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Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC

PATCH Superseded Sudhakar Kuppusamy 2 participants 25 messages Aug 21, 2025 – Aug 23, 2025

v8 of 18 Superseded Latest is v18 →

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v8 cover Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC

This patch set contains v8 the consolidated version of the patch sets for secure boot using appended signatures on powerpc, rebased on top of git HEAD.

The v7 series is at
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2025-08/msg00093.html

The v6 series is at
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2025-07/msg00255.html

Changes since v6 and v7:
- Daniel Kiper review comments addressed:
- v8 patch 10: changed the function name is_cert_removed_from_db to remove_cert_from_db and its return type to void.
- v8 patch 11: used "grub_" prefixed type for return type
- v8 patch 12: populated the partial db and dbx list.
- v8 patch 15: corrected commit message.
- v8 patch 16: GRUB_ERR_EXISTS and GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED enum.
corrected the indention issue. droped curly braces in for loop.
- v8 patch 19: updated the example sentence with yours.
- v8 patch 20: added more detailed info of appended signature and GRUB commands.

- Gary Lin review comments addressed:
- v8 patch 12: fixed 'address-of-packed-member' error.

Linux on Power LPAR secure boot ensures the integrity of the Linux boot stack. The hypervisor and partition firmware are part of the core root of trust. The partition firmware verifies the signature on the GRUB image before handing control to GRUB. Similarly, GRUB verifies the signature on the kernel image before booting the OS. This ensures that every image running at the boot time is verified and trusted. UEFI platforms relies on PECOFF based signature scheme. Since Power is not a UEFI platform, an alternative mechanism is needed. Power already uses appended signatures on the Linux Kernel, and is now extended to sign the grub as well.

Linux on Power also allows multiple signers, and if any one of the signature passes, then the image passes the validation. Appended signature scheme uses CMS structure to contain signatures. On Power, the multiple signature support relies on the multiple signers features already supported by CMS standards. It does require that all the signers should sign at the same time and are not allowed to add or remove the signatures randomly.

By default, Linux LPAR secure boot uses static key management[1]. This means that each image embeds the keys it needs to verify the image it loads. For example, the keys used to verify the GRUB image are built into the firmware image. Similarly, the keys used for verifying the kernel image are built into the GRUB image. These are pre-defined keys and they cannot be modified at runtime. The drawback of this approach is that key rotations results in both firmware and OS updates. This is where dynamic key management is useful.

An admin can switch from static keys to dynamic keys by coordinating with Hardware Management Console(HMC) admin and enabling the required flags for the given LPAR.

The dynamic key management relies on the Platform KeyStore(PKS)[2] storage allocation for each LPAR with individually managed access controls to store sensitive information securely. Once switched to dynamic keys, HMC advertises this flag to the PowerVM, which then initializes the PKS with the default secvars. It also creates a variable SB_VERSION that represents the secure boot key management mode. The default secvars are used by Partition firmware, grub and the linux kernel to reads keys for verification. These secvars can be managed by user interface exposed via linux kernel. The linux kernel already supports this interface and it is available in the upstream kernel.

This patchset adds the appended signature support both for signing and verification and the key management to the grub component. The whole patchset can be split into following four main parts:

The series has following four main parts:

1.) Sign grub.elf with an appended signature. (Patches 1, 18, 19)

These patches provide some infrastructure and documentation for signing grub's core.elf with a Linux-kernel-module style appended signature.

An appended signature is a 'dumb' signature over the contents of a file. (It is distinct from schemes like Authenticode that are aware of the structure of the file and only sign certain parts.) The signature is wrapped in a PKCS#7 message, and is appended to the signed file along with some metadata and a magic string. The signatures are validated against a public key which is usually provided as an x509 certificate.

Because some platforms, such as powerpc-ieee1275, may load grub from a raw disk partition rather than a filesystem, we extend grub-install to add an ELF note that allows us to specify the size and location of the signature.

2.) Enable lockdown if secure boot is enabled (Patch 9)
Read secure boot mode from 'ibm,secure-boot' property and
If the 'ibm,secure-boot' property of the root node is 2, enter lockdown. Else it is considered as disabled.
There are three secure boot modes. They are
0 - disabled
No signature verification is performed. This is the default.
1 - audit
Signature verification is performed and if signature verification fails, post the errors and allow the boot to continue.
2 - enforced
Lockdown the GRUB. Signature verification is performed and If signature verification fails, post the errors and stop the boot.

Now, only support disabled and enforced.

3.) Enable appended signature verification using builtin keys (Patches 2 - 8 and 10).

Part of a secure boot chain is allowing grub to verify the boot kernel. For UEFI platforms, this is usually delegated to the shim. However, for platforms that do not implement UEFI, an alternative scheme is required.

This part teaches grub how to verify Linux kernel-style appended signatures. Kernels on powerpc are already signed with this scheme and can be verified by IMA for kexec.

As PKCS#7 messages and x509 certificates are both based on ASN.1, we import libtasn1 to parse them. Because ASN.1 isn't self-documenting, we import from GNUTLS the information we need to navigate their structure.

This section is composed of the following patches:

- patches 2 and 3 are small refactorings.

- patch 4 allows x509 certificates to be built in to the grub core in much the same way as PGP keys.

- patch 5 brings in the code from GNUTLS that allows us to parse PKCS#7 and x509 with libtasn1.

- patch 6, 7 and 8 is our ASN1 node, PKCS#7 and x509 parser. They're minimal and fairly strict parsers that extract only the bits we need to verify the signatures.

- patch 10 is the guts of the appended signature verifier. It uses the verifier infrastructure like pgp, and adds a number of user-friendly commands that mirror the pgp module.

4.) Enable accessing keys dynamically from Platform KeyStore (Patch 11 - 16)

This part teaches grub how to read db and dbx variables from platform keystore using client interface call then load keys from those two variable, and use it to verify Linux kernel.

This section is composed of the following patches:

- patch 11 is an exposes an interface in ieee1275 for reading secure boot variable db and dbx from Platform Keystore. Read secure boot variables such as db and dbx from PKS and extract certificates from ESL.

- patch 12 is create the db and dbx lists from PKS.

- patch 13 is verify the kernel using db and dbx lists

- patch 14 sets the use_static_keys flag if DB not available in PKS, and patch 15 is reads the DB default keys from ELF Note and store it in trusted lists if use_static_keys flag is set.

- patch 16 adds GRUB commands to access db and dbx.

5.) patch 17 adds unit test and 20 adds GRUB commands and an appended signatures
documentation.

Thanks to Daniel Kiper and Gary Lin for providing review comments.

I've pushed this all to
https://github.com/SudhakarKuppusamy1/grub/tree/appendedsig-2.13

[1]https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/linux-on-systems?topic=servers-guest-secure-boot-static-keys [2]https://community.ibm.com/community/user/power/blogs/chris-engel1/2020/11/20/powervm-introduces-the-platform-keystore

Daniel Axtens (2):
crypto: Move storage for grub_crypto_pk_* to crypto.c docs/grub: Document signing GRUB under UEFI

Sudhakar Kuppusamy (18):
powerpc-ieee1275: Add support for signing GRUB with an appended
signature
pgp: Rename OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY to OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY
grub-install: Support embedding x509 certificates
appended signatures: Import GNUTLS's ASN.1 description files appended signatures: Parse ASN1 node
appended signatures: Parse PKCS#7 signedData
appended signatures: Parse X.509 certificates
powerpc_ieee1275: Enter lockdown based on /ibm,secure-boot appended signatures: Support verifying appended signatures
powerpc_ieee1275: Read the db and dbx secure boot variables appended signatures: Create db and dbx lists
appended signatures: Using db and dbx lists for signature verification
powerpc_ieee1275: Introduce use_static_keys flag
appended signatures: Read default db keys from the ELF Note appended signatures: Introduce GRUB commands to access db and dbx appended signatures: Verification tests
docs/grub: Document signing GRUB with an appended signature docs/grub: Document appended signature

 docs/grub.texi                                |  557 ++++-
 grub-core/Makefile.am                         |    2 +
 grub-core/Makefile.core.def                   |   26 +
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c  | 1795 +++++++++++++++++
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h  |  111 +
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c     |   96 +
 .../commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c    |  148 ++
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c        |  454 +++++
 .../commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c      |  485 +++++
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c         |  957 +++++++++
 grub-core/commands/pgp.c                      |    6 +-
 grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c            |    1 -
 grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c                |   63 +
 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c    |  139 ++
 .../kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c |  352 ++++
 grub-core/lib/crypto.c                        |    4 +
 grub-core/tests/appended_signature_test.c     |  340 ++++
 grub-core/tests/appended_signatures.h         |  975 +++++++++
 grub-core/tests/lib/functional_test.c         |    1 +
 include/grub/crypto.h                         |    1 +
 include/grub/efi/pks.h                        |  112 +
 include/grub/err.h                            |    3 +-
 include/grub/file.h                           |    4 +
 include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h              |    3 +
 include/grub/kernel.h                         |    3 +-
 include/grub/lockdown.h                       |    3 +-
 include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h      |   20 +
 .../grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h |  143 ++
 include/grub/types.h                          |    4 +
 include/grub/util/install.h                   |   10 +-
 include/grub/util/mkimage.h                   |    4 +-
 util/grub-install-common.c                    |   42 +-
 util/grub-mkimage.c                           |   32 +-
 util/grub-mkimagexx.c                         |   40 +-
 util/mkimage.c                                |   50 +-
 35 files changed, 6942 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/tests/appended_signature_test.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/tests/appended_signatures.h
 create mode 100644 include/grub/efi/pks.h
 create mode 100644 include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h
Signature · 7 lines
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#1 lore raw

PATCH v8 1/20 powerpc-ieee1275: Add support for signing GRUB with an appended signature

Add infrastructure to allow firmware to verify the integrity of GRUB by use of a Linux-kernel-module-style appended signature. We initially target powerpc-ieee1275, but the code should be extensible to other platforms.

Usually these signatures are appended to a file without modifying the ELF file itself. (This is what the 'sign-file' tool does, for example.) The verifier loads the signed file from the file system and looks at the end of the file for the appended signature. However, on powerpc-ieee1275 platforms, the bootloader is often stored directly in the PReP partition as raw bytes without a file-system. This makes determining the location of an appended signature more difficult.

To address this, we add a new ELF Note.

The name field of shall be the string "Appended-Signature", zero-padded to 4 byte alignment. The type field shall be 0x41536967 (the ASCII values for the string "ASig"). It must be the final section in the ELF binary.

The description shall contain the appended signature structure as defined by the Linux kernel. The description will also be padded to be a multiple of 4 bytes. The padding shall be added before the appended signature structure (not at the end) so that the final bytes of a signed ELF file are the appended signature magic.

A subsequent patch documents how to create a GRUB core.img validly signed under this scheme.

---
 include/grub/util/install.h |  7 +++++--
 include/grub/util/mkimage.h |  4 ++--
 util/grub-install-common.c  | 23 ++++++++++++++++++---
 util/grub-mkimage.c         | 18 +++++++++++++++++
 util/grub-mkimagexx.c       | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 util/mkimage.c              |  9 ++++++---
 6 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
include/grub/util/install.h +5 -2
index 5c0a52ca2..3aabc4285 100644
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@
       N_("disable shim_lock verifier"), 0 },				\
   { "disable-cli", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI, 0, 0,		\
     N_("disabled command line interface access"), 0 },			\
+  { "appended-signature-size", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_SIZE,  \
+    "SIZE", 0, N_("Add a note segment reserving SIZE bytes for an appended signature"), 1}, \
   { "verbose", 'v', 0, 0,						\
     N_("print verbose messages."), 1 }
 
@@ -132,7 +134,8 @@ enum grub_install_options {
   GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DTB,
   GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_SBAT,
   GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK,
-  GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI
+  GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI,
+  GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_SIZE
 };
 
 extern char *grub_install_source_directory;
@@ -192,7 +195,7 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
 			     size_t npubkeys,
 			     char *config_path,
 			     const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target,
-			     int note,
+			     int note, size_t appsig_size,
 			     grub_compression_t comp, const char *dtb_file,
 			     const char *sbat_path, const int disable_shim_lock,
 			     const int disable_cli);
include/grub/util/mkimage.h +2 -2
index 9d74f82c5..0d40383eb 100644
@@ -51,12 +51,12 @@ grub_mkimage_load_image64 (const char *kernel_path,
 			   const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target);
 void
 grub_mkimage_generate_elf32 (const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target,
-			     int note, char *sbat, char **core_img, size_t *core_size,
+			     int note, char *sbat, size_t appsig_size, char **core_img, size_t *core_size,
 			     Elf32_Addr target_addr,
 			     struct grub_mkimage_layout *layout);
 void
 grub_mkimage_generate_elf64 (const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target,
-			     int note, char *sbat, char **core_img, size_t *core_size,
+			     int note, char *sbat, size_t appsig_size, char **core_img, size_t *core_size,
 			     Elf64_Addr target_addr,
 			     struct grub_mkimage_layout *layout);
 
util/grub-install-common.c +20 -3
index 22bccb6a3..5f24124df 100644
@@ -467,10 +467,13 @@ static char *sbat;
 static int disable_shim_lock;
 static grub_compression_t compression;
 static int disable_cli;
+static size_t appsig_size;
 
 int
 grub_install_parse (int key, char *arg)
 {
+  const char *end;
+
   switch (key)
     {
     case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_INSTALL_CORE_COMPRESS:
@@ -571,6 +574,19 @@ grub_install_parse (int key, char *arg)
       grub_util_error (_("Unrecognized compression `%s'"), arg);
     case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_GRUB_MKIMAGE:
       return 1;
+    case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_SIZE:
+      appsig_size = grub_strtoul (arg, &end, 10);
+      if (*arg == '\0' || *end != '\0')
+        {
+          grub_util_error (_("non-numeric or invalid appended signature size `%s'"), arg);
+          return 0;
+        }
+      else if (appsig_size == 0)
+        {
+          grub_util_error (_("appended signature size `%s', and it should not be zero"), arg);
+          return 0;
+        }
+      return 1;
     default:
       return 0;
     }
@@ -683,9 +699,10 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
   *p = '\0';
 
   grub_util_info ("grub-mkimage --directory '%s' --prefix '%s' --output '%s'"
-		  " --format '%s' --compression '%s'%s%s%s%s\n",
+		  " --format '%s' --compression '%s'"
+		  " --appended-signature-size %zu %s %s %s %s\n",
 		  dir, prefix, outname,
-		  mkimage_target, compnames[compression],
+		  mkimage_target, compnames[compression], appsig_size,
 		  note ? " --note" : "",
 		  disable_shim_lock ? " --disable-shim-lock" : "",
 		  disable_cli ? " --disable-cli" : "", s);
@@ -698,7 +715,7 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
   grub_install_generate_image (dir, prefix, fp, outname,
 			       modules.entries, memdisk_path,
 			       pubkeys, npubkeys, config_path, tgt,
-			       note, compression, dtb, sbat,
+			       note, appsig_size, compression, dtb, sbat,
 			       disable_shim_lock, disable_cli);
   while (dc--)
     grub_install_pop_module ();
util/grub-mkimage.c +18 -0
index 547f7310f..922de021f 100644
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ static struct argp_option options[] = {
   {"sbat", 's', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("SBAT metadata"), 0},
   {"disable-shim-lock", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK, 0, 0, N_("disable shim_lock verifier"), 0},
   {"disable-cli", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI, 0, 0, N_("disable command line interface access"), 0},
+  {"appended-signature-size", 'S', N_("SIZE"), 0, N_("Add a note segment reserving SIZE bytes for an appended signature"), 0},
   {"verbose",     'v', 0,      0, N_("print verbose messages."), 0},
   { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
 };
@@ -130,6 +131,7 @@ struct arguments
   int note;
   int disable_shim_lock;
   int disable_cli;
+  size_t appsig_size;
   const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target;
   grub_compression_t comp;
 };
@@ -140,6 +142,7 @@ argp_parser (int key, char *arg, struct argp_state *state)
   /* Get the input argument from argp_parse, which we
      know is a pointer to our arguments structure. */
   struct arguments *arguments = state->input;
+  const char *end;
 
   switch (key)
     {
@@ -172,6 +175,20 @@ argp_parser (int key, char *arg, struct argp_state *state)
       arguments->note = 1;
       break;
 
+    case 'S':
+      arguments->appsig_size = grub_strtoul (arg, &end, 10);
+      if (*arg == '\0' || *end != '\0')
+        {
+          grub_util_error (_("non-numeric or invalid appended signature size `%s'"), arg);
+          return 1;
+        }
+      else if (arguments->appsig_size == 0)
+        {
+          grub_util_error (_("appended signature size `%s', and it should not be zero"), arg);
+          return 1;
+        }
+      break;
+
     case 'm':
       if (arguments->memdisk)
 	free (arguments->memdisk);
@@ -330,6 +347,7 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
 			       arguments.memdisk, arguments.pubkeys,
 			       arguments.npubkeys, arguments.config,
 			       arguments.image_target, arguments.note,
+			       arguments.appsig_size,
 			       arguments.comp, arguments.dtb,
 			       arguments.sbat, arguments.disable_shim_lock,
 			       arguments.disable_cli);
util/grub-mkimagexx.c +39 -1
index 448862b2e..7dddd987a 100644
@@ -115,6 +115,14 @@ struct grub_sbat_note {
   char name[ALIGN_UP(sizeof(GRUB_SBAT_NOTE_NAME), 4)];
 };
 
+#define GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_NAME "Appended-Signature"
+#define GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_TYPE 0x41536967 /* "ASig" */
+struct grub_appended_signature_note
+{
+  Elf32_Nhdr header;
+  char name[ALIGN_UP (sizeof (GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_NAME), 4)];
+};
+
 static int
 is_relocatable (const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target)
 {
@@ -216,7 +224,7 @@ grub_arm_reloc_jump24 (grub_uint32_t *target, Elf32_Addr sym_addr)
 
 void
 SUFFIX (grub_mkimage_generate_elf) (const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target,
-				    int note, char *sbat, char **core_img, size_t *core_size,
+				    int note, char *sbat, size_t appsig_size, char **core_img, size_t *core_size,
 				    Elf_Addr target_addr,
 				    struct grub_mkimage_layout *layout)
 {
@@ -237,6 +245,12 @@ SUFFIX (grub_mkimage_generate_elf) (const struct grub_install_image_target_desc
       footer_size += ALIGN_UP (sizeof (struct grub_sbat_note) + layout->sbat_size, 4);
     }
 
+  if (appsig_size)
+    {
+      phnum++;
+      footer_size += ALIGN_UP (sizeof (struct grub_appended_signature_note), 4);
+    }
+
   if (image_target->id != IMAGE_LOONGSON_ELF)
     phnum += 2;
 
@@ -518,6 +532,30 @@ SUFFIX (grub_mkimage_generate_elf) (const struct grub_install_image_target_desc
       memcpy (note_ptr->name, GRUB_SBAT_NOTE_NAME, sizeof (GRUB_SBAT_NOTE_NAME));
       memcpy ((char *)(note_ptr + 1), sbat, layout->sbat_size);
 
+      phdr++;
+      phdr->p_type = grub_host_to_target32 (PT_NOTE);
+      phdr->p_flags = grub_host_to_target32 (PF_R);
+      phdr->p_align = grub_host_to_target32 (image_target->voidp_sizeof);
+      phdr->p_vaddr = 0;
+      phdr->p_paddr = 0;
+      phdr->p_filesz = grub_host_to_target32 (note_size);
+      phdr->p_memsz = 0;
+      phdr->p_offset = grub_host_to_target32 (header_size + program_size + footer_offset);
+      footer += note_size;
+      footer_offset += note_size;
+    }
+
+  if (appsig_size)
+    {
+      int note_size = ALIGN_UP (sizeof (struct grub_appended_signature_note) + appsig_size, 4);
+      struct grub_appended_signature_note *note_ptr = (struct grub_appended_signature_note *) footer;
+
+      note_ptr->header.n_namesz = grub_host_to_target32 (sizeof (GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_NAME));
+      /* Needs to sit at the end, so we round this up and sign some zero padding. */
+      note_ptr->header.n_descsz = grub_host_to_target32 (ALIGN_UP (appsig_size, 4));
+      note_ptr->header.n_type = grub_host_to_target32 (GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_TYPE);
+      strcpy (note_ptr->name, GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_NAME);
+
       phdr++;
       phdr->p_type = grub_host_to_target32 (PT_NOTE);
       phdr->p_flags = grub_host_to_target32 (PF_R);
util/mkimage.c +6 -3
index b46df2909..9618b37cf 100644
@@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
 			     char *memdisk_path, char **pubkey_paths,
 			     size_t npubkeys, char *config_path,
 			     const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target,
-			     int note, grub_compression_t comp, const char *dtb_path,
+			     int note, size_t appsig_size, grub_compression_t comp, const char *dtb_path,
 			     const char *sbat_path, int disable_shim_lock,
 			     int disable_cli)
 {
@@ -946,6 +946,9 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
   if (sbat_path != NULL && (image_target->id != IMAGE_EFI && image_target->id != IMAGE_PPC))
     grub_util_error (_("SBAT data can be added only to EFI or powerpc-ieee1275 images"));
 
+  if (appsig_size != 0 && image_target->id != IMAGE_PPC)
+    grub_util_error (_("appended signature can be support only to powerpc-ieee1275 images"));
+
   if (disable_shim_lock)
     total_module_size += sizeof (struct grub_module_header);
 
@@ -1833,10 +1836,10 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
 	else
 	  target_addr = image_target->link_addr;
 	if (image_target->voidp_sizeof == 4)
-	  grub_mkimage_generate_elf32 (image_target, note, sbat, &core_img, &core_size,
+	  grub_mkimage_generate_elf32 (image_target, note, sbat, appsig_size, &core_img, &core_size,
 				       target_addr, &layout);
 	else
-	  grub_mkimage_generate_elf64 (image_target, note, sbat, &core_img, &core_size,
+	  grub_mkimage_generate_elf64 (image_target, note, sbat, appsig_size, &core_img, &core_size,
 				       target_addr, &layout);
       }
       break;
Signature · 7 lines
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#2 lore raw

PATCH v8 2/20 crypto: Move storage for grub_crypto_pk_* to crypto.c

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

From: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>

The way gcry_rsa and friends (the asymmetric ciphers) are loaded for the pgp module is a bit quirky.

include/grub/crypto.h contains:
extern struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_rsa;

commands/pgp.c contains the actual storage:
struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_rsa;

And the module itself saves to the storage in pgp.c:
GRUB_MOD_INIT(gcry_rsa)

  {
    grub_crypto_pk_rsa = &_gcry_pubkey_spec_rsa;

}

This is annoying: gcry_rsa now has a dependency on pgp!

We want to be able to bring in gcry_rsa without bringing in PGP, so move the storage to crypto.c.

Previously, gcry_rsa depended on pgp and mpi. Now it depends on crypto and mpi. As pgp depends on crypto, this doesn't add any new module dependencies using the PGP verfier.

[FWIW, the story is different for the symmetric ciphers. cryptodisk and friends (zfs encryption etc) use grub_crypto_lookup_cipher_by_name() to get a cipher handle. That depends on grub_ciphers being populated by people calling grub_cipher_register. import_gcry.py ensures that the symmetric ciphers call it.]

---
 grub-core/commands/pgp.c | 4 ----
 grub-core/lib/crypto.c   | 4 ++++
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
grub-core/commands/pgp.c +0 -4
index e61887862..251ed1b06 100644
@@ -136,10 +136,6 @@ struct signature_v4_header
   grub_uint16_t hashed_sub;
 } GRUB_PACKED;
 
-struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_dsa;
-struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_ecdsa;
-struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_rsa;
-
 struct
 {
   const char *name;
grub-core/lib/crypto.c +4 -0
index dd60dd4ac..292b747b2 100644
@@ -170,6 +170,10 @@ grub_md_unregister (gcry_md_spec_t *cipher)
       }
 }
 
+struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_dsa;
+struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_ecdsa;
+struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_rsa;
+
 void
 grub_crypto_hash (const gcry_md_spec_t *hash, void *out, const void *in,
 		  grub_size_t inlen)
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#3 lore raw

PATCH v8 3/20 pgp: Rename OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY to OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

Prior to the addition of the X.509 public key support for appended signature, current PGP signature relied on the GPG public key. Changing the enum name from "OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY" to "OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY" to differentiate between x509 certificate based appended signature and GPG certificate based PGP signature.

