Skip to contentSkip to conversation

arm64: traps: Mark kernel as tainted on SError panic

PATCH In review Breno Leitao 2 participants 5 messages Jul 10, 2025 – Jul 15, 2025 arm64

lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 arm64: traps: Mark kernel as tainted on SError panic

Set TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK when SError interrupts trigger a panic to flag potential hardware faults. This tainting mechanism aids in debugging and enables correlation of hardware-related crashes in large-scale deployments.

This change aligns with similar patches[1] that mark machine check events when the system crashes due to hardware errors.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +1 -0
index 9bfa5c944379d..7468b22585cef 100644
@@ -931,6 +931,7 @@ void __noreturn panic_bad_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr, unsigne
 
 void __noreturn arm64_serror_panic(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 {
+	add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
 	console_verbose();
 
 	pr_crit("SError Interrupt on CPU%d, code 0x%016lx -- %s\n",

---
base-commit: 8c2e52ebbe885c7eeaabd3b7ddcdc1246fc400d2
change-id: 20250710-arm_serror-77fca8d732d4

Best regards,

Signature · 1 line
Breno Leitao <[email protected]>
maintainer
#1 lore raw
Quoted 19 lines · Breno Leitao

Set TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK when SError interrupts trigger a panic to flag potential hardware faults. This tainting mechanism aids in debugging and enables correlation of hardware-related crashes in large-scale deployments.

This change aligns with similar patches[1] that mark machine check events when the system crashes due to hardware errors.

---
 arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +0 -0
index 9bfa5c944379d..7468b22585cef 100644

arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c void __noreturn panic_bad_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr, unsigne · line 937

Quoted 7 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +1 -0
@@ -931,6 +931,7 @@ void __noreturn panic_bad_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr, unsigne
 
 void __noreturn arm64_serror_panic(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 {
+	add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
 	console_verbose();
 
 	pr_crit("SError Interrupt on CPU%d, code 0x%016lx -- %s\n",

If we're going to taint for SError, shouldn't we also taint for an unclaimed SEA?

Will

#2 lore raw

Hello Will,

Quoted 11 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 9 lines · Breno Leitao
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +1 -0
@@ -931,6 +931,7 @@ void __noreturn panic_bad_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr, unsigne
 
 void __noreturn arm64_serror_panic(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 {
+	add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
 	console_verbose();
 
Quoted 4 lines

arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c void __noreturn panic_bad_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr, unsigne · line 937

Quoted 1 line
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +0 -0
 	pr_crit("SError Interrupt on CPU%d, code 0x%016lx -- %s\n",

If we're going to taint for SError, shouldn't we also taint for an unclaimed SEA?

Yes. I was not very familiar with SEA errors, given I haven't seen on in production yet, but, reading about it, that is another seems to crash the system due to hardware errors, thus, we want to taint MACHINE_CHECK.

What about this?

	Author: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>
	Date:   Mon Jul 14 05:16:55 2025 -0700

	arm64: Taint kernel on fatal hardware error in do_sea()

	This patch updates the do_sea() handler to taint the kernel with
	TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK when a fatal hardware error is detected and
	reported through Synchronous External Abort (SEA). By marking
	the kernel as tainted at the point of error, we improve
	post-mortem diagnostics and make it clear that a machine check
	or unrecoverable hardware fault has occurred.

	Suggested-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
	Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>

	diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
	index 11eb8d1adc84..f590dc71ce99 100644
	--- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
	+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
	@@ -838,6 +838,7 @@ static int do_sea(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
			*/
			siaddr  = untagged_addr(far);
		}
	+	add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
		arm64_notify_die(inf->name, regs, inf->sig, inf->code, siaddr, esr);

		return 0;

Thanks for the suggestion,
--breno

maintainer
#3 lore raw
Quoted 42 lines · Breno Leitao
Quoted 11 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 9 lines · Breno Leitao
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +1 -0
@@ -931,6 +931,7 @@ void __noreturn panic_bad_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr, unsigne
 
 void __noreturn arm64_serror_panic(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 {
+	add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
 	console_verbose();
 
Quoted 4 lines

arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c void __noreturn panic_bad_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr, unsigne · line 937

Quoted 1 line
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +0 -0
 	pr_crit("SError Interrupt on CPU%d, code 0x%016lx -- %s\n",

If we're going to taint for SError, shouldn't we also taint for an unclaimed SEA?

Yes. I was not very familiar with SEA errors, given I haven't seen on in production yet, but, reading about it, that is another seems to crash the system due to hardware errors, thus, we want to taint MACHINE_CHECK.

What about this?

	Author: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>
	Date:   Mon Jul 14 05:16:55 2025 -0700

	arm64: Taint kernel on fatal hardware error in do_sea()

	This patch updates the do_sea() handler to taint the kernel with
	TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK when a fatal hardware error is detected and
	reported through Synchronous External Abort (SEA). By marking
	the kernel as tainted at the point of error, we improve
	post-mortem diagnostics and make it clear that a machine check
	or unrecoverable hardware fault has occurred.

	Suggested-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
	Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>

	diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
	index 11eb8d1adc84..f590dc71ce99 100644
	--- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
	+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
Quoted 8 lines
	@@ -838,6 +838,7 @@ static int do_sea(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
			*/
			siaddr  = untagged_addr(far);
		}
	+	add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
		arm64_notify_die(inf->name, regs, inf->sig, inf->code, siaddr, esr);

		return 0;

Yeah, I reckon so. Probably just fold these into a single patch, though.

Cheers,

Will

#4 lore raw
Quoted 50 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 49 lines · Breno Leitao
Quoted 11 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 9 lines · Breno Leitao
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +1 -0
@@ -931,6 +931,7 @@ void __noreturn panic_bad_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr, unsigne
 
 void __noreturn arm64_serror_panic(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr)
 {
+	add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
 	console_verbose();
 
Quoted 4 lines

arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c void __noreturn panic_bad_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr, unsigne · line 937

Quoted 1 line
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +0 -0
 	pr_crit("SError Interrupt on CPU%d, code 0x%016lx -- %s\n",

If we're going to taint for SError, shouldn't we also taint for an unclaimed SEA?

Yes. I was not very familiar with SEA errors, given I haven't seen on in production yet, but, reading about it, that is another seems to crash the system due to hardware errors, thus, we want to taint MACHINE_CHECK.

What about this?

Author: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>
Date: Mon Jul 14 05:16:55 2025 -0700

arm64: Taint kernel on fatal hardware error in do_sea()

This patch updates the do_sea() handler to taint the kernel with TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK when a fatal hardware error is detected and reported through Synchronous External Abort (SEA). By marking the kernel as tainted at the point of error, we improve post-mortem diagnostics and make it clear that a machine check or unrecoverable hardware fault has occurred.

diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
index 11eb8d1adc84..f590dc71ce99 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
@@ -838,6 +838,7 @@ static int do_sea(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
*/
siaddr = untagged_addr(far);
}
+ add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
arm64_notify_die(inf->name, regs, inf->sig, inf->code, siaddr, esr);

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
		return 0;

Yeah, I reckon so. Probably just fold these into a single patch, though.

Thanks. I test it better tomorrow, then send it.

Thanks for the suggestions,
--breno