Enable Shadow Stack Virtualization for SVM
v3 cover Enable Shadow Stack Virtualization for SVM
AMD Zen3 and newer processors support shadow stack, a feature designed to protect against ROP (return-oriented programming) attacks in which an attacker manipulates return addresses on the call stack in order to execute arbitrary code. To prevent this, shadow stacks can be allocated that are only used by control transfer and return instructions. When a CALL instruction is issued, it writes the return address to both the program stack and the shadow stack. When the subsequent RET instruction is issued, it pops the return address from both stacks and compares them. If the addresses don't match, a control-protection exception is raised.
Shadow stack and a related feature, Indirect Branch Tracking (IBT), are collectively referred to as Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET). However, current AMD processors only support shadow stack and not IBT.
This series adds support for shadow stack in SVM guests and builds upon the support added in the CET guest support patch series [1]. Additional patches are required to support shadow stack enabled guests in qemu [2].
[1]: CET guest support patches (v11)
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[2]: CET qemu patches
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[3]: Previous SVM support patches (v2)
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
---
RFC v2:
- Rebased on v3 of the Intel CET virtualization series, dropping the patch that moved cet_is_msr_accessible to common code as that has been pulled into the Intel series.
- Minor change removing curly brackets around if statement introduced
in patch 6/6.
RFC v3:
- Rebased on v5 of the Intel CET virtualization series.
- Add patch changing the name of vmplX_ssp SEV-ES save area fields to plX_ssp.
- Merge this series intended for KVM with the separate guest kernel
patch (now patch 7/8).
- Update MSR passthrough code to conditionally pass through shadow stack MSRS based on both host and guest support.
- Don't save PL0_SSP, PL1_SSP, and PL2_SSP MSRs on SEV-ES VMRUN as these are currently unused.
v1:
- Remove RFC tag from series
- Rebase on v6 of the Intel CET virtualization series
- Use KVM-governed feature to track SHSTK for SVM
v2:
- Add new patch renaming boot_*msr to raw_*msr. Utilize raw_rdmsr when reading XSS on SEV-ES cpuid instructions.
- Omit unnecessary patch for saving shadow stack msrs on SEV-ES VMRUN
- Omit passing through of XSS for SEV-ES as support has already been properly implemented in a26b7cd22546 ("KVM: SEV: Do not intercept accesses to MSR_IA32_XSS for SEV-ES guests")
v3:
- Rebased on v11 of the Intel CET Virtualization series.
- Split guest kernel patches into a separate series as these are independent of this series and are needed to support non-KVM hypervisors.
John Allen (5):
KVM: x86: SVM: Emulate reads and writes to shadow stack MSRs
KVM: x86: SVM: Update dump_vmcb with shadow stack save area additions
KVM: x86: SVM: Pass through shadow stack MSRs
KVM: SVM: Add MSR_IA32_XSS to the GHCB for hypervisor kernel
KVM: SVM: Enable shadow stack virtualization for SVM
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 9 +++++++-- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v3 1/5 KVM: x86: SVM: Emulate reads and writes to shadow stack MSRs
Set up interception of shadow stack MSRs. In the event that shadow stack is unsupported on the host or the MSRs are otherwise inaccessible, the interception code will return an error. In certain circumstances such as host initiated MSR reads or writes, the interception code will get or set the requested MSR value.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +18 -0
@@ -2776,6 +2776,15 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)if (guest_cpuid_is_intel_compatible (vcpu)) msr_info->data |= (u64 )svm->sysenter_esp_hi <<32 ;break ; +case MSR_IA32_S_CET : + msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.s_cet; +break ; +case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB : + msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.isst_addr; +break ; +case MSR_KVM_INTERNAL_GUEST_SSP : + msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.ssp; +break ;case MSR_TSC_AUX : msr_info->data = svm->tsc_aux;break ;
@@ -3008,6 +3017,15 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sysenter_esp = (u32 )data; svm->sysenter_esp_hi =guest_cpuid_is_intel_compatible (vcpu) ? (data >>32 ) :0 ;break ; +case MSR_IA32_S_CET : + svm->vmcb->save.s_cet = data; +break ; +case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB : + svm->vmcb->save.isst_addr = data; +break ; +case MSR_KVM_INTERNAL_GUEST_SSP : + svm->vmcb->save.ssp = data; +break ;case MSR_TSC_AUX :/* * TSC_AUX is always virtualized for SEV-ES guests when the
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH v3 1/5] KVM: x86: SVM: Emulate reads and writes to shadow stack MSRs
Quoted 5 lines · John Allen
Set up interception of shadow stack MSRs. In the event that shadow stack is unsupported on the host or the MSRs are otherwise inaccessible, the interception code will return an error. In certain circumstances such as host initiated MSR reads or writes, the interception code will get or set the requested MSR value.
