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5.4.278-rc1 review

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 7 participants 211 messages Jun 13, 2024 – Jun 16, 2024 Page 2 of 2

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author maintainer
#163 lore raw

PATCH 161/202 ipvlan: Dont Use skb->sk in ipvlan_process_v{4,6}_outbound

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yue Haibing <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit b3dc6e8003b500861fa307e9a3400c52e78e4d3a ]

Raw packet from PF_PACKET socket ontop of an IPv6-backed ipvlan device will hit WARN_ON_ONCE() in sk_mc_loop() through sch_direct_xmit() path.

WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 0 at net/core/sock.c:775 sk_mc_loop+0x2d/0x70
Modules linked in: sch_netem ipvlan rfkill cirrus drm_shmem_helper sg drm_kms_helper
CPU: 2 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/2 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0+ #279
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:sk_mc_loop+0x2d/0x70
Code: fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 65 0f b7 15 f7 96 a3 4f 31 c0 66 85 d2 75 26 48 85 ff 74 1c
RSP: 0018:ffffa9584015cd78 EFLAGS: 00010212
RAX: 0000000000000011 RBX: ffff91e585793e00 RCX: 0000000002c6a001
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000040 RDI: ffff91e589c0f000
RBP: ffff91e5855bd100 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 3d00545216f43d00
R10: ffff91e584fdcc50 R11: 00000060dd8616f4 R12: ffff91e58132d000
R13: ffff91e584fdcc68 R14: ffff91e5869ce800 R15: ffff91e589c0f000
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff91e898100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f788f7c44c0 CR3: 0000000008e1a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
 ? __warn (kernel/panic.c:693)
 ? sk_mc_loop (net/core/sock.c:760)
 ? report_bug (lib/bug.c:201 lib/bug.c:219)
 ? handle_bug (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:239)
 ? exc_invalid_op (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:260 (discriminator 1))
 ? asm_exc_invalid_op (./arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:621)
 ? sk_mc_loop (net/core/sock.c:760)
 ip6_finish_output2 (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:83 (discriminator 1))
 ? nf_hook_slow (net/netfilter/core.c:626)
 ip6_finish_output (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:222)
 ? __pfx_ip6_finish_output (net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:215)
 ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 (drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c:602) ipvlan
 ipvlan_start_xmit (drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_main.c:226) ipvlan
 dev_hard_start_xmit (net/core/dev.c:3594)
 sch_direct_xmit (net/sched/sch_generic.c:343)
 __qdisc_run (net/sched/sch_generic.c:416)
 net_tx_action (net/core/dev.c:5286)
 handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:555)
 __irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:589)
 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1043)

The warning triggers as this:
packet_sendmsg
packet_snd //skb->sk is packet sk

      __dev_queue_xmit
         __dev_xmit_skb //q->enqueue is not NULL
             __qdisc_run
               sch_direct_xmit
                 dev_hard_start_xmit
                   ipvlan_start_xmit
                      ipvlan_xmit_mode_l3 //l3 mode
                        ipvlan_process_outbound //vepa flag
                          ipvlan_process_v6_outbound
                            ip6_local_out
                                __ip6_finish_output
                                  ip6_finish_output2 //multicast packet
                                    sk_mc_loop //sk->sk_family is AF_PACKET

Call ip{6}_local_out() with NULL sk in ipvlan as other tunnels to fix this.

---
 drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ipvlan/ipvlan_core.c +2 -2
index bfea28bd45027..d04b1450875b6 100644
@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@ static noinline_for_stack int ipvlan_process_v4_outbound(struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	memset(IPCB(skb), 0, sizeof(*IPCB(skb)));
 
-	err = ip_local_out(net, skb->sk, skb);
+	err = ip_local_out(net, NULL, skb);
 	if (unlikely(net_xmit_eval(err)))
 		DEV_STATS_INC(dev, tx_errors);
 	else
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ static int ipvlan_process_v6_outbound(struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	memset(IP6CB(skb), 0, sizeof(*IP6CB(skb)));
 
-	err = ip6_local_out(dev_net(dev), skb->sk, skb);
+	err = ip6_local_out(dev_net(dev), NULL, skb);
 	if (unlikely(net_xmit_eval(err)))
 		DEV_STATS_INC(dev, tx_errors);
 	else
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
author maintainer
#164 lore raw

PATCH 162/202 ALSA: timer: Set lower bound of start tick time

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

commit 4a63bd179fa8d3fcc44a0d9d71d941ddd62f0c4e upstream.

Currently ALSA timer doesn't have the lower limit of the start tick time, and it allows a very small size, e.g. 1 tick with 1ns resolution for hrtimer. Such a situation may lead to an unexpected RCU stall, where the callback repeatedly queuing the expire update, as reported by fuzzer.

This patch introduces a sanity check of the timer start tick time, so that the system returns an error when a too small start size is set. As of this patch, the lower limit is hard-coded to 100us, which is small enough but can still work somehow.

[ backport note: the error handling is changed, as the original commit
is based on the recent cleanup with guard() in commit beb45974dd49 -- tiwai ]

---
 sound/core/timer.c |   10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
sound/core/timer.c +10 -0
@@ -524,6 +524,16 @@ static int snd_timer_start1(struct snd_t
 		goto unlock;
 	}
 
+	/* check the actual time for the start tick;
+	 * bail out as error if it's way too low (< 100us)
+	 */
+	if (start) {
+		if ((u64)snd_timer_hw_resolution(timer) * ticks < 100000) {
+			result = -EINVAL;
+			goto unlock;
+		}
+	}
+
 	if (start)
 		timeri->ticks = timeri->cticks = ticks;
 	else if (!timeri->cticks)
author maintainer
#165 lore raw

PATCH 163/202 genirq/cpuhotplug, x86/vector: Prevent vector leak during CPU offline

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dongli Zhang <[email protected]>

commit a6c11c0a5235fb144a65e0cb2ffd360ddc1f6c32 upstream.

The absence of IRQD_MOVE_PCNTXT prevents immediate effectiveness of interrupt affinity reconfiguration via procfs. Instead, the change is deferred until the next instance of the interrupt being triggered on the original CPU.

When the interrupt next triggers on the original CPU, the new affinity is enforced within __irq_move_irq(). A vector is allocated from the new CPU, but the old vector on the original CPU remains and is not immediately reclaimed. Instead, apicd->move_in_progress is flagged, and the reclaiming process is delayed until the next trigger of the interrupt on the new CPU.

Upon the subsequent triggering of the interrupt on the new CPU, irq_complete_move() adds a task to the old CPU's vector_cleanup list if it remains online. Subsequently, the timer on the old CPU iterates over its vector_cleanup list, reclaiming old vectors.

However, a rare scenario arises if the old CPU is outgoing before the interrupt triggers again on the new CPU.

In that case irq_force_complete_move() is not invoked on the outgoing CPU to reclaim the old apicd->prev_vector because the interrupt isn't currently affine to the outgoing CPU, and irq_needs_fixup() returns false. Even though __vector_schedule_cleanup() is later called on the new CPU, it doesn't reclaim apicd->prev_vector; instead, it simply resets both apicd->move_in_progress and apicd->prev_vector to 0.

As a result, the vector remains unreclaimed in vector_matrix, leading to a CPU vector leak.

To address this issue, move the invocation of irq_force_complete_move() before the irq_needs_fixup() call to reclaim apicd->prev_vector, if the interrupt is currently or used to be affine to the outgoing CPU.

Additionally, reclaim the vector in __vector_schedule_cleanup() as well, following a warning message, although theoretically it should never see apicd->move_in_progress with apicd->prev_cpu pointing to an offline CPU.

Fixes f0383c24b485 ("genirq/cpuhotplug: Add support for cleaning up move in progress")
---
 arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c |    9 ++++++---
 kernel/irq/cpuhotplug.c       |   16 ++++++++--------
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/apic/vector.c +6 -3
@@ -913,7 +913,8 @@ static void __send_cleanup_vector(struct
 		hlist_add_head(&apicd->clist, per_cpu_ptr(&cleanup_list, cpu));
 		apic->send_IPI(cpu, IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR);
 	} else {
-		apicd->prev_vector = 0;
+		pr_warn("IRQ %u schedule cleanup for offline CPU %u\n", apicd->irq, cpu);
+		free_moved_vector(apicd);
 	}
 	raw_spin_unlock(&vector_lock);
 }
@@ -949,6 +950,7 @@ void irq_complete_move(struct irq_cfg *c
  */
 void irq_force_complete_move(struct irq_desc *desc)
 {
+	unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id();
 	struct apic_chip_data *apicd;
 	struct irq_data *irqd;
 	unsigned int vector;
@@ -973,10 +975,11 @@ void irq_force_complete_move(struct irq_
 		goto unlock;
 
 	/*
-	 * If prev_vector is empty, no action required.
+	 * If prev_vector is empty or the descriptor is neither currently
+	 * nor previously on the outgoing CPU no action required.
 	 */
 	vector = apicd->prev_vector;
-	if (!vector)
+	if (!vector || (apicd->cpu != cpu && apicd->prev_cpu != cpu))
 		goto unlock;
 
 	/*
kernel/irq/cpuhotplug.c +8 -8
@@ -69,6 +69,14 @@ static bool migrate_one_irq(struct irq_d
 	}
 
 	/*
+	 * Complete an eventually pending irq move cleanup. If this
+	 * interrupt was moved in hard irq context, then the vectors need
+	 * to be cleaned up. It can't wait until this interrupt actually
+	 * happens and this CPU was involved.
+	 */
+	irq_force_complete_move(desc);
+
+	/*
 	 * No move required, if:
 	 * - Interrupt is per cpu
 	 * - Interrupt is not started
@@ -87,14 +95,6 @@ static bool migrate_one_irq(struct irq_d
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * Complete an eventually pending irq move cleanup. If this
-	 * interrupt was moved in hard irq context, then the vectors need
-	 * to be cleaned up. It can't wait until this interrupt actually
-	 * happens and this CPU was involved.
-	 */
-	irq_force_complete_move(desc);
-
-	/*
 	 * If there is a setaffinity pending, then try to reuse the pending
 	 * mask, so the last change of the affinity does not get lost. If
 	 * there is no move pending or the pending mask does not contain
author maintainer
#166 lore raw

PATCH 164/202 SUNRPC: Fix loop termination condition in gss_free_in_token_pages()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chuck Lever <[email protected]>

commit 4a77c3dead97339478c7422eb07bf4bf63577008 upstream.

The in_token->pages[] array is not NULL terminated. This results in the following KASAN splat:

  KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0x04a2013400000008-0x04a201340000000f]
Fixes bafa6b4d95d9 ("SUNRPC: Fix gss_free_in_token_pages()")
---
 net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c +1 -1
@@ -1104,7 +1104,7 @@ static int gss_read_proxy_verf(struct sv
 	}
 
 	pages = DIV_ROUND_UP(inlen, PAGE_SIZE);
-	in_token->pages = kcalloc(pages, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_KERNEL);
+	in_token->pages = kcalloc(pages + 1, sizeof(struct page *), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!in_token->pages) {
 		kfree(in_handle->data);
 		return SVC_DENIED;
author maintainer
#167 lore raw

PATCH 165/202 binder: fix max_thread type inconsistency

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Carlos Llamas <[email protected]>

commit 42316941335644a98335f209daafa4c122f28983 upstream.

The type defined for the BINDER_SET_MAX_THREADS ioctl was changed from size_t to __u32 in order to avoid incompatibility issues between 32 and 64-bit kernels. However, the internal types used to copy from user and store the value were never updated. Use u32 to fix the inconsistency.

Fixes a9350fc859ae ("staging: android: binder: fix BINDER_SET_MAX_THREADS declaration")
[cmllamas: resolve minor conflicts due to missing commit 421518a2740f]
---
 drivers/android/binder.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +2 -2
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ struct binder_proc {
 	struct list_head todo;
 	struct binder_stats stats;
 	struct list_head delivered_death;
-	int max_threads;
+	u32 max_threads;
 	int requested_threads;
 	int requested_threads_started;
 	int tmp_ref;
@@ -5412,7 +5412,7 @@ static long binder_ioctl(struct file *fi
 			goto err;
 		break;
 	case BINDER_SET_MAX_THREADS: {
-		int max_threads;
+		u32 max_threads;
 
 		if (copy_from_user(&max_threads, ubuf,
 				   sizeof(max_threads))) {
author maintainer
#168 lore raw

PATCH 166/202 mmc: core: Do not force a retune before RPMB switch

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz <[email protected]>

commit 67380251e8bbd3302c64fea07f95c31971b91c22 upstream.

Requesting a retune before switching to the RPMB partition has been observed to cause CRC errors on the RPMB reads (-EILSEQ).

Since RPMB reads can not be retried, the clients would be directly affected by the errors.

This commit disables the retune request prior to switching to the RPMB
partition: mmc_retune_pause() no longer triggers a retune before the pause period begins.

This was verified with the sdhci-of-arasan driver (ZynqMP) configured for HS200 using two separate eMMC cards (DG4064 and 064GB2). In both cases, the error was easy to reproduce triggering every few tenths of reads.

With this commit, systems that were utilizing OP-TEE to access RPMB variables will experience an enhanced performance. Specifically, when OP-TEE is configured to employ RPMB as a secure storage solution, it not only writes the data but also the secure filesystem within the partition. As a result, retrieving any variable involves multiple RPMB reads, typically around five.

For context, on ZynqMP, each retune request consumed approximately 8ms. Consequently, reading any RPMB variable used to take at the very minimum 40ms.

After droping the need to retune before switching to the RPMB partition, this is no longer the case.

---
 drivers/mmc/core/host.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/mmc/core/host.c +1 -2
@@ -111,13 +111,12 @@ void mmc_retune_enable(struct mmc_host *
 
 /*
  * Pause re-tuning for a small set of operations.  The pause begins after the
- * next command and after first doing re-tuning.
+ * next command.
  */
 void mmc_retune_pause(struct mmc_host *host)
 {
 	if (!host->retune_paused) {
 		host->retune_paused = 1;
-		mmc_retune_needed(host);
 		mmc_retune_hold(host);
 	}
 }
author maintainer
#169 lore raw

PATCH 167/202 io_uring: fail NOP if non-zero op flags is passed in

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ming Lei <[email protected]>

commit 3d8f874bd620ce03f75a5512847586828ab86544 upstream.

