KEYS: trusted_tpm1: HMAC fix and cleanup
Subsystems (5)
v2 cover KEYS: trusted_tpm1: HMAC fix and cleanup
Patch 1 fixes the HMAC-SHA1 comparison in trusted_tpm1 to be constant-time.
Patch 2 simplifies the SHA-1 and HMAC-SHA1 computation in trusted_tpm1 by using library APIs instead of crypto_shash. Note that this depends on the SHA-1 and HMAC-SHA1 library APIs that were merged for v6.17-rc1.
Patch 3 is a trusted_tpm1 cleanup that moves private functionality out of a public header.
Changed in v2:
- Added the requested note to the commit message of patch 1.
- Added a Reviewed-by tag
Eric Biggers (3):
KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Compare HMAC values in constant time
KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Use SHA-1 library instead of crypto_shash
KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Move private functionality out of public header
include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 79 ------ security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 5 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 284 ++++++++-------------- 3 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 268 deletions(-)
base-commit: 561c80369df0733ba0574882a1635287b20f9de2
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1
PATCH v2 1/3 KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Compare HMAC values in constant time
To prevent timing attacks, HMAC value comparison needs to be constant time. Replace the memcmp() with the correct function, crypto_memneq().
[For the Fixes commit I used the commit that introduced the memcmp(). It predates the introduction of crypto_memneq(), but it was still a bug at the time even though a helper function didn't exist yet.]
--- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +4 -3
@@ -5,10 +5,11 @@* * See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst */ #include <crypto/hash_info.h> +#include <crypto/utils.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/parser.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/err.h>
@@ -239,11 +240,11 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,TPM_NONCE_SIZE , enonce,TPM_NONCE_SIZE , ononce, 1, continueflag, 0, 0);if (ret <0 ) goto out; -if (memcmp (testhmac, authdata,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE )) +if (crypto_memneq (testhmac, authdata,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE )) ret = -EINVAL ; out:kfree_sensitive (sdesc);return ret; }
@@ -332,20 +333,20 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer, ret =TSS_rawhmac (testhmac1, key1, keylen1,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE , paramdigest,TPM_NONCE_SIZE , enonce1,TPM_NONCE_SIZE , ononce,1 , continueflag1,0 ,0 );if (ret <0 ) goto out; -if (memcmp (testhmac1, authdata1,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE )) { +if (crypto_memneq (testhmac1, authdata1,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE )) { ret = -EINVAL ; goto out; } ret =TSS_rawhmac (testhmac2, key2, keylen2,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE , paramdigest,TPM_NONCE_SIZE , enonce2,TPM_NONCE_SIZE , ononce,1 , continueflag2,0 ,0 );if (ret <0 ) goto out; -if (memcmp (testhmac2, authdata2,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE )) +if (crypto_memneq (testhmac2, authdata2,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE )) ret = -EINVAL ; out:kfree_sensitive (sdesc);return ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1
Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Compare HMAC values in constant time
Quoted 69 lines · Eric Biggers
To prevent timing attacks, HMAC value comparison needs to be constant time. Replace the
memcmp()with the correct function,crypto_memneq().[For the Fixes commit I used the commit that introduced the
memcmp(). It predates the introduction ofcrypto_memneq(), but it was still a bug at the time even though a helper function didn't exist yet.]Fixes d00a1c72f7f4 ("keys: add new trusted key-type")Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>--- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +4
-3@@ -5,10 +5,11 @@* * See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst */ #include <crypto/hash_info.h> +#include <crypto/utils.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/parser.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/err.h> @@ -239,11 +240,11 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,TPM_NONCE_SIZE , enonce,TPM_NONCE_SIZE , ononce, 1, continueflag, 0, 0);if (ret <0 ) goto out; -if (memcmp (testhmac, authdata,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE )) +if (crypto_memneq (testhmac, authdata,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE )) ret = -EINVAL ; out:kfree_sensitive (sdesc);return ret; }@@ -332,20 +333,20 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer, ret =TSS_rawhmac (testhmac1, key1, keylen1,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE , paramdigest,TPM_NONCE_SIZE , enonce1,TPM_NONCE_SIZE , ononce,1 , continueflag1,0 ,0 );if (ret <0 ) goto out; -if (memcmp (testhmac1, authdata1,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE )) { +if (crypto_memneq (testhmac1, authdata1,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE )) { ret = -EINVAL ; goto out; } ret =TSS_rawhmac (testhmac2, key2, keylen2,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE , paramdigest,TPM_NONCE_SIZE , enonce2,TPM_NONCE_SIZE , ononce,1 , continueflag2,0 ,0 );if (ret <0 ) goto out; -if (memcmp (testhmac2, authdata2,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE )) +if (crypto_memneq (testhmac2, authdata2,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE )) ret = -EINVAL ; out:kfree_sensitive (sdesc);return ret; }Signature · 1 line
2.50.1
BR, Jarkko
PATCH v2 2/3 KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Use SHA-1 library instead of crypto_shash
In reply to Eric BiggersUse the SHA-1 and HMAC-SHA1 library functions instead of crypto_shash. This is simpler and faster.
