugs [1].

With the hook now exposed as a static call, one can see that the retpolines are no longer there and the LSM callbacks are invoked directly:

security_file_ioctl:
0xffffffff818f0ca0 <+0>: endbr64
0xffffffff818f0ca4 <+4>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
0xffffffff818f0ca9 <+9>: push %rbp

   0xffffffff818f0caa <+10>:	push   %r14
   0xffffffff818f0cac <+12>:	push   %rbx
   0xffffffff818f0cad <+13>:	mov    %rdx,%rbx
   0xffffffff818f0cb0 <+16>:	mov    %esi,%ebp
   0xffffffff818f0cb2 <+18>:	mov    %rdi,%r14
   0xffffffff818f0cb5 <+21>:	jmp    0xffffffff818f0cc7 <security_file_ioctl+39>

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Static key enabled for SELinux

0xffffffff818f0cb7 <+23>: jmp 0xffffffff818f0cde <security_file_ioctl+62>
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Static key enabled for BPF LSM. This is something that is changed to default to false to avoid the existing side effect issues of BPF LSM
[1] in a subsequent patch.

   0xffffffff818f0cb9 <+25>:	xor    %eax,%eax
   0xffffffff818f0cbb <+27>:	xchg   %ax,%ax
   0xffffffff818f0cbd <+29>:	pop    %rbx
   0xffffffff818f0cbe <+30>:	pop    %r14
   0xffffffff818f0cc0 <+32>:	pop    %rbp
   0xffffffff818f0cc1 <+33>:	cs jmp 0xffffffff82c00000 <__x86_return_thunk>
   0xffffffff818f0cc7 <+39>:	endbr64
   0xffffffff818f0ccb <+43>:	mov    %r14,%rdi
   0xffffffff818f0cce <+46>:	mov    %ebp,%esi
   0xffffffff818f0cd0 <+48>:	mov    %rbx,%rdx
   0xffffffff818f0cd3 <+51>:	call   0xffffffff81903230 <selinux_file_ioctl>

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Direct call to SELinux.

   0xffffffff818f0cd8 <+56>:	test   %eax,%eax
   0xffffffff818f0cda <+58>:	jne    0xffffffff818f0cbd <security_file_ioctl+29>
   0xffffffff818f0cdc <+60>:	jmp    0xffffffff818f0cb7 <security_file_ioctl+23>
   0xffffffff818f0cde <+62>:	endbr64
   0xffffffff818f0ce2 <+66>:	mov    %r14,%rdi
   0xffffffff818f0ce5 <+69>:	mov    %ebp,%esi
   0xffffffff818f0ce7 <+71>:	mov    %rbx,%rdx
   0xffffffff818f0cea <+74>:	call   0xffffffff8141e220 <bpf_lsm_file_ioctl>

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Direct call to BPF LSM.

   0xffffffff818f0cef <+79>:	test   %eax,%eax
   0xffffffff818f0cf1 <+81>:	jne    0xffffffff818f0cbd <security_file_ioctl+29>
   0xffffffff818f0cf3 <+83>:	jmp    0xffffffff818f0cb9 <security_file_ioctl+25>
   0xffffffff818f0cf5 <+85>:	endbr64
   0xffffffff818f0cf9 <+89>:	mov    %r14,%rdi
   0xffffffff818f0cfc <+92>:	mov    %ebp,%esi
   0xffffffff818f0cfe <+94>:	mov    %rbx,%rdx
   0xffffffff818f0d01 <+97>:	pop    %rbx
   0xffffffff818f0d02 <+98>:	pop    %r14

0xffffffff818f0d04 <+100>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff818f0d05 <+101>: ret
0xffffffff818f0d06 <+102>: int3
0xffffffff818f0d07 <+103>: int3
0xffffffff818f0d08 <+104>: int3
0xffffffff818f0d09 <+105>: int3

While this patch uses static_branch_unlikely indicating that an LSM hook is likely to be not present, a subsequent makes it configurable. In most cases this is still a better choice as even when an LSM with one hook is added, empty slots are created for all LSM hooks (especially when many LSMs that do not initialize most hooks are present on the system).

There are some hooks that don't use the call_int_hook and call_void_hook. These hooks are updated to use a new macro called security_for_each_hook where the lsm_callback is directly invoked as an indirect call. Currently, there are no performance sensitive hooks that use the security_for_each_hook macro. However, if, some performance sensitive hooks are discovered, these can be updated to use static calls with loop unrolling as well using a custom macro.

Below are results of the relevant Unixbench system benchmarks with BPF LSM and SELinux enabled with default policies enabled with and without these patches.

Benchmark Delta(%): (+ is better)
===============================================================================

Execl Throughput                                             +1.9356
File Write 1024 bufsize 2000 maxblocks                       +6.5953
Pipe Throughput                                              +9.5499
Pipe-based Context Switching                                 +3.0209
Process Creation                                             +2.3246
Shell Scripts (1 concurrent)                                 +1.4975
System Call Overhead                                         +2.7815
System Benchmarks Index Score (Partial Only):                +3.4859

In the best case, some syscalls like eventfd_create benefitted to about ~10%.

---
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h |  70 +++++++++++--
 security/security.c       | 208 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 2 files changed, 199 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +62 -8
index dcb5e5b5eb13..c77a1859214d 100644
@@ -29,26 +29,77 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/rculist.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/static_call.h>
+#include <linux/unroll.h>
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_count.h>
+
+#define SECURITY_HOOK_ACTIVE_KEY(HOOK, IDX) security_hook_active_##HOOK##_##IDX
+
+/*
+ * Identifier for the LSM static calls.
+ * HOOK is an LSM hook as defined in linux/lsm_hookdefs.h
+ * IDX is the index of the static call. 0 <= NUM < MAX_LSM_COUNT
+ */
+#define LSM_STATIC_CALL(HOOK, IDX) lsm_static_call_##HOOK##_##IDX
+
+/*
+ * Call the macro M for each LSM hook MAX_LSM_COUNT times.
+ */
+#define LSM_LOOP_UNROLL(M, ...) 		\
+do {						\
+	UNROLL(MAX_LSM_COUNT, M, __VA_ARGS__)	\
+} while (0)
+
+#define LSM_DEFINE_UNROLL(M, ...) UNROLL(MAX_LSM_COUNT, M, __VA_ARGS__)
 
 union security_list_options {
 	#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) RET (*NAME)(__VA_ARGS__);
 	#include "lsm_hook_defs.h"
 	#undef LSM_HOOK
+	void *lsm_callback;
 };
 
