KVM: SEV: Add support for the ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES feature
v2 cover KVM: SEV: Add support for the ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES feature
AMD EPYC 5th generation processors have introduced a feature that allows the hypervisor to control the SEV_FEATURES that are set for, or by, a guest. ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES can be used by the hypervisor to enforce that SEV-ES and SEV-SNP guests cannot enable features that the hypervisor does not want to be enabled.
Patch 1/2 adds support to detect the feature.
Patch 2/2 configures the ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES field in the VMCB according to the features the hypervisor supports.
Based on tip/master commit a2767e7f31ad ("Merge branch into tip/master: 'x86/timers'")
v2:
- Added some SEV_FEATURES require to be explicitly allowed by ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES wording (Sean).
- Added Nikunj's Reviewed-by.
v1:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Kim Phillips (2):
x86/cpufeatures: Add "Allowed SEV Features" Feature
KVM: SEV: Configure "ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES" VMCB Field
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 6 +++++- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 5 +++++ 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v2 1/2 x86/cpufeatures: Add "Allowed SEV Features" Feature
Add CPU feature detection for "Allowed SEV Features" to allow the Hypervisor to enforce that SEV-ES and SEV-SNP guest VMs cannot enable features (via SEV_FEATURES) that the Hypervisor does not support or wish to be enabled.
---
v2: no changes
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -0
@@ -447,6 +447,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX (19*32+ 9)/* Virtual TSC_AUX */ #define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT (19*32+10)/* AMD hardware-enforced cache coherency */ #define X86_FEATURE_DEBUG_SWAP (19*32+14)/* "debug_swap" AMD SEV-ES full debug state swap support */ +#define X86_FEATURE_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES (19*32+27)/* AMD Allowed SEV Features */ #define X86_FEATURE_SVSM (19*32+28)/* "svsm" SVSM present */ /* AMD-defined Extended Feature 2 EAX, CPUID level 0x80000021 (EAX), word 20 */
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] x86/cpufeatures: Add "Allowed SEV Features" Feature
Quoted 7 lines · Kim Phillips
Add CPU feature detection for "Allowed SEV Features" to allow the Hypervisor to enforce that SEV-ES and SEV-SNP guest VMs cannot enable features (via
SEV_FEATURES) that the Hypervisor does not support or wish to be enabled.Signed-off-by Kishon Vijay Abraham I <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Kim Phillips <[email protected]>
This Signed-off-by chain is wrong. Either the patch is authored by Kishon, then the changelog needs a From: Kishon... line or you need Co-developed-by. See Documentation/process ....
Thanks
tglx
PATCH v2 2/2 KVM: SEV: Configure "ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES" VMCB Field
In reply to Kim PhillipsAMD EPYC 5th generation processors have introduced a feature that allows the hypervisor to control the SEV_FEATURES that are set for, or by, a guest [1]. ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES can be used by the hypervisor to enforce that SEV-ES and SEV-SNP guests cannot enable features that the hypervisor does not want to be enabled.
When ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES is enabled, a VMRUN will fail if any non-reserved bits are 1 in SEV_FEATURES but are 0 in ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES.
Some SEV_FEATURES (currently PmcVirtualization and SecureAvic according to Appendix B, Table B-4) require an opt-in via ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES, i.e. are off-by-default, whereas all other features are effectively on-by-default, but still honor ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES.
[1] Section 15.36.20 "Allowed SEV Features", AMD64 Architecture
Programmer's Manual, Pub. 24593 Rev. 3.42 - March 2024:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/attachment.cgi?id=306250---
v2:
- Added some SEV_FEATURES require to be explicitly allowed by ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES wording (Sean).
- Added Nikunj's Reviewed-by.
v1:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 6 +++++- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h +5 -1
@@ -158,7 +158,9 @@ struct __attribute__ ((__packed__)) vmcb_control_area {u64 avic_physical_id;/* Offset 0xf8 */ u8 reserved_7[8 ];u64 vmsa_pa;/* Used for an SEV-ES guest */ -u8 reserved_8[720 ]; +u8 reserved_8[40 ]; +u64 allowed_sev_features;/* Offset 0x138 */ +u8 reserved_9[672 ];/* * Offset 0x3e0, 32 bytes reserved * for use by hypervisor/software.
@@ -294,6 +296,8 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AVIC_ (SVM_SEV_FEAT_RESTRICTED_INJECTION | \ SVM_SEV_FEAT_ALTERNATE_INJECTION) +#define VMCB_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES_VALID BIT_ULL(63) +struct vmcb_seg {u16 selector;u16 attrib;
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +5 -0
@@ -899,6 +899,7 @@ static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)static int __sev_launch_update_vmsa (struct kvm *kvm,struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,int *error) { +struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm (kvm)->sev_info;struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa vmsa;struct vcpu_svm *svm =to_svm (vcpu);int ret;
@@ -908,6 +909,10 @@ static int __sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,return -EINVAL ; } +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES )) + svm->vmcb->control.allowed_sev_features =VMCB_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES_VALID | + sev->vmsa_features; +/* Perform some pre-encryption checks against the VMSA */ ret =sev_es_sync_vmsa (svm);if (ret)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 2/2] KVM: SEV: Configure "ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES" VMCB Field
Quoted 9 lines · Kim Phillips
AMD EPYC 5th generation processors have introduced a feature that allows the hypervisor to control the
SEV_FEATURESthat are set for, or by, a guest [1].ALLOWED_SEV_FEATUREScan be used by the hypervisor to enforce that SEV-ES and SEV-SNP guests cannot enable features that the hypervisor does not want to be enabled.When
ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURESis enabled, a VMRUN will fail if any non-reserved bits are 1 inSEV_FEATURESbut are 0 inALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES.
This may need additional uAPI so that userspace can opt-in. Dunno. I hope guests aren't abusing features, but IIUC, flipping this on has the potential to break existing VMs, correct?