Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC
v15 cover Appended Signature Secure Boot Support for PowerPC
This patch set contains v15 the consolidated version of the patch sets for secure boot using appended signatures on powerpc, rebased on top of git HEAD.
The v14 series is at
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2025-10/msg00023.html
Changes since v14:
- Stefan Berger's review comments addressed in v15 patch 19 and 20.
Linux on Power LPAR secure boot ensures the integrity of the Linux boot stack. The hypervisor and partition firmware are part of the core root of trust. The partition firmware verifies the signature on the GRUB image before handing control to GRUB. Similarly, GRUB verifies the signature on the kernel image before booting the OS. This ensures that every image running at the boot time is verified and trusted. UEFI platforms relies on PECOFF based signature scheme. Since Power is not a UEFI platform, an alternative mechanism is needed. Power already uses appended signatures on the Linux Kernel, and is now extended to sign the grub as well.
Linux on Power also allows multiple signers, and if any one of the signature passes, then the image passes the validation. Appended signature scheme uses CMS structure to contain signatures. On Power, the multiple signature support relies on the multiple signers features already supported by CMS standards. It does require that all the signers should sign at the same time and are not allowed to add or remove the signatures randomly.
By default, Linux LPAR secure boot uses static key management[1]. This means that each image embeds the keys it needs to verify the image it loads. For example, the keys used to verify the GRUB image are built into the firmware image. Similarly, the keys used for verifying the kernel image are built into the GRUB image. These are pre-defined keys and they cannot be modified at runtime. The drawback of this approach is that key rotations results in both firmware and OS updates. This is where dynamic key management is useful.
An admin can switch from static keys to dynamic keys by coordinating with Hardware Management Console(HMC) admin and enabling the required flags for the given LPAR.
The dynamic key management relies on the Platform KeyStore(PKS)[2] storage allocation for each LPAR with individually managed access controls to store sensitive information securely. Once switched to dynamic keys, HMC advertises this flag to the PowerVM, which then initializes the PKS with the default secvars. It also creates a variable SB_VERSION that represents the secure boot key management mode. The default secvars are used by Partition firmware, grub and the linux kernel to reads keys for verification. These secvars can be managed by user interface exposed via linux kernel. The linux kernel already supports this interface and it is available in the upstream kernel.
This patchset adds the appended signature support both for signing and verification and the key management to the grub component. The whole patchset can be split into following four main parts:
The series has following four main parts:
1.) Sign grub.elf with an appended signature. (Patches 1, 18, 19)
These patches provide some infrastructure and documentation for signing grub's core.elf with a Linux-kernel-module style appended signature.
An appended signature is a 'dumb' signature over the contents of a file. (It is distinct from schemes like Authenticode that are aware of the structure of the file and only sign certain parts.) The signature is wrapped in a PKCS#7 message, and is appended to the signed file along with some metadata and a magic string. The signatures are validated against a public key which is usually provided as an x509 certificate.
Because some platforms, such as powerpc-ieee1275, may load grub from a raw disk partition rather than a filesystem, we extend grub-install to add an ELF note that allows us to specify the size and location of the signature.
2.) Enable lockdown if secure boot is enabled (Patch 9)
Read secure boot mode from 'ibm,secure-boot' property and
If the 'ibm,secure-boot' property of the root node is 2, enter lockdown. Else it is considered as disabled.
There are three secure boot modes. They are
0 - disabled
No signature verification is performed. This is the default.
1 - audit
Signature verification is performed and if signature verification fails, post the errors and allow the boot to continue.
2 - enforce
Lockdown the GRUB. Signature verification is performed and If signature verification fails, post the errors and stop the boot.
Now, only support disabled and enforce.
3.) Enable appended signature verification using builtin keys (Patches 2 - 8 and 10).
Part of a secure boot chain is allowing grub to verify the boot kernel. For UEFI platforms, this is usually delegated to the shim. However, for platforms that do not implement UEFI, an alternative scheme is required.
This part teaches grub how to verify Linux kernel-style appended signatures. Kernels on powerpc are already signed with this scheme and can be verified by IMA for kexec.
As PKCS#7 messages and x509 certificates are both based on ASN.1, we import libtasn1 to parse them. Because ASN.1 isn't self-documenting, we import from GNUTLS the information we need to navigate their structure.
This section is composed of the following patches:
- patches 2 and 3 are small refactorings.
- patch 4 allows x509 certificates to be built in to the grub core in much the same way as PGP keys.
- patch 5 brings in the code from GNUTLS that allows us to parse PKCS#7 and x509 with libtasn1.
- patch 6, 7 and 8 is our ASN1 node, PKCS#7 and x509 parser. They're minimal and fairly strict parsers that extract only the bits we need to verify the signatures.
- patch 10 is the guts of the appended signature verifier.
4.) Enable accessing keys dynamically from Platform KeyStore (Patch 11 - 16)
This part teaches grub how to read db and dbx variables from platform keystore using client interface call then load keys from those two variable, and use it to verify Linux kernel.
This section is composed of the following patches:
- patch 11 is an exposes an interface in ieee1275 for reading secure boot variable db and dbx from Platform Keystore. Read secure boot variables such as db and dbx from PKS and extract certificates from ESL.
- patch 12 is introducing key management environment variable.
- patch 13 is create the db and dbx lists from PKS.
- patch 14 is verify the kernel using db and dbx lists
- patch 15 is GRUB commands to manage the certificates
- patch 16 adds GRUB commands to access db and dbx.
5.) patch 17 adds unit test and 20 adds GRUB commands and an appended signatures
documentation.
Thanks to Daniel Kiper for providing review comments.
I've pushed this all to
https://github.com/SudhakarKuppusamy1/grub/tree/appendedsig-2.13
[1]https://www.ibm.com/docs/en/linux-on-systems?topic=servers-guest-secure-boot-static-keys [2]https://community.ibm.com/community/user/power/blogs/chris-engel1/2020/11/20/powervm-introduces-the-platform-keystore
Daniel Axtens (2):
crypto: Move storage for grub_crypto_pk_* to crypto.c docs/grub: Document signing GRUB under UEFI
Sudhakar Kuppusamy (18):
powerpc-ieee1275: Add support for signing GRUB with an appended
signature
pgp: Rename OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY to OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY
grub-install: Support embedding x509 certificates
appended signatures: Import GNUTLS's ASN.1 description files appended signatures: Parse ASN1 node
appended signatures: Parse PKCS#7 signed data
appended signatures: Parse X.509 certificates
powerpc_ieee1275: Enter lockdown based on /ibm,secure-boot appended signatures: Support verifying appended signatures
powerpc_ieee1275: Read the db and dbx secure boot variables appended signatures: Introducing key management environment variable appended signatures: Create db and dbx lists
appended signatures: Using db and dbx lists for signature verification appended signatures: GRUB commands to manage the certificates appended signatures: GRUB commands to manage the hashes appended signatures: Verification tests
docs/grub: Document signing GRUB with an appended signature docs/grub: Document appended signature
docs/grub.texi | 475 ++++- grub-core/Makefile.am | 2 + grub-core/Makefile.core.def | 26 + grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 1723 +++++++++++++++++ grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h | 133 ++ grub-core/commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c | 99 + .../commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c | 148 ++ grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c | 452 +++++ .../commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c | 485 +++++ grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c | 970 ++++++++++ grub-core/commands/pgp.c | 6 +- grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c | 1 - grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 58 + grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c | 137 ++ .../kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c | 331 ++++ grub-core/lib/crypto.c | 4 + grub-core/tests/appended_signature_test.c | 348 ++++ grub-core/tests/appended_signatures.h | 975 ++++++++++ grub-core/tests/lib/functional_test.c | 1 + include/grub/crypto.h | 1 + include/grub/efi/pks.h | 112 ++ include/grub/err.h | 3 +- include/grub/file.h | 4 + include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h | 3 + include/grub/kernel.h | 3 +- include/grub/lockdown.h | 3 +- include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h | 39 + .../grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h | 122 ++ include/grub/types.h | 4 + include/grub/util/install.h | 10 +- include/grub/util/mkimage.h | 4 +- util/grub-install-common.c | 36 +- util/grub-mkimage.c | 26 +- util/grub-mkimagexx.c | 40 +- util/mkimage.c | 50 +- 35 files changed, 6790 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c create mode 100644 grub-core/tests/appended_signature_test.c create mode 100644 grub-core/tests/appended_signatures.h create mode 100644 include/grub/efi/pks.h create mode 100644 include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h
Signature · 7 lines
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v15 1/20 powerpc-ieee1275: Add support for signing GRUB with an appended signature
Add infrastructure to allow firmware to verify the integrity of GRUB by use of a Linux-kernel-module-style appended signature. We initially target powerpc-ieee1275, but the code should be extensible to other platforms.
Usually these signatures are appended to a file without modifying the ELF file itself. (This is what the 'sign-file' tool does, for example.) The verifier loads the signed file from the file system and looks at the end of the file for the appended signature. However, on powerpc-ieee1275 platforms, the bootloader is often stored directly in the PReP partition as raw bytes without a file-system. This makes determining the location of an appended signature more difficult.
To address this, we add a new ELF Note.
The name field of shall be the string "Appended-Signature", zero-padded to 4 byte alignment. The type field shall be 0x41536967 (the ASCII values for the string "ASig"). It must be the final section in the ELF binary.
The description shall contain the appended signature structure as defined by the Linux kernel. The description will also be padded to be a multiple of 4 bytes. The padding shall be added before the appended signature structure (not at the end) so that the final bytes of a signed ELF file are the appended signature magic.
A subsequent patch documents how to create a GRUB core.img validly signed under this scheme.
