6.6.130-rc1 review
Subsystems (9)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 120/567 selftests: mptcp: join: check removing signal+subflow endp
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <[email protected]>
commit 1777f349ff41b62dfe27454b69c27b0bc99ffca5 upstream.
This validates the previous commit: endpoints with both the signal and subflow flags should always be marked as used even if it was not possible to create new subflows due to the MPTCP PM limits.
For this test, an extra endpoint is created with both the signal and the subflow flags, and limits are set not to create extra subflows. In this case, an ADD_ADDR is sent, but no subflows are created. Still, the local endpoint is marked as used, and no warning is fired when removing the endpoint, after having sent a RM_ADDR.
The 'Fixes' tag here below is the same as the one from the previous
commit: this patch here is not fixing anything wrong in the selftests, but it validates the previous fix for an issue introduced by this commit ID.
--- tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh +13 -0
@@ -2424,6 +2424,19 @@ remove_tests() chk_rst_nr 0 0 fi + # signal+subflow with limits, remove + if reset "remove signal+subflow with limits"; then + pm_nl_set_limits $ns1 0 0 + pm_nl_add_endpoint $ns1 10.0.2.1 flags signal,subflow + pm_nl_set_limits $ns2 0 0 + addr_nr_ns1=-1 speed=slow \ + run_tests $ns1 $ns2 10.0.1.1 + chk_join_nr 0 0 0 + chk_add_nr 1 1 + chk_rm_nr 1 0 invert + chk_rst_nr 0 0 + fi + # addresses remove if reset "remove addresses"; then pm_nl_set_limits $ns1 3 3
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 121/567 ARM: clean up the memset64() C wrapper
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Weißschuh <[email protected]>
commit b52343d1cb47bb27ca32a3f4952cc2fd3cd165bf upstream.
The current logic to split the 64-bit argument into its 32-bit halves is byte-order specific and a bit clunky. Use a union instead which is easier to read and works in all cases.
GCC still generates the same machine code.
While at it, rename the arguments of the __memset64() prototype to actually reflect their semantics.
--- arch/arm/include/asm/string.h | 14 +++++++++----- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/arm/include/asm/string.h +9 -5
@@ -39,13 +39,17 @@ static inline void *memset32(uint32_t *p }#define __HAVE_ARCH_MEMSET64 -extern void *__memset64 (uint64_t *,uint32_t low,__kernel_size_t ,uint32_t hi); +extern void *__memset64 (uint64_t *,uint32_t first,__kernel_size_t ,uint32_t second);static inline void *memset64 (uint64_t *p,uint64_t v,__kernel_size_t n) { -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN )) -return __memset64 (p, v, n *8 , v >>32 ); -else -return __memset64 (p, v >>32 , n *8 , v); +union { +uint64_t val; +struct { +uint32_t first, second; + }; + } word = { .val = v }; + +return __memset64 (p, word.first, n *8 , word.second); }/*
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 122/567 hwmon: (aht10) Add support for dht20
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Akhilesh Patil <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3eaf1b631506e8de2cb37c278d5bc042521e82c1 ]
Add support for dht20 temperature and humidity sensor from Aosong. Modify aht10 driver to handle different init command for dht20 sensor by adding init_cmd entry in the driver data. dht20 sensor is compatible with aht10 hwmon driver with this change.
Tested on TI am62x SK board with dht20 sensor connected at i2c-2 port.
Stable-dep-of: b7497b5a99f5 ("hwmon: (aht10) Fix initialization commands for AHT20")
--- Documentation/hwmon/aht10.rst | 10 +++++++++- drivers/hwmon/Kconfig | 6 +++--- drivers/hwmon/aht10.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
Documentation/hwmon/aht10.rst +9 -1
@@ -20,6 +20,14 @@ Supported chips: English: http://www.aosong.com/userfiles/files/media/Data%20Sheet%20AHT20.pdf + * Aosong DHT20 + + Prefix: 'dht20' + + Addresses scanned: None + + Datasheet: https://www.digikey.co.nz/en/htmldatasheets/production/9184855/0/0/1/101020932 + Author: Johannes Cornelis Draaijer <[email protected]>
@@ -33,7 +41,7 @@ The address of this i2c device may only be 0x38 Special Features ---------------- -AHT20 has additional CRC8 support which is sent as the last byte of the sensor +AHT20, DHT20 has additional CRC8 support which is sent as the last byte of the sensor values. Usage Notes
drivers/hwmon/Kconfig +3 -3
@@ -257,12 +257,12 @@ config SENSORS_ADT7475 will be called adt7475. config SENSORS_AHT10 - tristate "Aosong AHT10, AHT20" + tristate "Aosong AHT10, AHT20, DHT20" depends on I2C select CRC8 help - If you say yes here, you get support for the Aosong AHT10 and AHT20 - temperature and humidity sensors + If you say yes here, you get support for the Aosong AHT10, AHT20 and + DHT20 temperature and humidity sensors This driver can also be built as a module. If so, the module will be called aht10.
drivers/hwmon/aht10.c +16 -3
@@ -37,6 +37,8 @@#define AHT10_CMD_MEAS 0b10101100#define AHT10_CMD_RST 0b10111010 +#define DHT20_CMD_INIT 0x71 +/* * Flags in the answer byte/command */
@@ -48,11 +50,12 @@#define AHT10_MAX_POLL_INTERVAL_LEN 30 -enum aht10_variant { aht10, aht20 }; +enum aht10_variant { aht10, aht20, dht20};static const struct i2c_device_id aht10_id[] = { {"aht10" , aht10 }, {"aht20" , aht20 }, + {"dht20" , dht20 }, { }, };MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE (i2c, aht10_id);
@@ -77,6 +80,7 @@ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(i2c, aht10_id);* AHT10/AHT20 * @crc8: crc8 support flag * @meas_size: measurements data size +* @init_cmd: Initialization command */ struct aht10_data {
@@ -92,6 +96,7 @@ struct aht10_data {int humidity;bool crc8;unsigned int meas_size; +u8 init_cmd; };/**
@@ -101,13 +106,13 @@ struct aht10_data {*/ static int aht10_init (struct aht10_data *data) { -const u8 cmd_init[] = {AHT10_CMD_INIT ,AHT10_CAL_ENABLED |AHT10_MODE_CYC , +const u8 cmd_init[] = {data->init_cmd,AHT10_CAL_ENABLED |AHT10_MODE_CYC ,0x00 };int res;u8 status;struct i2c_client *client = data->client; - res =i2c_master_send (client, cmd_init,3 ); + res =i2c_master_send (client, cmd_init,sizeof (cmd_init));if (res <0 )return res;
@@ -353,9 +358,17 @@ static int aht10_probe(struct i2c_client *client) data->meas_size =AHT20_MEAS_SIZE ; data->crc8 = true;crc8_populate_msb (crc8_table,AHT20_CRC8_POLY ); + data->init_cmd =AHT10_CMD_INIT ; +break ; +case dht20: + data->meas_size =AHT20_MEAS_SIZE ; + data->crc8 = true; +crc8_populate_msb (crc8_table,AHT20_CRC8_POLY ); + data->init_cmd =DHT20_CMD_INIT ;break ;default : data->meas_size =AHT10_MEAS_SIZE ; + data->init_cmd =AHT10_CMD_INIT ;break ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 123/567 hwmon: (aht10) Fix initialization commands for AHT20
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hao Yu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b7497b5a99f54ab8dcda5b14a308385b2fb03d8d ]
According to the AHT20 datasheet (updated to V1.0 after the 2023.09 version), the initialization command for AHT20 is 0b10111110 (0xBE). The previous sequence (0xE1) used in earlier versions is no longer compatible with newer AHT20 sensors. Update the initialization command to ensure the sensor is properly initialized.
While at it, use binary notation for DHT20_CMD_INIT to match the notation used in the datasheet.
--- drivers/hwmon/aht10.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/hwmon/aht10.c +4 -2
@@ -37,7 +37,9 @@#define AHT10_CMD_MEAS 0b10101100#define AHT10_CMD_RST 0b10111010 -#define DHT20_CMD_INIT 0x71 +#define AHT20_CMD_INIT 0b10111110 + +#define DHT20_CMD_INIT 0b01110001/* * Flags in the answer byte/command
@@ -358,7 +360,7 @@ static int aht10_probe(struct i2c_client *client) data->meas_size =AHT20_MEAS_SIZE ; data->crc8 = true;crc8_populate_msb (crc8_table,AHT20_CRC8_POLY ); - data->init_cmd =AHT10_CMD_INIT ; + data->init_cmd =AHT20_CMD_INIT ;break ;case dht20: data->meas_size =AHT20_MEAS_SIZE ;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 124/567 pinctrl: equilibrium: rename irq_chip function callbacks
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Florian Eckert <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1f96b84835eafb3e6f366dc3a66c0e69504cec9d ]
Renaming of the irq_chip callback functions to improve clarity.
Stable-dep-of: 3e00b1b332e5 ("pinctrl: equilibrium: fix warning trace on load")
--- drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-equilibrium.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-equilibrium.c +12 -12
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@#define PIN_NAME_LEN 10#define PAD_REG_OFF 0x100 -static void eqbr_gpio_disable_irq (struct irq_data *d) +static void eqbr_irq_mask (struct irq_data *d) {struct gpio_chip *gc =irq_data_get_irq_chip_data (d);struct eqbr_gpio_ctrl *gctrl =gpiochip_get_data (gc);
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static void eqbr_gpio_disable_irq(struct irq_data *d)gpiochip_disable_irq (gc, offset); } -static void eqbr_gpio_enable_irq (struct irq_data *d) +static void eqbr_irq_unmask (struct irq_data *d) {struct gpio_chip *gc =irq_data_get_irq_chip_data (d);struct eqbr_gpio_ctrl *gctrl =gpiochip_get_data (gc);
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static void eqbr_gpio_enable_irq(struct irq_data *d)raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore (&gctrl->lock, flags); } -static void eqbr_gpio_ack_irq (struct irq_data *d) +static void eqbr_irq_ack (struct irq_data *d) {struct gpio_chip *gc =irq_data_get_irq_chip_data (d);struct eqbr_gpio_ctrl *gctrl =gpiochip_get_data (gc);
@@ -61,10 +61,10 @@ static void eqbr_gpio_ack_irq(struct irq_data *d)raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore (&gctrl->lock, flags); } -static void eqbr_gpio_mask_ack_irq (struct irq_data *d) +static void eqbr_irq_mask_ack (struct irq_data *d) { -eqbr_gpio_disable_irq (d); -eqbr_gpio_ack_irq (d); +eqbr_irq_mask (d); +eqbr_irq_ack (d); } static inline void eqbr_cfg_bit(void __iomem *addr,
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ static int eqbr_irq_type_cfg(struct gpio_irq_type *type,return 0 ; } -static int eqbr_gpio_set_irq_type (struct irq_data *d,unsigned int type) +static int eqbr_irq_set_type (struct irq_data *d,unsigned int type) {struct gpio_chip *gc =irq_data_get_irq_chip_data (d);struct eqbr_gpio_ctrl *gctrl =gpiochip_get_data (gc);
@@ -165,11 +165,11 @@ static void eqbr_irq_handler(struct irq_desc *desc)static const struct irq_chip eqbr_irq_chip = { .name ="gpio_irq" , - .irq_mask = eqbr_gpio_disable_irq, - .irq_unmask = eqbr_gpio_enable_irq, - .irq_ack = eqbr_gpio_ack_irq, - .irq_mask_ack = eqbr_gpio_mask_ack_irq, - .irq_set_type = eqbr_gpio_set_irq_type, + .irq_ack = eqbr_irq_ack, + .irq_mask = eqbr_irq_mask, + .irq_mask_ack = eqbr_irq_mask_ack, + .irq_unmask = eqbr_irq_unmask, + .irq_set_type = eqbr_irq_set_type, .flags =IRQCHIP_IMMUTABLE ,GPIOCHIP_IRQ_RESOURCE_HELPERS , };
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 125/567 pinctrl: equilibrium: fix warning trace on load
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Florian Eckert <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3e00b1b332e54ba50cca6691f628b9c06574024f ]
The callback functions 'eqbr_irq_mask()' and 'eqbr_irq_ack()' are also called in the callback function 'eqbr_irq_mask_ack()'. This is done to avoid source code duplication. The problem, is that in the function 'eqbr_irq_mask()' also calles the gpiolib function 'gpiochip_disable_irq()'
This generates the following warning trace in the log for every gpio on load.
[ 6.088111] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 6.092440] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1 at drivers/gpio/gpiolib.c:3810 gpiochip_disable_irq+0x39/0x50 [ 6.097847] Modules linked in: [ 6.097847] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 6.12.59+ #0 [ 6.097847] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 6.097847] RIP: 0010:gpiochip_disable_irq+0x39/0x50 [ 6.097847] Code: 39 c6 48 19 c0 21 c6 48 c1 e6 05 48 03 b2 38 03 00 00 48 81 fe 00 f0 ff ff 77 11 48 8b 46 08 f6 c4 02 74 06 f0 80 66 09 fb c3 <0f> 0b 90 0f 1f 40 00 c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 [ 6.097847] RSP: 0000:ffffc9000000b830 EFLAGS: 00010046 [ 6.097847] RAX: 0000000000000045 RBX: ffff888001be02a0 RCX: 0000000000000008 [ 6.097847] RDX: ffff888001be9000 RSI: ffff888001b2dd00 RDI: ffff888001be02a0 [ 6.097847] RBP: ffffc9000000b860 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 6.097847] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff888001b2a154 R12: ffff888001be0514 [ 6.097847] R13: ffff888001be02a0 R14: 0000000000000008 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 6.097847] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888041d80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 6.097847] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 6.097847] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000003030000 CR4: 00000000001026b0 [ 6.097847] Call Trace: [ 6.097847] <TASK> [ 6.097847] ? eqbr_irq_mask+0x63/0x70 [ 6.097847] ? no_action+0x10/0x10 [ 6.097847] eqbr_irq_mask_ack+0x11/0x60
In an other driver (drivers/pinctrl/starfive/pinctrl-starfive-jh7100.c) the interrupt is not disabled here.
To fix this, do not call the 'eqbr_irq_mask()' and 'eqbr_irq_ack()' function. Implement instead this directly without disabling the interrupts.
--- drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-equilibrium.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/pinctrl/pinctrl-equilibrium.c +9 -2
@@ -63,8 +63,15 @@ static void eqbr_irq_ack(struct irq_data *d)static void eqbr_irq_mask_ack (struct irq_data *d) { -eqbr_irq_mask (d); -eqbr_irq_ack (d); +struct gpio_chip *gc =irq_data_get_irq_chip_data (d); +struct eqbr_gpio_ctrl *gctrl =gpiochip_get_data (gc); +unsigned int offset =irqd_to_hwirq (d); +unsigned long flags; + +raw_spin_lock_irqsave (&gctrl->lock, flags); +writel (BIT (offset), gctrl->membase +GPIO_IRNENCLR ); +writel (BIT (offset), gctrl->membase +GPIO_IRNCR ); +raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore (&gctrl->lock, flags); } static inline void eqbr_cfg_bit(void __iomem *addr,
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 126/567 platform/x86: thinkpad_acpi: Fix errors reading battery thresholds
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jonathan Teh <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 53e977b1d50c46f2c4ec3865cd13a822f58ad3cd ]
Check whether the battery supports the relevant charge threshold before reading the value to silence these errors:
thinkpad_acpi: acpi_evalf(BCTG, dd, ...) failed: AE_NOT_FOUND
ACPI: \_SB_.PCI0.LPC_.EC__.HKEY: BCTG: evaluate failedthinkpad_acpi: acpi_evalf(BCSG, dd, ...) failed: AE_NOT_FOUND
ACPI: \_SB_.PCI0.LPC_.EC__.HKEY: BCSG: evaluate failed
when reading the charge thresholds via sysfs on platforms that do not support them such as the ThinkPad T400.
--- drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/platform/x86/thinkpad_acpi.c +4 -2
@@ -9441,14 +9441,16 @@ static int tpacpi_battery_get(int what, int battery, int *ret) {switch (what) {case THRESHOLD_START : - if ACPI_FAILURE(tpacpi_battery_acpi_eval(GET_START, ret, battery)) +if (!battery_info.batteries[battery].start_support || +ACPI_FAILURE (tpacpi_battery_acpi_eval (GET_START , ret, battery)))return -ENODEV ;/* The value is in the low 8 bits of the response */ *ret = *ret &0xFF ;return 0 ;case THRESHOLD_STOP : - if ACPI_FAILURE(tpacpi_battery_acpi_eval(GET_STOP, ret, battery)) +if (!battery_info.batteries[battery].stop_support || +ACPI_FAILURE (tpacpi_battery_acpi_eval (GET_STOP , ret, battery)))return -ENODEV ;/* Value is in lower 8 bits */ *ret = *ret &0xFF ;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 127/567 pinctrl: cirrus: cs42l43: Fix double-put in cs42l43_pin_probe()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Felix Gu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fd5bed798f45eb3a178ad527b43ab92705faaf8a ]
devm_add_action_or_reset() already invokes the action on failure, so the explicit put causes a double-put.
--- drivers/pinctrl/cirrus/pinctrl-cs42l43.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/pinctrl/cirrus/pinctrl-cs42l43.c +2 -3
@@ -574,10 +574,9 @@ static int cs42l43_pin_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)if (child) { ret =devm_add_action_or_reset (&pdev->dev, cs42l43_fwnode_put, child); -if (ret) { -fwnode_handle_put (child); +if (ret)return ret; - } +if (!child->dev) child->dev = priv->dev; fwnode = child;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 128/567 hwmon: (it87) Check the it87_lock() return value
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 07ed4f05bbfd2bc014974dcc4297fd3aa1cb88c0 ]
Return early in it87_resume() if it87_lock() fails instead of ignoring the return value of that function. This patch suppresses a Clang thread-safety warning.
--- drivers/hwmon/it87.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/hwmon/it87.c +4 -1
@@ -3547,10 +3547,13 @@ static int it87_resume(struct device *dev) {struct platform_device *pdev =to_platform_device (dev);struct it87_data *data =dev_get_drvdata (dev); +int err;it87_resume_sio (pdev); -it87_lock (data); + err =it87_lock (data); +if (err) +return err;it87_check_pwm (dev);it87_check_limit_regs (data);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 129/567 e1000e: clear DPG_EN after reset to avoid autonomous power-gating
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vitaly Lifshits <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0942fc6d324eb9c6b16187b2aa994c0823557f06 ]
Panther Lake systems introduced an autonomous power gating feature for the integrated Gigabit Ethernet in shutdown state (S5) state. As part of it, the reset value of DPG_EN bit was changed to 1. Clear this bit after performing hardware reset to avoid errors such as Tx/Rx hangs, or packet loss/corruption.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/defines.h | 1 + drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c | 9 +++++++++ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/defines.h +1 -0
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@/* Extended Device Control */ #define E1000_CTRL_EXT_LPCD 0x00000004/* LCD Power Cycle Done */ +#define E1000_CTRL_EXT_DPG_EN 0x00000008/* Dynamic Power Gating Enable */ #define E1000_CTRL_EXT_SDP3_DATA 0x00000080/* Value of SW Definable Pin 3 */ #define E1000_CTRL_EXT_FORCE_SMBUS 0x00000800/* Force SMBus mode */ #define E1000_CTRL_EXT_EE_RST 0x00002000/* Reinitialize from EEPROM */
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/ich8lan.c +9 -0
@@ -4925,6 +4925,15 @@ static s32 e1000_reset_hw_ich8lan(struct e1000_hw *hw) reg |=E1000_KABGTXD_BGSQLBIAS ;ew32 (KABGTXD , reg); +/* The hardware reset value of the DPG_EN bit is 1. +* Clear DPG_EN to prevent unexpected autonomous power gating. +*/ +if (hw->mac.type >= e1000_pch_ptp) { + reg =er32 (CTRL_EXT ); + reg &= ~E1000_CTRL_EXT_DPG_EN ; +ew32 (CTRL_EXT , reg); + } +return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 130/567 drm/ssd130x: Use bool for ssd130x_deviceinfo flags
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Geert Uytterhoeven <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 15d30b46573d75f5cb58cfacded8ebab9c76a2b0 ]
The .need_pwm and .need_chargepump fields in struct ssd130x_deviceinfo are flags that can have only two possible values: 0 and 1. Reduce kernel size by changing their types from int to bool.
Stable-dep-of: 36d9579fed6c ("drm/solomon: Fix page start when updating rectangle in page addressing mode")
--- drivers/gpu/drm/solomon/ssd130x.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/solomon/ssd130x.h +2 -2
@@ -40,8 +40,8 @@ struct ssd130x_deviceinfo {u32 default_width;u32 default_height;u32 page_height; -int need_pwm; -int need_chargepump; +bool need_pwm; +bool need_chargepump;bool page_mode_only; };
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 131/567 drm/ssd130x: Store the HW buffer in the driver-private CRTC state
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Javier Martinez Canillas <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d51f9fbd98b6d88aef4f6431bbb575378a6c7a24 ]
The commit 45b58669e532 ("drm/ssd130x: Allocate buffer in the plane's .atomic_check() callback") moved the allocation of the intermediate and HW buffers from the encoder's .atomic_enable callback, to the plane's .atomic_check callback.
This was suggested by Maxime Ripard, because drivers aren't allowed to fail after the drm_atomic_helper_swap_state() function has been called.
And the encoder's .atomic_enable happens after the new atomic state has been swapped, so allocations (that can fail) shouldn't be done there.
But the HW buffer isn't really tied to the plane's state. It has a fixed size that only depends on the (also fixed) display resolution defined in the Device Tree Blob.
That buffer can be considered part of the CRTC state, and for this reason makes more sense to do its allocation in the CRTC .atomic_check callback.
The other allocated buffer (used to store a conversion from the emulated XR24 format to the native R1 format) is part of the plane's state, since it will be optional once the driver supports R1 and allows user-space to set that pixel format.
So let's keep the allocation for it in the plane's .atomic_check callback, this can't be moved to the CRTC's .atomic_check because changing a format does not trigger a CRTC mode set.
Stable-dep-of: 36d9579fed6c ("drm/solomon: Fix page start when updating rectangle in page addressing mode")
--- drivers/gpu/drm/solomon/ssd130x.c | 153 +++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 118 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/solomon/ssd130x.c +118 -35
@@ -141,14 +141,23 @@ const struct ssd130x_deviceinfo ssd130x_variants[] = { };EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL (ssd130x_variants,DRM_SSD130X ); +struct ssd130x_crtc_state { +struct drm_crtc_state base; +/* Buffer to store pixels in HW format and written to the panel */ +u8 *data_array; +}; +struct ssd130x_plane_state {struct drm_shadow_plane_state base;/* Intermediate buffer to convert pixels from XRGB8888 to HW format */ u8 *buffer; -/* Buffer to store pixels in HW format and written to the panel */ -u8 *data_array; }; +static inline struct ssd130x_crtc_state *to_ssd130x_crtc_state (struct drm_crtc_state *state) +{ + return container_of(state, struct ssd130x_crtc_state, base); +} +static inline struct ssd130x_plane_state *to_ssd130x_plane_state (struct drm_plane_state *state) { return container_of(state, struct ssd130x_plane_state, base.base);
@@ -448,13 +457,11 @@ static int ssd130x_init(struct ssd130x_device *ssd130x) }static int ssd130x_update_rect (struct ssd130x_device *ssd130x, -struct ssd130x_plane_state *ssd130x_state, -struct drm_rect *rect) +struct drm_rect *rect,u8 *buf, +u8 *data_array) {unsigned int x = rect->x1;unsigned int y = rect->y1; -u8 *buf = ssd130x_state->buffer; -u8 *data_array = ssd130x_state->data_array;unsigned int width =drm_rect_width (rect);unsigned int height =drm_rect_height (rect);unsigned int line_length =DIV_ROUND_UP (width,8 );
@@ -550,12 +557,10 @@ static int ssd130x_update_rect(struct ssd130x_device *ssd130x,return ret; } -static void ssd130x_clear_screen (struct ssd130x_device *ssd130x, -struct ssd130x_plane_state *ssd130x_state) +static void ssd130x_clear_screen (struct ssd130x_device *ssd130x,u8 *data_array) {unsigned int page_height = ssd130x->device_info->page_height;unsigned int pages =DIV_ROUND_UP (ssd130x->height, page_height); -u8 *data_array = ssd130x_state->data_array;unsigned int width = ssd130x->width;int ret, i;
@@ -594,15 +599,13 @@ static void ssd130x_clear_screen(struct ssd130x_device *ssd130x, } } -static int ssd130x_fb_blit_rect (struct drm_plane_state *state, +static int ssd130x_fb_blit_rect (struct drm_framebuffer *fb,const struct iosys_map *vmap, -struct drm_rect *rect) +struct drm_rect *rect, +u8 *buf,u8 *data_array) { -struct drm_framebuffer *fb = state->fb;struct ssd130x_device *ssd130x =drm_to_ssd130x (fb->dev);unsigned int page_height = ssd130x->device_info->page_height; -struct ssd130x_plane_state *ssd130x_state =to_ssd130x_plane_state (state); -u8 *buf = ssd130x_state->buffer;struct iosys_map dst;unsigned int dst_pitch;int ret =0 ;
@@ -622,7 +625,7 @@ static int ssd130x_fb_blit_rect(struct drm_plane_state *state,drm_gem_fb_end_cpu_access (fb,DMA_FROM_DEVICE ); -ssd130x_update_rect (ssd130x, ssd130x_state, rect); +ssd130x_update_rect (ssd130x, rect, buf, data_array);return ret; }
@@ -634,12 +637,19 @@ static int ssd130x_primary_plane_helper_atomic_check(struct drm_plane *plane,struct ssd130x_device *ssd130x =drm_to_ssd130x (drm);struct drm_plane_state *plane_state =drm_atomic_get_new_plane_state (state, plane);struct ssd130x_plane_state *ssd130x_state =to_ssd130x_plane_state (plane_state); -unsigned int page_height = ssd130x->device_info->page_height; -unsigned int pages =DIV_ROUND_UP (ssd130x->height, page_height); +struct drm_crtc *crtc = plane_state->crtc; +struct drm_crtc_state *crtc_state;const struct drm_format_info *fi;unsigned int pitch;int ret; +if (!crtc) +return -EINVAL ; + + crtc_state =drm_atomic_get_crtc_state (state, crtc); +if (IS_ERR (crtc_state)) +return PTR_ERR (crtc_state); + ret =drm_plane_helper_atomic_check (plane, state);if (ret)return ret;
@@ -654,14 +664,6 @@ static int ssd130x_primary_plane_helper_atomic_check(struct drm_plane *plane,if (!ssd130x_state->buffer)return -ENOMEM ; - ssd130x_state->data_array =kcalloc (ssd130x->width, pages,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!ssd130x_state->data_array) { -kfree (ssd130x_state->buffer); -/* Set to prevent a double free in .atomic_destroy_state() */ - ssd130x_state->buffer =NULL ; -return -ENOMEM ; - } -return 0 ; }
@@ -671,6 +673,10 @@ static void ssd130x_primary_plane_helper_atomic_update(struct drm_plane *plane,struct drm_plane_state *plane_state =drm_atomic_get_new_plane_state (state, plane);struct drm_plane_state *old_plane_state =drm_atomic_get_old_plane_state (state, plane);struct drm_shadow_plane_state *shadow_plane_state =to_drm_shadow_plane_state (plane_state); +struct drm_crtc_state *crtc_state =drm_atomic_get_new_crtc_state (state, plane_state->crtc); +struct ssd130x_crtc_state *ssd130x_crtc_state =to_ssd130x_crtc_state (crtc_state); +struct ssd130x_plane_state *ssd130x_plane_state =to_ssd130x_plane_state (plane_state); +struct drm_framebuffer *fb = plane_state->fb;struct drm_atomic_helper_damage_iter iter;struct drm_device *drm = plane->dev;struct drm_rect dst_clip;
@@ -687,7 +693,9 @@ static void ssd130x_primary_plane_helper_atomic_update(struct drm_plane *plane,if (!drm_rect_intersect (&dst_clip, &damage))continue ; -ssd130x_fb_blit_rect (plane_state, &shadow_plane_state->data[0 ], &dst_clip); +ssd130x_fb_blit_rect (fb, &shadow_plane_state->data[0 ], &dst_clip, + ssd130x_plane_state->buffer, + ssd130x_crtc_state->data_array); }drm_dev_exit (idx);
