mm,procfs: allow read-only remote mm access under CAP_PERFMON
Subsystems (7)
Andrii Nakryiko
maintainerPATCH v2 1/1 mm,procfs: allow read-only remote mm access under CAP_PERFMON
It's very common for various tracing and profiling toolis to need to access /proc/PID/maps contents for stack symbolization needs to learn which shared libraries are mapped in memory, at which file offset, etc. Currently, access to /proc/PID/maps requires CAP_SYS_PTRACE (unless we are looking at data for our own process, which is a trivial case not too relevant for profilers use cases).
Unfortunately, CAP_SYS_PTRACE implies way more than just ability to discover memory layout of another process: it allows to fully control arbitrary other processes. This is problematic from security POV for applications that only need read-only /proc/PID/maps (and other similar read-only data) access, and in large production settings CAP_SYS_PTRACE is frowned upon even for the system-wide profilers.
On the other hand, it's already possible to access similar kind of information (and more) with just CAP_PERFMON capability. E.g., setting up PERF_RECORD_MMAP collection through perf_event_open() would give one similar information to what /proc/PID/maps provides.
CAP_PERFMON, together with CAP_BPF, is already a very common combination for system-wide profiling and observability application. As such, it's reasonable and convenient to be able to access /proc/PID/maps with CAP_PERFMON capabilities instead of CAP_SYS_PTRACE.
For procfs, these permissions are checked through common mm_access() helper, and so we augment that with cap_perfmon() check *only* if requested mode is PTRACE_MODE_READ. I.e., PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH wouldn't be permitted by CAP_PERFMON. So /proc/PID/mem, which uses PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, won't be permitted by CAP_PERFMON, but /proc/PID/maps, /proc/PID/environ, and a bunch of other read-only contents will be allowable under CAP_PERFMON.
Besides procfs itself, mm_access() is used by process_madvise() and process_vm_{readv,writev}() syscalls. The former one uses PTRACE_MODE_READ to avoid leaking ASLR metadata, and as such CAP_PERFMON seems like a meaningful allowable capability as well.
process_vm_{readv,writev} currently assume PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH level of permissions (though for readv PTRACE_MODE_READ seems more reasonable, but that's outside the scope of this change), and as such won't be affected by this patch.
---v1->v2:
- expanded commit message a bit more about PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH vs PTRACE_MODE_READ uses inside procfs; left the generic logic untouched, as it still seems generally meaningful to allow CAP_PERFMON for read-only memory access, given its use within perf and BPF subsystems;
- moved perfmon_capable() check after ptrace_may_access() to minimize the worry of extra audit messages where CAP_SYS_PTRACE would be provided (Christian);
- s/can/may/_access_mm rename (Kees);
kernel/fork.c | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/fork.c +12 -1
@@ -1547,6 +1547,17 @@ struct mm_struct *get_task_mm(struct task_struct *task) }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (get_task_mm); +static bool may_access_mm (struct mm_struct *mm,struct task_struct *task,unsigned int mode) +{ +if (mm == current->mm) +return true; +if (ptrace_may_access (task, mode)) +return true; +if ((mode &PTRACE_MODE_READ ) &&perfmon_capable ()) +return true; +return false; +} +struct mm_struct *mm_access (struct task_struct *task,unsigned int mode) {struct mm_struct *mm;
@@ -1559,7 +1570,7 @@ struct mm_struct *mm_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) mm =get_task_mm (task);if (!mm) { mm =ERR_PTR (-ESRCH ); - }else if (mm != current->mm && !ptrace_may_access (task, mode)) { + }else if (!may_access_mm (mm, task, mode)) {mmput (mm); mm =ERR_PTR (-EACCES ); }
Signature · 1 line
2.43.5
Andrew Morton
maintainerQuoted 37 lines · On Mon, 27 Jan 2025 14:21:14 -0800 Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]> wrote:
It's very common for various tracing and profiling toolis to need to access
/proc/PID/mapscontents for stack symbolization needs to learn which shared libraries are mapped in memory, at which file offset, etc. Currently, access to/proc/PID/mapsrequiresCAP_SYS_PTRACE(unless we are looking at data for our own process, which is a trivial case not too relevant for profilers use cases).Unfortunately,
CAP_SYS_PTRACEimplies way more than just ability to discover memory layout of another process: it allows to fully control arbitrary other processes. This is problematic from security POV for applications that only need read-only/proc/PID/maps(and other similar read-only data) access, and in large production settingsCAP_SYS_PTRACEis frowned upon even for the system-wide profilers.On the other hand, it's already possible to access similar kind of information (and more) with just
CAP_PERFMONcapability. E.g., setting upPERF_RECORD_MMAPcollection throughperf_event_open()would give one similar information to what/proc/PID/mapsprovides.