--- include/grub/util/install.h | 7 +++++-- include/grub/util/mkimage.h | 4 ++-- util/grub-install-common.c | 17 +++++++++++++--- util/grub-mkimage.c | 12 +++++++++++ util/grub-mkimagexx.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- util/mkimage.c | 9 ++++++--- 6 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
include/grub/util/install.h +5 -2
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ N_("disable shim_lock verifier"), 0 }, \ {"disable-cli" ,GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI ,0 ,0 , \ N_("disabled command line interface access"), 0 }, \ + { "appended-signature-size", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_SIZE, \ + "SIZE", 0, N_("Add a note segment reserving SIZE bytes for an appended signature"), 1}, \ { "verbose", 'v', 0, 0, \ N_("print verbose messages."), 1 }
@@ -132,7 +134,8 @@ enum grub_install_options {GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DTB ,GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_SBAT ,GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK , - GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI +GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI , + GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_SIZE };extern char *grub_install_source_directory;
@@ -192,7 +195,7 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,size_t npubkeys, char *config_path, const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target, - int note, + int note, size_t appsig_size, grub_compression_t comp, const char *dtb_file, const char *sbat_path, const int disable_shim_lock, const int disable_cli);
include/grub/util/mkimage.h +2 -2
@@ -51,12 +51,12 @@ grub_mkimage_load_image64 (const char *kernel_path, const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target);void grub_mkimage_generate_elf32 (const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target, -int note,char *sbat,char **core_img,size_t *core_size, +int note,char *sbat,size_t appsig_size,char **core_img,size_t *core_size,Elf32_Addr target_addr,struct grub_mkimage_layout *layout);void grub_mkimage_generate_elf64 (const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target, -int note,char *sbat,char **core_img,size_t *core_size, +int note,char *sbat,size_t appsig_size,char **core_img,size_t *core_size,Elf64_Addr target_addr,struct grub_mkimage_layout *layout);
util/grub-install-common.c +14 -3
@@ -467,10 +467,13 @@ static char *sbat;static int disable_shim_lock;static grub_compression_t compression;static int disable_cli; +static size_t appsig_size;int grub_install_parse (int key,char *arg) { +const char *end; +switch (key) {case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_INSTALL_CORE_COMPRESS :
@@ -571,6 +574,13 @@ grub_install_parse (int key, char *arg)grub_util_error (_ ("Unrecognized compression `%s'" ), arg);case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_GRUB_MKIMAGE :return 1 ; +case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_SIZE : + appsig_size =grub_strtoul (arg, &end,10 ); +if (*arg =='\0' || *end !='\0' ) +grub_util_error (_ ("non-numeric or invalid appended signature size `%s'" ), arg); +else if (appsig_size ==0 ) +grub_util_error (_ ("appended signature size `%s', and it should not be zero" ), arg); +return 1 ;default :return 0 ; }
@@ -683,9 +693,10 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix, *p ='\0' ;grub_util_info ("grub-mkimage --directory '%s' --prefix '%s' --output '%s'" -" --format '%s' --compression '%s'%s%s%s%s\n" , +" --format '%s' --compression '%s'" +" --appended-signature-size %zu %s %s %s %s\n" , dir, prefix, outname, - mkimage_target, compnames[compression], + mkimage_target, compnames[compression], appsig_size, note ?" --note" :"" , disable_shim_lock ?" --disable-shim-lock" :"" , disable_cli ?" --disable-cli" :"" , s);
@@ -698,7 +709,7 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix,grub_install_generate_image (dir, prefix, fp, outname, modules.entries, memdisk_path, pubkeys, npubkeys, config_path, tgt, - note, compression, dtb, sbat, + note, appsig_size, compression, dtb, sbat, disable_shim_lock, disable_cli);while (dc--)grub_install_pop_module ();
util/grub-mkimage.c +12 -0
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ static struct argp_option options[] = { {"sbat", 's', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("SBAT metadata"), 0}, {"disable-shim-lock", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK, 0, 0, N_("disable shim_lock verifier"), 0}, {"disable-cli", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI, 0, 0, N_("disable command line interface access"), 0}, + {"appended-signature-size", 'S', N_("SIZE"), 0, N_("Add a note segment reserving SIZE bytes for an appended signature"), 0}, {"verbose", 'v', 0, 0, N_("print verbose messages."), 0}, { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 } };
@@ -130,6 +131,7 @@ struct argumentsint note;int disable_shim_lock;int disable_cli; +size_t appsig_size;const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target;grub_compression_t comp; };
@@ -140,6 +142,7 @@ argp_parser (int key, char *arg, struct argp_state *state)/* Get the input argument from argp_parse, which we know is a pointer to our arguments structure. */ struct arguments *arguments = state->input; +const char *end;switch (key) {
@@ -172,6 +175,14 @@ argp_parser (int key, char *arg, struct argp_state *state) arguments->note =1 ;break ; +case 'S' : + arguments->appsig_size =grub_strtoul (arg, &end,10 ); +if (*arg =='\0' || *end !='\0' ) +grub_util_error (_ ("non-numeric or invalid appended signature size `%s'" ), arg); +else if (arguments->appsig_size ==0 ) +grub_util_error (_ ("appended signature size `%s', and it should not be zero" ), arg); +break ; +case 'm' :if (arguments->memdisk)free (arguments->memdisk);
@@ -330,6 +341,7 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[]) arguments.memdisk, arguments.pubkeys, arguments.npubkeys, arguments.config, arguments.image_target, arguments.note, + arguments.appsig_size, arguments.comp, arguments.dtb, arguments.sbat, arguments.disable_shim_lock, arguments.disable_cli);
util/grub-mkimagexx.c +39 -1
@@ -115,6 +115,14 @@ struct grub_sbat_note {char name[ALIGN_UP (sizeof (GRUB_SBAT_NOTE_NAME ),4 )]; }; +#define GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_NAME "Appended-Signature" +#define GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_TYPE 0x41536967/* "ASig" */ +struct grub_appended_signature_note +{ +Elf32_Nhdr header; +char name[ALIGN_UP (sizeof (GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_NAME ),4 )]; +}; +static int is_relocatable (const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target) {
@@ -216,7 +224,7 @@ grub_arm_reloc_jump24 (grub_uint32_t *target, Elf32_Addr sym_addr)void SUFFIX (grub_mkimage_generate_elf ) (const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target, -int note,char *sbat,char **core_img,size_t *core_size, +int note,char *sbat,size_t appsig_size,char **core_img,size_t *core_size,Elf_Addr target_addr,struct grub_mkimage_layout *layout) {
@@ -237,6 +245,12 @@ SUFFIX (grub_mkimage_generate_elf) (const struct grub_install_image_target_desc footer_size +=ALIGN_UP (sizeof (struct grub_sbat_note ) + layout->sbat_size,4 ); } +if (appsig_size) + { + phnum++; + footer_size +=ALIGN_UP (sizeof (struct grub_appended_signature_note ),4 ); + } +if (image_target->id !=IMAGE_LOONGSON_ELF ) phnum +=2 ;
@@ -518,6 +532,30 @@ SUFFIX (grub_mkimage_generate_elf) (const struct grub_install_image_target_descmemcpy (note_ptr->name,GRUB_SBAT_NOTE_NAME ,sizeof (GRUB_SBAT_NOTE_NAME ));memcpy ((char *)(note_ptr +1 ), sbat, layout->sbat_size); + phdr++; + phdr->p_type =grub_host_to_target32 (PT_NOTE ); + phdr->p_flags =grub_host_to_target32 (PF_R ); + phdr->p_align =grub_host_to_target32 (image_target->voidp_sizeof); + phdr->p_vaddr =0 ; + phdr->p_paddr =0 ; + phdr->p_filesz =grub_host_to_target32 (note_size); + phdr->p_memsz =0 ; + phdr->p_offset =grub_host_to_target32 (header_size + program_size + footer_offset); + footer += note_size; + footer_offset += note_size; + } + +if (appsig_size) + { +int note_size =ALIGN_UP (sizeof (struct grub_appended_signature_note ) + appsig_size,4 ); +struct grub_appended_signature_note *note_ptr = (struct grub_appended_signature_note *) footer; + + note_ptr->header.n_namesz =grub_host_to_target32 (sizeof (GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_NAME )); +/* Needs to sit at the end, so we round this up and sign some zero padding. */ + note_ptr->header.n_descsz =grub_host_to_target32 (ALIGN_UP (appsig_size,4 )); + note_ptr->header.n_type =grub_host_to_target32 (GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_TYPE ); +strcpy (note_ptr->name,GRUB_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_NOTE_NAME ); + phdr++; phdr->p_type =grub_host_to_target32 (PT_NOTE ); phdr->p_flags =grub_host_to_target32 (PF_R );
util/mkimage.c +6 -3
@@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix, char *memdisk_path, char **pubkey_paths, size_t npubkeys, char *config_path, const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target, - int note, grub_compression_t comp, const char *dtb_path, + int note, size_t appsig_size, grub_compression_t comp, const char *dtb_path, const char *sbat_path, int disable_shim_lock, int disable_cli) {
@@ -946,6 +946,9 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,if (sbat_path !=NULL && (image_target->id !=IMAGE_EFI && image_target->id !=IMAGE_PPC ))grub_util_error (_ ("SBAT data can be added only to EFI or powerpc-ieee1275 images" )); +if (appsig_size !=0 && image_target->id !=IMAGE_PPC ) +grub_util_error (_ ("appended signature can be support only to powerpc-ieee1275 images" )); +if (disable_shim_lock) total_module_size +=sizeof (struct grub_module_header );
@@ -1833,10 +1836,10 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix,else target_addr = image_target->link_addr;if (image_target->voidp_sizeof ==4 ) -grub_mkimage_generate_elf32 (image_target, note, sbat, &core_img, &core_size, +grub_mkimage_generate_elf32 (image_target, note, sbat, appsig_size, &core_img, &core_size, target_addr, &layout);else -grub_mkimage_generate_elf64 (image_target, note, sbat, &core_img, &core_size, +grub_mkimage_generate_elf64 (image_target, note, sbat, appsig_size, &core_img, &core_size, target_addr, &layout); }break ;
Signature · 7 lines
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v15 2/20 crypto: Move storage for grub_crypto_pk_* to crypto.c
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyFrom: Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>
The way gcry_rsa and friends (the asymmetric ciphers) are loaded for the pgp module is a bit quirky.
include/grub/crypto.h contains:
extern struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_rsa;
commands/pgp.c contains the actual storage:
struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_rsa;
And the module itself saves to the storage in pgp.c:
GRUB_MOD_INIT(gcry_rsa)
{
grub_crypto_pk_rsa = &_gcry_pubkey_spec_rsa;}
This is annoying: gcry_rsa now has a dependency on pgp!
We want to be able to bring in gcry_rsa without bringing in PGP, so move the storage to crypto.c.
Previously, gcry_rsa depended on pgp and mpi. Now it depends on crypto and mpi. As pgp depends on crypto, this doesn't add any new module dependencies using the PGP verfier.
[FWIW, the story is different for the symmetric ciphers. cryptodisk and friends (zfs encryption etc) use grub_crypto_lookup_cipher_by_name() to get a cipher handle. That depends on grub_ciphers being populated by people calling grub_cipher_register. import_gcry.py ensures that the symmetric ciphers call it.]