The NOP op flags should have been checked from beginning like any other opcode, otherwise NOP may not be extended with the op flags.

Given both liburing and Rust io-uring crate always zeros SQE op flags, just ignore users which play raw NOP uring interface without zeroing SQE, because NOP is just for test purpose. Then we can save one NOP2 opcode.

---
 fs/io_uring.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
fs/io_uring.c +2 -0
@@ -2112,6 +2112,8 @@ static int __io_submit_sqe(struct io_rin
 
 	switch (req->submit.opcode) {
 	case IORING_OP_NOP:
+		if (READ_ONCE(s->sqe->rw_flags))
+			return -EINVAL;
 		ret = io_nop(req, req->user_data);
 		break;
 	case IORING_OP_READV:
author maintainer
#170 lore raw

PATCH 168/202 afs: Dont cross .backup mountpoint from backup volume

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Marc Dionne <[email protected]>

commit 29be9100aca2915fab54b5693309bc42956542e5 upstream.

Don't cross a mountpoint that explicitly specifies a backup volume (target is <vol>.backup) when starting from a backup volume.

It it not uncommon to mount a volume's backup directly in the volume itself. This can cause tools that are not paying attention to get into a loop mounting the volume onto itself as they attempt to traverse the tree, leading to a variety of problems.

This doesn't prevent the general case of loops in a sequence of mountpoints, but addresses a common special case in the same way as other afs clients.

---
 fs/afs/mntpt.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
fs/afs/mntpt.c +5 -0
@@ -146,6 +146,11 @@ static int afs_mntpt_set_params(struct f
 		put_page(page);
 		if (ret < 0)
 			return ret;
+
+		/* Don't cross a backup volume mountpoint from a backup volume */
+		if (src_as->volume && src_as->volume->type == AFSVL_BACKVOL &&
+		    ctx->type == AFSVL_BACKVOL)
+			return -ENODEV;
 	}
 
 	return 0;
author maintainer
#171 lore raw

PATCH 169/202 nilfs2: fix use-after-free of timer for log writer thread

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ryusuke Konishi <[email protected]>

commit f5d4e04634c9cf68bdf23de08ada0bb92e8befe7 upstream.

Patch series "nilfs2: fix log writer related issues".

This bug fix series covers three nilfs2 log writer-related issues, including a timer use-after-free issue and potential deadlock issue on unmount, and a potential freeze issue in event synchronization found during their analysis. Details are described in each commit log.

This patch (of 3):

A use-after-free issue has been reported regarding the timer sc_timer on the nilfs_sc_info structure.

The problem is that even though it is used to wake up a sleeping log writer thread, sc_timer is not shut down until the nilfs_sc_info structure is about to be freed, and is used regardless of the thread's lifetime.

Fix this issue by limiting the use of sc_timer only while the log writer thread is alive.

---
 fs/nilfs2/segment.c |   25 +++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
fs/nilfs2/segment.c +19 -6
@@ -2159,8 +2159,10 @@ static void nilfs_segctor_start_timer(st
 {
 	spin_lock(&sci->sc_state_lock);
 	if (!(sci->sc_state & NILFS_SEGCTOR_COMMIT)) {
-		sci->sc_timer.expires = jiffies + sci->sc_interval;
-		add_timer(&sci->sc_timer);
+		if (sci->sc_task) {
+			sci->sc_timer.expires = jiffies + sci->sc_interval;
+			add_timer(&sci->sc_timer);
+		}
 		sci->sc_state |= NILFS_SEGCTOR_COMMIT;
 	}
 	spin_unlock(&sci->sc_state_lock);
@@ -2380,10 +2382,21 @@ int nilfs_construct_dsync_segment(struct
  */
 static void nilfs_segctor_accept(struct nilfs_sc_info *sci)
 {
+	bool thread_is_alive;
+
 	spin_lock(&sci->sc_state_lock);
 	sci->sc_seq_accepted = sci->sc_seq_request;
+	thread_is_alive = (bool)sci->sc_task;
 	spin_unlock(&sci->sc_state_lock);
-	del_timer_sync(&sci->sc_timer);
+
+	/*
+	 * This function does not race with the log writer thread's
+	 * termination.  Therefore, deleting sc_timer, which should not be
+	 * done after the log writer thread exits, can be done safely outside
+	 * the area protected by sc_state_lock.
+	 */
+	if (thread_is_alive)
+		del_timer_sync(&sci->sc_timer);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2409,7 +2422,7 @@ static void nilfs_segctor_notify(struct
 			sci->sc_flush_request &= ~FLUSH_DAT_BIT;
 
 		/* re-enable timer if checkpoint creation was not done */
-		if ((sci->sc_state & NILFS_SEGCTOR_COMMIT) &&
+		if ((sci->sc_state & NILFS_SEGCTOR_COMMIT) && sci->sc_task &&
 		    time_before(jiffies, sci->sc_timer.expires))
 			add_timer(&sci->sc_timer);
 	}
@@ -2599,6 +2612,7 @@ static int nilfs_segctor_thread(void *ar
 	int timeout = 0;
 
 	sci->sc_timer_task = current;
+	timer_setup(&sci->sc_timer, nilfs_construction_timeout, 0);
 
 	/* start sync. */
 	sci->sc_task = current;
@@ -2665,6 +2679,7 @@ static int nilfs_segctor_thread(void *ar
  end_thread:
 	/* end sync. */
 	sci->sc_task = NULL;
+	del_timer_sync(&sci->sc_timer);
 	wake_up(&sci->sc_wait_task); /* for nilfs_segctor_kill_thread() */
 	spin_unlock(&sci->sc_state_lock);
 	return 0;
@@ -2728,7 +2743,6 @@ static struct nilfs_sc_info *nilfs_segct
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sci->sc_gc_inodes);
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sci->sc_iput_queue);
 	INIT_WORK(&sci->sc_iput_work, nilfs_iput_work_func);
-	timer_setup(&sci->sc_timer, nilfs_construction_timeout, 0);
 
 	sci->sc_interval = HZ * NILFS_SC_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT;
 	sci->sc_mjcp_freq = HZ * NILFS_SC_DEFAULT_SR_FREQ;
@@ -2814,7 +2828,6 @@ static void nilfs_segctor_destroy(struct
 
 	down_write(&nilfs->ns_segctor_sem);
 
-	del_timer_sync(&sci->sc_timer);
 	kfree(sci);
 }
 
author maintainer
#172 lore raw

PATCH 170/202 vxlan: Fix regression when dropping packets due to invalid src addresses

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>

commit 1cd4bc987abb2823836cbb8f887026011ccddc8a upstream.

Commit f58f45c1e5b9 ("vxlan: drop packets from invalid src-address") has recently been added to vxlan mainly in the context of source address snooping/learning so that when it is enabled, an entry in the FDB is not being created for an invalid address for the corresponding tunnel endpoint.

Before commit f58f45c1e5b9 vxlan was similarly behaving as geneve in that it passed through whichever macs were set in the L2 header. It turns out that this change in behavior breaks setups, for example, Cilium with netkit in L3 mode for Pods as well as tunnel mode has been passing before the change in f58f45c1e5b9 for both vxlan and geneve. After mentioned change it is only passing for geneve as in case of vxlan packets are dropped due to vxlan_set_mac() returning false as source and destination macs are zero which for E/W traffic via tunnel is totally fine.

Fix it by only opting into the is_valid_ether_addr() check in vxlan_set_mac() when in fact source address snooping/learning is actually enabled in vxlan. This is done by moving the check into vxlan_snoop(). With this change, the Cilium connectivity test suite passes again for both tunnel flavors.

Fixes f58f45c1e5b9 ("vxlan: drop packets from invalid src-address")
Cc David Bauer <[email protected]>
Cc Ido Schimmel <[email protected]>
Cc Nikolay Aleksandrov <[email protected]>
Cc Martin KaFai Lau <[email protected]>

[ Backport note: vxlan snooping/learning not supported in 6.8 or older,
so commit is simply a revert. ]

---
 drivers/net/vxlan.c |    4 ----
 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)
drivers/net/vxlan.c +0 -4
@@ -1605,10 +1605,6 @@ static bool vxlan_set_mac(struct vxlan_d
 	if (ether_addr_equal(eth_hdr(skb)->h_source, vxlan->dev->dev_addr))
 		return false;
 
-	/* Ignore packets from invalid src-address */
-	if (!is_valid_ether_addr(eth_hdr(skb)->h_source))
-		return false;
-
 	/* Get address from the outer IP header */
 	if (vxlan_get_sk_family(vs) == AF_INET) {
 		saddr.sin.sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
author maintainer
#173 lore raw

PATCH 171/202 x86/mm: Remove broken vsyscall emulation code from the page fault code

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>

commit 02b670c1f88e78f42a6c5aee155c7b26960ca054 upstream.

The syzbot-reported stack trace from hell in this discussion thread actually has three nested page faults:

https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

... and I think that's actually the important thing here:

- the first page fault is from user space, and triggers the vsyscall emulation.

- the second page fault is from __do_sys_gettimeofday(), and that should just have caused the exception that then sets the return value to -EFAULT

- the third nested page fault is due to _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore() -> preempt_schedule() -> trace_sched_switch(), which then causes a BPF trace program to run, which does that bpf_probe_read_compat(), which causes that page fault under pagefault_disable().

It's quite the nasty backtrace, and there's a lot going on.

The problem is literally the vsyscall emulation, which sets

        current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err = 1;

and that causes the fixup_exception() code to send the signal *despite* the exception being caught.

And I think that is in fact completely bogus. It's completely bogus exactly because it sends that signal even when it *shouldn't* be sent - like for the BPF user mode trace gathering.

In other words, I think the whole "sig_on_uaccess_err" thing is entirely broken, because it makes any nested page-faults do all the wrong things.

Now, arguably, I don't think anybody should enable vsyscall emulation any more, but this test case clearly does.

I think we should just make the "send SIGSEGV" be something that the vsyscall emulation does on its own, not this broken per-thread state for something that isn't actually per thread.

The x86 page fault code actually tried to deal with the "incorrect nesting" by having that:

                if (in_interrupt())
                        return;

which ignores the sig_on_uaccess_err case when it happens in interrupts, but as shown by this example, these nested page faults do not need to be about interrupts at all.

IOW, I think the only right thing is to remove that horrendously broken code.

The attached patch looks like the ObviouslyCorrect(tm) thing to do.

NOTE! This broken code goes back to this commit in 2011:

4fc3490114bb ("x86-64: Set siginfo and context on vsyscall emulation faults")

... and back then the reason was to get all the siginfo details right. Honestly, I do not for a moment believe that it's worth getting the siginfo details right here, but part of the commit says:

This fixes issues with UML when vsyscall=emulate.

... and so my patch to remove this garbage will probably break UML in this situation.

I do not believe that anybody should be running with vsyscall=emulate in 2024 in the first place, much less if you are doing things like UML. But let's see if somebody screams.

[gpiccoli: Backport the patch due to differences in the trees. The main changes
between 5.4.y and 5.15.y are due to renaming the fixup function, by commit 6456a2a69ee1 ("x86/fault: Rename no_context() to kernelmode_fixup_or_oops()"), and on processor.h thread_struct due to commit cf122cfba5b1 ("kill uaccess_try()"). Following 2 commits cause divergence in the diffs too (in the removed lines):
cd072dab453a ("x86/fault: Add a helper function to sanitize error code") d4ffd5df9d18 ("x86/fault: Fix wrong signal when vsyscall fails with pkey").]

---
 arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c |   28 ++--------------------------
 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h      |    1 -
 arch/x86/mm/fault.c                   |   27 +--------------------------
 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c +2 -26
@@ -98,11 +98,6 @@ static int addr_to_vsyscall_nr(unsigned
 
 static bool write_ok_or_segv(unsigned long ptr, size_t size)
 {
-	/*
-	 * XXX: if access_ok, get_user, and put_user handled
-	 * sig_on_uaccess_err, this could go away.
-	 */
-
 	if (!access_ok((void __user *)ptr, size)) {
 		struct thread_struct *thread = &current->thread;
 
@@ -120,10 +115,8 @@ static bool write_ok_or_segv(unsigned lo
 bool emulate_vsyscall(unsigned long error_code,
 		      struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
 {
-	struct task_struct *tsk;
 	unsigned long caller;
 	int vsyscall_nr, syscall_nr, tmp;
-	int prev_sig_on_uaccess_err;
 	long ret;
 	unsigned long orig_dx;
 
@@ -172,8 +165,6 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(unsigned long erro
 		goto sigsegv;
 	}
 
-	tsk = current;
-
 	/*
 	 * Check for access_ok violations and find the syscall nr.
 	 *
@@ -233,12 +224,8 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(unsigned long erro
 		goto do_ret;  /* skip requested */
 
 	/*
-	 * With a real vsyscall, page faults cause SIGSEGV.  We want to
-	 * preserve that behavior to make writing exploits harder.
+	 * With a real vsyscall, page faults cause SIGSEGV.
 	 */
-	prev_sig_on_uaccess_err = current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err;
-	current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err = 1;
-
 	ret = -EFAULT;
 	switch (vsyscall_nr) {
 	case 0:
@@ -261,23 +248,12 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(unsigned long erro
 		break;
 	}
 
-	current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err = prev_sig_on_uaccess_err;
-
 check_fault:
 	if (ret == -EFAULT) {
 		/* Bad news -- userspace fed a bad pointer to a vsyscall. */
 		warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_INFO, regs,
 				  "vsyscall fault (exploit attempt?)");
-
-		/*
-		 * If we failed to generate a signal for any reason,
-		 * generate one here.  (This should be impossible.)
-		 */
-		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!sigismember(&tsk->pending.signal, SIGBUS) &&
-				 !sigismember(&tsk->pending.signal, SIGSEGV)))
-			goto sigsegv;
-
-		return true;  /* Don't emulate the ret. */
+		goto sigsegv;
 	}
 
 	regs->ax = ret;
arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h +0 -1
@@ -487,7 +487,6 @@ struct thread_struct {
 
 	mm_segment_t		addr_limit;
 