Replace the selection of CRYPTO, CRYPTO_HMAC, and CRYPTO_SHA1 with CRYPTO_LIB_SHA1 and CRYPTO_LIB_UTILS. The latter is needed for crypto_memneq() which was previously being pulled in via CRYPTO.
--- security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 5 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 221 ++++------------------ 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 190 deletions(-)
security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig +2 -3
@@ -3,14 +3,13 @@ config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM bool "TPM-based trusted keys" depends on TCG_TPM >= TRUSTED_KEYS default y - select CRYPTO - select CRYPTO_HMAC - select CRYPTO_SHA1 select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO + select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA1 + select CRYPTO_LIB_UTILS select ASN1_ENCODER select OID_REGISTRY select ASN1 select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS help
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +34 -187
420 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1
Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Use SHA-1 library instead of crypto_shash
Quoted 473 lines · Eric Biggers
Use the SHA-1 and HMAC-SHA1 library functions instead of
crypto_shash. This is simpler and faster.Replace the selection of CRYPTO,
CRYPTO_HMAC, andCRYPTO_SHA1withCRYPTO_LIB_SHA1andCRYPTO_LIB_UTILS. The latter is needed forcrypto_memneq()which was previously being pulled in via CRYPTO.Reviewed-by Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>--- security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig | 5 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 221 ++++------------------ 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 190 deletions(-)security/keys/trusted-keys/Kconfig +2
-3@@ -3,14 +3,13 @@ config HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS config TRUSTED_KEYS_TPM bool "TPM-based trusted keys" depends on TCG_TPM >= TRUSTED_KEYS default y - select CRYPTO - select CRYPTO_HMAC - select CRYPTO_SHA1 select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO + select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA1 + select CRYPTO_LIB_UTILS select ASN1_ENCODER select OID_REGISTRY select ASN1 select HAVE_TRUSTED_KEYS helpsecurity/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +34
-187@@ -5,90 +5,37 @@* * See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst */ #include <crypto/hash_info.h> +#include <crypto/sha1.h> #include <crypto/utils.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/parser.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/err.h> #include <keys/trusted-type.h> #include <linux/key-type.h> -#include <linux/crypto.h> -#include <crypto/hash.h> -#include <crypto/sha1.h> #include <linux/tpm.h> #include <linux/tpm_command.h> #include <keys/trusted_tpm.h> -static const char hmac_alg[] ="hmac(sha1)" ; -static const char hash_alg[] ="sha1" ;static struct tpm_chip *chip;static struct tpm_digest *digests; -struct sdesc { -struct shash_desc shash; -char ctx[]; -}; - -static struct crypto_shash *hashalg; -static struct crypto_shash *hmacalg; - -static struct sdesc *init_sdesc (struct crypto_shash *alg) -{ -struct sdesc *sdesc; -int size; - - size =sizeof (struct shash_desc ) +crypto_shash_descsize (alg); - sdesc =kmalloc (size,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!sdesc) -return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); - sdesc->shash.tfm = alg; -return sdesc; -} - -static int TSS_sha1 (const unsigned char *data,unsigned int datalen, -unsigned char *digest) -{ -struct sdesc *sdesc; -int ret; - - sdesc =init_sdesc (hashalg); -if (IS_ERR (sdesc)) { -pr_info ("can't alloc %s\n" , hash_alg); -return PTR_ERR (sdesc); - } - - ret =crypto_shash_digest (&sdesc->shash, data, datalen, digest); -kfree_sensitive (sdesc); -return ret; -} -static int TSS_rawhmac (unsigned char *digest,const unsigned char *key,unsigned int keylen, ...) { -struct sdesc *sdesc; +struct hmac_sha1_ctx hmac_ctx;va_list argp;unsigned int dlen;unsigned char *data; -int ret; - - sdesc =init_sdesc (hmacalg); -if (IS_ERR (sdesc)) { -pr_info ("can't alloc %s\n" , hmac_alg); -return PTR_ERR (sdesc); - } +int ret =0 ; - ret =crypto_shash_setkey (hmacalg, key, keylen); -if (ret <0 ) - goto out; - ret =crypto_shash_init (&sdesc->shash); -if (ret <0 ) - goto out; +hmac_sha1_init_usingrawkey (&hmac_ctx, key, keylen);va_start (argp, keylen);for (;;) { dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);if (dlen ==0 )@@ -96,19 +43,15 @@ static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *);if (data ==NULL ) { ret = -EINVAL ;break ; } - ret =crypto_shash_update (&sdesc->shash, data, dlen); -if (ret <0 ) -break ; +hmac_sha1_update (&hmac_ctx, data, dlen); }va_end (argp);if (!ret) - ret =crypto_shash_final (&sdesc->shash, digest); -out: -kfree_sensitive (sdesc); +hmac_sha1_final (&hmac_ctx, digest);return ret; }/* * calculate authorization info fields to send to TPM @@ -116,53 +59,41 @@ static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key,int TSS_authhmac (unsigned char *digest,const unsigned char *key,unsigned int keylen,unsigned char *h1,unsigned char *h2,unsigned int h3, ...) {unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ]; -struct sdesc *sdesc; +struct sha1_ctx sha_ctx;unsigned int dlen;unsigned char *data;unsigned char c; -int ret; +int ret =0 ;va_list argp;if (!chip)return -ENODEV ; - sdesc =init_sdesc (hashalg); -if (IS_ERR (sdesc)) { -pr_info ("can't alloc %s\n" , hash_alg); -return PTR_ERR (sdesc); - } - c = !!h3; - ret =crypto_shash_init (&sdesc->shash); -if (ret <0 ) - goto out; +sha1_init (&sha_ctx);va_start (argp, h3);for (;;) { dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);if (dlen ==0 )break ; data = va_arg(argp, unsigned char *);if (!data) { ret = -EINVAL ;break ; } - ret =crypto_shash_update (&sdesc->shash, data, dlen); -if (ret <0 ) -break ; +sha1_update (&sha_ctx, data, dlen); }va_end (argp);if (!ret) - ret =crypto_shash_final (&sdesc->shash, paramdigest); +sha1_final (&sha_ctx, paramdigest);if (!ret) ret =TSS_rawhmac (digest, key, keylen,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE , paramdigest,TPM_NONCE_SIZE , h1,TPM_NONCE_SIZE , h2,1 , &c,0 ,0 ); -out: -kfree_sensitive (sdesc);return ret; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (TSS_authhmac);/* @@ -181,11 +112,11 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,unsigned char *enonce;unsigned char *continueflag;unsigned char *authdata;unsigned char testhmac[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ];unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ]; -struct sdesc *sdesc; +struct sha1_ctx sha_ctx;unsigned int dlen;unsigned int dpos;va_list argp;int ret;@@ -202,53 +133,33 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,return -EINVAL ; authdata = buffer + bufsize -SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ; continueflag = authdata -1 ; enonce = continueflag -TPM_NONCE_SIZE ; - sdesc =init_sdesc (hashalg); -if (IS_ERR (sdesc)) { -pr_info ("can't alloc %s\n" , hash_alg); -return PTR_ERR (sdesc); - } - ret =crypto_shash_init (&sdesc->shash); -if (ret <0 ) - goto out; - ret =crypto_shash_update (&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result, -sizeof result); -if (ret <0 ) - goto out; - ret =crypto_shash_update (&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal, -sizeof ordinal); -if (ret <0 ) - goto out; +sha1_init (&sha_ctx); +sha1_update (&sha_ctx, (const u8 *)&result,sizeof (result)); +sha1_update (&sha_ctx, (const u8 *)&ordinal,sizeof (ordinal));va_start (argp, keylen);for (;;) { dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);if (dlen ==0 )break ; dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); - ret =crypto_shash_update (&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen); -if (ret <0 ) -break ; +sha1_update (&sha_ctx, buffer + dpos, dlen); }va_end (argp); -if (!ret) - ret =crypto_shash_final (&sdesc->shash, paramdigest); -if (ret <0 ) - goto out; +sha1_final (&sha_ctx, paramdigest); ret =TSS_rawhmac (testhmac, key, keylen,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE , paramdigest,TPM_NONCE_SIZE , enonce,TPM_NONCE_SIZE , ononce,1 , continueflag,0 ,0 );if (ret <0 ) - goto out; +return ret;if (crypto_memneq (testhmac, authdata,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE )) - ret = -EINVAL ; -out: -kfree_sensitive (sdesc); -return ret; +return -EINVAL ; +return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (TSS_checkhmac1);/* * verify the AUTH2_COMMAND (unseal) result from TPM @@ -272,11 +183,11 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,unsigned char *continueflag2;unsigned char *authdata2;unsigned char testhmac1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ];unsigned char testhmac2[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ];unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ]; -struct sdesc *sdesc; +struct sha1_ctx sha_ctx;unsigned int dlen;unsigned int dpos;va_list argp;int ret;@@ -295,62 +206,40 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer, continueflag1 = authdata1 -1 ; continueflag2 = authdata2 -1 ; enonce1 = continueflag1 -TPM_NONCE_SIZE ; enonce2 = continueflag2 -TPM_NONCE_SIZE ; - sdesc =init_sdesc (hashalg); -if (IS_ERR (sdesc)) { -pr_info ("can't alloc %s\n" , hash_alg); -return PTR_ERR (sdesc); - } - ret =crypto_shash_init (&sdesc->shash); -if (ret <0 ) - goto out; - ret =crypto_shash_update (&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&result, -sizeof result); -if (ret <0 ) - goto out; - ret =crypto_shash_update (&sdesc->shash, (const u8 *)&ordinal, -sizeof ordinal); -if (ret <0 ) - goto out; +sha1_init (&sha_ctx); +sha1_update (&sha_ctx, (const u8 *)&result,sizeof (result)); +sha1_update (&sha_ctx, (const u8 *)&ordinal,sizeof (ordinal));va_start (argp, keylen2);for (;;) { dlen = va_arg(argp, unsigned int);if (dlen ==0 )break ; dpos = va_arg(argp, unsigned int); - ret =crypto_shash_update (&sdesc->shash, buffer + dpos, dlen); -if (ret <0 ) -break ; +sha1_update (&sha_ctx, buffer + dpos, dlen); }va_end (argp); -if (!ret) - ret =crypto_shash_final (&sdesc->shash, paramdigest); -if (ret <0 ) - goto out; +sha1_final (&sha_ctx, paramdigest); ret =TSS_rawhmac (testhmac1, key1, keylen1,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE , paramdigest,TPM_NONCE_SIZE , enonce1,TPM_NONCE_SIZE , ononce,1 , continueflag1,0 ,0 );if (ret <0 ) - goto out; -if (crypto_memneq (testhmac1, authdata1,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE )) { - ret = -EINVAL ; - goto out; - } +return ret; +if (crypto_memneq (testhmac1, authdata1,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE )) +return -EINVAL ; ret =TSS_rawhmac (testhmac2, key2, keylen2,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE , paramdigest,TPM_NONCE_SIZE , enonce2,TPM_NONCE_SIZE , ononce,1 , continueflag2,0 ,0 );if (ret <0 ) - goto out; +return ret;if (crypto_memneq (testhmac2, authdata2,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE )) - ret = -EINVAL ; -out: -kfree_sensitive (sdesc); -return ret; +return -EINVAL ; +return 0 ; }/* * For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our * own TPM command packets using the drivers send function. @@ -497,13 +386,11 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,dump_sess (&sess);/* calculate encrypted authorization value */ memcpy (td->xorwork, sess.secret,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE );memcpy (td->xorwork +SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE , sess.enonce,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ); - ret =TSS_sha1 (td->xorwork,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE *2 , td->xorhash); -if (ret <0 ) - goto out; +sha1 (td->xorwork,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE *2 , td->xorhash); ret =tpm_get_random (chip, td->nonceodd,TPM_NONCE_SIZE );if (ret <0 ) goto out;@@ -988,44 +875,10 @@ static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob)static int trusted_tpm_get_random (unsigned char *key,size_t key_len) {return tpm_get_random (chip, key, key_len); } -static void trusted_shash_release (void ) -{ -if (hashalg) -crypto_free_shash (hashalg); -if (hmacalg) -crypto_free_shash (hmacalg); -} - -static int __init trusted_shash_alloc (void ) -{ -int ret; - - hmacalg =crypto_alloc_shash (hmac_alg,0 ,0 ); -if (IS_ERR (hmacalg)) { -pr_info ("could not allocate crypto %s\n" , - hmac_alg); -return PTR_ERR (hmacalg); - } - - hashalg =crypto_alloc_shash (hash_alg,0 ,0 ); -if (IS_ERR (hashalg)) { -pr_info ("could not allocate crypto %s\n" , - hash_alg); - ret =PTR_ERR (hashalg); - goto hashalg_fail; - } - -return 0 ; - -hashalg_fail: -crypto_free_shash (hmacalg); -return ret; -} -static int __init init_digests (void ) {int i; digests = kcalloc(chip->nr_allocated_banks, sizeof(*digests),@@ -1048,19 +901,14 @@ static int __init trusted_tpm_init(void)return -ENODEV ; ret =init_digests ();if (ret <0 ) goto err_put; - ret =trusted_shash_alloc (); -if (ret <0 ) - goto err_free; ret =register_key_type (&key_type_trusted);if (ret <0 ) - goto err_release; + goto err_free;return 0 ; -err_release: -trusted_shash_release (); err_free:kfree (digests); err_put:put_device (&chip->dev);return ret;@@ -1069,11 +917,10 @@ static int __init trusted_tpm_init(void)static void trusted_tpm_exit (void ) {if (chip) {put_device (&chip->dev);kfree (digests); -trusted_shash_release ();unregister_key_type (&key_type_trusted); } }struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops = {Signature · 1 line
2.50.1
BR, Jarkko
PATCH v2 3/3 KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Move private functionality out of public header
In reply to Eric BiggersMove functionality used only by trusted_tpm1.c out of the public header <keys/trusted_tpm.h>. Specifically, change the exported functions into static functions, since they are not used outside trusted_tpm1.c, and move various other definitions and inline functions to trusted_tpm1.c.