--- grub-core/commands/pgp.c | 4 ---- grub-core/lib/crypto.c | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
grub-core/commands/pgp.c +0 -4
@@ -136,10 +136,6 @@ struct signature_v4_headergrub_uint16_t hashed_sub; }GRUB_PACKED ; -struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_dsa; -struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_ecdsa; -struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_rsa; -struct {const char *name;
grub-core/lib/crypto.c +4 -0
@@ -170,6 +170,10 @@ grub_md_unregister (gcry_md_spec_t *cipher) } } +struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_dsa; +struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_ecdsa; +struct gcry_pk_spec *grub_crypto_pk_rsa; +void grub_crypto_hash (const gcry_md_spec_t *hash,void *out,const void *in,grub_size_t inlen)
Signature · 7 lines
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v15 3/20 pgp: Rename OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY to OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyPrior to the addition of the X.509 public key support for appended signature, current PGP signature relied on the GPG public key. Changing the enum name from "OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY" to "OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY" to differentiate between x509 certificate based appended signature and GPG certificate based PGP signature.
--- docs/grub.texi | 34 +++++++++++++++++----------------- grub-core/commands/pgp.c | 2 +- include/grub/kernel.h | 2 +- util/grub-mkimage.c | 2 +- util/mkimage.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
docs/grub.texi +17 -17
@@ -3357,8 +3357,8 @@ entry when selected. @node check_signatures @subsection check_signatures -This variable controls whether GRUB enforces digital signature -validation on loaded files. @xref{Using digital signatures}. +This variable controls whether GRUB enforces GPG-style digital signature +validation on loaded files. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}. @node chosen @subsection chosen
@@ -7054,7 +7054,7 @@ These keys are used to validate signatures when environment variable @code{check_signatures} is set to @code{enforce} (@pxref{check_signatures}), and by some invocations of @command{verify_detached} (@pxref{verify_detached}). @xref{Using -digital signatures}, for more information. +GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information. @end deffn @node drivemap
@@ -7470,7 +7470,7 @@ The output is in GPG's v4 key fingerprint format (i.e., the output of @code{gpg --fingerprint}). The least significant four bytes (last eight hexadecimal digits) can be used as an argument to @command{distrust} (@pxref{distrust}). -@xref{Using digital signatures}, for more information about uses for +@xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information about uses for these keys. @end deffn
@@ -7505,7 +7505,7 @@ When used with care, @option{--skip-sig} and the whitelist enable an administrator to configure a system to boot only signed configurations, but to allow the user to select from among multiple configurations, and to enable ``one-shot'' boot attempts and -``savedefault'' behavior. @xref{Using digital signatures}, for more +``savedefault'' behavior. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information. @end deffn
@@ -7877,7 +7877,7 @@ read. It is possible to modify a digitally signed environment block file from within GRUB using this command, such that its signature will no longer be valid on subsequent boots. Care should be taken in such advanced configurations to avoid rendering the system -unbootable. @xref{Using digital signatures}, for more information. +unbootable. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information. @end deffn
@@ -8367,7 +8367,7 @@ signatures when environment variable @code{check_signatures} is set to must itself be properly signed. The @option{--skip-sig} option can be used to disable signature-checking when reading @var{pubkey_file} itself. It is expected that @option{--skip-sig} is useful for testing -and manual booting. @xref{Using digital signatures}, for more +and manual booting. @xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information. @end deffn
@@ -8440,7 +8440,7 @@ tried. Exit code @code{$?} is set to 0 if the signature validates successfully. If validation fails, it is set to a non-zero value. -@xref{Using digital signatures}, for more information. +@xref{Using GPG-style digital signatures}, for more information. @end deffn @node videoinfo
@@ -8900,13 +8900,13 @@ environment variables and commands are listed in the same order. @chapter Security @menu -* Authentication and authorisation:: Users and access control -* Using digital signatures:: Booting digitally signed code -* UEFI secure boot and shim:: Booting digitally signed PE files -* Secure Boot Advanced Targeting:: Embedded information for generation number based revocation -* Measured Boot:: Measuring boot components -* Lockdown:: Lockdown when booting on a secure setup -* TPM2 key protector:: Managing disk key with TPM2 key protector +* Authentication and authorisation:: Users and access control +* Using GPG-style digital signatures:: Booting digitally signed code +* UEFI secure boot and shim:: Booting digitally signed PE files +* Secure Boot Advanced Targeting:: Embedded information for generation number based revocation +* Measured Boot:: Measuring boot components +* Lockdown:: Lockdown when booting on a secure setup +* TPM2 key protector:: Managing disk key with TPM2 key protector @end menu @node Authentication and authorisation
@@ -8982,8 +8982,8 @@ generating configuration files with authentication. You can use adding @kbd{set superusers=} and @kbd{password} or @kbd{password_pbkdf2} commands. -@node Using digital signatures -@section Using digital signatures in GRUB +@node Using GPG-style digital signatures +@section Using GPG-style digital signatures in GRUB GRUB's @file{core.img} can optionally provide enforcement that all files subsequently read from disk are covered by a valid digital signature.
grub-core/commands/pgp.c +1 -1
@@ -920,7 +920,7 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(pgp)grub_memset (&pseudo_file,0 ,sizeof (pseudo_file));/* Not an ELF module, skip. */ -if (header->type !=OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY ) +if (header->type !=OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY )continue ; pseudo_file.fs = &pseudo_fs;
include/grub/kernel.h +1 -1
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ enumOBJ_TYPE_MEMDISK ,OBJ_TYPE_CONFIG ,OBJ_TYPE_PREFIX , -OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY , +OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY ,OBJ_TYPE_DTB ,OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK ,OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_CLI
util/grub-mkimage.c +1 -1
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ static struct argp_option options[] = {/* TRANSLATORS: "embed" is a verb (command description). "*/ {"config", 'c', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as an early config"), 0},/* TRANSLATORS: "embed" is a verb (command description). "*/ - {"pubkey", 'k', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as public key for signature checking"), 0}, + {"pubkey", 'k', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as public key for PGP signature checking"), 0},/* TRANSLATORS: NOTE is a name of segment. */ {"note", 'n', 0, 0, N_("add NOTE segment for CHRP IEEE1275"), 0}, {"output", 'o', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("output a generated image to FILE [default=stdout]"), 0},
util/mkimage.c +1 -1
@@ -1056,7 +1056,7 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix, curs =grub_util_get_image_size (pubkey_paths[i]); header = (struct grub_module_header *) (kernel_img + offset); - header->type =grub_host_to_target32 (OBJ_TYPE_PUBKEY ); + header->type =grub_host_to_target32 (OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY ); header->size =grub_host_to_target32 (curs +sizeof (*header)); offset +=sizeof (*header);
Signature · 7 lines
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v15 4/20 grub-install: Support embedding x509 certificates
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyTo support verification of appended signatures, we need a way to embed the necessary public keys. Existing appended signature schemes in the Linux kernel use X.509 certificates, so allow certificates to be embedded in the GRUB core image in the same way as PGP keys.
--- include/grub/kernel.h | 1 + include/grub/util/install.h | 3 +++ util/grub-install-common.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++- util/grub-mkimage.c | 12 +++++++++++- util/mkimage.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 5 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/grub/kernel.h +1 -0
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ enumOBJ_TYPE_CONFIG ,OBJ_TYPE_PREFIX ,OBJ_TYPE_GPG_PUBKEY , +OBJ_TYPE_X509_PUBKEY ,OBJ_TYPE_DTB ,OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_SHIM_LOCK ,OBJ_TYPE_DISABLE_CLI
include/grub/util/install.h +3 -0
@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ N_("disable shim_lock verifier"), 0 }, \ {"disable-cli" ,GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI ,0 ,0 , \ N_("disabled command line interface access"), 0 }, \ + { "x509key", 'x', N_("FILE"), 0, \ + N_("embed FILE as an x509 certificate for appended signature checking"), 0}, \ { "appended-signature-size", GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_APPENDED_SIGNATURE_SIZE, \ "SIZE", 0, N_("Add a note segment reserving SIZE bytes for an appended signature"), 1}, \ { "verbose", 'v', 0, 0, \
@@ -193,6 +195,7 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix, const char *outname, char *mods[], char *memdisk_path, char **pubkey_paths, size_t npubkeys, + char **x509key_paths, size_t nx509keys, char *config_path, const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target, int note, size_t appsig_size,
util/grub-install-common.c +18 -1
@@ -463,6 +463,8 @@ handle_install_list (struct install_list *il, const char *val,static char **pubkeys;static size_t npubkeys; +static char **x509keys; +static size_t nx509keys;static char *sbat;static int disable_shim_lock;static grub_compression_t compression;
@@ -511,6 +513,10 @@ grub_install_parse (int key, char *arg)case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_DISABLE_CLI : disable_cli =1 ;return 1 ; +case 'x' : + x509keys =xrealloc (x509keys,sizeof (x509keys[0 ]) * (nx509keys +1 )); + x509keys[nx509keys++] =xstrdup (arg); +return 1 ;case GRUB_INSTALL_OPTIONS_VERBOSITY : verbosity++;
@@ -642,6 +648,9 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix,for (pk = pubkeys; pk < pubkeys + npubkeys; pk++) slen +=sizeof (" --pubkey ''" ) +grub_strlen (*pk); +for (pk = x509keys; pk < x509keys + nx509keys; pk++) + slen +=sizeof (" --x509key ''" ) +grub_strlen (*pk); +for (md = modules.entries; *md; md++) slen +=sizeof (" ''" ) +grub_strlen (*md);
@@ -682,6 +691,14 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix, *p++ ='\'' ; } +for (pk = x509keys; pk < x509keys + nx509keys; pk++) + { + p =grub_stpcpy (p,"--x509key '" ); + p =grub_stpcpy (p, *pk); + *p++ ='\'' ; + *p++ =' ' ; + } +for (md = modules.entries; *md; md++) { *p++ =' ' ;
@@ -708,7 +725,7 @@ grub_install_make_image_wrap_file (const char *dir, const char *prefix,grub_install_generate_image (dir, prefix, fp, outname, modules.entries, memdisk_path, - pubkeys, npubkeys, config_path, tgt, + pubkeys, npubkeys, x509keys, nx509keys, config_path, tgt, note, appsig_size, compression, dtb, sbat, disable_shim_lock, disable_cli);while (dc--)
util/grub-mkimage.c +11 -1
