mmprocfs-allow-read-only-remote-mm-access-under-cap_perfmon.patch removed from -mm tree
The quilt patch titled
Subject: mm,procfs: allow read-only remote mm access under CAP_PERFMON
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
mmprocfs-allow-read-only-remote-mm-access-under-cap_perfmon.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-nonmm-stable branch of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
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From: Andrii Nakryiko <[email protected]>
Subject: mm,procfs: allow read-only remote mm access under CAP_PERFMON
Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2025 14:21:14 -0800
It's very common for various tracing and profiling toolis to need to access /proc/PID/maps contents for stack symbolization needs to learn which shared libraries are mapped in memory, at which file offset, etc. Currently, access to /proc/PID/maps requires CAP_SYS_PTRACE (unless we are looking at data for our own process, which is a trivial case not too relevant for profilers use cases).
Unfortunately, CAP_SYS_PTRACE implies way more than just ability to discover memory layout of another process: it allows to fully control arbitrary other processes. This is problematic from security POV for applications that only need read-only /proc/PID/maps (and other similar read-only data) access, and in large production settings CAP_SYS_PTRACE is frowned upon even for the system-wide profilers.
On the other hand, it's already possible to access similar kind of information (and more) with just CAP_PERFMON capability. E.g., setting up PERF_RECORD_MMAP collection through perf_event_open() would give one similar information to what /proc/PID/maps provides.
CAP_PERFMON, together with CAP_BPF, is already a very common combination for system-wide profiling and observability application. As such, it's reasonable and convenient to be able to access /proc/PID/maps with CAP_PERFMON capabilities instead of CAP_SYS_PTRACE.
For procfs, these permissions are checked through common mm_access() helper, and so we augment that with cap_perfmon() check *only* if requested mode is PTRACE_MODE_READ. I.e., PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH wouldn't be permitted by CAP_PERFMON. So /proc/PID/mem, which uses PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, won't be permitted by CAP_PERFMON, but /proc/PID/maps, /proc/PID/environ, and a bunch of other read-only contents will be allowable under CAP_PERFMON.
Besides procfs itself, mm_access() is used by process_madvise() and process_vm_{readv,writev}() syscalls. The former one uses PTRACE_MODE_READ to avoid leaking ASLR metadata, and as such CAP_PERFMON seems like a meaningful allowable capability as well.
process_vm_{readv,writev} currently assume PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH level of permissions (though for readv PTRACE_MODE_READ seems more reasonable, but that's outside the scope of this change), and as such won't be affected by this patch.
---
kernel/fork.c | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/fork.c renamed from kernel/fork.c~mmprocfs-allow-read-only-remote-mm-access-under-cap_perfmon +12 -1
@@ -1559,6 +1559,17 @@ struct mm_struct *get_task_mm(struct tas }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (get_task_mm); +static bool may_access_mm (struct mm_struct *mm,struct task_struct *task,unsigned int mode) +{ +if (mm == current->mm) +return true; +if (ptrace_may_access (task, mode)) +return true; +if ((mode &PTRACE_MODE_READ ) &&perfmon_capable ()) +return true; +return false; +} +struct mm_struct *mm_access (struct task_struct *task,unsigned int mode) {struct mm_struct *mm;
@@ -1571,7 +1582,7 @@ struct mm_struct *mm_access(struct task_ mm =get_task_mm (task);if (!mm) { mm =ERR_PTR (-ESRCH ); - }else if (mm != current->mm && !ptrace_may_access (task, mode)) { + }else if (!may_access_mm (mm, task, mode)) {mmput (mm); mm =ERR_PTR (-EACCES ); }
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Patches currently in -mm which might be from [email protected] are