-	unsigned int		sig_on_uaccess_err:1;
 	unsigned int		uaccess_err:1;	/* uaccess failed */
 
 	/* Floating point and extended processor state */
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +1 -26
@@ -743,33 +743,8 @@ no_context(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigne
 	}
 
 	/* Are we prepared to handle this kernel fault? */
-	if (fixup_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_PF, error_code, address)) {
-		/*
-		 * Any interrupt that takes a fault gets the fixup. This makes
-		 * the below recursive fault logic only apply to a faults from
-		 * task context.
-		 */
-		if (in_interrupt())
-			return;
-
-		/*
-		 * Per the above we're !in_interrupt(), aka. task context.
-		 *
-		 * In this case we need to make sure we're not recursively
-		 * faulting through the emulate_vsyscall() logic.
-		 */
-		if (current->thread.sig_on_uaccess_err && signal) {
-			set_signal_archinfo(address, error_code);
-
-			/* XXX: hwpoison faults will set the wrong code. */
-			force_sig_fault(signal, si_code, (void __user *)address);
-		}
-
-		/*
-		 * Barring that, we can do the fixup and be happy.
-		 */
+	if (fixup_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_PF, error_code, address))
 		return;
-	}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
 	/*
author maintainer
#174 lore raw

PATCH 172/202 f2fs: fix to do sanity check on i_xattr_nid in sanity_check_inode()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Chao Yu <[email protected]>

commit 20faaf30e55522bba2b56d9c46689233205d7717 upstream.

syzbot reports a kernel bug as below:

F2FS-fs (loop0): Mounted with checkpoint version = 48b305e4
==================================================================

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_test_bit fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2933 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in current_nat_addr fs/f2fs/node.h:213 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in f2fs_get_node_info+0xece/0x1200 fs/f2fs/node.c:600
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88807a58c76c by task syz-executor280/5076

CPU: 1 PID: 5076 Comm: syz-executor280 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
 print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
 f2fs_test_bit fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2933 [inline]
 current_nat_addr fs/f2fs/node.h:213 [inline]
 f2fs_get_node_info+0xece/0x1200 fs/f2fs/node.c:600
 f2fs_xattr_fiemap fs/f2fs/data.c:1848 [inline]
 f2fs_fiemap+0x55d/0x1ee0 fs/f2fs/data.c:1925
 ioctl_fiemap fs/ioctl.c:220 [inline]
 do_vfs_ioctl+0x1c07/0x2e50 fs/ioctl.c:838
 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:902 [inline]
 __se_sys_ioctl+0x81/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:890
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

The root cause is we missed to do sanity check on i_xattr_nid during f2fs_iget(), so that in fiemap() path, current_nat_addr() will access nat_bitmap w/ offset from invalid i_xattr_nid, result in triggering kasan bug report, fix it.

---
 fs/f2fs/inode.c |    6 ++++++
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
fs/f2fs/inode.c +6 -0
@@ -286,6 +286,12 @@ static bool sanity_check_inode(struct in
 		return false;
 	}
 
+	if (fi->i_xattr_nid && f2fs_check_nid_range(sbi, fi->i_xattr_nid)) {
+		f2fs_warn(sbi, "%s: inode (ino=%lx) has corrupted i_xattr_nid: %u, run fsck to fix.",
+			  __func__, inode->i_ino, fi->i_xattr_nid);
+		return false;
+	}
+
 	return true;
 }
 
author maintainer
#175 lore raw

PATCH 173/202 media: lgdt3306a: Add a check against null-pointer-def

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zheyu Ma <[email protected]>

commit c1115ddbda9c930fba0fdd062e7a8873ebaf898d upstream.

The driver should check whether the client provides the platform_data.

The following log reveals it:

[   29.610324] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in kmemdup+0x30/0x40
[   29.610730] Read of size 40 at addr 0000000000000000 by task bash/414
[   29.612820] Call Trace:
[   29.613030]  <TASK>
[   29.613201]  dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x6f
[   29.613496]  ? kmemdup+0x30/0x40
[   29.613754]  print_report.cold+0x494/0x6b7
[   29.614082]  ? kmemdup+0x30/0x40
[   29.614340]  kasan_report+0x8a/0x190
[   29.614628]  ? kmemdup+0x30/0x40
[   29.614888]  kasan_check_range+0x14d/0x1d0
[   29.615213]  memcpy+0x20/0x60
[   29.615454]  kmemdup+0x30/0x40
[   29.615700]  lgdt3306a_probe+0x52/0x310
[   29.616339]  i2c_device_probe+0x951/0xa90
---
 drivers/media/dvb-frontends/lgdt3306a.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/lgdt3306a.c +5 -0
@@ -2199,6 +2199,11 @@ static int lgdt3306a_probe(struct i2c_cl
 	struct dvb_frontend *fe;
 	int ret;
 
+	if (!client->dev.platform_data) {
+		dev_err(&client->dev, "platform data is mandatory\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	config = kmemdup(client->dev.platform_data,
 			 sizeof(struct lgdt3306a_config), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (config == NULL) {
author maintainer
#176 lore raw

PATCH 174/202 drm/amdgpu: add error handle to avoid out-of-bounds

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bob Zhou <[email protected]>

commit 8b2faf1a4f3b6c748c0da36cda865a226534d520 upstream.

if the sdma_v4_0_irq_id_to_seq return -EINVAL, the process should be stop to avoid out-of-bounds read, so directly return -EINVAL.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/sdma_v4_0.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/sdma_v4_0.c +3 -0
@@ -2007,6 +2007,9 @@ static int sdma_v4_0_process_trap_irq(st
 
 	DRM_DEBUG("IH: SDMA trap\n");
 	instance = sdma_v4_0_irq_id_to_seq(entry->client_id);
+	if (instance < 0)
+		return instance;
+
 	switch (entry->ring_id) {
 	case 0:
 		amdgpu_fence_process(&adev->sdma.instance[instance].ring);
author maintainer
#177 lore raw

PATCH 175/202 ata: pata_legacy: make legacy_exit() work again

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sergey Shtylyov <[email protected]>

commit d4a89339f17c87c4990070e9116462d16e75894f upstream.

Commit defc9cd826e4 ("pata_legacy: resychronize with upstream changes and resubmit") missed to update legacy_exit(), so that it now fails to do any cleanup -- the loop body there can never be entered. Fix that and finally remove now useless nr_legacy_host variable...

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with the Svace static analysis tool.

Fixes defc9cd826e4 ("pata_legacy: resychronize with upstream changes and resubmit")
---
 drivers/ata/pata_legacy.c |    8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/ata/pata_legacy.c +4 -4
@@ -114,8 +114,6 @@ static int legacy_port[NR_HOST] = { 0x1f
 static struct legacy_probe probe_list[NR_HOST];
 static struct legacy_data legacy_data[NR_HOST];
 static struct ata_host *legacy_host[NR_HOST];
-static int nr_legacy_host;
-
 
 static int probe_all;		/* Set to check all ISA port ranges */
 static int ht6560a;		/* HT 6560A on primary 1, second 2, both 3 */
@@ -1239,9 +1237,11 @@ static __exit void legacy_exit(void)
 {
 	int i;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < nr_legacy_host; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < NR_HOST; i++) {
 		struct legacy_data *ld = &legacy_data[i];
-		ata_host_detach(legacy_host[i]);
+
+		if (legacy_host[i])
+			ata_host_detach(legacy_host[i]);
 		platform_device_unregister(ld->platform_dev);
 	}
 }
author maintainer
#178 lore raw

PATCH 176/202 ACPI: resource: Do IRQ override on TongFang GXxHRXx and GMxHGxx

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christoffer Sandberg <[email protected]>

commit c81bf14f9db68311c2e75428eea070d97d603975 upstream.

Listed devices need the override for the keyboard to work.

---
 drivers/acpi/resource.c |   12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
drivers/acpi/resource.c +12 -0
@@ -475,6 +475,18 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id asus_l
 			DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "B2502CBA"),
 		},
 	},
+	{
+		/* TongFang GXxHRXx/TUXEDO InfinityBook Pro Gen9 AMD */
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "GXxHRXx"),
+		},
+	},
+	{
+		/* TongFang GMxHGxx/TUXEDO Stellaris Slim Gen1 AMD */
+		.matches = {
+			DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "GMxHGxx"),
+		},
+	},
 	{ }
 };
 
author maintainer
#179 lore raw

PATCH 177/202 arm64: tegra: Correct Tegra132 I2C alias

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Krzysztof Kozlowski <[email protected]>

commit 2633c58e1354d7de2c8e7be8bdb6f68a0a01bad7 upstream.

There is no such device as "as3722@40", because its name is "pmic". Use phandles for aliases to fix relying on full node path. This corrects aliases for RTC devices and also fixes dtc W=1 warning:

tegra132-norrin.dts:12.3-36: Warning (alias_paths): /aliases:rtc0: aliases property is not a valid node (/i2c@7000d000/as3722@40)

Fixes 0f279ebdf3ce ("arm64: tegra: Add NVIDIA Tegra132 Norrin support")
---
 arch/arm64/boot/dts/nvidia/tegra132-norrin.dts |    4 ++--
 arch/arm64/boot/dts/nvidia/tegra132.dtsi       |    2 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/boot/dts/nvidia/tegra132-norrin.dts +2 -2
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@
 	compatible = "nvidia,norrin", "nvidia,tegra132", "nvidia,tegra124";
 
 	aliases {
-		rtc0 = "/i2c@7000d000/as3722@40";
-		rtc1 = "/rtc@7000e000";
+		rtc0 = &as3722;
+		rtc1 = &tegra_rtc;
 		serial0 = &uarta;
 	};
 
arch/arm64/boot/dts/nvidia/tegra132.dtsi +1 -1
@@ -569,7 +569,7 @@
 		status = "disabled";
 	};
 
-	rtc@7000e000 {
+	tegra_rtc: rtc@7000e000 {
 		compatible = "nvidia,tegra124-rtc", "nvidia,tegra20-rtc";
 		reg = <0x0 0x7000e000 0x0 0x100>;
 		interrupts = <GIC_SPI 2 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>;
author maintainer
#180 lore raw

PATCH 178/202 md/raid5: fix deadlock that raid5d() wait for itself to clear MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yu Kuai <[email protected]>

commit 151f66bb618d1fd0eeb84acb61b4a9fa5d8bb0fa upstream.

Xiao reported that lvm2 test lvconvert-raid-takeover.sh can hang with small possibility, the root cause is exactly the same as commit bed9e27baf52 ("Revert "md/raid5: Wait for MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING in raid5d"")

However, Dan reported another hang after that, and junxiao investigated the problem and found out that this is caused by plugged bio can't issue from raid5d().

Current implementation in raid5d() has a weird dependence:

1) md_check_recovery() from raid5d() must hold 'reconfig_mutex' to clear MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING;
2) raid5d() handles IO in a deadloop, until all IO are issued;
3) IO from raid5d() must wait for MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING to be cleared;

This behaviour is introduce before v2.6, and for consequence, if other context hold 'reconfig_mutex', and md_check_recovery() can't update super_block, then raid5d() will waste one cpu 100% by the deadloop, until 'reconfig_mutex' is released.

Refer to the implementation from raid1 and raid10, fix this problem by skipping issue IO if MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING is still set after md_check_recovery(), daemon thread will be woken up when 'reconfig_mutex' is released. Meanwhile, the hang problem will be fixed as well.

---
 drivers/md/raid5.c |   15 +++------------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/md/raid5.c +3 -12
@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@
  */
 
 #include <linux/blkdev.h>
-#include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <linux/kthread.h>
 #include <linux/raid/pq.h>
 #include <linux/async_tx.h>
@@ -6299,6 +6298,9 @@ static void raid5d(struct md_thread *thr
 		int batch_size, released;
 		unsigned int offset;
 
+		if (test_bit(MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING, &mddev->sb_flags))
+			break;
+
 		released = release_stripe_list(conf, conf->temp_inactive_list);
 		if (released)
 			clear_bit(R5_DID_ALLOC, &conf->cache_state);
@@ -6335,18 +6337,7 @@ static void raid5d(struct md_thread *thr
 			spin_unlock_irq(&conf->device_lock);
 			md_check_recovery(mddev);
 			spin_lock_irq(&conf->device_lock);
-
-			/*
-			 * Waiting on MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING below may deadlock
-			 * seeing md_check_recovery() is needed to clear
-			 * the flag when using mdmon.
-			 */
-			continue;
 		}
-
-		wait_event_lock_irq(mddev->sb_wait,
-			!test_bit(MD_SB_CHANGE_PENDING, &mddev->sb_flags),
-			conf->device_lock);
 	}
 	pr_debug("%d stripes handled\n", handled);
 
author maintainer
#181 lore raw

PATCH 179/202 wifi: rtl8xxxu: Fix the TX power of RTL8192CU, RTL8723AU

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Bitterblue Smith <[email protected]>

commit 08b5d052d17a89bb8706b2888277d0b682dc1610 upstream.

Don't subtract 1 from the power index. This was added in commit 2fc0b8e5a17d ("rtl8xxxu: Add TX power base values for gen1 parts") for unknown reasons. The vendor drivers don't do this.

Also correct the calculations of values written to REG_OFDM0_X{C,D}_TX_IQ_IMBALANCE. According to the vendor driver, these are used for TX power training.

With these changes rtl8xxxu sets the TX power of RTL8192CU the same as the vendor driver.