@@ -698,13 +706,21 @@ static void ssd130x_primary_plane_helper_atomic_disable(struct drm_plane *plane, {struct drm_device *drm = plane->dev;struct ssd130x_device *ssd130x =drm_to_ssd130x (drm); -struct ssd130x_plane_state *ssd130x_state =to_ssd130x_plane_state (plane->state); +struct drm_plane_state *plane_state =drm_atomic_get_new_plane_state (state, plane); +struct drm_crtc_state *crtc_state; +struct ssd130x_crtc_state *ssd130x_crtc_state;int idx; +if (!plane_state->crtc) +return ; + + crtc_state =drm_atomic_get_new_crtc_state (state, plane_state->crtc); + ssd130x_crtc_state =to_ssd130x_crtc_state (crtc_state); +if (!drm_dev_enter (drm, &idx))return ; -ssd130x_clear_screen (ssd130x, ssd130x_state); +ssd130x_clear_screen (ssd130x, ssd130x_crtc_state->data_array);drm_dev_exit (idx); }
@@ -737,9 +753,8 @@ static struct drm_plane_state *ssd130x_primary_plane_duplicate_state(struct drm_if (!ssd130x_state)return NULL ; -/* The buffers are not duplicated and are allocated in .atomic_check */ +/* The buffer is not duplicated and is allocated in .atomic_check */ ssd130x_state->buffer =NULL ; - ssd130x_state->data_array =NULL ; new_shadow_plane_state = &ssd130x_state->base;
@@ -753,7 +768,6 @@ static void ssd130x_primary_plane_destroy_state(struct drm_plane *plane, {struct ssd130x_plane_state *ssd130x_state =to_ssd130x_plane_state (state); -kfree (ssd130x_state->data_array);kfree (ssd130x_state->buffer);__drm_gem_destroy_shadow_plane_state (&ssd130x_state->base);
@@ -793,6 +807,75 @@ static enum drm_mode_status ssd130x_crtc_helper_mode_valid(struct drm_crtc *crtcreturn MODE_OK ; } +static int ssd130x_crtc_helper_atomic_check (struct drm_crtc *crtc, +struct drm_atomic_state *state) +{ +struct drm_device *drm = crtc->dev; +struct ssd130x_device *ssd130x =drm_to_ssd130x (drm); +struct drm_crtc_state *crtc_state =drm_atomic_get_new_crtc_state (state, crtc); +struct ssd130x_crtc_state *ssd130x_state =to_ssd130x_crtc_state (crtc_state); +unsigned int page_height = ssd130x->device_info->page_height; +unsigned int pages =DIV_ROUND_UP (ssd130x->height, page_height); +int ret; + + ret =drm_crtc_helper_atomic_check (crtc, state); +if (ret) +return ret; + + ssd130x_state->data_array =kmalloc (ssd130x->width * pages,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!ssd130x_state->data_array) +return -ENOMEM ; + +return 0 ; +} + +/* Called during init to allocate the CRTC's atomic state. */ +static void ssd130x_crtc_reset (struct drm_crtc *crtc) +{ +struct ssd130x_crtc_state *ssd130x_state; + +WARN_ON (crtc->state); + + ssd130x_state =kzalloc (sizeof (*ssd130x_state),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!ssd130x_state) +return ; + +__drm_atomic_helper_crtc_reset (crtc, &ssd130x_state->base); +} + +static struct drm_crtc_state *ssd130x_crtc_duplicate_state (struct drm_crtc *crtc) +{ +struct ssd130x_crtc_state *old_ssd130x_state; +struct ssd130x_crtc_state *ssd130x_state; + +if (WARN_ON (!crtc->state)) +return NULL ; + + old_ssd130x_state =to_ssd130x_crtc_state (crtc->state); + ssd130x_state =kmemdup (old_ssd130x_state,sizeof (*ssd130x_state),GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!ssd130x_state) +return NULL ; + +/* The buffer is not duplicated and is allocated in .atomic_check */ + ssd130x_state->data_array =NULL ; + +__drm_atomic_helper_crtc_duplicate_state (crtc, &ssd130x_state->base); + +return &ssd130x_state->base; +} + +static void ssd130x_crtc_destroy_state (struct drm_crtc *crtc, +struct drm_crtc_state *state) +{ +struct ssd130x_crtc_state *ssd130x_state =to_ssd130x_crtc_state (state); + +kfree (ssd130x_state->data_array); + +__drm_atomic_helper_crtc_destroy_state (state); + +kfree (ssd130x_state); +} +/* * The CRTC is always enabled. Screen updates are performed by * the primary plane's atomic_update function. Disabling clears
@@ -800,16 +883,16 @@ static enum drm_mode_status ssd130x_crtc_helper_mode_valid(struct drm_crtc *crtc*/ static const struct drm_crtc_helper_funcs ssd130x_crtc_helper_funcs = { .mode_valid = ssd130x_crtc_helper_mode_valid, - .atomic_check = drm_crtc_helper_atomic_check, + .atomic_check = ssd130x_crtc_helper_atomic_check, };static const struct drm_crtc_funcs ssd130x_crtc_funcs = { - .reset = drm_atomic_helper_crtc_reset, + .reset = ssd130x_crtc_reset, .destroy = drm_crtc_cleanup, .set_config = drm_atomic_helper_set_config, .page_flip = drm_atomic_helper_page_flip, - .atomic_duplicate_state = drm_atomic_helper_crtc_duplicate_state, - .atomic_destroy_state = drm_atomic_helper_crtc_destroy_state, + .atomic_duplicate_state = ssd130x_crtc_duplicate_state, + .atomic_destroy_state = ssd130x_crtc_destroy_state, }; static void ssd130x_encoder_helper_atomic_enable(struct drm_encoder *encoder,
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 132/567 drm/ssd130x: Replace .page_height field in device info with a constant
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Javier Martinez Canillas <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ec5dceb8180f0cb110dc7029d55d6a83d0583015 ]
This deemed useful to avoid hardcoding a page height and allow to support other Solomon controller families, but dividing the screen in pages seems to be something that is specific to the SSD130x chip family.
For example, SSD132x chip family divides the screen in segments (columns) and common outputs (rows), so the concept of screen pages does not exist for the SSD132x family.
Let's drop this field from the device info struct and just use a constant SSD130X_PAGE_HEIGHT macro to define the page height. While being there, replace hardcoded 8 values in places where it is used as the page height.
Stable-dep-of: 36d9579fed6c ("drm/solomon: Fix page start when updating rectangle in page addressing mode")
--- drivers/gpu/drm/solomon/ssd130x.c | 37 +++++++++++++++---------------- drivers/gpu/drm/solomon/ssd130x.h | 1 - 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/solomon/ssd130x.c +18 -19
@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@#define DRIVER_MAJOR 1#define DRIVER_MINOR 0 +#define SSD130X_PAGE_HEIGHT 8 +#define SSD130X_PAGE_COL_START_LOW 0x00#define SSD130X_PAGE_COL_START_HIGH 0x10#define SSD130X_SET_ADDRESS_MODE 0x20
@@ -102,7 +104,6 @@ const struct ssd130x_deviceinfo ssd130x_variants[] = { .default_width = 132, .default_height = 64, .page_mode_only = 1, - .page_height = 8, }, [SSD1305_ID] = { .default_vcomh = 0x34,
@@ -110,7 +111,6 @@ const struct ssd130x_deviceinfo ssd130x_variants[] = { .default_dclk_frq = 7, .default_width = 132, .default_height = 64, - .page_height = 8, }, [SSD1306_ID] = { .default_vcomh = 0x20,
@@ -119,7 +119,6 @@ const struct ssd130x_deviceinfo ssd130x_variants[] = { .need_chargepump = 1, .default_width = 128, .default_height = 64, - .page_height = 8, }, [SSD1307_ID] = { .default_vcomh = 0x20,
@@ -128,7 +127,6 @@ const struct ssd130x_deviceinfo ssd130x_variants[] = { .need_pwm = 1, .default_width = 128, .default_height = 39, - .page_height = 8, }, [SSD1309_ID] = { .default_vcomh = 0x34,
@@ -136,7 +134,6 @@ const struct ssd130x_deviceinfo ssd130x_variants[] = { .default_dclk_frq = 10, .default_width = 128, .default_height = 64, - .page_height = 8, } };EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL (ssd130x_variants,DRM_SSD130X );
@@ -465,13 +462,13 @@ static int ssd130x_update_rect(struct ssd130x_device *ssd130x,unsigned int width =drm_rect_width (rect);unsigned int height =drm_rect_height (rect);unsigned int line_length =DIV_ROUND_UP (width,8 ); -unsigned int page_height = ssd130x->device_info->page_height; +unsigned int page_height =SSD130X_PAGE_HEIGHT ;unsigned int pages =DIV_ROUND_UP (height, page_height);struct drm_device *drm = &ssd130x->drm;u32 array_idx =0 ;int ret, i, j, k; -drm_WARN_ONCE (drm, y %8 !=0 ,"y must be aligned to screen page\n" ); +drm_WARN_ONCE (drm, y % page_height !=0 ,"y must be aligned to screen page\n" );/* * The screen is divided in pages, each having a height of 8
@@ -503,27 +500,32 @@ static int ssd130x_update_rect(struct ssd130x_device *ssd130x,*/ if (!ssd130x->page_address_mode) { +u8 page_start; +/* Set address range for horizontal addressing mode */ ret =ssd130x_set_col_range (ssd130x, ssd130x->col_offset + x, width);if (ret <0 )return ret; - ret =ssd130x_set_page_range (ssd130x, ssd130x->page_offset + y /8 , pages); + page_start = ssd130x->page_offset + y / page_height; + ret =ssd130x_set_page_range (ssd130x, page_start, pages);if (ret <0 )return ret; }for (i =0 ; i < pages; i++) { -int m =8 ; +int m = page_height;/* Last page may be partial */ -if (8 * (y /8 + i +1 ) > ssd130x->height) - m = ssd130x->height %8 ; +if (page_height * (y / page_height + i +1 ) > ssd130x->height) + m = ssd130x->height % page_height; +for (j =0 ; j < width; j++) {u8 data =0 ;for (k =0 ; k < m; k++) { -u8 byte = buf[(8 * i + k) * line_length + j /8 ]; +u32 idx = (page_height * i + k) * line_length + j /8 ; +u8 byte = buf[idx];u8 bit = (byte >> (j %8 )) &1 ; data |= bit << k;
@@ -559,8 +561,7 @@ static int ssd130x_update_rect(struct ssd130x_device *ssd130x,static void ssd130x_clear_screen (struct ssd130x_device *ssd130x,u8 *data_array) { -unsigned int page_height = ssd130x->device_info->page_height; -unsigned int pages =DIV_ROUND_UP (ssd130x->height, page_height); +unsigned int pages =DIV_ROUND_UP (ssd130x->height,SSD130X_PAGE_HEIGHT );unsigned int width = ssd130x->width;int ret, i;
@@ -605,14 +606,13 @@ static int ssd130x_fb_blit_rect(struct drm_framebuffer *fb, u8 *buf, u8 *data_array) {struct ssd130x_device *ssd130x =drm_to_ssd130x (fb->dev); -unsigned int page_height = ssd130x->device_info->page_height;struct iosys_map dst;unsigned int dst_pitch;int ret =0 ;/* Align y to display page boundaries */ - rect->y1 =round_down (rect->y1, page_height); - rect->y2 = min_t(unsigned int, round_up(rect->y2, page_height), ssd130x->height); + rect->y1 =round_down (rect->y1,SSD130X_PAGE_HEIGHT ); + rect->y2 = min_t(unsigned int, round_up(rect->y2, SSD130X_PAGE_HEIGHT), ssd130x->height); dst_pitch =DIV_ROUND_UP (drm_rect_width (rect),8 );
@@ -814,8 +814,7 @@ static int ssd130x_crtc_helper_atomic_check(struct drm_crtc *crtc,struct ssd130x_device *ssd130x =drm_to_ssd130x (drm);struct drm_crtc_state *crtc_state =drm_atomic_get_new_crtc_state (state, crtc);struct ssd130x_crtc_state *ssd130x_state =to_ssd130x_crtc_state (crtc_state); -unsigned int page_height = ssd130x->device_info->page_height; -unsigned int pages =DIV_ROUND_UP (ssd130x->height, page_height); +unsigned int pages =DIV_ROUND_UP (ssd130x->height,SSD130X_PAGE_HEIGHT );int ret; ret =drm_crtc_helper_atomic_check (crtc, state);
drivers/gpu/drm/solomon/ssd130x.h +0 -1
@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ struct ssd130x_deviceinfo {u32 default_dclk_frq;u32 default_width;u32 default_height; -u32 page_height;bool need_pwm;bool need_chargepump;bool page_mode_only;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 133/567 drm/solomon: Fix page start when updating rectangle in page addressing mode
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Francesco Lavra <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 36d9579fed6c9429aa172f77bd28c58696ce8e2b ]
In page addressing mode, the pixel values of a dirty rectangle must be sent to the display controller one page at a time. The range of pages corresponding to a given rectangle is being incorrectly calculated as if the Y value of the top left coordinate of the rectangle was 0. This can result in rectangle updates being displayed on wrong parts of the screen.
Fix the above issue by consolidating the start page calculation in a single place at the beginning of the update_rect function, and using the calculated value for all addressing modes.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/solomon/ssd130x.c | 6 ++---- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/solomon/ssd130x.c +2 -4
@@ -463,6 +463,7 @@ static int ssd130x_update_rect(struct ssd130x_device *ssd130x,unsigned int height =drm_rect_height (rect);unsigned int line_length =DIV_ROUND_UP (width,8 );unsigned int page_height =SSD130X_PAGE_HEIGHT ; +u8 page_start = ssd130x->page_offset + y / page_height;unsigned int pages =DIV_ROUND_UP (height, page_height);struct drm_device *drm = &ssd130x->drm;u32 array_idx =0 ;
@@ -500,14 +501,11 @@ static int ssd130x_update_rect(struct ssd130x_device *ssd130x,*/ if (!ssd130x->page_address_mode) { -u8 page_start; -/* Set address range for horizontal addressing mode */ ret =ssd130x_set_col_range (ssd130x, ssd130x->col_offset + x, width);if (ret <0 )return ret; - page_start = ssd130x->page_offset + y / page_height; ret =ssd130x_set_page_range (ssd130x, page_start, pages);if (ret <0 )return ret;
@@ -539,7 +537,7 @@ static int ssd130x_update_rect(struct ssd130x_device *ssd130x,*/ if (ssd130x->page_address_mode) { ret =ssd130x_set_page_pos (ssd130x, - ssd130x->page_offset + i, + page_start + i, ssd130x->col_offset + x);if (ret <0 )return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 134/567 net: ethernet: ti: am65-cpsw-nuss/cpsw-ale: Fix multicast entry handling in ALE table
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chintan Vankar <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit be11a537224d72b906db6b98510619770298c8a4 ]
In the current implementation, flushing multicast entries in MAC mode incorrectly deletes entries for all ports instead of only the target port, disrupting multicast traffic on other ports. The cause is adding multicast entries by setting only host port bit, and not setting the MAC port bits.
