KVM: s390: Don't use %pK through tracepoints
Subsystems (7)
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 1/5 KVM: s390: Don't use %pK through tracepoints
From: Thomas Weißschuh <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6c9567e0850be2f0f94ab64fa6512413fd1a1eb1 ]
Restricted pointers ("%pK") are not meant to be used through TP_format(). It can unintentionally expose security sensitive, raw pointer values.
Use regular pointer formatting instead.
Message-ID: <20250217-restricted-pointers-s390-v1-1-0e4ace75d8aa@linutronix.de>
--- arch/s390/kvm/trace-s390.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/s390/kvm/trace-s390.h +2 -2
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(kvm_s390_create_vcpu, __entry->sie_block = sie_block; ), -TP_printk ("create cpu %d at 0x%pK, sie block at 0x%pK" , +TP_printk ("create cpu %d at 0x%p, sie block at 0x%p" , __entry->id, __entry->vcpu, __entry->sie_block) );
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ TRACE_EVENT(kvm_s390_enable_css, __entry->kvm = kvm; ), -TP_printk ("enabling channel I/O support (kvm @ %pK)\n" , +TP_printk ("enabling channel I/O support (kvm @ %p)\n" , __entry->kvm) );
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 2/5 udmabuf: fix a buf size overflow issue during udmabuf creation
From: Xiaogang Chen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 021ba7f1babd029e714d13a6bf2571b08af96d0f ]
by casting size_limit_mb to u64 when calculate pglimit.
--- drivers/dma-buf/udmabuf.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/dma-buf/udmabuf.c +1 -1
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static long udmabuf_create(const struct udmabuf_create_list *head,if (!ubuf)return -ENOMEM ; - pglimit = (size_limit_mb *1024 *1024 ) >>PAGE_SHIFT ; + pglimit = ((u64 )size_limit_mb *1024 *1024 ) >>PAGE_SHIFT ;for (i =0 ; i < head->count; i++) {if (!IS_ALIGNED (list[i].offset,PAGE_SIZE )) goto err;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 3/5 selftests: ublk: fix test_stripe_04
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Ming Lei <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 72070e57b0a518ec8e562a2b68fdfc796ef5c040 ]
Commit 57ed58c13256 ("selftests: ublk: enable zero copy for stripe target") added test entry of test_stripe_04, but forgot to add the test script.
So fix the test by adding the script file.
--- .../testing/selftests/ublk/test_stripe_04.sh | 24 +++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+) create mode 100755 tools/testing/selftests/ublk/test_stripe_04.sh
tools/testing/selftests/ublk/test_stripe_04.sh new file +24 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +#!/bin/bash +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +. "$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)"/test_common.sh + +TID="stripe_04" +ERR_CODE=0 + +_prep_test "stripe" "mkfs & mount & umount on zero copy" + +backfile_0=$(_create_backfile 256M) +backfile_1=$(_create_backfile 256M) +dev_id=$(_add_ublk_dev -t stripe -z -q 2 "$backfile_0" "$backfile_1") +_check_add_dev $TID $? "$backfile_0" "$backfile_1" + +_mkfs_mount_test /dev/ublkb"${dev_id}" +ERR_CODE=$? + +_cleanup_test "stripe" + +_remove_backfile "$backfile_0" +_remove_backfile "$backfile_1" + +_show_result $TID $ERR_CODE
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 4/5 ACPI PPTT: Fix coding mistakes in a couple of sizeof() calls
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Jean-Marc Eurin <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7ab4f0e37a0f4207e742a8de69be03984db6ebf0 ]
The end of table checks should be done with the structure size, but 2 of the 3 similar calls use the pointer size.
--- drivers/acpi/pptt.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/acpi/pptt.c +2 -2
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ static int acpi_pptt_leaf_node(struct acpi_table_header *table_hdr, node_entry =ACPI_PTR_DIFF (node, table_hdr); entry = ACPI_ADD_PTR(struct acpi_subtable_header, table_hdr,sizeof (struct acpi_table_pptt )); - proc_sz =sizeof (struct acpi_pptt_processor *); + proc_sz =sizeof (struct acpi_pptt_processor );while ((unsigned long )entry + proc_sz < table_end) { cpu_node = (struct acpi_pptt_processor *)entry;
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ static struct acpi_pptt_processor *acpi_find_processor_node(struct acpi_table_he table_end = (unsigned long )table_hdr + table_hdr->length; entry = ACPI_ADD_PTR(struct acpi_subtable_header, table_hdr,sizeof (struct acpi_table_pptt )); - proc_sz =sizeof (struct acpi_pptt_processor *); + proc_sz =sizeof (struct acpi_pptt_processor );/* find the processor structure associated with this cpuid */ while ((unsigned long )entry + proc_sz < table_end) {
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Sasha Levin
maintainerPATCH 5/5 x86/bugs: Don't fill RSB on VMEXIT with eIBRS+retpoline
In reply to Sasha LevinFrom: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 18bae0dfec15b24ec14ca17dc18603372f5f254f ]
eIBRS protects against guest->host RSB underflow/poisoning attacks. Adding retpoline to the mix doesn't change that. Retpoline has a balanced CALL/RET anyway.
So the current full RSB filling on VMEXIT with eIBRS+retpoline is overkill. Disable it or do the VMEXIT_LITE mitigation if needed.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +4 -4
@@ -1348,20 +1348,20 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_case SPECTRE_V2_NONE :return ; -case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE :case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS : +case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE : +case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE :if (boot_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB )) { -setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE );pr_info ("Spectre v2 / PBRSB-eIBRS: Retire a single CALL on VMEXIT\n" ); +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE ); }return ; -case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE :case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE :case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE :case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS : -setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT );pr_info ("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB : Filling RSB on VMEXIT\n" ); +setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT );return ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5