--- include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 79 ---------------------- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-)
include/keys/trusted_tpm.h +0 -79
@@ -3,94 +3,15 @@#define __TRUSTED_TPM_H#include <keys/trusted-type.h> #include <linux/tpm_command.h> -/* implementation specific TPM constants */ -#define TPM_SIZE_OFFSET 2 -#define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET 6 -#define TPM_DATA_OFFSET 10 - -#define LOAD32 (buffer, offset) (ntohl(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset])) -#define LOAD32N (buffer, offset) (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]) -#define LOAD16 (buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset])) -extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops; -struct osapsess { -uint32_t handle; -unsigned char secret[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ]; -unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE ]; -}; - -/* discrete values, but have to store in uint16_t for TPM use */ -enum { - SEAL_keytype =1 , - SRK_keytype =4 -}; - -int TSS_authhmac (unsigned char *digest,const unsigned char *key, -unsigned int keylen,unsigned char *h1, -unsigned char *h2,unsigned int h3, ...); -int TSS_checkhmac1 (unsigned char *buffer, -const uint32_t command, -const unsigned char *ononce, -const unsigned char *key, -unsigned int keylen, ...); - -int trusted_tpm_send (unsigned char *cmd,size_t buflen); -int oiap (struct tpm_buf *tb,uint32_t *handle,unsigned char *nonce); -int tpm2_seal_trusted (struct tpm_chip *chip,struct trusted_key_payload *payload,struct trusted_key_options *options);int tpm2_unseal_trusted (struct tpm_chip *chip,struct trusted_key_payload *payload,struct trusted_key_options *options); -#define TPM_DEBUG 0 - -#if TPM_DEBUG -static inline void dump_options (struct trusted_key_options *o) -{ -pr_info ("sealing key type %d\n" , o->keytype); -pr_info ("sealing key handle %0X\n" , o->keyhandle); -pr_info ("pcrlock %d\n" , o->pcrlock); -pr_info ("pcrinfo %d\n" , o->pcrinfo_len); -print_hex_dump (KERN_INFO ,"pcrinfo " ,DUMP_PREFIX_NONE , -16 ,1 , o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len,0 ); -} - -static inline void dump_sess (struct osapsess *s) -{ -print_hex_dump (KERN_INFO ,"trusted-key: handle " ,DUMP_PREFIX_NONE , -16 ,1 , &s->handle,4 ,0 ); -pr_info ("secret:\n" ); -print_hex_dump (KERN_INFO ,"" ,DUMP_PREFIX_NONE , -16 ,1 , &s->secret,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ,0 ); -pr_info ("trusted-key: enonce:\n" ); -print_hex_dump (KERN_INFO ,"" ,DUMP_PREFIX_NONE , -16 ,1 , &s->enonce,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ,0 ); -} - -static inline void dump_tpm_buf (unsigned char *buf) -{ -int len; - -pr_info ("\ntpm buffer\n" ); - len =LOAD32 (buf,TPM_SIZE_OFFSET ); -print_hex_dump (KERN_INFO ,"" ,DUMP_PREFIX_NONE ,16 ,1 , buf, len,0 ); -} -#else -static inline void dump_options (struct trusted_key_options *o) -{ -} - -static inline void dump_sess (struct osapsess *s) -{ -} - -static inline void dump_tpm_buf (unsigned char *buf) -{ -} -#endif #endif
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +72 -8
164 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.50.1
Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Move private functionality out of public header
Quoted 289 lines · Eric Biggers
Move functionality used only by
trusted_tpm1.cout of the public header <keys/trusted_tpm.h>. Specifically, change the exported functions into static functions, since they are not used outsidetrusted_tpm1.c, and move various other definitions and inline functions totrusted_tpm1.c.Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>--- include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 79 ---------------------- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-)include/keys/trusted_tpm.h +0
-79@@ -3,94 +3,15 @@#define __TRUSTED_TPM_H#include <keys/trusted-type.h> #include <linux/tpm_command.h> -/* implementation specific TPM constants */ -#define TPM_SIZE_OFFSET 2 -#define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET 6 -#define TPM_DATA_OFFSET 10 - -#define LOAD32 (buffer, offset) (ntohl(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset])) -#define LOAD32N (buffer, offset) (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]) -#define LOAD16 (buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset])) -extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops; -struct osapsess { -uint32_t handle; -unsigned char secret[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ]; -unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE ]; -}; - -/* discrete values, but have to store in uint16_t for TPM use */ -enum { - SEAL_keytype =1 , - SRK_keytype =4 -}; - -int TSS_authhmac (unsigned char *digest,const unsigned char *key, -unsigned int keylen,unsigned char *h1, -unsigned char *h2,unsigned int h3, ...); -int TSS_checkhmac1 (unsigned char *buffer, -const uint32_t command, -const unsigned char *ononce, -const unsigned char *key, -unsigned int keylen, ...); - -int trusted_tpm_send (unsigned char *cmd,size_t buflen); -int oiap (struct tpm_buf *tb,uint32_t *handle,unsigned char *nonce); -int tpm2_seal_trusted (struct tpm_chip *chip,struct trusted_key_payload *payload,struct trusted_key_options *options);int tpm2_unseal_trusted (struct tpm_chip *chip,struct trusted_key_payload *payload,struct trusted_key_options *options); -#define TPM_DEBUG 0 - -#if TPM_DEBUG -static inline void dump_options (struct trusted_key_options *o) -{ -pr_info ("sealing key type %d\n" , o->keytype); -pr_info ("sealing key handle %0X\n" , o->keyhandle); -pr_info ("pcrlock %d\n" , o->pcrlock); -pr_info ("pcrinfo %d\n" , o->pcrinfo_len); -print_hex_dump (KERN_INFO ,"pcrinfo " ,DUMP_PREFIX_NONE , -16 ,1 , o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len,0 ); -} - -static inline void dump_sess (struct osapsess *s) -{ -print_hex_dump (KERN_INFO ,"trusted-key: handle " ,DUMP_PREFIX_NONE , -16 ,1 , &s->handle,4 ,0 ); -pr_info ("secret:\n" ); -print_hex_dump (KERN_INFO ,"" ,DUMP_PREFIX_NONE , -16 ,1 , &s->secret,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ,0 ); -pr_info ("trusted-key: enonce:\n" ); -print_hex_dump (KERN_INFO ,"" ,DUMP_PREFIX_NONE , -16 ,1 , &s->enonce,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ,0 ); -} - -static inline void dump_tpm_buf (unsigned char *buf) -{ -int len; - -pr_info ("\ntpm buffer\n" ); - len =LOAD32 (buf,TPM_SIZE_OFFSET ); -print_hex_dump (KERN_INFO ,"" ,DUMP_PREFIX_NONE ,16 ,1 , buf, len,0 ); -} -#else -static inline void dump_options (struct trusted_key_options *o) -{ -} - -static inline void dump_sess (struct osapsess *s) -{ -} - -static inline void dump_tpm_buf (unsigned char *buf) -{ -} -#endif #endif security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +72
-8@@ -22,10 +22,78 @@#include <keys/trusted_tpm.h> static struct tpm_chip *chip;static struct tpm_digest *digests; +/* implementation specific TPM constants */ +#define TPM_SIZE_OFFSET 2 +#define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET 6 +#define TPM_DATA_OFFSET 10 + +#define LOAD32 (buffer, offset) (ntohl(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset])) +#define LOAD32N (buffer, offset) (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]) +#define LOAD16 (buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset])) + +struct osapsess { +uint32_t handle; +unsigned char secret[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ]; +unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE ]; +}; + +/* discrete values, but have to store in uint16_t for TPM use */ +enum { + SEAL_keytype =1 , + SRK_keytype =4 +}; + +#define TPM_DEBUG 0 + +#if TPM_DEBUG +static inline void dump_options (struct trusted_key_options *o) +{ +pr_info ("sealing key type %d\n" , o->keytype); +pr_info ("sealing key handle %0X\n" , o->keyhandle); +pr_info ("pcrlock %d\n" , o->pcrlock); +pr_info ("pcrinfo %d\n" , o->pcrinfo_len); +print_hex_dump (KERN_INFO ,"pcrinfo " ,DUMP_PREFIX_NONE , +16 ,1 , o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len,0 ); +} + +static inline void dump_sess (struct osapsess *s) +{ +print_hex_dump (KERN_INFO ,"trusted-key: handle " ,DUMP_PREFIX_NONE , +16 ,1 , &s->handle,4 ,0 ); +pr_info ("secret:\n" ); +print_hex_dump (KERN_INFO ,"" ,DUMP_PREFIX_NONE , +16 ,1 , &s->secret,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ,0 ); +pr_info ("trusted-key: enonce:\n" ); +print_hex_dump (KERN_INFO ,"" ,DUMP_PREFIX_NONE , +16 ,1 , &s->enonce,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ,0 ); +} + +static inline void dump_tpm_buf (unsigned char *buf) +{ +int len; + +pr_info ("\ntpm buffer\n" ); + len =LOAD32 (buf,TPM_SIZE_OFFSET ); +print_hex_dump (KERN_INFO ,"" ,DUMP_PREFIX_NONE ,16 ,1 , buf, len,0 ); +} +#else +static inline void dump_options (struct trusted_key_options *o) +{ +} + +static inline void dump_sess (struct osapsess *s) +{ +} + +static inline void dump_tpm_buf (unsigned char *buf) +{ +} +#endif +static int TSS_rawhmac (unsigned char *digest,const unsigned char *key,unsigned int keylen, ...) {struct hmac_sha1_ctx hmac_ctx;va_list argp;@@ -54,11 +122,11 @@ static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, }/* * calculate authorization info fields to send to TPM */ -int TSS_authhmac (unsigned char *digest,const unsigned char *key, +static int TSS_authhmac (unsigned char *digest,const unsigned char *key,unsigned int keylen,unsigned char *h1,unsigned char *h2,unsigned int h3, ...) {unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ];struct sha1_ctx sha_ctx;@@ -92,16 +160,15 @@ int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, ret =TSS_rawhmac (digest, key, keylen,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE , paramdigest,TPM_NONCE_SIZE , h1,TPM_NONCE_SIZE , h2,1 , &c,0 ,0 );return ret; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (TSS_authhmac);/* * verify the AUTH1_COMMAND (Seal) result from TPM */ -int TSS_checkhmac1 (unsigned char *buffer, +static int TSS_checkhmac1 (unsigned char *buffer,const uint32_t command,const unsigned char *ononce,const unsigned char *key,unsigned int keylen, ...) {@@ -157,11 +224,10 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,if (crypto_memneq (testhmac, authdata,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ))return -EINVAL ;return 0 ; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (TSS_checkhmac1);/* * verify the AUTH2_COMMAND (unseal) result from TPM */ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,@@ -242,11 +308,11 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,/* * For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our * own TPM command packets using the drivers send function. */ -int trusted_tpm_send (unsigned char *cmd,size_t buflen) +static int trusted_tpm_send (unsigned char *cmd,size_t buflen) {struct tpm_buf buf;int rc;if (!chip)@@ -268,11 +334,10 @@ int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen) rc = -EPERM ;tpm_put_ops (chip);return rc; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (trusted_tpm_send);/* * Lock a trusted key, by extending a selected PCR. * * Prevents a trusted key that is sealed to PCRs from being accessed. @@ -322,11 +387,11 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, }/* * Create an object independent authorisation protocol (oiap) session */ -int oiap (struct tpm_buf *tb,uint32_t *handle,unsigned char *nonce) +static int oiap (struct tpm_buf *tb,uint32_t *handle,unsigned char *nonce) {int ret;if (!chip)return -ENODEV ;@@ -339,11 +404,10 @@ int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce) *handle =LOAD32 (tb->data,TPM_DATA_OFFSET );memcpy (nonce, &tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET +sizeof (uint32_t )],TPM_NONCE_SIZE );return 0 ; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (oiap);struct tpm_digests {unsigned char encauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ];unsigned char pubauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ];unsigned char xorwork[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE *2 ];Signature · 1 line
2.50.1
BR, Jarkko
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 3/3] KEYS: trusted_tpm1: Move private functionality out of public header
Quoted 283 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 282 lines · Eric Biggers
Move functionality used only by
trusted_tpm1.cout of the public header <keys/trusted_tpm.h>. Specifically, change the exported functions into static functions, since they are not used outsidetrusted_tpm1.c, and move various other definitions and inline functions totrusted_tpm1.c.Signed-off-by Eric Biggers <[email protected]>--- include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 79 ---------------------- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-)include/keys/trusted_tpm.h +0
-79@@ -3,94 +3,15 @@#define __TRUSTED_TPM_H#include <keys/trusted-type.h> #include <linux/tpm_command.h> -/* implementation specific TPM constants */ -#define TPM_SIZE_OFFSET 2 -#define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET 6 -#define TPM_DATA_OFFSET 10 - -#define LOAD32 (buffer, offset) (ntohl(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset])) -#define LOAD32N (buffer, offset) (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]) -#define LOAD16 (buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset])) -extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops; -struct osapsess { -uint32_t handle; -unsigned char secret[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ]; -unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE ]; -}; - -/* discrete values, but have to store in uint16_t for TPM use */ -enum { - SEAL_keytype =1 , - SRK_keytype =4 -}; - -int TSS_authhmac (unsigned char *digest,const unsigned char *key, -unsigned int keylen,unsigned char *h1, -unsigned char *h2,unsigned int h3, ...); -int TSS_checkhmac1 (unsigned char *buffer, -const uint32_t command, -const unsigned char *ononce, -const unsigned char *key, -unsigned int keylen, ...); - -int trusted_tpm_send (unsigned char *cmd,size_t buflen); -int oiap (struct tpm_buf *tb,uint32_t *handle,unsigned char *nonce); -int tpm2_seal_trusted (struct tpm_chip *chip,struct trusted_key_payload *payload,struct trusted_key_options *options);int tpm2_unseal_trusted (struct tpm_chip *chip,struct trusted_key_payload *payload,struct trusted_key_options *options); -#define TPM_DEBUG 0 - -#if TPM_DEBUG -static inline void dump_options (struct trusted_key_options *o) -{ -pr_info ("sealing key type %d\n" , o->keytype); -pr_info ("sealing key handle %0X\n" , o->keyhandle); -pr_info ("pcrlock %d\n" , o->pcrlock); -pr_info ("pcrinfo %d\n" , o->pcrinfo_len); -print_hex_dump (KERN_INFO ,"pcrinfo " ,DUMP_PREFIX_NONE , -16 ,1 , o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len,0 ); -} - -static inline void dump_sess (struct osapsess *s) -{ -print_hex_dump (KERN_INFO ,"trusted-key: handle " ,DUMP_PREFIX_NONE , -16 ,1 , &s->handle,4 ,0 ); -pr_info ("secret:\n" ); -print_hex_dump (KERN_INFO ,"" ,DUMP_PREFIX_NONE , -16 ,1 , &s->secret,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ,0 ); -pr_info ("trusted-key: enonce:\n" ); -print_hex_dump (KERN_INFO ,"" ,DUMP_PREFIX_NONE , -16 ,1 , &s->enonce,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ,0 ); -} - -static inline void dump_tpm_buf (unsigned char *buf) -{ -int len; - -pr_info ("\ntpm buffer\n" ); - len =LOAD32 (buf,TPM_SIZE_OFFSET ); -print_hex_dump (KERN_INFO ,"" ,DUMP_PREFIX_NONE ,16 ,1 , buf, len,0 ); -} -#else -static inline void dump_options (struct trusted_key_options *o) -{ -} - -static inline void dump_sess (struct osapsess *s) -{ -} - -static inline void dump_tpm_buf (unsigned char *buf) -{ -} -#endif #endif security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +72