Fix this by setting the MAC port's bit in the port mask while adding the multicast entry. Also fix the flush logic to preserve the host port bit during removal of MAC port and free ALE entries when mask contains only host port.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/ti/am65-cpsw-nuss.c | 2 +- drivers/net/ethernet/ti/cpsw_ale.c | 9 ++++----- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/ti/am65-cpsw-nuss.c +1 -1
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ static void am65_cpsw_nuss_ndo_slave_set_rx_mode(struct net_device *ndev)cpsw_ale_set_allmulti (common->ale, ndev->flags &IFF_ALLMULTI , port->port_id); - port_mask =ALE_PORT_HOST ; + port_mask =BIT (port->port_id) |ALE_PORT_HOST ;/* Clear all mcast from ALE */ cpsw_ale_flush_multicast (common->ale, port_mask,-1 );
drivers/net/ethernet/ti/cpsw_ale.c +4 -5
@@ -422,14 +422,13 @@ static void cpsw_ale_flush_mcast(struct cpsw_ale *ale, u32 *ale_entry, ale->port_mask_bits);if ((mask & port_mask) ==0 )return ;/* ports dont intersect, not interested */ - mask &= ~port_mask; + mask &= (~port_mask |ALE_PORT_HOST ); -/* free if only remaining port is host port */ -if (mask) +if (mask ==0x0 || mask ==ALE_PORT_HOST ) +cpsw_ale_set_entry_type (ale_entry,ALE_TYPE_FREE ); +else cpsw_ale_set_port_mask (ale_entry, mask, ale->port_mask_bits); -else -cpsw_ale_set_entry_type (ale_entry,ALE_TYPE_FREE ); }int cpsw_ale_flush_multicast (struct cpsw_ale *ale,int port_mask,int vid)
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 135/567 xsk: Get rid of xdp_buff_xsk::xskb_list_node
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maciej Fijalkowski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b692bf9a7543af7ad11a59d182a3757578f0ba53 ]
Let's bring xdp_buff_xsk back to occupying 2 cachelines by removing xskb_list_node - for the purpose of gathering the xskb frags free_list_node can be used, head of the list (xsk_buff_pool::xskb_list) stays as-is, just reuse the node ptr.
It is safe to do as a single xdp_buff_xsk can never reside in two pool's lists simultaneously.
Stable-dep-of: f7387d6579d6 ("xsk: Fix zero-copy AF_XDP fragment drop")
--- include/net/xdp_sock_drv.h | 14 +++++++------- include/net/xsk_buff_pool.h | 1 - net/xdp/xsk.c | 4 ++-- net/xdp/xsk_buff_pool.c | 1 - 4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
include/net/xdp_sock_drv.h +7 -7
@@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ static inline void xsk_buff_free(struct xdp_buff *xdp)if (likely (!xdp_buff_has_frags (xdp))) goto out; -list_for_each_entry_safe (pos, tmp, xskb_list, xskb_list_node) { -list_del (&pos->xskb_list_node); +list_for_each_entry_safe (pos, tmp, xskb_list, free_list_node) { +list_del (&pos->free_list_node);xp_free (pos); }
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static inline void xsk_buff_add_frag(struct xdp_buff *xdp) { struct xdp_buff_xsk *frag = container_of(xdp, struct xdp_buff_xsk, xdp); -list_add_tail (&frag->xskb_list_node, &frag->pool->xskb_list); +list_add_tail (&frag->free_list_node, &frag->pool->xskb_list); }static inline struct xdp_buff *xsk_buff_get_frag (struct xdp_buff *first)
@@ -138,9 +138,9 @@ static inline struct xdp_buff *xsk_buff_get_frag(struct xdp_buff *first)struct xdp_buff_xsk *frag; frag =list_first_entry_or_null (&xskb->pool->xskb_list, - struct xdp_buff_xsk, xskb_list_node); + struct xdp_buff_xsk, free_list_node);if (frag) { -list_del (&frag->xskb_list_node); +list_del (&frag->free_list_node); ret = &frag->xdp; }
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static inline void xsk_buff_del_tail(struct xdp_buff *tail) { struct xdp_buff_xsk *xskb = container_of(tail, struct xdp_buff_xsk, xdp); -list_del (&xskb->xskb_list_node); +list_del (&xskb->free_list_node); }static inline struct xdp_buff *xsk_buff_get_tail (struct xdp_buff *first)
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ static inline struct xdp_buff *xsk_buff_get_tail(struct xdp_buff *first)struct xdp_buff_xsk *frag; frag = list_last_entry(&xskb->pool->xskb_list, struct xdp_buff_xsk, - xskb_list_node); + free_list_node);return &frag->xdp; }
include/net/xsk_buff_pool.h +0 -1
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ struct xdp_buff_xsk {struct xsk_buff_pool *pool;u64 orig_addr;struct list_head free_list_node; -struct list_head xskb_list_node; };#define XSK_CHECK_PRIV_TYPE (t) BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(t) > offsetofend(struct xdp_buff_xsk, cb))
net/xdp/xsk.c +2 -2
@@ -172,14 +172,14 @@ static int xsk_rcv_zc(struct xdp_sock *xs, struct xdp_buff *xdp, u32 len)return 0 ; xskb_list = &xskb->pool->xskb_list; -list_for_each_entry_safe (pos, tmp, xskb_list, xskb_list_node) { +list_for_each_entry_safe (pos, tmp, xskb_list, free_list_node) {if (list_is_singular (xskb_list)) contd =0 ; len = pos->xdp.data_end - pos->xdp.data; err =__xsk_rcv_zc (xs, pos, len, contd);if (err) goto err; -list_del (&pos->xskb_list_node); +list_del (&pos->free_list_node); }return 0 ;
net/xdp/xsk_buff_pool.c +0 -1
@@ -101,7 +101,6 @@ struct xsk_buff_pool *xp_create_and_assign_umem(struct xdp_sock *xs, xskb->pool = pool; xskb->xdp.frame_sz = umem->chunk_size - umem->headroom;INIT_LIST_HEAD (&xskb->free_list_node); -INIT_LIST_HEAD (&xskb->xskb_list_node);if (pool->unaligned) pool->free_heads[i] = xskb;else
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 136/567 xsk: s/free_list_node/list_node/
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maciej Fijalkowski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 30ec2c1baaead43903ad63ff8e3083949059083c ]
Now that free_list_node's purpose is two-folded, make it just a 'list_node'.
Stable-dep-of: f7387d6579d6 ("xsk: Fix zero-copy AF_XDP fragment drop")
--- include/net/xdp_sock_drv.h | 14 +++++++------- include/net/xsk_buff_pool.h | 2 +- net/xdp/xsk.c | 4 ++-- net/xdp/xsk_buff_pool.c | 14 +++++++------- 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
include/net/xdp_sock_drv.h +7 -7
@@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ static inline void xsk_buff_free(struct xdp_buff *xdp)if (likely (!xdp_buff_has_frags (xdp))) goto out; -list_for_each_entry_safe (pos, tmp, xskb_list, free_list_node) { -list_del (&pos->free_list_node); +list_for_each_entry_safe (pos, tmp, xskb_list, list_node) { +list_del (&pos->list_node);xp_free (pos); }
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static inline void xsk_buff_add_frag(struct xdp_buff *xdp) { struct xdp_buff_xsk *frag = container_of(xdp, struct xdp_buff_xsk, xdp); -list_add_tail (&frag->free_list_node, &frag->pool->xskb_list); +list_add_tail (&frag->list_node, &frag->pool->xskb_list); }static inline struct xdp_buff *xsk_buff_get_frag (struct xdp_buff *first)
@@ -138,9 +138,9 @@ static inline struct xdp_buff *xsk_buff_get_frag(struct xdp_buff *first)struct xdp_buff_xsk *frag; frag =list_first_entry_or_null (&xskb->pool->xskb_list, - struct xdp_buff_xsk, free_list_node); + struct xdp_buff_xsk, list_node);if (frag) { -list_del (&frag->free_list_node); +list_del (&frag->list_node); ret = &frag->xdp; }
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static inline void xsk_buff_del_tail(struct xdp_buff *tail) { struct xdp_buff_xsk *xskb = container_of(tail, struct xdp_buff_xsk, xdp); -list_del (&xskb->free_list_node); +list_del (&xskb->list_node); }static inline struct xdp_buff *xsk_buff_get_tail (struct xdp_buff *first)
@@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ static inline struct xdp_buff *xsk_buff_get_tail(struct xdp_buff *first)struct xdp_buff_xsk *frag; frag = list_last_entry(&xskb->pool->xskb_list, struct xdp_buff_xsk, - free_list_node); + list_node);return &frag->xdp; }
include/net/xsk_buff_pool.h +1 -1
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ struct xdp_buff_xsk {dma_addr_t frame_dma;struct xsk_buff_pool *pool;u64 orig_addr; -struct list_head free_list_node; +struct list_head list_node; };#define XSK_CHECK_PRIV_TYPE (t) BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(t) > offsetofend(struct xdp_buff_xsk, cb))
net/xdp/xsk.c +2 -2
@@ -172,14 +172,14 @@ static int xsk_rcv_zc(struct xdp_sock *xs, struct xdp_buff *xdp, u32 len)return 0 ; xskb_list = &xskb->pool->xskb_list; -list_for_each_entry_safe (pos, tmp, xskb_list, free_list_node) { +list_for_each_entry_safe (pos, tmp, xskb_list, list_node) {if (list_is_singular (xskb_list)) contd =0 ; len = pos->xdp.data_end - pos->xdp.data; err =__xsk_rcv_zc (xs, pos, len, contd);if (err) goto err; -list_del (&pos->free_list_node); +list_del (&pos->list_node); }return 0 ;
net/xdp/xsk_buff_pool.c +7 -7
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ struct xsk_buff_pool *xp_create_and_assign_umem(struct xdp_sock *xs, xskb = &pool->heads[i]; xskb->pool = pool; xskb->xdp.frame_sz = umem->chunk_size - umem->headroom; -INIT_LIST_HEAD (&xskb->free_list_node); +INIT_LIST_HEAD (&xskb->list_node);if (pool->unaligned) pool->free_heads[i] = xskb;else
@@ -534,8 +534,8 @@ struct xdp_buff *xp_alloc(struct xsk_buff_pool *pool) }else { pool->free_list_cnt--; xskb = list_first_entry(&pool->free_list, struct xdp_buff_xsk, - free_list_node); -list_del_init (&xskb->free_list_node); + list_node); +list_del_init (&xskb->list_node); } xskb->xdp.data = xskb->xdp.data_hard_start +XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM ;
@@ -603,8 +603,8 @@ static u32 xp_alloc_reused(struct xsk_buff_pool *pool, struct xdp_buff **xdp, u3 i = nb_entries;while (i--) { - xskb = list_first_entry(&pool->free_list, struct xdp_buff_xsk, free_list_node); -list_del_init (&xskb->free_list_node); + xskb = list_first_entry(&pool->free_list, struct xdp_buff_xsk, list_node); +list_del_init (&xskb->list_node); *xdp = &xskb->xdp; xdp++;
@@ -655,11 +655,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(xp_can_alloc);void xp_free (struct xdp_buff_xsk *xskb) { -if (!list_empty (&xskb->free_list_node)) +if (!list_empty (&xskb->list_node))return ; xskb->pool->free_list_cnt++; -list_add (&xskb->free_list_node, &xskb->pool->free_list); +list_add (&xskb->list_node, &xskb->pool->free_list); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (xp_free);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 137/567 xsk: Fix fragment node deletion to prevent buffer leak
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nikhil P. Rao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 60abb0ac11dccd6b98fd9182bc5f85b621688861 ]
After commit b692bf9a7543 ("xsk: Get rid of xdp_buff_xsk::xskb_list_node"), the list_node field is reused for both the xskb pool list and the buffer free list, this causes a buffer leak as described below.
xp_free() checks if a buffer is already on the free list using list_empty(&xskb->list_node). When list_del() is used to remove a node from the xskb pool list, it doesn't reinitialize the node pointers. This means list_empty() will return false even after the node has been removed, causing xp_free() to incorrectly skip adding the buffer to the free list.
Fix this by using list_del_init() instead of list_del() in all fragment handling paths, this ensures the list node is reinitialized after removal, allowing the list_empty() to work correctly.
Stable-dep-of: f7387d6579d6 ("xsk: Fix zero-copy AF_XDP fragment drop")
--- include/net/xdp_sock_drv.h | 6 +++--- net/xdp/xsk.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
include/net/xdp_sock_drv.h +3 -3
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static inline void xsk_buff_free(struct xdp_buff *xdp) goto out;list_for_each_entry_safe (pos, tmp, xskb_list, list_node) { -list_del (&pos->list_node); +list_del_init (&pos->list_node);xp_free (pos); }
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static inline struct xdp_buff *xsk_buff_get_frag(struct xdp_buff *first) frag =list_first_entry_or_null (&xskb->pool->xskb_list, struct xdp_buff_xsk, list_node);if (frag) { -list_del (&frag->list_node); +list_del_init (&frag->list_node); ret = &frag->xdp; }
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static inline void xsk_buff_del_tail(struct xdp_buff *tail) { struct xdp_buff_xsk *xskb = container_of(tail, struct xdp_buff_xsk, xdp); -list_del (&xskb->list_node); +list_del_init (&xskb->list_node); }static inline struct xdp_buff *xsk_buff_get_tail (struct xdp_buff *first)
net/xdp/xsk.c +1 -1
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static int xsk_rcv_zc(struct xdp_sock *xs, struct xdp_buff *xdp, u32 len) err =__xsk_rcv_zc (xs, pos, len, contd);if (err) goto err; -list_del (&pos->list_node); +list_del_init (&pos->list_node); }return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 138/567 xsk: Fix zero-copy AF_XDP fragment drop
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nikhil P. Rao <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f7387d6579d65efd490a864254101cb665f2e7a7 ]
AF_XDP should ensure that only a complete packet is sent to application. In the zero-copy case, if the Rx queue gets full as fragments are being enqueued, the remaining fragments are dropped.
For the multi-buffer case, add a check to ensure that the Rx queue has enough space for all fragments of a packet before starting to enqueue them.
--- net/xdp/xsk.c | 24 +++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
net/xdp/xsk.c +15 -9
@@ -160,25 +160,31 @@ static int xsk_rcv_zc(struct xdp_sock *xs, struct xdp_buff *xdp, u32 len)struct xdp_buff_xsk *pos, *tmp;struct list_head *xskb_list;u32 contd =0 ; +u32 num_desc;int err; -if (frags) - contd =XDP_PKT_CONTD ; +if (likely (!frags)) { + err =__xsk_rcv_zc (xs, xskb, len, contd); +if (err) + goto err; +return 0 ; + } - err =__xsk_rcv_zc (xs, xskb, len, contd); -if (err) + contd =XDP_PKT_CONTD ; + num_desc =xdp_get_shared_info_from_buff (xdp)->nr_frags +1 ; +if (xskq_prod_nb_free (xs->rx, num_desc) < num_desc) { + xs->rx_queue_full++; + err = -ENOBUFS ; goto err; -if (likely (!frags)) -return 0 ; + } +__xsk_rcv_zc (xs, xskb, len, contd); xskb_list = &xskb->pool->xskb_list;list_for_each_entry_safe (pos, tmp, xskb_list, list_node) {if (list_is_singular (xskb_list)) contd =0 ; len = pos->xdp.data_end - pos->xdp.data; - err =__xsk_rcv_zc (xs, pos, len, contd); -if (err) - goto err; +__xsk_rcv_zc (xs, pos, len, contd);list_del_init (&pos->list_node); }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 139/567 dpaa2-switch: do not clear any interrupts automatically
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ioana Ciornei <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f6da276479c63ca29774bc331a537b92f0550c45 ]
The DPSW object has multiple event sources multiplexed over the same IRQ. The driver has the capability to configure only some of these events to trigger the IRQ.