None of this appears to have any effect on my RTL8192CU device.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl8xxxu/rtl8xxxu_core.c |   26 +++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtl8xxxu/rtl8xxxu_core.c +11 -15
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #include <linux/wireless.h>
 #include <linux/firmware.h>
 #include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/bitfield.h>
 #include <net/mac80211.h>
 #include "rtl8xxxu.h"
 #include "rtl8xxxu_regs.h"
@@ -1390,13 +1391,13 @@ rtl8xxxu_gen1_set_tx_power(struct rtl8xx
 	u8 cck[RTL8723A_MAX_RF_PATHS], ofdm[RTL8723A_MAX_RF_PATHS];
 	u8 ofdmbase[RTL8723A_MAX_RF_PATHS], mcsbase[RTL8723A_MAX_RF_PATHS];
 	u32 val32, ofdm_a, ofdm_b, mcs_a, mcs_b;
-	u8 val8;
+	u8 val8, base;
 	int group, i;
 
 	group = rtl8xxxu_gen1_channel_to_group(channel);
 
-	cck[0] = priv->cck_tx_power_index_A[group] - 1;
-	cck[1] = priv->cck_tx_power_index_B[group] - 1;
+	cck[0] = priv->cck_tx_power_index_A[group];
+	cck[1] = priv->cck_tx_power_index_B[group];
 
 	if (priv->hi_pa) {
 		if (cck[0] > 0x20)
@@ -1407,10 +1408,6 @@ rtl8xxxu_gen1_set_tx_power(struct rtl8xx
 
 	ofdm[0] = priv->ht40_1s_tx_power_index_A[group];
 	ofdm[1] = priv->ht40_1s_tx_power_index_B[group];
-	if (ofdm[0])
-		ofdm[0] -= 1;
-	if (ofdm[1])
-		ofdm[1] -= 1;
 
 	ofdmbase[0] = ofdm[0] +	priv->ofdm_tx_power_index_diff[group].a;
 	ofdmbase[1] = ofdm[1] +	priv->ofdm_tx_power_index_diff[group].b;
@@ -1499,20 +1496,19 @@ rtl8xxxu_gen1_set_tx_power(struct rtl8xx
 
 	rtl8xxxu_write32(priv, REG_TX_AGC_A_MCS15_MCS12,
 			 mcs_a + power_base->reg_0e1c);
+	val8 = u32_get_bits(mcs_a + power_base->reg_0e1c, 0xff000000);
 	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
-		if (i != 2)
-			val8 = (mcsbase[0] > 8) ? (mcsbase[0] - 8) : 0;
-		else
-			val8 = (mcsbase[0] > 6) ? (mcsbase[0] - 6) : 0;
+		base = i != 2 ? 8 : 6;
+		val8 = max_t(int, val8 - base, 0);
 		rtl8xxxu_write8(priv, REG_OFDM0_XC_TX_IQ_IMBALANCE + i, val8);
 	}
+
 	rtl8xxxu_write32(priv, REG_TX_AGC_B_MCS15_MCS12,
 			 mcs_b + power_base->reg_0868);
+	val8 = u32_get_bits(mcs_b + power_base->reg_0868, 0xff000000);
 	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
-		if (i != 2)
-			val8 = (mcsbase[1] > 8) ? (mcsbase[1] - 8) : 0;
-		else
-			val8 = (mcsbase[1] > 6) ? (mcsbase[1] - 6) : 0;
+		base = i != 2 ? 8 : 6;
+		val8 = max_t(int, val8 - base, 0);
 		rtl8xxxu_write8(priv, REG_OFDM0_XD_TX_IQ_IMBALANCE + i, val8);
 	}
 }
author maintainer
#182 lore raw

PATCH 180/202 arm64: dts: hi3798cv200: fix the size of GICR

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yang Xiwen <[email protected]>

commit 428a575dc9038846ad259466d5ba109858c0a023 upstream.

During boot, Linux kernel complains:

[    0.000000] GIC: GICv2 detected, but range too small and irqchip.gicv2_force_probe not set

This SoC is using a regular GIC-400 and the GICR space size should be 8KB rather than 256B.

With this patch:

[    0.000000] GIC: Using split EOI/Deactivate mode

So this should be the correct fix.

Fixes 2f20182ed670 ("arm64: dts: hisilicon: add dts files for hi3798cv200-poplar board")
---
 arch/arm64/boot/dts/hisilicon/hi3798cv200.dtsi |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/boot/dts/hisilicon/hi3798cv200.dtsi +1 -1
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
 	gic: interrupt-controller@f1001000 {
 		compatible = "arm,gic-400";
 		reg = <0x0 0xf1001000 0x0 0x1000>,  /* GICD */
-		      <0x0 0xf1002000 0x0 0x100>;   /* GICC */
+		      <0x0 0xf1002000 0x0 0x2000>;  /* GICC */
 		#address-cells = <0>;
 		#interrupt-cells = <3>;
 		interrupt-controller;
author maintainer
#183 lore raw

PATCH 181/202 media: mc: mark the media devnode as registered from the, start

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>

commit 4bc60736154bc9e0e39d3b88918f5d3762ebe5e0 upstream.

First the media device node was created, and if successful it was marked as 'registered'. This leaves a small race condition where an application can open the device node and get an error back because the 'registered' flag was not yet set.

Change the order: first set the 'registered' flag, then actually register the media device node. If that fails, then clear the flag.

Fixes cf4b9211b568 ("[media] media: Media device node support")
---
 drivers/media/mc/mc-devnode.c |    5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/media/mc/mc-devnode.c +2 -3
@@ -246,15 +246,14 @@ int __must_check media_devnode_register(
 	kobject_set_name(&devnode->cdev.kobj, "media%d", devnode->minor);
 
 	/* Part 3: Add the media and char device */
+	set_bit(MEDIA_FLAG_REGISTERED, &devnode->flags);
 	ret = cdev_device_add(&devnode->cdev, &devnode->dev);
 	if (ret < 0) {
+		clear_bit(MEDIA_FLAG_REGISTERED, &devnode->flags);
 		pr_err("%s: cdev_device_add failed\n", __func__);
 		goto cdev_add_error;
 	}
 
-	/* Part 4: Activate this minor. The char device can now be used. */
-	set_bit(MEDIA_FLAG_REGISTERED, &devnode->flags);
-
 	return 0;
 
 cdev_add_error:
author maintainer
#184 lore raw

PATCH 182/202 media: mxl5xx: Move xpt structures off stack

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>

commit 526f4527545b2d4ce0733733929fac7b6da09ac6 upstream.

When building for LoongArch with clang 18.0.0, the stack usage of probe() is larger than the allowed 2048 bytes:

drivers/media/dvb-frontends/mxl5xx.c:1698:12: warning: stack frame size (2368) exceeds limit (2048) in 'probe' [-Wframe-larger-than]
1698 | static int probe(struct mxl *state, struct mxl5xx_cfg *cfg)
| ^
1 warning generated.

This is the result of the linked LLVM commit, which changes how the arrays of structures in config_ts() get handled with CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ZERO and CONFIG_INIT_STACK_PATTERN, which causes the above warning in combination with inlining, as config_ts() gets inlined into probe().

This warning can be easily fixed by moving the array of structures off of the stackvia 'static const', which is a better location for these variables anyways because they are static data that is only ever read from, never modified, so allocating the stack space is wasteful.

This drops the stack usage from 2368 bytes to 256 bytes with the same compiler and configuration.

---
 drivers/media/dvb-frontends/mxl5xx.c |   22 +++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/mxl5xx.c +11 -11
@@ -1391,57 +1391,57 @@ static int config_ts(struct mxl *state,
 	u32 nco_count_min = 0;
 	u32 clk_type = 0;
 
-	struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_sync_polarity[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX] = {
+	static const struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_sync_polarity[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX] = {
 		{0x90700010, 8, 1}, {0x90700010, 9, 1},
 		{0x90700010, 10, 1}, {0x90700010, 11, 1},
 		{0x90700010, 12, 1}, {0x90700010, 13, 1},
 		{0x90700010, 14, 1}, {0x90700010, 15, 1} };
-	struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_clock_polarity[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX] = {
+	static const struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_clock_polarity[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX] = {
 		{0x90700010, 16, 1}, {0x90700010, 17, 1},
 		{0x90700010, 18, 1}, {0x90700010, 19, 1},
 		{0x90700010, 20, 1}, {0x90700010, 21, 1},
 		{0x90700010, 22, 1}, {0x90700010, 23, 1} };
-	struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_valid_polarity[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX] = {
+	static const struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_valid_polarity[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX] = {
 		{0x90700014, 0, 1}, {0x90700014, 1, 1},
 		{0x90700014, 2, 1}, {0x90700014, 3, 1},
 		{0x90700014, 4, 1}, {0x90700014, 5, 1},
 		{0x90700014, 6, 1}, {0x90700014, 7, 1} };
-	struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_ts_clock_phase[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX] = {
+	static const struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_ts_clock_phase[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX] = {
 		{0x90700018, 0, 3}, {0x90700018, 4, 3},
 		{0x90700018, 8, 3}, {0x90700018, 12, 3},
 		{0x90700018, 16, 3}, {0x90700018, 20, 3},
 		{0x90700018, 24, 3}, {0x90700018, 28, 3} };
-	struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_lsb_first[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX] = {
+	static const struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_lsb_first[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX] = {
 		{0x9070000C, 16, 1}, {0x9070000C, 17, 1},
 		{0x9070000C, 18, 1}, {0x9070000C, 19, 1},
 		{0x9070000C, 20, 1}, {0x9070000C, 21, 1},
 		{0x9070000C, 22, 1}, {0x9070000C, 23, 1} };
-	struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_sync_byte[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX] = {
+	static const struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_sync_byte[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX] = {
 		{0x90700010, 0, 1}, {0x90700010, 1, 1},
 		{0x90700010, 2, 1}, {0x90700010, 3, 1},
 		{0x90700010, 4, 1}, {0x90700010, 5, 1},
 		{0x90700010, 6, 1}, {0x90700010, 7, 1} };
-	struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_enable_output[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX] = {
+	static const struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_enable_output[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX] = {
 		{0x9070000C, 0, 1}, {0x9070000C, 1, 1},
 		{0x9070000C, 2, 1}, {0x9070000C, 3, 1},
 		{0x9070000C, 4, 1}, {0x9070000C, 5, 1},
 		{0x9070000C, 6, 1}, {0x9070000C, 7, 1} };
-	struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_err_replace_sync[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX] = {
+	static const struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_err_replace_sync[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX] = {
 		{0x9070000C, 24, 1}, {0x9070000C, 25, 1},
 		{0x9070000C, 26, 1}, {0x9070000C, 27, 1},
 		{0x9070000C, 28, 1}, {0x9070000C, 29, 1},
 		{0x9070000C, 30, 1}, {0x9070000C, 31, 1} };
-	struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_err_replace_valid[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX] = {
+	static const struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_err_replace_valid[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX] = {
 		{0x90700014, 8, 1}, {0x90700014, 9, 1},
 		{0x90700014, 10, 1}, {0x90700014, 11, 1},
 		{0x90700014, 12, 1}, {0x90700014, 13, 1},
 		{0x90700014, 14, 1}, {0x90700014, 15, 1} };
-	struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_continuous_clock[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX] = {
+	static const struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_continuous_clock[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX] = {
 		{0x907001D4, 0, 1}, {0x907001D4, 1, 1},
 		{0x907001D4, 2, 1}, {0x907001D4, 3, 1},
 		{0x907001D4, 4, 1}, {0x907001D4, 5, 1},
 		{0x907001D4, 6, 1}, {0x907001D4, 7, 1} };
-	struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_nco_clock_rate[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX] = {
+	static const struct MXL_REG_FIELD_T xpt_nco_clock_rate[MXL_HYDRA_DEMOD_MAX] = {
 		{0x90700044, 16, 80}, {0x90700044, 16, 81},
 		{0x90700044, 16, 82}, {0x90700044, 16, 83},
 		{0x90700044, 16, 84}, {0x90700044, 16, 85},
author maintainer
#185 lore raw

PATCH 183/202 media: v4l2-core: hold videodev_lock until dev reg, finishes

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>

commit 1ed4477f2ea4743e7c5e1f9f3722152d14e6eeb1 upstream.

After the new V4L2 device node was registered, some additional initialization was done before the device node was marked as 'registered'. During the time between creating the device node and marking it as 'registered' it was possible to open the device node, which would return -ENODEV since the 'registered' flag was not yet set.

Hold the videodev_lock mutex from just before the device node is registered until the 'registered' flag is set. Since v4l2_open will take the same lock, it will wait until this registration process is finished. This resolves this race condition.

---
 drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-dev.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-dev.c +3 -0
@@ -1011,8 +1011,10 @@ int __video_register_device(struct video
 	vdev->dev.devt = MKDEV(VIDEO_MAJOR, vdev->minor);
 	vdev->dev.parent = vdev->dev_parent;
 	dev_set_name(&vdev->dev, "%s%d", name_base, vdev->num);
+	mutex_lock(&videodev_lock);
 	ret = device_register(&vdev->dev);
 	if (ret < 0) {
+		mutex_unlock(&videodev_lock);
 		pr_err("%s: device_register failed\n", __func__);
 		goto cleanup;
 	}
@@ -1032,6 +1034,7 @@ int __video_register_device(struct video
 
 	/* Part 6: Activate this minor. The char device can now be used. */
 	set_bit(V4L2_FL_REGISTERED, &vdev->flags);
+	mutex_unlock(&videodev_lock);
 
 	return 0;
 
author maintainer
#186 lore raw

PATCH 184/202 fbdev: savage: Handle err return when savagefb_check_var failed

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Cai Xinchen <[email protected]>

commit 6ad959b6703e2c4c5d7af03b4cfd5ff608036339 upstream.

The commit 04e5eac8f3ab("fbdev: savage: Error out if pixclock equals zero") checks the value of pixclock to avoid divide-by-zero error. However the function savagefb_probe doesn't handle the error return of savagefb_check_var. When pixclock is 0, it will cause divide-by-zero error.

