scsi: wd33c93: fix buffer overflow in SCSI message-in handling
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 scsi: wd33c93: fix buffer overflow in SCSI message-in handling
A buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the wd33c93 SCSI driver's message handling where missing bounds checking allows a malicious SCSI device to overflow the incoming_msg[] buffer and corrupt kernel memory.
The issue occurs because:
- incoming_msg[] is a fixed 8-byte buffer (line 235 in wd33c93.h)
- wd33c93_intr() writes to incoming_msg[incoming_ptr] without validating incoming_ptr is within bounds (line 935)
- For EXTENDED_MESSAGE, incoming_ptr increments based on the device- supplied length field (line 1085) with no maximum check
- The validation at line 1001 only checks if the message is complete, not if it exceeds buffer size
This allows an attacker controlling a SCSI device to craft an extended message with length field 0xFF, causing the driver to write 256 bytes into an 8-byte buffer. This can corrupt adjacent fields in the WD33C93_hostdata structure including function pointers, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution.
Add bounds checking in the MESSAGE_IN handler to ensure incoming_ptr does not exceed buffer capacity before writing. Reject oversized messages per SCSI protocol by sending MESSAGE_REJECT.
--- drivers/scsi/wd33c93.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
drivers/scsi/wd33c93.c +13 -0
@@ -932,6 +932,19 @@ wd33c93_intr(struct Scsi_Host *instance) sr =read_wd33c93 (regs,WD_SCSI_STATUS );/* clear interrupt */ udelay (7 ); +/* Prevent buffer overflow from malicious extended messages */ +if (hostdata->incoming_ptr >=sizeof (hostdata->incoming_msg)) { +printk ("wd33c93: Incoming message too long, rejecting\n" ); + hostdata->incoming_ptr =0 ; +write_wd33c93_cmd (regs,WD_CMD_ASSERT_ATN ); + hostdata->outgoing_msg[0 ] =MESSAGE_REJECT ; + hostdata->outgoing_len =1 ; +write_wd33c93_cmd (regs,WD_CMD_NEGATE_ACK ); + hostdata->state =S_CONNECTED ; +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&hostdata->lock, flags); +break ; + } + hostdata->incoming_msg[hostdata->incoming_ptr] = msg;if (hostdata->incoming_msg[0 ] ==EXTENDED_MESSAGE ) msg =EXTENDED_MESSAGE ;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
This exploit really needs a catchy name. Just think of how much valuable data you could extract by selling malicious fake 8-bit SCSI disks to retro computing enthusiasts and then exploiting their SCSI HBA driver.
Quoted 60 lines · Yuhao Jiang
A buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the wd33c93 SCSI driver's message handling where missing bounds checking allows a malicious SCSI device to overflow the incoming_msg[] buffer and corrupt kernel memory.
The issue occurs because:
- incoming_msg[] is a fixed 8-byte buffer (line 235 inwd33c93.h)
-wd33c93_intr()writes to incoming_msg[incoming_ptr] without validatingincoming_ptris within bounds (line 935)
- ForEXTENDED_MESSAGE,incoming_ptrincrements based on the device- supplied length field (line 1085) with no maximum check
- The validation at line 1001 only checks if the message is complete, not if it exceeds buffer sizeThis allows an attacker controlling a SCSI device to craft an extended message with length field
0xFF, causing the driver to write 256 bytes into an 8-byte buffer. This can corrupt adjacent fields in theWD33C93_hostdatastructure including function pointers, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution.Add bounds checking in the
MESSAGE_INhandler to ensureincoming_ptrdoes not exceed buffer capacity before writing. Reject oversized messages per SCSI protocol by sendingMESSAGE_REJECT.Reported-by Yuhao Jiang <[email protected]>Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")Signed-off-by Yuhao Jiang <[email protected]>--- drivers/scsi/wd33c93.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)drivers/scsi/wd33c93.c +13
-0@@ -932,6 +932,19 @@ wd33c93_intr(struct Scsi_Host *instance) sr =read_wd33c93 (regs,WD_SCSI_STATUS );/* clear interrupt */ udelay (7 ); +/* Prevent buffer overflow from malicious extended messages */ +if (hostdata->incoming_ptr >=sizeof (hostdata->incoming_msg)) { +printk ("wd33c93: Incoming message too long, rejecting\n" ); + hostdata->incoming_ptr =0 ; +write_wd33c93_cmd (regs,WD_CMD_ASSERT_ATN ); + hostdata->outgoing_msg[0 ] =MESSAGE_REJECT ; + hostdata->outgoing_len =1 ; +write_wd33c93_cmd (regs,WD_CMD_NEGATE_ACK ); + hostdata->state =S_CONNECTED ; +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&hostdata->lock, flags); +break ; + } + hostdata->incoming_msg[hostdata->incoming_ptr] = msg;if (hostdata->incoming_msg[0 ] ==EXTENDED_MESSAGE ) msg =EXTENDED_MESSAGE ;Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
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