The changelog does not match the code. This patch does not set up interception for shadow stack MSRs; instead, it emulates shadow stack MSR read/write by accessing the corresponding fields in the VMCB.
Quoted 45 lines
Signed-off-by John Allen <[email protected]>---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c| 18 ++++++++++++++++++1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +18
-0@@ -2776,6 +2776,15 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)if (guest_cpuid_is_intel_compatible (vcpu)) msr_info->data |= (u64 )svm->sysenter_esp_hi <<32 ;break ; +case MSR_IA32_S_CET : + msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.s_cet; +break ; +case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB : + msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.isst_addr; +break ; +case MSR_KVM_INTERNAL_GUEST_SSP : + msr_info->data = svm->vmcb->save.ssp; +break ;case MSR_TSC_AUX : msr_info->data = svm->tsc_aux;break ;@@ -3008,6 +3017,15 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr) svm->vmcb01.ptr->save.sysenter_esp = (u32 )data; svm->sysenter_esp_hi =guest_cpuid_is_intel_compatible (vcpu) ? (data >>32 ) :0 ;break ; +case MSR_IA32_S_CET : + svm->vmcb->save.s_cet = data; +break ; +case MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB : + svm->vmcb->save.isst_addr = data; +break ; +case MSR_KVM_INTERNAL_GUEST_SSP : + svm->vmcb->save.ssp = data; +break ;case MSR_TSC_AUX :/* * TSC_AUX is always virtualized for SEV-ES guests when the Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v3 2/5 KVM: x86: SVM: Update dump_vmcb with shadow stack save area additions
In reply to John AllenAdd shadow stack VMCB save area fields to dump_vmcb. Only include S_CET, SSP, and ISST_ADDR. Since there currently isn't support to decrypt and dump the SEV-ES save area, exclude PL0_SSP, PL1_SSP, PL2_SSP, PL3_SSP, and U_CET which are only inlcuded in the SEV-ES save area.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +4 -0
@@ -3416,6 +3416,10 @@ static void dump_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) "rip:", save->rip, "rflags:", save->rflags);pr_err ("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n" ,"rsp:" , save->rsp,"rax:" , save->rax); +pr_err ("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n" , +"s_cet:" , save->s_cet,"ssp:" , save->ssp); +pr_err ("%-15s %016llx\n" , +"isst_addr:" , save->isst_addr);pr_err ("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n" ,"star:" , save01->star,"lstar:" , save01->lstar); pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH v3 2/5] KVM: x86: SVM: Update dump_vmcb with shadow stack save area additions
Quoted 4 lines · John Allen
Add shadow stack VMCB save area fields to
dump_vmcb. Only includeS_CET, SSP, andISST_ADDR. Since there currently isn't support to decrypt and dump the SEV-ES save area, excludePL0_SSP,PL1_SSP,PL2_SSP,PL3_SSP, andU_CETwhich are only inlcuded in the SEV-ES save area.
There has been a recent patch series that can decrypt and dump VMSA contents, so you could add those fields if you think they should be dumped.