CAP_PERFMON, together withCAP_BPF, is already a very common combination for system-wide profiling and observability application. As such, it's reasonable and convenient to be able to access/proc/PID/mapswithCAP_PERFMONcapabilities instead ofCAP_SYS_PTRACE.For procfs, these permissions are checked through common
mm_access()helper, and so we augment that withcap_perfmon()check *only* if requested mode isPTRACE_MODE_READ. I.e.,PTRACE_MODE_ATTACHwouldn't be permitted byCAP_PERFMON. So/proc/PID/mem, which usesPTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, won't be permitted byCAP_PERFMON, but/proc/PID/maps,/proc/PID/environ, and a bunch of other read-only contents will be allowable underCAP_PERFMON.Besides procfs itself,
mm_access()is used byprocess_madvise()and process_vm_{readv,writev}() syscalls. The former one usesPTRACE_MODE_READto avoid leaking ASLR metadata, and as suchCAP_PERFMONseems like a meaningful allowable capability as well.
Quoted 5 lines
process_vm_{readv,writev} currently assume
PTRACE_MODE_ATTACHlevel of permissions (though for readvPTRACE_MODE_READseems more reasonable, but that's outside the scope of this change), and as such won't be affected by this patch.
This should be documented somewhere, so we can tell our users what we did. Documentation/filesystems/proc.rst seems to be the place. .
Quoted 40 lines · Andrew Morton
Quoted 37 lines · On Mon, 27 Jan 2025 14:21:14 -0800 Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]> wrote:
It's very common for various tracing and profiling toolis to need to access
/proc/PID/mapscontents for stack symbolization needs to learn which shared libraries are mapped in memory, at which file offset, etc. Currently, access to/proc/PID/mapsrequiresCAP_SYS_PTRACE(unless we are looking at data for our own process, which is a trivial case not too relevant for profilers use cases).Unfortunately,
CAP_SYS_PTRACEimplies way more than just ability to discover memory layout of another process: it allows to fully control arbitrary other processes. This is problematic from security POV for applications that only need read-only/proc/PID/maps(and other similar read-only data) access, and in large production settingsCAP_SYS_PTRACEis frowned upon even for the system-wide profilers.On the other hand, it's already possible to access similar kind of information (and more) with just
CAP_PERFMONcapability. E.g., setting upPERF_RECORD_MMAPcollection throughperf_event_open()would give one similar information to what/proc/PID/mapsprovides.
CAP_PERFMON, together withCAP_BPF, is already a very common combination for system-wide profiling and observability application. As such, it's reasonable and convenient to be able to access/proc/PID/mapswithCAP_PERFMONcapabilities instead ofCAP_SYS_PTRACE.For procfs, these permissions are checked through common
mm_access()helper, and so we augment that withcap_perfmon()check *only* if requested mode isPTRACE_MODE_READ. I.e.,PTRACE_MODE_ATTACHwouldn't be permitted byCAP_PERFMON. So/proc/PID/mem, which usesPTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, won't be permitted byCAP_PERFMON, but/proc/PID/maps,/proc/PID/environ, and a bunch of other read-only contents will be allowable underCAP_PERFMON.Besides procfs itself,
mm_access()is used byprocess_madvise()and process_vm_{readv,writev}() syscalls. The former one usesPTRACE_MODE_READto avoid leaking ASLR metadata, and as suchCAP_PERFMONseems like a meaningful allowable capability as well.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
process_vm_{readv,writev} currently assume
PTRACE_MODE_ATTACHlevel of permissions (though for readvPTRACE_MODE_READseems more reasonable, but that's outside the scope of this change), and as such won't be affected by this patch.This should be documented somewhere, so we can tell our users what we did.
Documentation/filesystems/proc.rstseems to be the place. .
Wow, that's a big file :) Funny enough, that file mentions ptrace only in the context of /proc/<pid>/timerslack_ns, nothing else. Hm.. Should I add a common section saying something about how either CAP_SYS_PTRACE or CAP_PERFMON provides access to other process' user space information?
If that's ok, I can send that as a follow up patch (as I bet there will be a bunch of iteration on exact form, shape, wording, placement).