-8@@ -22,10 +22,78 @@#include <keys/trusted_tpm.h> static struct tpm_chip *chip;static struct tpm_digest *digests; +/* implementation specific TPM constants */ +#define TPM_SIZE_OFFSET 2 +#define TPM_RETURN_OFFSET 6 +#define TPM_DATA_OFFSET 10 + +#define LOAD32 (buffer, offset) (ntohl(*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset])) +#define LOAD32N (buffer, offset) (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]) +#define LOAD16 (buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset])) + +struct osapsess { +uint32_t handle; +unsigned char secret[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ]; +unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE ]; +}; + +/* discrete values, but have to store in uint16_t for TPM use */ +enum { + SEAL_keytype =1 , + SRK_keytype =4 +}; + +#define TPM_DEBUG 0 + +#if TPM_DEBUG +static inline void dump_options (struct trusted_key_options *o) +{ +pr_info ("sealing key type %d\n" , o->keytype); +pr_info ("sealing key handle %0X\n" , o->keyhandle); +pr_info ("pcrlock %d\n" , o->pcrlock); +pr_info ("pcrinfo %d\n" , o->pcrinfo_len); +print_hex_dump (KERN_INFO ,"pcrinfo " ,DUMP_PREFIX_NONE , +16 ,1 , o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len,0 ); +} + +static inline void dump_sess (struct osapsess *s) +{ +print_hex_dump (KERN_INFO ,"trusted-key: handle " ,DUMP_PREFIX_NONE , +16 ,1 , &s->handle,4 ,0 ); +pr_info ("secret:\n" ); +print_hex_dump (KERN_INFO ,"" ,DUMP_PREFIX_NONE , +16 ,1 , &s->secret,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ,0 ); +pr_info ("trusted-key: enonce:\n" ); +print_hex_dump (KERN_INFO ,"" ,DUMP_PREFIX_NONE , +16 ,1 , &s->enonce,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ,0 ); +} + +static inline void dump_tpm_buf (unsigned char *buf) +{ +int len; + +pr_info ("\ntpm buffer\n" ); + len =LOAD32 (buf,TPM_SIZE_OFFSET ); +print_hex_dump (KERN_INFO ,"" ,DUMP_PREFIX_NONE ,16 ,1 , buf, len,0 ); +} +#else +static inline void dump_options (struct trusted_key_options *o) +{ +} + +static inline void dump_sess (struct osapsess *s) +{ +} + +static inline void dump_tpm_buf (unsigned char *buf) +{ +} +#endif +static int TSS_rawhmac (unsigned char *digest,const unsigned char *key,unsigned int keylen, ...) {struct hmac_sha1_ctx hmac_ctx;va_list argp;@@ -54,11 +122,11 @@ static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, }/* * calculate authorization info fields to send to TPM */ -int TSS_authhmac (unsigned char *digest,const unsigned char *key, +static int TSS_authhmac (unsigned char *digest,const unsigned char *key,unsigned int keylen,unsigned char *h1,unsigned char *h2,unsigned int h3, ...) {unsigned char paramdigest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ];struct sha1_ctx sha_ctx;@@ -92,16 +160,15 @@ int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, ret =TSS_rawhmac (digest, key, keylen,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE , paramdigest,TPM_NONCE_SIZE , h1,TPM_NONCE_SIZE , h2,1 , &c,0 ,0 );return ret; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (TSS_authhmac);/* * verify the AUTH1_COMMAND (Seal) result from TPM */ -int TSS_checkhmac1 (unsigned char *buffer, +static int TSS_checkhmac1 (unsigned char *buffer,const uint32_t command,const unsigned char *ononce,const unsigned char *key,unsigned int keylen, ...) {@@ -157,11 +224,10 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer,if (crypto_memneq (testhmac, authdata,SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ))return -EINVAL ;return 0 ; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (TSS_checkhmac1);/* * verify the AUTH2_COMMAND (unseal) result from TPM */ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,@@ -242,11 +308,11 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer,/* * For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our * own TPM command packets using the drivers send function. */ -int trusted_tpm_send (unsigned char *cmd,size_t buflen) +static int trusted_tpm_send (unsigned char *cmd,size_t buflen) {struct tpm_buf buf;int rc;if (!chip)@@ -268,11 +334,10 @@ int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen) rc = -EPERM ;tpm_put_ops (chip);return rc; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (trusted_tpm_send);/* * Lock a trusted key, by extending a selected PCR. * * Prevents a trusted key that is sealed to PCRs from being accessed. @@ -322,11 +387,11 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, }/* * Create an object independent authorisation protocol (oiap) session */ -int oiap (struct tpm_buf *tb,uint32_t *handle,unsigned char *nonce) +static int oiap (struct tpm_buf *tb,uint32_t *handle,unsigned char *nonce) {int ret;if (!chip)return -ENODEV ;@@ -339,11 +404,10 @@ int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce) *handle =LOAD32 (tb->data,TPM_DATA_OFFSET );memcpy (nonce, &tb->data[TPM_DATA_OFFSET +sizeof (uint32_t )],TPM_NONCE_SIZE );return 0 ; } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (oiap);
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 7 lines
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +0
-0struct tpm_digests {unsigned char encauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ];unsigned char pubauth[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE ];unsigned char xorwork[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE *2 ];Signature · 1 line
2.50.1Reviewed-by Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
also applied (all of three)
thank you!
BR, Jarkko