Fixes 04e5eac8f3ab ("fbdev: savage: Error out if pixclock equals zero")
---
 drivers/video/fbdev/savage/savagefb_driver.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/video/fbdev/savage/savagefb_driver.c +4 -1
@@ -2273,7 +2273,10 @@ static int savagefb_probe(struct pci_dev
 	if (info->var.xres_virtual > 0x1000)
 		info->var.xres_virtual = 0x1000;
 #endif
-	savagefb_check_var(&info->var, info);
+	err = savagefb_check_var(&info->var, info);
+	if (err)
+		goto failed;
+
 	savagefb_set_fix(info);
 
 	/*
author maintainer
#187 lore raw

PATCH 185/202 KVM: arm64: Allow AArch32 PSTATE.M to be restored as System mode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>

commit dfe6d190f38fc5df5ff2614b463a5195a399c885 upstream.

It appears that we don't allow a vcpu to be restored in AArch32 System mode, as we *never* included it in the list of valid modes.

Just add it to the list of allowed modes.

Fixes 0d854a60b1d7 ("arm64: KVM: enable initialization of a 32bit vcpu")
---
 arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/arm64/kvm/guest.c +1 -0
@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@ static int set_core_reg(struct kvm_vcpu
 		case PSR_AA32_MODE_SVC:
 		case PSR_AA32_MODE_ABT:
 		case PSR_AA32_MODE_UND:
+		case PSR_AA32_MODE_SYS:
 			if (!vcpu_el1_is_32bit(vcpu))
 				return -EINVAL;
 			break;
author maintainer
#188 lore raw

PATCH 186/202 crypto: ecrdsa - Fix module auto-load on add_key

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vitaly Chikunov <[email protected]>

commit eb5739a1efbc9ff216271aeea0ebe1c92e5383e5 upstream.

Add module alias with the algorithm cra_name similar to what we have for RSA-related and other algorithms.

The kernel attempts to modprobe asymmetric algorithms using the names "crypto-$cra_name" and "crypto-$cra_name-all." However, since these aliases are currently missing, the modules are not loaded. For instance, when using the add_key function, the hash algorithm is typically loaded automatically, but the asymmetric algorithm is not.

Steps to test:

1. Cert is generated usings ima-evm-utils test suite with gen-keys.sh, example cert is provided below:

  $ base64 -d >test-gost2012_512-A.cer <<EOF
  MIIB/DCCAWagAwIBAgIUK8+whWevr3FFkSdU9GLDAM7ure8wDAYIKoUDBwEBAwMFADARMQ8wDQYD
  VQQDDAZDQSBLZXkwIBcNMjIwMjAxMjIwOTQxWhgPMjA4MjEyMDUyMjA5NDFaMBExDzANBgNVBAMM
  BkNBIEtleTCBoDAXBggqhQMHAQEBAjALBgkqhQMHAQIBAgEDgYQABIGALXNrTJGgeErBUOov3Cfo
  IrHF9fcj8UjzwGeKCkbCcINzVUbdPmCopeJRHDJEvQBX1CQUPtlwDv6ANjTTRoq5nCk9L5PPFP1H
  z73JIXHT0eRBDVoWy0cWDRz1mmQlCnN2HThMtEloaQI81nTlKZOcEYDtDpi5WODmjEeRNQJMdqCj
  UDBOMAwGA1UdEwQFMAMBAf8wHQYDVR0OBBYEFCwfOITMbE9VisW1i2TYeu1tAo5QMB8GA1UdIwQY
  MBaAFCwfOITMbE9VisW1i2TYeu1tAo5QMAwGCCqFAwcBAQMDBQADgYEAmBfJCMTdC0/NSjz4BBiQ
  qDIEjomO7FEHYlkX5NGulcF8FaJW2jeyyXXtbpnub1IQ8af1KFIpwoS2e93LaaofxpWlpQLlju6m
  KYLOcO4xK3Whwa2hBAz9YbpUSFjvxnkS2/jpH2MsOSXuUEeCruG/RkHHB3ACef9umG6HCNQuAPY=
  EOF

2. Optionally, trace module requests with: trace-cmd stream -e module &

3. Trigger add_key call for the cert:

  # keyctl padd asymmetric "" @u <test-gost2012_512-A.cer
  939910969
  # lsmod | head -3
  Module                  Size  Used by
  ecrdsa_generic         16384  0
  streebog_generic       28672  0
---
 crypto/ecrdsa.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
crypto/ecrdsa.c +1 -0
@@ -293,4 +293,5 @@ module_exit(ecrdsa_mod_fini);
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
 MODULE_AUTHOR("Vitaly Chikunov <[email protected]>");
 MODULE_DESCRIPTION("EC-RDSA generic algorithm");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ecrdsa");
 MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("ecrdsa-generic");
author maintainer
#189 lore raw

PATCH 187/202 crypto: qat - Fix ADF_DEV_RESET_SYNC memory leak

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Herbert Xu <[email protected]>

commit d3b17c6d9dddc2db3670bc9be628b122416a3d26 upstream.

Using completion_done to determine whether the caller has gone away only works after a complete call. Furthermore it's still possible that the caller has not yet called wait_for_completion, resulting in another potential UAF.

Fix this by making the caller use cancel_work_sync and then freeing the memory safely.

Fixes 7d42e097607c ("crypto: qat - resolve race condition during AER recovery")
---
 drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c |   19 +++++--------------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
drivers/crypto/qat/qat_common/adf_aer.c +5 -14
@@ -139,8 +139,7 @@ static void adf_device_reset_worker(stru
 	if (adf_dev_init(accel_dev) || adf_dev_start(accel_dev)) {
 		/* The device hanged and we can't restart it so stop here */
 		dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev), "Restart device failed\n");
-		if (reset_data->mode == ADF_DEV_RESET_ASYNC ||
-		    completion_done(&reset_data->compl))
+		if (reset_data->mode == ADF_DEV_RESET_ASYNC)
 			kfree(reset_data);
 		WARN(1, "QAT: device restart failed. Device is unusable\n");
 		return;
@@ -148,16 +147,8 @@ static void adf_device_reset_worker(stru
 	adf_dev_restarted_notify(accel_dev);
 	clear_bit(ADF_STATUS_RESTARTING, &accel_dev->status);
 
-	/*
-	 * The dev is back alive. Notify the caller if in sync mode
-	 *
-	 * If device restart will take a more time than expected,
-	 * the schedule_reset() function can timeout and exit. This can be
-	 * detected by calling the completion_done() function. In this case
-	 * the reset_data structure needs to be freed here.
-	 */
-	if (reset_data->mode == ADF_DEV_RESET_ASYNC ||
-	    completion_done(&reset_data->compl))
+	/* The dev is back alive. Notify the caller if in sync mode */
+	if (reset_data->mode == ADF_DEV_RESET_ASYNC)
 		kfree(reset_data);
 	else
 		complete(&reset_data->compl);
@@ -192,10 +183,10 @@ static int adf_dev_aer_schedule_reset(st
 		if (!timeout) {
 			dev_err(&GET_DEV(accel_dev),
 				"Reset device timeout expired\n");
+			cancel_work_sync(&reset_data->reset_work);
 			ret = -EFAULT;
-		} else {
-			kfree(reset_data);
 		}
+		kfree(reset_data);
 		return ret;
 	}
 	return 0;
author maintainer
#190 lore raw

PATCH 188/202 net/ipv6: Fix route deleting failure when metric equals 0

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: xu xin <[email protected]>

commit bb487272380d120295e955ad8acfcbb281b57642 upstream.

Problem
=========
After commit 67f695134703 ("ipv6: Move setting default metric for routes"), we noticed that the logic of assigning the default value of fc_metirc changed in the ioctl process. That is, when users use ioctl(fd, SIOCADDRT, rt) with a non-zero metric to add a route, then they may fail to delete a route with passing in a metric value of 0 to the kernel by ioctl(fd, SIOCDELRT, rt). But iproute can succeed in deleting it.

As a reference, when using iproute tools by netlink to delete routes with a metric parameter equals 0, like the command as follows:

	ip -6 route del fe80::/64 via fe81::5054:ff:fe11:3451 dev eth0 metric 0

the user can still succeed in deleting the route entry with the smallest metric.

Root Reason
===========
After commit 67f695134703 ("ipv6: Move setting default metric for routes"), When ioctl() pass in SIOCDELRT with a zero metric, rtmsg_to_fib6_config() will set a defalut value (1024) to cfg->fc_metric in kernel, and in ip6_route_del() and the line 4074 at net/ipv3/route.c, it will check by

	if (cfg->fc_metric && cfg->fc_metric != rt->fib6_metric)
		continue;

and the condition is true and skip the later procedure (deleting route) because cfg->fc_metric != rt->fib6_metric. But before that commit, cfg->fc_metric is still zero there, so the condition is false and it will do the following procedure (deleting).

Solution
========
In order to keep a consistent behaviour across netlink() and ioctl(), we should allow to delete a route with a metric value of 0. So we only do the default setting of fc_metric in route adding.

---
 net/ipv6/route.c |    5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv6/route.c +4 -1
@@ -4341,7 +4341,7 @@ static void rtmsg_to_fib6_config(struct
 		.fc_table = l3mdev_fib_table_by_index(net, rtmsg->rtmsg_ifindex) ?
 			 : RT6_TABLE_MAIN,
 		.fc_ifindex = rtmsg->rtmsg_ifindex,
-		.fc_metric = rtmsg->rtmsg_metric ? : IP6_RT_PRIO_USER,
+		.fc_metric = rtmsg->rtmsg_metric,
 		.fc_expires = rtmsg->rtmsg_info,
 		.fc_dst_len = rtmsg->rtmsg_dst_len,
 		.fc_src_len = rtmsg->rtmsg_src_len,
@@ -4377,6 +4377,9 @@ int ipv6_route_ioctl(struct net *net, un
 		rtnl_lock();
 		switch (cmd) {
 		case SIOCADDRT:
+			/* Only do the default setting of fc_metric in route adding */
+			if (cfg.fc_metric == 0)
+				cfg.fc_metric = IP6_RT_PRIO_USER;
 			err = ip6_route_add(&cfg, GFP_KERNEL, NULL);
 			break;
 		case SIOCDELRT:
author maintainer
#191 lore raw

PATCH 189/202 net/9p: fix uninit-value in p9_client_rpc()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nikita Zhandarovich <[email protected]>

commit 25460d6f39024cc3b8241b14c7ccf0d6f11a736a upstream.

Syzbot with the help of KMSAN reported the following error:

BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in trace_9p_client_res include/trace/events/9p.h:146 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in p9_client_rpc+0x1314/0x1340 net/9p/client.c:754
 trace_9p_client_res include/trace/events/9p.h:146 [inline]
 p9_client_rpc+0x1314/0x1340 net/9p/client.c:754
 p9_client_create+0x1551/0x1ff0 net/9p/client.c:1031
 v9fs_session_init+0x1b9/0x28e0 fs/9p/v9fs.c:410
 v9fs_mount+0xe2/0x12b0 fs/9p/vfs_super.c:122
 legacy_get_tree+0x114/0x290 fs/fs_context.c:662
 vfs_get_tree+0xa7/0x570 fs/super.c:1797
 do_new_mount+0x71f/0x15e0 fs/namespace.c:3352
 path_mount+0x742/0x1f20 fs/namespace.c:3679
 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3692 [inline]
 __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3898 [inline]
 __se_sys_mount+0x725/0x810 fs/namespace.c:3875
 __x64_sys_mount+0xe4/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3875
 do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75

Uninit was created at:

 __alloc_pages+0x9d6/0xe70 mm/page_alloc.c:4598
 __alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:238 [inline]
 alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:261 [inline]
 alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:2175 [inline]
 allocate_slab mm/slub.c:2338 [inline]
 new_slab+0x2de/0x1400 mm/slub.c:2391
 ___slab_alloc+0x1184/0x33d0 mm/slub.c:3525
 __slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3610 [inline]
 __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3663 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3835 [inline]
 kmem_cache_alloc+0x6d3/0xbe0 mm/slub.c:3852
 p9_tag_alloc net/9p/client.c:278 [inline]
 p9_client_prepare_req+0x20a/0x1770 net/9p/client.c:641
 p9_client_rpc+0x27e/0x1340 net/9p/client.c:688
 p9_client_create+0x1551/0x1ff0 net/9p/client.c:1031
 v9fs_session_init+0x1b9/0x28e0 fs/9p/v9fs.c:410
 v9fs_mount+0xe2/0x12b0 fs/9p/vfs_super.c:122
 legacy_get_tree+0x114/0x290 fs/fs_context.c:662
 vfs_get_tree+0xa7/0x570 fs/super.c:1797
 do_new_mount+0x71f/0x15e0 fs/namespace.c:3352
 path_mount+0x742/0x1f20 fs/namespace.c:3679
 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3692 [inline]
 __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3898 [inline]
 __se_sys_mount+0x725/0x810 fs/namespace.c:3875
 __x64_sys_mount+0xe4/0x150 fs/namespace.c:3875
 do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75

If p9_check_errors() fails early in p9_client_rpc(), req->rc.tag will not be properly initialized. However, trace_9p_client_res() ends up trying to print it out anyway before p9_client_rpc() finishes.

Fix this issue by assigning default values to p9_fcall fields such as 'tag' and (just in case KMSAN unearths something new) 'id' during the tag allocation stage.

Reported-and-tested-by [email protected]
Fixes 348b59012e5c ("net/9p: Convert net/9p protocol dumps to tracepoints")

Message-ID: <[email protected]>

---
 net/9p/client.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/9p/client.c +2 -0
@@ -235,6 +235,8 @@ static int p9_fcall_init(struct p9_clien
 	if (!fc->sdata)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	fc->capacity = alloc_msize;
+	fc->id = 0;
+	fc->tag = P9_NOTAG;
 	return 0;
 }
 
author maintainer
#192 lore raw

PATCH 190/202 intel_th: pci: Add Meteor Lake-S CPU support

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>

commit a4f813c3ec9d1c32bc402becd1f011b3904dd699 upstream.