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ static struct argp_option options[] = { {"config", 'c', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as an early config"), 0},/* TRANSLATORS: "embed" is a verb (command description). "*/ {"pubkey", 'k', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as public key for PGP signature checking"), 0}, + {"x509key", 'x', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("embed FILE as an x509 certificate for appended signature checking"), 0},/* TRANSLATORS: NOTE is a name of segment. */ {"note", 'n', 0, 0, N_("add NOTE segment for CHRP IEEE1275"), 0}, {"output", 'o', N_("FILE"), 0, N_("output a generated image to FILE [default=stdout]"), 0},
@@ -125,6 +126,8 @@ struct argumentschar *dtb;char **pubkeys;size_t npubkeys; +char **x509keys; +size_t nx509keys;char *font;char *config;char *sbat;
@@ -209,6 +212,12 @@ argp_parser (int key, char *arg, struct argp_state *state) arguments->pubkeys[arguments->npubkeys++] =xstrdup (arg);break ; +case 'x' : + arguments->x509keys =xrealloc (arguments->x509keys, +sizeof (arguments->x509keys[0 ]) * (arguments->nx509keys +1 )); + arguments->x509keys[arguments->nx509keys++] =xstrdup (arg); +break ; +case 'c' :if (arguments->config)free (arguments->config);
@@ -339,7 +348,8 @@ main (int argc, char *argv[]) grub_install_generate_image (arguments.dir, arguments.prefix, fp, arguments.output, arguments.modules, arguments.memdisk, arguments.pubkeys, - arguments.npubkeys, arguments.config, + arguments.npubkeys, arguments.x509keys, + arguments.nx509keys, arguments.config, arguments.image_target, arguments.note, arguments.appsig_size, arguments.comp, arguments.dtb,
util/mkimage.c +38 -1
@@ -883,7 +883,7 @@ void grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix, FILE *out, const char *outname, char *mods[], char *memdisk_path, char **pubkey_paths, - size_t npubkeys, char *config_path, + size_t npubkeys, char **x509key_paths, size_t nx509keys, char *config_path, const struct grub_install_image_target_desc *image_target, int note, size_t appsig_size, grub_compression_t comp, const char *dtb_path, const char *sbat_path, int disable_shim_lock,
@@ -929,6 +929,24 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix, } } +if (nx509keys !=0 && image_target->id !=IMAGE_PPC ) +grub_util_error (_ ("x509 public key can be support only to appended signature" +" with powerpc-ieee1275 images" )); + + { +size_t i; + +for (i =0 ; i < nx509keys; i++) + { +size_t curs; + + curs =ALIGN_ADDR (grub_util_get_image_size (x509key_paths[i])); +grub_util_info ("the size of x509 public key %u is 0x%" GRUB_HOST_PRIxLONG_LONG, + (unsigned ) i, (unsigned long long ) curs); + total_module_size += curs +sizeof (struct grub_module_header ); + } + } +if (memdisk_path) { memdisk_size =ALIGN_UP (grub_util_get_image_size (memdisk_path),512 );
@@ -1065,6 +1083,25 @@ grub_install_generate_image (const char *dir, const char *prefix, } } + { +size_t i; + +for (i =0 ; i < nx509keys; i++) + { +size_t curs; +struct grub_module_header *header; + + curs =grub_util_get_image_size (x509key_paths[i]); + header = (struct grub_module_header *) (kernel_img + offset); + header->type =grub_host_to_target32 (OBJ_TYPE_X509_PUBKEY ); + header->size =grub_host_to_target32 (curs +sizeof (*header)); + + offset +=sizeof (*header); +grub_util_load_image (x509key_paths[i], kernel_img + offset); + offset +=ALIGN_ADDR (curs); + } + } +if (memdisk_path) {struct grub_module_header *header;
Signature · 7 lines
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v15 5/20 appended signatures: Import GNUTLS's ASN.1 description files
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyIn order to parse PKCS#7 messages and X.509 certificates with libtasn1, we need some information about how they are encoded. We get these from GNUTLS, which has the benefit that they support the features we need and are well tested.
The GNUTLS files are from:
- https://github.com/gnutls/gnutls/blob/master/lib/gnutls.asn
- https://github.com/gnutls/gnutls/blob/master/lib/pkix.asn
The GNUTLS license is LGPLv2.1+, which is GPLv3 compatible, allowing us to import it without issue.
--- .../commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c | 148 ++++++ .../commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c | 485 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 633 insertions(+) create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c new file +148 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +#include <grub/mm.h> +#include <libtasn1.h> + +/* +* Imported from gnutls.asn. +* https://github.com/gnutls/gnutls/blob/master/lib/gnutls.asn +*/ +const asn1_static_node grub_gnutls_asn1_tab[] = { + {"GNUTLS" ,536872976 ,NULL }, + {NULL ,1073741836 ,NULL }, + {"RSAPublicKey" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"modulus" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"publicExponent" ,3 ,NULL }, + {"RSAPrivateKey" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"version" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"modulus" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"publicExponent" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"privateExponent" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"prime1" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"prime2" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"exponent1" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"exponent2" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"coefficient" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"otherPrimeInfos" ,16386 ,"OtherPrimeInfos" }, + {"ProvableSeed" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"algorithm" ,1073741836 ,NULL }, + {"seed" ,7 ,NULL }, + {"OtherPrimeInfos" ,1612709899 ,NULL }, + {"MAX" ,1074266122 ,"1" }, + {NULL ,2 ,"OtherPrimeInfo" }, + {"OtherPrimeInfo" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"prime" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"exponent" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"coefficient" ,3 ,NULL }, + {"AlgorithmIdentifier" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"algorithm" ,1073741836 ,NULL }, + {"parameters" ,541081613 ,NULL }, + {"algorithm" ,1 ,NULL }, + {"DigestInfo" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"digestAlgorithm" ,1073741826 ,"DigestAlgorithmIdentifier" }, + {"digest" ,7 ,NULL }, + {"DigestAlgorithmIdentifier" ,1073741826 ,"AlgorithmIdentifier" }, + {"DSAPublicKey" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"DSAParameters" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"p" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"q" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"g" ,3 ,NULL }, + {"DSASignatureValue" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"r" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"s" ,3 ,NULL }, + {"DSAPrivateKey" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"version" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"p" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"q" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"g" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"Y" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"priv" ,3 ,NULL }, + {"DHParameter" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"prime" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"base" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"privateValueLength" ,16387 ,NULL }, + {"pkcs-11-ec-Parameters" ,1610612754 ,NULL }, + {"oId" ,1073741836 ,NULL }, + {"curveName" ,31 ,NULL }, + {"ECParameters" ,1610612754 ,NULL }, + {"namedCurve" ,12 ,NULL }, + {"ECPrivateKey" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"Version" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"privateKey" ,1073741831 ,NULL }, + {"parameters" ,1610637314 ,"ECParameters" }, + {NULL ,2056 ,"0" }, + {"publicKey" ,536895494 ,NULL }, + {NULL ,2056 ,"1" }, + {"PrincipalName" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"name-type" ,1610620931 ,NULL }, + {NULL ,2056 ,"0" }, + {"name-string" ,536879115 ,NULL }, + {NULL ,1073743880 ,"1" }, + {NULL ,27 ,NULL }, + {"KRB5PrincipalName" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"realm" ,1610620955 ,NULL }, + {NULL ,2056 ,"0" }, + {"principalName" ,536879106 ,"PrincipalName" }, + {NULL ,2056 ,"1" }, + {"RSAPSSParameters" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"hashAlgorithm" ,1610637314 ,"AlgorithmIdentifier" }, + {NULL ,2056 ,"0" }, + {"maskGenAlgorithm" ,1610637314 ,"AlgorithmIdentifier" }, + {NULL ,2056 ,"1" }, + {"saltLength" ,1610653699 ,NULL }, + {NULL ,1073741833 ,"20" }, + {NULL ,2056 ,"2" }, + {"trailerField" ,536911875 ,NULL }, + {NULL ,1073741833 ,"1" }, + {NULL ,2056 ,"3" }, + {"RSAOAEPParameters" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"hashAlgorithm" ,1610637314 ,"AlgorithmIdentifier" }, + {NULL ,2056 ,"0" }, + {"maskGenAlgorithm" ,1610637314 ,"AlgorithmIdentifier" }, + {NULL ,2056 ,"1" }, + {"pSourceFunc" ,536895490 ,"AlgorithmIdentifier" }, + {NULL ,2056 ,"2" }, + {"GOSTParameters" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"publicKeyParamSet" ,1073741836 ,NULL }, + {"digestParamSet" ,16396 ,NULL }, + {"GOSTParametersOld" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"publicKeyParamSet" ,1073741836 ,NULL }, + {"digestParamSet" ,1073741836 ,NULL }, + {"encryptionParamSet" ,16396 ,NULL }, + {"GOSTPrivateKey" ,1073741831 ,NULL }, + {"GOSTPrivateKeyOld" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"IssuerSignTool" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"signTool" ,1073741858 ,NULL }, + {"cATool" ,1073741858 ,NULL }, + {"signToolCert" ,1073741858 ,NULL }, + {"cAToolCert" ,34 ,NULL }, + {"Gost28147-89-EncryptedKey" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"encryptedKey" ,1073741831 ,NULL }, + {"maskKey" ,1610637319 ,NULL }, + {NULL ,4104 ,"0" }, + {"macKey" ,7 ,NULL }, + {"SubjectPublicKeyInfo" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"algorithm" ,1073741826 ,"AlgorithmIdentifier" }, + {"subjectPublicKey" ,6 ,NULL }, + {"GostR3410-TransportParameters" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"encryptionParamSet" ,1073741836 ,NULL }, + {"ephemeralPublicKey" ,1610637314 ,"SubjectPublicKeyInfo" }, + {NULL ,4104 ,"0" }, + {"ukm" ,7 ,NULL }, + {"GostR3410-KeyTransport" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"sessionEncryptedKey" ,1073741826 ,"Gost28147-89-EncryptedKey" }, + {"transportParameters" ,536895490 ,"GostR3410-TransportParameters" }, + {NULL ,4104 ,"0" }, + {"TPMKey" ,1610612741 ,NULL }, + {"type" ,1073741836 ,NULL }, + {"emptyAuth" ,1610637316 ,NULL }, + {NULL ,2056 ,"0" }, + {"parent" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"pubkey" ,1073741831 ,NULL }, + {"privkey" ,7 ,NULL }, + {"MLDSAPrivateKey" ,536870917 ,NULL }, + {"version" ,1073741827 ,NULL }, + {"privateKeyAlgorithm" ,1073741826 ,"AlgorithmIdentifier" }, + {"privateKey" ,1073741831 ,NULL }, + {"publicKey" ,536895495 ,NULL }, + {NULL ,2056 ,"1" }, + {NULL ,0 ,NULL } +};
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c new file +485 -0
485 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 7 lines
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v15 6/20 appended signatures: Parse ASN1 node
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyThis code allows us to parse ASN1 node and allocating memory to store it. It will work for anything where the size libtasn1 returns is right:
- Integers
- Octet strings
- DER encoding of other structures
It will _not_ work for things where libtasn1 size requires adjustment:
- Strings that require an extra NULL byte at the end
- Bit strings because libtasn1 returns the length in bits, not bytes.