-struct security_hook_heads {
-	#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) struct hlist_head NAME;
-	#include "lsm_hook_defs.h"
+/*
+ * @key: static call key as defined by STATIC_CALL_KEY
+ * @trampoline: static call trampoline as defined by STATIC_CALL_TRAMP
+ * @hl: The security_hook_list as initialized by the owning LSM.
+ * @active: Enabled when the static call has an LSM hook associated.
+ */
+struct lsm_static_call {
+	struct static_call_key *key;
+	void *trampoline;
+	struct security_hook_list *hl;
+	/* this needs to be true or false based on what the key defaults to */
+	struct static_key_false *active;
+} __randomize_layout;
+
+/*
+ * Table of the static calls for each LSM hook.
+ * Once the LSMs are initialized, their callbacks will be copied to these
+ * tables such that the calls are filled backwards (from last to first).
+ * This way, we can jump directly to the first used static call, and execute
+ * all of them after. This essentially makes the entry point
+ * dynamic to adapt the number of static calls to the number of callbacks.
+ */
+struct lsm_static_calls_table {
+	#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \
+		struct lsm_static_call NAME[MAX_LSM_COUNT];
+	#include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
 	#undef LSM_HOOK
 } __randomize_layout;
 
 /*
  * Security module hook list structure.
  * For use with generic list macros for common operations.
+ *
+ * struct security_hook_list - Contents of a cacheable, mappable object.
+ * @scalls: The beginning of the array of static calls assigned to this hook.
+ * @hook: The callback for the hook.
+ * @lsm: The name of the lsm that owns this hook.
  */
 struct security_hook_list {
-	struct hlist_node		list;
-	struct hlist_head		*head;
+	struct lsm_static_call	*scalls;
 	union security_list_options	hook;
 	const char			*lsm;
 } __randomize_layout;
@@ -97,10 +148,12 @@ static inline struct xattr *lsm_get_xattr_slot(struct xattr *xattrs,
  * care of the common case and reduces the amount of
  * text involved.
  */
-#define LSM_HOOK_INIT(HEAD, HOOK) \
-	{ .head = &security_hook_heads.HEAD, .hook = { .HEAD = HOOK } }
+#define LSM_HOOK_INIT(NAME, CALLBACK)			\
+	{						\
+		.scalls = static_calls_table.NAME,	\
+		.hook = { .NAME = CALLBACK }		\
+	}
 
-extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;
 extern char *lsm_names;
 
 extern void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count,
@@ -138,5 +191,6 @@ extern struct lsm_info __start_early_lsm_info[], __end_early_lsm_info[];
 		__aligned(sizeof(unsigned long))
 
 extern int lsm_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
+extern struct lsm_static_calls_table static_calls_table __ro_after_init;
 
 #endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
security/security.c +137 -71

392 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.42.0.869.gea05f2083d-goog
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH v8 4/5 bpf: Only enable BPF LSM hooks when an LSM program is attached

In reply to KP Singh

BPF LSM hooks have side-effects (even when a default value is returned), as some hooks end up behaving differently due to the very presence of the hook.

The static keys guarding the BPF LSM hooks are disabled by default and enabled only when a BPF program is attached implementing the hook logic. This avoids the issue of the side-effects and also the minor overhead associated with the empty callback.

security_file_ioctl:
0xffffffff818f0e30 <+0>: endbr64
0xffffffff818f0e34 <+4>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
0xffffffff818f0e39 <+9>: push %rbp

   0xffffffff818f0e3a <+10>:	push   %r14
   0xffffffff818f0e3c <+12>:	push   %rbx
   0xffffffff818f0e3d <+13>:	mov    %rdx,%rbx
   0xffffffff818f0e40 <+16>:	mov    %esi,%ebp
   0xffffffff818f0e42 <+18>:	mov    %rdi,%r14
   0xffffffff818f0e45 <+21>:	jmp    0xffffffff818f0e57 <security_file_ioctl+39>

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Static key enabled for SELinux

0xffffffff818f0e47 <+23>: xchg %ax,%ax
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Static key disabled for BPF. This gets patched when a BPF LSM program is attached

   0xffffffff818f0e49 <+25>:	xor    %eax,%eax
   0xffffffff818f0e4b <+27>:	xchg   %ax,%ax
   0xffffffff818f0e4d <+29>:	pop    %rbx
   0xffffffff818f0e4e <+30>:	pop    %r14
   0xffffffff818f0e50 <+32>:	pop    %rbp
   0xffffffff818f0e51 <+33>:	cs jmp 0xffffffff82c00000 <__x86_return_thunk>
   0xffffffff818f0e57 <+39>:	endbr64
   0xffffffff818f0e5b <+43>:	mov    %r14,%rdi
   0xffffffff818f0e5e <+46>:	mov    %ebp,%esi
   0xffffffff818f0e60 <+48>:	mov    %rbx,%rdx
   0xffffffff818f0e63 <+51>:	call   0xffffffff819033c0 <selinux_file_ioctl>
   0xffffffff818f0e68 <+56>:	test   %eax,%eax
   0xffffffff818f0e6a <+58>:	jne    0xffffffff818f0e4d <security_file_ioctl+29>
   0xffffffff818f0e6c <+60>:	jmp    0xffffffff818f0e47 <security_file_ioctl+23>
   0xffffffff818f0e6e <+62>:	endbr64
   0xffffffff818f0e72 <+66>:	mov    %r14,%rdi
   0xffffffff818f0e75 <+69>:	mov    %ebp,%esi
   0xffffffff818f0e77 <+71>:	mov    %rbx,%rdx
   0xffffffff818f0e7a <+74>:	call   0xffffffff8141e3b0 <bpf_lsm_file_ioctl>
   0xffffffff818f0e7f <+79>:	test   %eax,%eax
   0xffffffff818f0e81 <+81>:	jne    0xffffffff818f0e4d <security_file_ioctl+29>
   0xffffffff818f0e83 <+83>:	jmp    0xffffffff818f0e49 <security_file_ioctl+25>
   0xffffffff818f0e85 <+85>:	endbr64
   0xffffffff818f0e89 <+89>:	mov    %r14,%rdi
   0xffffffff818f0e8c <+92>:	mov    %ebp,%esi
   0xffffffff818f0e8e <+94>:	mov    %rbx,%rdx
   0xffffffff818f0e91 <+97>:	pop    %rbx
   0xffffffff818f0e92 <+98>:	pop    %r14

0xffffffff818f0e94 <+100>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff818f0e95 <+101>: ret

---
 include/linux/bpf_lsm.h   |  5 +++++
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 13 ++++++++++++-
 kernel/bpf/trampoline.c   | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/bpf/hooks.c      | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 security/security.c       |  3 ++-
 5 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/linux/bpf_lsm.h +5 -0
index 1de7ece5d36d..5bbc31ac948c 100644
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ int bpf_lsm_verify_prog(struct bpf_verifier_log *vlog,
 
 bool bpf_lsm_is_sleepable_hook(u32 btf_id);
 bool bpf_lsm_is_trusted(const struct bpf_prog *prog);
+void bpf_lsm_toggle_hook(void *addr, bool value);
 
 static inline struct bpf_storage_blob *bpf_inode(
 	const struct inode *inode)
@@ -78,6 +79,10 @@ static inline void bpf_lsm_find_cgroup_shim(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
 {
 }
 