The dpsw_get_irq_status() can clear events automatically based on the value stored in the 'status' variable passed to it. We don't want that to happen because we could get into a situation when we are clearing more events than we actually handled.
Just resort to manually clearing the events that we handled. Also, since status is not used on the out path we remove its initialization to zero.
This change does not have a user-visible effect because the dpaa2-switch driver enables and handles all the DPSW events which exist at the moment.
Stable-dep-of: 74badb9c20b1 ("dpaa2-switch: Fix interrupt storm after receiving bad if_id in IRQ handler")
--- drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa2/dpaa2-switch.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa2/dpaa2-switch.c +2 -2
@@ -1518,9 +1518,9 @@ static irqreturn_t dpaa2_switch_irq0_handler_thread(int irq_num, void *arg)struct device *dev = (struct device *)arg;struct ethsw_core *ethsw =dev_get_drvdata (dev);struct ethsw_port_priv *port_priv; -u32 status = ~0 ;int err, if_id;bool had_mac; +u32 status; err =dpsw_get_irq_status (ethsw->mc_io,0 , ethsw->dpsw_handle,DPSW_IRQ_INDEX_IF , &status);
@@ -1553,12 +1553,12 @@ static irqreturn_t dpaa2_switch_irq0_handler_thread(int irq_num, void *arg)dpaa2_switch_port_connect_mac (port_priv); } -out: err =dpsw_clear_irq_status (ethsw->mc_io,0 , ethsw->dpsw_handle,DPSW_IRQ_INDEX_IF , status);if (err)dev_err (dev,"Can't clear irq status (err %d)\n" , err); +out:return IRQ_HANDLED ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 140/567 dpaa2-switch: Fix interrupt storm after receiving bad if_id in IRQ handler
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 74badb9c20b1a9c02a95c735c6d3cd6121679c93 ]
Commit 31a7a0bbeb00 ("dpaa2-switch: add bounds check for if_id in IRQ handler") introduces a range check for if_id to avoid an out-of-bounds access. If an out-of-bounds if_id is detected, the interrupt status is not cleared. This may result in an interrupt storm.
Clear the interrupt status after detecting an out-of-bounds if_id to avoid the problem.
Found by an experimental AI code review agent at Google.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa2/dpaa2-switch.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/dpaa2/dpaa2-switch.c +2 -1
@@ -1532,7 +1532,7 @@ static irqreturn_t dpaa2_switch_irq0_handler_thread(int irq_num, void *arg) if_id = (status &0xFFFF0000 ) >>16 ;if (if_id >= ethsw->sw_attr.num_ifs) {dev_err (dev,"Invalid if_id %d in IRQ status\n" , if_id); - goto out; + goto out_clear; } port_priv = ethsw->ports[if_id];
@@ -1553,6 +1553,7 @@ static irqreturn_t dpaa2_switch_irq0_handler_thread(int irq_num, void *arg)dpaa2_switch_port_connect_mac (port_priv); } +out_clear: err =dpsw_clear_irq_status (ethsw->mc_io,0 , ethsw->dpsw_handle,DPSW_IRQ_INDEX_IF , status);if (err)
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 141/567 atm: lec: fix null-ptr-deref in lec_arp_clear_vccs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jiayuan Chen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 101bacb303e89dc2e0640ae6a5e0fb97c4eb45bb ]
syzkaller reported a null-ptr-deref in lec_arp_clear_vccs(). This issue can be easily reproduced using the syzkaller reproducer.
In the ATM LANE (LAN Emulation) module, the same atm_vcc can be shared by multiple lec_arp_table entries (e.g., via entry->vcc or entry->recv_vcc). When the underlying VCC is closed, lec_vcc_close() iterates over all ARP entries and calls lec_arp_clear_vccs() for each matched entry.
For example, when lec_vcc_close() iterates through the hlists in priv->lec_arp_empty_ones or other ARP tables:
1. In the first iteration, for the first matched ARP entry sharing the VCC, lec_arp_clear_vccs() frees the associated vpriv (which is vcc->user_back) and sets vcc->user_back to NULL.
2. In the second iteration, for the next matched ARP entry sharing the same VCC, lec_arp_clear_vccs() is called again. It obtains a NULL vpriv from vcc->user_back (via LEC_VCC_PRIV(vcc)) and then attempts to dereference it via vcc->pop = vpriv->old_pop, leading to a null-ptr-deref crash.
Fix this by adding a null check for vpriv before dereferencing it. If vpriv is already NULL, it means the VCC has been cleared by a previous call, so we can safely skip the cleanup and just clear the entry's vcc/recv_vcc pointers.
The entire cleanup block (including vcc_release_async()) is placed inside the vpriv guard because a NULL vpriv indicates the VCC has already been fully released by a prior iteration — repeating the teardown would redundantly set flags and trigger callbacks on an already-closing socket.
The Fixes tag points to the initial commit because the entry->vcc path has been vulnerable since the original code. The entry->recv_vcc path was later added by commit 8d9f73c0ad2f ("atm: fix a memory leak of vcc->user_back") with the same pattern, and both paths are fixed here.
--- net/atm/lec.c | 26 +++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
net/atm/lec.c +15 -11
@@ -1260,24 +1260,28 @@ static void lec_arp_clear_vccs(struct lec_arp_table *entry)struct lec_vcc_priv *vpriv =LEC_VCC_PRIV (vcc);struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)vcc->proto_data; - vcc->pop = vpriv->old_pop; -if (vpriv->xoff) -netif_wake_queue (dev); -kfree (vpriv); - vcc->user_back =NULL ; - vcc->push = entry->old_push; -vcc_release_async (vcc, -EPIPE ); +if (vpriv) { + vcc->pop = vpriv->old_pop; +if (vpriv->xoff) +netif_wake_queue (dev); +kfree (vpriv); + vcc->user_back =NULL ; + vcc->push = entry->old_push; +vcc_release_async (vcc, -EPIPE ); + } entry->vcc =NULL ; }if (entry->recv_vcc) {struct atm_vcc *vcc = entry->recv_vcc;struct lec_vcc_priv *vpriv =LEC_VCC_PRIV (vcc); -kfree (vpriv); - vcc->user_back =NULL ; +if (vpriv) { +kfree (vpriv); + vcc->user_back =NULL ; - entry->recv_vcc->push = entry->old_recv_push; -vcc_release_async (entry->recv_vcc, -EPIPE ); + entry->recv_vcc->push = entry->old_recv_push; +vcc_release_async (entry->recv_vcc, -EPIPE ); + } entry->recv_vcc =NULL ; } }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 142/567 amd-xgbe: fix MAC_TCR_SS register width for 2.5G and 10M speeds
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Raju Rangoju <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9439a661c2e80485406ce2c90b107ca17858382d ]
Extend the MAC_TCR_SS (Speed Select) register field width from 2 bits to 3 bits to properly support all speed settings.
The MAC_TCR register's SS field encoding requires 3 bits to represent all supported speeds:
- 0x00: 10Gbps (XGMII)
- 0x02: 2.5Gbps (GMII) / 100Mbps
- 0x03: 1Gbps / 10Mbps
- 0x06: 2.5Gbps (XGMII) - P100a only
With only 2 bits, values 0x04-0x07 cannot be represented, which breaks 2.5G XGMII mode on newer platforms and causes incorrect speed select values to be programmed.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-common.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-common.h +1 -1
@@ -514,7 +514,7 @@#define MAC_SSIR_SSINC_INDEX 16#define MAC_SSIR_SSINC_WIDTH 8#define MAC_TCR_SS_INDEX 29 -#define MAC_TCR_SS_WIDTH 2 +#define MAC_TCR_SS_WIDTH 3#define MAC_TCR_TE_INDEX 0#define MAC_TCR_TE_WIDTH 1#define MAC_TCR_VNE_INDEX 24
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 143/567 can: bcm: fix locking for bcm_op runtime updates
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Oliver Hartkopp <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c35636e91e392e1540949bbc67932167cb48bc3a ]
Commit c2aba69d0c36 ("can: bcm: add locking for bcm_op runtime updates") added a locking for some variables that can be modified at runtime when updating the sending bcm_op with a new TX_SETUP command in bcm_tx_setup().
Usually the RX_SETUP only handles and filters incoming traffic with one
exception: When the RX_RTR_FRAME flag is set a predefined CAN frame is sent when a specific RTR frame is received. Therefore the rx bcm_op uses bcm_can_tx() which uses the bcm_tx_lock that was only initialized in bcm_tx_setup(). Add the missing spin_lock_init() when allocating the bcm_op in bcm_rx_setup() to handle the RTR case properly.
--- net/can/bcm.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/can/bcm.c +1 -0
@@ -1128,6 +1128,7 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,if (!op)return -ENOMEM ; +spin_lock_init (&op->bcm_tx_lock); op->can_id = msg_head->can_id; op->nframes = msg_head->nframes; op->cfsiz =CFSIZ (msg_head->flags);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 144/567 can: mcp251x: fix deadlock in error path of mcp251x_open
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alban Bedel <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ab3f894de216f4a62adc3b57e9191888cbf26885 ]
The mcp251x_open() function call free_irq() in its error path with the mpc_lock mutex held. But if an interrupt already occurred the interrupt handler will be waiting for the mpc_lock and free_irq() will deadlock waiting for the handler to finish.
This issue is similar to the one fixed in commit 7dd9c26bd6cf ("can:
mcp251x: fix deadlock if an interrupt occurs during mcp251x_open") but for the error path.
To solve this issue move the call to free_irq() after the lock is released. Setting priv->force_quit = 1 beforehand ensure that the IRQ handler will exit right away once it acquired the lock.
--- drivers/net/can/spi/mcp251x.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/can/spi/mcp251x.c +14 -1
@@ -1202,6 +1202,7 @@ static int mcp251x_open(struct net_device *net) {struct mcp251x_priv *priv =netdev_priv (net);struct spi_device *spi = priv->spi; +bool release_irq = false;unsigned long flags =0 ;int ret;
@@ -1245,12 +1246,24 @@ static int mcp251x_open(struct net_device *net)return 0 ; out_free_irq: -free_irq (spi->irq, priv); +/* The IRQ handler might be running, and if so it will be waiting +* for the lock. But free_irq() must wait for the handler to finish +* so calling it here would deadlock. +* +* Setting priv->force_quit will let the handler exit right away +* without any access to the hardware. This make it safe to call +* free_irq() after the lock is released. +*/ + priv->force_quit =1 ; + release_irq = true; +mcp251x_hw_sleep (spi); out_close:mcp251x_power_enable (priv->transceiver,0 );close_candev (net);mutex_unlock (&priv->mcp_lock); +if (release_irq) +free_irq (spi->irq, priv);return ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 145/567 rust: kunit: fix warning when !CONFIG_PRINTK
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alexandre Courbot <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7dd34dfc8dfa92a7244242098110388367996ac3 ]
If CONFIG_PRINTK is not set, then the following warnings are issued during build:
warning: unused variable: args
--> ../rust/kernel/kunit.rs:16:12
| 16 | pub fn err(args: fmt::Arguments<'_>) {
| ^^^^ help: if this is intentional, prefix it with an underscore: _args
|
= note: #[warn(unused_variables)] (part of #[warn(unused)]) on by default
warning: unused variable: args
--> ../rust/kernel/kunit.rs:32:13
| 32 | pub fn info(args: fmt::Arguments<'_>) {
| ^^^^ help: if this is intentional, prefix it with an underscore: _args
Fix this by adding a no-op assignment using args when CONFIG_PRINTK is not set.
--- rust/kernel/kunit.rs | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
rust/kernel/kunit.rs +8 -0
@@ -13,6 +13,10 @@/// Public but hidden since it should only be used from KUnit generated code. #[doc(hidden)] pub fn err (args: fmt::Arguments <'_>) { +// `args` is unused if `CONFIG_PRINTK` is not set - this avoids a build-time warning. +#[cfg(not( CONFIG_PRINTK ))] +let _ = args; +// SAFETY: The format string is null-terminated and the `%pA` specifier matches the argument we // are passing. #[cfg( CONFIG_PRINTK )]
@@ -29,6 +33,10 @@ pub fn err(args: fmt::Arguments<'_>) {/// Public but hidden since it should only be used from KUnit generated code. #[doc(hidden)] pub fn info (args: fmt::Arguments <'_>) { +// `args` is unused if `CONFIG_PRINTK` is not set - this avoids a build-time warning. +#[cfg(not( CONFIG_PRINTK ))] +let _ = args; +// SAFETY: The format string is null-terminated and the `%pA` specifier matches the argument we // are passing. #[cfg( CONFIG_PRINTK )]
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 146/567 kunit: tool: copy caller args in run_kernel to prevent mutation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shuvam Pandey <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 40804c4974b8df2adab72f6475d343eaff72b7f6 ]
run_kernel() appended KUnit flags directly to the caller-provided args list. When exec_tests() calls run_kernel() repeatedly (e.g. with --run_isolated), each call mutated the same list, causing later runs to inherit stale filter_glob values and duplicate kunit.enable flags.
Fix this by copying args at the start of run_kernel(). Add a regression test that calls run_kernel() twice with the same list and verifies the original remains unchanged.