If the function returns a non-NULL value, the caller must free it.
--- grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h | 44 +++++++++ grub-core/commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c | 99 ++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 143 insertions(+) create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h new file +44 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +/* +* GRUB -- GRand Unified Bootloader +* Copyright (C) 2020, 2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc. +* Copyright (C) 2020, 2022, 2025 IBM Corporation +* +* GRUB is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify +* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by +* the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or +* (at your option) any later version. +* +* GRUB is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, +* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of +* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the +* GNU General Public License for more details. +* +* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License +* along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. +*/ + +#include <libtasn1.h> + +extern asn1_node grub_gnutls_gnutls_asn; +extern asn1_node grub_gnutls_pkix_asn; + +/* Do libtasn1 init. */ +extern int +grub_asn1_init (void ); + +/* +* Read a value from an ASN1 node, allocating memory to store it. It will work +* for anything where the size libtasn1 returns is right: +* - Integers +* - Octet strings +* - DER encoding of other structures +* +* It will _not_ work for things where libtasn1 size requires adjustment: +* - Strings that require an extra null byte at the end +* - Bit strings because libtasn1 returns the length in bits, not bytes. +* +* If the function returns a non-NULL value, the caller must free it. +*/ +extern void * +grub_asn1_allocate_and_read (asn1_node node,const char *name,const char *friendly_name, +grub_int32_t *content_size);
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c new file +99 -0
99 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 7 lines
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v15 7/20 appended signatures: Parse PKCS#7 signed data
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyThis code allows us to parse:
- PKCS#7 signed data messages. Only a single signer info is supported, which is all that the Linux sign-file utility supports creating out-of-the-box. Only RSA, SHA-256 and SHA-512 are supported. Any certificate embedded in the PKCS#7 message will be ignored.
--- grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h | 37 ++ grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c | 452 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 489 insertions(+) create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h +37 -0
@@ -17,11 +17,48 @@* along with GRUB. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */ +#include <grub/crypto.h> #include <libtasn1.h> extern asn1_node grub_gnutls_gnutls_asn;extern asn1_node grub_gnutls_pkix_asn; +#define GRUB_MAX_OID_LEN 32 + +/* A PKCS#7 signed data signer info. */ +struct pkcs7_signer +{ +const gcry_md_spec_t *hash; +gcry_mpi_t sig_mpi; +}; +typedef struct pkcs7_signer grub_pkcs7_signer_t ; + +/* +* A PKCS#7 signed data message. We make no attempt to match intelligently, so +* we don't save any info about the signer. +*/ +struct pkcs7_data +{ +grub_int32_t signer_count; +grub_pkcs7_signer_t *signers; +}; +typedef struct pkcs7_data grub_pkcs7_data_t ; + +/* +* Parse a PKCS#7 message, which must be a signed data message. The message must +* be in 'sigbuf' and of size 'data_size'. The result is placed in 'msg', which +* must already be allocated. +*/ +extern grub_err_t +grub_pkcs7_data_parse (const void *sigbuf,grub_size_t data_size,grub_pkcs7_data_t *msg); + +/* +* Release all the storage associated with the PKCS#7 message. If the caller +* dynamically allocated the message, it must free it. +*/ +extern void +grub_pkcs7_data_release (grub_pkcs7_data_t *msg); +/* Do libtasn1 init. */ extern int grub_asn1_init (void );
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c new file +452 -0
452 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 7 lines
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v15 8/20 appended signatures: Parse X.509 certificates
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyThis code allows us to parse:
- X.509 certificates: at least enough to verify the signatures on the PKCS#7 messages. We expect that the certificates embedded in GRUB will be leaf certificates, not CA certificates. The parser enforces this.
- X.509 certificates support the Extended Key Usage extension and handle it by verifying that the certificate has a Code Signing usage.
--- grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h | 52 + grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c | 970 +++++++++++++++++++ include/grub/crypto.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 1023 insertions(+) create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.h +52 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,43 @@ extern asn1_node grub_gnutls_pkix_asn;#define GRUB_MAX_OID_LEN 32 +/* RSA public key. */ +#define GRUB_MAX_MPI 2 +#define GRUB_RSA_PK_MODULUS 0 +#define GRUB_RSA_PK_EXPONENT 1 + +/* Certificate fingerprint. */ +#define GRUB_MAX_FINGERPRINT 3 +#define GRUB_FINGERPRINT_SHA256 0 +#define GRUB_FINGERPRINT_SHA384 1 +#define GRUB_FINGERPRINT_SHA512 2 + +/* Max size of hash data. */ +#define GRUB_MAX_HASH_LEN 64 + +/* +* One or more x509 certificates. We do limited parsing: +* extracting only the version, serial, issuer, subject, RSA public key +* and key size. +* Also, hold the sha256, sha384, and sha512 fingerprint of the certificate. +*/ +struct x509_certificate +{ +struct x509_certificate *next; +grub_uint8_t version; +grub_uint8_t *serial; +grub_size_t serial_len; +char *issuer; +grub_size_t issuer_len; +char *subject; +grub_size_t subject_len; +/* We only support RSA public keys. This encodes [modulus, publicExponent]. */ +gcry_mpi_t mpis[GRUB_MAX_MPI ]; +grub_int32_t modulus_size; +grub_uint8_t fingerprint[GRUB_MAX_FINGERPRINT ][GRUB_MAX_HASH_LEN ]; +}; +typedef struct x509_certificate grub_x509_cert_t ; +/* A PKCS#7 signed data signer info. */ struct pkcs7_signer {
@@ -44,6 +81,21 @@ struct pkcs7_data };typedef struct pkcs7_data grub_pkcs7_data_t ; +/* +* Import a DER-encoded certificate at 'data', of size 'size'. Place the results +* into 'results', which must be already allocated. +*/ +extern grub_err_t +grub_x509_cert_parse (const void *data,grub_size_t size,grub_x509_cert_t *results); + +/* +* Release all the storage associated with the x509 certificate. If the caller +* dynamically allocated the certificate, it must free it. The caller is also +* responsible for maintenance of the linked list. +*/ +extern void +grub_x509_cert_release (grub_x509_cert_t *cert); +/* * Parse a PKCS#7 message, which must be a signed data message. The message must * be in 'sigbuf' and of size 'data_size'. The result is placed in 'msg', which
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/x509.c new file +970 -0
970 lines not on this page · raw message
include/grub/crypto.h +1 -0
@@ -518,6 +518,7 @@ grub_crypto_hmac_buffer (const struct gcry_md_spec *md,extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_md5;extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_sha1;extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_sha256; +extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_sha384;extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_sha512;extern gcry_md_spec_t _gcry_digest_spec_crc32;extern gcry_cipher_spec_t _gcry_cipher_spec_aes;
Signature · 7 lines
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v15 9/20 powerpc_ieee1275: Enter lockdown based on /ibm, secure-boot
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyRead secure boot mode from 'ibm,secure-boot' property and if the secure boot mode is set to 2 (enforce), enter lockdown. Else it is considered as disabled. There are three secure boot modes. They are
0 - disabled
No signature verification is performed. This is the default.
1 - audit
Signature verification is performed and if signature verification fails, post the errors and allow the boot to continue.
2 - enforce
Lockdown the GRUB. Signature verification is performed and if signature verification fails, post the errors and stop the boot.
Now, only support disabled and enforce.
--- docs/grub.texi | 2 +- grub-core/Makefile.core.def | 1 + grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/grub/lockdown.h | 3 +- 4 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
docs/grub.texi +1 -1
@@ -9144,7 +9144,7 @@ platforms. @section Lockdown when booting on a secure setup The GRUB can be locked down when booted on a secure boot environment, for example -if the UEFI secure boot is enabled. On a locked down configuration, the GRUB will +if UEFI or Power secure boot is enabled. On a locked down configuration, the GRUB will be restricted and some operations/commands cannot be executed. This also includes limiting which filesystems are supported to those thought to be more robust and widely used within GRUB.
grub-core/Makefile.core.def +1 -0
@@ -333,6 +333,7 @@ kernel = { powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/cache.S; powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/dl.c; powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/compiler-rt.S; + powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/lockdown.c; sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/cache.S; sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/dl.c;
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c +54 -0
73 lines not on this page · raw message
include/grub/lockdown.h +2 -1
@@ -24,7 +24,8 @@#define GRUB_LOCKDOWN_DISABLED 0#define GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED 1 -#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI +#if defined(GRUB_MACHINE_EFI ) || \ + (defined(__powerpc__) && defined(GRUB_MACHINE_IEEE1275 ))extern void EXPORT_FUNC (grub_lockdown ) (void ); extern int
Signature · 7 lines
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v15 10/20 appended signatures: Support verifying appended signatures
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyBuilding on the parsers and the ability to embed X.509 certificates, as well as the existing gcrypt functionality, add a module for verifying appended signatures.
This includes a signature verifier that requires that the Linux kernel and GRUB modules have appended signatures for verification.
Signature verification must be enabled by setting check_appended_signatures. If secure boot is enabled with enforce mode when the appendedsig module is loaded, signature verification will be enabled, and trusted keys will be extracted from the GRUB ELF Note and stored in the db and locked automatically.
--- grub-core/Makefile.core.def | 15 + grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 581 +++++++++++++++++++ include/grub/err.h | 3 +- include/grub/file.h | 2 + 4 files changed, 600 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c
grub-core/Makefile.core.def +15 -0
@@ -997,6 +997,21 @@ module = { cppflags = '$(CPPFLAGS_GCRY)'; }; +module = { + name = appendedsig; + common = commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c; + common = commands/appendedsig/x509.c; + common = commands/appendedsig/pkcs7.c; + common = commands/appendedsig/asn1util.c; + common = commands/appendedsig/gnutls_asn1_tab.c; + common = commands/appendedsig/pkix_asn1_tab.c; + enable = emu; + enable = powerpc_ieee1275; + cflags = '$(CFLAGS_GCRY) -Wno-redundant-decls'; + cppflags = '$(CPPFLAGS_GCRY) -I$(srcdir)/lib/libtasn1-grub'; + depends = crypto, gcry_rsa, gcry_sha256, gcry_sha512, mpi, asn1; +}; + module = { name = hdparm; common = commands/hdparm.c;
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c new file +581 -0
581 lines not on this page · raw message
include/grub/err.h +2 -1
@@ -75,7 +75,8 @@ typedef enumGRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE ,GRUB_ERR_BAD_FIRMWARE ,GRUB_ERR_STILL_REFERENCED , - GRUB_ERR_RECURSION_DEPTH +GRUB_ERR_RECURSION_DEPTH , + GRUB_ERR_EXISTS } grub_err_t;
include/grub/file.h +2 -0
@@ -80,6 +80,8 @@ enum grub_file_typeGRUB_FILE_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY ,/* File holding public key to add to trused keys. */ GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_TRUST , +/* File holding x509 certificiate to add to trusted keys. */ +GRUB_FILE_TYPE_CERTIFICATE_TRUST ,/* File of which we intend to print a blocklist to the user. */ GRUB_FILE_TYPE_PRINT_BLOCKLIST,/* File we intend to use for test loading or testing speed. */
Signature · 7 lines
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v15 11/20 powerpc_ieee1275: Read the db and dbx secure boot variables
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyEnhancing the infrastructure to enable the Platform Keystore (PKS) feature, which provides access to the SB_VERSION, db, and dbx secure boot variables from PKS.