Thanks,
Tom
Quoted 22 lines
Signed-off-by John Allen <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +4
-0@@ -3416,6 +3416,10 @@ static void dump_vmcb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) "rip:", save->rip, "rflags:", save->rflags);pr_err ("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n" ,"rsp:" , save->rsp,"rax:" , save->rax); +pr_err ("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n" , +"s_cet:" , save->s_cet,"ssp:" , save->ssp); +pr_err ("%-15s %016llx\n" , +"isst_addr:" , save->isst_addr);pr_err ("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n" ,"star:" , save01->star,"lstar:" , save01->lstar); pr_err("%-15s %016llx %-13s %016llx\n",
PATCH v3 3/5 KVM: x86: SVM: Pass through shadow stack MSRs
In reply to John AllenIf kvm supports shadow stack, pass through shadow stack MSRs to improve guest performance.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +12 -0
@@ -838,6 +838,18 @@ static void svm_recalc_msr_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)svm_set_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP ,MSR_TYPE_RW ,guest_cpuid_is_intel_compatible (vcpu)); +if (kvm_cpu_cap_has (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) { +bool shstk_enabled =guest_cpu_cap_has (vcpu,X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ); + +svm_set_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,MSR_IA32_U_CET ,MSR_TYPE_RW , !shstk_enabled); +svm_set_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,MSR_IA32_S_CET ,MSR_TYPE_RW , !shstk_enabled); +svm_set_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ,MSR_TYPE_RW , !shstk_enabled); +svm_set_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP ,MSR_TYPE_RW , !shstk_enabled); +svm_set_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP ,MSR_TYPE_RW , !shstk_enabled); +svm_set_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP ,MSR_TYPE_RW , !shstk_enabled); +svm_set_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB ,MSR_TYPE_RW , !shstk_enabled); + } +if (sev_es_guest (vcpu->kvm))sev_es_recalc_msr_intercepts (vcpu);
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH v3 3/5] KVM: x86: SVM: Pass through shadow stack MSRs
Quoted 2 lines · John Allen
If kvm supports shadow stack, pass through shadow stack MSRs to improve guest performance.
The changelog is a bit sparse. Perhaps you could include something similar to what I did in my v13 version:
Pass through shadow stack MSRs that are managed by XSAVE, as they cannot be intercepted without also intercepting XSAVE. However, intercepting XSAVE would likely cause unacceptable performance overhead.
MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB is not managed by XSAVE, so it is intercepted.
Quoted 14 lines
Signed-off-by John Allen <[email protected]>---
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c| 12 ++++++++++++1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +0
-0@@ -838,6 +838,18 @@ static void svm_recalc_msr_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)svm_set_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP ,MSR_TYPE_RW ,guest_cpuid_is_intel_compatible (vcpu));
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c static void svm_recalc_msr_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) · line 850
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +10
-0+if (kvm_cpu_cap_has (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK )) { +bool shstk_enabled =guest_cpu_cap_has (vcpu,X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ); + +svm_set_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,MSR_IA32_U_CET ,MSR_TYPE_RW , !shstk_enabled); +svm_set_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,MSR_IA32_S_CET ,MSR_TYPE_RW , !shstk_enabled); +svm_set_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,MSR_IA32_PL0_SSP ,MSR_TYPE_RW , !shstk_enabled); +svm_set_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,MSR_IA32_PL1_SSP ,MSR_TYPE_RW , !shstk_enabled); +svm_set_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,MSR_IA32_PL2_SSP ,MSR_TYPE_RW , !shstk_enabled); +svm_set_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP ,MSR_TYPE_RW , !shstk_enabled); +svm_set_intercept_for_msr (vcpu,MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB ,MSR_TYPE_RW , !shstk_enabled);
MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB should be intercepted unless there is a justification for pass-through. See Sean's comment below
https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/
With above nits fixed,
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +2
-0+ } +if (sev_es_guest (vcpu->kvm))sev_es_recalc_msr_intercepts (vcpu);Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v3 4/5 KVM: SVM: Add MSR_IA32_XSS to the GHCB for hypervisor kernel
In reply to John AllenWhen a guest issues a cpuid instruction for Fn0000000D_x0B (CetUserOffset), KVM will intercept and need to access the guest MSR_IA32_XSS value. For SEV-ES, this is encrypted and needs to be included in the GHCB to be visible to the hypervisor.