+static inline void bpf_lsm_toggle_hook(void *addr, bool value)
+{
+}
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_LSM */
 
 #endif /* _LINUX_BPF_LSM_H */
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +12 -1
index c77a1859214d..0cd1e0737040 100644
@@ -97,11 +97,14 @@ struct lsm_static_calls_table {
  * @scalls: The beginning of the array of static calls assigned to this hook.
  * @hook: The callback for the hook.
  * @lsm: The name of the lsm that owns this hook.
+ * @default_state: The state of the LSM hook when initialized. If set to false,
+ * the static key guarding the hook will be set to disabled.
  */
 struct security_hook_list {
 	struct lsm_static_call	*scalls;
 	union security_list_options	hook;
 	const char			*lsm;
+	bool				default_enabled;
 } __randomize_layout;
 
 /*
@@ -151,7 +154,15 @@ static inline struct xattr *lsm_get_xattr_slot(struct xattr *xattrs,
 #define LSM_HOOK_INIT(NAME, CALLBACK)			\
 	{						\
 		.scalls = static_calls_table.NAME,	\
-		.hook = { .NAME = CALLBACK }		\
+		.hook = { .NAME = CALLBACK },		\
+		.default_enabled = true			\
+	}
+
+#define LSM_HOOK_INIT_DISABLED(NAME, CALLBACK)		\
+	{						\
+		.scalls = static_calls_table.NAME,	\
+		.hook = { .NAME = CALLBACK },		\
+		.default_enabled = false		\
 	}
 
 extern char *lsm_names;
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c +24 -0
index e97aeda3a86b..44788e2eaa1b 100644
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #include <linux/bpf_verifier.h>
 #include <linux/bpf_lsm.h>
 #include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/bpf_lsm.h>
 
 /* dummy _ops. The verifier will operate on target program's ops. */
 const struct bpf_verifier_ops bpf_extension_verifier_ops = {
@@ -510,6 +511,21 @@ static enum bpf_tramp_prog_type bpf_attach_type_to_tramp(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	}
 }
 
+static void bpf_trampoline_toggle_lsm(struct bpf_trampoline *tr,
+				      enum bpf_tramp_prog_type kind)
+{
+	struct bpf_tramp_link *link;
+	bool found = false;
+
+	hlist_for_each_entry(link, &tr->progs_hlist[kind], tramp_hlist) {
+		if (link->link.prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) {
+			found  = true;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	bpf_lsm_toggle_hook(tr->func.addr, found);
+}
+
 static int __bpf_trampoline_link_prog(struct bpf_tramp_link *link, struct bpf_trampoline *tr)
 {
 	enum bpf_tramp_prog_type kind;
@@ -549,6 +565,10 @@ static int __bpf_trampoline_link_prog(struct bpf_tramp_link *link, struct bpf_tr
 
 	hlist_add_head(&link->tramp_hlist, &tr->progs_hlist[kind]);
 	tr->progs_cnt[kind]++;
+
+	if (link->link.prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM)
+		bpf_trampoline_toggle_lsm(tr, kind);
+
 	err = bpf_trampoline_update(tr, true /* lock_direct_mutex */);
 	if (err) {
 		hlist_del_init(&link->tramp_hlist);
@@ -582,6 +602,10 @@ static int __bpf_trampoline_unlink_prog(struct bpf_tramp_link *link, struct bpf_
 	}
 	hlist_del_init(&link->tramp_hlist);
 	tr->progs_cnt[kind]--;
+
+	if (link->link.prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM)
+		bpf_trampoline_toggle_lsm(tr, kind);
+
 	return bpf_trampoline_update(tr, true /* lock_direct_mutex */);
 }
 
security/bpf/hooks.c +24 -1
index cfaf1d0e6a5f..6644715cf570 100644
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 
 static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(NAME, bpf_lsm_##NAME),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT_DISABLED(NAME, bpf_lsm_##NAME),
 	#include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
 	#undef LSM_HOOK
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, bpf_inode_storage_free),
@@ -32,3 +32,26 @@ DEFINE_LSM(bpf) = {
 	.init = bpf_lsm_init,
 	.blobs = &bpf_lsm_blob_sizes
 };
+
+void bpf_lsm_toggle_hook(void *addr, bool enable)
+{
+	struct lsm_static_call *scalls;
+	struct security_hook_list *h;
+	int i, j;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(bpf_lsm_hooks); i++) {
+		h = &bpf_lsm_hooks[i];
+		if (h->hook.lsm_callback != addr)
+			continue;
+
+		for (j = 0; j < MAX_LSM_COUNT; j++) {
+			scalls = &h->scalls[j];
+			if (scalls->hl != &bpf_lsm_hooks[i])
+				continue;
+			if (enable)
+				static_branch_enable(scalls->active);
+			else
+				static_branch_disable(scalls->active);
+		}
+	}
+}
security/security.c +2 -1
index ce4c0a9107ea..bc86b03e7170 100644
@@ -382,7 +382,8 @@ static void __init lsm_static_call_init(struct security_hook_list *hl)
 			__static_call_update(scall->key, scall->trampoline,
 					     hl->hook.lsm_callback);
 			scall->hl = hl;
-			static_branch_enable(scall->active);
+			if (hl->default_enabled)
+				static_branch_enable(scall->active);
 			return;
 		}
 		scall++;
Signature · 1 line
2.42.0.869.gea05f2083d-goog
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH v8 5/5 security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY

In reply to KP Singh

This config influences the nature of the static key that guards the static call for LSM hooks.

When enabled, it indicates that an LSM static call slot is more likely to be initialized. When disabled, it optimizes for the case when static call slot is more likely to be not initialized.

When a major LSM like (SELinux, AppArmor, Smack etc) is active on a system the system would benefit from enabling the config. However there are other cases which would benefit from the config being disabled (e.g. a system with a BPF LSM with no hooks enabled by default, or an LSM like loadpin / yama). Ultimately, there is no one-size fits all solution.

with CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY enabled, the inactive / uninitialized case is penalized with a direct jmp (still better than an indirect jmp):

function security_file_ioctl:
0xffffffff818f0c80 <+0>: endbr64
0xffffffff818f0c84 <+4>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
0xffffffff818f0c89 <+9>: push %rbp

   0xffffffff818f0c8a <+10>:	push   %r14
   0xffffffff818f0c8c <+12>:	push   %rbx
   0xffffffff818f0c8d <+13>:	mov    %rdx,%rbx
   0xffffffff818f0c90 <+16>:	mov    %esi,%ebp
   0xffffffff818f0c92 <+18>:	mov    %rdi,%r14
   0xffffffff818f0c95 <+21>:	jmp    0xffffffff818f0ca8 <security_file_ioctl+40>

jump to skip the inactive BPF LSM hook.