If PKS is enabled, it will read secure boot variables such as db and dbx from PKS and extract EFI Signature List (ESL) from it. The ESLs would be saved in the Platform Keystore buffer, and the appendedsig module would read it later to extract the certificate's details from ESL.
In the following scenarios, static key management mode will be activated:
1. When Secure Boot is enabled with static key management mode
2. When SB_VERSION is unavailable but Secure Boot is enabled
3. When PKS support is unavailable but Secure Boot is enabled
Note:-
SB_VERSION: Key Management Mode
1 - Enable dynamic key management mode. Read the db and dbx variables from PKS,
and use them for signature verification.
0 - Enable static key management mode. Read keys from the GRUB ELF Note and
use it for signature verification.
--- grub-core/Makefile.am | 2 + grub-core/Makefile.core.def | 2 + grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c | 1 - grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c | 4 + grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c | 137 ++++++++ .../kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c | 331 ++++++++++++++++++ include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h | 3 + include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h | 39 +++ .../grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h | 122 +++++++ 9 files changed, 640 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c create mode 100644 grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c create mode 100644 include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h
grub-core/Makefile.am +2 -0
@@ -246,6 +246,8 @@ KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/ieee1275/alloc.h KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/terminfo.h KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/extcmd.h KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/lib/arg.h +KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h +KERNEL_HEADER_FILES += $(top_srcdir)/include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h endif if COND_sparc64_ieee1275
grub-core/Makefile.core.def +2 -0
@@ -334,6 +334,8 @@ kernel = { powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/dl.c; powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/compiler-rt.S; powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/lockdown.c; + powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c; + powerpc_ieee1275 = kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c; sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/cache.S; sparc64_ieee1275 = kern/sparc64/dl.c;
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/ieee1275.c +0 -1
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@#define IEEE1275_PHANDLE_INVALID ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)#define IEEE1275_IHANDLE_INVALID ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) 0) -#define IEEE1275_CELL_INVALID ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)
grub-core/kern/ieee1275/init.c +4 -0
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@#endif #if defined(__powerpc__)#include <grub/lockdown.h> +#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h> +#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h> #endif #ifdef __powerpc__
@@ -1043,6 +1045,8 @@ grub_ieee1275_get_secure_boot (void) }else grub_dprintf ("ieee1275" ,"Secure Boot Disabled\n" ); + +grub_pks_keystore_init (); }#endif /* __powerpc__ */ grub_addr_t grub_modbase;
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.c new file +137 -0
137 lines not on this page · raw message
grub-core/kern/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.c new file +331 -0
331 lines not on this page · raw message
include/grub/ieee1275/ieee1275.h +3 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,9 @@#include <grub/types.h> #include <grub/machine/ieee1275.h> +#define IEEE1275_CELL_INVALID ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1) +#define IEEE1275_CELL_NOT_FOUND ((grub_int32_t) -7) +#define GRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_FALSE ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) 0)#define GRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_TRUE ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) -1)
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/ieee1275.h +39 -0
@@ -28,4 +28,43 @@ typedef grub_uint32_t grub_ieee1275_cell_t;#define PRIxGRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_T PRIxGRUB_UINT32_T#define PRIuGRUB_IEEE1275_CELL_T PRIuGRUB_UINT32_T +#ifdef __powerpc__ +/* The maximum object size interface name for a PKS object. */ +#define GRUB_PKS_MAX_OBJ_INTERFACE "pks-max-object-size" + +/* PKS read object and read sbvar interface name. */ +#define GRUB_PKS_READ_OBJ_INTERFACE "pks-read-object" +#define GRUB_PKS_READ_SBVAR_INTERFACE "pks-read-sbvar" + +/* PKS read object label for secure boot version. */ +#define GRUB_SB_VERSION_KEY_NAME "SB_VERSION" +#define GRUB_SB_VERSION_KEY_LEN (sizeof (GRUB_SB_VERSION_KEY_NAME) - 1) + +/* PKS object minmum size. */ +#define GRUB_PKS_MIN_OBJ_SIZE ((grub_ieee1275_cell_t) 4096) + +/* PKS consumer type for firmware. */ +#define GRUB_PKS_CONSUMER_FW ((grub_uint32_t) 1) + +/* PKS read secure boot variable request type for db and dbx. */ +#define GRUB_PKS_SBVAR_DB ((grub_uint32_t) 1) +#define GRUB_PKS_SBVAR_DBX ((grub_uint32_t) 2) + +extern grub_int32_t +grub_ieee1275_test (const char *interface_name); + +extern grub_int32_t +grub_ieee1275_pks_max_object_size (grub_uint32_t *result); + +extern grub_int32_t +grub_ieee1275_pks_read_object (const grub_uint32_t consumer,const char *label, +const grub_uint32_t label_len,const grub_uint32_t buffer_len, +grub_uint8_t *buffer,grub_uint32_t *data_len, +grub_uint32_t *policies); + +extern grub_int32_t +grub_ieee1275_pks_read_sbvar (const grub_uint32_t sbvar_flags,const grub_uint32_t sbvar_type, +const grub_uint32_t buffer_len,grub_uint8_t *buffer, +grub_size_t *data_len); +#endif /* __powerpc__ */ #endif /* ! GRUB_IEEE1275_MACHINE_HEADER */
include/grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h new file +122 -0
122 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 7 lines
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v15 12/20 appended signatures: Introducing key management environment variable
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyIntroducing the appended signature key management environment variable. It is automatically set to either "static" or "dynamic" based on the Platform KeyStore.
"static": Enforce static key management signature verification. This is the
default. When the GRUB is locked down, user cannot change the value by setting the appendedsig_key_mgmt variable back to "dynamic".
"dynamic": Enforce dynamic key management signature verification. When the GRUB
is locked down, user cannot change the value by setting the appendedsig_key_mgmt variable back to "static".
--- grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 75 insertions(+)
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +75 -0
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@#include <libtasn1.h> #include <grub/env.h> #include <grub/lockdown.h> +#include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h> #include "appendedsig.h"
@@ -94,6 +95,16 @@ static sb_database_t db = {.certs = NULL, .cert_entries = 0};*/ static bool check_sigs = false; +/* +* append_key_mgmt: Key Management Modes +* False: Static key management (use built-in Keys). This is default. +* True: Dynamic key management (use Platform KeySotre). +*/ +static bool append_key_mgmt = false; + +/* Platform KeyStore db and dbx. */ +static grub_pks_t *pks_keystore; +static grub_ssize_t pseudo_read (struct grub_file *file,char *buf,grub_size_t len) {
@@ -469,6 +480,46 @@ grub_env_write_sec (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)), const chareturn ret; } +static const char * +grub_env_read_key_mgmt (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)), +const char *val __attribute__ ((unused))) +{ +if (append_key_mgmt == true) +return "dynamic" ; + +return "static" ; +} + +static char * +grub_env_write_key_mgmt (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)),const char *val) +{ +char *ret; + +/* +* Do not allow the value to be changed if signature verification is enabled +* (check_sigs is set to true) and GRUB is locked down. +*/ +if (check_sigs == true &&grub_is_lockdown () ==GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED ) + { + ret =grub_strdup (grub_env_read_key_mgmt (NULL ,NULL )); +if (ret ==NULL ) +grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ,"out of memory" ); + +return ret; + } + +if (grub_strcmp (val,"dynamic" ) ==0 ) + append_key_mgmt = true; +else if (grub_strcmp (val,"static" ) ==0 ) + append_key_mgmt = false; + + ret =grub_strdup (grub_env_read_key_mgmt (NULL ,NULL )); +if (ret ==NULL ) +grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ,"out of memory" ); + +return ret; +} +static grub_err_t appendedsig_init (grub_file_t io __attribute__ ((unused)),enum grub_file_type type,void **context __attribute__ ((unused)),enum grub_verify_flags *flags)
@@ -540,6 +591,11 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (appendedsig)if (grub_is_lockdown () ==GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED ) check_sigs = true; +/* If PKS keystore is available, use dynamic key management. */ + pks_keystore =grub_pks_get_keystore (); +if (pks_keystore !=NULL ) + append_key_mgmt = true; +/* * This is appended signature verification environment variable. It is * automatically set to either "no" or "yes" based on the ’ibm,secure-boot’
@@ -554,6 +610,23 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (appendedsig)grub_register_variable_hook ("check_appended_signatures" , grub_env_read_sec, grub_env_write_sec);grub_env_export ("check_appended_signatures" ); +/* +* This is appended signature key management environment variable. It is +* automatically set to either "static" or "dynamic" based on the +* Platform KeyStore. +* +* "static": Enforce static key management signature verification. This is +* the default. When the GRUB is locked down, user cannot change +* the value by setting the appendedsig_key_mgmt variable back to +* "dynamic". +* +* "dynamic": Enforce dynamic key management signature verification. When the +* GRUB is locked down, user cannot change the value by setting the +* appendedsig_key_mgmt variable back to "static". +*/ +grub_register_variable_hook ("appendedsig_key_mgmt" , grub_env_read_key_mgmt, grub_env_write_key_mgmt); +grub_env_export ("appendedsig_key_mgmt" ); + rc =grub_asn1_init ();if (rc !=ASN1_SUCCESS )grub_fatal ("error initing ASN.1 data structures: %d: %s\n" , rc,asn1_strerror (rc));
@@ -577,5 +650,7 @@ GRUB_MOD_FINI (appendedsig)free_db_list ();grub_register_variable_hook ("check_appended_signatures" ,NULL ,NULL );grub_env_unset ("check_appended_signatures" ); +grub_register_variable_hook ("appendedsig_key_mgmt" ,NULL ,NULL ); +grub_env_unset ("appendedsig_key_mgmt" );grub_verifier_unregister (&grub_appendedsig_verifier); }
Signature · 7 lines
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v15 13/20 appended signatures: Create db and dbx lists
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamyIf secure boot is enabled with static key management mode, the trusted certificates will be extracted from the GRUB ELF Note and added to db list.