---
 docs/grub.texi           | 34 +++++++++++++++++-----------------
 grub-core/commands/pgp.c |  2 +-
 include/grub/kernel.h    |  2 +-
 util/grub-mkimage.c      |  2 +-
 util/mkimage.c           |  2 +-
 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
docs/grub.texi +17 -17
index 34b3484dc..bdbc3b82e 100644
@@ -3347,8 +3347,8 @@ chain-loaded system, @pxref{drivemap}.
 @node check_signatures
 @subsection check_signatures
 
-This variable controls whether GRUB enforces digital signature
-validation on loaded files. @xref{Using digital signatures}.
+This variable controls whether GRUB enforces GPG-style digital signature
+validation on loaded files. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}.
 
 @node chosen
 @subsection chosen
@@ -6854,7 +6854,7 @@ These keys are used to validate signatures when environment variable
 @code{check_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}
 (@pxref{check_signatures}), and by some invocations of
 @command{verify_detached} (@pxref{verify_detached}).  @xref{Using
-digital signatures}, for more information.
+GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information.
 @end deffn
 
 @node drivemap
@@ -7270,7 +7270,7 @@ The output is in GPG's v4 key fingerprint format (i.e., the output of
 @code{gpg --fingerprint}).  The least significant four bytes (last
 eight hexadecimal digits) can be used as an argument to
 @command{distrust} (@pxref{distrust}).
-@xref{Using digital signatures}, for more information about uses for
+@xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information about uses for
 these keys.
 @end deffn
 
@@ -7305,7 +7305,7 @@ When used with care, @option{--skip-sig} and the whitelist enable an
 administrator to configure a system to boot only signed
 configurations, but to allow the user to select from among multiple
 configurations, and to enable ``one-shot'' boot attempts and
-``savedefault'' behavior.  @xref{Using digital signatures}, for more
+``savedefault'' behavior.  @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more
 information.
 @end deffn
 
@@ -7677,7 +7677,7 @@ read.  It is possible to modify a digitally signed environment block
 file from within GRUB using this command, such that its signature will
 no longer be valid on subsequent boots.  Care should be taken in such
 advanced configurations to avoid rendering the system
-unbootable. @xref{Using digital signatures}, for more information.
+unbootable. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information.
 @end deffn
 
 
@@ -8167,7 +8167,7 @@ signatures when environment variable @code{check_signatures} is set to
 must itself be properly signed.  The @option{--skip-sig} option can be
 used to disable signature-checking when reading @var{pubkey_file}
 itself. It is expected that @option{--skip-sig} is useful for testing
-and manual booting. @xref{Using digital signatures}, for more
+and manual booting. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more
 information.
 @end deffn
 
@@ -8208,7 +8208,7 @@ tried.
 
 Exit code @code{$?} is set to 0 if the signature validates
 successfully.  If validation fails, it is set to a non-zero value.
-@xref{Using digital signatures}, for more information.
+@xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information.
 @end deffn
 
 @node videoinfo
@@ -8668,13 +8668,13 @@ environment variables and commands are listed in the same order.
 @chapter Security
 
 @menu
-* Authentication and authorisation:: Users and access control
-* Using digital signatures::         Booting digitally signed code
-* UEFI secure boot and shim::        Booting digitally signed PE files
-* Secure Boot Advanced Targeting::   Embedded information for generation number based revocation
-* Measured Boot::                    Measuring boot components
-* Lockdown::                         Lockdown when booting on a secure setup
-* TPM2 key protector::               Managing disk key with TPM2 key protector
+* Authentication and authorisation::   Users and access control
+* Using GPG-style digital signatures:: Booting digitally signed code
+* UEFI secure boot and shim::          Booting digitally signed PE files
+* Secure Boot Advanced Targeting::     Embedded information for generation number based revocation
+* Measured Boot::                      Measuring boot components
+* Lockdown::                           Lockdown when booting on a secure setup
+* TPM2 key protector::                 Managing disk key with TPM2 key protector
 @end menu
 
 @node Authentication and authorisation
@@ -8750,8 +8750,8 @@ generating configuration files with authentication.  You can use
 adding @kbd{set superusers=} and @kbd{password} or @kbd{password_pbkdf2}
 commands.
 
-@node Using digital signatures
-@section Using digital signatures in GRUB
+@node Using GPG-style digital signatures
+@section Using GPG-style digital signatures in GRUB
 
 GRUB's @file{core.img} can optionally provide enforcement that all files
 subsequently read from disk are covered by a valid digital signature.
grub-core/commands/pgp.c +1 -1
index 251ed1b06..a2549f9fd 100644
@@ -920,7 +920,7 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(pgp)
     grub_memset (&pseudo_file, 0, sizeof (pseudo_file));
 
     /* Not an ELF module, skip.  */
-    if (header->type != OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY)
+    if (header->type != OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY)
       continue;
 
     pseudo_file.fs = &pseudo_fs;
include/grub/kernel.h +1 -1
index 6121c1e66..885289f5d 100644
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ enum
   OBJ_TYPE_MEMDISK,
   OBJ_TYPE_CONFIG,
   OBJ_TYPE_PREFIX,
-  OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY,
+  OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY,
   OBJ_TYPE_DTB,
   OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK,
   OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_CLI
util/grub-mkimage.c +1 -1
index 922de021f..000d05822 100644
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static struct argp_option options[] = {
    /* TRANSLATORS: "embed" is a verb (command description).  "*/
   {"config",   'c', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as an early config"), 0},
    /* TRANSLATORS: "embed" is a verb (command description).  "*/
-  {"pubkey",   'k', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as public key for signature checking"), 0},
+  {"pubkey",   'k', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as public key for PGP signature checking"), 0},
   /* TRANSLATORS: NOTE is a name of segment.  */
   {"note",   'n', 0, 0, N_("add NOTE segment for CHRP IEEE1275"), 0},
   {"output",  'o', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("output a generated image to FILE [default=stdout]"), 0},
util/mkimage.c +1 -1
index 9618b37cf..61c4e78e2 100644
@@ -1056,7 +1056,7 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
 	curs = grub_util_get_image_size (pubkey_paths[i]);
 
 	header = (struct grub_module_header *) (kernel_img + offset);
-	header->type = grub_host_to_target32 (OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY);
+	header->type = grub_host_to_target32 (OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY);
 	header->size = grub_host_to_target32 (curs + sizeof (*header));
 	offset += sizeof (*header);
 
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#4 lore raw

PATCH v8 4/20 grub-install: Support embedding x509 certificates

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

To support verification of appended signatures, we need a way to embed the necessary public keys. Existing appended signature schemes in the Linux kernel use X.509 certificates, so allow certificates to be embedded in the GRUB core image in the same way as PGP keys.

---
 include/grub/kernel.h       |  1 +
 include/grub/util/install.h |  3 +++
 util/grub-install-common.c  | 19 +++++++++++++++++-
 util/grub-mkimage.c         | 12 +++++++++++-
 util/mkimage.c              | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 5 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/grub/kernel.h +1 -0
index 885289f5d..9f3e2031f 100644
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ enum
   OBJ_TYPE_CONFIG,
   OBJ_TYPE_PREFIX,
   OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY,
+  OBJ_TYPE_X509_PUBKEY,
   OBJ_TYPE_DTB,
   OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK,
   OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_CLI
include/grub/util/install.h +3 -0
index 3aabc4285..6f27e2e42 100644
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@
       N_("disable shim_lock verifier"), 0 },				\
   { "disable-cli", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI, 0, 0,		\
     N_("disabled command line interface access"), 0 },			\
+  { "x509key",   'x', N_("FILE"), 0,					\
+      N_("embed FILE as an x509 certificate for appended signature checking"), 0}, \
   { "appended-signature-size", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_SIZE,  \
     "SIZE", 0, N_("Add a note segment reserving SIZE bytes for an appended signature"), 1}, \
   { "verbose", 'v', 0, 0,						\
@@ -193,6 +195,7 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
 			     const char *outname, char *mods[],
 			     char *memdisk_path, char **pubkey_paths,
 			     size_t npubkeys,
+			     char **x509key_paths, size_t nx509keys,
 			     char *config_path,
 			     const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target,
 			     int note, size_t appsig_size,
util/grub-install-common.c +18 -1
index 5f24124df..820105771 100644
@@ -463,6 +463,8 @@ handle_install_list (struct install_list *il, const char *val,
 
 static char **pubkeys;
 static size_t npubkeys;
+static char **x509keys;
+static size_t nx509keys;
 static char *sbat;
 static int disable_shim_lock;
 static grub_compression_t compression;
@@ -511,6 +513,10 @@ grub_install_parse (int key, char *arg)
     case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI:
       disable_cli = 1;
       return 1;
+    case 'x':
+      x509keys = xrealloc (x509keys, sizeof (x509keys[0]) * (nx509keys + 1));
+      x509keys[nx509keys++] = xstrdup (arg);
+      return 1;
 
     case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_VERBOSITY:
       verbosity++;
@@ -648,6 +654,9 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
   for (pk = pubkeys; pk < pubkeys + npubkeys; pk++)
     slen += sizeof (" --pubkey ''") + grub_strlen (*pk);
 
+  for (pk = x509keys; pk < x509keys + nx509keys; pk++)
+    slen += sizeof (" --x509key ''") + grub_strlen (*pk);
+
   for (md = modules.entries; *md; md++)
     slen += sizeof (" ''") + grub_strlen (*md);
 
@@ -688,6 +697,14 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
       *p++ = '\'';
     }
 
+  for (pk = x509keys; pk < x509keys + nx509keys; pk++)
+    {
+      p = grub_stpcpy (p, "--x509key '");
+      p = grub_stpcpy (p, *pk);
+      *p++ = '\'';
+      *p++ = ' ';
+    }
+
   for (md = modules.entries; *md; md++)
     {
       *p++ = ' ';
@@ -714,7 +731,7 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
 
   grub_install_generate_image (dir, prefix, fp, outname,
 			       modules.entries, memdisk_path,
-			       pubkeys, npubkeys, config_path, tgt,
+			       pubkeys, npubkeys,  x509keys, nx509keys, config_path, tgt,
 			       note, appsig_size, compression, dtb, sbat,
 			       disable_shim_lock, disable_cli);
   while (dc--)
util/grub-mkimage.c +11 -1
index 000d05822..6fcc20699 100644
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ static struct argp_option options[] = {
   {"config",   'c', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as an early config"), 0},
    /* TRANSLATORS: "embed" is a verb (command description).  "*/
   {"pubkey",   'k', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as public key for PGP signature checking"), 0},
+  {"x509key",     'x', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as an x509 certificate for appended signature checking"), 0},
   /* TRANSLATORS: NOTE is a name of segment.  */
   {"note",   'n', 0, 0, N_("add NOTE segment for CHRP IEEE1275"), 0},
   {"output",  'o', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("output a generated image to FILE [default=stdout]"), 0},
@@ -125,6 +126,8 @@ struct arguments
   char *dtb;
   char **pubkeys;
   size_t npubkeys;
+  char **x509keys;
+  size_t nx509keys;
   char *font;
   char *config;
   char *sbat;
@@ -215,6 +218,12 @@ argp_parser (int key, char *arg, struct argp_state *state)
       arguments->pubkeys[arguments->npubkeys++] = xstrdup (arg);
       break;
 
+    case 'x':
+      arguments->x509keys = xrealloc (arguments->x509keys,
+                                      sizeof (arguments->x509keys[0]) * (arguments->nx509keys + 1));
+      arguments->x509keys[arguments->nx509keys++] = xstrdup (arg);
+      break;
+
     case 'c':
       if (arguments->config)
 	free (arguments->config);
@@ -345,7 +354,8 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[])
   grub_install_generate_image (arguments.dir, arguments.prefix, fp,
 			       arguments.output, arguments.modules,
 			       arguments.memdisk, arguments.pubkeys,
-			       arguments.npubkeys, arguments.config,
+			       arguments.npubkeys, arguments.x509keys,
+			       arguments.nx509keys, arguments.config,
 			       arguments.image_target, arguments.note,
 			       arguments.appsig_size,
 			       arguments.comp, arguments.dtb,
util/mkimage.c +38 -1
index 61c4e78e2..f364a5718 100644
@@ -883,7 +883,7 @@ void
 grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
 			     FILE *out, const char *outname, char *mods[],
 			     char *memdisk_path, char **pubkey_paths,
-			     size_t npubkeys, char *config_path,
+			     size_t npubkeys, char **x509key_paths, size_t nx509keys, char *config_path,
 			     const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target,
 			     int note, size_t appsig_size, grub_compression_t comp, const char *dtb_path,
 			     const char *sbat_path, int disable_shim_lock,
@@ -929,6 +929,24 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
       }
   }
 
+  if (nx509keys != 0 && image_target->id != IMAGE_PPC)
+    grub_util_error (_("x509 public key can be support only to appended signature"
+                       " with powerpc-ieee1275 images"));
+
+  {
+    size_t i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < nx509keys; i++)
+      {
+        size_t curs;
+
+        curs = ALIGN_ADDR (grub_util_get_image_size (x509key_paths[i]));
+        grub_util_info ("the size of x509 public key %u is 0x%" GRUB_HOST_PRIxLONG_LONG,
+                        (unsigned) i, (unsigned long long) curs);
+        total_module_size += curs + sizeof (struct grub_module_header);
+      }
+  }
+
   if (memdisk_path)
     {
       memdisk_size = ALIGN_UP(grub_util_get_image_size (memdisk_path), 512);
@@ -1065,6 +1083,25 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,
       }
   }
 
+  {
+    size_t i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < nx509keys; i++)
+      {
+        size_t curs;
+        struct grub_module_header *header;
+
+        curs = grub_util_get_image_size (x509key_paths[i]);
+        header = (struct grub_module_header *) (kernel_img + offset);
+        header->type = grub_host_to_target32 (OBJ_TYPE_X509_PUBKEY);
+        header->size = grub_host_to_target32 (curs + sizeof (*header));
+
+        offset += sizeof (*header);
+        grub_util_load_image (x509key_paths[i], kernel_img + offset);
+        offset += ALIGN_ADDR (curs);
+      }
+  }
+
   if (memdisk_path)
     {
       struct grub_module_header *header;
Signature · 7 lines
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#5 lore raw

PATCH v8 5/20 appended signatures: Import GNUTLS's ASN.1 description files

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

In order to parse PKCS#7 messages and X.509 certificates with libtasn1, we need some information about how they are encoded.

We get these from GNUTLS, which has the benefit that they support the features we need and are well tested.

The GNUTLS files are from:

- https://github.com/gnutls/gnutls/blob/master/lib/gnutls.asn
- https://github.com/gnutls/gnutls/blob/master/lib/pkix.asn

The GNUTLS license is LGPLv2.1+, which is GPLv3 compatible, allowing us to import it without issue.

---
 .../commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c    | 148 ++++++
 .../commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c      | 485 ++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 633 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c new file +148 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..efc0c145a
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+#include <grub/mm.h>
+#include <libtasn1.h>
+
+/*
+ * Imported from gnutls.asn.
+ * https://github.com/gnutls/gnutls/blob/master/lib/gnutls.asn
+ */
+const asn1_static_node grub_gnutls_asn1_tab[] = {
+  { "GNUTLS", 536872976, NULL },
+  { NULL, 1073741836, NULL },
+  { "RSAPublicKey", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "modulus", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "publicExponent", 3, NULL },
+  { "RSAPrivateKey", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "version", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "modulus", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "publicExponent", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "privateExponent", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "prime1", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "prime2", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "exponent1", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "exponent2", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "coefficient", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "otherPrimeInfos", 16386, "OtherPrimeInfos"},
+  { "ProvableSeed", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "algorithm", 1073741836, NULL },
+  { "seed", 7, NULL },
+  { "OtherPrimeInfos", 1612709899, NULL },
+  { "MAX", 1074266122, "1"},
+  { NULL, 2, "OtherPrimeInfo"},
+  { "OtherPrimeInfo", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "prime", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "exponent", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "coefficient", 3, NULL },
+  { "AlgorithmIdentifier", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "algorithm", 1073741836, NULL },
+  { "parameters", 541081613, NULL },
+  { "algorithm", 1, NULL },
+  { "DigestInfo", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "digestAlgorithm", 1073741826, "DigestAlgorithmIdentifier"},
+  { "digest", 7, NULL },
+  { "DigestAlgorithmIdentifier", 1073741826, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+  { "DSAPublicKey", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "DSAParameters", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "p", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "q", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "g", 3, NULL },
+  { "DSASignatureValue", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "r", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "s", 3, NULL },
+  { "DSAPrivateKey", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "version", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "p", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "q", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "g", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "Y", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "priv", 3, NULL },
+  { "DHParameter", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "prime", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "base", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "privateValueLength", 16387, NULL },
+  { "pkcs-11-ec-Parameters", 1610612754, NULL },
+  { "oId", 1073741836, NULL },
+  { "curveName", 31, NULL },
+  { "ECParameters", 1610612754, NULL },
+  { "namedCurve", 12, NULL },
+  { "ECPrivateKey", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "Version", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "privateKey", 1073741831, NULL },
+  { "parameters", 1610637314, "ECParameters"},
+  { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+  { "publicKey", 536895494, NULL },
+  { NULL, 2056, "1"},
+  { "PrincipalName", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "name-type", 1610620931, NULL },
+  { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+  { "name-string", 536879115, NULL },
+  { NULL, 1073743880, "1"},
+  { NULL, 27, NULL },
+  { "KRB5PrincipalName", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "realm", 1610620955, NULL },
+  { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+  { "principalName", 536879106, "PrincipalName"},
+  { NULL, 2056, "1"},
+  { "RSAPSSParameters", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "hashAlgorithm", 1610637314, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+  { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+  { "maskGenAlgorithm", 1610637314, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+  { NULL, 2056, "1"},
+  { "saltLength", 1610653699, NULL },
+  { NULL, 1073741833, "20"},
+  { NULL, 2056, "2"},
+  { "trailerField", 536911875, NULL },
+  { NULL, 1073741833, "1"},
+  { NULL, 2056, "3"},
+  { "RSAOAEPParameters", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "hashAlgorithm", 1610637314, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+  { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+  { "maskGenAlgorithm", 1610637314, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+  { NULL, 2056, "1"},
+  { "pSourceFunc", 536895490, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+  { NULL, 2056, "2"},
+  { "GOSTParameters", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "publicKeyParamSet", 1073741836, NULL },
+  { "digestParamSet", 16396, NULL },
+  { "GOSTParametersOld", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "publicKeyParamSet", 1073741836, NULL },
+  { "digestParamSet", 1073741836, NULL },
+  { "encryptionParamSet", 16396, NULL },
+  { "GOSTPrivateKey", 1073741831, NULL },
+  { "GOSTPrivateKeyOld", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "IssuerSignTool", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "signTool", 1073741858, NULL },
+  { "cATool", 1073741858, NULL },
+  { "signToolCert", 1073741858, NULL },
+  { "cAToolCert", 34, NULL },
+  { "Gost28147-89-EncryptedKey", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "encryptedKey", 1073741831, NULL },
+  { "maskKey", 1610637319, NULL },
+  { NULL, 4104, "0"},
+  { "macKey", 7, NULL },
+  { "SubjectPublicKeyInfo", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "algorithm", 1073741826, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+  { "subjectPublicKey", 6, NULL },
+  { "GostR3410-TransportParameters", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "encryptionParamSet", 1073741836, NULL },
+  { "ephemeralPublicKey", 1610637314, "SubjectPublicKeyInfo"},
+  { NULL, 4104, "0"},
+  { "ukm", 7, NULL },
+  { "GostR3410-KeyTransport", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "sessionEncryptedKey", 1073741826, "Gost28147-89-EncryptedKey"},
+  { "transportParameters", 536895490, "GostR3410-TransportParameters"},
+  { NULL, 4104, "0"},
+  { "TPMKey", 1610612741, NULL },
+  { "type", 1073741836, NULL },
+  { "emptyAuth", 1610637316, NULL },
+  { NULL, 2056, "0"},
+  { "parent", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "pubkey", 1073741831, NULL },
+  { "privkey", 7, NULL },
+  { "MLDSAPrivateKey", 536870917, NULL },
+  { "version", 1073741827, NULL },
+  { "privateKeyAlgorithm", 1073741826, "AlgorithmIdentifier"},
+  { "privateKey", 1073741831, NULL },
+  { "publicKey", 536895495, NULL },
+  { NULL, 2056, "1"},
+  { NULL, 0, NULL }
+};
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c new file +485 -0

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#6 lore raw

PATCH v8 6/20 appended signatures: Parse ASN1 node

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

This code allows us to parse ASN1 node and allocating memory to store it. It will work for anything where the size libtasn1 returns is right:
- Integers
- Octet strings
- DER encoding of other structures
It will _not_ work for things where libtasn1 size requires adjustment:
- Strings that require an extra NULL byte at the end
- Bit strings because libtasn1 returns the length in bits, not bytes.
If the function returns a non-NULL value, the caller must free it.

---
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h | 42 +++++++++
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c    | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 138 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h new file +42 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..91cc040bb
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+/*
+ *  GRUB  --  GRand Unified Bootloader
+ *  Copyright (C) 2020, 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *  Copyright (C) 2020, 2022, 2025 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ *  GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *  the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ *  (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *  GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ *  GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ *  along with GRUB.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <libtasn1.h>
+
+extern asn1_node grub_gnutls_gnutls_asn;
+extern asn1_node grub_gnutls_pkix_asn;
+
+/* Do libtasn1 init. */
+extern int
+asn1_init (void);
+
+/*
+ * Read a value from an ASN1 node, allocating memory to store it.
+ * It will work for anything where the size libtasn1 returns is right:
+ *  - Integers
+ *  - Octet strings
+ *  - DER encoding of other structures
+ * It will _not_ work for things where libtasn1 size requires adjustment:
+ *  - Strings that require an extra null byte at the end
+ *  - Bit strings because libtasn1 returns the length in bits, not bytes.
+ *
+ * If the function returns a non-NULL value, the caller must free it.
+ */
+extern void *
+grub_asn1_allocate_and_read (asn1_node node, const char *name, const char *friendly_name, int *content_size);
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c new file +96 -0

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#7 lore raw

PATCH v8 7/20 appended signatures: Parse PKCS#7 signedData

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

This code allows us to parse:

- PKCS#7 signedData messages. Only a single signerInfo is supported, which is all that the Linux sign-file utility supports creating out-of-the-box. Only RSA, SHA-256 and SHA-512 are supported. Any certificate embedded in the PKCS#7 message will be ignored.

---
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h |  36 ++
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c       | 454 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 490 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h +36 -0
index 91cc040bb..cac7fb02c 100644
@@ -17,11 +17,47 @@
  *  along with GRUB.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
  */
 
+#include <grub/crypto.h>
 #include <libtasn1.h>
 
 extern asn1_node grub_gnutls_gnutls_asn;
 extern asn1_node grub_gnutls_pkix_asn;
 
+#define MAX_OID_LEN 32
+
+/* A PKCS#7 signedData signerInfo. */
+struct pkcs7_signerInfo
+{
+  const gcry_md_spec_t *hash;
+  gcry_mpi_t sig_mpi;
+};
+
+/*
+ * A PKCS#7 signedData message.
+ * We make no attempt to match intelligently, so we don't save any info about
+ * the signer.
+ */
+struct pkcs7_signedData
+{
+  int signerInfo_count;
+  struct pkcs7_signerInfo *signerInfos;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Parse a PKCS#7 message, which must be a signedData message.
+ * The message must be in 'sigbuf' and of size 'data_size'. The result is
+ * placed in 'msg', which must already be allocated.
+ */
+extern grub_err_t
+parse_pkcs7_signedData (const void *sigbuf, grub_size_t data_size, struct pkcs7_signedData *msg);
+
+/*
+ * Release all the storage associated with the PKCS#7 message.
+ * If the caller dynamically allocated the message, it must free it.
+ */
+extern void
+pkcs7_signedData_release (struct pkcs7_signedData *msg);
+
 /* Do libtasn1 init. */
 extern int
 asn1_init (void);
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c new file +454 -0

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#8 lore raw

PATCH v8 8/20 appended signatures: Parse X.509 certificates

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

This code allows us to parse:

- X.509 certificates: at least enough to verify the signatures on the PKCS#7 messages. We expect that the certificates embedded in GRUB will be leaf certificates, not CA certificates. The parser enforces this.