Add support for the Trace Hub in Meteor Lake-S CPU.

---
 drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/pci.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/hwtracing/intel_th/pci.c +5 -0
@@ -290,6 +290,11 @@ static const struct pci_device_id intel_
 		.driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)&intel_th_2x,
 	},
 	{
+		/* Meteor Lake-S CPU */
+		PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0xae24),
+		.driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)&intel_th_2x,
+	},
+	{
 		/* Raptor Lake-S */
 		PCI_DEVICE(PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL, 0x7a26),
 		.driver_data = (kernel_ulong_t)&intel_th_2x,
author maintainer
#193 lore raw

PATCH 191/202 sparc64: Fix number of online CPUs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sam Ravnborg <[email protected]>

commit 98937707fea8375e8acea0aaa0b68a956dd52719 upstream.

Nick Bowler reported:
When using newer kernels on my Ultra 60 with dual 450MHz UltraSPARC-II CPUs, I noticed that only CPU 0 comes up, while older kernels (including 4.7) are working fine with both CPUs.

I bisected the failure to this commit:

9b2f753ec23710aa32c0d837d2499db92fe9115b is the first bad commit commit 9b2f753ec23710aa32c0d837d2499db92fe9115b
Author: Atish Patra <[email protected]>
Date: Thu Sep 15 14:54:40 2016 -0600

sparc64: Fix cpu_possible_mask if nr_cpus is set

This is a small change that reverts very easily on top of 5.18: there is just one trivial conflict. Once reverted, both CPUs work again.

Maybe this is related to the fact that the CPUs on this system are numbered CPU0 and CPU2 (there is no CPU1)?

The current code that adjust cpu_possible based on nr_cpu_ids do not take into account that CPU's may not come one after each other. Move the chech to the function that setup the cpu_possible mask so there is no need to adjust it later.

---
 arch/sparc/include/asm/smp_64.h |    2 --
 arch/sparc/kernel/prom_64.c     |    4 +++-
 arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c    |    1 -
 arch/sparc/kernel/smp_64.c      |   14 --------------
 4 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
arch/sparc/include/asm/smp_64.h +0 -2
@@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ void arch_send_call_function_ipi_mask(co
 int hard_smp_processor_id(void);
 #define raw_smp_processor_id() (current_thread_info()->cpu)
 
-void smp_fill_in_cpu_possible_map(void);
 void smp_fill_in_sib_core_maps(void);
 void cpu_play_dead(void);
 
@@ -77,7 +76,6 @@ void __cpu_die(unsigned int cpu);
 #define smp_fill_in_sib_core_maps() do { } while (0)
 #define smp_fetch_global_regs() do { } while (0)
 #define smp_fetch_global_pmu() do { } while (0)
-#define smp_fill_in_cpu_possible_map() do { } while (0)
 #define smp_init_cpu_poke() do { } while (0)
 #define scheduler_poke() do { } while (0)
 
arch/sparc/kernel/prom_64.c +3 -1
@@ -483,7 +483,9 @@ static void *record_one_cpu(struct devic
 	ncpus_probed++;
 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 	set_cpu_present(cpuid, true);
-	set_cpu_possible(cpuid, true);
+
+	if (num_possible_cpus() < nr_cpu_ids)
+		set_cpu_possible(cpuid, true);
 #endif
 	return NULL;
 }
arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c +0 -1
@@ -695,7 +695,6 @@ void __init setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)
 
 	paging_init();
 	init_sparc64_elf_hwcap();
-	smp_fill_in_cpu_possible_map();
 	/*
 	 * Once the OF device tree and MDESC have been setup and nr_cpus has
 	 * been parsed, we know the list of possible cpus.  Therefore we can
arch/sparc/kernel/smp_64.c +0 -14
@@ -1213,20 +1213,6 @@ void __init smp_setup_processor_id(void)
 		xcall_deliver_impl = hypervisor_xcall_deliver;
 }
 
-void __init smp_fill_in_cpu_possible_map(void)
-{
-	int possible_cpus = num_possible_cpus();
-	int i;
-
-	if (possible_cpus > nr_cpu_ids)
-		possible_cpus = nr_cpu_ids;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < possible_cpus; i++)
-		set_cpu_possible(i, true);
-	for (; i < NR_CPUS; i++)
-		set_cpu_possible(i, false);
-}
-
 void smp_fill_in_sib_core_maps(void)
 {
 	unsigned int i;
author maintainer
#194 lore raw

PATCH 192/202 kdb: Fix buffer overflow during tab-complete

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Thompson <[email protected]>

commit e9730744bf3af04cda23799029342aa3cddbc454 upstream.

Currently, when the user attempts symbol completion with the Tab key, kdb will use strncpy() to insert the completed symbol into the command buffer. Unfortunately it passes the size of the source buffer rather than the destination to strncpy() with predictably horrible results. Most obviously if the command buffer is already full but cp, the cursor position, is in the middle of the buffer, then we will write past the end of the supplied buffer.

Fix this by replacing the dubious strncpy() calls with memmove()/memcpy() calls plus explicit boundary checks to make sure we have enough space before we start moving characters around.

---
 kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c |   21 +++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c +13 -8
@@ -364,14 +364,19 @@ poll_again:
 			kdb_printf(kdb_prompt_str);
 			kdb_printf("%s", buffer);
 		} else if (tab != 2 && count > 0) {
-			len_tmp = strlen(p_tmp);
-			strncpy(p_tmp+len_tmp, cp, lastchar-cp+1);
-			len_tmp = strlen(p_tmp);
-			strncpy(cp, p_tmp+len, len_tmp-len + 1);
-			len = len_tmp - len;
-			kdb_printf("%s", cp);
-			cp += len;
-			lastchar += len;
+			/* How many new characters do we want from tmpbuffer? */
+			len_tmp = strlen(p_tmp) - len;
+			if (lastchar + len_tmp >= bufend)
+				len_tmp = bufend - lastchar;
+
+			if (len_tmp) {
+				/* + 1 ensures the '\0' is memmove'd */
+				memmove(cp+len_tmp, cp, (lastchar-cp) + 1);
+				memcpy(cp, p_tmp+len, len_tmp);
+				kdb_printf("%s", cp);
+				cp += len_tmp;
+				lastchar += len_tmp;
+			}
 		}
 		kdb_nextline = 1; /* reset output line number */
 		break;
author maintainer
#195 lore raw

PATCH 193/202 kdb: Use format-strings rather than \0 injection in kdb_read()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Thompson <[email protected]>

commit 09b35989421dfd5573f0b4683c7700a7483c71f9 upstream.

Currently when kdb_read() needs to reposition the cursor it uses copy and paste code that works by injecting an '\0' at the cursor position before delivering a carriage-return and reprinting the line (which stops at the '\0').

Tidy up the code by hoisting the copy and paste code into an appropriately named function. Additionally let's replace the '\0' injection with a proper field width parameter so that the string will be abridged during formatting instead.

---
 kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c |   55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c +34 -21
@@ -170,6 +170,33 @@ static int kdb_read_get_key(char *buffer
 	return key;
 }
 
+/**
+ * kdb_position_cursor() - Place cursor in the correct horizontal position
+ * @prompt: Nil-terminated string containing the prompt string
+ * @buffer: Nil-terminated string containing the entire command line
+ * @cp: Cursor position, pointer the character in buffer where the cursor
+ *      should be positioned.
+ *
+ * The cursor is positioned by sending a carriage-return and then printing
+ * the content of the line until we reach the correct cursor position.
+ *
+ * There is some additional fine detail here.
+ *
+ * Firstly, even though kdb_printf() will correctly format zero-width fields
+ * we want the second call to kdb_printf() to be conditional. That keeps things
+ * a little cleaner when LOGGING=1.
+ *
+ * Secondly, we can't combine everything into one call to kdb_printf() since
+ * that renders into a fixed length buffer and the combined print could result
+ * in unwanted truncation.
+ */
+static void kdb_position_cursor(char *prompt, char *buffer, char *cp)
+{
+	kdb_printf("\r%s", kdb_prompt_str);
+	if (cp > buffer)
+		kdb_printf("%.*s", (int)(cp - buffer), buffer);
+}
+
 /*
  * kdb_read
  *
@@ -208,7 +235,6 @@ static char *kdb_read(char *buffer, size
 						 * and null byte */
 	char *lastchar;
 	char *p_tmp;
-	char tmp;
 	static char tmpbuffer[CMD_BUFLEN];
 	int len = strlen(buffer);
 	int len_tmp;
@@ -247,12 +273,8 @@ poll_again:
 			}
 			*(--lastchar) = '\0';
 			--cp;
-			kdb_printf("\b%s \r", cp);
-			tmp = *cp;
-			*cp = '\0';
-			kdb_printf(kdb_prompt_str);
-			kdb_printf("%s", buffer);
-			*cp = tmp;
+			kdb_printf("\b%s ", cp);
+			kdb_position_cursor(kdb_prompt_str, buffer, cp);
 		}
 		break;
 	case 13: /* enter */
@@ -269,19 +291,14 @@ poll_again:
 			memcpy(tmpbuffer, cp+1, lastchar - cp - 1);
 			memcpy(cp, tmpbuffer, lastchar - cp - 1);
 			*(--lastchar) = '\0';
-			kdb_printf("%s \r", cp);
-			tmp = *cp;
-			*cp = '\0';
-			kdb_printf(kdb_prompt_str);
-			kdb_printf("%s", buffer);
-			*cp = tmp;
+			kdb_printf("%s ", cp);
+			kdb_position_cursor(kdb_prompt_str, buffer, cp);
 		}
 		break;
 	case 1: /* Home */
 		if (cp > buffer) {
-			kdb_printf("\r");
-			kdb_printf(kdb_prompt_str);
 			cp = buffer;
+			kdb_position_cursor(kdb_prompt_str, buffer, cp);
 		}
 		break;
 	case 5: /* End */
@@ -387,13 +404,9 @@ poll_again:
 				memcpy(cp+1, tmpbuffer, lastchar - cp);
 				*++lastchar = '\0';
 				*cp = key;
-				kdb_printf("%s\r", cp);
+				kdb_printf("%s", cp);
 				++cp;
-				tmp = *cp;
-				*cp = '\0';
-				kdb_printf(kdb_prompt_str);
-				kdb_printf("%s", buffer);
-				*cp = tmp;
+				kdb_position_cursor(kdb_prompt_str, buffer, cp);
 			} else {
 				*++lastchar = '\0';
 				*cp++ = key;
author maintainer
#196 lore raw

PATCH 194/202 kdb: Fix console handling when editing and tab-completing commands

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Thompson <[email protected]>

commit db2f9c7dc29114f531df4a425d0867d01e1f1e28 upstream.

Currently, if the cursor position is not at the end of the command buffer and the user uses the Tab-complete functions, then the console does not leave the cursor in the correct position.

For example consider the following buffer with the cursor positioned at the ^:

md kdb_pro 10

          ^

Pressing tab should result in:

md kdb_prompt_str 10

                 ^

However this does not happen. Instead the cursor is placed at the end (after then 10) and further cursor movement redraws incorrectly. The same problem exists when we double-Tab but in a different part of the code.

Fix this by sending a carriage return and then redisplaying the text to the left of the cursor.

---
 kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c +5 -0
@@ -380,6 +380,8 @@ poll_again:
 			kdb_printf("\n");
 			kdb_printf(kdb_prompt_str);
 			kdb_printf("%s", buffer);
+			if (cp != lastchar)
+				kdb_position_cursor(kdb_prompt_str, buffer, cp);
 		} else if (tab != 2 && count > 0) {
 			/* How many new characters do we want from tmpbuffer? */
 			len_tmp = strlen(p_tmp) - len;
@@ -393,6 +395,9 @@ poll_again:
 				kdb_printf("%s", cp);
 				cp += len_tmp;
 				lastchar += len_tmp;
+				if (cp != lastchar)
+					kdb_position_cursor(kdb_prompt_str,
+							    buffer, cp);
 			}
 		}
 		kdb_nextline = 1; /* reset output line number */
author maintainer
#197 lore raw

PATCH 195/202 kdb: Merge identical case statements in kdb_read()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Thompson <[email protected]>

commit 6244917f377bf64719551b58592a02a0336a7439 upstream.

The code that handles case 14 (down) and case 16 (up) has been copy and pasted despite being byte-for-byte identical. Combine them.

---
 kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c |   10 +---------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 9 deletions(-)
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c +1 -9
@@ -314,6 +314,7 @@ poll_again:
 		}
 		break;
 	case 14: /* Down */
+	case 16: /* Up */
 		memset(tmpbuffer, ' ',
 		       strlen(kdb_prompt_str) + (lastchar-buffer));
 		*(tmpbuffer+strlen(kdb_prompt_str) +
@@ -328,15 +329,6 @@ poll_again:
 			++cp;
 		}
 		break;
-	case 16: /* Up */
-		memset(tmpbuffer, ' ',
-		       strlen(kdb_prompt_str) + (lastchar-buffer));
-		*(tmpbuffer+strlen(kdb_prompt_str) +
-		  (lastchar-buffer)) = '\0';
-		kdb_printf("\r%s\r", tmpbuffer);
-		*lastchar = (char)key;
-		*(lastchar+1) = '\0';
-		return lastchar;
 	case 9: /* Tab */
 		if (tab < 2)
 			++tab;
author maintainer
#198 lore raw

PATCH 196/202 kdb: Use format-specifiers rather than memset() for padding in kdb_read()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Thompson <[email protected]>

commit c9b51ddb66b1d96e4d364c088da0f1dfb004c574 upstream.

Currently when the current line should be removed from the display kdb_read() uses memset() to fill a temporary buffer with spaces. The problem is not that this could be trivially implemented using a format string rather than open coding it. The real problem is that it is possible, on systems with a long kdb_prompt_str, to write past the end of the tmpbuffer.

Happily, as mentioned above, this can be trivially implemented using a format string. Make it so!