If secure boot is enabled with dynamic key management mode, the trusted certificates and certificate/binary hash will be extracted from the PKS and added to db list. The distrusted certificates, certificate/binary hash are read from the PKS and added to dbx list. Both dbx and db lists usage is added by a subsequent patch.
Note:
If the certificate or the certificate hash exists in the dbx list, then do not add that certificate/certificate hash to the db list.
--- grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 408 ++++++++++++++++++- include/grub/efi/pks.h | 112 +++++ include/grub/types.h | 4 + 3 files changed, 507 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/grub/efi/pks.h
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +391 -17
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@#include <grub/env.h> #include <grub/lockdown.h> #include <grub/powerpc/ieee1275/platform_keystore.h> +#include <grub/efi/pks.h> #include "appendedsig.h"
@@ -46,6 +47,11 @@ GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");#define SIG_MAGIC "~Module signature appended~\n"#define SIG_MAGIC_SIZE ((sizeof(SIG_MAGIC) - 1)) +/* SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 hash sizes. */ +#define SHA256_HASH_SIZE 32 +#define SHA384_HASH_SIZE 48 +#define SHA512_HASH_SIZE 64 +/* * This structure is extracted from scripts/sign-file.c in the linux kernel * source. It was licensed as LGPLv2.1+, which is GPLv3+ compatible.
@@ -79,11 +85,23 @@ struct sb_database {grub_x509_cert_t *certs;/* Certificates. */ grub_uint32_t cert_entries;/* Number of certificates. */ +grub_uint8_t **hashes;/* Certificate/binary hashes. */ +grub_size_t *hash_sizes;/* Sizes of certificate/binary hashes. */ +grub_uint32_t hash_entries;/* Number of certificate/binary hashes. */ +bool is_db;/* Flag to indicate the db/dbx list. */ };typedef struct sb_database sb_database_t ;/* The db list is used to validate appended signatures. */ -static sb_database_t db = {.certs =NULL , .cert_entries =0 }; +static sb_database_t db = {.certs =NULL , .cert_entries =0 , .hashes =NULL , + .hash_sizes =NULL , .hash_entries =0 , .is_db = true}; +/* +* The dbx list is used to ensure that the distrusted certificates or GRUB +* modules/kernel binaries are rejected during appended signatures/hashes +* validation. +*/ +static sb_database_t dbx = {.certs =NULL , .cert_entries =0 , .hashes =NULL , + .hash_sizes =NULL , .hash_entries =0 , .is_db = false};/* * Signature verification flag (check_sigs).
@@ -118,6 +136,169 @@ static struct grub_fs pseudo_fs = { .fs_read = pseudo_read }; +/* +* GUID can be used to determine the hashing function and generate the hash using +* determined hashing function. +*/ +static grub_err_t +get_hash (const grub_packed_guid_t *guid,const grub_uint8_t *data,const grub_size_t data_size, +grub_uint8_t *hash,grub_size_t *hash_size) +{ +gcry_md_spec_t *hash_func =NULL ; + +if (guid ==NULL ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE ,"GUID is not available" ); + +if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA256_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 || +grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 ) + hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha256; +else if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA384_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 || +grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 ) + hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha384; +else if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA512_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 || +grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 ) + hash_func = &_gcry_digest_spec_sha512; +else +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE ,"unsupported GUID hash" ); + +grub_crypto_hash (hash_func, hash, data, data_size); + *hash_size = hash_func->mdlen; + +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +} + +static grub_err_t +generate_cert_hash (const grub_size_t cert_hash_size,const grub_uint8_t *data, +const grub_size_t data_size,grub_uint8_t *hash,grub_size_t *hash_size) +{ +grub_packed_guid_t guid = {0 }; + +/* support SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 for certificate hash */ +if (cert_hash_size ==SHA256_HASH_SIZE ) +grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ); +else if (cert_hash_size ==SHA384_HASH_SIZE ) +grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ); +else if (cert_hash_size ==SHA512_HASH_SIZE ) +grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ); +else + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"unsupported hash type (%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE") and " +"skipped\n" , cert_hash_size); +return GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_COMMAND ; + } + +return get_hash (&guid, data, data_size, hash, hash_size); +} + +/* Check the hash presence in the db/dbx list. */ +static bool +check_hash_presence (grub_uint8_t *const hash,const grub_size_t hash_size, +const sb_database_t *sb_database) +{ +grub_uint32_t i; + +for (i =0 ; i < sb_database->hash_entries; i++) + { +if (sb_database->hashes[i] ==NULL ) +continue ; + +if (hash_size == sb_database->hash_sizes[i] && +grub_memcmp (sb_database->hashes[i], hash, hash_size) ==0 ) +return true; + } + +return false; +} + +/* Add the certificate/binary hash into the db/dbx list. */ +static grub_err_t +add_hash (grub_uint8_t *const data,const grub_size_t data_size,sb_database_t *sb_database) +{ +grub_uint8_t **hashes; +grub_size_t *hash_sizes; + +if (data ==NULL || data_size ==0 ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE ,"certificate/binary-hash data or size is not available" ); + +if (sb_database->is_db == true) + { +if (check_hash_presence (data, data_size, &dbx) == true) + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" , +"cannot add a hash (%02x%02x%02x%02x), as it is present in the dbx list\n" , + data[0 ], data[1 ], data[2 ], data[3 ]); +return GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED ; + } + } + +if (check_hash_presence (data, data_size, sb_database) == true) + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" , +"cannot add a hash (%02x%02x%02x%02x), as it is present in the %s list\n" , + data[0 ], data[1 ], data[2 ], data[3 ], ((sb_database->is_db == true) ?"db" :"dbx" )); +return GRUB_ERR_EXISTS ; + } + + hashes =grub_realloc (sb_database->hashes,sizeof (grub_uint8_t *) * (sb_database->hash_entries +1 )); +if (hashes ==NULL ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ,"out of memory" ); + + hash_sizes =grub_realloc (sb_database->hash_sizes,sizeof (grub_size_t) * (sb_database->hash_entries +1 )); +if (hash_sizes ==NULL ) + { +/* Allocated memory will be freed by free_db_list()/free_dbx_list(). */ + hashes[sb_database->hash_entries] =NULL ; + sb_database->hashes = hashes; + sb_database->hash_entries++; + +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ,"out of memory" ); + } + + hashes[sb_database->hash_entries] =grub_malloc (data_size); +if (hashes[sb_database->hash_entries] ==NULL ) +return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ,"out of memory" ); + +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" , +"added the hash %02x%02x%02x%02x... with size of %" PRIuGRUB_SIZE" to the %s list\n" , + data[0 ], data[1 ], data[2 ], data[3 ], data_size, + ((sb_database->is_db == true) ?"db" :"dbx" )); + +grub_memcpy (hashes[sb_database->hash_entries], data, data_size); + hash_sizes[sb_database->hash_entries] = data_size; + sb_database->hash_sizes = hash_sizes; + sb_database->hashes = hashes; + sb_database->hash_entries++; + +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +} + +static bool +is_hash (const grub_packed_guid_t *guid) +{ +/* GUID type of the binary hash. */ +if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA256_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 || +grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA384_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 || +grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA512_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 ) +return true; + +/* GUID type of the certificate hash. */ +if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 || +grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA384_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 || +grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 ) +return true; + +return false; +} + +static bool +is_x509 (const grub_packed_guid_t *guid) +{ +if (grub_memcmp (guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_X509_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ) ==0 ) +return true; + +return false; +} +static bool is_cert_match (const grub_x509_cert_t *cert1,const grub_x509_cert_t *cert2) {
@@ -136,7 +317,33 @@ is_cert_match (const grub_x509_cert_t *cert1, const grub_x509_cert_t *cert2)return false; } -/* Check the certificate presence in the db list. */ +/* Check the certificate hash presence in the dbx list. */ +static bool +is_cert_hash_present_in_dbx (const grub_uint8_t *data,const grub_size_t data_size) +{ +grub_err_t rc; +grub_uint32_t i; +grub_size_t cert_hash_size =0 ; +grub_uint8_t cert_hash[GRUB_MAX_HASH_LEN ] = {0 }; + +for (i =0 ; i < dbx.hash_entries; i++) + { +if (dbx.hashes[i] ==NULL ) +continue ; + + rc =generate_cert_hash (dbx.hash_sizes[i], data, data_size, cert_hash, &cert_hash_size); +if (rc !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +continue ; + +if (cert_hash_size == dbx.hash_sizes[i] && +grub_memcmp (dbx.hashes[i], cert_hash, cert_hash_size) ==0 ) +return true; + } + +return false; +} + +/* Check the certificate presence in the db/dbx list. */ static bool check_cert_presence (const grub_x509_cert_t *cert_in,const sb_database_t *sb_database) {
@@ -149,7 +356,11 @@ check_cert_presence (const grub_x509_cert_t *cert_in, const sb_database_t *sb_dareturn false; } -/* Add the certificate into the db list */ +/* +* Add the certificate into the db list if it is not present in the dbx and db +* list when is_db is true. Add the certificate into the dbx list when is_db is +* false. +*/ static grub_err_t add_certificate (const grub_uint8_t *data,const grub_size_t data_size,sb_database_t *sb_database)
@@ -167,30 +378,54 @@ add_certificate (const grub_uint8_t *data, const grub_size_t data_size, rc =grub_x509_cert_parse (data, data_size, cert);if (rc !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) { -grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"cannot add a certificate CN='%s' to the db list\n" , - cert->subject); +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"cannot add a certificate CN='%s' to the %s list\n" , + cert->subject, (sb_database->is_db == true) ?"db" :"dbx" );grub_free (cert);return rc; } +/* +* Only checks the certificate against dbx if is_db is true when dynamic key +* management is enabled. +*/ +if (append_key_mgmt == true) + { +if (sb_database->is_db == true) + { +if (is_cert_hash_present_in_dbx (data, data_size) == true || +check_cert_presence (cert, &dbx) == true) + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" , +"cannot add a certificate CN='%s', as it is present in the dbx list" , + cert->subject); + rc =GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED ; + goto fail; + } + } + } +if (check_cert_presence (cert, sb_database) == true) {grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" , -"cannot add a certificate CN='%s', as it is present in the db list" , - cert->subject); -grub_x509_cert_release (cert); -grub_free (cert); - -return GRUB_ERR_EXISTS ; +"cannot add a certificate CN='%s', as it is present in the %s list" , + cert->subject, ((sb_database->is_db == true) ?"db" :"dbx" )); + rc =GRUB_ERR_EXISTS ; + goto fail; } -grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"added a certificate CN='%s' to the db list\n" , - cert->subject); +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"added a certificate CN='%s' to the %s list\n" , + cert->subject, ((sb_database->is_db == true) ?"db" :"dbx" )); cert->next = sb_database->certs; sb_database->certs = cert; sb_database->cert_entries++; +return rc; + + fail: +grub_x509_cert_release (cert); +grub_free (cert); +return rc; }
@@ -382,6 +617,68 @@ grub_verify_appended_signature (const grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t bufsize)return err; } +/* Add the X.509 certificates/binary hash to the db list from PKS. */ +static grub_err_t +load_pks2db (void ) +{ +grub_err_t rc; +grub_uint32_t i; + +for (i =0 ; i < pks_keystore->db_entries; i++) + { +if (is_hash (&pks_keystore->db[i].guid) == true) + { + rc =add_hash (pks_keystore->db[i].data, + pks_keystore->db[i].data_size, &db); +if (rc ==GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ) +return rc; + } +else if (is_x509 (&pks_keystore->db[i].guid) == true) + { + rc =add_certificate (pks_keystore->db[i].data, + pks_keystore->db[i].data_size, &db); +if (rc ==GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ) +return rc; + } +else +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"unsupported signature data type and " +"skipped (%u)\n" , i +1 ); + } + +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +} + +/* Add the certificates and certificate/binary hash to the dbx list from PKS. */ +static grub_err_t +load_pks2dbx (void ) +{ +grub_err_t rc; +grub_uint32_t i; + +for (i =0 ; i < pks_keystore->dbx_entries; i++) + { +if (is_x509 (&pks_keystore->dbx[i].guid) == true) + { + rc =add_certificate (pks_keystore->dbx[i].data, + pks_keystore->dbx[i].data_size, &dbx); +if (rc ==GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY ) +return rc; + } +else if (is_hash (&pks_keystore->dbx[i].guid) == true) + { + rc =add_hash (pks_keystore->dbx[i].data, + pks_keystore->dbx[i].data_size, &dbx); +if (rc !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +return rc; + } +else +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"unsupported signature data type and " +"skipped (%u)\n" , i +1 ); + } + +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +} +/* * Extract the X.509 certificates from the ELF Note header, parse it, and add * it to the db list.
