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scsi: wd33c93: fix buffer overflow in SCSI message-in handling

PATCH In review Yuhao Jiang 2 participants 2 messages Oct 21, 2025

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PATCH 1/1 scsi: wd33c93: fix buffer overflow in SCSI message-in handling

A buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the wd33c93 SCSI driver's message handling where missing bounds checking allows a malicious SCSI device to overflow the incoming_msg[] buffer and corrupt kernel memory.

The issue occurs because:
- incoming_msg[] is a fixed 8-byte buffer (line 235 in wd33c93.h)
- wd33c93_intr() writes to incoming_msg[incoming_ptr] without validating incoming_ptr is within bounds (line 935)
- For EXTENDED_MESSAGE, incoming_ptr increments based on the device- supplied length field (line 1085) with no maximum check
- The validation at line 1001 only checks if the message is complete, not if it exceeds buffer size

This allows an attacker controlling a SCSI device to craft an extended message with length field 0xFF, causing the driver to write 256 bytes into an 8-byte buffer. This can corrupt adjacent fields in the WD33C93_hostdata structure including function pointers, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution.

Add bounds checking in the MESSAGE_IN handler to ensure incoming_ptr does not exceed buffer capacity before writing. Reject oversized messages per SCSI protocol by sending MESSAGE_REJECT.

Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
---
 drivers/scsi/wd33c93.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
drivers/scsi/wd33c93.c +13 -0
index dd1fef9226f2..2d50a0a01726 100644
@@ -932,6 +932,19 @@ wd33c93_intr(struct Scsi_Host *instance)
 		sr = read_wd33c93(regs, WD_SCSI_STATUS);	/* clear interrupt */
 		udelay(7);
 
+		/* Prevent buffer overflow from malicious extended messages */
+		if (hostdata->incoming_ptr >= sizeof(hostdata->incoming_msg)) {
+			printk("wd33c93: Incoming message too long, rejecting\n");
+			hostdata->incoming_ptr = 0;
+			write_wd33c93_cmd(regs, WD_CMD_ASSERT_ATN);
+			hostdata->outgoing_msg[0] = MESSAGE_REJECT;
+			hostdata->outgoing_len = 1;
+			write_wd33c93_cmd(regs, WD_CMD_NEGATE_ACK);
+			hostdata->state = S_CONNECTED;
+			spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hostdata->lock, flags);
+			break;
+		}
+
 		hostdata->incoming_msg[hostdata->incoming_ptr] = msg;
 		if (hostdata->incoming_msg[0] == EXTENDED_MESSAGE)
 			msg = EXTENDED_MESSAGE;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#1 lore raw

This exploit really needs a catchy name. Just think of how much valuable data you could extract by selling malicious fake 8-bit SCSI disks to retro computing enthusiasts and then exploiting their SCSI HBA driver.

Quoted 60 lines · Yuhao Jiang

A buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the wd33c93 SCSI driver's message handling where missing bounds checking allows a malicious SCSI device to overflow the incoming_msg[] buffer and corrupt kernel memory.

The issue occurs because:
- incoming_msg[] is a fixed 8-byte buffer (line 235 in wd33c93.h)
- wd33c93_intr() writes to incoming_msg[incoming_ptr] without validating incoming_ptr is within bounds (line 935)
- For EXTENDED_MESSAGE, incoming_ptr increments based on the device- supplied length field (line 1085) with no maximum check
- The validation at line 1001 only checks if the message is complete, not if it exceeds buffer size

This allows an attacker controlling a SCSI device to craft an extended message with length field 0xFF, causing the driver to write 256 bytes into an 8-byte buffer. This can corrupt adjacent fields in the WD33C93_hostdata structure including function pointers, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution.

Add bounds checking in the MESSAGE_IN handler to ensure incoming_ptr does not exceed buffer capacity before writing. Reject oversized messages per SCSI protocol by sending MESSAGE_REJECT.

Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
---
 drivers/scsi/wd33c93.c | 13 +++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
drivers/scsi/wd33c93.c +13 -0
index dd1fef9226f2..2d50a0a01726 100644
@@ -932,6 +932,19 @@ wd33c93_intr(struct Scsi_Host *instance)
 		sr = read_wd33c93(regs, WD_SCSI_STATUS);	/* clear interrupt */
 		udelay(7);
 
+		/* Prevent buffer overflow from malicious extended messages */
+		if (hostdata->incoming_ptr >= sizeof(hostdata->incoming_msg)) {
+			printk("wd33c93: Incoming message too long, rejecting\n");
+			hostdata->incoming_ptr = 0;
+			write_wd33c93_cmd(regs, WD_CMD_ASSERT_ATN);
+			hostdata->outgoing_msg[0] = MESSAGE_REJECT;
+			hostdata->outgoing_len = 1;
+			write_wd33c93_cmd(regs, WD_CMD_NEGATE_ACK);
+			hostdata->state = S_CONNECTED;
+			spin_unlock_irqrestore(&hostdata->lock, flags);
+			break;
+		}
+
 		hostdata->incoming_msg[hostdata->incoming_ptr] = msg;
 		if (hostdata->incoming_msg[0] == EXTENDED_MESSAGE)
 			msg = EXTENDED_MESSAGE;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1

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