   0xffffffff818f0c97 <+23>:	mov    %r14,%rdi
   0xffffffff818f0c9a <+26>:	mov    %ebp,%esi
   0xffffffff818f0c9c <+28>:	mov    %rbx,%rdx
   0xffffffff818f0c9f <+31>:	call   0xffffffff8141e3b0 <bpf_lsm_file_ioctl>
   0xffffffff818f0ca4 <+36>:	test   %eax,%eax
   0xffffffff818f0ca6 <+38>:	jne    0xffffffff818f0cbf <security_file_ioctl+63>

0xffffffff818f0ca8 <+40>: endbr64
0xffffffff818f0cac <+44>: jmp 0xffffffff818f0ccd <security_file_ioctl+77>

jump to skip the empty slot.

   0xffffffff818f0cae <+46>:	mov    %r14,%rdi
   0xffffffff818f0cb1 <+49>:	mov    %ebp,%esi
   0xffffffff818f0cb3 <+51>:	mov    %rbx,%rdx
   0xffffffff818f0cb6 <+54>:	nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)

^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Empty slot

0xffffffff818f0cbb <+59>: test %eax,%eax
0xffffffff818f0cbd <+61>: je 0xffffffff818f0ccd <security_file_ioctl+77>
0xffffffff818f0cbf <+63>: endbr64

   0xffffffff818f0cc3 <+67>:	pop    %rbx
   0xffffffff818f0cc4 <+68>:	pop    %r14
   0xffffffff818f0cc6 <+70>:	pop    %rbp
   0xffffffff818f0cc7 <+71>:	cs jmp 0xffffffff82c00000 <__x86_return_thunk>
   0xffffffff818f0ccd <+77>:	endbr64
   0xffffffff818f0cd1 <+81>:	xor    %eax,%eax
   0xffffffff818f0cd3 <+83>:	jmp    0xffffffff818f0cbf <security_file_ioctl+63>
   0xffffffff818f0cd5 <+85>:	mov    %r14,%rdi
   0xffffffff818f0cd8 <+88>:	mov    %ebp,%esi
   0xffffffff818f0cda <+90>:	mov    %rbx,%rdx
   0xffffffff818f0cdd <+93>:	pop    %rbx
   0xffffffff818f0cde <+94>:	pop    %r14
   0xffffffff818f0ce0 <+96>:	pop    %rbp

0xffffffff818f0ce1 <+97>: ret

When the config is disabled, the case optimizes the scenario above.

security_file_ioctl:
0xffffffff818f0e30 <+0>: endbr64
0xffffffff818f0e34 <+4>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
0xffffffff818f0e39 <+9>: push %rbp

   0xffffffff818f0e3a <+10>:	push   %r14
   0xffffffff818f0e3c <+12>:	push   %rbx
   0xffffffff818f0e3d <+13>:	mov    %rdx,%rbx
   0xffffffff818f0e40 <+16>:	mov    %esi,%ebp
   0xffffffff818f0e42 <+18>:	mov    %rdi,%r14
   0xffffffff818f0e45 <+21>:	xchg   %ax,%ax
   0xffffffff818f0e47 <+23>:	xchg   %ax,%ax

The static keys in their disabled state do not create jumps leading to faster code.

   0xffffffff818f0e49 <+25>:	xor    %eax,%eax
   0xffffffff818f0e4b <+27>:	xchg   %ax,%ax
   0xffffffff818f0e4d <+29>:	pop    %rbx
   0xffffffff818f0e4e <+30>:	pop    %r14
   0xffffffff818f0e50 <+32>:	pop    %rbp
   0xffffffff818f0e51 <+33>:	cs jmp 0xffffffff82c00000 <__x86_return_thunk>
   0xffffffff818f0e57 <+39>:	endbr64
   0xffffffff818f0e5b <+43>:	mov    %r14,%rdi
   0xffffffff818f0e5e <+46>:	mov    %ebp,%esi
   0xffffffff818f0e60 <+48>:	mov    %rbx,%rdx
   0xffffffff818f0e63 <+51>:	call   0xffffffff8141e3b0 <bpf_lsm_file_ioctl>
   0xffffffff818f0e68 <+56>:	test   %eax,%eax
   0xffffffff818f0e6a <+58>:	jne    0xffffffff818f0e4d <security_file_ioctl+29>
   0xffffffff818f0e6c <+60>:	jmp    0xffffffff818f0e47 <security_file_ioctl+23>
   0xffffffff818f0e6e <+62>:	endbr64
   0xffffffff818f0e72 <+66>:	mov    %r14,%rdi
   0xffffffff818f0e75 <+69>:	mov    %ebp,%esi
   0xffffffff818f0e77 <+71>:	mov    %rbx,%rdx
   0xffffffff818f0e7a <+74>:	nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
   0xffffffff818f0e7f <+79>:	test   %eax,%eax
   0xffffffff818f0e81 <+81>:	jne    0xffffffff818f0e4d <security_file_ioctl+29>
   0xffffffff818f0e83 <+83>:	jmp    0xffffffff818f0e49 <security_file_ioctl+25>
   0xffffffff818f0e85 <+85>:	endbr64
   0xffffffff818f0e89 <+89>:	mov    %r14,%rdi
   0xffffffff818f0e8c <+92>:	mov    %ebp,%esi
   0xffffffff818f0e8e <+94>:	mov    %rbx,%rdx
   0xffffffff818f0e91 <+97>:	pop    %rbx
   0xffffffff818f0e92 <+98>:	pop    %r14

0xffffffff818f0e94 <+100>: pop %rbp
0xffffffff818f0e95 <+101>: ret

---
 security/Kconfig | 11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
security/Kconfig +11 -0
index 52c9af08ad35..317018dcbc67 100644
@@ -32,6 +32,17 @@ config SECURITY
 
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
+config SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY
+	bool "LSM hooks are likely to be initialized"
+	depends on SECURITY && EXPERT
+	default SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK || SECURITY_TOMOYO || SECURITY_APPARMOR
+	help
+	  This controls the behaviour of the static keys that guard LSM hooks.
+	  If LSM hooks are likely to be initialized by LSMs, then one gets
+	  better performance by enabling this option. However, if the system is
+	  using an LSM where hooks are much likely to be disabled, one gets
+	  better performance by disabling this config.
+
 config SECURITYFS
 	bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
 	help
Signature · 1 line
2.42.0.869.gea05f2083d-goog
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 5/5] security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY

Quoted 4 lines · KP Singh

[...]

---
 security/Kconfig | 11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

Did something go missing from this patch? I don't see anything depending on CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY (I think this was working in v7, though?)

Regardless, Paul, please take patches 1-4, they bring us measurable speed-ups across the board.