--- tools/testing/kunit/kunit_kernel.py | 6 ++++-- tools/testing/kunit/kunit_tool_test.py | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
tools/testing/kunit/kunit_kernel.py +4 -2
@@ -331,8 +331,10 @@ class LinuxSourceTree: return self.validate_config(build_dir) def run_kernel(self, args: Optional[List[str]]=None, build_dir: str='', filter_glob: str='', filter: str='', filter_action: Optional[str]=None, timeout: Optional[int]=None) -> Iterator[str]: - if not args: - args = [] + # Copy to avoid mutating the caller-supplied list. exec_tests() reuses + # the same args across repeated run_kernel() calls (e.g. --run_isolated), + # so appending to the original would accumulate stale flags on each call. + args = list(args) if args else [] if filter_glob: args.append('kunit.filter_glob=' + filter_glob) if filter:
tools/testing/kunit/kunit_tool_test.py +26 -0
@@ -461,6 +461,32 @@ class LinuxSourceTreeTest(unittest.TestCase): with open(kunit_kernel.get_outfile_path(build_dir), 'rt') as outfile: self.assertEqual(outfile.read(), 'hi\nbye\n', msg='Missing some output') + def test_run_kernel_args_not_mutated(self): + """Verify run_kernel() copies args so callers can reuse them.""" + start_calls = [] + + def fake_start(start_args, unused_build_dir): + start_calls.append(list(start_args)) + return subprocess.Popen(['printf', 'KTAP version 1\n'], + text=True, stdout=subprocess.PIPE) + + with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory('') as build_dir: + tree = kunit_kernel.LinuxSourceTree(build_dir, + kunitconfig_paths=[os.devnull]) + with mock.patch.object(tree._ops, 'start', side_effect=fake_start), \ + mock.patch.object(kunit_kernel.subprocess, 'call'): + kernel_args = ['mem=1G'] + for _ in tree.run_kernel(args=kernel_args, build_dir=build_dir, + filter_glob='suite.test1'): + pass + for _ in tree.run_kernel(args=kernel_args, build_dir=build_dir, + filter_glob='suite.test2'): + pass + self.assertEqual(kernel_args, ['mem=1G'], + 'run_kernel() should not modify caller args') + self.assertIn('kunit.filter_glob=suite.test1', start_calls[0]) + self.assertIn('kunit.filter_glob=suite.test2', start_calls[1]) + def test_build_reconfig_no_config(self): with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory('') as build_dir: with open(kunit_kernel.get_kunitconfig_path(build_dir), 'w') as f:
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 147/567 net: dsa: realtek: rtl8365mb: fix rtl8365mb_phy_ocp_write return value
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mieczyslaw Nalewaj <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7cbe98f7bef965241a5908d50d557008cf998aee ]
Function rtl8365mb_phy_ocp_write() always returns 0, even when an error occurs during register access. This patch fixes the return value to propagate the actual error code from regmap operations.
--- drivers/net/dsa/realtek/rtl8365mb.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/dsa/realtek/rtl8365mb.c +1 -1
@@ -766,7 +766,7 @@ static int rtl8365mb_phy_ocp_write(struct realtek_priv *priv, int phy, out:mutex_unlock (&priv->map_lock); -return 0 ; +return ret; }static int rtl8365mb_phy_read (struct realtek_priv *priv,int phy,int regnum)
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 148/567 bpf/bonding: reject vlan+srcmac xmit_hash_policy change when XDP is loaded
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jiayuan Chen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 479d589b40b836442bbdadc3fdb37f001bb67f26 ]
bond_option_mode_set() already rejects mode changes that would make a loaded XDP program incompatible via bond_xdp_check(). However, bond_option_xmit_hash_policy_set() has no such guard.
For 802.3ad and balance-xor modes, bond_xdp_check() returns false when xmit_hash_policy is vlan+srcmac, because the 802.1q payload is usually absent due to hardware offload. This means a user can:
1. Attach a native XDP program to a bond in 802.3ad/balance-xor mode with a compatible xmit_hash_policy (e.g. layer2+3).
2. Change xmit_hash_policy to vlan+srcmac while XDP remains loaded.
This leaves bond->xdp_prog set but bond_xdp_check() now returning false for the same device. When the bond is later destroyed, dev_xdp_uninstall() calls bond_xdp_set(dev, NULL, NULL) to remove the program, which hits the bond_xdp_check() guard and returns -EOPNOTSUPP, triggering:
WARN_ON(dev_xdp_install(dev, mode, bpf_op, NULL, 0, NULL))
Fix this by rejecting xmit_hash_policy changes to vlan+srcmac when an XDP program is loaded on a bond in 802.3ad or balance-xor mode.
commit 39a0876d595b ("net, bonding: Disallow vlan+srcmac with XDP") introduced bond_xdp_check() which returns false for 802.3ad/balance-xor modes when xmit_hash_policy is vlan+srcmac. The check was wired into bond_xdp_set() to reject XDP attachment with an incompatible policy, but the symmetric path -- preventing xmit_hash_policy from being changed to an incompatible value after XDP is already loaded -- was left unguarded in bond_option_xmit_hash_policy_set().
Note:
commit 094ee6017ea0 ("bonding: check xdp prog when set bond mode") later added a similar guard to bond_option_mode_set(), but bond_option_xmit_hash_policy_set() remained unprotected.
--- drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 9 +++++++-- drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c | 2 ++ include/net/bonding.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c +7 -2
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ static bool bond_sk_check(struct bonding *bond) } } -bool bond_xdp_check (struct bonding *bond,int mode) +bool __bond_xdp_check (int mode,int xmit_policy) {switch (mode) {case BOND_MODE_ROUNDROBIN :
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ bool bond_xdp_check(struct bonding *bond, int mode)/* vlan+srcmac is not supported with XDP as in most cases the 802.1q * payload is not in the packet due to hardware offload. */ -if (bond->params.xmit_policy !=BOND_XMIT_POLICY_VLAN_SRCMAC ) +if (xmit_policy !=BOND_XMIT_POLICY_VLAN_SRCMAC )return true; fallthrough;default :
@@ -341,6 +341,11 @@ bool bond_xdp_check(struct bonding *bond, int mode) } } +bool bond_xdp_check (struct bonding *bond,int mode) +{ +return __bond_xdp_check (mode, bond->params.xmit_policy); +} +/*---------------------------------- VLAN -----------------------------------*/ /* In the following 2 functions, bond_vlan_rx_add_vid and bond_vlan_rx_kill_vid,
drivers/net/bonding/bond_options.c +2 -0
@@ -1546,6 +1546,8 @@ static int bond_option_fail_over_mac_set(struct bonding *bond,static int bond_option_xmit_hash_policy_set (struct bonding *bond,const struct bond_opt_value *newval) { +if (bond->xdp_prog && !__bond_xdp_check (BOND_MODE (bond), newval->value)) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ;netdev_dbg (bond->dev,"Setting xmit hash policy to %s (%llu)\n" , newval->string, newval->value); bond->params.xmit_policy = newval->value;
include/net/bonding.h +1 -0
@@ -696,6 +696,7 @@ void bond_debug_register(struct bonding *bond);void bond_debug_unregister (struct bonding *bond);void bond_debug_reregister (struct bonding *bond);const char *bond_mode_name (int mode); +bool __bond_xdp_check (int mode,int xmit_policy);bool bond_xdp_check (struct bonding *bond,int mode);void bond_setup (struct net_device *bond_dev);unsigned int bond_get_num_tx_queues (void );
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 149/567 octeon_ep: Relocate counter updates before NAPI
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vimlesh Kumar <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 18c04a808c436d629d5812ce883e3822a5f5a47f ]
Relocate IQ/OQ IN/OUT_CNTS updates to occur before NAPI completion, and replace napi_complete with napi_complete_done.
Moving the IQ/OQ counter updates before napi_complete_done ensures
1. Counter registers are updated before re-enabling interrupts.
2. Prevents a race where new packets arrive but counters aren't properly synchronized.napi_complete_done (vs napi_complete) allows for better interrupt coalescing.
--- .../ethernet/marvell/octeon_ep/octep_main.c | 19 +++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeon_ep/octep_main.c +15 -4
@@ -534,12 +534,12 @@ static void octep_clean_irqs(struct octep_device *oct) }/** -* octep_enable_ioq_irq() - Enable MSI-x interrupt of a Tx/Rx queue. +* octep_update_pkt() - Update IQ/OQ IN/OUT_CNT registers. * * @iq: Octeon Tx queue data structure. * @oq: Octeon Rx queue data structure. */ -static void octep_enable_ioq_irq (struct octep_iq *iq,struct octep_oq *oq) +static void octep_update_pkt (struct octep_iq *iq,struct octep_oq *oq) {u32 pkts_pend = oq->pkts_pending;
@@ -555,7 +555,17 @@ static void octep_enable_ioq_irq(struct octep_iq *iq, struct octep_oq *oq) }/* Flush the previous wrties before writing to RESEND bit */ -wmb (); +smp_wmb (); +} + +/** +* octep_enable_ioq_irq() - Enable MSI-x interrupt of a Tx/Rx queue. +* +* @iq: Octeon Tx queue data structure. +* @oq: Octeon Rx queue data structure. +*/ +static void octep_enable_ioq_irq (struct octep_iq *iq,struct octep_oq *oq) +{writeq (1UL <<OCTEP_OQ_INTR_RESEND_BIT , oq->pkts_sent_reg);writeq (1UL <<OCTEP_IQ_INTR_RESEND_BIT , iq->inst_cnt_reg); }
@@ -581,7 +591,8 @@ static int octep_napi_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget)if (tx_pending || rx_done >= budget)return budget; -napi_complete (napi); +octep_update_pkt (ioq_vector->iq, ioq_vector->oq); +napi_complete_done (napi, rx_done);octep_enable_ioq_irq (ioq_vector->iq, ioq_vector->oq);return rx_done; }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 150/567 octeon_ep: avoid compiler and IQ/OQ reordering
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Vimlesh Kumar <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 43b3160cb639079a15daeb5f080120afbfbfc918 ]
Utilize READ_ONCE and WRITE_ONCE APIs for IO queue Tx/Rx variable access to prevent compiler optimization and reordering. Additionally, ensure IO queue OUT/IN_CNT registers are flushed by performing a read-back after writing.
The compiler could reorder reads/writes to pkts_pending, last_pkt_count, etc., causing stale values to be used when calculating packets to process or register updates to send to hardware. The Octeon hardware requires a read-back after writing to OUT_CNT/IN_CNT registers to ensure the write has been flushed through any posted write buffers before the interrupt resend bit is set. Without this, we have observed cases where the hardware didn't properly update its internal state.
wmb/rmb only provides ordering guarantees but doesn't prevent the compiler from performing optimizations like caching in registers, load tearing etc.
--- .../ethernet/marvell/octeon_ep/octep_main.c | 21 +++++++++------ .../net/ethernet/marvell/octeon_ep/octep_rx.c | 27 +++++++++++++------ 2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeon_ep/octep_main.c +13 -8
@@ -541,17 +541,22 @@ static void octep_clean_irqs(struct octep_device *oct)*/ static void octep_update_pkt (struct octep_iq *iq,struct octep_oq *oq) { -u32 pkts_pend = oq->pkts_pending; +u32 pkts_pend =READ_ONCE (oq->pkts_pending); +u32 last_pkt_count =READ_ONCE (oq->last_pkt_count); +u32 pkts_processed =READ_ONCE (iq->pkts_processed); +u32 pkt_in_done =READ_ONCE (iq->pkt_in_done);netdev_dbg (iq->netdev,"enabling intr for Q-%u\n" , iq->q_no); -if (iq->pkts_processed) { -writel (iq->pkts_processed, iq->inst_cnt_reg); - iq->pkt_in_done -= iq->pkts_processed; - iq->pkts_processed =0 ; +if (pkts_processed) { +writel (pkts_processed, iq->inst_cnt_reg); +readl (iq->inst_cnt_reg); +WRITE_ONCE (iq->pkt_in_done, (pkt_in_done - pkts_processed)); +WRITE_ONCE (iq->pkts_processed,0 ); } -if (oq->last_pkt_count - pkts_pend) { -writel (oq->last_pkt_count - pkts_pend, oq->pkts_sent_reg); - oq->last_pkt_count = pkts_pend; +if (last_pkt_count - pkts_pend) { +writel (last_pkt_count - pkts_pend, oq->pkts_sent_reg); +readl (oq->pkts_sent_reg); +WRITE_ONCE (oq->last_pkt_count, pkts_pend); }/* Flush the previous wrties before writing to RESEND bit */
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeon_ep/octep_rx.c +19 -8
@@ -323,10 +323,16 @@ static int octep_oq_check_hw_for_pkts(struct octep_device *oct, struct octep_oq *oq) {u32 pkt_count, new_pkts; +u32 last_pkt_count, pkts_pending; pkt_count =readl (oq->pkts_sent_reg); - new_pkts = pkt_count - oq->last_pkt_count; + last_pkt_count =READ_ONCE (oq->last_pkt_count); + new_pkts = pkt_count - last_pkt_count; +if (pkt_count < last_pkt_count) { +dev_err (oq->dev,"OQ-%u pkt_count(%u) < oq->last_pkt_count(%u)\n" , + oq->q_no, pkt_count, last_pkt_count); + }/* Clear the hardware packets counter register if the rx queue is * being processed continuously with-in a single interrupt and * reached half its max value.
@@ -337,8 +343,9 @@ static int octep_oq_check_hw_for_pkts(struct octep_device *oct, pkt_count =readl (oq->pkts_sent_reg); new_pkts += pkt_count; } - oq->last_pkt_count = pkt_count; - oq->pkts_pending += new_pkts; +WRITE_ONCE (oq->last_pkt_count, pkt_count); + pkts_pending =READ_ONCE (oq->pkts_pending); +WRITE_ONCE (oq->pkts_pending, (pkts_pending + new_pkts));return new_pkts; }
@@ -411,7 +418,7 @@ static int __octep_oq_process_rx(struct octep_device *oct,u16 data_offset;u32 read_idx; - read_idx = oq->host_read_idx; + read_idx =READ_ONCE (oq->host_read_idx); rx_bytes =0 ; desc_used =0 ;for (pkt =0 ; pkt < pkts_to_process; pkt++) {
@@ -494,7 +501,7 @@ static int __octep_oq_process_rx(struct octep_device *oct,napi_gro_receive (oq->napi, skb); } - oq->host_read_idx = read_idx; +WRITE_ONCE (oq->host_read_idx, read_idx); oq->refill_count += desc_used; oq->stats.packets += pkt; oq->stats.bytes += rx_bytes;
@@ -517,22 +524,26 @@ int octep_oq_process_rx(struct octep_oq *oq, int budget) {u32 pkts_available, pkts_processed, total_pkts_processed;struct octep_device *oct = oq->octep_dev; +u32 pkts_pending; pkts_available =0 ; pkts_processed =0 ; total_pkts_processed =0 ;while (total_pkts_processed < budget) {/* update pending count only when current one exhausted */ -if (oq->pkts_pending ==0 ) + pkts_pending =READ_ONCE (oq->pkts_pending); +if (pkts_pending ==0 )octep_oq_check_hw_for_pkts (oct, oq); + pkts_pending =READ_ONCE (oq->pkts_pending); pkts_available =min (budget - total_pkts_processed, - oq->pkts_pending); + pkts_pending);if (!pkts_available)break ; pkts_processed =__octep_oq_process_rx (oct, oq, pkts_available); - oq->pkts_pending -= pkts_processed; + pkts_pending =READ_ONCE (oq->pkts_pending); +WRITE_ONCE (oq->pkts_pending, (pkts_pending - pkts_processed)); total_pkts_processed += pkts_processed; }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 151/567 wifi: cw1200: Fix locking in error paths
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d98c24617a831e92e7224a07dcaed2dd0b02af96 ]
cw1200_wow_suspend() must only return with priv->conf_mutex locked if it returns zero. This mutex must be unlocked if an error is returned. Add mutex_unlock() calls to the error paths from which that call is missing. This has been detected by the Clang thread-safety analyzer.
--- drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/pm.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/net/wireless/st/cw1200/pm.c +2 -0
@@ -264,12 +264,14 @@ int cw1200_wow_suspend(struct ieee80211_hw *hw, struct cfg80211_wowlan *wowlan)wiphy_err (priv->hw->wiphy,"PM request failed: %d. WoW is disabled.\n" , ret);cw1200_wow_resume (hw); +mutex_unlock (&priv->conf_mutex);return -EBUSY ; }/* Force resume if event is coming from the device. */ if (atomic_read (&priv->bh_rx)) {cw1200_wow_resume (hw); +mutex_unlock (&priv->conf_mutex);return -EAGAIN ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 152/567 wifi: wlcore: Fix a locking bug
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 72c6df8f284b3a49812ce2ac136727ace70acc7c ]
Make sure that wl->mutex is locked before it is unlocked. This has been detected by the Clang thread-safety analyzer.
--- drivers/net/wireless/ti/wlcore/main.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/ti/wlcore/main.c +2 -2
@@ -1800,6 +1800,8 @@ static int __maybe_unused wl1271_op_resume(struct ieee80211_hw *hw) wl->wow_enabled);WARN_ON (!wl->wow_enabled); +mutex_lock (&wl->mutex); + ret =pm_runtime_force_resume (wl->dev);if (ret <0 ) {wl1271_error ("ELP wakeup failure!" );
@@ -1816,8 +1818,6 @@ static int __maybe_unused wl1271_op_resume(struct ieee80211_hw *hw) run_irq_work = true;spin_unlock_irqrestore (&wl->wl_lock, flags); -mutex_lock (&wl->mutex); -/* test the recovery flag before calling any SDIO functions */ pending_recovery =test_bit (WL1271_FLAG_RECOVERY_IN_PROGRESS , &wl->flags);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 153/567 wifi: mt76: mt7996: Fix possible oob access in mt7996_mac_write_txwi_80211()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lorenzo Bianconi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 60862846308627e9e15546bb647a00de44deb27b ]
Check frame length before accessing the mgmt fields in mt7996_mac_write_txwi_80211 in order to avoid a possible oob access.
--- drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7996/mac.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt7996/mac.c +1 -0
@@ -784,6 +784,7 @@ mt7996_mac_write_txwi_80211(struct mt7996_dev *dev, __le32 *txwi,u32 val;if (ieee80211_is_action (fc) && + skb->len >=IEEE80211_MIN_ACTION_SIZE +1 && mgmt->u.action.category ==WLAN_CATEGORY_BACK && mgmt->u.action.u.addba_req.action_code ==WLAN_ACTION_ADDBA_REQ ) tid =MT_TX_ADDBA ;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 154/567 wifi: mt76: Fix possible oob access in mt76_connac2_mac_write_txwi_80211()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lorenzo Bianconi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4e10a730d1b511ff49723371ed6d694dd1b2c785 ]
Check frame length before accessing the mgmt fields in mt76_connac2_mac_write_txwi_80211 in order to avoid a possible oob access.
[fix check to also cover mgmt->u.action.u.addba_req.capab, correct Fixes tag]
--- drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt76_connac_mac.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/wireless/mediatek/mt76/mt76_connac_mac.c +1 -0
@@ -394,6 +394,7 @@ mt76_connac2_mac_write_txwi_80211(struct mt76_dev *dev, __le32 *txwi,u32 val;if (ieee80211_is_action (fc) && + skb->len >=IEEE80211_MIN_ACTION_SIZE +1 +1 +2 && mgmt->u.action.category ==WLAN_CATEGORY_BACK && mgmt->u.action.u.addba_req.action_code ==WLAN_ACTION_ADDBA_REQ ) {u16 capab =le16_to_cpu (mgmt->u.action.u.addba_req.capab);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 155/567 indirect_call_wrapper: do not reevaluate function pointer
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 710f5c76580306cdb9ec51fac8fcf6a8faff7821 ]
We have an increasing number of READ_ONCE(xxx->function) combined with INDIRECT_CALL_[1234]() helpers.
Unfortunately this forces INDIRECT_CALL_[1234]() to read xxx->function many times, which is not what we wanted.
Fix these macros so that xxx->function value is not reloaded.
$ scripts/bloat-o-meter -t vmlinux.0 vmlinux add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 1/65 up/down: 122/-1084 (-962) Function old new delta ip_push_pending_frames 59 181 +122 ip6_finish_output 687 681 -6 __udp_enqueue_schedule_skb 1078 1072 -6 ioam6_output 2319 2312 -7 xfrm4_rcv_encap_finish2 64 56 -8 xfrm4_output 297 289 -8 vrf_ip_local_out 278 270 -8 vrf_ip6_local_out 278 270 -8 seg6_input_finish 64 56 -8 rpl_output 700 692 -8 ipmr_forward_finish 124 116 -8 ip_forward_finish 143 135 -8 ip6mr_forward2_finish 100 92 -8 ip6_forward_finish 73 65 -8 input_action_end_bpf 1091 1083 -8 dst_input 52 44 -8 __xfrm6_output 801 793 -8 __xfrm4_output 83 75 -8 bpf_input 500 491 -9 __tcp_check_space 530 521 -9 input_action_end_dt6 291 280 -11 vti6_tnl_xmit 1634 1622 -12 bpf_xmit 1203 1191 -12 rpl_input 497 483 -14 rawv6_send_hdrinc 1355 1341 -14 ndisc_send_skb 1030 1016 -14 ipv6_srh_rcv 1377 1363 -14 ip_send_unicast_reply 1253 1239 -14 ip_rcv_finish 226 212 -14 ip6_rcv_finish 300 286 -14 input_action_end_x_core 205 191 -14 input_action_end_x 355 341 -14 input_action_end_t 205 191 -14 input_action_end_dx6_finish 127 113 -14 input_action_end_dx4_finish 373 359 -14 input_action_end_dt4 426 412 -14 input_action_end_core 186 172 -14 input_action_end_b6_encap 292 278 -14 input_action_end_b6 198 184 -14 igmp6_send 1332 1318 -14 ip_sublist_rcv 864 848 -16 ip6_sublist_rcv 1091 1075 -16 ipv6_rpl_srh_rcv 1937 1920 -17 xfrm_policy_queue_process 1246 1228 -18 seg6_output_core 903 885 -18 mld_sendpack 856 836 -20 NF_HOOK 756 736 -20 vti_tunnel_xmit 1447 1426 -21 input_action_end_dx6 664 642 -22 input_action_end 1502 1480 -22 sock_sendmsg_nosec 134 111 -23 ip6mr_forward2 388 364 -24 sock_recvmsg_nosec 134 109 -25 seg6_input_core 836 810 -26 ip_send_skb 172 146 -26 ip_local_out 140 114 -26 ip6_local_out 140 114 -26 __sock_sendmsg 162 136 -26 __ip_queue_xmit 1196 1170 -26 __ip_finish_output 405 379 -26 ipmr_queue_fwd_xmit 373 346 -27 sock_recvmsg 173 145 -28 ip6_xmit 1635 1607 -28 xfrm_output_resume 1418 1389 -29 ip_build_and_send_pkt 625 591 -34 dst_output 504 432 -72 Total: Before=25217686, After=25216724, chg -0.00%
--- include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h | 18 +++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h +11 -7
@@ -16,22 +16,26 @@*/ #define INDIRECT_CALL_1 (f, f1, ...) \ ({ \ - likely(f == f1) ? f1(__VA_ARGS__) : f(__VA_ARGS__); \ + typeof(f) __f1 = (f); \ + likely(__f1 == f1) ? f1(__VA_ARGS__) : __f1(__VA_ARGS__); \ })#define INDIRECT_CALL_2 (f, f2, f1, ...) \ ({ \ - likely(f == f2) ? f2(__VA_ARGS__) : \ - INDIRECT_CALL_1(f, f1, __VA_ARGS__); \ + typeof(f) __f2 = (f); \ + likely(__f2 == f2) ? f2(__VA_ARGS__) : \ + INDIRECT_CALL_1(__f2, f1, __VA_ARGS__); \ })#define INDIRECT_CALL_3 (f, f3, f2, f1, ...) \ ({ \ - likely(f == f3) ? f3(__VA_ARGS__) : \ - INDIRECT_CALL_2(f, f2, f1, __VA_ARGS__); \ + typeof(f) __f3 = (f); \ + likely(__f3 == f3) ? f3(__VA_ARGS__) : \ + INDIRECT_CALL_2(__f3, f2, f1, __VA_ARGS__); \ })#define INDIRECT_CALL_4 (f, f4, f3, f2, f1, ...) \ ({ \ - likely(f == f4) ? f4(__VA_ARGS__) : \ - INDIRECT_CALL_3(f, f3, f2, f1, __VA_ARGS__); \ + typeof(f) __f4 = (f); \ + likely(__f4 == f4) ? f4(__VA_ARGS__) : \ + INDIRECT_CALL_3(__f4, f3, f2, f1, __VA_ARGS__); \ })#define INDIRECT_CALLABLE_DECLARE (f) f
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 156/567 net/rds: Fix circular locking dependency in rds_tcp_tune
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Allison Henderson <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6a877ececd6daa002a9a0002cd0fbca6592a9244 ]
syzbot reported a circular locking dependency in rds_tcp_tune() where sk_net_refcnt_upgrade() is called while holding the socket lock:
======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
======================================================
kworker/u10:8/15040 is trying to acquire lock:ffffffff8e9aaf80 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0},
at: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x4b/0x6f0
but task is already holding lock:ffff88805a3c1ce0 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET6){+.+.}-{0:0},
at: rds_tcp_tune+0xd7/0x930
The issue occurs because sk_net_refcnt_upgrade() performs memory allocation (via get_net_track() -> ref_tracker_alloc()) while the socket lock is held, creating a circular dependency with fs_reclaim.
Fix this by moving sk_net_refcnt_upgrade() outside the socket lock critical section. This is safe because the fields modified by the sk_net_refcnt_upgrade() call (sk_net_refcnt, ns_tracker) are not accessed by any concurrent code path at this point.
v2:
- Corrected fixes tag
- check patch line wrap nits
- ai commentary nits
--- net/rds/tcp.c | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/rds/tcp.c +10 -4
@@ -494,18 +494,24 @@ bool rds_tcp_tune(struct socket *sock)struct rds_tcp_net *rtn;tcp_sock_set_nodelay (sock->sk); -lock_sock (sk);/* TCP timer functions might access net namespace even after * a process which created this net namespace terminated. */ if (!sk->sk_net_refcnt) { -if (!maybe_get_net (net)) { -release_sock (sk); +if (!maybe_get_net (net))return false; - } +/* +* sk_net_refcnt_upgrade() must be called before lock_sock() +* because it does a GFP_KERNEL allocation, which can trigger +* fs_reclaim and create a circular lock dependency with the +* socket lock. The fields it modifies (sk_net_refcnt, +* ns_tracker) are not accessed by any concurrent code path +* at this point. +*/ sk_net_refcnt_upgrade (sk);put_net (net); } +lock_sock (sk); rtn =net_generic (net, rds_tcp_netid);if (rtn->sndbuf_size >0 ) { sk->sk_sndbuf = rtn->sndbuf_size;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 157/567 xen/acpi-processor: fix _CST detection using undersized evaluation buffer
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Thomson <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8b57227d59a86fc06d4f09de08f98133680f2cae ]
read_acpi_id() attempts to evaluate _CST using a stack buffer of sizeof(union acpi_object) (48 bytes), but _CST returns a nested Package of sub-Packages (one per C-state, each containing a register descriptor, type, latency, and power) requiring hundreds of bytes. The evaluation always fails with AE_BUFFER_OVERFLOW.
On modern systems using FFH/MWAIT entry (where pblk is zero), this causes the function to return before setting the acpi_id_cst_present bit. In check_acpi_ids(), flags.power is then zero for all Phase 2 CPUs (physical CPUs beyond dom0's vCPU count), so push_cxx_to_hypervisor() is never called for them.
On a system with dom0_max_vcpus=2 and 8 physical CPUs, only PCPUs 0-1 receive C-state data. PCPUs 2-7 are stuck in C0/C1 idle, unable to enter C2/C3. This costs measurable wall power (4W observed on an Intel Core Ultra 7 265K with Xen 4.20).
The function never uses the _CST return value -- it only needs to know whether _CST exists. Replace the broken acpi_evaluate_object() call with acpi_has_method(), which correctly detects _CST presence using acpi_get_handle() without any buffer allocation. This brings C-state detection to parity with the P-state path, which already works correctly for Phase 2 CPUs.
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
--- drivers/xen/xen-acpi-processor.c | 7 ++----- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/xen/xen-acpi-processor.c +2 -5
@@ -379,11 +379,8 @@ read_acpi_id(acpi_handle handle, u32 lvl, void *context, void **rv) acpi_psd[acpi_id].domain); } - status =acpi_evaluate_object (handle,"_CST" ,NULL , &buffer); -if (ACPI_FAILURE (status)) { -if (!pblk) -return AE_OK ; - } +if (!pblk && !acpi_has_method (handle,"_CST" )) +return AE_OK ;/* .. and it has a C-state */ __set_bit (acpi_id, acpi_id_cst_present);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 158/567 bpf: export bpf_link_inc_not_zero.
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kui-Feng Lee <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 67c3e8353f45c27800eecc46e00e8272f063f7d1 ]
bpf_link_inc_not_zero() will be used by kernel modules. We will use it in bpf_testmod.c later.