- X.509 certificates support the Extended Key Usage extension and handle it by verifying that the certificate has a Code Signing usage.

---
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h |  33 +
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c        | 957 +++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 990 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h +33 -0
index cac7fb02c..5ea31f1fd 100644
@@ -25,6 +25,24 @@ extern asn1_node grub_gnutls_pkix_asn;
 
 #define MAX_OID_LEN 32
 
+/*
+ * One or more x509 certificates.
+ * We do limited parsing:
+ * extracting only the serial, issuer, subject and RSA public key.
+ */
+struct x509_certificate
+{
+  struct x509_certificate *next;
+  grub_uint8_t *serial;
+  grub_size_t serial_len;
+  char *issuer;
+  grub_size_t issuer_len;
+  char *subject;
+  grub_size_t subject_len;
+  /* We only support RSA public keys. This encodes [modulus, publicExponent]. */
+  gcry_mpi_t mpis[2];
+};
+
 /* A PKCS#7 signedData signerInfo. */
 struct pkcs7_signerInfo
 {
@@ -43,6 +61,21 @@ struct pkcs7_signedData
   struct pkcs7_signerInfo *signerInfos;
 };
 
+/*
+ * Import a DER-encoded certificate at 'data', of size 'size'.
+ * Place the results into 'results', which must be already allocated.
+ */
+extern grub_err_t
+parse_x509_certificate (const void *data, grub_size_t size, struct x509_certificate *results);
+
+/*
+ * Release all the storage associated with the x509 certificate.
+ * If the caller dynamically allocated the certificate, it must free it.
+ * The caller is also responsible for maintenance of the linked list.
+ */
+extern void
+certificate_release (struct x509_certificate *cert);
+
 /*
  * Parse a PKCS#7 message, which must be a signedData message.
  * The message must be in 'sigbuf' and of size 'data_size'. The result is
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c new file +957 -0

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#9 lore raw

PATCH v8 9/20 powerpc_ieee1275: Enter lockdown based on /ibm, secure-boot

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

Read secure boot mode from 'ibm,secure-boot' property and if the secure boot mode is enforced, enter lockdown. Else it is considered as disabled. There are three secure boot modes. They are

0 - disabled
No signature verification is performed. This is the default.
1 - audit
Signature verification is performed and if signature verification fails, post the errors and allow the boot to continue.
2 - enforced
Lockdown the GRUB. Signature verification is performed and If signature verification fails, post the errors and stop the boot.

Now, only support disabled and enforced.

---
 docs/grub.texi                 |  2 +-
 grub-core/Makefile.core.def    |  1 +
 grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/grub/lockdown.h        |  3 +-
 4 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
docs/grub.texi +1 -1
index bdbc3b82e..15f087f27 100644
@@ -8912,7 +8912,7 @@ platforms.
 @section Lockdown when booting on a secure setup
 
 The GRUB can be locked down when booted on a secure boot environment, for example
-if the UEFI secure boot is enabled. On a locked down configuration, the GRUB will
+if the UEFI or Power secure boot is enabled. On a locked down configuration, the GRUB will
 be restricted and some operations/commands cannot be executed. This also includes
 limiting which filesystems are supported to those thought to be more robust and
 widely used within GRUB.
grub-core/Makefile.core.def +1 -0
index b3f71196a..b72f322b1 100644
@@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ kernel = {
   powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/cache.S;
   powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/dl.c;
   powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/compiler-rt.S;
+  powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/lockdown.c;
 
   sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/cache.S;
   sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/dl.c;
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c +51 -0

69 lines not on this page · raw message

include/grub/lockdown.h +2 -1
index 40531fa82..ebfee4bf0 100644
@@ -24,7 +24,8 @@
 #define GRUB_LOCKDOWN_DISABLED       0
 #define GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED        1
 
-#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI
+#if defined(GRUB_MACHINE_EFI) || \
+    (defined(__powerpc__) && defined(GRUB_MACHINE_IEEE1275))
 extern void
 EXPORT_FUNC (grub_lockdown) (void);
 extern int
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#10 lore raw

PATCH v8 10/20 appended signatures: Support verifying appended signatures

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

Building on the parsers and the ability to embed X.509 certificates, as well as the existing gcrypt functionality, add a module for verifying appended signatures.

This includes a verifier that requires that Linux kernels and GRUB modules have appended signatures, and commands to manage the list of trusted certificates for verification.

Verification must be enabled by setting check_appended_signatures. If secure boot is enabled with enforced mode when the module is loaded, verification will be enabled and locked automatically. If verification is enabled, extract trusted keys from the GRUB ELF Note and store them in the db.

As with the PGP verifier, it is not a complete secure-boot solution:
other mechanisms, such as a password or lockdown, must be used to ensure that a user cannot drop to the GRUB shell and disable verification.

Introducing the following GRUB commands to access db.

1. append_list_db:
Show the list of trusted certificates from the db list
2. append_add_db_cert:
Add the trusted certificate to the db list
3. append_rm_dbx_cert:
Remove the distrusted certificate from the db list
4. append_verify:
Verify the signed file using db list

---
 grub-core/Makefile.core.def                  |  15 +
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 793 +++++++++++++++++++
 include/grub/err.h                           |   3 +-
 include/grub/file.h                          |   2 +
 4 files changed, 812 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
grub-core/Makefile.core.def +15 -0
index b72f322b1..d91694de0 100644
@@ -980,6 +980,21 @@ module = {
   cppflags = '$(CPPFLAGS_GCRY)';
 };
 
+module = {
+  name = appendedsig;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/x509.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c;
+  enable = emu;
+  enable = powerpc_ieee1275;
+  cflags = '$(CFLAGS_GCRY) -Wno-redundant-decls';
+  cppflags = '$(CPPFLAGS_GCRY) -I$(srcdir)/lib/libtasn1-grub';
+  depends = crypto, gcry_rsa, gcry_sha256, gcry_sha512, mpi, asn1;
+};
+
 module = {
   name = hdparm;
   common = commands/hdparm.c;
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +793 -0

793 lines not on this page · raw message

include/grub/err.h +2 -1
index 202fa8a7a..6ab905c93 100644
@@ -75,7 +75,8 @@ typedef enum
     GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
     GRUB_ERR_BAD_FIRMWARE,
     GRUB_ERR_STILL_REFERENCED,
-    GRUB_ERR_RECURSION_DEPTH
+    GRUB_ERR_RECURSION_DEPTH,
+    GRUB_ERR_EXISTS
   }
 grub_err_t;
 
include/grub/file.h +2 -0
index a5bf3a792..d678de063 100644
@@ -80,6 +80,8 @@ enum grub_file_type
     GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY,
     /* File holding public key to add to trused keys.  */
     GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_TRUST,
+    /* File holding x509 certificiate to add to trusted keys.  */
+    GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CERTIFICATE_TRUST,
     /* File of which we intend to print a blocklist to the user.  */
     GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PRINT_BLOCKLIST,
     /* File we intend to use for test loading or testing speed.  */
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#11 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 10/20] appended signatures: Support verifying appended signatures

Quoted 7 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy

Building on the parsers and the ability to embed X.509 certificates, as well as the existing gcrypt functionality, add a module for verifying appended signatures.

This includes a verifier that requires that Linux kernels and GRUB modules have appended signatures, and commands to manage the list of trusted certificates for verification.

This suggests that this patch should be split into two separate ones.

Quoted 99 lines

Verification must be enabled by setting check_appended_signatures. If secure boot is enabled with enforced mode when the module is loaded, verification will be enabled and locked automatically. If verification is enabled, extract trusted keys from the GRUB ELF Note and store them in the db.

As with the PGP verifier, it is not a complete secure-boot solution:
other mechanisms, such as a password or lockdown, must be used to ensure that a user cannot drop to the GRUB shell and disable verification.

Introducing the following GRUB commands to access db.

1. append_list_db:
Show the list of trusted certificates from the db list
2. append_add_db_cert:
Add the trusted certificate to the db list
3. append_rm_dbx_cert:
Remove the distrusted certificate from the db list
4. append_verify:
Verify the signed file using db list

---
 grub-core/Makefile.core.def                  |  15 +
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 793 +++++++++++++++++++
 include/grub/err.h                           |   3 +-
 include/grub/file.h                          |   2 +
 4 files changed, 812 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
grub-core/Makefile.core.def +15 -0
index b72f322b1..d91694de0 100644
@@ -980,6 +980,21 @@ module = {
   cppflags = '$(CPPFLAGS_GCRY)';
 };
 
+module = {
+  name = appendedsig;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/x509.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c;
+  enable = emu;
+  enable = powerpc_ieee1275;
+  cflags = '$(CFLAGS_GCRY) -Wno-redundant-decls';
+  cppflags = '$(CPPFLAGS_GCRY) -I$(srcdir)/lib/libtasn1-grub';
+  depends = crypto, gcry_rsa, gcry_sha256, gcry_sha512, mpi, asn1;
+};
+
 module = {
   name = hdparm;
   common = commands/hdparm.c;
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +35 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2ddbb3a15
@@ -0,0 +1,793 @@
+/*
+ *  GRUB  --  GRand Unified Bootloader
+ *  Copyright (C) 2020, 2021, 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *  Copyright (C) 2020, 2021, 2022, 2025 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ *  GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *  the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ *  (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *  GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ *  GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ *  along with GRUB.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <grub/types.h>
+#include <grub/misc.h>
+#include <grub/mm.h>
+#include <grub/err.h>
+#include <grub/dl.h>
+#include <grub/file.h>
+#include <grub/command.h>
+#include <grub/crypto.h>
+#include <grub/i18n.h>
+#include <grub/gcrypt/gcrypt.h>
+#include <grub/kernel.h>
+#include <grub/extcmd.h>
+#include <grub/verify.h>
+#include <libtasn1.h>
+#include <grub/env.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c line 45

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +10 -0
+
+#include "appendedsig.h"
+
+GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
+
+/* Public key type. */
+#define GRUB_PKEY_ID_PKCS7 2
+
+/* Appended signature magic string. */
+static const char magic[] = "~Module signature appended~\n";

This could be a constant... Two useful constants...

#define SIG_MAGIC "~Module signature appended~\n"
#define SIG_MAGIC_SIZE ((sizeof(SIG_MAGIC) - 1)

Quoted 115 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +115 -0
+/*
+ * This structure is extracted from scripts/sign-file.c in the linux kernel
+ * source. It was licensed as LGPLv2.1+, which is GPLv3+ compatible.
+ */
+struct module_signature
+{
+  grub_uint8_t algo;       /* Public-key crypto algorithm [0]. */
+  grub_uint8_t hash;       /* Digest algorithm [0]. */
+  grub_uint8_t id_type;    /* Key identifier type [GRUB_PKEY_ID_PKCS7]. */
+  grub_uint8_t signer_len; /* Length of signer's name [0]. */
+  grub_uint8_t key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier [0]. */
+  grub_uint8_t __pad[3];
+  grub_uint32_t sig_len;   /* Length of signature data. */
+} GRUB_PACKED;
+
+/* This represents an entire, parsed, appended signature. */
+struct grub_appended_signature
+{
+  grub_size_t signature_len;            /* Length of PKCS#7 data + metadata + magic. */
+  struct module_signature sig_metadata; /* Module signature metadata. */
+  struct pkcs7_signedData pkcs7;        /* Parsed PKCS#7 data. */
+};
+
+/* This represents a trusted certificates. */
+struct grub_database
+{
+  struct x509_certificate *certs; /* Certificates. */
+  grub_uint32_t cert_entries;     /* Number of certificates. */
+};
+
+/* The db list is used to validate appended signatures. */
+struct grub_database db = {.certs = NULL, .cert_entries = 0};
+
+/* Appended signature size. */
+static grub_size_t append_sig_len = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Signature verification flag (check_sigs).
+ * check_sigs: false
+ *  - No signature verification. This is the default.
+ * check_sigs: true
+ *  - Enforce signature verification, and if signature verification fails,
+ *    post the errors and stop the boot.
+ */
+static bool check_sigs = false;
+
+static void
+register_appended_signatures_cmd (void);
+static void
+unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (void);
+static void
+free_db_list (void);
+static void
+build_static_db_list (void);
+
+static const char *
+grub_env_read_sec (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)),
+                   const char *val __attribute__ ((unused)))
+{
+  if (check_sigs == true)
+    return "enforce";
+
+  return "no";
+}
+
+static char *
+grub_env_write_sec (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)), const char *val)
+{
+  char *ret;
+
+  /*
+   * Do not allow the value to be changed If signature verification is
+   * (check_sigs is set to enforce) enabled and GRUB is locked down.
+   */
+  if (check_sigs == true && grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED)
+    {
+      ret = grub_strdup ("enforce");
+      if (ret == NULL)
+        grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "could not duplicate a string enforce");
+
+      return ret;
+    }
+
+  if ((*val == '1') || (*val == 'e'))
+    check_sigs = true;
+  else if ((*val == '0') || (*val == 'n'))
+    check_sigs = false;
+
+  ret = grub_strdup (grub_env_read_sec (NULL, NULL));
+  if (ret == NULL)
+    grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "could not duplicate a string %s",
+                grub_env_read_sec (NULL, NULL));
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static bool
+is_cert_match (const struct x509_certificate *distrusted_cert,
+               const struct x509_certificate *db_cert)
+{
+  if (grub_memcmp (distrusted_cert->subject, db_cert->subject, db_cert->subject_len) == 0
+      && grub_memcmp (distrusted_cert->issuer, db_cert->issuer, db_cert->issuer_len) == 0
+      && grub_memcmp (distrusted_cert->serial, db_cert->serial, db_cert->serial_len) == 0
+      && grub_memcmp (distrusted_cert->mpis[0], db_cert->mpis[0], sizeof (db_cert->mpis[0])) == 0
+      && grub_memcmp (distrusted_cert->mpis[1], db_cert->mpis[1], sizeof (db_cert->mpis[1])) == 0)
+    return true;
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+file_read_whole (grub_file_t file, grub_uint8_t **buf, grub_size_t *len)
+{
+  grub_off_t full_file_size;
+  grub_size_t file_size, total_read_size = 0;

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c line 171

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +10 -0
+  grub_ssize_t read_size;
+
+  full_file_size = grub_file_size (file);
+  if (full_file_size == GRUB_FILE_SIZE_UNKNOWN)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+                       "cannot read a file of unknown size into a buffer");
+
+  if (full_file_size > GRUB_SIZE_MAX)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE,
+                       "file is too large to read: %" PRIuGRUB_UINT64_T " bytes",

s/PRIuGRUB_UINT64_T/PRIuGRUB_OFFSET/

Quoted 31 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +31 -0
+                       full_file_size);
+
+  file_size = (grub_size_t) full_file_size;
+  *buf = grub_malloc (file_size);
+  if (*buf == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
+                       "could not allocate file data buffer size %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE,
+                       file_size);
+
+  while (total_read_size < file_size)
+    {
+      read_size = grub_file_read (file, *buf + total_read_size, file_size - total_read_size);
+      if (read_size < 0)
+        {
+          grub_free (*buf);
+          return grub_errno;
+        }
+      else if (read_size == 0)
+        {
+          grub_free (*buf);
+          return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_IO,
+                             "could not read full file size "
+                             "(%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE "), only %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE " bytes read",
+                             file_size, total_read_size);
+        }
+
+      total_read_size += read_size;
+    }
+
+  *len = file_size;
+

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c line 212

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +10 -0
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+extract_appended_signature (const grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t bufsize,
+                            struct grub_appended_signature *sig)
+{
+  grub_size_t pkcs7_size;
+  grub_size_t remaining_len;
+  const grub_uint8_t *appsigdata = buf + bufsize - grub_strlen (magic);

s/grub_strlen (magic)/sizeof (magic) - 1/

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c line 213

Quoted 2 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +2 -0
+
+  if (bufsize < grub_strlen (magic))

s/grub_strlen (magic)/sizeof (magic) - 1/

Please be more consistent...

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c line 220

Quoted 6 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +6 -0
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "file too short for signature magic");
+
+  if (grub_strncmp ((const char *) appsigdata, magic, sizeof (magic) - 1))
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "missing or invalid signature magic");
+
+  remaining_len = bufsize - grub_strlen (magic);

Ditto...

Or even define a constant, as above, and use it everywhere...

Quoted 9 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +9 -0
+  if (remaining_len < sizeof (struct module_signature))
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "file too short for signature metadata");
+
+  appsigdata -= sizeof (struct module_signature);
+  /* Extract the metadata. */
+  grub_memcpy (&(sig->sig_metadata), appsigdata, sizeof (struct module_signature));
+  remaining_len -= sizeof (struct module_signature);
+
+  if (sig->sig_metadata.id_type != GRUB_PKEY_ID_PKCS7)

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c line 240

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +10 -0
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "wrong signature type");
+
+  pkcs7_size = grub_be_to_cpu32 (sig->sig_metadata.sig_len);
+
+  if (pkcs7_size > remaining_len)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "file too short for PKCS#7 message");
+
+  grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "sig len %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE "\n", pkcs7_size);
+
+  sig->signature_len = grub_strlen (magic) + sizeof (struct module_signature) + pkcs7_size;

Ditto...

Quoted 9 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +9 -0
+  /* Rewind pointer and parse pkcs7 data. */
+  appsigdata -= pkcs7_size;
+
+  return parse_pkcs7_signedData (appsigdata, pkcs7_size, &sig->pkcs7);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a hash value 'hval', of hash specification 'hash', prepare
+ * the S-expressions (sexp) and perform the signature verification.

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c line 259

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +10 -0
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+verify_signature (const gcry_mpi_t *pkmpi, const gcry_mpi_t hmpi,
+                  const gcry_md_spec_t *hash, const grub_uint8_t *hval)
+{
+  gcry_sexp_t hsexp, pubkey, sig;
+  grub_size_t errof;
+
+  if (_gcry_sexp_build(&hsexp, &errof, "(data (flags %s) (hash %s %b))", "pkcs1",
+                       hash->name, hash->mdlen, hval) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)

Missing space after "_gcry_sexp_build" here and below...

Quoted 8 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +8 -0
+    return GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+
+  if (_gcry_sexp_build(&pubkey, &errof, "(public-key (dsa (n %M) (e %M)))",
+                       pkmpi[0], pkmpi[1]) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
+    return GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+
+  if (_gcry_sexp_build(&sig, &errof, "(sig-val (rsa (s %M)))", hmpi) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
+    return GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c line 277

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +10 -0
+
+  _gcry_sexp_dump(sig);
+  _gcry_sexp_dump(hsexp);
+  _gcry_sexp_dump(pubkey);
+
+  if (grub_crypto_pk_rsa->verify (sig, hsexp, pubkey) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
+    return GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}

Daniel

_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel

#12 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 10/20] appended signatures: Support verifying appended signatures

Thank you Daniel for the review.

Quoted 7 lines · Daniel Kiper
Quoted 4 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy

Building on the parsers and the ability to embed X.509 certificates, as well as the existing gcrypt functionality, add a module for verifying appended signatures.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines

This includes a verifier that requires that Linux kernels and GRUB modules have appended signatures, and commands to manage the list of trusted certificates for verification.

This suggests that this patch should be split into two separate ones.

I will split the patch into two separate ones.

Quoted 113 lines
Quoted 100 lines

Verification must be enabled by setting check_appended_signatures. If secure boot is enabled with enforced mode when the module is loaded, verification will be enabled and locked automatically. If verification is enabled, extract trusted keys from the GRUB ELF Note and store them in the db.

As with the PGP verifier, it is not a complete secure-boot solution:
other mechanisms, such as a password or lockdown, must be used to ensure that a user cannot drop to the GRUB shell and disable verification.

Introducing the following GRUB commands to access db.

1. append_list_db:
Show the list of trusted certificates from the db list
2. append_add_db_cert:
Add the trusted certificate to the db list
3. append_rm_dbx_cert:
Remove the distrusted certificate from the db list
4. append_verify:
Verify the signed file using db list

---

grub-core/Makefile.core.def                  |  15 +
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 793 +++++++++++++++++++
include/grub/err.h                           |   3 +-
include/grub/file.h                          |   2 +
4 files changed, 812 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c

grub-core/Makefile.core.def +15 -0
index b72f322b1..d91694de0 100644
@@ -980,6 +980,21 @@ module = {
  cppflags = '$(CPPFLAGS_GCRY)';
 };
 
+module = {
+  name = appendedsig;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/x509.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c;
+  common = commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c;
+  enable = emu;
+  enable = powerpc_ieee1275;
+  cflags = '$(CFLAGS_GCRY) -Wno-redundant-decls';
+  cppflags = '$(CPPFLAGS_GCRY) -I$(srcdir)/lib/libtasn1-grub';
+  depends = crypto, gcry_rsa, gcry_sha256, gcry_sha512, mpi, asn1;
+};
+
 module = {
  name = hdparm;
  common = commands/hdparm.c;
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +35 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2ddbb3a15
@@ -0,0 +1,793 @@
+/*
+ *  GRUB  --  GRand Unified Bootloader
+ *  Copyright (C) 2020, 2021, 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *  Copyright (C) 2020, 2021, 2022, 2025 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ *  GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *  the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ *  (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *  GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ *  GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ *  along with GRUB.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <grub/types.h>
+#include <grub/misc.h>
+#include <grub/mm.h>
+#include <grub/err.h>
+#include <grub/dl.h>
+#include <grub/file.h>
+#include <grub/command.h>
+#include <grub/crypto.h>
+#include <grub/i18n.h>
+#include <grub/gcrypt/gcrypt.h>
+#include <grub/kernel.h>
+#include <grub/extcmd.h>
+#include <grub/verify.h>
+#include <libtasn1.h>
+#include <grub/env.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c line 45

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +10 -0
+
+#include "appendedsig.h"
+
+GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
+
+/* Public key type. */
+#define GRUB_PKEY_ID_PKCS7 2
+
+/* Appended signature magic string. */
+static const char magic[] = "~Module signature appended~\n";

This could be a constant... Two useful constants...

Quoted 2 lines

#define SIG_MAGIC "~Module signature appended~\n"
#define SIG_MAGIC_SIZE ((sizeof(SIG_MAGIC) - 1)

Sure, will do it.

Quoted 120 lines
Quoted 120 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +119 -0
+/*
+ * This structure is extracted from scripts/sign-file.c in the linux kernel
+ * source. It was licensed as LGPLv2.1+, which is GPLv3+ compatible.
+ */
+struct module_signature
+{
+  grub_uint8_t algo;       /* Public-key crypto algorithm [0]. */
+  grub_uint8_t hash;       /* Digest algorithm [0]. */
+  grub_uint8_t id_type;    /* Key identifier type [GRUB_PKEY_ID_PKCS7]. */
+  grub_uint8_t signer_len; /* Length of signer's name [0]. */
+  grub_uint8_t key_id_len; /* Length of key identifier [0]. */
+  grub_uint8_t __pad[3];
+  grub_uint32_t sig_len;   /* Length of signature data. */
+} GRUB_PACKED;
+
+/* This represents an entire, parsed, appended signature. */
+struct grub_appended_signature
+{
+  grub_size_t signature_len;            /* Length of PKCS#7 data + metadata + magic. */
+  struct module_signature sig_metadata; /* Module signature metadata. */
+  struct pkcs7_signedData pkcs7;        /* Parsed PKCS#7 data. */
+};
+
+/* This represents a trusted certificates. */
+struct grub_database
+{
+  struct x509_certificate *certs; /* Certificates. */
+  grub_uint32_t cert_entries;     /* Number of certificates. */
+};
+
+/* The db list is used to validate appended signatures. */
+struct grub_database db = {.certs = NULL, .cert_entries = 0};
+
+/* Appended signature size. */
+static grub_size_t append_sig_len = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Signature verification flag (check_sigs).
+ * check_sigs: false
+ *  - No signature verification. This is the default.
+ * check_sigs: true
+ *  - Enforce signature verification, and if signature verification fails,
+ *    post the errors and stop the boot.
+ */
+static bool check_sigs = false;
+
+static void
+register_appended_signatures_cmd (void);
+static void
+unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (void);
+static void
+free_db_list (void);
+static void
+build_static_db_list (void);
+
+static const char *
+grub_env_read_sec (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)),
+                   const char *val __attribute__ ((unused)))
+{
+  if (check_sigs == true)
+    return "enforce";
+
+  return "no";
+}
+
+static char *
+grub_env_write_sec (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)), const char *val)
+{
+  char *ret;
+
+  /*
+   * Do not allow the value to be changed If signature verification is
+   * (check_sigs is set to enforce) enabled and GRUB is locked down.
+   */
+  if (check_sigs == true && grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED)
+    {
+      ret = grub_strdup ("enforce");
+      if (ret == NULL)
+        grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "could not duplicate a string enforce");
+
+      return ret;
+    }
+
+  if ((*val == '1') || (*val == 'e'))
+    check_sigs = true;
+  else if ((*val == '0') || (*val == 'n'))
+    check_sigs = false;
+
+  ret = grub_strdup (grub_env_read_sec (NULL, NULL));
+  if (ret == NULL)
+    grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "could not duplicate a string %s",
+                grub_env_read_sec (NULL, NULL));
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+static bool
+is_cert_match (const struct x509_certificate *distrusted_cert,
+               const struct x509_certificate *db_cert)
+{
+  if (grub_memcmp (distrusted_cert->subject, db_cert->subject, db_cert->subject_len) == 0
+      && grub_memcmp (distrusted_cert->issuer, db_cert->issuer, db_cert->issuer_len) == 0
+      && grub_memcmp (distrusted_cert->serial, db_cert->serial, db_cert->serial_len) == 0
+      && grub_memcmp (distrusted_cert->mpis[0], db_cert->mpis[0], sizeof (db_cert->mpis[0])) == 0
+      && grub_memcmp (distrusted_cert->mpis[1], db_cert->mpis[1], sizeof (db_cert->mpis[1])) == 0)
+    return true;
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+file_read_whole (grub_file_t file, grub_uint8_t **buf, grub_size_t *len)
+{
+  grub_off_t full_file_size;
+  grub_size_t file_size, total_read_size = 0;
+  grub_ssize_t read_size;
+
+  full_file_size = grub_file_size (file);
+  if (full_file_size == GRUB_FILE_SIZE_UNKNOWN)
Quoted 8 lines

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c line 171

Quoted 6 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +6 -0
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+                       "cannot read a file of unknown size into a buffer");
+
+  if (full_file_size > GRUB_SIZE_MAX)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE,
+                       "file is too large to read: %" PRIuGRUB_UINT64_T " bytes",

s/PRIuGRUB_UINT64_T/PRIuGRUB_OFFSET/

will change it.

Quoted 45 lines
Quoted 32 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +31 -0
+                       full_file_size);
+
+  file_size = (grub_size_t) full_file_size;
+  *buf = grub_malloc (file_size);
+  if (*buf == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY,
+                       "could not allocate file data buffer size %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE,
+                       file_size);
+
+  while (total_read_size < file_size)
+    {
+      read_size = grub_file_read (file, *buf + total_read_size, file_size - total_read_size);
+      if (read_size < 0)
+        {
+          grub_free (*buf);
+          return grub_errno;
+        }
+      else if (read_size == 0)
+        {
+          grub_free (*buf);
+          return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_IO,
+                             "could not read full file size "
+                             "(%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE "), only %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE " bytes read",
+                             file_size, total_read_size);
+        }
+
+      total_read_size += read_size;
+    }
+
+  *len = file_size;
+

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c line 212

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +10 -0
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+extract_appended_signature (const grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t bufsize,
+                            struct grub_appended_signature *sig)
+{
+  grub_size_t pkcs7_size;
+  grub_size_t remaining_len;
+  const grub_uint8_t *appsigdata = buf + bufsize - grub_strlen (magic);

s/grub_strlen (magic)/sizeof (magic) - 1/

Quoted 6 lines

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c line 213

Quoted 2 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +2 -0
+
+  if (bufsize < grub_strlen (magic))

s/grub_strlen (magic)/sizeof (magic) - 1/

Please be more consistent…

Sure, will do it.

Quoted 11 lines

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c line 220

Quoted 7 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +6 -0
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "file too short for signature magic");
+
+  if (grub_strncmp ((const char *) appsigdata, magic, sizeof (magic) - 1))
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "missing or invalid signature magic");
+
+  remaining_len = bufsize - grub_strlen (magic);

Ditto...

Or even define a constant, as above, and use it everywhere...

Sure, will do it.

Quoted 36 lines
Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +9 -0
+  if (remaining_len < sizeof (struct module_signature))
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "file too short for signature metadata");
+
+  appsigdata -= sizeof (struct module_signature);
+  /* Extract the metadata. */
+  grub_memcpy (&(sig->sig_metadata), appsigdata, sizeof (struct module_signature));
+  remaining_len -= sizeof (struct module_signature);
+
+  if (sig->sig_metadata.id_type != GRUB_PKEY_ID_PKCS7)

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c line 240

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +10 -0
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "wrong signature type");
+
+  pkcs7_size = grub_be_to_cpu32 (sig->sig_metadata.sig_len);
+
+  if (pkcs7_size > remaining_len)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "file too short for PKCS#7 message");
+
+  grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "sig len %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE "\n", pkcs7_size);
+
+  sig->signature_len = grub_strlen (magic) + sizeof (struct module_signature) + pkcs7_size;

Ditto…

Quoted 13 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +13 -0
+  /* Rewind pointer and parse pkcs7 data. */
+  appsigdata -= pkcs7_size;
+
+  return parse_pkcs7_signedData (appsigdata, pkcs7_size, &sig->pkcs7);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a hash value 'hval', of hash specification 'hash', prepare
+ * the S-expressions (sexp) and perform the signature verification.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+verify_signature (const gcry_mpi_t *pkmpi, const gcry_mpi_t hmpi,
+                  const gcry_md_spec_t *hash, const grub_uint8_t *hval)
Quoted 8 lines

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c line 259

Quoted 6 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +6 -0
+{
+  gcry_sexp_t hsexp, pubkey, sig;
+  grub_size_t errof;
+
+  if (_gcry_sexp_build(&hsexp, &errof, "(data (flags %s) (hash %s %b))", "pkcs1",
+                       hash->name, hash->mdlen, hval) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)

Missing space after "_gcry_sexp_build" here and below…

Sure, will do it.

Thanks,
Sudhakar

Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 13 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +12 -0
+    return GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+
+  if (_gcry_sexp_build(&pubkey, &errof, "(public-key (dsa (n %M) (e %M)))",
+                       pkmpi[0], pkmpi[1]) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
+    return GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+
+  if (_gcry_sexp_build(&sig, &errof, "(sig-val (rsa (s %M)))", hmpi) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
+    return GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+
+  _gcry_sexp_dump(sig);
+  _gcry_sexp_dump(hsexp);
+  _gcry_sexp_dump(pubkey);
Quoted 8 lines

grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c line 277

Quoted 6 lines
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +6 -0
+
+  if (grub_crypto_pk_rsa->verify (sig, hsexp, pubkey) != GPG_ERR_NO_ERROR)
+    return GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}

Daniel

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https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel

#13 lore raw

PATCH v8 11/20 powerpc_ieee1275: Read the db and dbx secure boot variables

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

Enhancing the infrastructure to enable the Platform Keystore (PKS) feature, which provides access to the SB_VERSION, db, and dbx secure boot variables from PKS.

If PKS is enabled, it will read secure boot variables such as db and dbx from PKS and extract EFI Signature List (ESL) from it. The ESLs would be saved in the Platform Keystore buffer, and the appendedsig module would read it later to extract the certificate's details from ESL.

In the following scenarios, static key management mode will be activated:
1. When Secure Boot is enabled with static key management mode
2. When SB_VERSION is unavailable but Secure Boot is enabled
3. When PKS support is unavailable but Secure Boot is enabled

Note:-

SB_VERSION: Key Management Mode
1 - Enable dynamic key management mode. Read the db and dbx variables from PKS,
and use them for signature verification.
0 - Enable static key management mode. Read keys from the GRUB ELF Note and
use it for signature verification.

---
 grub-core/Makefile.am                         |   2 +
 grub-core/Makefile.core.def                   |   2 +
 grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c            |   1 -
 grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c                |  14 +-
 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c    | 139 +++++++
 .../kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c | 341 ++++++++++++++++++
 include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h              |   3 +
 include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h      |  20 +
 .../grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h | 142 ++++++++
 9 files changed, 662 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c
 create mode 100644 include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h
grub-core/Makefile.am +2 -0
index e50db8106..cd6bb7c32 100644
@@ -241,11 +241,13 @@ KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_builddir)/include/grub/machine/kernel.h
 endif
 
 if COND_powerpc_ieee1275
+KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h
 KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h
 KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/ieee1275/alloc.h
 KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/terminfo.h
 KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/extcmd.h
 KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/lib/arg.h
+KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h
 endif
 
 if COND_sparc64_ieee1275
grub-core/Makefile.core.def +2 -0
index d91694de0..05ccbf264 100644
@@ -328,10 +328,12 @@ kernel = {
   extra_dist = video/sis315_init.c;
   mips_loongson = commands/keylayouts.c;
 
+  powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c;
   powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/cache.S;
   powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/dl.c;
   powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/compiler-rt.S;
   powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/lockdown.c;
+  powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c;
 
   sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/cache.S;
   sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/dl.c;
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c +0 -1
index 36ca2dbfc..afa37a9f0 100644
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@
 
 #define IEEE1275_PHANDLE_INVALID  ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)
 #define IEEE1275_IHANDLE_INVALID  ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) 0)
-#define IEEE1275_CELL_INVALID     ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)
 
 
 
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c +13 -1
index 89303f33e..46bfaa9a8 100644
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@
 #endif
 #if defined(__powerpc__)
 #include <grub/lockdown.h>
+#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h>
+#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h>
 #endif
 
 #ifdef __powerpc__
@@ -1007,6 +1009,7 @@ grub_parse_cmdline (void)
 static void
 grub_ieee1275_get_secure_boot (void)
 {
+  grub_err_t err;
   grub_ieee1275_phandle_t root;
   grub_uint32_t sb_mode = GRUB_SB_DISABLED;
   int rc;
@@ -1038,7 +1041,16 @@ grub_ieee1275_get_secure_boot (void)
    * Now, only support disabled and enforced.
    */
   if (sb_mode == GRUB_SB_ENFORCED)
-    grub_lockdown ();
+    {
+      grub_dprintf ("ieee1275", "Secure Boot Enabled\n");
+      grub_lockdown ();
+    }
+  else
+    grub_dprintf ("ieee1275", "Secure Boot Disabled\n");
+
+  err = grub_pks_keystore_init ();
+  if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    grub_error (err, "initialization of the Platform KeyStore failed\n");
 }
 #endif /* __powerpc__ */
 
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c new file +139 -0

139 lines not on this page · raw message

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +341 -0

341 lines not on this page · raw message

include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h +3 -0
index c445d0499..157ed57be 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@
 #include <grub/types.h>
 #include <grub/machine/ieee1275.h>
 
+#define IEEE1275_CELL_INVALID          ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)
+#define IEEE1275_CELL_NOT_FOUND        ((grub_int32_t) -7)
+
 #define GRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_FALSE       ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) 0)
 #define GRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_TRUE        ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)
 
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h +20 -0
index 4eb207018..19a4772bf 100644
@@ -28,4 +28,24 @@ typedef grub_uint32_t grub_ieee1275_cell_t;
 #define PRIxGRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_T	PRIxGRUB_UINT32_T
 #define PRIuGRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_T	PRIuGRUB_UINT32_T
 
+#ifdef __powerpc__
+
+extern grub_int32_t
+grub_ieee1275_test (const grub_uint8_t *name, grub_ieee1275_cell_t *missing);
+
+extern grub_int32_t
+grub_ieee1275_pks_max_object_size (grub_ieee1275_cell_t *result);
+
+extern grub_int32_t
+grub_ieee1275_pks_read_object (const grub_uint8_t consumer, const grub_uint8_t *label,
+                               const grub_size_t label_len, const grub_size_t buffer_len,
+                               grub_uint8_t *buffer, grub_uint32_t *data_len,
+                               grub_uint32_t *policies);
+
+extern grub_int32_t
+grub_ieee1275_pks_read_sbvar (const grub_uint8_t sbvar_flags, const grub_uint8_t sbvar_type,
+                              const grub_uint32_t buffer_len, grub_uint8_t *buffer,
+                              grub_size_t *data_len);
+#endif
+
 #endif /* ! GRUB_IEEE1275_MACHINE_HEADER */
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h new file +142 -0

142 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 7 lines
2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)


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[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
#14 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 11/20] powerpc_ieee1275: Read the db and dbx secure boot variables

Quoted 43 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy

Enhancing the infrastructure to enable the Platform Keystore (PKS) feature, which provides access to the SB_VERSION, db, and dbx secure boot variables from PKS.

If PKS is enabled, it will read secure boot variables such as db and dbx from PKS and extract EFI Signature List (ESL) from it. The ESLs would be saved in the Platform Keystore buffer, and the appendedsig module would read it later to extract the certificate's details from ESL.

In the following scenarios, static key management mode will be activated:
1. When Secure Boot is enabled with static key management mode
2. When SB_VERSION is unavailable but Secure Boot is enabled
3. When PKS support is unavailable but Secure Boot is enabled

Note:-

SB_VERSION: Key Management Mode
1 - Enable dynamic key management mode. Read the db and dbx variables from PKS,
and use them for signature verification.
0 - Enable static key management mode. Read keys from the GRUB ELF Note and
use it for signature verification.

---
 grub-core/Makefile.am                         |   2 +
 grub-core/Makefile.core.def                   |   2 +
 grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c            |   1 -
 grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c                |  14 +-
 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c    | 139 +++++++
 .../kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c | 341 ++++++++++++++++++
 include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h              |   3 +
 include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h      |  20 +
 .../grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h | 142 ++++++++
 9 files changed, 662 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c
 create mode 100644 include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h
grub-core/Makefile.am +0 -0
index e50db8106..cd6bb7c32 100644

grub-core/Makefile.am KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_builddir)/include/grub/machine/kernel.h · line 250

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/Makefile.am +2 -0
@@ -241,11 +241,13 @@ KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_builddir)/include/grub/machine/kernel.h
 endif
 
 if COND_powerpc_ieee1275
+KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h
 KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h
 KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/ieee1275/alloc.h
 KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/terminfo.h
 KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/extcmd.h
 KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/lib/arg.h
+KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h

I am not entirely sure why you cannot put these two changes next to each other...

Quoted 8 lines
grub-core/Makefile.am +0 -0
 endif
 
 if COND_sparc64_ieee1275
grub-core/Makefile.core.def +0 -0
index d91694de0..05ccbf264 100644

grub-core/Makefile.core.def kernel = { · line 336

Quoted 9 lines
grub-core/Makefile.core.def +2 -0
@@ -328,10 +328,12 @@ kernel = {
   extra_dist = video/sis315_init.c;
   mips_loongson = commands/keylayouts.c;
 
+  powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c;
   powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/cache.S;
   powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/dl.c;
   powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/compiler-rt.S;
   powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/lockdown.c;
+  powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c;

Ditto...

Quoted 36 lines
grub-core/Makefile.core.def +0 -0
   sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/cache.S;
   sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/dl.c;
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c +0 -1
index 36ca2dbfc..afa37a9f0 100644
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@
 
 #define IEEE1275_PHANDLE_INVALID  ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)
 #define IEEE1275_IHANDLE_INVALID  ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) 0)
-#define IEEE1275_CELL_INVALID     ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)
 
 
 
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c +3 -0
index 89303f33e..46bfaa9a8 100644
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@
 #endif
 #if defined(__powerpc__)
 #include <grub/lockdown.h>
+#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h>
+#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h>
 #endif
 
 #ifdef __powerpc__
@@ -1007,6 +1009,7 @@ grub_parse_cmdline (void)
 static void
 grub_ieee1275_get_secure_boot (void)
 {
+  grub_err_t err;
   grub_ieee1275_phandle_t root;
   grub_uint32_t sb_mode = GRUB_SB_DISABLED;
   int rc;

grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c grub_ieee1275_get_secure_boot (void) · line 1049

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c +6 -1
@@ -1038,7 +1041,16 @@ grub_ieee1275_get_secure_boot (void)
    * Now, only support disabled and enforced.
    */
   if (sb_mode == GRUB_SB_ENFORCED)
-    grub_lockdown ();
+    {
+      grub_dprintf ("ieee1275", "Secure Boot Enabled\n");
+      grub_lockdown ();
+    }
+  else
+    grub_dprintf ("ieee1275", "Secure Boot Disabled\n");

Sorry, this change does not belong to this patch.

grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c grub_ieee1275_get_secure_boot (void) · line 1053

Quoted 3 lines
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c +3 -0
+  err = grub_pks_keystore_init ();
+  if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    grub_error (err, "initialization of the Platform KeyStore failed\n");

Only this one...

Quoted 2 lines
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c +0 -0
 }
 #endif /* __powerpc__ */

[...]

Quoted 54 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +48 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aaf90500f
@@ -0,0 +1,341 @@
+/*
+ *  GRUB  --  GRand Unified Bootloader
+ *  Copyright (C) 2024  Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *  Copyright (C) 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ *  GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *  the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ *  (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *  GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ *  GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ *  along with GRUB.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <grub/mm.h>
+#include <grub/types.h>
+#include <grub/misc.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
+#include <grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h>
+#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h>
+#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h>
+
+#if __GNUC__ >= 9
+#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Waddress-of-packed-member"
+#endif
+
+/* PKS consumer type for firmware. */
+#define PKS_CONSUMER_FW      ((grub_uint8_t) 1)
+
+/* The maximum object size interface name for a PKS object. */
+#define PKS_MAX_OBJ_SIZE     ((grub_uint8_t *) "pks-max-object-size")
+
+/* PKS read object lable for secure boot version. */
+#define SB_VERSION_KEY_NAME  ((grub_uint8_t *) "SB_VERSION")
+#define SB_VERSION_KEY_LEN   ((grub_size_t) 10)
+
+/* PKS read secure boot variable request type for db and dbx. */
+#define DB                   ((grub_uint8_t) 1)
+#define DBX                  ((grub_uint8_t) 2)
+
+static grub_size_t pks_max_object_size;
+/*
+ * Flag to indicate the key management.

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 58

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +10 -0
+ * True: Dynamic key management (use Platform KeySotre).
+ * False: Static key management (use built-in Keys).
+ */
+bool grub_pks_use_keystore = false;
+/*
+ * Flag to indicate the availability of PSK support.
+ * True: PKS support available.
+ * False: No PKS support.
+ */
+bool grub_pks_is_support_pks = false;

Why could not we use grub_pks_use_keystore only instead of both grub_pks_use_keystore and grub_pks_is_support_pks? If you convince me that both are needed then s/grub_pks_is_support_pks/grub_pks_supported/...

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 69

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +10 -0
+/* Platform KeyStore db and dbx. */
+grub_pks_t grub_pks_keystore = { .db = NULL, .dbx = NULL, .db_entries = 0, .dbx_entries = 0 };
+
+/*
+ * Import the Globally Unique Identifier (GUID), EFI Signature Database (ESD),
+ * and its size into the PKS Signature Database (SD) (i.e pks_sd buffer) and pks_sd entries
+ * from the EFI Signature List (ESL).
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+esd_from_esl (const grub_uint8_t *esl_data, grub_size_t esl_size,

s/esd_from_esl/__esl_to_esd/

Quoted 43 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +43 -0
+              const grub_size_t signature_size, const grub_packed_guid_t *guid,
+              grub_pks_sd_t **pks_sd, grub_uint32_t *pks_sd_entries)
+{
+  grub_esd_t *esd;
+  grub_pks_sd_t *signature = *pks_sd;
+  grub_uint32_t entries = *pks_sd_entries;
+  grub_size_t data_size, offset = 0;
+
+  /* Reads the ESD from ESL. */
+  while (esl_size > 0)
+    {
+      esd = (grub_esd_t *) (esl_data + offset);
+      data_size = signature_size - sizeof (grub_esd_t);
+
+      signature = grub_realloc (signature, (entries + 1) * sizeof (grub_pks_sd_t));
+      if (signature == NULL)
+        return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
+
+      signature[entries].data = grub_malloc (data_size * sizeof (grub_uint8_t));
+      if (signature[entries].data == NULL)
+        {
+          /*
+           * Allocated memory will be freed by
+           * grub_free_platform_keystore.
+           */
+          *pks_sd = signature;
+          *pks_sd_entries = entries + 1;
+          return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
+        }
+
+      grub_memcpy (signature[entries].data, esd->signature_data, data_size);
+      signature[entries].data_size = data_size;
+      signature[entries].guid = *guid;
+      entries++;
+      esl_size -= signature_size;
+      offset += signature_size;
+    }
+
+  *pks_sd = signature;
+  *pks_sd_entries = entries;
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 122

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +10 -0
+
+/* Extract the ESD after removing the ESL header from ESL. */
+static grub_err_t
+esl_to_esd (const grub_uint8_t *esl_data, grub_size_t *next_esl,
+            grub_pks_sd_t **pks_sd, grub_uint32_t *pks_sd_entries)
+{
+  grub_packed_guid_t guid;
+  grub_esl_t *esl;
+  grub_size_t offset, esl_size,
+              signature_size, signature_header_size;

You do not need to wrap this line. I am OK with lines (a bit) longer than 80 characters...

Quoted 87 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +87 -0
+  /* Convert the ESL data into the ESL. */
+  esl = (grub_esl_t *) esl_data;
+  if (*next_esl < sizeof (grub_esl_t) || esl == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BUG, "invalid ESL");
+
+  esl_size = grub_le_to_cpu32 (esl->signature_list_size);
+  signature_header_size = grub_le_to_cpu32 (esl->signature_header_size);
+  signature_size = grub_le_to_cpu32 (esl->signature_size);
+  grub_memcpy (&guid, &esl->signature_type, sizeof (grub_packed_guid_t));
+
+  if (esl_size < sizeof (grub_esl_t) || esl_size > *next_esl)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BUG, "invalid ESL size (%u)\n", esl_size);
+
+  *next_esl = esl_size;
+  offset = sizeof (grub_esl_t) + signature_header_size;
+  esl_size = esl_size - offset;
+
+  return esd_from_esl (esl_data + offset, esl_size, signature_size, &guid,
+                       pks_sd, pks_sd_entries);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Import the EFI Signature Database (ESD) and the number of ESD from the ESL
+ * into the pks_sd buffer and pks_sd entries.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+pks_sd_from_esl (const grub_uint8_t *esl_data, grub_size_t esl_size,
+                 grub_pks_sd_t **pks_sd, grub_uint32_t *pks_sd_entries)
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_size_t next_esl = esl_size;
+
+  do
+    {
+      rc = esl_to_esd (esl_data, &next_esl, pks_sd, pks_sd_entries);
+      if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+        break;
+
+      esl_data += next_esl;
+      esl_size -= next_esl;
+      next_esl = esl_size;
+    }
+  while (esl_size > 0);
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read the secure boot version from PKS as an object.
+ * Caller must free result.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+read_sbversion_from_pks (grub_uint8_t **out, grub_uint32_t *outlen, grub_uint32_t *policy)
+{
+  grub_int32_t rc;
+
+  *out = grub_malloc (pks_max_object_size);
+  if (*out == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
+
+  rc = grub_ieee1275_pks_read_object (PKS_CONSUMER_FW, SB_VERSION_KEY_NAME,
+                                      SB_VERSION_KEY_LEN, pks_max_object_size, *out,
+                                      outlen, policy);
+  if (rc < 0)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR, "SB version read failed (%d)\n", rc);
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reads the secure boot variable from PKS.
+ * Caller must free result.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+read_sbvar_from_pks (const grub_uint8_t sbvarflags, const grub_uint8_t sbvartype,
+                     grub_uint8_t **out, grub_size_t *outlen)
+{
+  grub_int32_t rc;
+
+  *out = grub_malloc (pks_max_object_size);
+  if (*out == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
+
+  rc = grub_ieee1275_pks_read_sbvar (sbvarflags, sbvartype, pks_max_object_size, *out, outlen);
+  if (rc == IEEE1275_CELL_NOT_FOUND)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_COMMAND, "secure boot variable %s not found (%d)",
+                       (sbvartype == DB ? "db" : "dbx"), rc);

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 220

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +10 -0
+  else if (rc < 0)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR, "secure boot variable %s reading (%d)",
+                       (sbvartype == DB ? "db" : "dbx"), rc);
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/* Test the availability of PKS support. */
+static grub_err_t
+is_support_pks (void)

s/is_support_pks/is_pks_present/

Quoted 38 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +38 -0
+{
+  grub_int32_t rc;
+  grub_ieee1275_cell_t missing = 0;
+
+  rc = grub_ieee1275_test (PKS_MAX_OBJ_SIZE, &missing);
+  if (rc < 0 || missing == IEEE1275_CELL_INVALID)
+    return  grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FIRMWARE, "firmware doesn't have PKS support\n");
+  else
+    {
+      rc = grub_ieee1275_pks_max_object_size (&pks_max_object_size);
+      if (rc < 0)
+        return  grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_NUMBER, "PKS support is there but it has zero objects\n");
+    }
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Retrieve the secure boot variable from PKS, unpacks it, read the ESD
+ * from ESL, and store the information in the pks_sd buffer.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+read_secure_boot_variables (const grub_uint8_t sbvarflags, const grub_uint8_t sbvartype,
+                            grub_pks_sd_t **pks_sd, grub_uint32_t *pks_sd_entries)
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_uint8_t *esl_data = NULL;
+  grub_size_t esl_data_size = 0;
+
+  rc = read_sbvar_from_pks (sbvarflags, sbvartype, &esl_data, &esl_data_size);
+  if (rc == GRUB_ERR_NONE && esl_data_size != 0)
+    rc = pks_sd_from_esl ((const grub_uint8_t *) esl_data, esl_data_size,
+                          pks_sd, pks_sd_entries);
+  grub_free (esl_data);
+
+  return rc;
+}
+

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 268

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +10 -0
+/*
+ * Reads secure boot version (SB_VERSION) and it supports following.
+ * SB_VERSION:
+ * 1 - Enable dynamic key management mode. Read the db and dbx variables from PKS,
+       and use them for signature verification.
+ * 0 - Enable static key management mode. Read keys from the GRUB ELF Note and
+ *     use it for signature verification.
+ */
+static void
+get_secure_boot_version (void)

s/get_secure_boot_version/is_pks_present/

And it seems to me the get_secure_boot_version() should be merged with this function.

Quoted 6 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +6 -0
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_uint8_t *data = NULL;
+  grub_uint32_t len = 0, policy = 0;
+
+  rc = read_sbversion_from_pks (&data, &len, &policy);

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 284

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +10 -0
+  if (rc == GRUB_ERR_NONE && (len != 1 || (*data >= 2)))
+    grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_NUMBER, "found unexpected SB version (%d)\n", *data);
+
+  if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    grub_dprintf ("ieee1275", "switch to static key\n");
+  else if (*data)
+    grub_pks_use_keystore = true;
+
+  grub_free (data);
+}

Daniel

_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel

#15 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 11/20] powerpc_ieee1275: Read the db and dbx secure boot variables

Thank you Daniel for the review.

Quoted 48 lines · Daniel Kiper
Quoted 45 lines · Sudhakar Kuppusamy

Enhancing the infrastructure to enable the Platform Keystore (PKS) feature, which provides access to the SB_VERSION, db, and dbx secure boot variables from PKS.

If PKS is enabled, it will read secure boot variables such as db and dbx from PKS and extract EFI Signature List (ESL) from it. The ESLs would be saved in the Platform Keystore buffer, and the appendedsig module would read it later to extract the certificate's details from ESL.

In the following scenarios, static key management mode will be activated:
1. When Secure Boot is enabled with static key management mode
2. When SB_VERSION is unavailable but Secure Boot is enabled
3. When PKS support is unavailable but Secure Boot is enabled

Note:-

SB_VERSION: Key Management Mode
1 - Enable dynamic key management mode. Read the db and dbx variables from PKS,
and use them for signature verification.
0 - Enable static key management mode. Read keys from the GRUB ELF Note and
use it for signature verification.

---

grub-core/Makefile.am                         |   2 +
grub-core/Makefile.core.def                   |   2 +
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c            |   1 -
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c                |  14 +-
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c    | 139 +++++++
.../kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c | 341 ++++++++++++++++++
include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h              |   3 +
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h      |  20 +
.../grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h | 142 ++++++++
9 files changed, 662 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c create mode 100644 include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h

grub-core/Makefile.am +0 -0
index e50db8106..cd6bb7c32 100644
@@ -241,11 +241,13 @@ KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_builddir)/include/grub/machine/kernel.h

endif

Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 8 lines

if COND_powerpc_ieee1275
+KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/ieee1275/alloc.h KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/terminfo.h KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/extcmd.h KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/lib/arg.h +KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h

I am not entirely sure why you cannot put these two changes next to each other…

Sure, will put these two changes next to each other.

Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 12 lines

endif

if COND_sparc64_ieee1275

grub-core/Makefile.core.def +0 -0
index d91694de0..05ccbf264 100644
@@ -328,10 +328,12 @@ kernel = {
  extra_dist = video/sis315_init.c;
  mips_loongson = commands/keylayouts.c;
 
Quoted 8 lines

grub-core/Makefile.core.def kernel = { · line 336

Quoted 6 lines
grub-core/Makefile.core.def +2 -0
+  powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c;
  powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/cache.S;
  powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/dl.c;
  powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/compiler-rt.S;
  powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/lockdown.c;
+  powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c;

Ditto…

Will do.

Quoted 41 lines
Quoted 41 lines
grub-core/Makefile.core.def +0 -0
  sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/cache.S;
  sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/dl.c;
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c +0 -1
index 36ca2dbfc..afa37a9f0 100644
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@
 
 #define IEEE1275_PHANDLE_INVALID  ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)
 #define IEEE1275_IHANDLE_INVALID  ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) 0)
-#define IEEE1275_CELL_INVALID     ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)
 
 
 
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c +2 -0
index 89303f33e..46bfaa9a8 100644
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@
 #endif
 #if defined(__powerpc__)
 #include <grub/lockdown.h>
+#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h>
+#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h>
 #endif
 
 #ifdef __powerpc__
@@ -1007,6 +1009,7 @@ grub_parse_cmdline (void)

static void
grub_ieee1275_get_secure_boot (void)
{

grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c +1 -1
+  grub_err_t err;
  grub_ieee1275_phandle_t root;
  grub_uint32_t sb_mode = GRUB_SB_DISABLED;
  int rc;
@@ -1038,7 +1041,16 @@ grub_ieee1275_get_secure_boot (void)
   * Now, only support disabled and enforced.
   */
  if (sb_mode == GRUB_SB_ENFORCED)
-    grub_lockdown ();
Quoted 8 lines

grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c grub_ieee1275_get_secure_boot (void) · line 1049

Quoted 6 lines
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c +6 -0
+    {
+      grub_dprintf ("ieee1275", "Secure Boot Enabled\n");
+      grub_lockdown ();
+    }
+  else
+    grub_dprintf ("ieee1275", "Secure Boot Disabled\n");

Sorry, this change does not belong to this patch.

Sure, will do it.

Quoted 72 lines

grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c grub_ieee1275_get_secure_boot (void) · line 1053

Quoted 4 lines
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c +3 -0
+  err = grub_pks_keystore_init ();
+  if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    grub_error (err, "initialization of the Platform KeyStore failed\n");

Only this one...

Quoted 2 lines
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c +0 -0
 }
 #endif /* __powerpc__ */

[...]

Quoted 60 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +54 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aaf90500f
@@ -0,0 +1,341 @@
+/*
+ *  GRUB  --  GRand Unified Bootloader
+ *  Copyright (C) 2024  Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *  Copyright (C) 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ *  GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *  it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *  the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+ *  (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *  GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *  but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *  MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ *  GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *  You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ *  along with GRUB.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+ */
+
+#include <grub/mm.h>
+#include <grub/types.h>
+#include <grub/misc.h>
+#include <grub/lockdown.h>
+#include <grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h>
+#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h>
+#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h>
+
+#if __GNUC__ >= 9
+#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Waddress-of-packed-member"
+#endif
+
+/* PKS consumer type for firmware. */
+#define PKS_CONSUMER_FW      ((grub_uint8_t) 1)
+
+/* The maximum object size interface name for a PKS object. */
+#define PKS_MAX_OBJ_SIZE     ((grub_uint8_t *) "pks-max-object-size")
+
+/* PKS read object lable for secure boot version. */
+#define SB_VERSION_KEY_NAME  ((grub_uint8_t *) "SB_VERSION")
+#define SB_VERSION_KEY_LEN   ((grub_size_t) 10)
+
+/* PKS read secure boot variable request type for db and dbx. */
+#define DB                   ((grub_uint8_t) 1)
+#define DBX                  ((grub_uint8_t) 2)
+
+static grub_size_t pks_max_object_size;
+/*
+ * Flag to indicate the key management.
+ * True: Dynamic key management (use Platform KeySotre).
+ * False: Static key management (use built-in Keys).
+ */
+bool grub_pks_use_keystore = false;
+/*
+ * Flag to indicate the availability of PSK support.
Quoted 8 lines

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 58

Quoted 4 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +4 -0
+ * True: PKS support available.
+ * False: No PKS support.
+ */
+bool grub_pks_is_support_pks = false;

Why could not we use grub_pks_use_keystore only instead of both grub_pks_use_keystore and grub_pks_is_support_pks? If you convince me that both are needed then s/grub_pks_is_support_pks/grub_pks_supported/…

Ok. I will be strict with one variable, i.e., grub_pks_keystore,
and will add the variables use_keystore and pks_supported to the member of grub_pks_keystore.

Quoted 13 lines

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 69

Quoted 11 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +10 -0
+/* Platform KeyStore db and dbx. */
+grub_pks_t grub_pks_keystore = { .db = NULL, .dbx = NULL, .db_entries = 0, .dbx_entries = 0 };
+
+/*
+ * Import the Globally Unique Identifier (GUID), EFI Signature Database (ESD),
+ * and its size into the PKS Signature Database (SD) (i.e pks_sd buffer) and pks_sd entries
+ * from the EFI Signature List (ESL).
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+esd_from_esl (const grub_uint8_t *esl_data, grub_size_t esl_size,

s/esd_from_esl/__esl_to_esd/

Sure, will do it.

Quoted 49 lines
Quoted 49 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +48 -0
+              const grub_size_t signature_size, const grub_packed_guid_t *guid,
+              grub_pks_sd_t **pks_sd, grub_uint32_t *pks_sd_entries)
+{
+  grub_esd_t *esd;
+  grub_pks_sd_t *signature = *pks_sd;
+  grub_uint32_t entries = *pks_sd_entries;
+  grub_size_t data_size, offset = 0;
+
+  /* Reads the ESD from ESL. */
+  while (esl_size > 0)
+    {
+      esd = (grub_esd_t *) (esl_data + offset);
+      data_size = signature_size - sizeof (grub_esd_t);
+
+      signature = grub_realloc (signature, (entries + 1) * sizeof (grub_pks_sd_t));
+      if (signature == NULL)
+        return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
+
+      signature[entries].data = grub_malloc (data_size * sizeof (grub_uint8_t));
+      if (signature[entries].data == NULL)
+        {
+          /*
+           * Allocated memory will be freed by
+           * grub_free_platform_keystore.
+           */
+          *pks_sd = signature;
+          *pks_sd_entries = entries + 1;
+          return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
+        }
+
+      grub_memcpy (signature[entries].data, esd->signature_data, data_size);
+      signature[entries].data_size = data_size;
+      signature[entries].guid = *guid;
+      entries++;
+      esl_size -= signature_size;
+      offset += signature_size;
+    }
+
+  *pks_sd = signature;
+  *pks_sd_entries = entries;
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/* Extract the ESD after removing the ESL header from ESL. */
+static grub_err_t
+esl_to_esd (const grub_uint8_t *esl_data, grub_size_t *next_esl,
+            grub_pks_sd_t **pks_sd, grub_uint32_t *pks_sd_entries)
Quoted 8 lines

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 122

Quoted 5 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +5 -0
+{
+  grub_packed_guid_t guid;
+  grub_esl_t *esl;
+  grub_size_t offset, esl_size,
+              signature_size, signature_header_size;

You do not need to wrap this line. I am OK with lines (a bit) longer than 80 characters…

Sure, will do it.

Quoted 92 lines
Quoted 92 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +91 -0
+  /* Convert the ESL data into the ESL. */
+  esl = (grub_esl_t *) esl_data;
+  if (*next_esl < sizeof (grub_esl_t) || esl == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BUG, "invalid ESL");
+
+  esl_size = grub_le_to_cpu32 (esl->signature_list_size);
+  signature_header_size = grub_le_to_cpu32 (esl->signature_header_size);
+  signature_size = grub_le_to_cpu32 (esl->signature_size);
+  grub_memcpy (&guid, &esl->signature_type, sizeof (grub_packed_guid_t));
+
+  if (esl_size < sizeof (grub_esl_t) || esl_size > *next_esl)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BUG, "invalid ESL size (%u)\n", esl_size);
+
+  *next_esl = esl_size;
+  offset = sizeof (grub_esl_t) + signature_header_size;
+  esl_size = esl_size - offset;
+
+  return esd_from_esl (esl_data + offset, esl_size, signature_size, &guid,
+                       pks_sd, pks_sd_entries);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Import the EFI Signature Database (ESD) and the number of ESD from the ESL
+ * into the pks_sd buffer and pks_sd entries.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+pks_sd_from_esl (const grub_uint8_t *esl_data, grub_size_t esl_size,
+                 grub_pks_sd_t **pks_sd, grub_uint32_t *pks_sd_entries)
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_size_t next_esl = esl_size;
+
+  do
+    {
+      rc = esl_to_esd (esl_data, &next_esl, pks_sd, pks_sd_entries);
+      if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+        break;
+
+      esl_data += next_esl;
+      esl_size -= next_esl;
+      next_esl = esl_size;
+    }
+  while (esl_size > 0);
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read the secure boot version from PKS as an object.
+ * Caller must free result.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+read_sbversion_from_pks (grub_uint8_t **out, grub_uint32_t *outlen, grub_uint32_t *policy)
+{
+  grub_int32_t rc;
+
+  *out = grub_malloc (pks_max_object_size);
+  if (*out == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
+
+  rc = grub_ieee1275_pks_read_object (PKS_CONSUMER_FW, SB_VERSION_KEY_NAME,
+                                      SB_VERSION_KEY_LEN, pks_max_object_size, *out,
+                                      outlen, policy);
+  if (rc < 0)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR, "SB version read failed (%d)\n", rc);
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reads the secure boot variable from PKS.
+ * Caller must free result.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+read_sbvar_from_pks (const grub_uint8_t sbvarflags, const grub_uint8_t sbvartype,
+                     grub_uint8_t **out, grub_size_t *outlen)
+{
+  grub_int32_t rc;
+
+  *out = grub_malloc (pks_max_object_size);
+  if (*out == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
+
+  rc = grub_ieee1275_pks_read_sbvar (sbvarflags, sbvartype, pks_max_object_size, *out, outlen);
+  if (rc == IEEE1275_CELL_NOT_FOUND)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_COMMAND, "secure boot variable %s not found (%d)",
+                       (sbvartype == DB ? "db" : "dbx"), rc);
+  else if (rc < 0)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR, "secure boot variable %s reading (%d)",
+                       (sbvartype == DB ? "db" : "dbx"), rc);
+
Quoted 8 lines

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 220

Quoted 6 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +6 -0
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/* Test the availability of PKS support. */
+static grub_err_t
+is_support_pks (void)

s/is_support_pks/is_pks_present/

Sure, will do it.

Quoted 52 lines
Quoted 39 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +38 -0
+{
+  grub_int32_t rc;
+  grub_ieee1275_cell_t missing = 0;
+
+  rc = grub_ieee1275_test (PKS_MAX_OBJ_SIZE, &missing);
+  if (rc < 0 || missing == IEEE1275_CELL_INVALID)
+    return  grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FIRMWARE, "firmware doesn't have PKS support\n");
+  else
+    {
+      rc = grub_ieee1275_pks_max_object_size (&pks_max_object_size);
+      if (rc < 0)
+        return  grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_NUMBER, "PKS support is there but it has zero objects\n");
+    }
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Retrieve the secure boot variable from PKS, unpacks it, read the ESD
+ * from ESL, and store the information in the pks_sd buffer.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+read_secure_boot_variables (const grub_uint8_t sbvarflags, const grub_uint8_t sbvartype,
+                            grub_pks_sd_t **pks_sd, grub_uint32_t *pks_sd_entries)
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_uint8_t *esl_data = NULL;
+  grub_size_t esl_data_size = 0;
+
+  rc = read_sbvar_from_pks (sbvarflags, sbvartype, &esl_data, &esl_data_size);
+  if (rc == GRUB_ERR_NONE && esl_data_size != 0)
+    rc = pks_sd_from_esl ((const grub_uint8_t *) esl_data, esl_data_size,
+                          pks_sd, pks_sd_entries);
+  grub_free (esl_data);
+
+  return rc;
+}
+

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 268

Quoted 10 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +10 -0
+/*
+ * Reads secure boot version (SB_VERSION) and it supports following.
+ * SB_VERSION:
+ * 1 - Enable dynamic key management mode. Read the db and dbx variables from PKS,
+       and use them for signature verification.
+ * 0 - Enable static key management mode. Read keys from the GRUB ELF Note and
+ *     use it for signature verification.
+ */
+static void
+get_secure_boot_version (void)

s/get_secure_boot_version/is_pks_present/

Quoted 2 lines

And it seems to me the get_secure_boot_version() should be merged with this function.

Sure, will do it.

Thanks,
Sudhakar

Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +10 -0
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_uint8_t *data = NULL;
+  grub_uint32_t len = 0, policy = 0;
+
+  rc = read_sbversion_from_pks (&data, &len, &policy);
+  if (rc == GRUB_ERR_NONE && (len != 1 || (*data >= 2)))
+    grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_NUMBER, "found unexpected SB version (%d)\n", *data);
+
+  if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
Quoted 8 lines

grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c line 284

Quoted 6 lines
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +6 -0
+    grub_dprintf ("ieee1275", "switch to static key\n");
+  else if (*data)
+    grub_pks_use_keystore = true;
+
+  grub_free (data);
+}

Daniel

_______________________________________________
Grub-devel mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel

#16 lore raw

PATCH v8 12/20 appended signatures: Create db and dbx lists

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

If secure boot is enabled with static key management mode, the trusted certificates will be extracted from the GRUB ELF Note and added to db list. This is introduced by a subsequent patch.

If secure boot is enabled with dynamic key management mode, the trusted certificates and certificate/binary hash will be extracted from the PKS and added to db list. The distrusted certificates, certificate/binary hash are read from the PKS and added to dbx list. Both dbx and db lists are introduced by a subsequent patch.

Note:-

If the certificate or the certificate hash exists in the dbx list, then do not add that certificate/certificate hash to the db list.

---
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 497 ++++++++++++++++++-
 include/grub/crypto.h                        |   1 +
 include/grub/efi/pks.h                       | 112 +++++
 include/grub/types.h                         |   4 +
 4 files changed, 608 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/grub/efi/pks.h
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +491 -6
index 2ddbb3a15..ea65c3988 100644
@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@
 #include <libtasn1.h>
 #include <grub/env.h>
 #include <grub/lockdown.h>
-
+#include <grub/efi/pks.h>
+#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h>
 #include "appendedsig.h"
 
 GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
@@ -72,10 +73,21 @@ struct grub_database
 {
   struct x509_certificate *certs; /* Certificates. */
   grub_uint32_t cert_entries;     /* Number of certificates. */
+  grub_uint8_t **signatures;      /* Certificate/binary hashes. */
+  grub_size_t *signature_size;    /* Size of certificate/binary hashes. */
+  grub_uint32_t signature_entries;/* Number of certificate/binary hashes. */
 };
 
 /* The db list is used to validate appended signatures. */
-struct grub_database db = {.certs = NULL, .cert_entries = 0};
+struct grub_database db = {.certs = NULL, .cert_entries = 0, .signatures = NULL,
+                           .signature_size = NULL, .signature_entries = 0};
+
+/*
+ * The dbx list is used to ensure that the distrusted certificates/kernel binaries are
+ * rejected during appended signatures/hashes validation.
+ */
+struct grub_database dbx = {.certs = NULL, .cert_entries = 0, .signatures = NULL,
+                            .signature_size = NULL, .signature_entries = 0};
 
 /* Appended signature size. */
 static grub_size_t append_sig_len = 0;
@@ -98,6 +110,8 @@ static void
 free_db_list (void);
 static void
 build_static_db_list (void);
+static void
+build_pks_keystore (void);
 
 static const char *
 grub_env_read_sec (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)),
@@ -140,6 +154,145 @@ grub_env_write_sec (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)), const cha
   return ret;
 }
 
+static const char *
+grub_env_read_key_mgmt (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)),
+                        const char *val __attribute__ ((unused)))
+{
+  if (grub_pks_use_keystore == true)
+    return "dynamic";
+
+  return "static";
+}
+
+static char *
+grub_env_write_key_mgmt (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)), const char *val)
+{
+  char *ret;
+
+  /*
+   * Do not allow the value to be changed if check_sigs is set to enforce and
+   * GRUB is locked down.
+   */
+  if (check_sigs == true && grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED)
+    {
+      ret = grub_strdup (grub_env_read_key_mgmt (NULL, NULL));
+      if (ret == NULL)
+        grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
+
+      return ret;
+    }
+
+  if ((*val == '1') || (*val == 'd'))
+    {
+      /*
+       * If dynamic key management is disabled and PKS support is available,
+       * load the PKS.
+       */
+      if (grub_pks_is_support_pks == true && grub_pks_use_keystore == false)
+        build_pks_keystore ();
+
+      grub_pks_use_keystore = true;
+    }
+  else if ((*val == '0') || (*val == 's'))
+    grub_pks_use_keystore = false;
+
+  ret = grub_strdup (grub_env_read_key_mgmt (NULL, NULL));
+  if (ret == NULL)
+    grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
+
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * GUID can be used to determine the hashing function and
+ * generate the hash using determined hashing function.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+get_hash (const grub_packed_guid_t *guid, const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size,
+          grub_uint8_t *hash, grub_size_t *hash_size)
+{
+  gcry_md_spec_t *hash_func = NULL;
+
+  if (guid == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "GUID is not available");
+
+  if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA256_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
+      grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0)
+    hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha256;
+  else if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA384_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
+           grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0)
+    hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha384;
+  else if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA512_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
+           grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0)
+    hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha512;
+  else
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "unsupported GUID hash");
+
+  grub_memset (hash, 0, GRUB_MAX_HASH_SIZE);
+  grub_crypto_hash (hash_func, hash, data, data_size);
+  *hash_size =  hash_func->mdlen;
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/* Add the certificate/binary hash into the db/dbx list. */
+static grub_err_t
+add_hash (grub_uint8_t *const data, const grub_size_t data_size,
+          grub_uint8_t ***signature_list, grub_size_t **signature_size_list,
+          grub_uint32_t *signature_list_entries)
+{
+  grub_uint8_t **signatures;
+  grub_size_t *signature_size;
+  grub_uint32_t signature_entries = *signature_list_entries;
+
+  if (data == NULL || data_size == 0)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "certificate/binary-hash data or size is not available");
+
+  signatures = grub_realloc (*signature_list, sizeof (grub_uint8_t *) * (signature_entries + 1));
+  if (signatures == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
+
+  signature_size = grub_realloc (*signature_size_list,
+                                 sizeof (grub_size_t) * (signature_entries + 1));
+  if (signature_size == NULL)
+    {
+      /*
+       * Allocated memory will be freed by
+       * free_db_list/free_dbx_list.
+       */
+      signatures[signature_entries + 1] = NULL;
+      *signature_list = signatures;
+      *signature_list_entries = signature_entries + 1;
+
+      return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
+    }
+
+  signatures[signature_entries] = grub_malloc (data_size);
+  if (signatures[signature_entries] != NULL)
+    grub_memcpy (signatures[signature_entries], data, data_size);
+
+  signature_size[signature_entries] = data_size;
+  signature_entries++;
+
+  if (signatures[signature_entries] == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
+
+  *signature_list = signatures;
+  *signature_size_list = signature_size;
+  *signature_list_entries = signature_entries;
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static bool
+is_x509 (const grub_packed_guid_t *guid)
+{
+  if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0)
+    return true;
+
+  return false;
+}
+
 static bool
 is_cert_match (const struct x509_certificate *distrusted_cert,
                const struct x509_certificate *db_cert)
@@ -154,6 +307,95 @@ is_cert_match (const struct x509_certificate *distrusted_cert,
   return false;
 }
 
+/* Check the certificate presence in the Platform Keystore dbx list. */
+static grub_err_t
+is_dbx_cert (const struct x509_certificate *db_cert)
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_uint32_t i;
+  struct x509_certificate *distrusted_cert;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < grub_pks_keystore.dbx_entries; i++)
+    {
+      if (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data == NULL)
+        continue;
+
+      if (is_x509 (&grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].guid) == true)
+        {
+          distrusted_cert = grub_zalloc (sizeof (struct x509_certificate));
+          if (distrusted_cert == NULL)
+            return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
+
+          rc = parse_x509_certificate (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data,
+                                       grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data_size, distrusted_cert);
+          if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+            {
+              grub_free (distrusted_cert);
+              continue;
+            }
+
+          if (is_cert_match (distrusted_cert, db_cert) == true)
+            {
+              grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "a certificate CN='%s' is ignored "
+                            "because it is on the dbx list\n", db_cert->subject);
+              return GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED;
+            }
+
+          certificate_release (distrusted_cert);
+          grub_free (distrusted_cert);
+        }
+    }
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/* Add the certificate into the db/dbx list */
+static grub_err_t
+add_certificate (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size,
+                 struct grub_database *database, const bool is_db)
+{
+  struct x509_certificate *cert;
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_uint32_t cert_entries = database->cert_entries;
+
+  if (data == NULL || data_size == 0)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "certificate data or size is not available");
+
+  cert = grub_zalloc (sizeof (struct x509_certificate));
+  if (cert == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, "out of memory");
+
+  rc = parse_x509_certificate (data, data_size, cert);
+  if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    {
+      grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "cannot add a certificate CN='%s' to %s\n",
+                    cert->subject, ((is_db == true) ? "db" : "dbx"));
+      grub_free (cert);
+      return rc;
+    }
+
+  if (is_db == true)
+    {
+      rc = is_dbx_cert (cert);
+      if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+        {
+          certificate_release (cert);
+          grub_free (cert);
+          return rc;
+        }
+    }
+
+  grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "add a certificate CN='%s' to %s", cert->subject,
+                ((is_db == true) ? "db" : "dbx"));
+
+  cert_entries++;
+  cert->next = database->certs;
+  database->certs = cert;
+  database->cert_entries = cert_entries;
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
 static grub_err_t
 file_read_whole (grub_file_t file, grub_uint8_t **buf, grub_size_t *len)
 {
@@ -653,11 +895,169 @@ static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = {
 
 static grub_command_t cmd_verify, cmd_list_db, cmd_dbx_cert, cmd_db_cert;
 
+/* Check the certificate hash presence in the PKS dbx list. */
+static bool
+is_dbx_cert_hash (grub_uint8_t *const data, const grub_size_t data_size)
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_uint32_t i;
+  grub_size_t cert_hash_size = 0;
+  grub_uint8_t cert_hash[GRUB_MAX_HASH_SIZE] = { 0 };
+
+  for (i = 0; i < grub_pks_keystore.dbx_entries; i++)
+    {
+      if (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data == NULL ||
+          grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data_size == 0)
+        continue;
+
+      rc = get_hash (&grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].guid, data, data_size,
+                     cert_hash, &cert_hash_size);
+      if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+        continue;
+
+      if (cert_hash_size == grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data_size &&
+          grub_memcmp (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data, cert_hash, cert_hash_size) == 0)
+        {
+          grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "a certificate (%02x%02x%02x%02x) is ignored "
+                        "because this certificate hash is on the dbx list\n",
+                        cert_hash[0], cert_hash[1], cert_hash[2], cert_hash[3]);
+          return true;
+        }
+    }
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+/* Check the binary hash presence in the PKS dbx list. */
+static bool
+is_dbx_binary_hash (grub_uint8_t *const binary_hash, const grub_size_t binary_hash_size)
+{
+  grub_uint32_t i;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < grub_pks_keystore.dbx_entries; i++)
+    {
+      if (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data == NULL ||
+          grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data_size == 0)
+        continue;
+
+      if (binary_hash_size == grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data_size &&
+          grub_memcmp (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data, binary_hash, binary_hash_size) == 0)
+        {
+          grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "a binary hash (%02x%02x%02x%02x) is ignored"
+                        " because it is on the dbx list\n", binary_hash[0], binary_hash[1],
+                        binary_hash[2], binary_hash[3]);
+          return true;
+        }
+    }
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+/* Add the binary hash to the db list if it does not exist in the PKS dbx list. */
+static grub_err_t
+add_db_binary_hash (grub_uint8_t *const data, const grub_size_t data_size)
+{
+  if (data == NULL || data_size == 0)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "binary hash data or size is not available");
+
+  if (is_dbx_binary_hash (data, data_size) == false)
+    return add_hash (data, data_size, &db.signatures, &db.signature_size,
+                     &db.signature_entries);
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+}
+
+static bool
+is_hash (const grub_packed_guid_t *guid)
+{
+  /* GUID type of the binary hash. */
+  if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA256_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
+      grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA384_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
+      grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA512_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0)
+    return true;
+
+  /* GUID type of the certificate hash. */
+  if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
+      grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0 ||
+      grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE) == 0)
+    return true;
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+/* Add the X.509 certificates/binary hash to the db list from PKS. */
+static grub_err_t
+create_db_list (void)
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_uint32_t i;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < grub_pks_keystore.db_entries; i++)
+    {
+      if (is_hash (&grub_pks_keystore.db[i].guid) == true)
+        {
+          rc = add_db_binary_hash (grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data,
+                                   grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data_size);
+          if (rc == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY)
+            return rc;
+        }
+      else if (is_x509 (&grub_pks_keystore.db[i].guid) == true)
+        {
+          if (is_dbx_cert_hash (grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data,
+                                grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data_size) == true)
+            continue;
+
+          rc = add_certificate (grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data,
+                                grub_pks_keystore.db[i].data_size, &db, true);
+          if (rc == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY)
+            return rc;
+        }
+      else
+        grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "unsupported signature data type and "
+                      "skipped (%u)\n", i + 1);
+    }
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+/* Add the certificates and certificate/binary hash to the dbx list from PKS. */
+static grub_err_t
+create_dbx_list (void)
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_uint32_t i;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < grub_pks_keystore.dbx_entries; i++)
+    {
+      if (is_x509 (&grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].guid) == true)
+        {
+          rc = add_certificate (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data,
+                                grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data_size, &dbx, false);
+          if (rc == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY)
+            return rc;
+        }
+      else if (is_hash (&grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].guid) == true)
+        {
+          rc = add_hash (grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data,
+                         grub_pks_keystore.dbx[i].data_size, &dbx.signatures,
+                         &dbx.signature_size, &dbx.signature_entries);
+          if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+            return rc;
+        }
+      else
+        grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "unsupported signature data type and "
+                      "skipped (%u)\n", i + 1);
+    }
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
 /* Free db list memory */
 static void
 free_db_list (void)
 {
   struct x509_certificate *cert;
+  grub_uint32_t i;
 
   while (db.certs != NULL)
     {
@@ -667,9 +1067,37 @@ free_db_list (void)
       grub_free (cert);
     }
 
+  for (i = 0; i < db.signature_entries; i++)
+    grub_free (db.signatures[i]);
+
+  grub_free (db.signatures);
+  grub_free (db.signature_size);
   grub_memset (&db, 0, sizeof (struct grub_database));
 }
 
+/* Free dbx list memory */
+static void
+free_dbx_list (void)
+{
+  struct x509_certificate *cert;
+  grub_uint32_t i;
+
+  while (dbx.certs != NULL)
+    {
+      cert = dbx.certs;
+      dbx.certs = dbx.certs->next;
+      certificate_release (cert);
+      grub_free (cert);
+    }
+
+  for (i = 0; i < dbx.signature_entries; i++)
+    grub_free (dbx.signatures[i]);
+
+  grub_free (dbx.signatures);
+  grub_free (dbx.signature_size);
+  grub_memset (&dbx, 0, sizeof (struct grub_database));
+}
+
 /*
  * Extract the X.509 certificates from the ELF Note header,
  * parse it, and add it to the db list.
@@ -715,6 +1143,30 @@ build_static_db_list (void)
     }
 }
 
+/*
+ * Extract trusted and distrusted keys from PKS and store them in
+ * the db and dbx list.
+ */
+static void
+build_pks_keystore (void)
+{
+  grub_err_t err;
+
+  err = create_db_list ();
+  if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    grub_printf ("warning: db list might not be fully populated\n");
+
+  err = create_dbx_list ();
+  if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    grub_printf ("warning: dbx list might not be fully populated\n");
+
+  grub_pks_free_keystore ();
+  grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "the db list now has %u keys\n"
+                "the dbx list now has %u keys\n",
+                db.signature_entries + db.cert_entries,
+                dbx.signature_entries + dbx.cert_entries);
+}
+
 /* It registers the appended signatures GRUB commands. */
 static void
 register_appended_signatures_cmd (void)
@@ -763,15 +1215,45 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (appendedsig)
    */
   grub_register_variable_hook ("check_appended_signatures", grub_env_read_sec, grub_env_write_sec);
   grub_env_export ("check_appended_signatures");
+  /*
+   * This is appended signature key management environment variable.
+   * It is automatically set to "static" or "dynamic" based on the
+   * ’ibm,secure-boot’ device tree property and Platform KeyStore
+   * (grub_pks_use_keystore).
+   *
+   * "static": Enforce static key management signature verification.
+   *           This is the default. When the GRUB is locked down,
+   *           user cannot change the value by setting the
+   *           appendedsig_key_mgmt variable back to "dynamic".
+   *
+   * "dynamic": Enforce dynamic key management signature verification.
+   *            When the GRUB is locked down, user cannot change the value
+   *            by setting the appendedsig_key_mgmt variable back to "static".
+   */
+  grub_register_variable_hook ("appendedsig_key_mgmt", grub_env_read_key_mgmt,
+                               grub_env_write_key_mgmt);
+  grub_env_export ("appendedsig_key_mgmt");
 
   rc = asn1_init ();
   if (rc != ASN1_SUCCESS)
     grub_fatal ("error initing ASN.1 data structures: %d: %s\n", rc, asn1_strerror (rc));
 
-  /* Extract trusted keys from ELF Note and store them in the db. */
-  build_static_db_list ();
-  grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "the db list now has %u static keys\n",
-                db.cert_entries);
+  /*
+   * If signature verification is enabled with the static key management,
+   * extract trusted keys from ELF Note and store them in the db list.
+   */
+  if (grub_pks_use_keystore == false)
+    {
+      build_static_db_list ();
+      grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "the db list now has %u static keys\n",
+                    db.cert_entries);
+    }
+  /*
+   * If signature verification is enabled with the dynamic key management,
+   * load the Platform KeyStore(PKS).
+   */
+  else if (grub_pks_use_keystore == true)
+    build_pks_keystore ();
 
   register_appended_signatures_cmd ();
   grub_verifier_register (&grub_appendedsig_verifier);
@@ -786,8 +1268,11 @@ GRUB_MOD_FINI (appendedsig)
    */
 
   free_db_list ();
+  free_dbx_list ();
   grub_register_variable_hook ("check_appended_signatures", NULL, NULL);
   grub_env_unset ("check_appended_signatures");
+  grub_register_variable_hook ("appendedsig_key_mgmt", NULL, NULL);
+  grub_env_unset ("appendedsig_key_mgmt");
   grub_verifier_unregister (&grub_appendedsig_verifier);
   unregister_appended_signatures_cmd ();
 }
include/grub/crypto.h +1 -0
index b0d7add1d..00d074df8 100644
@@ -510,6 +510,7 @@ grub_crypto_hmac_buffer (const struct gcry_md_spec *md,
 extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_md5;
 extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_sha1;
 extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_sha256;
+extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_sha384;
 extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_sha512;
 extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_crc32;
 extern gcry_cipher_spec_t _gcry_cipher_spec_aes;
include/grub/efi/pks.h new file +112 -0

112 lines not on this page · raw message

include/grub/types.h +4 -0
index 45079bf65..b3ba762fc 100644
@@ -379,6 +379,8 @@ struct grub_guid
 } __attribute__ ((aligned(4)));
 typedef struct grub_guid grub_guid_t;
 
+#define GRUB_GUID_SIZE    (sizeof (grub_guid_t))
+
 struct grub_packed_guid
 {
   grub_uint32_t data1;
@@ -388,4 +390,6 @@ struct grub_packed_guid
 } GRUB_PACKED;
 typedef struct grub_packed_guid grub_packed_guid_t;
 
+#define GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE    (sizeof (grub_packed_guid_t))
+
 #endif /* ! GRUB_TYPES_HEADER */
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#17 lore raw

PATCH v8 13/20 appended signatures: Using db and dbx lists for signature verification

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

Signature verification: verify the kernel against lists of hashes that are either in dbx or db list. If it is not in the dbx list then the trusted keys from the db list are used to verify the signature.

---
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 94 +++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 93 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +93 -1
index ea65c3988..b6cd9af32 100644
@@ -518,6 +518,83 @@ verify_signature (const gcry_mpi_t *pkmpi, const gcry_mpi_t hmpi,
   return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
 }
 
+static grub_err_t
+get_binary_hash (const grub_size_t binary_hash_size, const grub_uint8_t *data,
+                 const grub_size_t data_size, grub_uint8_t *hash, grub_size_t *hash_size)
+{
+  grub_packed_guid_t guid = { 0 };
+
+  /* support SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 for binary hash */
+  if (binary_hash_size == 32)
+    grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA256_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE);
+  else if (binary_hash_size == 48)
+    grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA384_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE);
+  else if (binary_hash_size == 64)
+    grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA512_GUID, GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE);
+  else
+    {
+      grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "unsupported hash type (%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE ") and "
+                    "skipped\n", binary_hash_size);
+      return GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_COMMAND;
+    }
+
+  return get_hash (&guid, data, data_size, hash, hash_size);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify binary hash against the db and dbx list.
+ * The following errors can occur:
+ *  - GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE: indicates that the hash is in dbx list.
+ *  - GRUB_ERR_EOF: the hash could not be found in the db and dbx list.
+ *  - GRUB_ERR_NONE: the hash is found in db list.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+verify_binary_hash (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size)
+{
+  grub_err_t rc = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+  grub_uint32_t i;
+  grub_size_t hash_size = 0;
+  grub_uint8_t hash[GRUB_MAX_HASH_SIZE] = { 0 };
+
+  for (i = 0; i < dbx.signature_entries; i++)
+    {
+      if (dbx.signatures[i] == NULL)
+        continue;
+
+      rc = get_binary_hash (dbx.signature_size[i], data, data_size, hash, &hash_size);
+      if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+        continue;
+
+      if (hash_size == dbx.signature_size[i] &&
+          grub_memcmp (dbx.signatures[i], hash, hash_size) == 0)
+        {
+          grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "the hash (%02x%02x%02x%02x) is present in the dbx list\n",
+                        hash[0], hash[1], hash[2], hash[3]);
+          return GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE;
+        }
+    }
+
+  for (i = 0; i < db.signature_entries; i++)
+    {
+      if (db.signatures[i] == NULL)
+        continue;
+
+      rc = get_binary_hash (db.signature_size[i], data, data_size, hash, &hash_size);
+      if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+        continue;
+
+      if (hash_size == db.signature_size[i] &&
+          grub_memcmp (db.signatures[i], hash, hash_size) == 0)
+        {
+          grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "verified with a trusted hash (%02x%02x%02x%02x)\n",
+                        hash[0], hash[1], hash[2], hash[3]);
+          return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+        }
+    }
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_EOF;
+}
+
 static grub_err_t
 grub_verify_appended_signature (const grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t bufsize)
 {
@@ -530,7 +607,7 @@ grub_verify_appended_signature (const grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t bufsize)
   struct pkcs7_signerInfo *si;
   grub_uint32_t i;
 
-  if (!db.cert_entries)
+  if (!db.cert_entries && !db.signature_entries)
     return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "no trusted keys to verify against");
 
   err = extract_appended_signature (buf, bufsize, &sig);
@@ -540,6 +617,21 @@ grub_verify_appended_signature (const grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t bufsize)
   append_sig_len = sig.signature_len;
   datasize = bufsize - sig.signature_len;
 
+  /*
+   * If signature verification is enabled with dynamic key management mode,
+   * Verify binary hash against the db and dbx list.
+   */
+  if (grub_pks_use_keystore == true)
+    {
+      err = verify_binary_hash (buf, datasize);
+      if (err == GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE)
+        {
+          pkcs7_signedData_release (&sig.pkcs7);
+          return grub_error (err,
+                             "failed to verify the binary hash against a trusted binary hash");
+        }
+    }
+
   /* Verify signature using trusted keys from db list. */
   for (i = 0; i < sig.pkcs7.signerInfo_count; i++)
     {
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#18 lore raw

PATCH v8 14/20 powerpc_ieee1275: Introduce use_static_keys flag

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

Introduce the use_static_keys flag to indicate that static keys are to be used rather than keys from the PKS storage's db variable. This flag is set when Secure Boot is enabled with PKS but the db variable is not present in the PKS storage. The appendedsig module would use this flag to extract the static keys from the GRUB ELF Note and stored in the db list.

---
 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
 include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h   |  1 +
 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c +12 -1
index aaf90500f..2c556a563 100644
@@ -58,7 +58,8 @@ bool grub_pks_use_keystore = false;
 bool grub_pks_is_support_pks = false;
 
 /* Platform KeyStore db and dbx. */
-grub_pks_t grub_pks_keystore = { .db = NULL, .dbx = NULL, .db_entries = 0, .dbx_entries = 0 };
+grub_pks_t grub_pks_keystore = { .db = NULL, .dbx = NULL, .db_entries = 0, .dbx_entries = 0,
+                                 .use_static_keys = false };
 
 /*
  * Import the Globally Unique Identifier (GUID), EFI Signature Database (ESD),
@@ -325,6 +326,16 @@ grub_pks_keystore_init (void)
       grub_memset (&grub_pks_keystore, 0, sizeof (grub_pks_t));
       /* Read db from PKS. */
       rc = read_secure_boot_variables (0, DB, &grub_pks_keystore.db, &grub_pks_keystore.db_entries);
+      if (rc == GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_COMMAND)
+        {
+          rc = GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+          /*
+           * The db variable won't be available by default in PKS.
+           * So, it will use the static key as a default key from the GRUB ELF Note.
+           */
+          grub_pks_keystore.use_static_keys = true;
+        }
+
       if (rc == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
         {
           /* Read dbx from PKS. */
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h +1 -0
index 4b34a3198..666f39684 100644
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ struct grub_pks
   grub_pks_sd_t *dbx;       /* Forbidden signature database. */
   grub_uint32_t db_entries; /* Size of signature database. */
   grub_uint32_t dbx_entries;/* Size of forbidden signature database. */
+  bool use_static_keys;     /* Flag to indicate use of static keys. */
 } GRUB_PACKED;
 typedef struct grub_pks grub_pks_t;
 
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#19 lore raw

PATCH v8 15/20 appended signatures: Read default db keys from the ELF Note

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

If Secure Boot is enabled with dynamic key management mode and the use_static_keys flag is set, then read the static keys as a db default keys from the ELF Note and add them into the db.

---
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 42 ++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +30 -12
index b6cd9af32..146017867 100644
@@ -1200,7 +1200,8 @@ build_static_db_list (void)
   grub_err_t err;
   struct grub_module_header *header;
   struct grub_file pseudo_file;
-  struct x509_certificate *cert;
+  grub_uint8_t *cert_data = NULL;
+  grub_size_t cert_data_size = 0;
 
   FOR_MODULES (header)
     {
@@ -1216,22 +1217,25 @@ build_static_db_list (void)
       grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "found an X.509 certificate, size=%" PRIuGRUB_UINT64_T "\n",
                     pseudo_file.size);
 
-      err = read_cert_from_file (&pseudo_file, &cert);
+      err = file_read_whole (&pseudo_file, &cert_data, &cert_data_size);
       if (err == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY)
-        return;
+        break;
       else if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+        continue;
+
+      if (grub_pks_use_keystore == true)
         {
-          grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
-                        "warning: cannot add a certificate %u to the db list\n",
-                        db.cert_entries + 1);
-          continue;
+          if (is_dbx_cert_hash (cert_data, cert_data_size) == true)
+            {
+              grub_free (cert_data);
+              continue;
+            }
         }
 
-      grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "add a certificate CN='%s' to db\n", cert->subject);
-
-      cert->next = db.certs;
-      db.certs = cert;
-      db.cert_entries++;
+      err = add_certificate (cert_data, cert_data_size, &db, true);
+      grub_free (cert_data);
+      if (err == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY)
+        break;
     }
 }
 
@@ -1248,6 +1252,20 @@ build_pks_keystore (void)
   if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
     grub_printf ("warning: db list might not be fully populated\n");
 
+  if (grub_pks_keystore.use_static_keys == true)
+    {
+      grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "db variable is not available at PKS and "
+                    "using a static keys as a default key in db list\n");
+    }
+
+  build_static_db_list ();
+  if (grub_pks_keystore.use_static_keys == false)
+    {
+      err = create_db_list ();
+      if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+        grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "warning: db list might not be fully populated\n");
+    }
+
   err = create_dbx_list ();
   if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
     grub_printf ("warning: dbx list might not be fully populated\n");
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#20 lore raw

PATCH v8 16/20 appended signatures: Introduce GRUB commands to access db and dbx

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

Introducing the following db and dbx commands

1. append_list_db:
Show the list of trusted certificates and binary hashes from the db list.
2. append_list_dbx:
Show the list of distrusted certificates and binary/certificate hashes from the dbx list.
3. append_add_db_cert:
Add the trusted certificate to the db list.
4. append_add_db_hash:
Add the trusted binary hash to the db list.
5. append_add_dbx_cert:
Add the distrusted certificate to the dbx list.
6. append_add_dbx_hash:
Add the distrusted certificate/binary hash to the dbx list.

Note that if signature verification (check_appended_signature) is set to enforce,
1. When append_add_db_cert or append_add_dbx_cert executes,
then the certificate file must be signed with an appended signature.
2. When append_add_db_hash executes, then the binary hash file
must be signed with an appended signature.
3. When append_add_dbx_hash executes, then the certificate/binary hash file must be signed with an appended signature.

---
 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 427 ++++++++++++++++++-
 include/grub/file.h                          |   2 +
 2 files changed, 419 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +417 -10
index 146017867..bc2cec977 100644
@@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
 /* Public key type. */
 #define GRUB_PKEY_ID_PKCS7 2
 
+#define OPTION_BINARY_HASH 0
+#define OPTION_CERT_HASH   1
+
 /* Appended signature magic string. */
 static const char magic[] = "~Module signature appended~\n";
 
@@ -102,6 +105,13 @@ static grub_size_t append_sig_len = 0;
  */
 static bool check_sigs = false;
 
+static const struct grub_arg_option options[] =
+{
+  {"binary-hash", 'b', 0, N_("hash file of the binary."), 0, ARG_TYPE_PATHNAME},
+  {"cert-hash", 'c', 1, N_("hash file of the certificate."), 0, ARG_TYPE_PATHNAME},
+  {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}
+};
+
 static void
 register_appended_signatures_cmd (void);
 static void
@@ -191,10 +201,16 @@ grub_env_write_key_mgmt (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)), cons
       if (grub_pks_is_support_pks == true && grub_pks_use_keystore == false)
         build_pks_keystore ();
 
+      unregister_appended_signatures_cmd ();
       grub_pks_use_keystore = true;
+      register_appended_signatures_cmd ();
     }
   else if ((*val == '0') || (*val == 's'))
-    grub_pks_use_keystore = false;
+    {
+      unregister_appended_signatures_cmd ();
+      grub_pks_use_keystore = false;
+      register_appended_signatures_cmd ();
+    }
 
   ret = grub_strdup (grub_env_read_key_mgmt (NULL, NULL));
   if (ret == NULL)
@@ -751,6 +767,52 @@ remove_cert_from_db (const struct x509_certificate *cert)
     }
 }
 
+/*
+ * We cannot use hexdump() to display hash data because it is typically
+ * displayed in hexadecimal format, along with an ASCII representation of
+ * the same data.
+ * Example: sha256 hash data
+ * 00000000  52 b5 90 49 64 de 22 d7  4e 5f 4f b4 1b 51 9c 34  |R..Id.".N_O..Q.4|
+ * 00000010  b1 96 21 7c 91 78 a5 0d  20 8c e9 5c 22 54 53 f7  |..!|.x.. ..\"TS.|
+ *
+ * An appended signature only required to display the hexadecimal of the hash data
+ * by separating each byte with ":". So, we introduced a new method dump_data_to_hex
+ * to display it.
+ * Example: Sha256 hash data
+ *  52:b5:90:49:64:de:22:d7:4e:5f:4f:b4:1b:51:9c:34:
+ *  b1:96:21:7c:91:78:a5:0d:20:8c:e9:5c:22:54:53:f7
+ */
+static void
+dump_data_to_hex (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t length)
+{
+  grub_size_t i, count = 0;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < length - 1; i++)
+    {
+      grub_printf ("%02x:", data[i]);
+      count++;
+      if (count == 16)
+        {
+          grub_printf ("\n\t      ");
+          count = 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+  grub_printf ("%02x\n", data[i]);
+}
+
+static bool
+is_cert_present_in_dbx (const struct x509_certificate *cert_in)
+{
+  struct x509_certificate *cert;
+
+  for (cert = dbx.certs; cert; cert = cert->next)
+    if (is_cert_match (cert, cert_in) == true)
+      return true;
+
+  return false;
+}
+
 static grub_err_t
 grub_cmd_verify_signature (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **args)
 {
@@ -783,7 +845,8 @@ grub_cmd_verify_signature (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc
 }
 
 /*
- * Add the trusted certificate to the db list if it is not already present.
+ * Checks the trusted certificate against dbx list if dynamic key management is enabled.
+ * And add it to the db list if it is not already present.
  * Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts the
  * trusted certificate that is signed with an appended signature.
  * The signature is verified by the appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
@@ -823,6 +886,14 @@ grub_cmd_db_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **
       return err;
     }
 
+  /* Only checks the certificate against dbx if dynamic key management is enabled. */
+  if (grub_pks_use_keystore == true)
+    {
+      if (is_cert_present_in_dbx (cert) == true)
+        return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED,
+                           "could not add trusted certificate, as it is present in the dbx list");
+    }
+
   if (is_cert_present_in_db (cert) == true)
     {
       certificate_release (cert);
@@ -842,6 +913,8 @@ grub_cmd_db_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **
 
 /*
  * Remove the distrusted certificate from the db list if it is already present.
+ * And add it to the dbx list if not present when dynamic key management is
+ * enabled.
  * Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts the
  * distrusted certificate that is signed with an appended signature.
  * The signature is verified by the appended sig module. If verification succeeds,
@@ -851,7 +924,9 @@ grub_cmd_db_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **
  * without an appended signature and removes it from the db list.
  *
  * Also, note that the removal of the distrusted certificate using this command
- * does not persist across reboots.
+ * does not persist across reboots. If static key management is enabled, the
+ * append_rm_dbx_cert command is only available in the GRUB console. Else the
+ * append_add_dbx_cert command is available in the GRUB console.
  */
 static grub_err_t
 grub_cmd_dbx_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char **args)
@@ -862,8 +937,10 @@ grub_cmd_dbx_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char *
 
   if (argc != 1)
     return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
-                       "a distrusted X.509 certificate file is expected in DER format\n"
-                       "Example:\n\tappend_rm_dbx_cert <X509_CERTIFICATE>\n");
+                       "a distrusted X.509 certificate file is expected in DER format\n%s",
+                       ((grub_pks_use_keystore == true) ?
+                       "Example:\n\tappend_add_dbx_cert <X509_CERTIFICATE>\n" :
+                       "Example:\n\tappend_rm_dbx_cert <X509_CERTIFICATE>\n"));
 
   if (*args == NULL)
     return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME, "missing distrusted X.509 certificate file");
@@ -883,8 +960,30 @@ grub_cmd_dbx_cert (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc, char *
 
   /* Remove distrusted certificate from the db list if present. */
   remove_cert_from_db (cert);
-  certificate_release (cert);
-  grub_free (cert);
+
+  /* Only checks the certificate against dbx if dynamic key management is enabled. */
+  if (grub_pks_use_keystore == true)
+    {
+      if (is_cert_present_in_dbx (cert) == true)
+        {
+          certificate_release (cert);
+          grub_free (cert);
+          return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_EXISTS,
+                             "could not add distrusted certificate, as it is present in the dbx list");
+        }
+
+      grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "added distrusted certificate with CN: %s to the dbx list\n",
+                    cert->subject);
+
+      cert->next = dbx.certs;
+      dbx.certs = cert;
+      dbx.cert_entries++;
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      certificate_release (cert);
+      grub_free (cert);
+    }
 
   return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
 }
@@ -909,9 +1008,281 @@ grub_cmd_list_db (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), int argc __attrib
       grub_printf ("\tCN: %s\n\n", cert->subject);
     }
 
+  /* Only list the binary hash if dynamic key management is enabled. */
+  if (grub_pks_use_keystore == true)
+    {
+      for (i = 0; i < db.signature_entries; i++)
+        {
+          if (db.signatures[i] != NULL)
+            {
+              grub_printf ("Binary hash %u:\n", i + 1);
+              grub_printf ("\thash: ");
+              dump_data_to_hex (db.signatures[i], db.signature_size[i]);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
   return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
 }
 
+static grub_err_t
+grub_cmd_list_dbx (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__((unused)),
+                   int argc __attribute__((unused)), char **args __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+  struct x509_certificate *cert;
+  grub_uint32_t i, cert_num = 1;
+
+  for (cert = dbx.certs; cert != NULL; cert = cert->next, cert_num++)
+    {
+      grub_printf ("Certificate %u:\n", cert_num);
+      grub_printf ("\tserial: ");
+
+      for (i = 0; i < cert->serial_len - 1; i++)
+        grub_printf ("%02x:", cert->serial[i]);
+
+      grub_printf ("%02x\n", cert->serial[cert->serial_len - 1]);
+      grub_printf ("\tissuer: %s\n", cert->issuer);
+      grub_printf ("\tCN: %s\n\n", cert->subject);
+    }
+
+  for (i = 0; i < dbx.signature_entries; i++)
+    {
+      if (dbx.signatures[i] != NULL)
+        {
+          grub_printf ("Certificate/Binary hash %u:\n", i + 1);
+          grub_printf ("\thash: ");
+          dump_data_to_hex (dbx.signatures[i], dbx.signature_size[i]);
+        }
+    }
+
+  return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
+}
+
+static grub_err_t
+read_hash_from_file (char *file_path, grub_uint8_t **hash_data, grub_size_t *hash_data_size)
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_file_t hash_file;
+
+  hash_file = grub_file_open (file_path, GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HASH_TRUST | GRUB_FILE_TYPE_NO_DECOMPRESS);
+  if (hash_file == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_FILE_NOT_FOUND, "unable to open %s file", file_path);
+
+  rc = file_read_whole (hash_file, hash_data, hash_data_size);
+  grub_file_close (hash_file);
+
+  /*
+   * If signature verification is enabled and GRUB is locked down,
+   * obtain the actual hash data size by subtracting the appended
+   * signature size from the hash data size because
+   * the hash has an appended signature, and this actual hash data size is
+   * used to get the hash data.
+   */
+  if (check_sigs == true && grub_is_lockdown () == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED)
+    *hash_data_size -= append_sig_len;
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+static bool
+is_hash_present_in_db (const grub_uint8_t *hash_data, const grub_size_t hash_data_size)
+{
+  grub_uint32_t i;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < db.signature_entries; i++)
+    if (grub_memcmp (db.signatures[i], hash_data, hash_data_size) == 0)
+      return true;
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+static bool
+is_hash_present_in_dbx (const grub_uint8_t *hash_data, const grub_size_t hash_data_size)
+{
+  grub_uint32_t i;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < dbx.signature_entries; i++)
+    if (grub_memcmp (dbx.signatures[i], hash_data, hash_data_size) == 0)
+      return true;
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+static void
+remove_hash_from_db (const grub_uint8_t *hash_data, const grub_size_t hash_data_size)
+{
+  grub_uint32_t i;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < db.signature_entries; i++)
+    {
+      if (grub_memcmp (db.signatures[i], hash_data, hash_data_size) == 0)
+        {
+          grub_dprintf ("appendedsig", "removed distrusted hash %02x%02x%02x%02x.. from the db list\n",
+                        db.signatures[i][0], db.signatures[i][1], db.signatures[i][2],
+                        db.signatures[i][3]);
+          grub_free (db.signatures[i]);
+          db.signatures[i] = NULL;
+          db.signature_size[i] = 0;
+          break;
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Remove the trusted binary hash from the dbx list if present.
+ * And add them to the db list if it is not already present.
+ * Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts
+ * the binary hash file that is signed with an appended signature.
+ * The signature is verified by the appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
+ * the binary hash is added to the db list. Otherwise, an error is posted and
+ * the binary hash is not added.
+ * When signature verification is disabled, it accepts the binary hash file without
+ * an appended signature and adds it to the db list.
+ *
+ * Also, note that the adding of the trusted binary hash using this command does
+ * not persist across reboots.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+grub_cmd_db_hash (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__((unused)), int argc, char**args)
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_uint8_t *hash_data = NULL;
+  grub_size_t hash_data_size = 0;
+
+  if (argc != 1)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+                       "a trusted binary hash file is expected in ASCII text format\n"
+                       "Example:\n\tappend_add_db_hash <BINARY HASH FILE>\n");
+
+  if (*args == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME, "missing trusted binary hash file");
+
+  rc = read_hash_from_file (args[0], &hash_data, &hash_data_size);
+  if (rc == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    {
+      grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
+                    "adding a trusted binary hash %02x%02x%02x%02x...\n with size of %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE "\n",
+                    hash_data[0], hash_data[1], hash_data[2], hash_data[3], hash_data_size);
+
+      /* Only accept SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 binary hash */
+      if (hash_data_size != 32 && hash_data_size != 48 && hash_data_size != 64)
+        {
+          grub_free (hash_data);
+          return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, "unacceptable trusted binary hash type");
+        }
+
+      if (is_hash_present_in_dbx (hash_data, hash_data_size) == true)
+        {
+          grub_free (hash_data);
+          return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED,
+                             "could not add trusted binary hash, as it is present in the dbx list");
+        }
+
+      if (is_hash_present_in_db (hash_data, hash_data_size) == false)
+        {
+          rc = add_hash (hash_data, hash_data_size, &db.signatures,
+                         &db.signature_size, &db.signature_entries);
+          if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+            rc = grub_error (rc, "adding of trusted binary hash failed");
+          else
+            grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
+                          "added trusted binary hash %02x%02x%02x%02x...\n to the db list\n",
+                          hash_data[0], hash_data[1], hash_data[2], hash_data[3]);
+         }
+       else
+         rc = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_EXISTS,
+                          "could not add trusted binary hash, as it is present in the db list");
+    }
+
+  grub_free (hash_data);
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Remove the distrusted binary/certificate hash from the db list if present.
+ * And add them to the dbx list if it is not already present.
+ * Note:- When signature verification is enabled, this command only accepts
+ * the binary/certificate hash file that is signed with an appended signature.
+ * The signature is verified by the appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
+ * the binary/certificate hash is added to the dbx list. Otherwise, an error is posted and
+ * the binary/certificate hash is not added.
+ * When signature verification is disabled, it accepts the binary/certificate hash file without
+ * an appended signature and adds it to the dbx list.
+ *
+ * Also, note that the adding of the distrusted binary/certificate hash using this command does
+ * not persist across reboots.
+ */
+static grub_err_t
+grub_cmd_dbx_hash (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc __attribute__ ((unused)),
+                   char **args __attribute__ ((unused)))
+{
+  grub_err_t rc;
+  grub_uint8_t *hash_data = NULL;
+  grub_size_t hash_data_size = 0;
+  char *file_path;
+
+  if (!ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].set && !ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH].set)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT,
+                       "a distrusted certificate/binary hash file is expected in ASCII text format\n"
+                       "Example:\n\tappend_add_dbx_hash [option] <FILE>\n"
+                       "option:\n[-b|--binary-hash] FILE [BINARY HASH FILE]\n"
+                       "[-c|--cert-hash] FILE [CERTFICATE HASH FILE]\n");
+
+  if (ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].arg == NULL && ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH].arg == NULL)
+    return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME, "missing distrusted certificate/binary hash file");
+
+  if (ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].arg != NULL)
+    file_path = ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].arg;
+  else
+    file_path = ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH].arg;
+
+  rc = read_hash_from_file (file_path, &hash_data, &hash_data_size);
+  if (rc == GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+    {
+      grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
+                    "adding a distrusted certificate/binary hash %02x%02x%02x%02x...\n"
+                    " with size of %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE "\n", hash_data[0], hash_data[1],
+                    hash_data[2], hash_data[3], hash_data_size);
+
+      if (ctxt->state[OPTION_BINARY_HASH].set || ctxt->state[OPTION_CERT_HASH].set)
+        {
+          /* Only accept SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 certificate/binary hash */
+          if (hash_data_size != 32 && hash_data_size != 48 && hash_data_size != 64)
+            {
+              rc = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE,
+                               "unacceptable distrusted certificate/binary hash type");
+              goto clean;
+            }
+        }
+
+      /* Remove distrusted hash from the db list if present. */
+      remove_hash_from_db (hash_data, hash_data_size);
+
+      if (is_hash_present_in_dbx (hash_data, hash_data_size) == true)
+        {
+          rc = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_EXISTS,
+                           "could not add distrusted certificate/binary hash, "
+                           "as it is present in the dbx list");
+          goto clean;
+        }
+
+      rc = add_hash (hash_data, hash_data_size, &dbx.signatures,
+                     &dbx.signature_size, &dbx.signature_entries);
+      if (rc != GRUB_ERR_NONE)
+        rc = grub_error (rc, "adding of distrusted binary/certificate hash failed");
+      else
+        grub_dprintf ("appendedsig",
+                      "added distrusted binary/certificate hash %02x%02x%02x%02x...\n to the dbx list\n",
+                      hash_data[0], hash_data[1], hash_data[2], hash_data[3]);
+    }
+
+ clean:
+  grub_free (hash_data);
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
 static grub_err_t
 appendedsig_init (grub_file_t io __attribute__ ((unused)), enum grub_file_type type,
                   void **context __attribute__ ((unused)), enum grub_verify_flags *flags)
@@ -932,6 +1303,11 @@ appendedsig_init (grub_file_t io __attribute__ ((unused)), enum grub_file_type t
          * verifier, but we lack the hubris required to take this on. Instead,
          * require that it have an appended signature.
          */
+      case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HASH_TRUST:
+        /*
+         * This is a certificate/binary hash to add to db/dbx.
+         * This needs to be verified or blocked.
+         */
       case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_LINUX_KERNEL:
       case GRUB_FILE_TYPE_GRUB_MODULE:
         /*
@@ -985,7 +1361,9 @@ static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = {
   .fs_read = pseudo_read
 };
 
-static grub_command_t cmd_verify, cmd_list_db, cmd_dbx_cert, cmd_db_cert;
+static grub_extcmd_t cmd_dbx_hash;
+static grub_command_t cmd_verify, cmd_list_db, cmd_db_cert, cmd_db_hash,
+                      cmd_list_dbx, cmd_dbx_cert;
 
 /* Check the certificate hash presence in the PKS dbx list. */
 static bool
@@ -1287,8 +1665,27 @@ register_appended_signatures_cmd (void)
                                        N_("Show the list of trusted X.509 certificates from the db list"));
   cmd_db_cert = grub_register_command ("append_add_db_cert", grub_cmd_db_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
                                        N_("Add trusted X509_CERTIFICATE to the db list"));
-  cmd_dbx_cert = grub_register_command ("append_rm_dbx_cert", grub_cmd_dbx_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
-                                        N_("Remove distrusted X509_CERTIFICATE from the db list"));
+  /*
+   * If signature verification is enabled with dynamic key management mode,
+   * register dynamic secure boot GRUB commands.
+   */
+  if (grub_pks_use_keystore == true)
+    {
+      cmd_dbx_cert = grub_register_command ("append_add_dbx_cert", grub_cmd_dbx_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
+                                            N_("Add distrusted X509_CERTIFICATE to the dbx list"));
+      cmd_list_dbx = grub_register_command ("append_list_dbx", grub_cmd_list_dbx, 0,
+                                            N_("Show the list of distrusted certificates and"
+                                            " certificate/binary hashes from the dbx list"));
+      cmd_db_hash = grub_register_command ("append_add_db_hash", grub_cmd_db_hash, N_("BINARY HASH FILE"),
+                                           N_("Add trusted BINARY HASH to the db list."));
+      cmd_dbx_hash = grub_register_extcmd ("append_add_dbx_hash", grub_cmd_dbx_hash, 0,
+                                           N_("[-b|--binary-hash] FILE [BINARY HASH FILE]\n"
+                                           "[-c|--cert-hash] FILE [CERTFICATE HASH FILE]"),
+                                           N_("Add distrusted CERTFICATE/BINARY HASH to the dbx list."), options);
+    }
+  else
+    cmd_dbx_cert = grub_register_command ("append_rm_dbx_cert", grub_cmd_dbx_cert, N_("X509_CERTIFICATE"),
+                                          N_("Remove distrusted X509_CERTIFICATE from the db list"));
 }
 
 /* It unregisters the appended signatures GRUB commands. */
@@ -1299,6 +1696,16 @@ unregister_appended_signatures_cmd (void)
   grub_unregister_command (cmd_list_db);
   grub_unregister_command (cmd_db_cert);
   grub_unregister_command (cmd_dbx_cert);
+  /*
+   * If signature verification is enabled with dynamic key management mode,
+   * unregister dynamic secure boot GRUB commands.
+   */
+  if (grub_pks_use_keystore == true)
+    {
+      grub_unregister_command (cmd_list_dbx);
+      grub_unregister_command (cmd_db_hash);
+      grub_unregister_extcmd (cmd_dbx_hash);
+    }
 }
 
 GRUB_MOD_INIT (appendedsig)
include/grub/file.h +2 -0
index d678de063..16a4b7d26 100644
@@ -115,6 +115,8 @@ enum grub_file_type
     GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HASHLIST,
     /* File hashed by hashsum.  */
     GRUB_FILE_TYPE_TO_HASH,
+    /* File holding certificiate/binary hash to add to db/dbx. */
+    GRUB_FILE_TYPE_HASH_TRUST,
     /* Keyboard layout.  */
     GRUB_FILE_TYPE_KEYBOARD_LAYOUT,
     /* Picture file.  */
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#21 lore raw

PATCH v8 17/20 appended signatures: Verification tests

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

These tests are run through all_functional_test and test a range of commands and behaviours.

---
 grub-core/Makefile.core.def               |   8 +
 grub-core/tests/appended_signature_test.c | 340 ++++++++
 grub-core/tests/appended_signatures.h     | 975 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 grub-core/tests/lib/functional_test.c     |   1 +
 4 files changed, 1324 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 grub-core/tests/appended_signature_test.c
 create mode 100644 grub-core/tests/appended_signatures.h
grub-core/Makefile.core.def +8 -0
index 05ccbf264..30a4ac6b2 100644
@@ -2214,6 +2214,14 @@ module = {
   cppflags = '$(CPPFLAGS_GCRY)';
 };
 
+module = {
+  name = appended_signature_test;
+  common = tests/appended_signature_test.c;
+  common = tests/appended_signatures.h;
+  enable = emu;
+  enable = powerpc_ieee1275;
+};
+
 module = {
   name = signature_test;
   common = tests/signature_test.c;
grub-core/tests/appended_signature_test.c new file +340 -0

340 lines not on this page · raw message

grub-core/tests/appended_signatures.h new file +975 -0

975 lines not on this page · raw message

grub-core/tests/lib/functional_test.c +1 -0
index 38e981f2c..23048919d 100644
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ grub_functional_all_tests (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt __attribute__ ((unused)),
   grub_dl_load ("xnu_uuid_test");
   grub_dl_load ("pbkdf2_test");
   grub_dl_load ("signature_test");
+  grub_dl_load ("appended_signature_test");
   grub_dl_load ("sleep_test");
   grub_dl_load ("bswap_test");
   grub_dl_load ("ctz_test");
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#22 lore raw

PATCH v8 18/20 docs/grub: Document signing GRUB under UEFI

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

From: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>

Before adding information about how GRUB is signed with an appended signature scheme, it's worth adding some information about how it can currently be signed for UEFI.

---
 docs/grub.texi | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
docs/grub.texi +17 -1
index 15f087f27..72ee8d08c 100644
@@ -8675,6 +8675,7 @@ environment variables and commands are listed in the same order.
 * Measured Boot::                      Measuring boot components
 * Lockdown::                           Lockdown when booting on a secure setup
 * TPM2 key protector::                 Managing disk key with TPM2 key protector
+* Signing GRUB itself::                Ensuring the integrity of the GRUB core image
 @end menu
 
 @node Authentication and authorisation
@@ -8755,7 +8756,7 @@ commands.
 
 GRUB's @file{core.img} can optionally provide enforcement that all files
 subsequently read from disk are covered by a valid digital signature.
-This document does @strong{not} cover how to ensure that your
+This section does @strong{not} cover how to ensure that your
 platform's firmware (e.g., Coreboot) validates @file{core.img}.
 
 If environment variable @code{check_signatures}
@@ -9363,6 +9364,21 @@ which increases the risk of password leakage during the process. Moreover, the
 superuser list must be well maintained, and the password used cannot be
 synchronized with LUKS key rotation.
 