-Kees

Quoted 26 lines
security/Kconfig +11 -0
index 52c9af08ad35..317018dcbc67 100644
@@ -32,6 +32,17 @@ config SECURITY
 
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
+config SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY
+	bool "LSM hooks are likely to be initialized"
+	depends on SECURITY && EXPERT
+	default SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK || SECURITY_TOMOYO || SECURITY_APPARMOR
+	help
+	  This controls the behaviour of the static keys that guard LSM hooks.
+	  If LSM hooks are likely to be initialized by LSMs, then one gets
+	  better performance by enabling this option. However, if the system is
+	  using an LSM where hooks are much likely to be disabled, one gets
+	  better performance by disabling this config.
+
 config SECURITYFS
 	bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
 	help
Signature · 1 line
2.42.0.869.gea05f2083d-goog
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
maintainer
#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 5/5] security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY

Quoted 11 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 4 lines · KP Singh

[...]

---
 security/Kconfig | 11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

Did something go missing from this patch? I don't see anything depending on CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY (I think this was working in v7, though?)

Regardless, Paul, please take patches 1-4, they bring us measurable speed-ups across the board.

As I mentioned when you were poking me off-list, this is in my review queue and I will get to it when it reaches the top. I can promise you that continued nudging doesn't move the patchset further up in the queue, it actually has the opposite effect.

Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
maintainer
#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 5/5] security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY

Quoted 9 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 8 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 4 lines · KP Singh

[...]

---
 security/Kconfig | 11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)

Did something go missing from this patch? I don't see anything depending on CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY (I think this was working in v7, though?)

I guess while I'm at it, and for the sake of the mailing list, it is worth mentioning that I voiced my dislike of the CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY Kconfig option earlier this year yet it continues to appear in the patchset. It's hard to give something priority when I do provide some feedback and it is apparently ignored.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Regardless, Paul, please take patches 1-4, they bring us measurable speed-ups across the board.

As I mentioned when you were poking me off-list, this is in my review queue and I will get to it when it reaches the top. I can promise you that continued nudging doesn't move the patchset further up in the queue, it actually has the opposite effect.

Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 5/5] security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY

Quoted 8 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 7 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 6 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 4 lines · KP Singh

[...]

---
 security/Kconfig | 11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Did something go missing from this patch? I don't see anything depending on CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY (I think this was working in v7, though?)

I guess while I'm at it, and for the sake of the mailing list, it is worth mentioning that I voiced my dislike of the CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY Kconfig option earlier this year yet it continues to appear in the patchset. It's hard to give something priority when I do provide some feedback and it is apparently ignored.

The CONFIG was created specifically to address earlier concerns about not being able to choose whether to use this performance improvement. :P What's the right direction forward?

Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
maintainer
#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 5/5] security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY

Quoted 18 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 8 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 7 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 6 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 4 lines · KP Singh

[...]

---
 security/Kconfig | 11 +++++++++++
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Did something go missing from this patch? I don't see anything depending on CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY (I think this was working in v7, though?)

I guess while I'm at it, and for the sake of the mailing list, it is worth mentioning that I voiced my dislike of the CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY Kconfig option earlier this year yet it continues to appear in the patchset. It's hard to give something priority when I do provide some feedback and it is apparently ignored.

Quoted 3 lines

The CONFIG was created specifically to address earlier concerns about not being able to choose whether to use this performance improvement. :P What's the right direction forward?

Are you honestly uncertain after our discussions today? I'll be honest and say that I'm a little confused as I thought I made it very clear when I told you to just be patient off-list, and reminded you in this thread that the patchset was in my review queue and I will get to it once it bubbles to the top. I don't know what else to say here ... ?

As far as the CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY patch, looking back at my comments from September [1] there is a clear statement that I am not in favor of this patch along with a brief explanation as to why:

"I'm not in favor of adding a Kconfig option for something
like this. If you have an extremely well defined use case then you can probably do the work to figure out the "correct" value for the tunable, but for a general purpose kernel build that will have different LSMs active, a variety of different BPF LSM hook implementations at different times, etc. there is little hope to getting this right."

... and that was back when the knob actually did something, as you pointed out in this thread, the v8 version of this patch doesn't appear to do anything, which is really baffling and not a good sign. As far as what to do about this patch, in our off-list discussion I asked you and KP to refrain from respinning the patchset just to get rid of this patch, but keep it in mind for future submissions.

Hopefully by repeating the important bits of the conversation you now understand that there is nothing you can do at this moment to speed my review of this patchset, but there are things you, and KP, can do in the future if additional respins are needed. However, if you are still confused, it may be best to go do something else for a bit and then revisit this email because there is nothing more that I can say on this topic at this point in time.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/CAHC9VhSSX0KRuWRURUmt2tUis6fbbmozUbcoeAPkLRmfR2jqAg@mail.gmail.com/

Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
#11 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 5/5] security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY

Quoted 7 lines · Paul Moore

Hopefully by repeating the important bits of the conversation you now understand that there is nothing you can do at this moment to speed my review of this patchset, but there are things you, and KP, can do in the future if additional respins are needed. However, if you are still confused, it may be best to go do something else for a bit and then revisit this email because there is nothing more that I can say on this topic at this point in time.

I moved to the list because off-list discussions (that I got involuntarily CCed into and never replied to at all) tend to be unhelpful as no one else can share in any context they may provide. And I'm not trying to rush you; I'm trying to make review easier. While looking at the v8 again I saw an obvious problem with it, so I commented on it so that it's clear to you that it'll need work when you do get around to the review.

As far as the CONFIG topic, I think we're talking past each other (it IS figuring out the correct value, but it looks like you don't want it even to be a choice at all), but we can discuss that more when this series bubbles up your list.

Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
maintainer
#12 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 5/5] security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY

Quoted 9 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 7 lines · Paul Moore

Hopefully by repeating the important bits of the conversation you now understand that there is nothing you can do at this moment to speed my review of this patchset, but there are things you, and KP, can do in the future if additional respins are needed. However, if you are still confused, it may be best to go do something else for a bit and then revisit this email because there is nothing more that I can say on this topic at this point in time.

Quoted 4 lines

I moved to the list because off-list discussions (that I got involuntarily CCed into and never replied to at all) tend to be unhelpful as no one else can share in any context they may provide. And I'm not trying to rush you; I'm trying to make review easier.

From my perspective whatever good intentions you had at the start were completely lost when you asked "What's the right direction forward?" after I had already explained things multiple times *today*. That's the sort of thing that drives really bothers me.

Quoted 3 lines

While looking at the v8 again I
saw an obvious problem with it, so I commented on it so that it's clear to you that it'll need work when you do get around to the review.

That's fair. The Kconfig patch shouldn't have even been part of the v8 patchset as far as I'm concerned, both because I explained I didn't want to merge something like that (and was ignored) and because it doesn't appear to do anything. From where I sit this was, and remains, equally parts comical and frustrating.

Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
#13 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 5/5] security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY

Quoted 15 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 9 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 7 lines · Paul Moore

Hopefully by repeating the important bits of the conversation you now understand that there is nothing you can do at this moment to speed my review of this patchset, but there are things you, and KP, can do in the future if additional respins are needed. However, if you are still confused, it may be best to go do something else for a bit and then revisit this email because there is nothing more that I can say on this topic at this point in time.

Quoted 4 lines

I moved to the list because off-list discussions (that I got involuntarily CCed into and never replied to at all) tend to be unhelpful as no one else can share in any context they may provide. And I'm not trying to rush you; I'm trying to make review easier.

Quoted 4 lines

From my perspective whatever good intentions you had at the start were completely lost when you asked "What's the right direction forward?" after I had already explained things multiple times *today*. That's the sort of thing that drives really bothers me.

Okay, I understand now. Sorry for frustrating you! By "way forward", I meant I didn't understand how to address what looked like conflicting feedback. I think my confusion was over separating the goal ("this feature should be automatically enabled when it is known to be useful") from an interpretation of earlier feedback as "I don't want a CONFIG [that leaves this up to the user]", when what you really wanted understood was "I don't want a CONFIG *ever*, regardless of whether it picks the correct setting automatically".

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 4 lines

While looking at the v8 again I
saw an obvious problem with it, so I commented on it so that it's clear to you that it'll need work when you do get around to the review.

That's fair. The Kconfig patch shouldn't have even been part of the v8 patchset as far as I'm concerned, both because I explained I didn't want to merge something like that (and was ignored) and because it doesn't appear to do anything. From where I sit this was, and remains, equally parts comical and frustrating.

Agreed. :) Anyway, when you do review it, I think you can just ignore patch 5, and if a v9 isn't needed, a brand new patch for that logic can be created later.

Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
author maintainer
#14 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 5/5] security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY

Quoted 22 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 15 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 9 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 7 lines · Paul Moore

Hopefully by repeating the important bits of the conversation you now understand that there is nothing you can do at this moment to speed my review of this patchset, but there are things you, and KP, can do in the future if additional respins are needed. However, if you are still confused, it may be best to go do something else for a bit and then revisit this email because there is nothing more that I can say on this topic at this point in time.

Quoted 4 lines

I moved to the list because off-list discussions (that I got involuntarily CCed into and never replied to at all) tend to be unhelpful as no one else can share in any context they may provide. And I'm not trying to rush you; I'm trying to make review easier.

Quoted 4 lines

From my perspective whatever good intentions you had at the start were completely lost when you asked "What's the right direction forward?" after I had already explained things multiple times *today*. That's the sort of thing that drives really bothers me.

Quoted 19 lines

Okay, I understand now. Sorry for frustrating you! By "way forward", I meant I didn't understand how to address what looked like conflicting feedback. I think my confusion was over separating the goal ("this feature should be automatically enabled when it is known to be useful") from an interpretation of earlier feedback as "I don't want a CONFIG [that leaves this up to the user]", when what you really wanted understood was "I don't want a CONFIG *ever*, regardless of whether it picks the correct setting automatically".

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 4 lines

While looking at the v8 again I
saw an obvious problem with it, so I commented on it so that it's clear to you that it'll need work when you do get around to the review.

That's fair. The Kconfig patch shouldn't have even been part of the v8 patchset as far as I'm concerned, both because I explained I didn't want to merge something like that (and was ignored) and because it doesn't appear to do anything. From where I sit this was, and remains, equally parts comical and frustrating.

Paul, as I said I will include it in v3 and we can drop it if that's the consensus.

https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CACYkzJ7KBBJV-CWPkMCqT6rK6yVEOJzhqUjvWzp9BAm-rx3Gsg@mail.gmail.com/

Following that, I received Acks on the patch, so I kept it. I wasn't sure if this was going to be perceived as "ignoring your feedback". Definitely not my intention. I was just giving an option for folks who wanted to test the patch so that we get the defaults right. I am totally okay with us dropping the config patch.

Quoted 7 lines

Agreed. :) Anyway, when you do review it, I think you can just ignore patch 5, and if a v9 isn't needed, a brand new patch for that logic can be created later.

--
Kees Cook

maintainer
#15 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 5/5] security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY

Quoted 46 lines · KP Singh
Quoted 21 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 15 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 9 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 7 lines · Paul Moore

Hopefully by repeating the important bits of the conversation you now understand that there is nothing you can do at this moment to speed my review of this patchset, but there are things you, and KP, can do in the future if additional respins are needed. However, if you are still confused, it may be best to go do something else for a bit and then revisit this email because there is nothing more that I can say on this topic at this point in time.

Quoted 4 lines

I moved to the list because off-list discussions (that I got involuntarily CCed into and never replied to at all) tend to be unhelpful as no one else can share in any context they may provide. And I'm not trying to rush you; I'm trying to make review easier.

Quoted 4 lines

From my perspective whatever good intentions you had at the start were completely lost when you asked "What's the right direction forward?" after I had already explained things multiple times *today*. That's the sort of thing that drives really bothers me.

Quoted 19 lines

Okay, I understand now. Sorry for frustrating you! By "way forward", I meant I didn't understand how to address what looked like conflicting feedback. I think my confusion was over separating the goal ("this feature should be automatically enabled when it is known to be useful") from an interpretation of earlier feedback as "I don't want a CONFIG [that leaves this up to the user]", when what you really wanted understood was "I don't want a CONFIG *ever*, regardless of whether it picks the correct setting automatically".

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 4 lines

While looking at the v8 again I
saw an obvious problem with it, so I commented on it so that it's clear to you that it'll need work when you do get around to the review.

That's fair. The Kconfig patch shouldn't have even been part of the v8 patchset as far as I'm concerned, both because I explained I didn't want to merge something like that (and was ignored) and because it doesn't appear to do anything. From where I sit this was, and remains, equally parts comical and frustrating.

Paul, as I said I will include it in v3 and we can drop it if that's the consensus.

Quoted 7 lines

https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CACYkzJ7KBBJV-CWPkMCqT6rK6yVEOJzhqUjvWzp9BAm-rx3Gsg@mail.gmail.com/

Following that, I received Acks on the patch, so I kept it. I wasn't sure if this was going to be perceived as "ignoring your feedback". Definitely not my intention. I was just giving an option for folks who wanted to test the patch so that we get the defaults right. I am totally okay with us dropping the config patch.

<heavy sarcasm>I'm glad you're okay with dropping a patch I said I wasn't going to merge three months ago. I'm also glad you're okay with dropping a patch that does absolutely nothing.</heavy sarcasm>

Come on KP, you're better than this. Continuing to carry a patch that I've said I'm not going to merge only creates confusion about what will be accepted/supported (see today's exchange as a perfect example). There is no need to keep the patch going "for reference", to record ACKs, or anything similar to that; all the reviews, ACKs, etc. happened on a public list so we have that covered from a historical perspective.