---
 kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c |    8 +++-----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_io.c +3 -5
@@ -315,11 +315,9 @@ poll_again:
 		break;
 	case 14: /* Down */
 	case 16: /* Up */
-		memset(tmpbuffer, ' ',
-		       strlen(kdb_prompt_str) + (lastchar-buffer));
-		*(tmpbuffer+strlen(kdb_prompt_str) +
-		  (lastchar-buffer)) = '\0';
-		kdb_printf("\r%s\r", tmpbuffer);
+		kdb_printf("\r%*c\r",
+			   (int)(strlen(kdb_prompt_str) + (lastchar - buffer)),
+			   ' ');
 		*lastchar = (char)key;
 		*(lastchar+1) = '\0';
 		return lastchar;
author maintainer
#199 lore raw

PATCH 197/202 net: fix __dst_negative_advice() race

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

commit 92f1655aa2b2294d0b49925f3b875a634bd3b59e upstream.

__dst_negative_advice() does not enforce proper RCU rules when sk->dst_cache must be cleared, leading to possible UAF.

RCU rules are that we must first clear sk->sk_dst_cache, then call dst_release(old_dst).

Note that sk_dst_reset(sk) is implementing this protocol correctly, while __dst_negative_advice() uses the wrong order.

Given that ip6_negative_advice() has special logic against RTF_CACHE, this means each of the three ->negative_advice() existing methods must perform the sk_dst_reset() themselves.

Note the check against NULL dst is centralized in __dst_negative_advice(), there is no need to duplicate it in various callbacks.

Many thanks to Clement Lecigne for tracking this issue.

This old bug became visible after the blamed commit, using UDP sockets.

Fixes a87cb3e48ee8 ("net: Facility to report route quality of connected sockets")
Cc Tom Herbert <[email protected]>
[Lee: Stable backport]
---
 include/net/dst_ops.h  |    2 +-
 include/net/sock.h     |   13 +++----------
 net/ipv4/route.c       |   22 ++++++++--------------
 net/ipv6/route.c       |   29 +++++++++++++++--------------
 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c |   11 +++--------
 5 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
include/net/dst_ops.h +1 -1
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ struct dst_ops {
 	void			(*destroy)(struct dst_entry *);
 	void			(*ifdown)(struct dst_entry *,
 					  struct net_device *dev, int how);
-	struct dst_entry *	(*negative_advice)(struct dst_entry *);
+	void			(*negative_advice)(struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *);
 	void			(*link_failure)(struct sk_buff *);
 	void			(*update_pmtu)(struct dst_entry *dst, struct sock *sk,
 					       struct sk_buff *skb, u32 mtu,
include/net/sock.h +3 -10
@@ -1938,19 +1938,12 @@ sk_dst_get(struct sock *sk)
 
 static inline void dst_negative_advice(struct sock *sk)
 {
-	struct dst_entry *ndst, *dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);
+	struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);
 
 	sk_rethink_txhash(sk);
 
-	if (dst && dst->ops->negative_advice) {
-		ndst = dst->ops->negative_advice(dst);
-
-		if (ndst != dst) {
-			rcu_assign_pointer(sk->sk_dst_cache, ndst);
-			sk_tx_queue_clear(sk);
-			WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_dst_pending_confirm, 0);
-		}
-	}
+	if (dst && dst->ops->negative_advice)
+		dst->ops->negative_advice(sk, dst);
 }
 
 static inline void
net/ipv4/route.c +8 -14
@@ -137,7 +137,8 @@ static int ip_rt_gc_timeout __read_mostl
 static struct dst_entry *ipv4_dst_check(struct dst_entry *dst, u32 cookie);
 static unsigned int	 ipv4_default_advmss(const struct dst_entry *dst);
 static unsigned int	 ipv4_mtu(const struct dst_entry *dst);
-static struct dst_entry *ipv4_negative_advice(struct dst_entry *dst);
+static void		ipv4_negative_advice(struct sock *sk,
+					     struct dst_entry *dst);
 static void		 ipv4_link_failure(struct sk_buff *skb);
 static void		 ip_rt_update_pmtu(struct dst_entry *dst, struct sock *sk,
 					   struct sk_buff *skb, u32 mtu,
@@ -856,22 +857,15 @@ static void ip_do_redirect(struct dst_en
 	__ip_do_redirect(rt, skb, &fl4, true);
 }
 
-static struct dst_entry *ipv4_negative_advice(struct dst_entry *dst)
+static void ipv4_negative_advice(struct sock *sk,
+				 struct dst_entry *dst)
 {
 	struct rtable *rt = (struct rtable *)dst;
-	struct dst_entry *ret = dst;
 
-	if (rt) {
-		if (dst->obsolete > 0) {
-			ip_rt_put(rt);
-			ret = NULL;
-		} else if ((rt->rt_flags & RTCF_REDIRECTED) ||
-			   rt->dst.expires) {
-			ip_rt_put(rt);
-			ret = NULL;
-		}
-	}
-	return ret;
+	if ((dst->obsolete > 0) ||
+	    (rt->rt_flags & RTCF_REDIRECTED) ||
+	    rt->dst.expires)
+		sk_dst_reset(sk);
 }
 
 /*
net/ipv6/route.c +15 -14
@@ -84,7 +84,8 @@ enum rt6_nud_state {
 static struct dst_entry	*ip6_dst_check(struct dst_entry *dst, u32 cookie);
 static unsigned int	 ip6_default_advmss(const struct dst_entry *dst);
 static unsigned int	 ip6_mtu(const struct dst_entry *dst);
-static struct dst_entry *ip6_negative_advice(struct dst_entry *);
+static void		ip6_negative_advice(struct sock *sk,
+					    struct dst_entry *dst);
 static void		ip6_dst_destroy(struct dst_entry *);
 static void		ip6_dst_ifdown(struct dst_entry *,
 				       struct net_device *dev, int how);
@@ -2658,24 +2659,24 @@ static struct dst_entry *ip6_dst_check(s
 	return dst_ret;
 }
 
-static struct dst_entry *ip6_negative_advice(struct dst_entry *dst)
+static void ip6_negative_advice(struct sock *sk,
+				struct dst_entry *dst)
 {
 	struct rt6_info *rt = (struct rt6_info *) dst;
 
-	if (rt) {
-		if (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_CACHE) {
-			rcu_read_lock();
-			if (rt6_check_expired(rt)) {
-				rt6_remove_exception_rt(rt);
-				dst = NULL;
-			}
-			rcu_read_unlock();
-		} else {
-			dst_release(dst);
-			dst = NULL;
+	if (rt->rt6i_flags & RTF_CACHE) {
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		if (rt6_check_expired(rt)) {
+			/* counteract the dst_release() in sk_dst_reset() */
+			dst_hold(dst);
+			sk_dst_reset(sk);
+
+			rt6_remove_exception_rt(rt);
 		}
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return;
 	}
-	return dst;
+	sk_dst_reset(sk);
 }
 
 static void ip6_link_failure(struct sk_buff *skb)
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +3 -8
@@ -3772,15 +3772,10 @@ static void xfrm_link_failure(struct sk_
 	/* Impossible. Such dst must be popped before reaches point of failure. */
 }
 
-static struct dst_entry *xfrm_negative_advice(struct dst_entry *dst)
+static void xfrm_negative_advice(struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst)
 {
-	if (dst) {
-		if (dst->obsolete) {
-			dst_release(dst);
-			dst = NULL;
-		}
-	}
-	return dst;
+	if (dst->obsolete)
+		sk_dst_reset(sk);
 }
 
 static void xfrm_init_pmtu(struct xfrm_dst **bundle, int nr)
author maintainer
#200 lore raw

PATCH 198/202 xsk: validate user input for XDP_{UMEM|COMPLETION}_FILL_RING

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>

commit 237f3cf13b20db183d3706d997eedc3c49eacd44 upstream.

syzbot reported an illegal copy in xsk_setsockopt() [1]

Make sure to validate setsockopt() @optlen parameter.

[1]

 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline]
 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline]
 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xsk_setsockopt+0x909/0xa40 net/xdp/xsk.c:1420
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888028c6cde3 by task syz-executor.0/7549

CPU: 0 PID: 7549 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-08951-gfe46a7dd189e #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
  dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
  print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
  print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
  kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
  copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline]
  copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline]
  xsk_setsockopt+0x909/0xa40 net/xdp/xsk.c:1420
  do_sock_setsockopt+0x3af/0x720 net/socket.c:2311
  __sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334
  __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline]
  __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline]
  __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340
 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
RIP: 0033:0x7fb40587de69
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fb40665a0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fb4059abf80 RCX: 00007fb40587de69
RDX: 0000000000000005 RSI: 000000000000011b RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00007fb4058ca47a R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000020001980 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fb4059abf80 R15: 00007fff57ee4d08
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 7549:
  kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
  kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
  poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:370 [inline]
  __kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:387
  kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline]
  __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3966 [inline]
  __kmalloc+0x233/0x4a0 mm/slub.c:3979
  kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:632 [inline]
  __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_setsockopt+0xd2f/0x1040 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:1869
  do_sock_setsockopt+0x6b4/0x720 net/socket.c:2293
  __sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334
  __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline]
  __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline]
  __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340
 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75

The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888028c6cde0
 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8

The buggy address is located 1 bytes to the right of
allocated 2-byte region [ffff888028c6cde0, ffff888028c6cde2)

The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page:ffffea0000a31b00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff888028c6c9c0 pfn:0x28c6c
anon flags: 0xfff00000000800(slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 00fff00000000800 ffff888014c41280 0000000000000000 dead000000000001
raw: ffff888028c6c9c0 0000000080800057 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x112cc0(GFP_USER|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY), pid 6648, tgid 6644 (syz-executor.0), ts 133906047828, free_ts 133859922223
  set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:31 [inline]
  post_alloc_hook+0x1ea/0x210 mm/page_alloc.c:1533
  prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1540 [inline]
  get_page_from_freelist+0x33ea/0x3580 mm/page_alloc.c:3311
  __alloc_pages+0x256/0x680 mm/page_alloc.c:4569
  __alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:238 [inline]
  alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:261 [inline]
  alloc_slab_page+0x5f/0x160 mm/slub.c:2175
  allocate_slab mm/slub.c:2338 [inline]
  new_slab+0x84/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:2391
  ___slab_alloc+0xc73/0x1260 mm/slub.c:3525
  __slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3610 [inline]
  __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3663 [inline]
  slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3835 [inline]
  __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:3965 [inline]
  __kmalloc_node+0x2db/0x4e0 mm/slub.c:3973
  kmalloc_node include/linux/slab.h:648 [inline]
  __vmalloc_area_node mm/vmalloc.c:3197 [inline]
  __vmalloc_node_range+0x5f9/0x14a0 mm/vmalloc.c:3392
  __vmalloc_node mm/vmalloc.c:3457 [inline]
  vzalloc+0x79/0x90 mm/vmalloc.c:3530
  bpf_check+0x260/0x19010 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:21162
  bpf_prog_load+0x1667/0x20f0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2895
  __sys_bpf+0x4ee/0x810 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5631
  __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5738 [inline]
  __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5736 [inline]
  __x64_sys_bpf+0x7c/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5736
 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75
page last free pid 6650 tgid 6647 stack trace:
  reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline]
  free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1140 [inline]
  free_unref_page_prepare+0x95d/0xa80 mm/page_alloc.c:2346
  free_unref_page_list+0x5a3/0x850 mm/page_alloc.c:2532
  release_pages+0x2117/0x2400 mm/swap.c:1042
  tlb_batch_pages_flush mm/mmu_gather.c:98 [inline]
  tlb_flush_mmu_free mm/mmu_gather.c:293 [inline]
  tlb_flush_mmu+0x34d/0x4e0 mm/mmu_gather.c:300
  tlb_finish_mmu+0xd4/0x200 mm/mmu_gather.c:392
  exit_mmap+0x4b6/0xd40 mm/mmap.c:3300
  __mmput+0x115/0x3c0 kernel/fork.c:1345
  exit_mm+0x220/0x310 kernel/exit.c:569
  do_exit+0x99e/0x27e0 kernel/exit.c:865
  do_group_exit+0x207/0x2c0 kernel/exit.c:1027
  get_signal+0x176e/0x1850 kernel/signal.c:2907
  arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x96/0x860 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:310
  exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:105 [inline]
  exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:328 [inline]
  __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:201 [inline]
  syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xc9/0x360 kernel/entry/common.c:212
  do_syscall_64+0x10a/0x240 arch/x86/entry/common.c:89
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75

Memory state around the buggy address:
 ffff888028c6cc80: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc
 ffff888028c6cd00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc 00 fc fc fc 06 fc fc fc
>ffff888028c6cd80: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc 02 fc fc fc
                                                       ^
 ffff888028c6ce00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc
 ffff888028c6ce80: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc
Fixes 423f38329d26 ("xsk: add umem fill queue support and mmap")
Cc "Björn Töpel" <[email protected]>
Cc Magnus Karlsson <[email protected]>
Cc Maciej Fijalkowski <[email protected]>
Cc Jonathan Lemon <[email protected]>

[shung-hsi.yu: copy_from_sockptr() in the context was replaced with copy_from_usr() because commit a7b75c5a8c414
("net: pass a sockptr_t into ->setsockopt") was not present]

---
 net/xdp/xsk.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/xdp/xsk.c +2 -0
@@ -809,6 +809,8 @@ static int xsk_setsockopt(struct socket
 		struct xsk_queue **q;
 		int entries;
 
+		if (optlen < sizeof(entries))
+			return -EINVAL;
 		if (copy_from_user(&entries, optval, sizeof(entries)))
 			return -EFAULT;
 
author maintainer
#201 lore raw

PATCH 199/202 sparc: move struct termio to asm/termios.h

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mike Gilbert <[email protected]>

commit c32d18e7942d7589b62e301eb426b32623366565 upstream.

Every other arch declares struct termio in asm/termios.h, so make sparc match them.

Resolves a build failure in the PPP software package, which includes both bits/ioctl-types.h via sys/ioctl.h (glibc) and asm/termbits.h.

---
 arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/termbits.h |   10 ----------
 arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/termios.h  |    9 +++++++++
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/termbits.h +0 -10
@@ -13,16 +13,6 @@ typedef unsigned int    tcflag_t;
 typedef unsigned long   tcflag_t;
 #endif
 
-#define NCC 8
-struct termio {
-	unsigned short c_iflag;		/* input mode flags */
-	unsigned short c_oflag;		/* output mode flags */
-	unsigned short c_cflag;		/* control mode flags */
-	unsigned short c_lflag;		/* local mode flags */
-	unsigned char c_line;		/* line discipline */
-	unsigned char c_cc[NCC];	/* control characters */
-};
-
 #define NCCS 17
 struct termios {
 	tcflag_t c_iflag;		/* input mode flags */
arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/termios.h +9 -0
@@ -40,5 +40,14 @@ struct winsize {
 	unsigned short ws_ypixel;
 };
 
+#define NCC 8
+struct termio {
+	unsigned short c_iflag;		/* input mode flags */
+	unsigned short c_oflag;		/* output mode flags */
+	unsigned short c_cflag;		/* control mode flags */
+	unsigned short c_lflag;		/* local mode flags */
+	unsigned char c_line;		/* line discipline */
+	unsigned char c_cc[NCC];	/* control characters */
+};
 
 #endif /* _UAPI_SPARC_TERMIOS_H */
author maintainer
#202 lore raw

PATCH 200/202 ext4: fix mb_cache_entrys e_refcnt leak in ext4_xattr_block_cache_find()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Baokun Li <[email protected]>

commit 0c0b4a49d3e7f49690a6827a41faeffad5df7e21 upstream.

Syzbot reports a warning as follows:

============================================

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5075 at fs/mbcache.c:419 mb_cache_destroy+0x224/0x290
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 5075 Comm: syz-executor199 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6-gb947cc5bf6d7
RIP: 0010:mb_cache_destroy+0x224/0x290 fs/mbcache.c:419
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ext4_put_super+0x6d4/0xcd0 fs/ext4/super.c:1375
 generic_shutdown_super+0x136/0x2d0 fs/super.c:641
 kill_block_super+0x44/0x90 fs/super.c:1675
 ext4_kill_sb+0x68/0xa0 fs/ext4/super.c:7327

[...]
============================================

This is because when finding an entry in ext4_xattr_block_cache_find(), if ext4_sb_bread() returns -ENOMEM, the ce's e_refcnt, which has already grown in the __entry_find(), won't be put away, and eventually trigger the above issue in mb_cache_destroy() due to reference count leakage.

So call mb_cache_entry_put() on the -ENOMEM error branch as a quick fix.

---
 fs/ext4/xattr.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/ext4/xattr.c +3 -1
@@ -3079,8 +3079,10 @@ ext4_xattr_block_cache_find(struct inode
 
 		bh = ext4_sb_bread(inode->i_sb, ce->e_value, REQ_PRIO);
 		if (IS_ERR(bh)) {
-			if (PTR_ERR(bh) == -ENOMEM)
+			if (PTR_ERR(bh) == -ENOMEM) {
+				mb_cache_entry_put(ea_block_cache, ce);
 				return NULL;
+			}
 			bh = NULL;
 			EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "block %lu read error",
 					 (unsigned long)ce->e_value);
author maintainer
#203 lore raw

PATCH 201/202 s390/ap: Fix crash in AP internal function modify_bitmap()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Harald Freudenberger <[email protected]>

commit d4f9d5a99a3fd1b1c691b7a1a6f8f3f25f4116c9 upstream.

A system crash like this

Failing address: 200000cb7df6f000 TEID: 200000cb7df6f403
Fault in home space mode while using kernel ASCE. AS:00000002d71bc007 R3:00000003fe5b8007 S:000000011a446000 P:000000015660c13d

  Oops: 0038 ilc:3 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
  Modules linked in: mlx5_ib ...
  CPU: 8 PID: 7556 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7 #8
  Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (LPAR)
  Krnl PSW : 0704e00180000000 0000014b75e7b606 (ap_parse_bitmap_str+0x10e/0x1f8)
  R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:2 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3
  Krnl GPRS: 0000000000000001 ffffffffffffffc0 0000000000000001 00000048f96b75d3
  000000cb00000100 ffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff 000000cb7df6fce0
  000000cb7df6fce0 00000000ffffffff 000000000000002b 00000048ffffffff
  000003ff9b2dbc80 200000cb7df6fcd8 0000014bffffffc0 000000cb7df6fbc8
  Krnl Code: 0000014b75e7b5fc: a7840047            brc     8,0000014b75e7b68a
  0000014b75e7b600: 18b2                lr      %r11,%r2
  #0000014b75e7b602: a7f4000a            brc     15,0000014b75e7b616
  >0000014b75e7b606: eb22d00000e6        laog    %r2,%r2,0(%r13)
  0000014b75e7b60c: a7680001            lhi     %r6,1
  0000014b75e7b610: 187b                lr      %r7,%r11
  0000014b75e7b612: 84960021            brxh    %r9,%r6,0000014b75e7b654
  0000014b75e7b616: 18e9                lr      %r14,%r9
  Call Trace:
  [<0000014b75e7b606>] ap_parse_bitmap_str+0x10e/0x1f8
  ([<0000014b75e7b5dc>] ap_parse_bitmap_str+0xe4/0x1f8)
  [<0000014b75e7b758>] apmask_store+0x68/0x140
  [<0000014b75679196>] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x14e/0x1e8
  [<0000014b75598524>] vfs_write+0x1b4/0x448
  [<0000014b7559894c>] ksys_write+0x74/0x100
  [<0000014b7618a440>] __do_syscall+0x268/0x328
  [<0000014b761a3558>] system_call+0x70/0x98
  INFO: lockdep is turned off.
  Last Breaking-Event-Address:
  [<0000014b75e7b636>] ap_parse_bitmap_str+0x13e/0x1f8
  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oops

occured when /sys/bus/ap/a[pq]mask was updated with a relative mask value (like +0x10-0x12,+60,-90) with one of the numeric values exceeding INT_MAX.

The fix is simple: use unsigned long values for the internal variables. The correct checks are already in place in the function but a simple int for the internal variables was used with the possibility to overflow.

---
 drivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.c |    2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.c +1 -1
@@ -947,7 +947,7 @@ static int hex2bitmap(const char *str, u
  */
 static int modify_bitmap(const char *str, unsigned long *bitmap, int bits)
 {
-	int a, i, z;
+	unsigned long a, i, z;
 	char *np, sign;
 
 	/* bits needs to be a multiple of 8 */
author maintainer
#204 lore raw

PATCH 202/202 nfs: fix undefined behavior in nfs_block_bits()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sergey Shtylyov <[email protected]>

commit 3c0a2e0b0ae661457c8505fecc7be5501aa7a715 upstream.

Shifting *signed int* typed constant 1 left by 31 bits causes undefined behavior. Specify the correct *unsigned long* type by using 1UL instead.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with the Svace static analysis tool.

---
 fs/nfs/internal.h |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/nfs/internal.h +2 -2
@@ -609,9 +609,9 @@ unsigned long nfs_block_bits(unsigned lo
 	if ((bsize & (bsize - 1)) || nrbitsp) {
 		unsigned char	nrbits;
 
-		for (nrbits = 31; nrbits && !(bsize & (1 << nrbits)); nrbits--)
+		for (nrbits = 31; nrbits && !(bsize & (1UL << nrbits)); nrbits--)
 			;
-		bsize = 1 << nrbits;
+		bsize = 1UL << nrbits;
 		if (nrbitsp)
 			*nrbitsp = nrbits;
 	}
#205 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.278 release. There are 202 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat, 15 Jun 2024 11:31:50 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

net/nfc/nci/core.c:1455:15: error:
mixing declarations and code is incompatible with standards before C99 [-Werror,-Wdeclaration-after-statement]
1455 | unsigned int hdr_size = NCI_CTRL_HDR_SIZE;

Maybe enable C99 on older kernel branches ?

The code is

+static bool nci_valid_size(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(NCI_CTRL_HDR_SIZE != NCI_DATA_HDR_SIZE);
+ unsigned int hdr_size = NCI_CTRL_HDR_SIZE;

Swapping those two lines would be another possible fix.

Guenter

author maintainer
#206 lore raw
Quoted 24 lines · Guenter Roeck
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.278 release. There are 202 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat, 15 Jun 2024 11:31:50 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

net/nfc/nci/core.c:1455:15: error:
mixing declarations and code is incompatible with standards before C99 [-Werror,-Wdeclaration-after-statement]
1455 | unsigned int hdr_size = NCI_CTRL_HDR_SIZE;

Maybe enable C99 on older kernel branches ?

The code is

(quoted diff) +4 -0
+static bool nci_valid_size(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+       BUILD_BUG_ON(NCI_CTRL_HDR_SIZE != NCI_DATA_HDR_SIZE);
+       unsigned int hdr_size = NCI_CTRL_HDR_SIZE;
Quoted 1 line

Swapping those two lines would be another possible fix.

Odd, I fixed this for other branches, but it didn't trigger for me here, must be a build issue somewhere.

I'll go fix it up now, thanks!

greg k-h

maintainer Tested-by on the v1 series
#207 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.278 release. There are 202 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat, 15 Jun 2024 11:31:50 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.278-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

All tests passing for Tegra ...

Test results for stable-v5.4:

    10 builds:	10 pass, 0 fail
    24 boots:	24 pass, 0 fail
    54 tests:	54 pass, 0 fail

Linux version: 5.4.278-rc1-gb5a457a9ff04
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra186-p2771-0000,

                tegra194-p2972-0000, tegra20-ventana,
                tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra210-p3450-0000,
                tegra30-cardhu-a04

Jon

Tested-by on the v1 series
#208 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.278 release. There are 202 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat, 15 Jun 2024 11:31:50 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 9 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.278-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

thanks,
-- Shuah

Tested-by Linux Kernel Functional Testing on the v1 series
#209 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.278 release. There are 202 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat, 15 Jun 2024 11:31:50 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
        https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.278-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

## Build
* kernel: 5.4.278-rc1
* git: https://gitlab.com/Linaro/lkft/mirrors/stable/linux-stable-rc
* git branch: linux-5.4.y
* git commit: b5a457a9ff04a0bb90149f3bc8033a2a98d04caf
* git describe: v5.4.277-203-gb5a457a9ff04
* test details:
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-5.4.y/build/v5.4.277-203-gb5a457a9ff04

## Test Regressions (compared to v5.4.277)

## Metric Regressions (compared to v5.4.277)

## Test Fixes (compared to v5.4.277)

## Metric Fixes (compared to v5.4.277)

## Test result summary
total: 93744, pass: 75189, fail: 2023, skip: 16475, xfail: 57

## Build Summary
* arc: 5 total, 5 passed, 0 failed
* arm: 135 total, 135 passed, 0 failed
* arm64: 35 total, 33 passed, 2 failed
* i386: 23 total, 17 passed, 6 failed
* mips: 25 total, 25 passed, 0 failed
* parisc: 3 total, 0 passed, 3 failed
* powerpc: 30 total, 30 passed, 0 failed
* riscv: 9 total, 9 passed, 0 failed
* s390: 6 total, 6 passed, 0 failed
* sh: 10 total, 10 passed, 0 failed
* sparc: 6 total, 6 passed, 0 failed
* x86_64: 31 total, 31 passed, 0 failed

## Test suites summary
* boot
* kselftest-android
* kselftest-arm64
* kselftest-breakpoints
* kselftest-capabilities
* kselftest-cgroup
* kselftest-clone3
* kselftest-core
* kselftest-cpu-hotplug
* kselftest-cpufreq
* kselftest-drivers-dma-buf
* kselftest-efivarfs
* kselftest-exec
* kselftest-filesystems
* kselftest-filesystems-binderfs
* kselftest-filesystems-epoll
* kselftest-firmware
* kselftest-fpu
* kselftest-ftrace
* kselftest-futex
* kselftest-gpio
* kselftest-intel_pstate
* kselftest-ipc
* kselftest-ir
* kselftest-kcmp
* kselftest-kexec
* kselftest-lib
* kselftest-livepatch
* kselftest-membarrier
* kselftest-memfd
* kselftest-memory-hotplug
* kselftest-mincore
* kselftest-mm
* kselftest-mount
* kselftest-mqueue
* kselftest-net
* kselftest-net-forwarding
* kselftest-net-mptcp
* kselftest-netfilter
* kselftest-nsfs
* kselftest-openat2
* kselftest-pid_namespace
* kselftest-pidfd
* kselftest-proc
* kselftest-pstore
* kselftest-ptrace
* kselftest-rseq
* kselftest-rtc
* kselftest-sigaltstack
* kselftest-size
* kselftest-splice
* kselftest-static_keys
* kselftest-sync
* kselftest-sysctl
* kselftest-tc-testing
* kselftest-timens
* kselftest-timers
* kselftest-tmpfs
* kselftest-tpm2
* kselftest-user
* kselftest-user_events
* kselftest-vDSO
* kselftest-watchdog
* kselftest-x86
* kselftest-zram
* kunit
* log-parser-boot
* log-parser-test
* ltp-commands
* ltp-containers
* ltp-controllers
* ltp-cpuhotplug
* ltp-crypto
* ltp-cve
* ltp-dio
* ltp-fcntl-locktests
* ltp-fs
* ltp-fs_bind
* ltp-fs_perms_simple
* ltp-hugetlb
* ltp-ipc
* ltp-math
* ltp-mm
* ltp-nptl
* ltp-pty
* ltp-sched
* ltp-smoke
* ltp-smoketest
* ltp-syscalls
* ltp-tracing
* perf
* rcutorture

--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org

Tested-by on the v1 series
#210 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.278 release. There are 202 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sat, 15 Jun 2024 11:31:50 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.278-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

On ARCH_BRCMST using 32-bit and 64-bit ARM kernels, build tested on BMIPS_GENERIC:

Signature · 1 line
Florian