+@node Signing GRUB itself
+@section Signing GRUB itself
+To ensure a complete secure-boot chain, there must be a way for the code that
+loads GRUB to verify the integrity of the core image.
+This is ultimately platform-specific and individual platforms can define their
+own mechanisms. However, there are general-purpose mechanisms that can be used
+with GRUB.
+@section Signing GRUB for UEFI secure boot
+On UEFI platforms, @file{core.img} is a PE binary. Therefore, it can be signed
+with a tool such as @command{pesign} or @command{sbsign}. Refer to the
+suggestions in @pxref{UEFI secure boot and shim} to ensure that the final
+image works under UEFI secure boot and can maintain the secure-boot chain. It
+will also be necessary to enroll the public key used into a relevant firmware
+key database.
+
 @node Platform limitations
 @chapter Platform limitations
 
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#23 lore raw

PATCH v8 19/20 docs/grub: Document signing GRUB with an appended signature

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

Signing GRUB for firmware that verifies an appended signature is a bit fiddly. I don't want people to have to figure it out from scratch so document it here.

---
 docs/grub.texi | 100 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 100 insertions(+)
docs/grub.texi +100 -0
index 72ee8d08c..3ee4989b8 100644
@@ -9379,6 +9379,106 @@ image works under UEFI secure boot and can maintain the secure-boot chain. It
 will also be necessary to enroll the public key used into a relevant firmware
 key database.
 
+@section Signing GRUB with an appended signature
+The @file{core.elf} itself can be signed with a Linux kernel module-style
+appended signature (@pxref{Using appended signatures}).
+To support IEEE1275 platforms where the boot image is often loaded directly
+from a disk partition rather than from a file system, the @file{core.elf}
+can specify the size and location of the appended signature with an ELF
+Note added by @command{grub-install} or @command{grub-mkimage}.
+An image can be signed this way using the @command{sign-file} command from
+the Linux kernel:
+
+@itemize
+@item Signing a GRUB image using a single signer key. The grub.key is your
+private key used for GRUB signing, grub.der is a corresponding public key
+(certificate) used for GRUB signature verification, and the kernel.der is
+your public key (certificate) used for kernel signature verification.
+@example
+@group
+# Determine the size of the appended signature. It depends on the
+# signing key (certificate) and the hash algorithm.
+#
+# Signing the /dev/null with an appended signature.
+
+sign-file SHA256 grub.key grub.der /dev/null ./empty.sig
+
+# Get the size of the signature.
+
+EMPTY_SIG_SIZE=`stat -c '%s' ./empty.sig`
+
+# Remove the empty file signature.
+
+rm ./empty.sig
+
+# Build a GRUB image with $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE reserved for the signature.
+
+grub-install --appended-signature-size $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE -x kernel.der \
+  --modules="appendedsig ..." ...
+                      or
+grub-mkimage -O powerpc-ieee1275 -o core.elf.unsigned -x kernel.der \
+  -p /grub --appended-signature-size $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE \
+  --modules="appendedsig ..." ...
+
+# Signing a GRUB image with an appended signature.
+
+sign-file SHA256 grub.key grub.der core.elf.unsigned core.elf.signed
+
+@end group
+@end example
+@item Signing a GRUB image using more than one signer key. The grub1.key and
+grub2.key are private keys used for GRUB signing, grub1.der and grub2.der
+are corresponding public keys (certificates) used for GRUB signature verification.
+The kernel1.der and kernel2.der are your public keys (certificates) used for
+kernel signature verification.
+@example
+@group
+# Generate a raw signature for /dev/null signing using OpenSSL.
+
+openssl cms -sign -binary -nocerts -in /dev/null -signer \
+  grub1.der -inkey grub1.key -signer grub2.der -inkey grub2.key \
+  -out ./empty.p7s -outform DER -noattr -md sha256
+
+# Signing the /dev/null with an appended signature.
+
+sign-file -s ./empty.p7s sha256 /dev/null /dev/null ./empty.signed
+
+# Get the size of the signature.
+
+EMPTY_SIG_SIZE=`stat -c '%s' ./empty.signed`
+
+# Remove the empty file signatures.
+
+rm ./empty.signed ./empty.p7s
+
+# Build a GRUB image with $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE reserved for the signature.
+
+grub-install --appended-signature-size $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE -x kernel1.der \
+  kernel2.der --modules="appendedsig ..." ...
+                         or
+grub-mkimage -O powerpc-ieee1275 -o core.elf.unsigned -x kernel1.der \
+  kernel2.der -p /grub --appended-signature-size $EMPTY_SIG_SIZE \
+  --modules="appendedsig ..." ...
+
+# Generate a raw signature for GRUB image signing using OpenSSL.
+
+openssl cms -sign -binary -nocerts -in core.elf.unsigned -signer \
+  grub1.der -inkey grub1.key -signer grub2.der -inkey grub2.key \
+  -out core.p7s -outform DER -noattr -md sha256
+
+# Signing a GRUB image with an appended signature.
+
+sign-file -s core.p7s sha256 /dev/null core.elf.unsigned core.elf.signed
+
+@end group
+@end example
+@item Don't forget to install the signed image as required
+(e.g. on powerpc-ieee1275, to the PReP partition).
+@end itemize
+
+As with UEFI secure boot, it is necessary to build-in the required modules,
+or sign them if they are not part of the GRUB image.
+
 @node Platform limitations
 @chapter Platform limitations
 
Signature · 7 lines
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#24 lore raw

PATCH v8 20/20 docs/grub: Document appended signature

In reply to Sudhakar Kuppusamy

This explains how appended signatures can be used to form part of a secure boot chain, and documents the commands and variables introduced.

---
 docs/grub.texi | 403 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 403 insertions(+)
docs/grub.texi +403 -0
index 3ee4989b8..36fc6da30 100644
@@ -3280,7 +3280,9 @@ GRUB.  Others may be used freely in GRUB configuration files.
 These variables have special meaning to GRUB.
 
 @menu
+* appendedsig_key_mgmt::
 * biosnum::
+* check_appended_signatures::
 * check_signatures::
 * chosen::
 * cmdpath::
@@ -3331,6 +3333,19 @@ These variables have special meaning to GRUB.
 @end menu
 
 
+@node appendedsig_key_mgmt
+@subsection appendedsig_key_mgmt
+
+This variable controls whether GRUB enforces appended signature validation
+using @code{static} or @code{dynamic} key management. It is automatically
+set by GRUB to @code{static} or @code{dynamic} based on the
+@strong{'ibm,secure-boot'} device tree property and Platform KeyStore(PKS).
+Also, it can be explicitly set to @code{static} or @code{dynamic} by
+executing @code{set appendedsig_key_mgmt} command from the GRUB console
+when the GRUB is not locked down.
+
+@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+
 @node biosnum
 @subsection biosnum
 
@@ -3343,6 +3358,17 @@ this.
 For an alternative approach which also changes BIOS drive mappings for the
 chain-loaded system, @pxref{drivemap}.
 
+@node check_appended_signatures
+@subsection check_appended_signatures
+
+This variable controls whether GRUB enforces appended signature validation on
+loaded kernel and GRUB module files. It is automatically set by GRUB
+to @code{no} or @code{enforce} based on the @strong{'ibm,secure-boot'} device
+tree property. Also, it can be explicitly set to @code{no} or @code{enforce} by
+executing @code{set check_appended_signatures} command from the GRUB console
+when the GRUB is not locked down.
+
+@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
 
 @node check_signatures
 @subsection check_signatures
@@ -6414,6 +6440,14 @@ you forget a command, you can run the command @command{help}
 @menu
 * [::                           Check file types and compare values
 * acpi::                        Load ACPI tables
+* append_add_db_cert::          Add trusted certificate to the db list
+* append_add_db_hash::          Add trusted certificate/binary hash to the db list
+* append_add_dbx_cert::         Add distrusted certificate to the dbx list
+* append_add_dbx_hash::         Add distrusted certificate/binary hash to the dbx list
+* append_list_db::              List all trusted certificates from the db list
+* append_list_dbx::             List all distrusted certificates and binary/certificate hashes from the dbx list
+* append_rm_dbx_cert::          Remove distrusted certificate from the db list
+* append_verify::               Verify appended digital signature using db and dbx lists
 * authenticate::                Check whether user is in user list
 * background_color::            Set background color for active terminal
 * background_image::            Load background image for active terminal
@@ -6535,6 +6569,229 @@ Note: The command is not allowed when lockdown is enforced (@pxref{Lockdown}).
       unsigned code.
 @end deffn
 
+@node append_add_db_cert
+@subsection append_add_db_cert
+
+@deffn Command append_add_db_cert <X509_certificate>
+Read X.509 certificate from the file @var{X509_certificate}
+and add it to GRUB's internal db list of trusted certificates.
+These certificates are used to validate appended signatures when the
+environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures})
+is set to @code{enforce} or the @command{append_verify} (@pxref{append_verify})
+command is executed from the GRUB console.
+
+Note: The file @var{X509_certificate} should be in DER-format. When the environment
+      variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce},
+      the @command{append_add_db_cert} command only accepts the file @var{X509_certificate}
+      that is signed with an appended signature (@pxref{Signing certificate and hash file}).
+      The signature is verified by appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
+      the certificate is added to the db list. Otherwise, an error is posted and
+      the certificate is not added.
+      When the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is to @code{no},
+      it accepts files @var{X509_certificate} without an appended signature and the
+      certificate is added to the db list.
+
+Also, note that the adding of the certificate using @command{append_add_db_cert} command
+does not persist across reboots, and this command is available if either static
+or dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
+
+@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
+
+@node append_add_db_hash
+@subsection append_add_db_hash
+
+@deffn Command append_add_db_hash <hash_file>
+Read binary hash from the file @var{hash_file}
+and add it to GRUB's internal db list of trusted binary hashes. These
+hashes are used to validate the Linux kernel binary hashes when the
+environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures}
+(@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) is set to @code{enforce} or the
+@command{append_verify} (@pxref{append_verify}) command is executed
+from the GRUB console.
+
+Note: The file @var{hash_file} should contain data in binary format. When the
+      environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is
+      set to @code{enforce}, the @command{append_add_db_hash} command only accepts
+      the file @var{hash_file} that is signed with an appended signature
+      (@pxref{Signing certificate and hash file}).
+      The signature is verified by appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
+      the binary hash is added to the db list. Otherwise, an error is posted and
+      the binary hash is not added.
+      When the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is to @code{no},
+      it accepts files @var{hash_file} without an appended signature and the
+      binary hash is added to the db list.
+
+Also, note that the adding of the certificate using @command{append_add_db_hash}
+command does not persist across reboots, and this command is only available when
+dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
+
+@example
+
+# Generate the hash of the binary file using OpenSSL
+# in binary format. The vmlinux (kernel image) file
+# should be unsigned.
+
+openssl dgst -binary -sha256 -out binary_hash vmlinux
+
+@end example
+
+@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
+
+@node append_add_dbx_cert
+@subsection append_add_dbx_cert
+
+@deffn Command append_add_dbx_cert <X509_certificate>
+Read X.509 certificate from the file @var{X509_certificate}
+and add it to GRUB's internal dbx list of distrusted certificates.
+These certificates are used to ensure that the distrusted certificates
+are rejected during appended signatures validation when the environment
+variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}
+(@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) or the @command{append_verify}
+(@pxref{append_verify}) command is executed from the GRUB console.
+Also, These certificates are used to block adding the distrusted
+certificates to the db list in the future.
+
+Note: The file @var{X509_certificate} should be in DER-format. When the
+      environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to
+      @code{enforce}, the @command{append_add_dbx_cert} command only accepts
+      the file @var{X509_certificate} that is signed with an appended signature
+      (@pxref{Signing certificate and hash file}).
+      The signature is verified by appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
+      the certificate is added to the dbx list. Otherwise, an error is posted and
+      the certificate is not added.
+      When the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is to @code{no},
+      it accepts file @var{X509_certificate} without an appended signature and the
+      certificate is added to the db list.
+
+Also, note that the adding of the certificate using @command{append_add_dbx_cert}
+command does not persist across reboots, and this command is only available when
+dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
+
+@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
+
+@node append_add_dbx_hash
+@subsection append_add_dbx_hash
+
+@deffn Command append_add_dbx_hash [@option{-b}|@option{-c}] <hash_file>
+Read binary/certificate hash from the file @var{hash_file}
+and add it to GRUB's internal dbx list of distrusted binary/certificate hashes.
+These hashes are used to ensure that the distrusted binary hashes/certificates
+are rejected during Linux kernel binary hashes and appended signatures validation
+when the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures})
+is set to @code{enforce} or the @command{append_verify} (@pxref{append_verify}) command
+is executed from the GRUB console. Also,these hashes are used to block adding the distrusted
+binary hashes and certificates to the db list in the future.
+
+The @option{-b} (@option{--binary-hash}) can be used to specify binary hash file and
+@option{-c} (@option{--cert-hash}) can be used to specify certificate hash file.
+
+Note: The file @var{hash_file} should contain data in binary format. When the environment
+      variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}, the
+      @command{append_add_dbx_hash} command only accepts the file @var{hash_file}
+      that is signed with an appended signature (@pxref{Signing certificate and hash file}).
+      The signature is verified by appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
+      the binary/certificate hash is added to the db list. Otherwise, an error is posted and
+      the binary/certificate hash is not added.
+      When the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is to @code{no},
+      it accepts the file @var{hash_file} without an appended signature and the
+      binary/certificate hash is added to the db list.
+
+Also, note that the adding of the certificate using @command{append_add_dbx_hash}
+command does not persist across reboots, and this command is only available when
+dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
+
+@example
+
+# Generate the hash of the binary/certificate file
+# using OpenSSL in binary format. The vmlinux
+# (kernel image) file should be unsigned, kernel.der
+# is certificate.
+
+openssl dgst -binary -sha256 -out cert_hash kernel.der
+
+openssl dgst -binary -sha256 -out binary_hash vmlinux
+
+@end example
+
+@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
+
+@node append_list_db
+@subsection append_list_db
+
+@deffn Command append_list_db
+List all X.509 certificates and binary hashes trusted by GRUB for validating
+appended signatures. The output is a numbered list of certificates and binary hashes,
+showing the certificate's serial number, issuer and Common Name.
+
+Note that the @command{append_list_db} command is available if either static
+or dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
+
+@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
+
+@node append_list_dbx
+@subsection append_list_dbx
+
+@deffn Command append_list_dbx
+List all the distrusted X.509 certificates and binary/certificate hashes.
+The output is a numbered list of certificates and binary/certificate hashes,
+showing the certificate's serial number, issuer and Common Name.
+
+Note that the @command{append_list_dbx} command is only available when
+dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
+
+@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
+
+@node append_rm_dbx_cert
+@subsection append_rm_dbx_cert
+
+@deffn Command append_rm_dbx_cert <X509_certificate>
+Read DER-formatted X.509 certificate from the file @var{X509_certificate}
+and remove it from GRUB's internal db list of trusted certificates.
+These certificates are used to ensure that the distrusted certificates
+are rejected during appended signatures validation when the environment
+variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}
+(@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) or the @command{append_verify}
+(@pxref{append_verify}) command is executed from the GRUB console.
+
+Note: The file @var{X509_certificate} should be in DER-format. When the environment
+      variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is set to @code{enforce}, the
+      @command{append_rm_dbx_cert} command only accepts the files @var{X509_certificate}
+      that are signed with an appended signature (@pxref{Signing certificate and hash file}).
+      The signature is verified by appendedsig module. If verification succeeds,
+      the certificate is removed from the db list. Otherwise, an error is posted and
+      the certificate is not removed.
+      When the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} is to @code{no},
+      it accepts the file @var{X509_certificate} without an appended signature and
+      certificate is removed from the db list.
+
+Also, note that the removing of the certificate using @command{append_rm_dbx_cert}
+command does not persist across reboots, and this command is only available when
+static key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
+
+@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
+
+@node append_verify
+@subsection append_verify
+
+@deffn Command append_verify <signed_file>
+Verifies an appended signature on @var{signed_file} against the trusted X.509 certificates
+and hashes known to GRUB (@pxref{append_list_db},@pxref{append_list_dbx}, @pxref{append_add_db_cert},
+@pxref{append_add_db_hash}, @pxref{append_add_dbx_hash}, @pxref{append_add_dbx_cert}, and
+@pxref{append_rm_dbx_cert}). Exit code @code{$?} is set to 0 if the signature validates successfully.
+If validation fails, it is set to a non-zero value.
+
+Note that the @command{append_verify} command is available if either static
+or dynamic key management is enabled (@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
+
+@xref{Using appended signatures} for more information.
+@end deffn
 
 @node authenticate
 @subsection authenticate
@@ -7307,6 +7564,15 @@ configurations, but to allow the user to select from among multiple
 configurations, and to enable ``one-shot'' boot attempts and
 ``savedefault'' behavior.  @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more
 information.
+
+On Linux on Power LPAR, the signature validation on the environment block file
+is not supported with or without the @option{--skip-sig} option.
+If the environment variable @code{check_appended_signatures} value is set to
+@code{enforce} and GRUB is in locked down mode, the user is not allowed to set
+@code{check_appended_signatures} to @code{no} and @code{appendedsig_key_mgmt}
+to @code{static} or @code{dynamic} either directly using @command{load_env}
+command or via environment block file. @xref{Using appended signatures}, for
+more information.
 @end deffn
 
 
@@ -8670,11 +8936,13 @@ environment variables and commands are listed in the same order.
 @menu
 * Authentication and authorisation::   Users and access control
 * Using GPG-style digital signatures:: Booting digitally signed code
+* Using appended signatures::          An alternative approach to booting digitally signed code
 * UEFI secure boot and shim::          Booting digitally signed PE files
 * Secure Boot Advanced Targeting::     Embedded information for generation number based revocation
 * Measured Boot::                      Measuring boot components
 * Lockdown::                           Lockdown when booting on a secure setup
 * TPM2 key protector::                 Managing disk key with TPM2 key protector
+* Signing certificate and hash file::  Certificate and hash file signing
 * Signing GRUB itself::                Ensuring the integrity of the GRUB core image
 @end menu
 
@@ -8835,6 +9103,113 @@ or BIOS) configuration to cause the machine to boot from a different
 (attacker-controlled) device.  GRUB is at best only one link in a
 secure boot chain.
 
+@node Using appended signatures
+@section Using appended signatures in GRUB
+
+GRUB supports verifying Linux-style 'appended signatures' for Linux on Power LPAR
+secure boot. Appended signatures are PKCS#7 messages containing a signature over the
+contents of a file, plus some metadata, appended to the end of a file. A file
+with an appended signature ends with the magic string:
+
+@example
+~Module signature appended~\n
+@end example
+
+where @code{\n} represents the line feed character, @code{0x0a}.
+
+Linux on Power LPAR secure boot is controlled by @strong{'ibm,secure-boot'}
+device tree property and if this property is set to @code{2} (@samp{2 - enforced}),
+GRUB enters lockdown. There are three secure boot modes. They are
+
+@itemize
+@item @samp{0 - disabled}: Secure boot is disabled. This is the default.
+@item @samp{1 - audit}: Enforce signature verification by setting
+      @code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) to
+      @code{enforce} and do not to lockdown the GRUB.
+@item @samp{2 - enforced}: Lockdown the GRUB and enforce signature verification by setting
+      @code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) to @code{enforce}.
+@end itemize
+
+Note that Linux on Power LPAR only supports @samp{0 - disabled} and @samp{2 - enforced}.
+
+To enable appended signature verification, load the appendedsig module and an
+X.509 certificate for verification. Building the appendedsig module into the
+core GRUB image is recommended.
+
+Key management is controlled by the environment variable @code{appendedsig_key_mgmt}
+(@pxref{appendedsig_key_mgmt}).
+
+@itemize
+@item @samp{static}: Enforce static key management signature verification. This is the default.
+      When the GRUB is locked down, user cannot change the value by setting the
+      @code{appendedsig_key_mgmt} variable back to @samp{dynamic}.
+@item @samp{dynamic}: Enforce dynamic key management signature verification. When the GRUB is
+      locked down, user cannot change the value by setting the @code{appendedsig_key_mgmt}
+      variable back to @samp{static}.
+@end itemize
+
+In static key management mode, certificates will be built into the core image using
+the @code{--x509} parameter to @command{grub-install} or @command{grub-mkimage}.
+It is possible to list the trusted certificates available at boot time using
+@command{append_list_db} (@pxref{append_list_db}). The distrusted certificates can be
+explicitly removed from the db using the @command{append_rm_dbx_cert} (@pxref{append_rm_dbx_cert}).
+The trusted certificates can be explicitly added to the db using the
+@command{append_add_db_cert} (@pxref{append_add_db_cert}).
+
+
+In dynamic key management mode, db and dbx are read from the Platform KeyStore(PKS). If
+db is not present in PKS, static key (built-in keys) is used as the default key.
+It is possible to list the trusted certificates and binary hashes available at boot time using
+@command{append_list_dbx} (@pxref{append_list_db}) and list the distrusted
+certificates and binary/certificate hashes available at boot time using @command{append_list_dbx}
+(@pxref{append_list_dbx}). The trusted certificates and binary hashes can be explicitly added
+to the db using the @command{append_add_db_cert} (@pxref{append_add_db_cert}) and
+@command{append_add_db_hash} (@pxref{append_add_db_hash}). The distrusted certificates can be
+explicitly added to the dbx using the @command{append_add_dbx_cert} (@pxref{append_add_dbx_cert})
+and the distrusted certificate/binary hases can be explicitly added to the dbx using the
+@command{append_add_dbx_hash} (@pxref{append_add_dbx_hash}).
+
+Enforcement of signature verification is controlled by the environment variable
+@code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures}).
+
+@itemize
+@item @samp{no}: No verification is performed. This is the default.
+@item @samp{enforce}: Signature verification is performed and if signature verification fails,
+      post the errors and stop the boot. Signature verification cannot be disabled by setting
+      the @code{check_appended_signatures} variable back to @samp{no}.
+@end itemize
+
+A file can be explicitly verified using the @command{append_verify} (@pxref{append_verify}).
+
+Only signatures generated using SHA-256 or SHA-512 hash algorithms are supported,
+and only RSA signatures generated using 2048, 3076, or 4096 bit key are supported.
+Only binary/certificate hash generated using SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512 algorithms
+are supported.
+
+A file can be signed with the @command{sign-file} utility supplied with the
+Linux kernel source. For example, if you have @code{signing.key} as the private
+key and @code{certificate.der} as the X.509 certificate containing the public key:
+
+@example
+sign-file SHA256 signing.key certificate.der vmlinux vmlinux.signed
+@end example
+
+Once signature verification is turned on, the following file types must carry
+appended signatures:
+
+@enumerate
+@item Linux kernels
+@item GRUB modules, except those built in to the core image
+@item Any new certificate and binary hash files to be trusted
+@item Any new certificate/binary hash files to be distrusted
+@end enumerate
+
+When GRUB is locked down (when secure boot modes is @code{enforced}),
+signature verification cannot be @strong{disabled} by setting the
+@code{check_appended_signatures} (@pxref{check_appended_signatures}) variable
+to @code{no} or using the @command{load_env} (@pxref{load_env}) command from
+the GRUB console.
+
 @node UEFI secure boot and shim
 @section UEFI secure boot and shim support
 
@@ -9364,6 +9739,34 @@ which increases the risk of password leakage during the process. Moreover, the
 superuser list must be well maintained, and the password used cannot be
 synchronized with LUKS key rotation.
 
+@node Signing certificate and hash file
+@section Signing certificate and hash file
+The X.509 certificate (public key) file and hash file (binary/certificate hash file)
+can be signed with a Linux kernel module-style appended signature.
+
+The signer.key is your private key used for signing, signer.der is corresponding
+public key (certificate) used for appended signature verification. Note that the
+signer.der (certificate) should exist in the db (@pxref{Using appended signatures}).
+
+@itemize
+@item Signing the X.509 certificate file using @file{sign-file}.
+The kernel.der is your X.509 certificate file.
+@example
+
+sign-file SHA256 signer.key signer.der kernel.der \
+  kernel.der.signed
+
+@end example
+@item Signing the hash file using @file{sign-file}.
+The binary_hash is your hash file.
+@example
+
+sign-file SHA256 signer.key signer.der binary_hash \
+  binary_hash.signed
+
+@end example
+@end itemize
+
 @node Signing GRUB itself
 @section Signing GRUB itself
 To ensure a complete secure-boot chain, there must be a way for the code that
Signature · 7 lines
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