I suppose there is a worthy offshoot discussion about consensus and maintainer discretion, but I'm too tired and annoyed to give that discussion the attention it deserves, so let's just say that when I say stuff like I did back in the v2 patchset that should be taken as a "regardless of what consensus there may be, I'm not going to merge this patch."

Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
author maintainer
#16 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 5/5] security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY

Quoted 56 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 46 lines · KP Singh
Quoted 21 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 15 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 9 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 7 lines · Paul Moore

Hopefully by repeating the important bits of the conversation you now understand that there is nothing you can do at this moment to speed my review of this patchset, but there are things you, and KP, can do in the future if additional respins are needed. However, if you are still confused, it may be best to go do something else for a bit and then revisit this email because there is nothing more that I can say on this topic at this point in time.

Quoted 4 lines

I moved to the list because off-list discussions (that I got involuntarily CCed into and never replied to at all) tend to be unhelpful as no one else can share in any context they may provide. And I'm not trying to rush you; I'm trying to make review easier.

Quoted 4 lines

From my perspective whatever good intentions you had at the start were completely lost when you asked "What's the right direction forward?" after I had already explained things multiple times *today*. That's the sort of thing that drives really bothers me.

Quoted 19 lines

Okay, I understand now. Sorry for frustrating you! By "way forward", I meant I didn't understand how to address what looked like conflicting feedback. I think my confusion was over separating the goal ("this feature should be automatically enabled when it is known to be useful") from an interpretation of earlier feedback as "I don't want a CONFIG [that leaves this up to the user]", when what you really wanted understood was "I don't want a CONFIG *ever*, regardless of whether it picks the correct setting automatically".

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 4 lines

While looking at the v8 again I
saw an obvious problem with it, so I commented on it so that it's clear to you that it'll need work when you do get around to the review.

That's fair. The Kconfig patch shouldn't have even been part of the v8 patchset as far as I'm concerned, both because I explained I didn't want to merge something like that (and was ignored) and because it doesn't appear to do anything. From where I sit this was, and remains, equally parts comical and frustrating.

Paul, as I said I will include it in v3 and we can drop it if that's the consensus.

Quoted 7 lines

https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CACYkzJ7KBBJV-CWPkMCqT6rK6yVEOJzhqUjvWzp9BAm-rx3Gsg@mail.gmail.com/

Following that, I received Acks on the patch, so I kept it. I wasn't sure if this was going to be perceived as "ignoring your feedback". Definitely not my intention. I was just giving an option for folks who wanted to test the patch so that we get the defaults right. I am totally okay with us dropping the config patch.

Quoted 3 lines

<heavy sarcasm>I'm glad you're okay with dropping a patch I said I wasn't going to merge three months ago. I'm also glad you're okay with dropping a patch that does absolutely nothing.</heavy sarcasm>

The patch does something (it's in the patch description). But it's something that you don't think is worth tweaking and that's fine.

Quoted 5 lines

Come on KP, you're better than this. Continuing to carry a patch that I've said I'm not going to merge only creates confusion about what will be accepted/supported (see today's exchange as a perfect example). There is no need to keep the patch going "for reference",

Okay, I won't. I honestly did not think this was that big a deal and would bother you so much and, please do assume good intent, I did not want to create confusion here.

- KP

Quoted 13 lines

to record ACKs, or anything similar to that; all the reviews, ACKs, etc. happened on a public list so we have that covered from a historical perspective.

I suppose there is a worthy offshoot discussion about consensus and maintainer discretion, but I'm too tired and annoyed to give that discussion the attention it deserves, so let's just say that when I say stuff like I did back in the v2 patchset that should be taken as a "regardless of what consensus there may be, I'm not going to merge this patch."

--
paul-moore.com

maintainer
#17 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 5/5] security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY

Quoted 63 lines · KP Singh
Quoted 55 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 46 lines · KP Singh
Quoted 21 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 15 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 9 lines · Kees Cook
Quoted 7 lines · Paul Moore

Hopefully by repeating the important bits of the conversation you now understand that there is nothing you can do at this moment to speed my review of this patchset, but there are things you, and KP, can do in the future if additional respins are needed. However, if you are still confused, it may be best to go do something else for a bit and then revisit this email because there is nothing more that I can say on this topic at this point in time.

Quoted 4 lines

I moved to the list because off-list discussions (that I got involuntarily CCed into and never replied to at all) tend to be unhelpful as no one else can share in any context they may provide. And I'm not trying to rush you; I'm trying to make review easier.

Quoted 4 lines

From my perspective whatever good intentions you had at the start were completely lost when you asked "What's the right direction forward?" after I had already explained things multiple times *today*. That's the sort of thing that drives really bothers me.

Quoted 19 lines

Okay, I understand now. Sorry for frustrating you! By "way forward", I meant I didn't understand how to address what looked like conflicting feedback. I think my confusion was over separating the goal ("this feature should be automatically enabled when it is known to be useful") from an interpretation of earlier feedback as "I don't want a CONFIG [that leaves this up to the user]", when what you really wanted understood was "I don't want a CONFIG *ever*, regardless of whether it picks the correct setting automatically".

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 4 lines

While looking at the v8 again I
saw an obvious problem with it, so I commented on it so that it's clear to you that it'll need work when you do get around to the review.

That's fair. The Kconfig patch shouldn't have even been part of the v8 patchset as far as I'm concerned, both because I explained I didn't want to merge something like that (and was ignored) and because it doesn't appear to do anything. From where I sit this was, and remains, equally parts comical and frustrating.

Paul, as I said I will include it in v3 and we can drop it if that's the consensus.

Quoted 7 lines

https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CACYkzJ7KBBJV-CWPkMCqT6rK6yVEOJzhqUjvWzp9BAm-rx3Gsg@mail.gmail.com/

Following that, I received Acks on the patch, so I kept it. I wasn't sure if this was going to be perceived as "ignoring your feedback". Definitely not my intention. I was just giving an option for folks who wanted to test the patch so that we get the defaults right. I am totally okay with us dropping the config patch.

Quoted 3 lines

<heavy sarcasm>I'm glad you're okay with dropping a patch I said I wasn't going to merge three months ago. I'm also glad you're okay with dropping a patch that does absolutely nothing.</heavy sarcasm>

The patch does something (it's in the patch description). But it's something that you don't think is worth tweaking and that's fine.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Come on KP, you're better than this. Continuing to carry a patch that I've said I'm not going to merge only creates confusion about what will be accepted/supported (see today's exchange as a perfect example). There is no need to keep the patch going "for reference",

Okay, I won't. I honestly did not think this was that big a deal and would bother you so much and, please do assume good intent, I did not want to create confusion here.

