SVM guest shadow stack support
v2 cover SVM guest shadow stack support
AMD Zen3 and newer processors support shadow stack, a feature designed to protect against ROP (return-oriented programming) attacks in which an attacker manipulates return addresses on the call stack in order to execute arbitrary code. To prevent this, shadow stacks can be allocated that are only used by control transfer and return instructions. When a CALL instruction is issued, it writes the return address to both the program stack and the shadow stack. When the subsequent RET instruction is issued, it pops the return address from both stacks and compares them. If the addresses don't match, a control-protection exception is raised.
Shadow stack and a related feature, Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT), are collectively referred to as Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET). However, current AMD processors only support shadow stack and not IBT.
This series adds support for shadow stack in SVM guests and builds upon the support added in the CET guest support patch series [1]. Additional patches are required to support shadow stack enabled guests in qemu [2].
[1]: CET guest support patches (v10)
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[2]: CET qemu patches
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[3]: Initial SVM support series
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
---
RFC v2:
- Rebased on v3 of the Intel CET virtualization series, dropping the patch that moved cet_is_msr_accessible to common code as that has been pulled into the Intel series.
- Minor change removing curly brackets around if statement introduced
in patch 6/6.
RFC v3:
- Rebased on v5 of the Intel CET virtualization series.
- Add patch changing the name of vmplX_ssp SEV-ES save area fields to plX_ssp.
- Merge this series intended for KVM with the separate guest kernel
patch (now patch 7/8).
- Update MSR passthrough code to conditionally pass through shadow stack MSRS based on both host and guest support.
- Don't save PL0_SSP, PL1_SSP, and PL2_SSP MSRs on SEV-ES VMRUN as these are currently unused.
v1:
- Remove RFC tag from series
- Rebase on v6 of the Intel CET virtualization series
- Use KVM-governed feature to track SHSTK for SVM
v2:
- Add new patch renaming boot_*msr to raw_*msr. Utilize raw_rdmsr when reading XSS on SEV-ES cpuid instructions.
- Omit unnecessary patch for saving shadow stack msrs on SEV-ES VMRUN
- Omit passing through of XSS for SEV-ES as support has already been properly implemented in a26b7cd22546 ("KVM: SEV: Do not intercept accesses to MSR_IA32_XSS for SEV-ES guests")
John Allen (9):
x86/boot: Move boot_*msr helpers to asm/shared/msr.h
KVM: x86: SVM: Emulate reads and writes to shadow stack MSRs
KVM: x86: SVM: Update dump_vmcb with shadow stack save area additions
KVM: x86: SVM: Pass through shadow stack MSRs
KVM: SVM: Rename vmplX_ssp -> plX_ssp
KVM: SVM: Add MSR_IA32_XSS to the GHCB for hypervisor kernel x86/sev-es: Include XSS value in GHCB CPUID request
KVM: SVM: Use KVM-governed features to track SHSTK
KVM: SVM: Add CET features to supported_xss
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 10 +++--- arch/x86/boot/cpucheck.c | 16 +++++----- arch/x86/boot/msr.h | 26 --------------- arch/x86/include/asm/shared/msr.h | 15 +++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 9 +++--- arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 7 ++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 9 ++++-- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 3 +- 9 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/msr.h
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
PATCH v2 1/9 x86/boot: Move boot_*msr helpers to asm/shared/msr.h
The boot_rdmsr and boot_wrmsr helpers used to reduce the need for inline assembly in the boot kernel can also be useful in code shared by boot and run-time kernel code. Move these helpers to asm/shared/msr.h and rename to raw_rdmsr and raw_wrmsr to indicate that these may also be used outside of the boot kernel.
---
v2:
- New in v2
--- arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 10 +++++----- arch/x86/boot/cpucheck.c | 16 ++++++++-------- arch/x86/boot/msr.h | 26 -------------------------- arch/x86/include/asm/shared/msr.h | 15 +++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/msr.h
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c +5 -5
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@#include "misc.h" #include <asm/pgtable_types.h> +#include <asm/shared/msr.h> #include <asm/sev.h> #include <asm/trapnr.h> #include <asm/trap_pf.h>
@@ -23,7 +24,6 @@#include <asm/cpuid.h> #include "error.h" -#include "../msr.h" static struct ghcb boot_ghcb_page__aligned(PAGE_SIZE) ;struct ghcb *boot_ghcb;
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ static inline u64 sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr(void) {struct msr m; -boot_rdmsr (MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB , &m); +raw_rdmsr (MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB , &m);return m.q; }
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static inline void sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(u64 val)struct msr m; m.q = val; -boot_wrmsr (MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB , &m); +raw_wrmsr (MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB , &m); }static enum es_result vc_decode_insn (struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt)
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ void sev_enable(struct boot_params *bp) }/* Set the SME mask if this is an SEV guest. */ -boot_rdmsr (MSR_AMD64_SEV , &m); +raw_rdmsr (MSR_AMD64_SEV , &m); sev_status = m.q;if (!(sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED ))return ;
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ u64 sev_get_status(void)if (sev_check_cpu_support () <0 )return 0 ; -boot_rdmsr (MSR_AMD64_SEV , &m); +raw_rdmsr (MSR_AMD64_SEV , &m);return m.q; }
arch/x86/boot/cpucheck.c +8 -8
@@ -25,9 +25,9 @@#include <asm/intel-family.h> #include <asm/processor-flags.h> #include <asm/required-features.h> +#include <asm/shared/msr.h> #include <asm/msr-index.h> #include "string.h" -#include "msr.h" static u32 err_flags[NCAPINTS ];
@@ -133,9 +133,9 @@ int check_cpu(int *cpu_level_ptr, int *req_level_ptr, u32 **err_flags_ptr)struct msr m; -boot_rdmsr (MSR_K7_HWCR , &m); +raw_rdmsr (MSR_K7_HWCR , &m); m.l &= ~(1 <<15 ); -boot_wrmsr (MSR_K7_HWCR , &m); +raw_wrmsr (MSR_K7_HWCR , &m);get_cpuflags ();/* Make sure it really did something */ err =check_cpuflags ();
@@ -147,9 +147,9 @@ int check_cpu(int *cpu_level_ptr, int *req_level_ptr, u32 **err_flags_ptr)struct msr m; -boot_rdmsr (MSR_VIA_FCR , &m); +raw_rdmsr (MSR_VIA_FCR , &m); m.l |= (1 <<1 ) | (1 <<7 ); -boot_wrmsr (MSR_VIA_FCR , &m); +raw_wrmsr (MSR_VIA_FCR , &m);set_bit (X86_FEATURE_CX8 , cpu.flags); err =check_cpuflags ();
@@ -159,14 +159,14 @@ int check_cpu(int *cpu_level_ptr, int *req_level_ptr, u32 **err_flags_ptr)struct msr m, m_tmp;u32 level =1 ; -boot_rdmsr (0x80860004 , &m); +raw_rdmsr (0x80860004 , &m); m_tmp = m; m_tmp.l = ~0 ; -boot_wrmsr (0x80860004 , &m_tmp); +raw_wrmsr (0x80860004 , &m_tmp); asm("cpuid" :"+a" (level),"=d" (cpu.flags[0 ]) : :"ecx" ,"ebx" ); -boot_wrmsr (0x80860004 , &m); +raw_wrmsr (0x80860004 , &m); err =check_cpuflags (); } else if (err == 0x01 &&
arch/x86/boot/msr.h deleted +0 -26
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@ -/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ -/* -* Helpers/definitions related to MSR access. -*/ - -#ifndef BOOT_MSR_H -#define BOOT_MSR_H - -#include <asm/shared/msr.h> - -/* -* The kernel proper already defines rdmsr()/wrmsr(), but they are not for the -* boot kernel since they rely on tracepoint/exception handling infrastructure -* that's not available here. -*/ -static inline void boot_rdmsr (unsigned int reg,struct msr *m) -{ - asmvolatile ("rdmsr" :"=a" (m->l),"=d" (m->h) :"c" (reg)); -} - -static inline void boot_wrmsr (unsigned int reg,const struct msr *m) -{ - asmvolatile ("wrmsr" : :"c" (reg),"a" (m->l),"d" (m->h) :"memory" ); -} - -#endif /* BOOT_MSR_H */
arch/x86/include/asm/shared/msr.h +15 -0
@@ -12,4 +12,19 @@ struct msr { }; }; +/* +* The kernel proper already defines rdmsr()/wrmsr(), but they are not for the +* boot kernel since they rely on tracepoint/exception handling infrastructure +* that's not available here. +*/ +static inline void raw_rdmsr (unsigned int reg,struct msr *m) +{ + asmvolatile ("rdmsr" :"=a" (m->l),"=d" (m->h) :"c" (reg)); +} + +static inline void raw_wrmsr (unsigned int reg,const struct msr *m) +{ + asmvolatile ("wrmsr" : :"c" (reg),"a" (m->l),"d" (m->h) :"memory" ); +} +#endif /* _ASM_X86_SHARED_MSR_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
Re: [PATCH v2 1/9] x86/boot: Move boot_*msr helpers to asm/shared/msr.h
Quoted 10 lines · John Allen
The
boot_rdmsrandboot_wrmsrhelpers used to reduce the need for inline assembly in the boot kernel can also be useful in code shared by boot and run-time kernel code. Move these helpers toasm/shared/msr.hand rename toraw_rdmsrandraw_wrmsrto indicate that these may also be used outside of the boot kernel.Signed-off-by John Allen <[email protected]>---
v2:
- New in v2
Quoted 7 lines
--- arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 10 +++++----- arch/x86/boot/cpucheck.c | 16 ++++++++-------- arch/x86/boot/msr.h | 26 -------------------------- arch/x86/include/asm/shared/msr.h | 15 +++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/msr.h
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquettePATCH v2 2/9 KVM: x86: SVM: Emulate reads and writes to shadow stack MSRs
In reply to John AllenSet up interception of shadow stack MSRs. In the event that shadow stack is unsupported on the host or the MSRs are otherwise inaccessible, the interception code will return an error. In certain circumstances such as host initiated MSR reads or writes, the interception code will get or set the requested MSR value.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +18 -0
@@ -2864,6 +2864,15 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)if (guest_cpuid_is_intel (vcpu)) msr_info->data |= (u64 )svm->sysenter_esp_hi <<32 ;break ; +case MSR_IA32_S_CET : + msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.s_cet; +break ; +case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB : + msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.isst_addr; +break ; +case MSR_KVM_SSP : + msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.ssp; +break ;case MSR_TSC_AUX : msr_info->data = svm->tsc_aux;break ;
@@ -3090,6 +3099,15 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sysenter_esp = (u32 )data; svm->sysenter_esp_hi =guest_cpuid_is_intel (vcpu) ? (data >>32 ) :0 ;break ; +case MSR_IA32_S_CET : + svm->vmcb->save.s_cet = data; +break ; +case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB : + svm->vmcb->save.isst_addr = data; +break ; +case MSR_KVM_SSP : + svm->vmcb->save.ssp = data; +break ;case MSR_TSC_AUX :/* * TSC_AUX is always virtualized for SEV-ES guests when the
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
PATCH v2 3/9 KVM: x86: SVM: Update dump_vmcb with shadow stack save area additions
In reply to John AllenAdd shadow stack VMCB save area fields to dump_vmcb. Only include S_CET, SSP, and ISST_ADDR. Since there currently isn't support to decrypt and dump the SEV-ES save area, exclude PL0_SSP, PL1_SSP, PL2_SSP, PL3_SSP, and U_CET which are only inlcuded in the SEV-ES save area.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +4 -0
@@ -3431,6 +3431,10 @@ static void dump_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) "rip:", save->rip, "rflags:", save->rflags);pr_err ("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n" ,"rsp:" , save->rsp,"rax:" , save->rax); +pr_err ("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n" , +"s_cet:" , save->s_cet,"ssp:" , save->ssp); +pr_err ("%-15s %016llx\n" , +"isst_addr:" , save->isst_addr);pr_err ("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n" ,"star:" , save01->star,"lstar:" , save01->lstar); pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
PATCH v2 4/9 KVM: x86: SVM: Pass through shadow stack MSRs
In reply to John AllenIf kvm supports shadow stack, pass through shadow stack MSRs to improve guest performance.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +26 -0
@@ -140,6 +140,13 @@ static const struct svm_direct_access_msrs { { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMICT), .always = false }, { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMCCT), .always = false }, { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TDCR), .always = false }, + { .index = MSR_IA32_U_CET, .always = false }, + { .index = MSR_IA32_S_CET, .always = false }, + { .index = MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB, .always = false }, + { .index = MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP, .always = false }, + { .index = MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP, .always = false }, + { .index = MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP, .always = false }, + { .index = MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, .always = false }, { .index = MSR_INVALID, .always = false }, };
@@ -1222,6 +1229,25 @@ static inline void init_vmcb_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)set_msr_interception (vcpu, svm->msrpm,MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP ,1 ,1 );set_msr_interception (vcpu, svm->msrpm,MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP ,1 ,1 ); } + +if (kvm_cpu_cap_has (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) { +bool shstk_enabled =guest_cpuid_has (vcpu,X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ); + +set_msr_interception (vcpu, svm->msrpm,MSR_IA32_U_CET , + shstk_enabled, shstk_enabled); +set_msr_interception (vcpu, svm->msrpm,MSR_IA32_S_CET , + shstk_enabled, shstk_enabled); +set_msr_interception (vcpu, svm->msrpm,MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB , + shstk_enabled, shstk_enabled); +set_msr_interception (vcpu, svm->msrpm,MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP , + shstk_enabled, shstk_enabled); +set_msr_interception (vcpu, svm->msrpm,MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP , + shstk_enabled, shstk_enabled); +set_msr_interception (vcpu, svm->msrpm,MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP , + shstk_enabled, shstk_enabled); +set_msr_interception (vcpu, svm->msrpm,MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP , + shstk_enabled, shstk_enabled); + } }static void init_vmcb (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +1 -1
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@#define IOPM_SIZE PAGE_SIZE * 3#define MSRPM_SIZE PAGE_SIZE * 2 -#define MAX_DIRECT_ACCESS_MSRS 47 +#define MAX_DIRECT_ACCESS_MSRS 54#define MSRPM_OFFSETS 32extern u32 msrpm_offsets[MSRPM_OFFSETS ]__read_mostly ;extern bool npt_enabled;
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
PATCH v2 5/9 KVM: SVM: Rename vmplX_ssp -> plX_ssp
In reply to John AllenRename SEV-ES save area SSP fields to be consistent with the APM.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h +4 -4
@@ -358,10 +358,10 @@ struct sev_es_save_area {struct vmcb_seg ldtr;struct vmcb_seg idtr;struct vmcb_seg tr; -u64 vmpl0_ssp; -u64 vmpl1_ssp; -u64 vmpl2_ssp; -u64 vmpl3_ssp; +u64 pl0_ssp; +u64 pl1_ssp; +u64 pl2_ssp; +u64 pl3_ssp;u64 u_cet;u8 reserved_0xc8[2 ];u8 vmpl;
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 5/9] KVM: SVM: Rename vmplX_ssp -> plX_ssp
Quoted 13 lines · John Allen
Rename SEV-ES save area SSP fields to be consistent with the APM.
Signed-off-by John Allen <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h +0
-0@@ -358,10 +358,10 @@ struct sev_es_save_area {struct vmcb_seg ldtr;
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h struct sev_es_save_area { · line 364
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h +4
-4struct vmcb_seg idtr;struct vmcb_seg tr; -u64 vmpl0_ssp; -u64 vmpl1_ssp; -u64 vmpl2_ssp; -u64 vmpl3_ssp; +u64 pl0_ssp; +u64 pl1_ssp; +u64 pl2_ssp; +u64 pl3_ssp;
Are these CPL fields, or VMPL fields? Presumably it's the former since this is a single save area. If so, the changelog should call that out, i.e. make it clear that the current names are outright bugs. If these somehow really are VMPL fields, I would prefer to diverge from the APM, because pl[0..3] is way to ambiguous in that case.
It's borderline if they're CPL fields, but Intel calls them PL[0..3]_SSP, so I'm much less inclined to diverge from two other things in that case.
Re: [PATCH v2 5/9] KVM: SVM: Rename vmplX_ssp -> plX_ssp
Quoted 22 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 21 lines · John Allen
Rename SEV-ES save area SSP fields to be consistent with the APM.
Signed-off-by John Allen <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h +2
-4@@ -358,10 +358,10 @@ struct sev_es_save_area {struct vmcb_seg ldtr;struct vmcb_seg idtr;struct vmcb_seg tr; -u64 vmpl0_ssp; -u64 vmpl1_ssp; -u64 vmpl2_ssp; -u64 vmpl3_ssp; +u64 pl0_ssp; +u64 pl1_ssp;
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h struct sev_es_save_area { · line 364
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h +2
-0+u64 pl2_ssp; +u64 pl3_ssp;Are these CPL fields, or VMPL fields? Presumably it's the former since this is a single save area. If so, the changelog should call that out, i.e. make it clear that the current names are outright bugs. If these somehow really are VMPL fields, I would prefer to diverge from the APM, because pl[0..3] is way to ambiguous in that case.
Definitely not VMPL fields... I guess I had VMPL levels on my mind when I was typing those names.
Thanks,
Tom
Quoted 3 lines
It's borderline if they're CPL fields, but Intel calls them PL[0..3]_SSP, so I'm much less inclined to diverge from two other things in that case.
Re: [PATCH v2 5/9] KVM: SVM: Rename vmplX_ssp -> plX_ssp
Quoted 32 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 22 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 21 lines · John Allen
Rename SEV-ES save area SSP fields to be consistent with the APM.
Signed-off-by John Allen <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h +2
-4@@ -358,10 +358,10 @@ struct sev_es_save_area {struct vmcb_seg ldtr;struct vmcb_seg idtr;struct vmcb_seg tr; -u64 vmpl0_ssp; -u64 vmpl1_ssp; -u64 vmpl2_ssp; -u64 vmpl3_ssp; +u64 pl0_ssp; +u64 pl1_ssp;Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h struct sev_es_save_area { · line 364
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h +2
-0+u64 pl2_ssp; +u64 pl3_ssp;Are these CPL fields, or VMPL fields? Presumably it's the former since this is a single save area. If so, the changelog should call that out, i.e. make it clear that the current names are outright bugs. If these somehow really are VMPL fields, I would prefer to diverge from the APM, because pl[0..3] is way to ambiguous in that case.
Quoted 2 lines
Definitely not VMPL fields... I guess I had VMPL levels on my mind when I was typing those names.
FWIW, the patch that accessed these fields has been omitted in this version so if we just want to correct the names of these fields, this patch can be pulled in separately from this series.
Thanks,
John
Quoted 7 lines
Thanks,
TomQuoted 3 lines
It's borderline if they're CPL fields, but Intel calls them PL[0..3]_SSP, so I'm much less inclined to diverge from two other things in that case.
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 5/9] KVM: SVM: Rename vmplX_ssp -> plX_ssp
Quoted 33 lines · John Allen
Quoted 32 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 30 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 13 lines · John Allen
Rename SEV-ES save area SSP fields to be consistent with the APM.
Signed-off-by John Allen <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h +0
-0@@ -358,10 +358,10 @@ struct sev_es_save_area {struct vmcb_seg ldtr;arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h struct sev_es_save_area { · line 364
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h +4
-4struct vmcb_seg idtr;struct vmcb_seg tr; -u64 vmpl0_ssp; -u64 vmpl1_ssp; -u64 vmpl2_ssp; -u64 vmpl3_ssp; +u64 pl0_ssp; +u64 pl1_ssp; +u64 pl2_ssp; +u64 pl3_ssp;Are these CPL fields, or VMPL fields? Presumably it's the former since this is a single save area. If so, the changelog should call that out, i.e. make it clear that the current names are outright bugs. If these somehow really are VMPL fields, I would prefer to diverge from the APM, because pl[0..3] is way to ambiguous in that case.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Definitely not VMPL fields... I guess I had VMPL levels on my mind when I was typing those names.
FWIW, the patch that accessed these fields has been omitted in this version so if we just want to correct the names of these fields, this patch can be pulled in separately from this series.
Nice! Can you post this as a standalone patch, with a massage changelog to explain that the vmpl prefix was just a braino?
Thanks!
Re: [PATCH v2 5/9] KVM: SVM: Rename vmplX_ssp -> plX_ssp
Quoted 37 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 36 lines · John Allen
Quoted 34 lines · Tom Lendacky
Quoted 22 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 21 lines · John Allen
Rename SEV-ES save area SSP fields to be consistent with the APM.
Signed-off-by John Allen <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h +2
-4@@ -358,10 +358,10 @@ struct sev_es_save_area {struct vmcb_seg ldtr;struct vmcb_seg idtr;struct vmcb_seg tr; -u64 vmpl0_ssp; -u64 vmpl1_ssp; -u64 vmpl2_ssp; -u64 vmpl3_ssp; +u64 pl0_ssp; +u64 pl1_ssp;Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h struct sev_es_save_area { · line 364
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h +2
-0+u64 pl2_ssp; +u64 pl3_ssp;Are these CPL fields, or VMPL fields? Presumably it's the former since this is a single save area. If so, the changelog should call that out, i.e. make it clear that the current names are outright bugs. If these somehow really are VMPL fields, I would prefer to diverge from the APM, because pl[0..3] is way to ambiguous in that case.
Definitely not VMPL fields... I guess I had VMPL levels on my mind when I was typing those names.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
FWIW, the patch that accessed these fields has been omitted in this version so if we just want to correct the names of these fields, this patch can be pulled in separately from this series.
Nice! Can you post this as a standalone patch, with a massage changelog to explain that the vmpl prefix was just a braino?
Thanks!
Will do.
Thanks,
John
PATCH v2 6/9 KVM: SVM: Add MSR_IA32_XSS to the GHCB for hypervisor kernel
In reply to John AllenWhen a guest issues a cpuid instruction for Fn0000000D_x0B (CetUserOffset), KVM will intercept and need to access the guest MSR_IA32_XSS value. For SEV-ES, this is encrypted and needs to be included in the GHCB to be visible to the hypervisor.
---
v2:
- Omit passing through XSS as this has already been properly implemented in a26b7cd22546 ("KVM: SEV: Do not intercept accesses to MSR_IA32_XSS for SEV-ES guests")
--- arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 9 +++++++-- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h +1 -0
@@ -673,5 +673,6 @@ DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_exit_info_1) DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_exit_info_2) DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_scratch) DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(xcr0) +DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(xss)#endif
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +7 -2
@@ -2458,8 +2458,13 @@ static void sev_es_sync_from_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) svm->vmcb->save.cpl =kvm_ghcb_get_cpl_if_valid (svm, ghcb); -if (kvm_ghcb_xcr0_is_valid (svm)) { - vcpu->arch.xcr0 =ghcb_get_xcr0 (ghcb); +if (kvm_ghcb_xcr0_is_valid (svm) ||kvm_ghcb_xss_is_valid (svm)) { +if (kvm_ghcb_xcr0_is_valid (svm)) + vcpu->arch.xcr0 =ghcb_get_xcr0 (ghcb); + +if (kvm_ghcb_xss_is_valid (svm)) + vcpu->arch.ia32_xss =ghcb_get_xss (ghcb); +kvm_update_cpuid_runtime (vcpu); }
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +1 -0
@@ -723,5 +723,6 @@ DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_exit_info_1) DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_exit_info_2) DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_scratch) DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(xcr0) +DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(xss)#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 6/9] KVM: SVM: Add MSR_IA32_XSS to the GHCB for hypervisor kernel
Quoted 4 lines · John Allen
When a guest issues a cpuid instruction for
Fn0000000D_x0B(CetUserOffset), KVM will intercept and need to access the guestMSR_IA32_XSSvalue. For SEV-ES, this is encrypted and needs to be included in the GHCB to be visible to the hypervisor.
Heh, too many pronouns and implicit subjects. I read this, several times, as:
When a guest issues a cpuid instruction for Fn0000000D_x0B (CetUserOffset), KVM will intercept MSR_IA32_XSS and need to access the guest MSR_IA32_XSS value.
I think you mean this?
When a vCPU executes CPUID.0xD.0xB (CetUserOffset), KVM will intercept and emulate CPUID. To emulate CPUID, KVM needs access to the vCPU's MSR_IA32_XSS value. For SEV-ES guests, XSS is encrypted, and so the guest must include its XSS value in the GHCB as part of the CPUID request.
Hmm, I suspect that last sentence is wrong though. Question on that below.
Quoted 31 lines
Signed-off-by John Allen <[email protected]>---
v2:
- Omit passing through XSS as this has already been properly implemented ina26b7cd22546("KVM: SEV: Do not intercept accesses toMSR_IA32_XSSfor SEV-ES guests")--- arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 9 +++++++-- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h +1
-0@@ -673,5 +673,6 @@ DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_exit_info_1) DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_exit_info_2) DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_scratch) DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(xcr0) +DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(xss)#endif arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +0
-0@@ -2458,8 +2458,13 @@ static void sev_es_sync_from_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) svm->vmcb->save.cpl =kvm_ghcb_get_cpl_if_valid (svm, ghcb);
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c static void sev_es_sync_from_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) · line 2468
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +7
-2-if (kvm_ghcb_xcr0_is_valid (svm)) { - vcpu->arch.xcr0 =ghcb_get_xcr0 (ghcb); +if (kvm_ghcb_xcr0_is_valid (svm) ||kvm_ghcb_xss_is_valid (svm)) { +if (kvm_ghcb_xcr0_is_valid (svm)) + vcpu->arch.xcr0 =ghcb_get_xcr0 (ghcb); + +if (kvm_ghcb_xss_is_valid (svm)) + vcpu->arch.ia32_xss =ghcb_get_xss (ghcb); +kvm_update_cpuid_runtime (vcpu);
Pre-existing code, but isn't updating CPUID runtime on every VMGEXIT super wasteful? Or is the guest behavior to mark XCR0 and XSS as valid only when changing XCR0/XSS? If so, the last sentence of the changelog should be something like:
MSR_IA32_XSS value. For SEV-ES guests, XSS is encrypted, and so the guest must notify the host of XSS changes by performing a ??? VMGEXIT and providing its XSS value in the GHCB.
Re: [PATCH v2 6/9] KVM: SVM: Add MSR_IA32_XSS to the GHCB for hypervisor kernel
Quoted 52 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 4 lines · John Allen
When a guest issues a cpuid instruction for
Fn0000000D_x0B(CetUserOffset), KVM will intercept and need to access the guestMSR_IA32_XSSvalue. For SEV-ES, this is encrypted and needs to be included in the GHCB to be visible to the hypervisor.Heh, too many pronouns and implicit subjects. I read this, several times, as:
When a guest issues a cpuid instruction for
Fn0000000D_x0B(CetUserOffset), KVM will interceptMSR_IA32_XSSand need to access the guestMSR_IA32_XSSvalue.I think you mean this?
When a vCPU executes CPUID.0xD.0xB (CetUserOffset), KVM will intercept and emulate CPUID. To emulate CPUID, KVM needs access to the vCPU's
MSR_IA32_XSSvalue. For SEV-ES guests, XSS is encrypted, and so the guest must include its XSS value in the GHCB as part of the CPUID request.Hmm, I suspect that last sentence is wrong though. Question on that below.
Quoted 31 lines
Signed-off-by John Allen <[email protected]>---
v2:
- Omit passing through XSS as this has already been properly implemented ina26b7cd22546("KVM: SEV: Do not intercept accesses toMSR_IA32_XSSfor SEV-ES guests")--- arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 9 +++++++-- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h +1
-0@@ -673,5 +673,6 @@ DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_exit_info_1) DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_exit_info_2) DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_scratch) DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(xcr0) +DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(xss)#endif arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +0
-0@@ -2458,8 +2458,13 @@ static void sev_es_sync_from_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) svm->vmcb->save.cpl =kvm_ghcb_get_cpl_if_valid (svm, ghcb);
Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c static void sev_es_sync_from_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) · line 2468
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +7
-2-if (kvm_ghcb_xcr0_is_valid (svm)) { - vcpu->arch.xcr0 =ghcb_get_xcr0 (ghcb); +if (kvm_ghcb_xcr0_is_valid (svm) ||kvm_ghcb_xss_is_valid (svm)) { +if (kvm_ghcb_xcr0_is_valid (svm)) + vcpu->arch.xcr0 =ghcb_get_xcr0 (ghcb); + +if (kvm_ghcb_xss_is_valid (svm)) + vcpu->arch.ia32_xss =ghcb_get_xss (ghcb); +kvm_update_cpuid_runtime (vcpu);Pre-existing code, but isn't updating CPUID runtime on every VMGEXIT super wasteful? Or is the guest behavior to mark XCR0 and XSS as valid only when changing XCR0/XSS?
It's not really on every VMGEXIT. It's only if those values have been supplied in the GHCB will the CPUID runtime be updated. And the Linux guest code supplies XCR0 and XSS only on a CPUID VMGEXIT.
Both sides of that can optimized. The guest can be optimized down to just supplying the values on CPUID 0xD or even further to only supplying the values if they have changed since the last time they were supplied. The hypervisor side could be optimized to compare the value and only update the CPUID runtime if those values are different.
Thanks,
Tom
Quoted 5 lines
If so, the last sentence of the changelog should be something like:
MSR_IA32_XSSvalue. For SEV-ES guests, XSS is encrypted, and so the guest must notify the host of XSS changes by performing a ??? VMGEXIT and providing its XSS value in the GHCB.
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 6/9] KVM: SVM: Add MSR_IA32_XSS to the GHCB for hypervisor kernel
Quoted 2 lines · Tom Lendacky
The hypervisor side could be optimized to compare the value and only update the CPUID runtime if those values are different.
Heh, this is exactly the thought I had around dinner time yesterday :-)
PATCH v2 7/9 x86/sev-es: Include XSS value in GHCB CPUID request
In reply to John AllenWhen a guest issues a cpuid instruction for Fn0000000D_x0B (CetUserOffset), the hypervisor may intercept and access the guest XSS value. For SEV-ES, this is encrypted and needs to be included in the GHCB to be visible to the hypervisor. The rdmsr instruction needs to be called directly as the code may be used in early boot in which case the rdmsr wrappers should be avoided as they are incompatible with the decompression boot phase.
---
v2:
- Use raw_rdmsr instead of calling rdmsr directly.
--- arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +7 -0
@@ -966,6 +966,13 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb,/* xgetbv will cause #GP - use reset value for xcr0 */ ghcb_set_xcr0 (ghcb,1 ); +if (has_cpuflag (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && regs->ax ==0xd && regs->cx <=1 ) { +struct msr m; + +raw_rdmsr (MSR_IA32_XSS , &m); +ghcb_set_xss (ghcb, m.q); + } + ret =sev_es_ghcb_hv_call (ghcb, ctxt,SVM_EXIT_CPUID ,0 ,0 );if (ret !=ES_OK )return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
Re: [PATCH v2 7/9] x86/sev-es: Include XSS value in GHCB CPUID request
Quoted 25 lines · John Allen
When a guest issues a cpuid instruction for
Fn0000000D_x0B(CetUserOffset), the hypervisor may intercept and access the guest XSS value. For SEV-ES, this is encrypted and needs to be included in the GHCB to be visible to the hypervisor. The rdmsr instruction needs to be called directly as the code may be used in early boot in which case the rdmsr wrappers should be avoided as they are incompatible with the decompression boot phase.Signed-off-by John Allen <[email protected]>---
v2:
- Useraw_rdmsrinstead of calling rdmsr directly.--- arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +0
-0@@ -966,6 +966,13 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb,/* xgetbv will cause #GP - use reset value for xcr0 */ ghcb_set_xcr0 (ghcb,1 );
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb, · line 978
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +7
-0+if (has_cpuflag (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ) && regs->ax ==0xd && regs->cx <=1 ) { +struct msr m; + +raw_rdmsr (MSR_IA32_XSS , &m); +ghcb_set_xss (ghcb, m.q); + } + ret =sev_es_ghcb_hv_call (ghcb, ctxt,SVM_EXIT_CPUID ,0 ,0 );if (ret !=ES_OK )return ret;
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquettePATCH v2 8/9 KVM: SVM: Use KVM-governed features to track SHSTK
In reply to John AllenUse the KVM-governed features framework to track whether SHSTK can be by both userspace and guest for SVM.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1 -0
@@ -4386,6 +4386,7 @@ static void svm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set (vcpu,X86_FEATURE_PFTHRESHOLD );kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set (vcpu,X86_FEATURE_VGIF );kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set (vcpu,X86_FEATURE_VNMI ); +kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set (vcpu,X86_FEATURE_SHSTK );svm_recalc_instruction_intercepts (vcpu, svm);
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
PATCH v2 9/9 KVM: SVM: Add CET features to supported_xss
In reply to John AllenIf the CPU supports CET, add CET XSAVES feature bits to the supported_xss mask.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +4 -0
@@ -5177,6 +5177,10 @@ static __init void svm_set_cpu_caps(void) boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))kvm_cpu_cap_set (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD ); +if (kvm_cpu_cap_has (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) + kvm_caps.supported_xss |=XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER | +XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL ; +if (enable_pmu) {/* * Enumerate support for PERFCTR_CORE if and only if KVM has
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 9/9] KVM: SVM: Add CET features to supported_xss
Quoted 13 lines · John Allen
If the CPU supports CET, add CET XSAVES feature bits to the
supported_xssmask.Signed-off-by John Allen <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c static __init void svm_set_cpu_caps(void) · line 5182
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +3
-0@@ -5177,6 +5177,10 @@ static __init void svm_set_cpu_caps(void) boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))kvm_cpu_cap_set (X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD ); +if (kvm_cpu_cap_has (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) + kvm_caps.supported_xss |=XFEATURE_MASK_CET_USER | +XFEATURE_MASK_CET_KERNEL ;
Based on Weijiang's series, I believe this is unnecessary. Common x86 code will both set supported_xss, and clear bits if their associated features are unsupported.
I also asked Weijiang to modify the "advertise to userspace" patch to explicitly clear SHSTK and IBT in svm_set_cpu_caps()[*], so if the stars align as I think they will, this patch should simply need to delete the
kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
that will be added by the VMX series.