Quoted 37 lines · Andrii Nakryiko
It's very common for various tracing and profiling toolis to need to access
/proc/PID/mapscontents for stack symbolization needs to learn which shared libraries are mapped in memory, at which file offset, etc. Currently, access to/proc/PID/mapsrequiresCAP_SYS_PTRACE(unless we are looking at data for our own process, which is a trivial case not too relevant for profilers use cases).Unfortunately,
CAP_SYS_PTRACEimplies way more than just ability to discover memory layout of another process: it allows to fully control arbitrary other processes. This is problematic from security POV for applications that only need read-only/proc/PID/maps(and other similar read-only data) access, and in large production settingsCAP_SYS_PTRACEis frowned upon even for the system-wide profilers.On the other hand, it's already possible to access similar kind of information (and more) with just
CAP_PERFMONcapability. E.g., setting upPERF_RECORD_MMAPcollection throughperf_event_open()would give one similar information to what/proc/PID/mapsprovides.
CAP_PERFMON, together withCAP_BPF, is already a very common combination for system-wide profiling and observability application. As such, it's reasonable and convenient to be able to access/proc/PID/mapswithCAP_PERFMONcapabilities instead ofCAP_SYS_PTRACE.For procfs, these permissions are checked through common
mm_access()helper, and so we augment that withcap_perfmon()check *only* if requested mode isPTRACE_MODE_READ. I.e.,PTRACE_MODE_ATTACHwouldn't be permitted byCAP_PERFMON. So/proc/PID/mem, which usesPTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, won't be permitted byCAP_PERFMON, but/proc/PID/maps,/proc/PID/environ, and a bunch of other read-only contents will be allowable underCAP_PERFMON.Besides procfs itself,
mm_access()is used byprocess_madvise()and process_vm_{readv,writev}() syscalls. The former one usesPTRACE_MODE_READto avoid leaking ASLR metadata, and as suchCAP_PERFMONseems like a meaningful allowable capability as well.
Quoted 6 lines
process_vm_{readv,writev} currently assume
PTRACE_MODE_ATTACHlevel of permissions (though for readvPTRACE_MODE_READseems more reasonable, but that's outside the scope of this change), and as such won't be affected by this patch.Signed-off-by Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Quoted 37 lines · Andrii Nakryiko
It's very common for various tracing and profiling toolis to need to access
/proc/PID/mapscontents for stack symbolization needs to learn which shared libraries are mapped in memory, at which file offset, etc. Currently, access to/proc/PID/mapsrequiresCAP_SYS_PTRACE(unless we are looking at data for our own process, which is a trivial case not too relevant for profilers use cases).Unfortunately,
CAP_SYS_PTRACEimplies way more than just ability to discover memory layout of another process: it allows to fully control arbitrary other processes. This is problematic from security POV for applications that only need read-only/proc/PID/maps(and other similar read-only data) access, and in large production settingsCAP_SYS_PTRACEis frowned upon even for the system-wide profilers.On the other hand, it's already possible to access similar kind of information (and more) with just
CAP_PERFMONcapability. E.g., setting upPERF_RECORD_MMAPcollection throughperf_event_open()would give one similar information to what/proc/PID/mapsprovides.
CAP_PERFMON, together withCAP_BPF, is already a very common combination for system-wide profiling and observability application. As such, it's reasonable and convenient to be able to access/proc/PID/mapswithCAP_PERFMONcapabilities instead ofCAP_SYS_PTRACE.For procfs, these permissions are checked through common
mm_access()helper, and so we augment that withcap_perfmon()check *only* if requested mode isPTRACE_MODE_READ. I.e.,PTRACE_MODE_ATTACHwouldn't be permitted byCAP_PERFMON. So/proc/PID/mem, which usesPTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, won't be permitted byCAP_PERFMON, but/proc/PID/maps,/proc/PID/environ, and a bunch of other read-only contents will be allowable underCAP_PERFMON.Besides procfs itself,
mm_access()is used byprocess_madvise()and process_vm_{readv,writev}() syscalls. The former one usesPTRACE_MODE_READto avoid leaking ASLR metadata, and as suchCAP_PERFMONseems like a meaningful allowable capability as well.
Quoted 6 lines
process_vm_{readv,writev} currently assume
PTRACE_MODE_ATTACHlevel of permissions (though for readvPTRACE_MODE_READseems more reasonable, but that's outside the scope of this change), and as such won't be affected by this patch.Signed-off-by Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Thanks,
Ingo