---
v2:
- Omit passing through XSS as this has already been properly implemented in a26b7cd22546 ("KVM: SEV: Do not intercept accesses to MSR_IA32_XSS for SEV-ES guests")
v3:
- Move guest kernel GHCB_ACCESSORS definition to new series.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 9 +++++++-- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +7 -2
@@ -3239,8 +3239,13 @@ static void sev_es_sync_from_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) svm->vmcb->save.cpl =kvm_ghcb_get_cpl_if_valid (svm, ghcb); -if (kvm_ghcb_xcr0_is_valid (svm)) { - vcpu->arch.xcr0 =ghcb_get_xcr0 (ghcb); +if (kvm_ghcb_xcr0_is_valid (svm) ||kvm_ghcb_xss_is_valid (svm)) { +if (kvm_ghcb_xcr0_is_valid (svm)) + vcpu->arch.xcr0 =ghcb_get_xcr0 (ghcb); + +if (kvm_ghcb_xss_is_valid (svm)) + vcpu->arch.ia32_xss =ghcb_get_xss (ghcb); + vcpu->arch.cpuid_dynamic_bits_dirty = true; }
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +1 -0
@@ -925,5 +925,6 @@ DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_exit_info_1) DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_exit_info_2) DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_scratch) DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(xcr0) +DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(xss)#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH v3 4/5] KVM: SVM: Add MSR_IA32_XSS to the GHCB for hypervisor kernel
Quoted 26 lines · John Allen
When a guest issues a cpuid instruction for
Fn0000000D_x0B(CetUserOffset), KVM will intercept and need to access the guestMSR_IA32_XSSvalue. For SEV-ES, this is encrypted and needs to be included in the GHCB to be visible to the hypervisor.Signed-off-by John Allen <[email protected]>---
v2:
- Omit passing through XSS as this has already been properly implemented ina26b7cd22546("KVM: SEV: Do not intercept accesses toMSR_IA32_XSSfor SEV-ES guests")
v3:
- Move guest kernelGHCB_ACCESSORSdefinition to new series.
---arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c| 9 +++++++--arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h| 1 +2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +0
-0@@ -3239,8 +3239,13 @@ static void sev_es_sync_from_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) svm->vmcb->save.cpl =kvm_ghcb_get_cpl_if_valid (svm, ghcb);
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c static void sev_es_sync_from_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm) · line 3249
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +7
-2-if (kvm_ghcb_xcr0_is_valid (svm)) { - vcpu->arch.xcr0 =ghcb_get_xcr0 (ghcb); +if (kvm_ghcb_xcr0_is_valid (svm) ||kvm_ghcb_xss_is_valid (svm)) { +if (kvm_ghcb_xcr0_is_valid (svm)) + vcpu->arch.xcr0 =ghcb_get_xcr0 (ghcb); + +if (kvm_ghcb_xss_is_valid (svm)) + vcpu->arch.ia32_xss =ghcb_get_xss (ghcb); + vcpu->arch.cpuid_dynamic_bits_dirty = true;
It seems a bit odd to me. How about:
if (kvm_ghcb_xcr0_is_valid(svm)) {
vcpu->arch.xcr0 = ghcb_get_xcr0(ghcb);
vcpu->arch.cpuid_dynamic_bits_dirty = true;
}
if (kvm_ghcb_xss_is_valid(svm)) {
vcpu->arch.xss = ghcb_get_xss(ghcb);
vcpu->arch.cpuid_dynamic_bits_dirty = true;
}This looks better because it has less indentation and reduces the number of "if" statements by one.
