arm64: traps: Mark kernel as tainted on SError panic
PATCH 1/1 arm64: traps: Mark kernel as tainted on SError panic
Set TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK when SError interrupts trigger a panic to flag potential hardware faults. This tainting mechanism aids in debugging and enables correlation of hardware-related crashes in large-scale deployments.
This change aligns with similar patches[1] that mark machine check events when the system crashes due to hardware errors.
--- arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +1 -0
@@ -931,6 +931,7 @@ void __noreturn panic_bad_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr, unsignevoid __noreturn arm64_serror_panic (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned long esr) { +add_taint (TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK ,LOCKDEP_STILL_OK );console_verbose (); pr_crit("SError Interrupt on CPU%d, code 0x%016lx -- %s\n",
---
base-commit: 8c2e52ebbe885c7eeaabd3b7ddcdc1246fc400d2
change-id: 20250710-arm_serror-77fca8d732d4
Best regards,
Signature · 1 line
Breno Leitao <[email protected]>
Will Deacon
maintainerQuoted 19 lines · Breno Leitao
Set
TAINT_MACHINE_CHECKwhen SError interrupts trigger a panic to flag potential hardware faults. This tainting mechanism aids in debugging and enables correlation of hardware-related crashes in large-scale deployments.This change aligns with similar patches[1] that mark machine check events when the system crashes due to hardware errors.
Signed-off-by Breno Leitao <[email protected]>--- arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +0
-0
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c void __noreturn panic_bad_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr, unsigne · line 937
Quoted 7 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +1
-0@@ -931,6 +931,7 @@ void __noreturn panic_bad_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr, unsignevoid __noreturn arm64_serror_panic (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned long esr) { +add_taint (TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK ,LOCKDEP_STILL_OK );console_verbose (); pr_crit("SError Interrupt on CPU%d, code 0x%016lx -- %s\n",
If we're going to taint for SError, shouldn't we also taint for an unclaimed SEA?
Will
Hello Will,
Quoted 11 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 9 lines · Breno Leitao
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +1
-0@@ -931,6 +931,7 @@ void __noreturn panic_bad_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr, unsignevoid __noreturn arm64_serror_panic (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned long esr) { +add_taint (TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK ,LOCKDEP_STILL_OK );console_verbose ();
Quoted 4 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c void __noreturn panic_bad_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr, unsigne · line 937
Quoted 1 line
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +0
-0pr_crit("SError Interrupt on CPU%d, code 0x%016lx -- %s\n",If we're going to taint for SError, shouldn't we also taint for an unclaimed SEA?
Yes. I was not very familiar with SEA errors, given I haven't seen on in production yet, but, reading about it, that is another seems to crash the system due to hardware errors, thus, we want to taint MACHINE_CHECK.
What about this?
Author: Breno Leitao <[email protected]> Date: Mon Jul 14 05:16:55 2025 -0700 arm64: Taint kernel on fatal hardware error in do_sea() This patch updates the do_sea() handler to taint the kernel with TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK when a fatal hardware error is detected and reported through Synchronous External Abort (SEA). By marking the kernel as tainted at the point of error, we improve post-mortem diagnostics and make it clear that a machine check or unrecoverable hardware fault has occurred. Suggested-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <[email protected]> diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c index 11eb8d1adc84..f590dc71ce99 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c @@ -838,6 +838,7 @@ static int do_sea(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr, struct pt_regs *regs) */ siaddr = untagged_addr(far); } + add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); arm64_notify_die(inf->name, regs, inf->sig, inf->code, siaddr, esr); return 0;
Thanks for the suggestion,
--breno
Will Deacon
maintainerQuoted 42 lines · Breno Leitao
Quoted 11 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 9 lines · Breno Leitao
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +1
-0@@ -931,6 +931,7 @@ void __noreturn panic_bad_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr, unsignevoid __noreturn arm64_serror_panic (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned long esr) { +add_taint (TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK ,LOCKDEP_STILL_OK );console_verbose ();Quoted 4 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c void __noreturn panic_bad_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr, unsigne · line 937
Quoted 1 line
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +0
-0pr_crit("SError Interrupt on CPU%d, code 0x%016lx -- %s\n",If we're going to taint for SError, shouldn't we also taint for an unclaimed SEA?
Yes. I was not very familiar with SEA errors, given I haven't seen on in production yet, but, reading about it, that is another seems to crash the system due to hardware errors, thus, we want to taint
MACHINE_CHECK.What about this?
Author: Breno Leitao <[email protected]> Date: Mon Jul 14 05:16:55 2025 -0700 arm64: Taint kernel on fatal hardware error in do_sea() This patch updates the do_sea() handler to taint the kernel with TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK when a fatal hardware error is detected and reported through Synchronous External Abort (SEA). By marking the kernel as tainted at the point of error, we improve post-mortem diagnostics and make it clear that a machine check or unrecoverable hardware fault has occurred. Suggested-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <[email protected]> diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c index 11eb8d1adc84..f590dc71ce99 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
Quoted 8 lines
@@ -838,6 +838,7 @@ static int do_sea(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr, struct pt_regs *regs) */ siaddr = untagged_addr(far); } + add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK); arm64_notify_die(inf->name, regs, inf->sig, inf->code, siaddr, esr); return 0;
Yeah, I reckon so. Probably just fold these into a single patch, though.
Cheers,
Will
Quoted 50 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 49 lines · Breno Leitao
Quoted 11 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 9 lines · Breno Leitao
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +1
-0@@ -931,6 +931,7 @@ void __noreturn panic_bad_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr, unsignevoid __noreturn arm64_serror_panic (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned long esr) { +add_taint (TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK ,LOCKDEP_STILL_OK );console_verbose ();Quoted 4 lines
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c void __noreturn panic_bad_stack(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr, unsigne · line 937
Quoted 1 line
arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c +0
-0pr_crit("SError Interrupt on CPU%d, code 0x%016lx -- %s\n",If we're going to taint for SError, shouldn't we also taint for an unclaimed SEA?
Yes. I was not very familiar with SEA errors, given I haven't seen on in production yet, but, reading about it, that is another seems to crash the system due to hardware errors, thus, we want to taint
MACHINE_CHECK.What about this?
Author: Breno Leitao <[email protected]>
Date: Mon Jul 14 05:16:55 2025 -0700arm64: Taint kernel on fatal hardware error in
do_sea()This patch updates the
do_sea()handler to taint the kernel withTAINT_MACHINE_CHECKwhen a fatal hardware error is detected and reported through Synchronous External Abort (SEA). By marking the kernel as tainted at the point of error, we improve post-mortem diagnostics and make it clear that a machine check or unrecoverable hardware fault has occurred.Suggested-by Will Deacon <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Breno Leitao <[email protected]>diff --git
a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.cb/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
index11eb8d1adc84..f590dc71ce99100644
---a/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
+++b/arch/arm64/mm/fault.c
@@ -838,6 +838,7 @@ static intdo_sea(unsigned long far, unsigned long esr, struct pt_regs *regs)
*/
siaddr =untagged_addr(far);
}
+add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
arm64_notify_die(inf->name, regs, inf->sig, inf->code, siaddr, esr);
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
return 0;Yeah, I reckon so. Probably just fold these into a single patch, though.
Thanks. I test it better tomorrow, then send it.
Thanks for the suggestions,
--breno