@@ -422,11 +719,46 @@ load_elf2db (void) } } +/* +* Extract trusted and distrusted keys from PKS and store them in the db and +* dbx list. +*/ +static void +create_dbs_from_pks (void ) +{ +grub_err_t err; + + err =load_pks2dbx (); +if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +grub_printf ("warning: dbx list might not be fully populated\n" ); + +/* +* If the db variable is not present or empty in the PKS storage, then read +* the static keys as a db default keys from the GRUB ELF Note and add them +* into the db list. +*/ +if (pks_keystore->db ==NULL ) +load_elf2db (); +else + { + err =load_pks2db (); +if (err !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +grub_printf ("warning: db list might not be fully populated\n" ); + } + +grub_pks_free_data (); +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"the db list now has %u keys\n" +"the dbx list now has %u keys\n" , + db.hash_entries + db.cert_entries, + dbx.hash_entries + dbx.cert_entries); +} +/* Free db list memory */ static void free_db_list (void ) {grub_x509_cert_t *cert; +grub_uint32_t i;while (db.certs !=NULL ) {
@@ -436,9 +768,37 @@ free_db_list (void)grub_free (cert); } +for (i =0 ; i < db.hash_entries; i++) +grub_free (db.hashes[i]); + +grub_free (db.hashes); +grub_free (db.hash_sizes);grub_memset (&db,0 ,sizeof (sb_database_t)); } +/* Free dbx list memory */ +static void +free_dbx_list (void ) +{ +grub_x509_cert_t *cert; +grub_uint32_t i; + +while (dbx.certs !=NULL ) + { + cert = dbx.certs; + dbx.certs = dbx.certs->next; +grub_x509_cert_release (cert); +grub_free (cert); + } + +for (i =0 ; i < dbx.hash_entries; i++) +grub_free (dbx.hashes[i]); + +grub_free (dbx.hashes); +grub_free (dbx.hash_sizes); +grub_memset (&dbx,0 ,sizeof (sb_database_t)); +} +static const char *grub_env_read_sec (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)),const char *val __attribute__ ((unused)))
@@ -631,10 +991,23 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (appendedsig)if (rc !=ASN1_SUCCESS )grub_fatal ("error initing ASN.1 data structures: %d: %s\n" , rc,asn1_strerror (rc)); -/* Extract trusted keys from ELF Note and store them in the db. */ -load_elf2db (); -grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"the db list now has %u static keys\n" , - db.cert_entries); +/* +* If signature verification is enabled with the dynamic key management, +* extract trusted and distrusted keys from PKS and store them in the db +* and dbx list. +*/ +if (append_key_mgmt == true) +create_dbs_from_pks (); +/* +* If signature verification is enabled with the static key management, +* extract trusted keys from ELF Note and store them in the db list. +*/ +else + { +load_elf2db (); +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"the db list now has %u static keys\n" , + db.cert_entries); + }grub_verifier_register (&grub_appendedsig_verifier);grub_dl_set_persistent (mod);
@@ -648,6 +1021,7 @@ GRUB_MOD_FINI (appendedsig)*/ free_db_list (); +free_dbx_list ();grub_register_variable_hook ("check_appended_signatures" ,NULL ,NULL );grub_env_unset ("check_appended_signatures" );grub_register_variable_hook ("appendedsig_key_mgmt" ,NULL ,NULL );
include/grub/efi/pks.h new file +112 -0
112 lines not on this page · raw message
include/grub/types.h +4 -0
@@ -379,6 +379,8 @@ struct grub_guid } __attribute__ ((aligned(4)));typedef struct grub_guid grub_guid_t ; +#define GRUB_GUID_SIZE (sizeof (grub_guid_t)) +struct grub_packed_guid {grub_uint32_t data1;
@@ -388,4 +390,6 @@ struct grub_packed_guid } GRUB_PACKED;typedef struct grub_packed_guid grub_packed_guid_t ; +#define GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE (sizeof (grub_packed_guid_t)) +#endif /* ! GRUB_TYPES_HEADER */
Signature · 7 lines
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel
PATCH v15 14/20 appended signatures: Using db and dbx lists for signature verification
In reply to Sudhakar KuppusamySignature verification: verify the kernel against lists of hashes that are either in dbx or db list. If it is not in the dbx list then the trusted keys from the db list are used to verify the signature.
--- grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c | 94 +++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 93 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
grub-core/commands/appendedsig/appendedsig.c +93 -1
@@ -521,6 +521,83 @@ extract_appended_signature (const grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t bufsize,return grub_pkcs7_data_parse (signed_data, appendedsig_pkcs7_size, &sig->pkcs7); } +static grub_err_t +get_binary_hash (const grub_size_t binary_hash_size,const grub_uint8_t *data, +const grub_size_t data_size,grub_uint8_t *hash,grub_size_t *hash_size) +{ +grub_packed_guid_t guid = {0 }; + +/* support SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 for binary hash */ +if (binary_hash_size ==SHA256_HASH_SIZE ) +grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA256_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ); +else if (binary_hash_size ==SHA384_HASH_SIZE ) +grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA384_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ); +else if (binary_hash_size ==SHA512_HASH_SIZE ) +grub_memcpy (&guid, &GRUB_PKS_CERT_SHA512_GUID ,GRUB_PACKED_GUID_SIZE ); +else + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"unsupported hash type (%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE") and " +"skipped\n" , binary_hash_size); +return GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_COMMAND ; + } + +return get_hash (&guid, data, data_size, hash, hash_size); +} + +/* +* Verify binary hash against the db and dbx list. +* The following errors can occur: +* - GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE: indicates that the hash is in dbx list. +* - GRUB_ERR_EOF: the hash could not be found in the db and dbx list. +* - GRUB_ERR_NONE: the hash is found in db list. +*/ +static grub_err_t +verify_binary_hash (const grub_uint8_t *data,const grub_size_t data_size) +{ +grub_err_t rc =GRUB_ERR_NONE ; +grub_uint32_t i; +grub_size_t hash_size =0 ; +grub_uint8_t hash[GRUB_MAX_HASH_LEN ] = {0 }; + +for (i =0 ; i < dbx.hash_entries; i++) + { +if (dbx.hashes[i] ==NULL ) +continue ; + + rc =get_binary_hash (dbx.hash_sizes[i], data, data_size, hash, &hash_size); +if (rc !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +continue ; + +if (hash_size == dbx.hash_sizes[i] && +grub_memcmp (dbx.hashes[i], hash, hash_size) ==0 ) + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"the hash (%02x%02x%02x%02x) is present in the dbx list\n" , + hash[0 ], hash[1 ], hash[2 ], hash[3 ]); +return GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE ; + } + } + +for (i =0 ; i < db.hash_entries; i++) + { +if (db.hashes[i] ==NULL ) +continue ; + + rc =get_binary_hash (db.hash_sizes[i], data, data_size, hash, &hash_size); +if (rc !=GRUB_ERR_NONE ) +continue ; + +if (hash_size == db.hash_sizes[i] && +grub_memcmp (db.hashes[i], hash, hash_size) ==0 ) + { +grub_dprintf ("appendedsig" ,"verified with a trusted hash (%02x%02x%02x%02x)\n" , + hash[0 ], hash[1 ], hash[2 ], hash[3 ]); +return GRUB_ERR_NONE ; + } + } + +return GRUB_ERR_EOF ; +} +/* * Given a hash value 'hval', of hash specification 'hash', prepare the * S-expressions (sexp) and perform the signature verification.
@@ -565,7 +642,7 @@ grub_verify_appended_signature (const grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t bufsize)grub_pkcs7_signer_t *si;grub_int32_t i; -if (!db.cert_entries) +if (!db.cert_entries && !db.hash_entries)return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE ,"no trusted keys to verify against" ); err =extract_appended_signature (buf, bufsize, &sig);
@@ -574,6 +651,21 @@ grub_verify_appended_signature (const grub_uint8_t *buf, grub_size_t bufsize) datasize = bufsize - sig.signature_len; +/* +* If signature verification is enabled with dynamic key management mode, +* Verify binary hash against the db and dbx list. +*/ +if (append_key_mgmt == true) + { + err =verify_binary_hash (buf, datasize); +if (err ==GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE ) + { +grub_pkcs7_data_release (&sig.pkcs7); +return grub_error (err, +"failed to verify the binary hash against a trusted binary hash" ); + } + } +/* Verify signature using trusted keys from db list. */ for (i =0 ; i < sig.pkcs7.signer_count; i++) {
Signature · 7 lines
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155) _______________________________________________ Grub-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/grub-devel