The patch itself isn't the problem, it's at the end of the patchset and easily dropped. The problem is that you pinged me off-list to try and get me to move your patchset up the review queue, which isn't something I appreciate, especially when the feedback I provided previously was not acted upon ... and yes, I've heard your arguments about why you continued to carry the patch, but please understand when I explicitly say "no thank you" to a patch, I want you to drop that patch; "no thank you" shouldn't be ambiguous.

To summarize:
1. Don't ping me off-list to review patchsets. I personally find that incredibly annoying and it guarantees that the patchset gets pushed to the end of the list (spiteful? sure, but it helps soothe the jagged nerves of this haggard maintainer).
2. Take maintainer feedback seriously. If you ignore feedback, providing a proper review tends to be a waste of time; there are plenty of other patchsets with authors who are receptive to comments.

Anyway, go enjoy your weekend and just do better next time. What's done is done.

Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
#18 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 5/5] security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY

In reply to Kees Cook
Quoted 8 lines · Kees Cook

Okay, I understand now. Sorry for frustrating you! By "way forward", I meant I didn't understand how to address what looked like conflicting feedback. I think my confusion was over separating the goal ("this feature should be automatically enabled when it is known to be useful") from an interpretation of earlier feedback as "I don't want a CONFIG [that leaves this up to the user]", when what you really wanted understood was "I don't want a CONFIG *ever*, regardless of whether it picks the correct setting automatically".

Is it possible to change the direction from "call all individual callbacks from security/security.c" to "call next callback at end of current callback if current callback succeeded and next callback is defined, and security/security.c calls only the first callback"
( https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] ), something like

static int module_specific_some_ops(args) {
	if (logic_for_this_module(arg)) {
		return -EPERM;
	}
	return 0;
}
static int autogenerated_some_ops(args) {
	int ret = module_specific_some_ops(args);
	if (ret == 0) {
		ret = static_call(next_registered_hook)(args);
	}
	return ret;
}

and let LSM_HOOK_INIT() macro generate autogenerated_some_ops() part ?

Acked-by on the v8 series
#19 lore raw
In reply to KP Singh
Quoted 138 lines · KP Singh

# Background

LSM hooks (callbacks) are currently invoked as indirect function calls. These callbacks are registered into a linked list at boot time as the order of the LSMs can be configured on the kernel command line with the "lsm=" command line parameter.

Indirect function calls have a high overhead due to retpoline mitigation for various speculative execution attacks.

Retpolines remain relevant even with newer generation CPUs as recently discovered speculative attacks, like Spectre BHB need Retpolines to mitigate against branch history injection and still need to be used in combination with newer mitigation features like eIBRS.

This overhead is especially significant for the "bpf" LSM which allows the user to implement LSM functionality with eBPF program. In order to facilitate this the "bpf" LSM provides a default callback for all LSM hooks. When enabled, the "bpf" LSM incurs an unnecessary / avoidable indirect call. This is especially bad in OS hot paths (e.g. in the networking stack). This overhead prevents the adoption of bpf LSM on performance critical systems, and also, in general, slows down all LSMs.

Since we know the address of the enabled LSM callbacks at compile time and only the order is determined at boot time, the LSM framework can allocate static calls for each of the possible LSM callbacks and these calls can be updated once the order is determined at boot.

This series is a respin of the RFC proposed by Paul Renauld ([email protected]) and Brendan Jackman ([email protected]) [1]

# Performance improvement

With this patch-set some syscalls with lots of LSM hooks in their path benefitted at an average of ~3% and I/O and Pipe based system calls benefitting the most.

Here are the results of the relevant Unixbench system benchmarks with BPF LSM and SELinux enabled with default policies enabled with and without these patches.

Benchmark Delta(%): (+ is better)
===============================================================================

Execl Throughput                                             +1.9356
File Write 1024 bufsize 2000 maxblocks                       +6.5953
Pipe Throughput                                              +9.5499
Pipe-based Context Switching                                 +3.0209
Process Creation                                             +2.3246
Shell Scripts (1 concurrent)                                 +1.4975
System Call Overhead                                         +2.7815
System Benchmarks Index Score (Partial Only):                +3.4859

In the best case, some syscalls like eventfd_create benefitted to about ~10%. The full analysis can be viewed at https://kpsingh.ch/lsm-perf

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/[email protected]/

# BPF LSM Side effects

Patch 4 of the series also addresses the issues with the side effects of the default value return values of the BPF LSM callbacks and also removes the overheads associated with them making it deployable at hyperscale.

# v7 to v8

* Addressed Andrii's feedback
* Rebased (this seems to have removed the syscall changes). v7 has the required conflict resolution incase the conflicts need to be resolved again.

# v6 -> v7

* Rebased with latest LSM id changes merged

NOTE: The warning shown by the kernel test bot is spurious, there is no flex array and it seems to come from an older tool chain.

https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/

# v5 -> v6

* Fix a bug in BPF LSM hook toggle logic.

# v4 -> v5

* Rebase to linux-next/master
* Fixed the case where MAX_LSM_COUNT comes to zero when just CONFIG_SECURITY is compiled in without any other LSM enabled as reported here:

https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]

# v3 -> v4

* Refactor LSM count macros to use COUNT_ARGS
* Change CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY likely's default value to be based on the LSM enabled and have it depend on CONFIG_EXPERT. There are a lot of subtle options behind CONFIG_EXPERT and this should, hopefully alleviate concerns about yet another knob.
* __randomize_layout for struct lsm_static_call and, in addition to the cover letter add performance numbers to 3rd patch and some minor commit message updates.
* Rebase to linux-next.

# v2 -> v3

* Fixed a build issue on archs which don't have static calls and enable CONFIG_SECURITY.
* Updated the LSM_COUNT macros based on Andrii's suggestions.
* Changed the security_ prefix to lsm_prefix based on Casey's suggestion.
* Inlined static_branch_maybe into lsm_for_each_hook on Kees' feedback.

# v1 -> v2 (based on linux-next, next-20230614)

* Incorporated suggestions from Kees
* Changed the way MAX_LSMs are counted from a binary based generator to a clever header.
* Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY to configure the likelihood of LSM hooks.

KP Singh (5):
kernel: Add helper macros for loop unrolling
security: Count the LSMs enabled at compile time
security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls
bpf: Only enable BPF LSM hooks when an LSM program is attached
security: Add CONFIG_SECURITY_HOOK_LIKELY

 include/linux/bpf_lsm.h   |   5 +
 include/linux/lsm_count.h | 114 +++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h |  81 +++++++++++++--
 include/linux/unroll.h    |  36 +++++++
 kernel/bpf/trampoline.c   |  24 +++++
 security/Kconfig          |  11 ++
 security/bpf/hooks.c      |  25 ++++-
 security/security.c       | 209 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 8 files changed, 425 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/linux/lsm_count.h
 create mode 100644 include/linux/unroll.h
Quoted 4 lines

--
2.42.0.869.gea05f2083d-goog

(carrying it over from v7) For the series: