5.4.278-rc1 review
Subsystems (4)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 161/202 ipvlan: Dont Use skb->sk in ipvlan_process_v{4,6}_outbound
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yue Haibing <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b3dc6e8003b500861fa307e9a3400c52e78e4d3a ]
Raw packet from PF_PACKET socket ontop of an IPv6-backed ipvlan device will hit WARN_ON_ONCE() in sk_mc_loop() through sch_direct_xmit() path.
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 0 at net/core/sock.c:775 sk_mc_loop+0x2d/0x70 Modules linked in: sch_netem ipvlan rfkill cirrus drm_shmem_helper sg drm_kms_helper CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0+ #279 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:sk_mc_loop+0x2d/0x70 Code: fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 65 0f b7 15 f7 96 a3 4f 31 c0 66 85 d2 75 26 48 85 ff 74 1c RSP: 0018:ffffa9584015cd78 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: 0000000000000011 RBX: ffff91e585793e00 RCX: 0000000002c6a001 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000040 RDI: ffff91e589c0f000 RBP: ffff91e5855bd100 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 3d00545216f43d00 R10: ffff91e584fdcc50 R11: 00000060dd8616f4 R12: ffff91e58132d000 R13: ffff91e584fdcc68 R14: ffff91e5869ce800 R15: ffff91e589c0f000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff91e898100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f788f7c44c0 CR3: 0000000008e1a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <IRQ> ? __warn (kernel/panic.c:693) ? sk_mc_loop (net/core/sock.c:760) ? report_bug (lib/bug.c:201 lib/bug.c:219) ? handle_bug (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:239) ? exc_invalid_op (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:260 (discriminator 1)) ? asm_exc_invalid_op (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:621) ? sk_mc_loop (net/core/sock.c:760) ip6_finish_output2 (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:83 (discriminator 1)) ? nf_hook_slow (net/netfilter/core.c:626) ip6_finish_output (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:222) ? __pfx_ip6_finish_output (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:215) ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 (drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602) ipvlan ipvlan_start_xmit (drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:226) ipvlan dev_hard_start_xmit (net/core/dev.c:3594) sch_direct_xmit (net/sched/sch_generic.c:343) __qdisc_run (net/sched/sch_generic.c:416) net_tx_action (net/core/dev.c:5286) handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:555) __irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:589) sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043)
The warning triggers as this:packet_sendmsg
packet_snd //skb->sk is packet sk
__dev_queue_xmit
__dev_xmit_skb //q->enqueue is not NULL
__qdisc_run
sch_direct_xmit
dev_hard_start_xmit
ipvlan_start_xmit
ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 //l3 mode
ipvlan_process_outbound //vepa flag
ipvlan_process_v6_outbound
ip6_local_out
__ip6_finish_output
ip6_finish_output2 //multicast packet
sk_mc_loop //sk->sk_family is AF_PACKETCall ip{6}_local_out() with NULL sk in ipvlan as other tunnels to fix this.
--- drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c +2 -2
@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ static noinline_for_stack int ipvlan_process_v4_outbound(struct sk_buff *skb)memset (IPCB (skb),0 ,sizeof (*IPCB (skb))); - err =ip_local_out (net, skb->sk, skb); + err =ip_local_out (net,NULL , skb);if (unlikely (net_xmit_eval (err)))DEV_STATS_INC (dev, tx_errors);else
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ static int ipvlan_process_v6_outbound(struct sk_buff *skb)memset (IP6CB (skb),0 ,sizeof (*IP6CB (skb))); - err =ip6_local_out (dev_net (dev), skb->sk, skb); + err =ip6_local_out (dev_net (dev),NULL , skb);if (unlikely (net_xmit_eval (err)))DEV_STATS_INC (dev, tx_errors);else
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 162/202 ALSA: timer: Set lower bound of start tick time
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit 4a63bd179fa8d3fcc44a0d9d71d941ddd62f0c4e upstream.
Currently ALSA timer doesn't have the lower limit of the start tick time, and it allows a very small size, e.g. 1 tick with 1ns resolution for hrtimer. Such a situation may lead to an unexpected RCU stall, where the callback repeatedly queuing the expire update, as reported by fuzzer.
This patch introduces a sanity check of the timer start tick time, so that the system returns an error when a too small start size is set. As of this patch, the lower limit is hard-coded to 100us, which is small enough but can still work somehow.
[ backport note: the error handling is changed, as the original commit
is based on the recent cleanup with guard() in commit beb45974dd49 -- tiwai ]
--- sound/core/timer.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
sound/core/timer.c +10 -0
@@ -524,6 +524,16 @@ static int snd_timer_start1(struct snd_t goto unlock; } +/* check the actual time for the start tick; +* bail out as error if it's way too low (< 100us) +*/ +if (start) { +if ((u64 )snd_timer_hw_resolution (timer) * ticks <100000 ) { + result = -EINVAL ; + goto unlock; + } + } +if (start) timeri->ticks = timeri->cticks = ticks;else if (!timeri->cticks)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 163/202 genirq/cpuhotplug, x86/vector: Prevent vector leak during CPU offline
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dongli Zhang <[email protected]>
commit a6c11c0a5235fb144a65e0cb2ffd360ddc1f6c32 upstream.
The absence of IRQD_MOVE_PCNTXT prevents immediate effectiveness of interrupt affinity reconfiguration via procfs. Instead, the change is deferred until the next instance of the interrupt being triggered on the original CPU.
When the interrupt next triggers on the original CPU, the new affinity is enforced within __irq_move_irq(). A vector is allocated from the new CPU, but the old vector on the original CPU remains and is not immediately reclaimed. Instead, apicd->move_in_progress is flagged, and the reclaiming process is delayed until the next trigger of the interrupt on the new CPU.
Upon the subsequent triggering of the interrupt on the new CPU, irq_complete_move() adds a task to the old CPU's vector_cleanup list if it remains online. Subsequently, the timer on the old CPU iterates over its vector_cleanup list, reclaiming old vectors.
However, a rare scenario arises if the old CPU is outgoing before the interrupt triggers again on the new CPU.
In that case irq_force_complete_move() is not invoked on the outgoing CPU to reclaim the old apicd->prev_vector because the interrupt isn't currently affine to the outgoing CPU, and irq_needs_fixup() returns false. Even though __vector_schedule_cleanup() is later called on the new CPU, it doesn't reclaim apicd->prev_vector; instead, it simply resets both apicd->move_in_progress and apicd->prev_vector to 0.
As a result, the vector remains unreclaimed in vector_matrix, leading to a CPU vector leak.
To address this issue, move the invocation of irq_force_complete_move() before the irq_needs_fixup() call to reclaim apicd->prev_vector, if the interrupt is currently or used to be affine to the outgoing CPU.
Additionally, reclaim the vector in __vector_schedule_cleanup() as well, following a warning message, although theoretically it should never see apicd->move_in_progress with apicd->prev_cpu pointing to an offline CPU.
--- arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c | 9 ++++++--- kernel/irq/cpuhotplug.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c +6 -3
@@ -913,7 +913,8 @@ static void __send_cleanup_vector(structhlist_add_head (&apicd->clist,per_cpu_ptr (&cleanup_list, cpu)); apic->send_IPI (cpu,IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR ); }else { - apicd->prev_vector =0 ; +pr_warn ("IRQ %u schedule cleanup for offline CPU %u\n" , apicd->irq, cpu); +free_moved_vector (apicd); }raw_spin_unlock (&vector_lock); }
@@ -949,6 +950,7 @@ void irq_complete_move(struct irq_cfg *c*/ void irq_force_complete_move (struct irq_desc *desc) { +unsigned int cpu =smp_processor_id ();struct apic_chip_data *apicd;struct irq_data *irqd;unsigned int vector;
@@ -973,10 +975,11 @@ void irq_force_complete_move(struct irq_ goto unlock;/* -* If prev_vector is empty, no action required. +* If prev_vector is empty or the descriptor is neither currently +* nor previously on the outgoing CPU no action required. */ vector = apicd->prev_vector; -if (!vector) +if (!vector || (apicd->cpu != cpu && apicd->prev_cpu != cpu)) goto unlock;/*
kernel/irq/cpuhotplug.c +8 -8
@@ -69,6 +69,14 @@ static bool migrate_one_irq(struct irq_d }/* +* Complete an eventually pending irq move cleanup. If this +* interrupt was moved in hard irq context, then the vectors need +* to be cleaned up. It can't wait until this interrupt actually +* happens and this CPU was involved. +*/ +irq_force_complete_move (desc); + +/* * No move required, if: * - Interrupt is per cpu * - Interrupt is not started
@@ -87,14 +95,6 @@ static bool migrate_one_irq(struct irq_d }/* -* Complete an eventually pending irq move cleanup. If this -* interrupt was moved in hard irq context, then the vectors need -* to be cleaned up. It can't wait until this interrupt actually -* happens and this CPU was involved. -*/ -irq_force_complete_move (desc); - -/* * If there is a setaffinity pending, then try to reuse the pending * mask, so the last change of the affinity does not get lost. If * there is no move pending or the pending mask does not contain
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 164/202 SUNRPC: Fix loop termination condition in gss_free_in_token_pages()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>
commit 4a77c3dead97339478c7422eb07bf4bf63577008 upstream.
The in_token->pages[] array is not NULL terminated. This results in the following KASAN splat:
KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x04a2013400000008-0x04a201340000000f]
--- net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c +1 -1
@@ -1104,7 +1104,7 @@ static int gss_read_proxy_verf(struct sv } pages =DIV_ROUND_UP (inlen,PAGE_SIZE ); - in_token->pages =kcalloc (pages,sizeof (struct page *),GFP_KERNEL ); + in_token->pages =kcalloc (pages +1 ,sizeof (struct page *),GFP_KERNEL );if (!in_token->pages) {kfree (in_handle->data);return SVC_DENIED ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 165/202 binder: fix max_thread type inconsistency
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Carlos Llamas <[email protected]>
commit 42316941335644a98335f209daafa4c122f28983 upstream.
The type defined for the BINDER_SET_MAX_THREADS ioctl was changed from size_t to __u32 in order to avoid incompatibility issues between 32 and 64-bit kernels. However, the internal types used to copy from user and store the value were never updated. Use u32 to fix the inconsistency.
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +2 -2
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ struct binder_proc {struct list_head todo;struct binder_stats stats;struct list_head delivered_death; -int max_threads; +u32 max_threads;int requested_threads;int requested_threads_started;int tmp_ref;
@@ -5412,7 +5412,7 @@ static long binder_ioctl(struct file *fi goto err;break ;case BINDER_SET_MAX_THREADS : { -int max_threads; +u32 max_threads;if (copy_from_user (&max_threads, ubuf,sizeof (max_threads))) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 166/202 mmc: core: Do not force a retune before RPMB switch
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz <[email protected]>
commit 67380251e8bbd3302c64fea07f95c31971b91c22 upstream.
Requesting a retune before switching to the RPMB partition has been observed to cause CRC errors on the RPMB reads (-EILSEQ).
Since RPMB reads can not be retried, the clients would be directly affected by the errors.
This commit disables the retune request prior to switching to the RPMB
partition: mmc_retune_pause() no longer triggers a retune before the pause period begins.
This was verified with the sdhci-of-arasan driver (ZynqMP) configured for HS200 using two separate eMMC cards (DG4064 and 064GB2). In both cases, the error was easy to reproduce triggering every few tenths of reads.
With this commit, systems that were utilizing OP-TEE to access RPMB variables will experience an enhanced performance. Specifically, when OP-TEE is configured to employ RPMB as a secure storage solution, it not only writes the data but also the secure filesystem within the partition. As a result, retrieving any variable involves multiple RPMB reads, typically around five.
For context, on ZynqMP, each retune request consumed approximately 8ms. Consequently, reading any RPMB variable used to take at the very minimum 40ms.
After droping the need to retune before switching to the RPMB partition, this is no longer the case.
--- drivers/mmc/core/host.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/mmc/core/host.c +1 -2
@@ -111,13 +111,12 @@ void mmc_retune_enable(struct mmc_host */* * Pause re-tuning for a small set of operations. The pause begins after the -* next command and after first doing re-tuning. +* next command. */ void mmc_retune_pause (struct mmc_host *host) {if (!host->retune_paused) { host->retune_paused =1 ; -mmc_retune_needed (host);mmc_retune_hold (host); } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 167/202 io_uring: fail NOP if non-zero op flags is passed in
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
commit 3d8f874bd620ce03f75a5512847586828ab86544 upstream.
The NOP op flags should have been checked from beginning like any other opcode, otherwise NOP may not be extended with the op flags.
Given both liburing and Rust io-uring crate always zeros SQE op flags, just ignore users which play raw NOP uring interface without zeroing SQE, because NOP is just for test purpose. Then we can save one NOP2 opcode.
--- fs/io_uring.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
fs/io_uring.c +2 -0
@@ -2112,6 +2112,8 @@ static int __io_submit_sqe(struct io_rinswitch (req->submit.opcode) {case IORING_OP_NOP : +if (READ_ONCE (s->sqe->rw_flags)) +return -EINVAL ; ret =io_nop (req, req->user_data);break ;case IORING_OP_READV :
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 168/202 afs: Dont cross .backup mountpoint from backup volume
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Marc Dionne <[email protected]>
commit 29be9100aca2915fab54b5693309bc42956542e5 upstream.
Don't cross a mountpoint that explicitly specifies a backup volume (target is <vol>.backup) when starting from a backup volume.
It it not uncommon to mount a volume's backup directly in the volume itself. This can cause tools that are not paying attention to get into a loop mounting the volume onto itself as they attempt to traverse the tree, leading to a variety of problems.
This doesn't prevent the general case of loops in a sequence of mountpoints, but addresses a common special case in the same way as other afs clients.
--- fs/afs/mntpt.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
fs/afs/mntpt.c +5 -0
@@ -146,6 +146,11 @@ static int afs_mntpt_set_params(struct fput_page (page);if (ret <0 )return ret; + +/* Don't cross a backup volume mountpoint from a backup volume */ +if (src_as->volume && src_as->volume->type ==AFSVL_BACKVOL && + ctx->type ==AFSVL_BACKVOL ) +return -ENODEV ; }return 0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 169/202 nilfs2: fix use-after-free of timer for log writer thread
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ryusuke Konishi <[email protected]>
commit f5d4e04634c9cf68bdf23de08ada0bb92e8befe7 upstream.
Patch series "nilfs2: fix log writer related issues".
This bug fix series covers three nilfs2 log writer-related issues, including a timer use-after-free issue and potential deadlock issue on unmount, and a potential freeze issue in event synchronization found during their analysis. Details are described in each commit log.
This patch (of 3):
A use-after-free issue has been reported regarding the timer sc_timer on the nilfs_sc_info structure.
The problem is that even though it is used to wake up a sleeping log writer thread, sc_timer is not shut down until the nilfs_sc_info structure is about to be freed, and is used regardless of the thread's lifetime.
Fix this issue by limiting the use of sc_timer only while the log writer thread is alive.
--- fs/nilfs2/segment.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/nilfs2/segment.c +19 -6
@@ -2159,8 +2159,10 @@ static void nilfs_segctor_start_timer(st {spin_lock (&sci->sc_state_lock);if (!(sci->sc_state &NILFS_SEGCTOR_COMMIT )) { - sci->sc_timer.expires = jiffies + sci->sc_interval; -add_timer (&sci->sc_timer); +if (sci->sc_task) { + sci->sc_timer.expires = jiffies + sci->sc_interval; +add_timer (&sci->sc_timer); + } sci->sc_state |=NILFS_SEGCTOR_COMMIT ; }spin_unlock (&sci->sc_state_lock);
@@ -2380,10 +2382,21 @@ int nilfs_construct_dsync_segment(struct*/ static void nilfs_segctor_accept (struct nilfs_sc_info *sci) { +bool thread_is_alive; +spin_lock (&sci->sc_state_lock); sci->sc_seq_accepted = sci->sc_seq_request; + thread_is_alive = (bool )sci->sc_task;spin_unlock (&sci->sc_state_lock); -del_timer_sync (&sci->sc_timer); + +/* +* This function does not race with the log writer thread's +* termination. Therefore, deleting sc_timer, which should not be +* done after the log writer thread exits, can be done safely outside +* the area protected by sc_state_lock. +*/ +if (thread_is_alive) +del_timer_sync (&sci->sc_timer); }/**
@@ -2409,7 +2422,7 @@ static void nilfs_segctor_notify(struct sci->sc_flush_request &= ~FLUSH_DAT_BIT ;/* re-enable timer if checkpoint creation was not done */ -if ((sci->sc_state &NILFS_SEGCTOR_COMMIT ) && +if ((sci->sc_state &NILFS_SEGCTOR_COMMIT ) && sci->sc_task &&time_before (jiffies, sci->sc_timer.expires))add_timer (&sci->sc_timer); }
@@ -2599,6 +2612,7 @@ static int nilfs_segctor_thread(void *arint timeout =0 ; sci->sc_timer_task = current; +timer_setup (&sci->sc_timer, nilfs_construction_timeout,0 );/* start sync. */ sci->sc_task = current;
@@ -2665,6 +2679,7 @@ static int nilfs_segctor_thread(void *ar end_thread:/* end sync. */ sci->sc_task =NULL ; +del_timer_sync (&sci->sc_timer);wake_up (&sci->sc_wait_task);/* for nilfs_segctor_kill_thread() */ spin_unlock (&sci->sc_state_lock);return 0 ;
@@ -2728,7 +2743,6 @@ static struct nilfs_sc_info *nilfs_segctINIT_LIST_HEAD (&sci->sc_gc_inodes);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&sci->sc_iput_queue);INIT_WORK (&sci->sc_iput_work, nilfs_iput_work_func); -timer_setup (&sci->sc_timer, nilfs_construction_timeout,0 ); sci->sc_interval =HZ *NILFS_SC_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT ; sci->sc_mjcp_freq =HZ *NILFS_SC_DEFAULT_SR_FREQ ;
@@ -2814,7 +2828,6 @@ static void nilfs_segctor_destroy(structdown_write (&nilfs->ns_segctor_sem); -del_timer_sync (&sci->sc_timer);kfree (sci); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 170/202 vxlan: Fix regression when dropping packets due to invalid src addresses
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>
commit 1cd4bc987abb2823836cbb8f887026011ccddc8a upstream.
Commit f58f45c1e5b9 ("vxlan: drop packets from invalid src-address") has recently been added to vxlan mainly in the context of source address snooping/learning so that when it is enabled, an entry in the FDB is not being created for an invalid address for the corresponding tunnel endpoint.
Before commit f58f45c1e5b9 vxlan was similarly behaving as geneve in that it passed through whichever macs were set in the L2 header. It turns out that this change in behavior breaks setups, for example, Cilium with netkit in L3 mode for Pods as well as tunnel mode has been passing before the change in f58f45c1e5b9 for both vxlan and geneve. After mentioned change it is only passing for geneve as in case of vxlan packets are dropped due to vxlan_set_mac() returning false as source and destination macs are zero which for E/W traffic via tunnel is totally fine.
Fix it by only opting into the is_valid_ether_addr() check in vxlan_set_mac() when in fact source address snooping/learning is actually enabled in vxlan. This is done by moving the check into vxlan_snoop(). With this change, the Cilium connectivity test suite passes again for both tunnel flavors.
[ Backport note: vxlan snooping/learning not supported in 6.8 or older,
so commit is simply a revert. ]
--- drivers/net/vxlan.c | 4 ---- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
drivers/net/vxlan.c +0 -4
@@ -1605,10 +1605,6 @@ static bool vxlan_set_mac(struct vxlan_dif (ether_addr_equal (eth_hdr (skb)->h_source, vxlan->dev->dev_addr))return false; -/* Ignore packets from invalid src-address */ -if (!is_valid_ether_addr (eth_hdr (skb)->h_source)) -return false; -/* Get address from the outer IP header */ if (vxlan_get_sk_family (vs) ==AF_INET ) { saddr.sin.sin_addr.s_addr =ip_hdr (skb)->saddr;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 171/202 x86/mm: Remove broken vsyscall emulation code from the page fault code
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
commit 02b670c1f88e78f42a6c5aee155c7b26960ca054 upstream.
The syzbot-reported stack trace from hell in this discussion thread actually has three nested page faults:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
... and I think that's actually the important thing here:
- the first page fault is from user space, and triggers the vsyscall emulation.
- the second page fault is from __do_sys_gettimeofday(), and that should just have caused the exception that then sets the return value to -EFAULT
- the third nested page fault is due to _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore() -> preempt_schedule() -> trace_sched_switch(), which then causes a BPF trace program to run, which does that bpf_probe_read_compat(), which causes that page fault under pagefault_disable().
It's quite the nasty backtrace, and there's a lot going on.
The problem is literally the vsyscall emulation, which sets
current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err = 1;
and that causes the fixup_exception() code to send the signal *despite* the exception being caught.
And I think that is in fact completely bogus. It's completely bogus exactly because it sends that signal even when it *shouldn't* be sent - like for the BPF user mode trace gathering.
In other words, I think the whole "sig_on_uaccess_err" thing is entirely broken, because it makes any nested page-faults do all the wrong things.
Now, arguably, I don't think anybody should enable vsyscall emulation any more, but this test case clearly does.
I think we should just make the "send SIGSEGV" be something that the vsyscall emulation does on its own, not this broken per-thread state for something that isn't actually per thread.
The x86 page fault code actually tried to deal with the "incorrect nesting" by having that:
if (in_interrupt())
return;which ignores the sig_on_uaccess_err case when it happens in interrupts, but as shown by this example, these nested page faults do not need to be about interrupts at all.
IOW, I think the only right thing is to remove that horrendously broken code.
The attached patch looks like the ObviouslyCorrect(tm) thing to do.
NOTE! This broken code goes back to this commit in 2011:
4fc3490114bb ("x86-64: Set siginfo and context on vsyscall emulation faults")
... and back then the reason was to get all the siginfo details right. Honestly, I do not for a moment believe that it's worth getting the siginfo details right here, but part of the commit says:
This fixes issues with UML when vsyscall=emulate.
... and so my patch to remove this garbage will probably break UML in this situation.
I do not believe that anybody should be running with vsyscall=emulate in 2024 in the first place, much less if you are doing things like UML. But let's see if somebody screams.
[gpiccoli: Backport the patch due to differences in the trees. The main changes
between 5.4.y and 5.15.y are due to renaming the fixup function, by commit 6456a2a69ee1 ("x86/fault: Rename no_context() to kernelmode_fixup_or_oops()"), and on processor.h thread_struct due to commit cf122cfba5b1 ("kill uaccess_try()"). Following 2 commits cause divergence in the diffs too (in the removed lines):
cd072dab453a ("x86/fault: Add a helper function to sanitize error code") d4ffd5df9d18 ("x86/fault: Fix wrong signal when vsyscall fails with pkey").]
--- arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 28 ++-------------------------- arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 1 - arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 27 +-------------------------- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c +2 -26
@@ -98,11 +98,6 @@ static int addr_to_vsyscall_nr(unsignedstatic bool write_ok_or_segv (unsigned long ptr,size_t size) { -/* -* XXX: if access_ok, get_user, and put_user handled -* sig_on_uaccess_err, this could go away. -*/ -if (!access_ok ((void __user *)ptr, size)) {struct thread_struct *thread = ¤t->thread;
@@ -120,10 +115,8 @@ static bool write_ok_or_segv(unsigned lobool emulate_vsyscall (unsigned long error_code,struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned long address) { -struct task_struct *tsk;unsigned long caller;int vsyscall_nr, syscall_nr, tmp; -int prev_sig_on_uaccess_err;long ret;unsigned long orig_dx;
@@ -172,8 +165,6 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(unsigned long erro goto sigsegv; } - tsk = current; -/* * Check for access_ok violations and find the syscall nr. *
@@ -233,12 +224,8 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(unsigned long erro goto do_ret;/* skip requested */ /* -* With a real vsyscall, page faults cause SIGSEGV. We want to -* preserve that behavior to make writing exploits harder. +* With a real vsyscall, page faults cause SIGSEGV. */ - prev_sig_on_uaccess_err = current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err; - current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err =1 ; - ret = -EFAULT ;switch (vsyscall_nr) {case 0 :
@@ -261,23 +248,12 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(unsigned long errobreak ; } - current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err = prev_sig_on_uaccess_err; - check_fault:if (ret == -EFAULT ) {/* Bad news -- userspace fed a bad pointer to a vsyscall. */ warn_bad_vsyscall (KERN_INFO , regs,"vsyscall fault (exploit attempt?)" ); - -/* -* If we failed to generate a signal for any reason, -* generate one here. (This should be impossible.) -*/ -if (WARN_ON_ONCE (!sigismember (&tsk->pending.signal,SIGBUS ) && - !sigismember (&tsk->pending.signal,SIGSEGV ))) - goto sigsegv; - -return true;/* Don't emulate the ret. */ + goto sigsegv; } regs->ax = ret;
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +0 -1
@@ -487,7 +487,6 @@ struct thread_struct {mm_segment_t addr_limit; - unsigned int sig_on_uaccess_err:1; unsigned int uaccess_err:1; /* uaccess failed *//* Floating point and extended processor state */
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +1 -26
@@ -743,33 +743,8 @@ no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigne }/* Are we prepared to handle this kernel fault? */ -if (fixup_exception (regs,X86_TRAP_PF , error_code, address)) { -/* -* Any interrupt that takes a fault gets the fixup. This makes -* the below recursive fault logic only apply to a faults from -* task context. -*/ -if (in_interrupt ()) -return ; - -/* -* Per the above we're !in_interrupt(), aka. task context. -* -* In this case we need to make sure we're not recursively -* faulting through the emulate_vsyscall() logic. -*/ -if (current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err && signal) { -set_signal_archinfo (address, error_code); - -/* XXX: hwpoison faults will set the wrong code. */ -force_sig_fault (signal, si_code, (void __user *)address); - } - -/* -* Barring that, we can do the fixup and be happy. -*/ +if (fixup_exception (regs,X86_TRAP_PF , error_code, address))return ; - }#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK /*
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 172/202 f2fs: fix to do sanity check on i_xattr_nid in sanity_check_inode()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>
commit 20faaf30e55522bba2b56d9c46689233205d7717 upstream.
syzbot reports a kernel bug as below:
F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 48b305e4
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_test_bit fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2933 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in current_nat_addr fs/f2fs/node.h:213 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_get_node_info+0xece/0x1200 fs/f2fs/node.c:600 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88807a58c76c by task syz-executor280/5076 CPU: 1 PID: 5076 Comm: syz-executor280 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601 f2fs_test_bit fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2933 [inline] current_nat_addr fs/f2fs/node.h:213 [inline] f2fs_get_node_info+0xece/0x1200 fs/f2fs/node.c:600 f2fs_xattr_fiemap fs/f2fs/data.c:1848 [inline] f2fs_fiemap+0x55d/0x1ee0 fs/f2fs/data.c:1925 ioctl_fiemap fs/ioctl.c:220 [inline] do_vfs_ioctl+0x1c07/0x2e50 fs/ioctl.c:838 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:902 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0x81/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
The root cause is we missed to do sanity check on i_xattr_nid during f2fs_iget(), so that in fiemap() path, current_nat_addr() will access nat_bitmap w/ offset from invalid i_xattr_nid, result in triggering kasan bug report, fix it.
--- fs/f2fs/inode.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
fs/f2fs/inode.c +6 -0
@@ -286,6 +286,12 @@ static bool sanity_check_inode(struct inreturn false; } +if (fi->i_xattr_nid &&f2fs_check_nid_range (sbi, fi->i_xattr_nid)) { +f2fs_warn (sbi,"%s: inode (ino=%lx) has corrupted i_xattr_nid: %u, run fsck to fix." , + __func__, inode->i_ino, fi->i_xattr_nid); +return false; + } +return true; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 173/202 media: lgdt3306a: Add a check against null-pointer-def
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Zheyu Ma <[email protected]>
commit c1115ddbda9c930fba0fdd062e7a8873ebaf898d upstream.
The driver should check whether the client provides the platform_data.
The following log reveals it:
[ 29.610324] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in kmemdup+0x30/0x40 [ 29.610730] Read of size 40 at addr 0000000000000000 by task bash/414 [ 29.612820] Call Trace: [ 29.613030] <TASK> [ 29.613201] dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x6f [ 29.613496] ? kmemdup+0x30/0x40 [ 29.613754] print_report.cold+0x494/0x6b7 [ 29.614082] ? kmemdup+0x30/0x40 [ 29.614340] kasan_report+0x8a/0x190 [ 29.614628] ? kmemdup+0x30/0x40 [ 29.614888] kasan_check_range+0x14d/0x1d0 [ 29.615213] memcpy+0x20/0x60 [ 29.615454] kmemdup+0x30/0x40 [ 29.615700] lgdt3306a_probe+0x52/0x310 [ 29.616339] i2c_device_probe+0x951/0xa90
--- drivers/media/dvb-frontends/lgdt3306a.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/lgdt3306a.c +5 -0
@@ -2199,6 +2199,11 @@ static int lgdt3306a_probe(struct i2c_clstruct dvb_frontend *fe;int ret; +if (!client->dev.platform_data) { +dev_err (&client->dev,"platform data is mandatory\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + config =kmemdup (client->dev.platform_data,sizeof (struct lgdt3306a_config ),GFP_KERNEL );if (config ==NULL ) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 174/202 drm/amdgpu: add error handle to avoid out-of-bounds
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bob Zhou <[email protected]>
commit 8b2faf1a4f3b6c748c0da36cda865a226534d520 upstream.
if the sdma_v4_0_irq_id_to_seq return -EINVAL, the process should be stop to avoid out-of-bounds read, so directly return -EINVAL.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/sdma_v4_0.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/sdma_v4_0.c +3 -0
@@ -2007,6 +2007,9 @@ static int sdma_v4_0_process_trap_irq(stDRM_DEBUG ("IH: SDMA trap\n" ); instance =sdma_v4_0_irq_id_to_seq (entry->client_id); +if (instance <0 ) +return instance; +switch (entry->ring_id) {case 0 :amdgpu_fence_process (&adev->sdma.instance[instance].ring);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 175/202 ata: pata_legacy: make legacy_exit() work again
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sergey Shtylyov <[email protected]>
commit d4a89339f17c87c4990070e9116462d16e75894f upstream.
Commit defc9cd826e4 ("pata_legacy: resychronize with upstream changes and resubmit") missed to update legacy_exit(), so that it now fails to do any cleanup -- the loop body there can never be entered. Fix that and finally remove now useless nr_legacy_host variable...
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with the Svace static analysis tool.
--- drivers/ata/pata_legacy.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/ata/pata_legacy.c +4 -4
@@ -114,8 +114,6 @@ static int legacy_port[NR_HOST] = { 0x1fstatic struct legacy_probe probe_list[NR_HOST ];static struct legacy_data legacy_data[NR_HOST ];static struct ata_host *legacy_host[NR_HOST ]; -static int nr_legacy_host; -static int probe_all;/* Set to check all ISA port ranges */ static int ht6560a;/* HT 6560A on primary 1, second 2, both 3 */
@@ -1239,9 +1237,11 @@ static __exit void legacy_exit(void) {int i; -for (i =0 ; i < nr_legacy_host; i++) { +for (i =0 ; i <NR_HOST ; i++) {struct legacy_data *ld = &legacy_data[i]; -ata_host_detach (legacy_host[i]); + +if (legacy_host[i]) +ata_host_detach (legacy_host[i]);platform_device_unregister (ld->platform_dev); } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 176/202 ACPI: resource: Do IRQ override on TongFang GXxHRXx and GMxHGxx
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christoffer Sandberg <[email protected]>
commit c81bf14f9db68311c2e75428eea070d97d603975 upstream.
Listed devices need the override for the keyboard to work.
--- drivers/acpi/resource.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
drivers/acpi/resource.c +12 -0
@@ -475,6 +475,18 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id asus_l DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "B2502CBA"), }, }, + { +/* TongFang GXxHRXx/TUXEDO InfinityBook Pro Gen9 AMD */ + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "GXxHRXx"), + }, + }, + { +/* TongFang GMxHGxx/TUXEDO Stellaris Slim Gen1 AMD */ + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "GMxHGxx"), + }, + }, { } };
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 177/202 arm64: tegra: Correct Tegra132 I2C alias
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>
commit 2633c58e1354d7de2c8e7be8bdb6f68a0a01bad7 upstream.
There is no such device as "as3722@40", because its name is "pmic". Use phandles for aliases to fix relying on full node path. This corrects aliases for RTC devices and also fixes dtc W=1 warning:
tegra132-norrin.dts:12.3-36: Warning (alias_paths): /aliases:rtc0: aliases property is not a valid node (/i2c@7000d000/as3722@40)
--- arch/arm64/boot/dts/nvidia/tegra132-norrin.dts | 4 ++-- arch/arm64/boot/dts/nvidia/tegra132.dtsi | 2 +- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/boot/dts/nvidia/tegra132-norrin.dts +2 -2
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ compatible = "nvidia,norrin", "nvidia,tegra132", "nvidia,tegra124"; aliases { - rtc0 = "/i2c@7000d000/as3722@40"; - rtc1 = "/rtc@7000e000"; + rtc0 = &as3722; + rtc1 = &tegra_rtc; serial0 = &uarta; };
arch/arm64/boot/dts/nvidia/tegra132.dtsi +1 -1
@@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ status = "disabled"; }; - rtc@7000e000 { + tegra_rtc: rtc@7000e000 { compatible = "nvidia,tegra124-rtc", "nvidia,tegra20-rtc"; reg = <0x0 0x7000e000 0x0 0x100>; interrupts = <GIC_SPI 2 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 178/202 md/raid5: fix deadlock that raid5d() wait for itself to clear MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yu Kuai <[email protected]>
commit 151f66bb618d1fd0eeb84acb61b4a9fa5d8bb0fa upstream.
Xiao reported that lvm2 test lvconvert-raid-takeover.sh can hang with small possibility, the root cause is exactly the same as commit bed9e27baf52 ("Revert "md/raid5: Wait for MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING in raid5d"")
However, Dan reported another hang after that, and junxiao investigated the problem and found out that this is caused by plugged bio can't issue from raid5d().
Current implementation in raid5d() has a weird dependence:
1) md_check_recovery() from raid5d() must hold 'reconfig_mutex' to clear MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING;
2) raid5d() handles IO in a deadloop, until all IO are issued;
3) IO from raid5d() must wait for MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING to be cleared;
This behaviour is introduce before v2.6, and for consequence, if other context hold 'reconfig_mutex', and md_check_recovery() can't update super_block, then raid5d() will waste one cpu 100% by the deadloop, until 'reconfig_mutex' is released.
Refer to the implementation from raid1 and raid10, fix this problem by skipping issue IO if MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING is still set after md_check_recovery(), daemon thread will be woken up when 'reconfig_mutex' is released. Meanwhile, the hang problem will be fixed as well.
--- drivers/md/raid5.c | 15 +++------------ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/md/raid5.c +3 -12
@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@*/ #include <linux/blkdev.h> -#include <linux/delay.h> #include <linux/kthread.h> #include <linux/raid/pq.h> #include <linux/async_tx.h>
@@ -6299,6 +6298,9 @@ static void raid5d(struct md_thread *thrint batch_size, released;unsigned int offset; +if (test_bit (MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING , &mddev->sb_flags)) +break ; + released =release_stripe_list (conf, conf->temp_inactive_list);if (released)clear_bit (R5_DID_ALLOC , &conf->cache_state);
@@ -6335,18 +6337,7 @@ static void raid5d(struct md_thread *thrspin_unlock_irq (&conf->device_lock);md_check_recovery (mddev);spin_lock_irq (&conf->device_lock); - -/* -* Waiting on MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING below may deadlock -* seeing md_check_recovery() is needed to clear -* the flag when using mdmon. -*/ -continue ; } - -wait_event_lock_irq (mddev->sb_wait, - !test_bit (MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING , &mddev->sb_flags), - conf->device_lock); }pr_debug ("%d stripes handled\n" , handled);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 179/202 wifi: rtl8xxxu: Fix the TX power of RTL8192CU, RTL8723AU
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bitterblue Smith <[email protected]>
commit 08b5d052d17a89bb8706b2888277d0b682dc1610 upstream.
Don't subtract 1 from the power index. This was added in commit 2fc0b8e5a17d ("rtl8xxxu: Add TX power base values for gen1 parts") for unknown reasons. The vendor drivers don't do this.
Also correct the calculations of values written to REG_OFDM0_X{C,D}_TX_IQ_IMBALANCE. According to the vendor driver, these are used for TX power training.
With these changes rtl8xxxu sets the TX power of RTL8192CU the same as the vendor driver.
None of this appears to have any effect on my RTL8192CU device.
--- drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl8xxxu/rtl8xxxu_core.c | 26 +++++++----------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl8xxxu/rtl8xxxu_core.c +11 -15
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@#include <linux/wireless.h> #include <linux/firmware.h> #include <linux/moduleparam.h> +#include <linux/bitfield.h> #include <net/mac80211.h> #include "rtl8xxxu.h" #include "rtl8xxxu_regs.h"
@@ -1390,13 +1391,13 @@ rtl8xxxu_gen1_set_tx_power(struct rtl8xxu8 cck[RTL8723A_MAX_RF_PATHS ], ofdm[RTL8723A_MAX_RF_PATHS ];u8 ofdmbase[RTL8723A_MAX_RF_PATHS ], mcsbase[RTL8723A_MAX_RF_PATHS ];u32 val32, ofdm_a, ofdm_b, mcs_a, mcs_b; -u8 val8; +u8 val8, base;int group, i; group =rtl8xxxu_gen1_channel_to_group (channel); - cck[0 ] = priv->cck_tx_power_index_A[group] -1 ; - cck[1 ] = priv->cck_tx_power_index_B[group] -1 ; + cck[0 ] = priv->cck_tx_power_index_A[group]; + cck[1 ] = priv->cck_tx_power_index_B[group];if (priv->hi_pa) {if (cck[0 ] >0x20 )
@@ -1407,10 +1408,6 @@ rtl8xxxu_gen1_set_tx_power(struct rtl8xx ofdm[0 ] = priv->ht40_1s_tx_power_index_A[group]; ofdm[1 ] = priv->ht40_1s_tx_power_index_B[group]; -if (ofdm[0 ]) - ofdm[0 ] -=1 ; -if (ofdm[1 ]) - ofdm[1 ] -=1 ; ofdmbase[0 ] = ofdm[0 ] + priv->ofdm_tx_power_index_diff[group].a; ofdmbase[1 ] = ofdm[1 ] + priv->ofdm_tx_power_index_diff[group].b;
@@ -1499,20 +1496,19 @@ rtl8xxxu_gen1_set_tx_power(struct rtl8xxrtl8xxxu_write32 (priv,REG_TX_AGC_A_MCS15_MCS12 , mcs_a + power_base->reg_0e1c); + val8 =u32_get_bits (mcs_a + power_base->reg_0e1c,0xff000000 );for (i =0 ; i <3 ; i++) { -if (i !=2 ) - val8 = (mcsbase[0 ] >8 ) ? (mcsbase[0 ] -8 ) :0 ; -else - val8 = (mcsbase[0 ] >6 ) ? (mcsbase[0 ] -6 ) :0 ; + base = i !=2 ?8 :6 ; + val8 =max_t (int, val8 - base,0 );rtl8xxxu_write8 (priv,REG_OFDM0_XC_TX_IQ_IMBALANCE + i, val8); } +rtl8xxxu_write32 (priv,REG_TX_AGC_B_MCS15_MCS12 , mcs_b + power_base->reg_0868); + val8 =u32_get_bits (mcs_b + power_base->reg_0868,0xff000000 );for (i =0 ; i <3 ; i++) { -if (i !=2 ) - val8 = (mcsbase[1 ] >8 ) ? (mcsbase[1 ] -8 ) :0 ; -else - val8 = (mcsbase[1 ] >6 ) ? (mcsbase[1 ] -6 ) :0 ; + base = i !=2 ?8 :6 ; + val8 =max_t (int, val8 - base,0 );rtl8xxxu_write8 (priv,REG_OFDM0_XD_TX_IQ_IMBALANCE + i, val8); } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 180/202 arm64: dts: hi3798cv200: fix the size of GICR
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yang Xiwen <[email protected]>
commit 428a575dc9038846ad259466d5ba109858c0a023 upstream.
During boot, Linux kernel complains:
[ 0.000000] GIC: GICv2 detected, but range too small and irqchip.gicv2_force_probe not set
This SoC is using a regular GIC-400 and the GICR space size should be 8KB rather than 256B.
With this patch:
[ 0.000000] GIC: Using split EOI/Deactivate mode
So this should be the correct fix.
--- arch/arm64/boot/dts/hisilicon/hi3798cv200.dtsi | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/boot/dts/hisilicon/hi3798cv200.dtsi +1 -1
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ gic: interrupt-controller@f1001000 { compatible = "arm,gic-400"; reg = <0x0 0xf1001000 0x0 0x1000>, /* GICD */ - <0x0 0xf1002000 0x0 0x100>; /* GICC */ + <0x0 0xf1002000 0x0 0x2000>; /* GICC */ #address-cells = <0>; #interrupt-cells = <3>; interrupt-controller;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 181/202 media: mc: mark the media devnode as registered from the, start
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
commit 4bc60736154bc9e0e39d3b88918f5d3762ebe5e0 upstream.
First the media device node was created, and if successful it was marked as 'registered'. This leaves a small race condition where an application can open the device node and get an error back because the 'registered' flag was not yet set.
Change the order: first set the 'registered' flag, then actually register the media device node. If that fails, then clear the flag.
--- drivers/media/mc/mc-devnode.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/media/mc/mc-devnode.c +2 -3
@@ -246,15 +246,14 @@ int __must_check media_devnode_register(kobject_set_name (&devnode->cdev.kobj,"media%d" , devnode->minor);/* Part 3: Add the media and char device */ +set_bit (MEDIA_FLAG_REGISTERED , &devnode->flags); ret =cdev_device_add (&devnode->cdev, &devnode->dev);if (ret <0 ) { +clear_bit (MEDIA_FLAG_REGISTERED , &devnode->flags);pr_err ("%s: cdev_device_add failed\n" , __func__); goto cdev_add_error; } -/* Part 4: Activate this minor. The char device can now be used. */ -set_bit (MEDIA_FLAG_REGISTERED , &devnode->flags); -return 0 ; cdev_add_error:
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 182/202 media: mxl5xx: Move xpt structures off stack
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
commit 526f4527545b2d4ce0733733929fac7b6da09ac6 upstream.
When building for LoongArch with clang 18.0.0, the stack usage of probe() is larger than the allowed 2048 bytes:
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/mxl5xx.c:1698:12: warning: stack frame size (2368) exceeds limit (2048) in 'probe' [-Wframe-larger-than]
1698 | static int probe(struct mxl *state, struct mxl5xx_cfg *cfg)
| ^
1 warning generated.
This is the result of the linked LLVM commit, which changes how the arrays of structures in config_ts() get handled with CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ZERO and CONFIG_INIT_STACK_PATTERN, which causes the above warning in combination with inlining, as config_ts() gets inlined into probe().
This warning can be easily fixed by moving the array of structures off of the stackvia 'static const', which is a better location for these variables anyways because they are static data that is only ever read from, never modified, so allocating the stack space is wasteful.
This drops the stack usage from 2368 bytes to 256 bytes with the same compiler and configuration.
--- drivers/media/dvb-frontends/mxl5xx.c | 22 +++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/mxl5xx.c +11 -11
@@ -1391,57 +1391,57 @@ static int config_ts(struct mxl *state,u32 nco_count_min =0 ;u32 clk_type =0 ; -struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_sync_polarity[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX ] = { +static const struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_sync_polarity[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX ] = { {0x90700010 ,8 ,1 }, {0x90700010 ,9 ,1 }, {0x90700010 ,10 ,1 }, {0x90700010 ,11 ,1 }, {0x90700010 ,12 ,1 }, {0x90700010 ,13 ,1 }, {0x90700010 ,14 ,1 }, {0x90700010 ,15 ,1 } }; -struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_clock_polarity[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX ] = { +static const struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_clock_polarity[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX ] = { {0x90700010 ,16 ,1 }, {0x90700010 ,17 ,1 }, {0x90700010 ,18 ,1 }, {0x90700010 ,19 ,1 }, {0x90700010 ,20 ,1 }, {0x90700010 ,21 ,1 }, {0x90700010 ,22 ,1 }, {0x90700010 ,23 ,1 } }; -struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_valid_polarity[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX ] = { +static const struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_valid_polarity[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX ] = { {0x90700014 ,0 ,1 }, {0x90700014 ,1 ,1 }, {0x90700014 ,2 ,1 }, {0x90700014 ,3 ,1 }, {0x90700014 ,4 ,1 }, {0x90700014 ,5 ,1 }, {0x90700014 ,6 ,1 }, {0x90700014 ,7 ,1 } }; -struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_ts_clock_phase[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX ] = { +static const struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_ts_clock_phase[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX ] = { {0x90700018 ,0 ,3 }, {0x90700018 ,4 ,3 }, {0x90700018 ,8 ,3 }, {0x90700018 ,12 ,3 }, {0x90700018 ,16 ,3 }, {0x90700018 ,20 ,3 }, {0x90700018 ,24 ,3 }, {0x90700018 ,28 ,3 } }; -struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_lsb_first[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX ] = { +static const struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_lsb_first[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX ] = { {0x9070000C ,16 ,1 }, {0x9070000C ,17 ,1 }, {0x9070000C ,18 ,1 }, {0x9070000C ,19 ,1 }, {0x9070000C ,20 ,1 }, {0x9070000C ,21 ,1 }, {0x9070000C ,22 ,1 }, {0x9070000C ,23 ,1 } }; -struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_sync_byte[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX ] = { +static const struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_sync_byte[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX ] = { {0x90700010 ,0 ,1 }, {0x90700010 ,1 ,1 }, {0x90700010 ,2 ,1 }, {0x90700010 ,3 ,1 }, {0x90700010 ,4 ,1 }, {0x90700010 ,5 ,1 }, {0x90700010 ,6 ,1 }, {0x90700010 ,7 ,1 } }; -struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_enable_output[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX ] = { +static const struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_enable_output[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX ] = { {0x9070000C ,0 ,1 }, {0x9070000C ,1 ,1 }, {0x9070000C ,2 ,1 }, {0x9070000C ,3 ,1 }, {0x9070000C ,4 ,1 }, {0x9070000C ,5 ,1 }, {0x9070000C ,6 ,1 }, {0x9070000C ,7 ,1 } }; -struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_err_replace_sync[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX ] = { +static const struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_err_replace_sync[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX ] = { {0x9070000C ,24 ,1 }, {0x9070000C ,25 ,1 }, {0x9070000C ,26 ,1 }, {0x9070000C ,27 ,1 }, {0x9070000C ,28 ,1 }, {0x9070000C ,29 ,1 }, {0x9070000C ,30 ,1 }, {0x9070000C ,31 ,1 } }; -struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_err_replace_valid[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX ] = { +static const struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_err_replace_valid[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX ] = { {0x90700014 ,8 ,1 }, {0x90700014 ,9 ,1 }, {0x90700014 ,10 ,1 }, {0x90700014 ,11 ,1 }, {0x90700014 ,12 ,1 }, {0x90700014 ,13 ,1 }, {0x90700014 ,14 ,1 }, {0x90700014 ,15 ,1 } }; -struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_continuous_clock[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX ] = { +static const struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_continuous_clock[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX ] = { {0x907001D4 ,0 ,1 }, {0x907001D4 ,1 ,1 }, {0x907001D4 ,2 ,1 }, {0x907001D4 ,3 ,1 }, {0x907001D4 ,4 ,1 }, {0x907001D4 ,5 ,1 }, {0x907001D4 ,6 ,1 }, {0x907001D4 ,7 ,1 } }; -struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_nco_clock_rate[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX ] = { +static const struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_nco_clock_rate[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX ] = { {0x90700044 ,16 ,80 }, {0x90700044 ,16 ,81 }, {0x90700044 ,16 ,82 }, {0x90700044 ,16 ,83 }, {0x90700044 ,16 ,84 }, {0x90700044 ,16 ,85 },
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 183/202 media: v4l2-core: hold videodev_lock until dev reg, finishes
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>
commit 1ed4477f2ea4743e7c5e1f9f3722152d14e6eeb1 upstream.
After the new V4L2 device node was registered, some additional initialization was done before the device node was marked as 'registered'. During the time between creating the device node and marking it as 'registered' it was possible to open the device node, which would return -ENODEV since the 'registered' flag was not yet set.
Hold the videodev_lock mutex from just before the device node is registered until the 'registered' flag is set. Since v4l2_open will take the same lock, it will wait until this registration process is finished. This resolves this race condition.
--- drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-dev.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-dev.c +3 -0
@@ -1011,8 +1011,10 @@ int __video_register_device(struct video vdev->dev.devt =MKDEV (VIDEO_MAJOR , vdev->minor); vdev->dev.parent = vdev->dev_parent;dev_set_name (&vdev->dev,"%s%d" , name_base, vdev->num); +mutex_lock (&videodev_lock); ret =device_register (&vdev->dev);if (ret <0 ) { +mutex_unlock (&videodev_lock);pr_err ("%s: device_register failed\n" , __func__); goto cleanup; }
@@ -1032,6 +1034,7 @@ int __video_register_device(struct video/* Part 6: Activate this minor. The char device can now be used. */ set_bit (V4L2_FL_REGISTERED , &vdev->flags); +mutex_unlock (&videodev_lock);return 0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 184/202 fbdev: savage: Handle err return when savagefb_check_var failed
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cai Xinchen <[email protected]>
commit 6ad959b6703e2c4c5d7af03b4cfd5ff608036339 upstream.
The commit 04e5eac8f3ab("fbdev: savage: Error out if pixclock equals zero") checks the value of pixclock to avoid divide-by-zero error. However the function savagefb_probe doesn't handle the error return of savagefb_check_var. When pixclock is 0, it will cause divide-by-zero error.
--- drivers/video/fbdev/savage/savagefb_driver.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/video/fbdev/savage/savagefb_driver.c +4 -1
@@ -2273,7 +2273,10 @@ static int savagefb_probe(struct pci_devif (info->var.xres_virtual >0x1000 ) info->var.xres_virtual =0x1000 ;#endif -savagefb_check_var (&info->var, info); + err =savagefb_check_var (&info->var, info); +if (err) + goto failed; +savagefb_set_fix (info);/*
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 185/202 KVM: arm64: Allow AArch32 PSTATE.M to be restored as System mode
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
commit dfe6d190f38fc5df5ff2614b463a5195a399c885 upstream.
It appears that we don't allow a vcpu to be restored in AArch32 System mode, as we *never* included it in the list of valid modes.
Just add it to the list of allowed modes.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c +1 -0
@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ static int set_core_reg(struct kvm_vcpucase PSR_AA32_MODE_SVC :case PSR_AA32_MODE_ABT :case PSR_AA32_MODE_UND : +case PSR_AA32_MODE_SYS :if (!vcpu_el1_is_32bit (vcpu))return -EINVAL ;break ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 186/202 crypto: ecrdsa - Fix module auto-load on add_key
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vitaly Chikunov <[email protected]>
commit eb5739a1efbc9ff216271aeea0ebe1c92e5383e5 upstream.
Add module alias with the algorithm cra_name similar to what we have for RSA-related and other algorithms.
The kernel attempts to modprobe asymmetric algorithms using the names "crypto-$cra_name" and "crypto-$cra_name-all." However, since these aliases are currently missing, the modules are not loaded. For instance, when using the add_key function, the hash algorithm is typically loaded automatically, but the asymmetric algorithm is not.
Steps to test:
1. Cert is generated usings ima-evm-utils test suite with gen-keys.sh, example cert is provided below:
$ base64 -d >test-gost2012_512-A.cer <<EOF MIIB/DCCAWagAwIBAgIUK8+whWevr3FFkSdU9GLDAM7ure8wDAYIKoUDBwEBAwMFADARMQ8wDQYD VQQDDAZDQSBLZXkwIBcNMjIwMjAxMjIwOTQxWhgPMjA4MjEyMDUyMjA5NDFaMBExDzANBgNVBAMM BkNBIEtleTCBoDAXBggqhQMHAQEBAjALBgkqhQMHAQIBAgEDgYQABIGALXNrTJGgeErBUOov3Cfo IrHF9fcj8UjzwGeKCkbCcINzVUbdPmCopeJRHDJEvQBX1CQUPtlwDv6ANjTTRoq5nCk9L5PPFP1H z73JIXHT0eRBDVoWy0cWDRz1mmQlCnN2HThMtEloaQI81nTlKZOcEYDtDpi5WODmjEeRNQJMdqCj UDBOMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wHQYDVR0OBBYEFCwfOITMbE9VisW1i2TYeu1tAo5QMB8GA1UdIwQY MBaAFCwfOITMbE9VisW1i2TYeu1tAo5QMAwGCCqFAwcBAQMDBQADgYEAmBfJCMTdC0/NSjz4BBiQ qDIEjomO7FEHYlkX5NGulcF8FaJW2jeyyXXtbpnub1IQ8af1KFIpwoS2e93LaaofxpWlpQLlju6m KYLOcO4xK3Whwa2hBAz9YbpUSFjvxnkS2/jpH2MsOSXuUEeCruG/RkHHB3ACef9umG6HCNQuAPY= EOF
2. Optionally, trace module requests with: trace-cmd stream -e module &
3. Trigger add_key call for the cert:
# keyctl padd asymmetric "" @u <test-gost2012_512-A.cer 939910969 # lsmod | head -3 Module Size Used by ecrdsa_generic 16384 0 streebog_generic 28672 0
--- crypto/ecrdsa.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
crypto/ecrdsa.c +1 -0
@@ -293,4 +293,5 @@ module_exit(ecrdsa_mod_fini);MODULE_LICENSE ("GPL" );MODULE_AUTHOR ("Vitaly Chikunov <[email protected]>" );MODULE_DESCRIPTION ("EC-RDSA generic algorithm" ); +MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO ("ecrdsa" );MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO ("ecrdsa-generic" );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 187/202 crypto: qat - Fix ADF_DEV_RESET_SYNC memory leak
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
commit d3b17c6d9dddc2db3670bc9be628b122416a3d26 upstream.
Using completion_done to determine whether the caller has gone away only works after a complete call. Furthermore it's still possible that the caller has not yet called wait_for_completion, resulting in another potential UAF.
Fix this by making the caller use cancel_work_sync and then freeing the memory safely.
--- drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c | 19 +++++-------------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c +5 -14
@@ -139,8 +139,7 @@ static void adf_device_reset_worker(struif (adf_dev_init (accel_dev) ||adf_dev_start (accel_dev)) {/* The device hanged and we can't restart it so stop here */ dev_err (&GET_DEV (accel_dev),"Restart device failed\n" ); -if (reset_data->mode ==ADF_DEV_RESET_ASYNC || -completion_done (&reset_data->compl)) +if (reset_data->mode ==ADF_DEV_RESET_ASYNC )kfree (reset_data);WARN (1 ,"QAT: device restart failed. Device is unusable\n" );return ;
@@ -148,16 +147,8 @@ static void adf_device_reset_worker(struadf_dev_restarted_notify (accel_dev);clear_bit (ADF_STATUS_RESTARTING , &accel_dev->status); -/* -* The dev is back alive. Notify the caller if in sync mode -* -* If device restart will take a more time than expected, -* the schedule_reset() function can timeout and exit. This can be -* detected by calling the completion_done() function. In this case -* the reset_data structure needs to be freed here. -*/ -if (reset_data->mode ==ADF_DEV_RESET_ASYNC || -completion_done (&reset_data->compl)) +/* The dev is back alive. Notify the caller if in sync mode */ +if (reset_data->mode ==ADF_DEV_RESET_ASYNC )kfree (reset_data);else complete (&reset_data->compl);
@@ -192,10 +183,10 @@ static int adf_dev_aer_schedule_reset(stif (!timeout) {dev_err (&GET_DEV (accel_dev),"Reset device timeout expired\n" ); +cancel_work_sync (&reset_data->reset_work); ret = -EFAULT ; - }else { -kfree (reset_data); } +kfree (reset_data);return ret; }return 0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 188/202 net/ipv6: Fix route deleting failure when metric equals 0
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: xu xin <[email protected]>
commit bb487272380d120295e955ad8acfcbb281b57642 upstream.
Problem
=========
After commit 67f695134703 ("ipv6: Move setting default metric for routes"), we noticed that the logic of assigning the default value of fc_metirc changed in the ioctl process. That is, when users use ioctl(fd, SIOCADDRT, rt) with a non-zero metric to add a route, then they may fail to delete a route with passing in a metric value of 0 to the kernel by ioctl(fd, SIOCDELRT, rt). But iproute can succeed in deleting it.
As a reference, when using iproute tools by netlink to delete routes with a metric parameter equals 0, like the command as follows:
ip -6 route del fe80::/64 via fe81::5054:ff:fe11:3451 dev eth0 metric 0
the user can still succeed in deleting the route entry with the smallest metric.
Root Reason
===========
After commit 67f695134703 ("ipv6: Move setting default metric for routes"), When ioctl() pass in SIOCDELRT with a zero metric, rtmsg_to_fib6_config() will set a defalut value (1024) to cfg->fc_metric in kernel, and in ip6_route_del() and the line 4074 at net/ipv3/route.c, it will check by
if (cfg->fc_metric && cfg->fc_metric != rt->fib6_metric) continue;
and the condition is true and skip the later procedure (deleting route) because cfg->fc_metric != rt->fib6_metric. But before that commit, cfg->fc_metric is still zero there, so the condition is false and it will do the following procedure (deleting).
Solution
========
In order to keep a consistent behaviour across netlink() and ioctl(), we should allow to delete a route with a metric value of 0. So we only do the default setting of fc_metric in route adding.
--- net/ipv6/route.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv6/route.c +4 -1
@@ -4341,7 +4341,7 @@ static void rtmsg_to_fib6_config(struct .fc_table = l3mdev_fib_table_by_index(net, rtmsg->rtmsg_ifindex) ? : RT6_TABLE_MAIN, .fc_ifindex = rtmsg->rtmsg_ifindex, - .fc_metric = rtmsg->rtmsg_metric ? : IP6_RT_PRIO_USER, + .fc_metric = rtmsg->rtmsg_metric, .fc_expires = rtmsg->rtmsg_info, .fc_dst_len = rtmsg->rtmsg_dst_len, .fc_src_len = rtmsg->rtmsg_src_len,
@@ -4377,6 +4377,9 @@ int ipv6_route_ioctl(struct net *net, unrtnl_lock ();switch (cmd) {case SIOCADDRT : +/* Only do the default setting of fc_metric in route adding */ +if (cfg.fc_metric ==0 ) + cfg.fc_metric =IP6_RT_PRIO_USER ; err =ip6_route_add (&cfg,GFP_KERNEL ,NULL );break ;case SIOCDELRT :
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 189/202 net/9p: fix uninit-value in p9_client_rpc()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nikita Zhandarovich <[email protected]>
commit 25460d6f39024cc3b8241b14c7ccf0d6f11a736a upstream.
Syzbot with the help of KMSAN reported the following error:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in trace_9p_client_res include/trace/events/9p.h:146 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in p9_client_rpc+0x1314/0x1340 net/9p/client.c:754 trace_9p_client_res include/trace/events/9p.h:146 [inline] p9_client_rpc+0x1314/0x1340 net/9p/client.c:754 p9_client_create+0x1551/0x1ff0 net/9p/client.c:1031 v9fs_session_init+0x1b9/0x28e0 fs/9p/v9fs.c:410 v9fs_mount+0xe2/0x12b0 fs/9p/vfs_super.c:122 legacy_get_tree+0x114/0x290 fs/fs_context.c:662 vfs_get_tree+0xa7/0x570 fs/super.c:1797 do_new_mount+0x71f/0x15e0 fs/namespace.c:3352 path_mount+0x742/0x1f20 fs/namespace.c:3679 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3692 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3898 [inline] __se_sys_mount+0x725/0x810 fs/namespace.c:3875 __x64_sys_mount+0xe4/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3875 do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
Uninit was created at:
__alloc_pages+0x9d6/0xe70 mm/page_alloc.c:4598 __alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:238 [inline] alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:261 [inline] alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:2175 [inline] allocate_slab mm/slub.c:2338 [inline] new_slab+0x2de/0x1400 mm/slub.c:2391 ___slab_alloc+0x1184/0x33d0 mm/slub.c:3525 __slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3610 [inline] __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3663 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3835 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc+0x6d3/0xbe0 mm/slub.c:3852 p9_tag_alloc net/9p/client.c:278 [inline] p9_client_prepare_req+0x20a/0x1770 net/9p/client.c:641 p9_client_rpc+0x27e/0x1340 net/9p/client.c:688 p9_client_create+0x1551/0x1ff0 net/9p/client.c:1031 v9fs_session_init+0x1b9/0x28e0 fs/9p/v9fs.c:410 v9fs_mount+0xe2/0x12b0 fs/9p/vfs_super.c:122 legacy_get_tree+0x114/0x290 fs/fs_context.c:662 vfs_get_tree+0xa7/0x570 fs/super.c:1797 do_new_mount+0x71f/0x15e0 fs/namespace.c:3352 path_mount+0x742/0x1f20 fs/namespace.c:3679 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3692 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3898 [inline] __se_sys_mount+0x725/0x810 fs/namespace.c:3875 __x64_sys_mount+0xe4/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3875 do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
If p9_check_errors() fails early in p9_client_rpc(), req->rc.tag will not be properly initialized. However, trace_9p_client_res() ends up trying to print it out anyway before p9_client_rpc() finishes.
Fix this issue by assigning default values to p9_fcall fields such as 'tag' and (just in case KMSAN unearths something new) 'id' during the tag allocation stage.
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
--- net/9p/client.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/9p/client.c +2 -0
@@ -235,6 +235,8 @@ static int p9_fcall_init(struct p9_clienif (!fc->sdata)return -ENOMEM ; fc->capacity = alloc_msize; + fc->id =0 ; + fc->tag =P9_NOTAG ;return 0 ; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 190/202 intel_th: pci: Add Meteor Lake-S CPU support
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
commit a4f813c3ec9d1c32bc402becd1f011b3904dd699 upstream.
Add support for the Trace Hub in Meteor Lake-S CPU.
--- drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/pci.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/pci.c +5 -0
@@ -290,6 +290,11 @@ static const struct pci_device_id intel_ .driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)&intel_th_2x, }, { +/* Meteor Lake-S CPU */ + PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0xae24), + .driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)&intel_th_2x, + }, + {/* Raptor Lake-S */ PCI_DEVICE (PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL ,0x7a26 ), .driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)&intel_th_2x,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 191/202 sparc64: Fix number of online CPUs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sam Ravnborg <[email protected]>
commit 98937707fea8375e8acea0aaa0b68a956dd52719 upstream.
Nick Bowler reported:
When using newer kernels on my Ultra 60 with dual 450MHz UltraSPARC-II CPUs, I noticed that only CPU 0 comes up, while older kernels (including 4.7) are working fine with both CPUs.
I bisected the failure to this commit:
9b2f753ec23710aa32c0d837d2499db92fe9115b is the first bad commit commit 9b2f753ec23710aa32c0d837d2499db92fe9115b
Author: Atish Patra <[email protected]>
Date: Thu Sep 15 14:54:40 2016 -0600
sparc64: Fix cpu_possible_mask if nr_cpus is set
This is a small change that reverts very easily on top of 5.18: there is just one trivial conflict. Once reverted, both CPUs work again.
Maybe this is related to the fact that the CPUs on this system are numbered CPU0 and CPU2 (there is no CPU1)?
The current code that adjust cpu_possible based on nr_cpu_ids do not take into account that CPU's may not come one after each other. Move the chech to the function that setup the cpu_possible mask so there is no need to adjust it later.
--- arch/sparc/include/asm/smp_64.h | 2 -- arch/sparc/kernel/prom_64.c | 4 +++- arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c | 1 - arch/sparc/kernel/smp_64.c | 14 -------------- 4 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
arch/sparc/include/asm/smp_64.h +0 -2
@@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ void arch_send_call_function_ipi_mask(coint hard_smp_processor_id (void );#define raw_smp_processor_id () (current_thread_info()->cpu) -void smp_fill_in_cpu_possible_map (void );void smp_fill_in_sib_core_maps (void );void cpu_play_dead (void );
@@ -77,7 +76,6 @@ void __cpu_die(unsigned int cpu);#define smp_fill_in_sib_core_maps () do { } while (0)#define smp_fetch_global_regs () do { } while (0)#define smp_fetch_global_pmu () do { } while (0) -#define smp_fill_in_cpu_possible_map () do { } while (0)#define smp_init_cpu_poke () do { } while (0)#define scheduler_poke () do { } while (0)
arch/sparc/kernel/prom_64.c +3 -1
@@ -483,7 +483,9 @@ static void *record_one_cpu(struct devic ncpus_probed++;#ifdef CONFIG_SMP set_cpu_present (cpuid, true); -set_cpu_possible (cpuid, true); + +if (num_possible_cpus () < nr_cpu_ids) +set_cpu_possible (cpuid, true);#endif return NULL ; }
arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c +0 -1
@@ -695,7 +695,6 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)paging_init ();init_sparc64_elf_hwcap (); -smp_fill_in_cpu_possible_map ();/* * Once the OF device tree and MDESC have been setup and nr_cpus has * been parsed, we know the list of possible cpus. Therefore we can
arch/sparc/kernel/smp_64.c +0 -14
@@ -1213,20 +1213,6 @@ void __init smp_setup_processor_id(void) xcall_deliver_impl = hypervisor_xcall_deliver; } -void __init smp_fill_in_cpu_possible_map (void ) -{ -int possible_cpus =num_possible_cpus (); -int i; - -if (possible_cpus > nr_cpu_ids) - possible_cpus = nr_cpu_ids; - -for (i =0 ; i < possible_cpus; i++) -set_cpu_possible (i, true); -for (; i <NR_CPUS ; i++) -set_cpu_possible (i, false); -} -void smp_fill_in_sib_core_maps (void ) {unsigned int i;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 192/202 kdb: Fix buffer overflow during tab-complete
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Daniel Thompson <[email protected]>
commit e9730744bf3af04cda23799029342aa3cddbc454 upstream.
Currently, when the user attempts symbol completion with the Tab key, kdb will use strncpy() to insert the completed symbol into the command buffer. Unfortunately it passes the size of the source buffer rather than the destination to strncpy() with predictably horrible results. Most obviously if the command buffer is already full but cp, the cursor position, is in the middle of the buffer, then we will write past the end of the supplied buffer.
Fix this by replacing the dubious strncpy() calls with memmove()/memcpy() calls plus explicit boundary checks to make sure we have enough space before we start moving characters around.
--- kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c | 21 +++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c +13 -8
@@ -364,14 +364,19 @@ poll_again:kdb_printf (kdb_prompt_str);kdb_printf ("%s" , buffer); }else if (tab !=2 && count >0 ) { - len_tmp =strlen (p_tmp); -strncpy (p_tmp+len_tmp, cp, lastchar-cp+1 ); - len_tmp =strlen (p_tmp); -strncpy (cp, p_tmp+len, len_tmp-len +1 ); - len = len_tmp - len; -kdb_printf ("%s" , cp); - cp += len; - lastchar += len; +/* How many new characters do we want from tmpbuffer? */ + len_tmp =strlen (p_tmp) - len; +if (lastchar + len_tmp >= bufend) + len_tmp = bufend - lastchar; + +if (len_tmp) { +/* + 1 ensures the '\0' is memmove'd */ +memmove (cp+len_tmp, cp, (lastchar-cp) +1 ); +memcpy (cp, p_tmp+len, len_tmp); +kdb_printf ("%s" , cp); + cp += len_tmp; + lastchar += len_tmp; + } } kdb_nextline =1 ;/* reset output line number */ break ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 193/202 kdb: Use format-strings rather than \0 injection in kdb_read()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Daniel Thompson <[email protected]>
commit 09b35989421dfd5573f0b4683c7700a7483c71f9 upstream.
Currently when kdb_read() needs to reposition the cursor it uses copy and paste code that works by injecting an '\0' at the cursor position before delivering a carriage-return and reprinting the line (which stops at the '\0').
Tidy up the code by hoisting the copy and paste code into an appropriately named function. Additionally let's replace the '\0' injection with a proper field width parameter so that the string will be abridged during formatting instead.
--- kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c +34 -21
@@ -170,6 +170,33 @@ static int kdb_read_get_key(char *bufferreturn key; } +/** +* kdb_position_cursor() - Place cursor in the correct horizontal position +* @prompt: Nil-terminated string containing the prompt string +* @buffer: Nil-terminated string containing the entire command line +* @cp: Cursor position, pointer the character in buffer where the cursor +* should be positioned. +* +* The cursor is positioned by sending a carriage-return and then printing +* the content of the line until we reach the correct cursor position. +* +* There is some additional fine detail here. +* +* Firstly, even though kdb_printf() will correctly format zero-width fields +* we want the second call to kdb_printf() to be conditional. That keeps things +* a little cleaner when LOGGING=1. +* +* Secondly, we can't combine everything into one call to kdb_printf() since +* that renders into a fixed length buffer and the combined print could result +* in unwanted truncation. +*/ +static void kdb_position_cursor (char *prompt,char *buffer,char *cp) +{ +kdb_printf ("\r%s" , kdb_prompt_str); +if (cp > buffer) +kdb_printf ("%.*s" , (int )(cp - buffer), buffer); +} +/* * kdb_read *
@@ -208,7 +235,6 @@ static char *kdb_read(char *buffer, size* and null byte */ char *lastchar;char *p_tmp; -char tmp;static char tmpbuffer[CMD_BUFLEN ];int len =strlen (buffer);int len_tmp;
@@ -247,12 +273,8 @@ poll_again: } *(--lastchar) ='\0' ; --cp; -kdb_printf ("\b%s \r" , cp); - tmp = *cp; - *cp ='\0' ; -kdb_printf (kdb_prompt_str); -kdb_printf ("%s" , buffer); - *cp = tmp; +kdb_printf ("\b%s " , cp); +kdb_position_cursor (kdb_prompt_str, buffer, cp); }break ;case 13 :/* enter */
@@ -269,19 +291,14 @@ poll_again:memcpy (tmpbuffer, cp+1 , lastchar - cp -1 );memcpy (cp, tmpbuffer, lastchar - cp -1 ); *(--lastchar) ='\0' ; -kdb_printf ("%s \r" , cp); - tmp = *cp; - *cp ='\0' ; -kdb_printf (kdb_prompt_str); -kdb_printf ("%s" , buffer); - *cp = tmp; +kdb_printf ("%s " , cp); +kdb_position_cursor (kdb_prompt_str, buffer, cp); }break ;case 1 :/* Home */ if (cp > buffer) { -kdb_printf ("\r" ); -kdb_printf (kdb_prompt_str); cp = buffer; +kdb_position_cursor (kdb_prompt_str, buffer, cp); }break ;case 5 :/* End */
@@ -387,13 +404,9 @@ poll_again:memcpy (cp+1 , tmpbuffer, lastchar - cp); *++lastchar ='\0' ; *cp = key; -kdb_printf ("%s\r" , cp); +kdb_printf ("%s" , cp); ++cp; - tmp = *cp; - *cp ='\0' ; -kdb_printf (kdb_prompt_str); -kdb_printf ("%s" , buffer); - *cp = tmp; +kdb_position_cursor (kdb_prompt_str, buffer, cp); }else { *++lastchar ='\0' ; *cp++ = key;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 194/202 kdb: Fix console handling when editing and tab-completing commands
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Daniel Thompson <[email protected]>
commit db2f9c7dc29114f531df4a425d0867d01e1f1e28 upstream.
Currently, if the cursor position is not at the end of the command buffer and the user uses the Tab-complete functions, then the console does not leave the cursor in the correct position.
For example consider the following buffer with the cursor positioned at the ^:
md kdb_pro 10
^
Pressing tab should result in:
md kdb_prompt_str 10
^
However this does not happen. Instead the cursor is placed at the end (after then 10) and further cursor movement redraws incorrectly. The same problem exists when we double-Tab but in a different part of the code.
Fix this by sending a carriage return and then redisplaying the text to the left of the cursor.
--- kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c +5 -0
@@ -380,6 +380,8 @@ poll_again:kdb_printf ("\n" );kdb_printf (kdb_prompt_str);kdb_printf ("%s" , buffer); +if (cp != lastchar) +kdb_position_cursor (kdb_prompt_str, buffer, cp); }else if (tab !=2 && count >0 ) {/* How many new characters do we want from tmpbuffer? */ len_tmp =strlen (p_tmp) - len;
@@ -393,6 +395,9 @@ poll_again:kdb_printf ("%s" , cp); cp += len_tmp; lastchar += len_tmp; +if (cp != lastchar) +kdb_position_cursor (kdb_prompt_str, + buffer, cp); } } kdb_nextline =1 ;/* reset output line number */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 195/202 kdb: Merge identical case statements in kdb_read()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Daniel Thompson <[email protected]>
commit 6244917f377bf64719551b58592a02a0336a7439 upstream.
The code that handles case 14 (down) and case 16 (up) has been copy and pasted despite being byte-for-byte identical. Combine them.
--- kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c | 10 +--------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 9 deletions(-)
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c +1 -9
@@ -314,6 +314,7 @@ poll_again: }break ;case 14 :/* Down */ +case 16 :/* Up */ memset (tmpbuffer,' ' ,strlen (kdb_prompt_str) + (lastchar-buffer)); *(tmpbuffer+strlen(kdb_prompt_str) +
@@ -328,15 +329,6 @@ poll_again: ++cp; }break ; -case 16 :/* Up */ -memset (tmpbuffer,' ' , -strlen (kdb_prompt_str) + (lastchar-buffer)); - *(tmpbuffer+strlen (kdb_prompt_str) + - (lastchar-buffer)) ='\0' ; -kdb_printf ("\r%s\r" , tmpbuffer); - *lastchar = (char )key; - *(lastchar+1 ) ='\0' ; -return lastchar;case 9 :/* Tab */ if (tab <2 ) ++tab;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 196/202 kdb: Use format-specifiers rather than memset() for padding in kdb_read()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Daniel Thompson <[email protected]>
commit c9b51ddb66b1d96e4d364c088da0f1dfb004c574 upstream.
Currently when the current line should be removed from the display kdb_read() uses memset() to fill a temporary buffer with spaces. The problem is not that this could be trivially implemented using a format string rather than open coding it. The real problem is that it is possible, on systems with a long kdb_prompt_str, to write past the end of the tmpbuffer.