Quoted 16 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +0
-0}arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h +1
-0@@ -925,5 +925,6 @@ DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_exit_info_1) DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_exit_info_2) DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_scratch) DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(xcr0) +DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(xss)#endif Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v3 5/5 KVM: SVM: Enable shadow stack virtualization for SVM
In reply to John AllenRemove the explicit clearing of shadow stack CPU capabilities.
---
v3:
- New in v3.
--- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 5 ----- 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +0 -5
@@ -5255,11 +5255,6 @@ static __init void svm_set_cpu_caps(void)kvm_set_cpu_caps (); kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap =0 ; - kvm_caps.supported_xss =0 ; - -/* KVM doesn't yet support CET virtualization for SVM. */ -kvm_cpu_cap_clear (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ); -kvm_cpu_cap_clear (X86_FEATURE_IBT );/* CPUID 0x80000001 and 0x8000000A (SVM features) */ if (nested) {
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH v3 5/5] KVM: SVM: Enable shadow stack virtualization for SVM
Quoted 15 lines · John Allen
Remove the explicit clearing of shadow stack CPU capabilities.
Signed-off-by John Allen <[email protected]>---
v3:
- New in v3.
---arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c| 5 -----1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c static __init void svm_set_cpu_caps(void) · line 5262
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +0
-5@@ -5255,11 +5255,6 @@ static __init void svm_set_cpu_caps(void)kvm_set_cpu_caps (); kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap =0 ; - kvm_caps.supported_xss =0 ; - -/* KVM doesn't yet support CET virtualization for SVM. */ -kvm_cpu_cap_clear (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ); -kvm_cpu_cap_clear (X86_FEATURE_IBT );
IIUC, IBT should be cleared because KVM doesn't support IBT for SVM.
With this fixed:
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +0
-0/* CPUID 0x80000001 and 0x8000000A (SVM features) */ if (nested) {Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH v3 5/5] KVM: SVM: Enable shadow stack virtualization for SVM
Quoted 18 lines · Chao Gao
Quoted 17 lines · John Allen
Remove the explicit clearing of shadow stack CPU capabilities.
Signed-off-by John Allen <[email protected]>---
v3:
- New in v3.
---arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c| 5 -----1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +0
-0@@ -5255,11 +5255,6 @@ static __init void svm_set_cpu_caps(void)kvm_set_cpu_caps ();
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c static __init void svm_set_cpu_caps(void) · line 5262
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +0
-5kvm_caps.supported_perf_cap =0 ; - kvm_caps.supported_xss =0 ; - -/* KVM doesn't yet support CET virtualization for SVM. */ -kvm_cpu_cap_clear (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ); -kvm_cpu_cap_clear (X86_FEATURE_IBT );IIUC, IBT should be cleared because KVM doesn't support IBT for SVM.
Yeah, I wondered about this. The reason I chose to not clear this is because we don't explicitly clear other features that are not supported on AMD hardware AFAICT. Is there a reason we should clear this and not other unsupported features?
Thanks,
John
Re: [PATCH v3 5/5] KVM: SVM: Enable shadow stack virtualization for SVM
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c static __init void svm_set_cpu_caps(void) · line 5262
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +0
-3-/* KVM doesn't yet support CET virtualization for SVM. */ -kvm_cpu_cap_clear (X86_FEATURE_SHSTK ); -kvm_cpu_cap_clear (X86_FEATURE_IBT );IIUC, IBT should be cleared because KVM doesn't support IBT for SVM.
Yeah, I wondered about this. The reason I chose to not clear this is because we don't explicitly clear other features that are not supported on AMD hardware AFAICT.
Your series doesn't enable IBT for SVM. If future AMD CPUs add IBT support, this KVM running on those CPUs will inadvertently advertise IBT support.
Quoted 2 lines
Is there a reason we should clear this and not
other unsupported features?
I think they should be cleared if they require any KVM enabling beyond just adding the CPUID bits. At the very least, we can handle IBT correctly.