Happily, as mentioned above, this can be trivially implemented using a format string. Make it so!
--- kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c | 8 +++----- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c +3 -5
@@ -315,11 +315,9 @@ poll_again:break ;case 14 :/* Down */ case 16 :/* Up */ -memset (tmpbuffer,' ' , -strlen (kdb_prompt_str) + (lastchar-buffer)); - *(tmpbuffer+strlen (kdb_prompt_str) + - (lastchar-buffer)) ='\0' ; -kdb_printf ("\r%s\r" , tmpbuffer); +kdb_printf ("\r%*c\r" , + (int )(strlen (kdb_prompt_str) + (lastchar - buffer)), +' ' ); *lastchar = (char )key; *(lastchar+1 ) ='\0' ;return lastchar;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 197/202 net: fix __dst_negative_advice() race
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
commit 92f1655aa2b2294d0b49925f3b875a634bd3b59e upstream.
__dst_negative_advice() does not enforce proper RCU rules when sk->dst_cache must be cleared, leading to possible UAF.
RCU rules are that we must first clear sk->sk_dst_cache, then call dst_release(old_dst).
Note that sk_dst_reset(sk) is implementing this protocol correctly, while __dst_negative_advice() uses the wrong order.
Given that ip6_negative_advice() has special logic against RTF_CACHE, this means each of the three ->negative_advice() existing methods must perform the sk_dst_reset() themselves.
Note the check against NULL dst is centralized in __dst_negative_advice(), there is no need to duplicate it in various callbacks.
Many thanks to Clement Lecigne for tracking this issue.
This old bug became visible after the blamed commit, using UDP sockets.
--- include/net/dst_ops.h | 2 +- include/net/sock.h | 13 +++---------- net/ipv4/route.c | 22 ++++++++-------------- net/ipv6/route.c | 29 +++++++++++++++-------------- net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 11 +++-------- 5 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
include/net/dst_ops.h +1 -1
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ struct dst_ops {void (*destroy)(struct dst_entry *);void (*ifdown)(struct dst_entry *,struct net_device *dev,int how); -struct dst_entry * (*negative_advice)(struct dst_entry *); +void (*negative_advice)(struct sock *sk,struct dst_entry *);void (*link_failure)(struct sk_buff *); void (*update_pmtu)(struct dst_entry *dst, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 mtu,
include/net/sock.h +3 -10
@@ -1938,19 +1938,12 @@ sk_dst_get(struct sock *sk)static inline void dst_negative_advice (struct sock *sk) { -struct dst_entry *ndst, *dst =__sk_dst_get (sk); +struct dst_entry *dst =__sk_dst_get (sk);sk_rethink_txhash (sk); -if (dst && dst->ops->negative_advice) { - ndst = dst->ops->negative_advice (dst); - -if (ndst != dst) { -rcu_assign_pointer (sk->sk_dst_cache, ndst); -sk_tx_queue_clear (sk); -WRITE_ONCE (sk->sk_dst_pending_confirm,0 ); - } - } +if (dst && dst->ops->negative_advice) + dst->ops->negative_advice (sk, dst); } static inline void
net/ipv4/route.c +8 -14
@@ -137,7 +137,8 @@ static int ip_rt_gc_timeout __read_mostlstatic struct dst_entry *ipv4_dst_check (struct dst_entry *dst,u32 cookie);static unsigned int ipv4_default_advmss (const struct dst_entry *dst);static unsigned int ipv4_mtu (const struct dst_entry *dst); -static struct dst_entry *ipv4_negative_advice (struct dst_entry *dst); +static void ipv4_negative_advice (struct sock *sk, +struct dst_entry *dst);static void ipv4_link_failure (struct sk_buff *skb); static void ip_rt_update_pmtu(struct dst_entry *dst, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 mtu,
@@ -856,22 +857,15 @@ static void ip_do_redirect(struct dst_en__ip_do_redirect (rt, skb, &fl4, true); } -static struct dst_entry *ipv4_negative_advice (struct dst_entry *dst) +static void ipv4_negative_advice (struct sock *sk, +struct dst_entry *dst) {struct rtable *rt = (struct rtable *)dst; -struct dst_entry *ret = dst; -if (rt) { -if (dst->obsolete >0 ) { -ip_rt_put (rt); - ret =NULL ; - }else if ((rt->rt_flags &RTCF_REDIRECTED ) || - rt->dst.expires) { -ip_rt_put (rt); - ret =NULL ; - } - } -return ret; +if ((dst->obsolete >0 ) || + (rt->rt_flags &RTCF_REDIRECTED ) || + rt->dst.expires) +sk_dst_reset (sk); }/*
net/ipv6/route.c +15 -14
@@ -84,7 +84,8 @@ enum rt6_nud_state {static struct dst_entry *ip6_dst_check (struct dst_entry *dst,u32 cookie);static unsigned int ip6_default_advmss (const struct dst_entry *dst);static unsigned int ip6_mtu (const struct dst_entry *dst); -static struct dst_entry *ip6_negative_advice (struct dst_entry *); +static void ip6_negative_advice (struct sock *sk, +struct dst_entry *dst);static void ip6_dst_destroy (struct dst_entry *);static void ip6_dst_ifdown (struct dst_entry *,struct net_device *dev,int how);
@@ -2658,24 +2659,24 @@ static struct dst_entry *ip6_dst_check(sreturn dst_ret; } -static struct dst_entry *ip6_negative_advice (struct dst_entry *dst) +static void ip6_negative_advice (struct sock *sk, +struct dst_entry *dst) {struct rt6_info *rt = (struct rt6_info *) dst; -if (rt) { -if (rt->rt6i_flags &RTF_CACHE ) { -rcu_read_lock (); -if (rt6_check_expired (rt)) { -rt6_remove_exception_rt (rt); - dst =NULL ; - } -rcu_read_unlock (); - }else { -dst_release (dst); - dst =NULL ; +if (rt->rt6i_flags &RTF_CACHE ) { +rcu_read_lock (); +if (rt6_check_expired (rt)) { +/* counteract the dst_release() in sk_dst_reset() */ +dst_hold (dst); +sk_dst_reset (sk); + +rt6_remove_exception_rt (rt); } +rcu_read_unlock (); +return ; } -return dst; +sk_dst_reset (sk); }static void ip6_link_failure (struct sk_buff *skb)
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +3 -8
@@ -3772,15 +3772,10 @@ static void xfrm_link_failure(struct sk_/* Impossible. Such dst must be popped before reaches point of failure. */ } -static struct dst_entry *xfrm_negative_advice (struct dst_entry *dst) +static void xfrm_negative_advice (struct sock *sk,struct dst_entry *dst) { -if (dst) { -if (dst->obsolete) { -dst_release (dst); - dst =NULL ; - } - } -return dst; +if (dst->obsolete) +sk_dst_reset (sk); }static void xfrm_init_pmtu (struct xfrm_dst **bundle,int nr)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 198/202 xsk: validate user input for XDP_{UMEM|COMPLETION}_FILL_RING
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
commit 237f3cf13b20db183d3706d997eedc3c49eacd44 upstream.
syzbot reported an illegal copy in xsk_setsockopt() [1]
Make sure to validate setsockopt() @optlen parameter.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xsk_setsockopt+0x909/0xa40 net/xdp/xsk.c:1420 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888028c6cde3 by task syz-executor.0/7549 CPU: 0 PID: 7549 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-08951-gfe46a7dd189e #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601 copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline] copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline] xsk_setsockopt+0x909/0xa40 net/xdp/xsk.c:1420 do_sock_setsockopt+0x3af/0x720 net/socket.c:2311 __sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 RIP: 0033:0x7fb40587de69 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fb40665a0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb4059abf80 RCX: 00007fb40587de69 RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 000000000000011b RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 00007fb4058ca47a R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000020001980 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fb4059abf80 R15: 00007fff57ee4d08 </TASK> Allocated by task 7549: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:370 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:387 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3966 [inline] __kmalloc+0x233/0x4a0 mm/slub.c:3979 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:632 [inline] __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_setsockopt+0xd2f/0x1040 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:1869 do_sock_setsockopt+0x6b4/0x720 net/socket.c:2293 __sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888028c6cde0 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
The buggy address is located 1 bytes to the right of
allocated 2-byte region [ffff888028c6cde0, ffff888028c6cde2)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:ffffea0000a31b00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888028c6c9c0 pfn:0x28c6c
anon flags: 0xfff00000000800(slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 00fff00000000800 ffff888014c41280 0000000000000000 dead000000000001
raw: ffff888028c6c9c0 0000000080800057 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x112cc0(GFP_USER|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY), pid 6648, tgid 6644 (syz-executor.0), ts 133906047828, free_ts 133859922223
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:31 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0x1ea/0x210 mm/page_alloc.c:1533
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1540 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x33ea/0x3580 mm/page_alloc.c:3311
__alloc_pages+0x256/0x680 mm/page_alloc.c:4569
__alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:238 [inline]
alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:261 [inline]
alloc_slab_page+0x5f/0x160 mm/slub.c:2175
allocate_slab mm/slub.c:2338 [inline]
new_slab+0x84/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:2391
___slab_alloc+0xc73/0x1260 mm/slub.c:3525
__slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3610 [inline]
__slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3663 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3835 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3965 [inline]
__kmalloc_node+0x2db/0x4e0 mm/slub.c:3973
kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:648 [inline]
__vmalloc_area_node mm/vmalloc.c:3197 [inline]
__vmalloc_node_range+0x5f9/0x14a0 mm/vmalloc.c:3392
__vmalloc_node mm/vmalloc.c:3457 [inline]
vzalloc+0x79/0x90 mm/vmalloc.c:3530
bpf_check+0x260/0x19010 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:21162
bpf_prog_load+0x1667/0x20f0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2895
__sys_bpf+0x4ee/0x810 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5631
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5738 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5736 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0x7c/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5736
do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
page last free pid 6650 tgid 6647 stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline]
free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1140 [inline]
free_unref_page_prepare+0x95d/0xa80 mm/page_alloc.c:2346
free_unref_page_list+0x5a3/0x850 mm/page_alloc.c:2532
release_pages+0x2117/0x2400 mm/swap.c:1042
tlb_batch_pages_flush mm/mmu_gather.c:98 [inline]
tlb_flush_mmu_free mm/mmu_gather.c:293 [inline]
tlb_flush_mmu+0x34d/0x4e0 mm/mmu_gather.c:300
tlb_finish_mmu+0xd4/0x200 mm/mmu_gather.c:392
exit_mmap+0x4b6/0xd40 mm/mmap.c:3300
__mmput+0x115/0x3c0 kernel/fork.c:1345
exit_mm+0x220/0x310 kernel/exit.c:569
do_exit+0x99e/0x27e0 kernel/exit.c:865
do_group_exit+0x207/0x2c0 kernel/exit.c:1027
get_signal+0x176e/0x1850 kernel/signal.c:2907
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x96/0x860 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:310
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:105 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:328 [inline]
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:201 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xc9/0x360 kernel/entry/common.c:212
do_syscall_64+0x10a/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888028c6cc80: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc
ffff888028c6cd00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc 06 fc fc fc
>ffff888028c6cd80: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc 02 fc fc fc
^
ffff888028c6ce00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc
ffff888028c6ce80: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc[shung-hsi.yu: copy_from_sockptr() in the context was replaced with copy_from_usr() because commit a7b75c5a8c414
("net: pass a sockptr_t into ->setsockopt") was not present]
--- net/xdp/xsk.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/xdp/xsk.c +2 -0
@@ -809,6 +809,8 @@ static int xsk_setsockopt(struct socketstruct xsk_queue **q;int entries; +if (optlen <sizeof (entries)) +return -EINVAL ;if (copy_from_user (&entries, optval,sizeof (entries)))return -EFAULT ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 199/202 sparc: move struct termio to asm/termios.h
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mike Gilbert <[email protected]>
commit c32d18e7942d7589b62e301eb426b32623366565 upstream.
Every other arch declares struct termio in asm/termios.h, so make sparc match them.
Resolves a build failure in the PPP software package, which includes both bits/ioctl-types.h via sys/ioctl.h (glibc) and asm/termbits.h.
--- arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/termbits.h | 10 ---------- arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/termios.h | 9 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/termbits.h +0 -10
@@ -13,16 +13,6 @@ typedef unsigned int tcflag_t;typedef unsigned long tcflag_t ;#endif -#define NCC 8 -struct termio { -unsigned short c_iflag;/* input mode flags */ -unsigned short c_oflag;/* output mode flags */ -unsigned short c_cflag;/* control mode flags */ -unsigned short c_lflag;/* local mode flags */ -unsigned char c_line;/* line discipline */ -unsigned char c_cc[NCC ];/* control characters */ -}; -#define NCCS 17struct termios {tcflag_t c_iflag;/* input mode flags */
arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/termios.h +9 -0
@@ -40,5 +40,14 @@ struct winsize { unsigned short ws_ypixel; }; +#define NCC 8 +struct termio { +unsigned short c_iflag;/* input mode flags */ +unsigned short c_oflag;/* output mode flags */ +unsigned short c_cflag;/* control mode flags */ +unsigned short c_lflag;/* local mode flags */ +unsigned char c_line;/* line discipline */ +unsigned char c_cc[NCC ];/* control characters */ +};#endif /* _UAPI_SPARC_TERMIOS_H */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 200/202 ext4: fix mb_cache_entrys e_refcnt leak in ext4_xattr_block_cache_find()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Baokun Li <[email protected]>
commit 0c0b4a49d3e7f49690a6827a41faeffad5df7e21 upstream.
Syzbot reports a warning as follows:
============================================
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5075 at fs/mbcache.c:419 mb_cache_destroy+0x224/0x290 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 5075 Comm: syz-executor199 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6-gb947cc5bf6d7 RIP: 0010:mb_cache_destroy+0x224/0x290 fs/mbcache.c:419 Call Trace: <TASK> ext4_put_super+0x6d4/0xcd0 fs/ext4/super.c:1375 generic_shutdown_super+0x136/0x2d0 fs/super.c:641 kill_block_super+0x44/0x90 fs/super.c:1675 ext4_kill_sb+0x68/0xa0 fs/ext4/super.c:7327
[...]
============================================
This is because when finding an entry in ext4_xattr_block_cache_find(), if ext4_sb_bread() returns -ENOMEM, the ce's e_refcnt, which has already grown in the __entry_find(), won't be put away, and eventually trigger the above issue in mb_cache_destroy() due to reference count leakage.
So call mb_cache_entry_put() on the -ENOMEM error branch as a quick fix.
--- fs/ext4/xattr.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/xattr.c +3 -1
@@ -3079,8 +3079,10 @@ ext4_xattr_block_cache_find(struct inode bh =ext4_sb_bread (inode->i_sb, ce->e_value,REQ_PRIO );if (IS_ERR (bh)) { -if (PTR_ERR (bh) == -ENOMEM ) +if (PTR_ERR (bh) == -ENOMEM ) { +mb_cache_entry_put (ea_block_cache, ce);return NULL ; + } bh =NULL ;EXT4_ERROR_INODE (inode,"block %lu read error" , (unsigned long )ce->e_value);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 201/202 s390/ap: Fix crash in AP internal function modify_bitmap()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Harald Freudenberger <[email protected]>
commit d4f9d5a99a3fd1b1c691b7a1a6f8f3f25f4116c9 upstream.
A system crash like this
Failing address: 200000cb7df6f000 TEID: 200000cb7df6f403
Fault in home space mode while using kernel ASCE. AS:00000002d71bc007 R3:00000003fe5b8007 S:000000011a446000 P:000000015660c13d
Oops: 0038 ilc:3 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: mlx5_ib ... CPU: 8 PID: 7556 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7 #8 Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (LPAR) Krnl PSW : 0704e00180000000 0000014b75e7b606 (ap_parse_bitmap_str+0x10e/0x1f8) R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:2 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 Krnl GPRS: 0000000000000001 ffffffffffffffc0 0000000000000001 00000048f96b75d3 000000cb00000100 ffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff 000000cb7df6fce0 000000cb7df6fce0 00000000ffffffff 000000000000002b 00000048ffffffff 000003ff9b2dbc80 200000cb7df6fcd8 0000014bffffffc0 000000cb7df6fbc8 Krnl Code: 0000014b75e7b5fc: a7840047 brc 8,0000014b75e7b68a 0000014b75e7b600: 18b2 lr %r11,%r2 #0000014b75e7b602: a7f4000a brc 15,0000014b75e7b616 >0000014b75e7b606: eb22d00000e6 laog %r2,%r2,0(%r13) 0000014b75e7b60c: a7680001 lhi %r6,1 0000014b75e7b610: 187b lr %r7,%r11 0000014b75e7b612: 84960021 brxh %r9,%r6,0000014b75e7b654 0000014b75e7b616: 18e9 lr %r14,%r9 Call Trace: [<0000014b75e7b606>] ap_parse_bitmap_str+0x10e/0x1f8 ([<0000014b75e7b5dc>] ap_parse_bitmap_str+0xe4/0x1f8) [<0000014b75e7b758>] apmask_store+0x68/0x140 [<0000014b75679196>] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x14e/0x1e8 [<0000014b75598524>] vfs_write+0x1b4/0x448 [<0000014b7559894c>] ksys_write+0x74/0x100 [<0000014b7618a440>] __do_syscall+0x268/0x328 [<0000014b761a3558>] system_call+0x70/0x98 INFO: lockdep is turned off. Last Breaking-Event-Address: [<0000014b75e7b636>] ap_parse_bitmap_str+0x13e/0x1f8 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oops
occured when /sys/bus/ap/a[pq]mask was updated with a relative mask value (like +0x10-0x12,+60,-90) with one of the numeric values exceeding INT_MAX.
The fix is simple: use unsigned long values for the internal variables. The correct checks are already in place in the function but a simple int for the internal variables was used with the possibility to overflow.
--- drivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.c +1 -1
@@ -947,7 +947,7 @@ static int hex2bitmap(const char *str, u*/ static int modify_bitmap (const char *str,unsigned long *bitmap,int bits) { -int a, i, z; +unsigned long a, i, z;char *np, sign;/* bits needs to be a multiple of 8 */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 202/202 nfs: fix undefined behavior in nfs_block_bits()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sergey Shtylyov <[email protected]>
commit 3c0a2e0b0ae661457c8505fecc7be5501aa7a715 upstream.
Shifting *signed int* typed constant 1 left by 31 bits causes undefined behavior. Specify the correct *unsigned long* type by using 1UL instead.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with the Svace static analysis tool.
--- fs/nfs/internal.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/internal.h +2 -2
@@ -609,9 +609,9 @@ unsigned long nfs_block_bits(unsigned loif ((bsize & (bsize -1 )) || nrbitsp) {unsigned char nrbits; -for (nrbits =31 ; nrbits && !(bsize & (1 << nrbits)); nrbits--) +for (nrbits =31 ; nrbits && !(bsize & (1UL << nrbits)); nrbits--) ; - bsize =1 << nrbits; + bsize =1UL << nrbits;if (nrbitsp) *nrbitsp = nrbits; }
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.278 release. There are 202 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sat, 15 Jun 2024 11:31:50 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
net/nfc/nci/core.c:1455:15: error:
mixing declarations and code is incompatible with standards before C99 [-Werror,-Wdeclaration-after-statement]
1455 | unsigned int hdr_size = NCI_CTRL_HDR_SIZE;
Maybe enable C99 on older kernel branches ?
The code is
+static bool nci_valid_size(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(NCI_CTRL_HDR_SIZE != NCI_DATA_HDR_SIZE);
+ unsigned int hdr_size = NCI_CTRL_HDR_SIZE;
Swapping those two lines would be another possible fix.
Guenter
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 24 lines · Guenter Roeck
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.278 release. There are 202 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sat, 15 Jun 2024 11:31:50 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
net/nfc/nci/core.c:1455:15: error:
mixing declarations and code is incompatible with standards before C99 [-Werror,-Wdeclaration-after-statement]
1455 | unsigned inthdr_size=NCI_CTRL_HDR_SIZE;Maybe enable C99 on older kernel branches ?
The code is
(quoted diff) +4
-0+static bool nci_valid_size(struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + BUILD_BUG_ON(NCI_CTRL_HDR_SIZE != NCI_DATA_HDR_SIZE); + unsigned int hdr_size = NCI_CTRL_HDR_SIZE;
Quoted 1 line
Swapping those two lines would be another possible fix.
Odd, I fixed this for other branches, but it didn't trigger for me here, must be a build issue somewhere.
I'll go fix it up now, thanks!
greg k-h
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.278 release. There are 202 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sat, 15 Jun 2024 11:31:50 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.278-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-5.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
All tests passing for Tegra ...
Test results for stable-v5.4:
10 builds: 10 pass, 0 fail
24 boots: 24 pass, 0 fail
54 tests: 54 pass, 0 failLinux version: 5.4.278-rc1-gb5a457a9ff04
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra186-p2771-0000,
tegra194-p2972-0000, tegra20-ventana,
tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra210-p3450-0000,
tegra30-cardhu-a04Jon
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.278 release. There are 202 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sat, 15 Jun 2024 11:31:50 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 9 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.278-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-5.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
thanks,
-- Shuah
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.278 release. There are 202 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sat, 15 Jun 2024 11:31:50 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.278-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-5.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
## Build
* kernel: 5.4.278-rc1
* git: https://gitlab.com/Linaro/lkft/mirrors/stable/linux-stable-rc
* git branch: linux-5.4.y
* git commit: b5a457a9ff04a0bb90149f3bc8033a2a98d04caf
* git describe: v5.4.277-203-gb5a457a9ff04
* test details:
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-5.4.y/build/v5.4.277-203-gb5a457a9ff04
## Test Regressions (compared to v5.4.277)
## Metric Regressions (compared to v5.4.277)
## Test Fixes (compared to v5.4.277)
## Metric Fixes (compared to v5.4.277)
## Test result summary
total: 93744, pass: 75189, fail: 2023, skip: 16475, xfail: 57
## Build Summary
* arc: 5 total, 5 passed, 0 failed
* arm: 135 total, 135 passed, 0 failed
* arm64: 35 total, 33 passed, 2 failed
* i386: 23 total, 17 passed, 6 failed
* mips: 25 total, 25 passed, 0 failed
* parisc: 3 total, 0 passed, 3 failed
* powerpc: 30 total, 30 passed, 0 failed
* riscv: 9 total, 9 passed, 0 failed
* s390: 6 total, 6 passed, 0 failed
* sh: 10 total, 10 passed, 0 failed
* sparc: 6 total, 6 passed, 0 failed
* x86_64: 31 total, 31 passed, 0 failed
## Test suites summary
* boot
* kselftest-android
* kselftest-arm64
* kselftest-breakpoints
* kselftest-capabilities
* kselftest-cgroup
* kselftest-clone3
* kselftest-core
* kselftest-cpu-hotplug
* kselftest-cpufreq
* kselftest-drivers-dma-buf
* kselftest-efivarfs
* kselftest-exec
* kselftest-filesystems
* kselftest-filesystems-binderfs
* kselftest-filesystems-epoll
* kselftest-firmware
* kselftest-fpu
* kselftest-ftrace
* kselftest-futex
* kselftest-gpio
* kselftest-intel_pstate
* kselftest-ipc
* kselftest-ir
* kselftest-kcmp
* kselftest-kexec
* kselftest-lib
* kselftest-livepatch
* kselftest-membarrier
* kselftest-memfd
* kselftest-memory-hotplug
* kselftest-mincore
* kselftest-mm
* kselftest-mount
* kselftest-mqueue
* kselftest-net
* kselftest-net-forwarding
* kselftest-net-mptcp
* kselftest-netfilter
* kselftest-nsfs
* kselftest-openat2
* kselftest-pid_namespace
* kselftest-pidfd
* kselftest-proc
* kselftest-pstore
* kselftest-ptrace
* kselftest-rseq
* kselftest-rtc
* kselftest-sigaltstack
* kselftest-size
* kselftest-splice
* kselftest-static_keys
* kselftest-sync
* kselftest-sysctl
* kselftest-tc-testing
* kselftest-timens
* kselftest-timers
* kselftest-tmpfs
* kselftest-tpm2
* kselftest-user
* kselftest-user_events
* kselftest-vDSO
* kselftest-watchdog
* kselftest-x86
* kselftest-zram
* kunit
* log-parser-boot
* log-parser-test
* ltp-commands
* ltp-containers
* ltp-controllers
* ltp-cpuhotplug
* ltp-crypto
* ltp-cve
* ltp-dio
* ltp-fcntl-locktests
* ltp-fs
* ltp-fs_bind
* ltp-fs_perms_simple
* ltp-hugetlb
* ltp-ipc
* ltp-math
* ltp-mm
* ltp-nptl
* ltp-pty
* ltp-sched
* ltp-smoke
* ltp-smoketest
* ltp-syscalls
* ltp-tracing
* perf
* rcutorture
--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.278 release. There are 202 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Sat, 15 Jun 2024 11:31:50 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.278-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-5.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
On ARCH_BRCMST using 32-bit and 64-bit ARM kernels, build tested on BMIPS_GENERIC:
Signature · 1 line
Florian