Stable-dep-of: 56145d237385 ("bpf: Fix a UAF issue in bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim")
--- include/linux/bpf.h | 6 ++++++ kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/bpf.h +6 -0
@@ -2231,6 +2231,7 @@ int bpf_link_prime(struct bpf_link *link, struct bpf_link_primer *primer);int bpf_link_settle (struct bpf_link_primer *primer);void bpf_link_cleanup (struct bpf_link_primer *primer);void bpf_link_inc (struct bpf_link *link); +struct bpf_link *bpf_link_inc_not_zero (struct bpf_link *link);void bpf_link_put (struct bpf_link *link);int bpf_link_new_fd (struct bpf_link *link);struct bpf_link *bpf_link_get_from_fd (u32 ufd);
@@ -2586,6 +2587,11 @@ static inline void bpf_link_inc(struct bpf_link *link) { } +static inline struct bpf_link *bpf_link_inc_not_zero (struct bpf_link *link) +{ +return NULL ; +} +static inline void bpf_link_put (struct bpf_link *link) { }
kernel/bpf/syscall.c +2 -1
@@ -5219,10 +5219,11 @@ static int link_detach(union bpf_attr *attr)return ret; } -static struct bpf_link *bpf_link_inc_not_zero (struct bpf_link *link) +struct bpf_link *bpf_link_inc_not_zero (struct bpf_link *link) {return atomic64_fetch_add_unless (&link->refcnt,1 ,0 ) ? link :ERR_PTR (-ENOENT ); } +EXPORT_SYMBOL (bpf_link_inc_not_zero);struct bpf_link *bpf_link_by_id (u32 id) {
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 159/567 bpf: Fix a UAF issue in bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lang Xu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 56145d237385ca0e7ca9ff7b226aaf2eb8ef368b ]
The root cause of this bug is that when 'bpf_link_put' reduces the refcount of 'shim_link->link.link' to zero, the resource is considered released but may still be referenced via 'tr->progs_hlist' in 'cgroup_shim_find'. The actual cleanup of 'tr->progs_hlist' in 'bpf_shim_tramp_link_release' is deferred. During this window, another process can cause a use-after-free via 'bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim'.
Based on Martin KaFai Lau's suggestions, I have created a simple patch.
To fix this:
Add an atomic non-zero check in 'bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim'. Only increment the refcount if it is not already zero.
Testing:
I verified the fix by adding a delay in 'bpf_shim_tramp_link_release' to make the bug easier to trigger:
static void bpf_shim_tramp_link_release(struct bpf_link *link)
{
/* ... */
if (!shim_link->trampoline)
return;+ msleep(100); WARN_ON_ONCE(bpf_trampoline_unlink_prog(&shim_link->link, shim_link->trampoline, NULL)); bpf_trampoline_put(shim_link->trampoline); }
Before the patch, running a PoC easily reproduced the crash(almost 100%) with a call trace similar to KaiyanM's report.
After the patch, the bug no longer occurs even after millions of iterations.
--- kernel/bpf/trampoline.c | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c +1 -3
@@ -701,10 +701,8 @@ int bpf_trampoline_link_cgroup_shim(struct bpf_prog *prog,mutex_lock (&tr->mutex); shim_link =cgroup_shim_find (tr, bpf_func); -if (shim_link) { +if (shim_link && !IS_ERR (bpf_link_inc_not_zero (&shim_link->link.link))) {/* Reusing existing shim attached by the other program. */ -bpf_link_inc (&shim_link->link.link); -mutex_unlock (&tr->mutex);bpf_trampoline_put (tr);/* bpf_trampoline_get above */ return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 160/567 smb/client: fix buffer size for smb311_posix_qinfo in smb2_compound_op()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: ZhangGuoDong <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 12c43a062acb0ac137fc2a4a106d4d084b8c5416 ]
Use sizeof(struct smb311_posix_qinfo) instead of sizeof its pointer, so the allocated buffer matches the actual struct size.
--- fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c +2 -2
@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ static int smb2_compound_op(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, cfile->fid.volatile_fid,SMB_FIND_FILE_POSIX_INFO ,SMB2_O_INFO_FILE ,0 , -sizeof (struct smb311_posix_qinfo *) + +sizeof (struct smb311_posix_qinfo ) + (PATH_MAX *2 ) + (sizeof(struct smb_sid) * 2), 0, NULL); }else {
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ static int smb2_compound_op(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,COMPOUND_FID ,SMB_FIND_FILE_POSIX_INFO ,SMB2_O_INFO_FILE ,0 , -sizeof (struct smb311_posix_qinfo *) + +sizeof (struct smb311_posix_qinfo ) + (PATH_MAX *2 ) + (sizeof(struct smb_sid) * 2), 0, NULL); }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 161/567 smb/client: fix buffer size for smb311_posix_qinfo in SMB311_posix_query_info()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: ZhangGuoDong <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9621b996e4db1dbc2b3dc5d5910b7d6179397320 ]
SMB311_posix_query_info() is currently unused, but it may still be used in some stable versions, so these changes are submitted as a separate patch.
Use sizeof(struct smb311_posix_qinfo) instead of sizeof its pointer, so the allocated buffer matches the actual struct size.
--- fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/smb/client/smb2pdu.c +1 -1
@@ -3927,7 +3927,7 @@ int SMB311_posix_query_info(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon, u64 persistent_fid, u64 volatile_fid, struct smb311_posix_qinfo *data, u32 *plen) { - size_t output_len = sizeof(struct smb311_posix_qinfo *) + + size_t output_len = sizeof(struct smb311_posix_qinfo) + (sizeof (struct smb_sid ) *2 ) + (PATH_MAX *2 ); *plen =0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 162/567 ipv6: fix NULL pointer deref in ip6_rt_get_dev_rcu()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2ffb4f5c2ccb2fa1c049dd11899aee7967deef5a ]
l3mdev_master_dev_rcu() can return NULL when the slave device is being un-slaved from a VRF. All other callers deal with this, but we lost the fallback to loopback in ip6_rt_pcpu_alloc() -> ip6_rt_get_dev_rcu() with commit 4832c30d5458 ("net: ipv6: put host and anycast routes on device with address").
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000108-0x000000000000010f] RIP: 0010:ip6_rt_pcpu_alloc (net/ipv6/route.c:1418) Call Trace: ip6_pol_route (net/ipv6/route.c:2318) fib6_rule_lookup (net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:115) ip6_route_output_flags (net/ipv6/route.c:2607) vrf_process_v6_outbound (drivers/net/vrf.c:437)
I was tempted to rework the un-slaving code to clear the flag first and insert synchronize_rcu() before we remove the upper. But looks like the explicit fallback to loopback_dev is an established pattern. And I guess avoiding the synchronize_rcu() is nice, too.
--- net/ipv6/route.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/ipv6/route.c +2 -1
@@ -1065,7 +1065,8 @@ static struct net_device *ip6_rt_get_dev_rcu(const struct fib6_result *res)*/ if (netif_is_l3_slave (dev) && !rt6_need_strict (&res->f6i->fib6_dst.addr)) - dev =l3mdev_master_dev_rcu (dev); + dev =l3mdev_master_dev_rcu (dev) ? : +dev_net (dev)->loopback_dev;else if (!netif_is_l3_master (dev)) dev =dev_net (dev)->loopback_dev;/* last case is netif_is_l3_master(dev) is true in which
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 163/567 amd-xgbe: fix sleep while atomic on suspend/resume
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Raju Rangoju <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e2f27363aa6d983504c6836dd0975535e2e9dba0 ]
The xgbe_powerdown() and xgbe_powerup() functions use spinlocks (spin_lock_irqsave) while calling functions that may sleep:
- napi_disable() can sleep waiting for NAPI polling to complete
- flush_workqueue() can sleep waiting for pending work items
This causes a "BUG: scheduling while atomic" error during suspend/resume cycles on systems using the AMD XGBE Ethernet controller.
The spinlock protection in these functions is unnecessary as these functions are called from suspend/resume paths which are already serialized by the PM core
Fix this by removing the spinlock. Since only code that takes this lock is xgbe_powerdown() and xgbe_powerup(), remove it completely.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-drv.c | 10 ---------- drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-main.c | 1 - drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe.h | 3 --- 3 files changed, 14 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-drv.c +0 -10
@@ -1181,7 +1181,6 @@ int xgbe_powerdown(struct net_device *netdev, unsigned int caller) {struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata =netdev_priv (netdev);struct xgbe_hw_if *hw_if = &pdata->hw_if; -unsigned long flags;DBGPR ("-->xgbe_powerdown\n" );
@@ -1192,8 +1191,6 @@ int xgbe_powerdown(struct net_device *netdev, unsigned int caller)return -EINVAL ; } -spin_lock_irqsave (&pdata->lock, flags); -if (caller ==XGMAC_DRIVER_CONTEXT )netif_device_detach (netdev);
@@ -1209,8 +1206,6 @@ int xgbe_powerdown(struct net_device *netdev, unsigned int caller) pdata->power_down =1 ; -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&pdata->lock, flags); -DBGPR ("<--xgbe_powerdown\n" );return 0 ;
@@ -1220,7 +1215,6 @@ int xgbe_powerup(struct net_device *netdev, unsigned int caller) {struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata =netdev_priv (netdev);struct xgbe_hw_if *hw_if = &pdata->hw_if; -unsigned long flags;DBGPR ("-->xgbe_powerup\n" );
@@ -1231,8 +1225,6 @@ int xgbe_powerup(struct net_device *netdev, unsigned int caller)return -EINVAL ; } -spin_lock_irqsave (&pdata->lock, flags); - pdata->power_down =0 ;xgbe_napi_enable (pdata,0 );
@@ -1247,8 +1239,6 @@ int xgbe_powerup(struct net_device *netdev, unsigned int caller)xgbe_start_timers (pdata); -spin_unlock_irqrestore (&pdata->lock, flags); -DBGPR ("<--xgbe_powerup\n" );return 0 ;
drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-main.c +0 -1
@@ -185,7 +185,6 @@ struct xgbe_prv_data *xgbe_alloc_pdata(struct device *dev) pdata->netdev = netdev; pdata->dev = dev; -spin_lock_init (&pdata->lock);spin_lock_init (&pdata->xpcs_lock);mutex_init (&pdata->rss_mutex);spin_lock_init (&pdata->tstamp_lock);
drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe.h +0 -3
@@ -1083,9 +1083,6 @@ struct xgbe_prv_data {unsigned int pp3;unsigned int pp4; -/* Overall device lock */ -spinlock_t lock; -/* XPCS indirect addressing lock */ spinlock_t xpcs_lock;unsigned int xpcs_window_def_reg;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 164/567 drm/sched: Fix kernel-doc warning for drm_sched_job_done()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yujie Liu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 61ded1083b264ff67ca8c2de822c66b6febaf9a8 ]
There is a kernel-doc warning for the scheduler:
Warning: drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_main.c:367 function parameter 'result' not described in 'drm_sched_job_done'
Fix the warning by describing the undocumented error code.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_main.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_main.c +1 -0
@@ -259,6 +259,7 @@ drm_sched_rq_select_entity_fifo(struct drm_sched_rq *rq)/** * drm_sched_job_done - complete a job * @s_job: pointer to the job which is done +* @result: 0 on success, -ERRNO on error * * Finish the job's fence and wake up the worker thread. */
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 165/567 nvme: reject invalid pr_read_keys() num_keys values
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 38ec8469f39e0e96e7dd9b76f05e0f8eb78be681 ]
The pr_read_keys() interface has a u32 num_keys parameter. The NVMe Reservation Report command has a u32 maximum length. Reject num_keys values that are too large to fit.
This will become important when pr_read_keys() is exposed to untrusted userspace via an <linux/pr.h> ioctl.
Stable-dep-of: c3320153769f ("nvme: fix memory allocation in nvme_pr_read_keys()")
--- drivers/nvme/host/pr.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/nvme/host/pr.c +5 -1
@@ -203,7 +203,8 @@ static int nvme_pr_resv_report(struct block_device *bdev, void *data,static int nvme_pr_read_keys (struct block_device *bdev,struct pr_keys *keys_info) { -u32 rse_len, num_keys = keys_info->num_keys; +size_t rse_len; +u32 num_keys = keys_info->num_keys;struct nvme_reservation_status_ext *rse;int ret, i;bool eds;
@@ -213,6 +214,9 @@ static int nvme_pr_read_keys(struct block_device *bdev,* enough to get enough keys to fill the return keys buffer. */ rse_len =struct_size (rse, regctl_eds, num_keys); +if (rse_len >U32_MAX ) +return -EINVAL ; + rse =kzalloc (rse_len,GFP_KERNEL );if (!rse)return -ENOMEM ;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 166/567 nvme: fix memory allocation in nvme_pr_read_keys()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sungwoo Kim <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c3320153769f05fd7fe9d840cb555dd3080ae424 ]
nvme_pr_read_keys() takes num_keys from userspace and uses it to calculate the allocation size for rse via struct_size(). The upper limit is PR_KEYS_MAX (64K).
A malicious or buggy userspace can pass a large num_keys value that results in a 4MB allocation attempt at most, causing a warning in the page allocator when the order exceeds MAX_PAGE_ORDER.
To fix this, use kvzalloc() instead of kzalloc().
This bug has the same reasoning and fix with the patch below:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-block/[email protected]/
Warning log:
WARNING: mm/page_alloc.c:5216 at __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x5aa/0x2300 mm/page_alloc.c:5216, CPU#1: syz-executor117/272 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 272 Comm: syz-executor117 Not tainted 6.19.0 #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x5aa/0x2300 mm/page_alloc.c:5216 Code: ff 83 bd a8 fe ff ff 0a 0f 86 69 fb ff ff 0f b6 1d f9 f9 c4 04 80 fb 01 0f 87 3b 76 30 ff 83 e3 01 75 09 c6 05 e4 f9 c4 04 01 <0f> 0b 48 c7 85 70 fe ff ff 00 00 00 00 e9 8f fd ff ff 31 c0 e9 0d RSP: 0018:ffffc90000fcf450 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 1ffff920001f9ea0 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000b RDI: 0000000000040dc0 RBP: ffffc90000fcf648 R08: ffff88800b6c3380 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffffc90000fcf840 R11: ffff88807ffad280 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000040dc0 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffffc90000fcf620 FS: 0000555565db33c0(0000) GS:ffff8880be26c000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000002000000c CR3: 0000000003b72000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> alloc_pages_mpol+0x236/0x4d0 mm/mempolicy.c:2486 alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x149/0x180 mm/mempolicy.c:2557 ___kmalloc_large_node+0x10c/0x140 mm/slub.c:5598 __kmalloc_large_node_noprof+0x25/0xc0 mm/slub.c:5629 __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5645 [inline] __kmalloc_noprof+0x483/0x6f0 mm/slub.c:5669 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:961 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1094 [inline] nvme_pr_read_keys+0x8f/0x4c0 drivers/nvme/host/pr.c:245 blkdev_pr_read_keys block/ioctl.c:456 [inline] blkdev_common_ioctl+0x1b71/0x29b0 block/ioctl.c:730 blkdev_ioctl+0x299/0x700 block/ioctl.c:786 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1bf/0x220 fs/ioctl.c:583 x64_sys_call+0x1280/0x21b0 mnt/fuzznvme_1/fuzznvme/linux-build/v6.19/./arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:17 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x71/0x330 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7fb893d3108d Code: 28 c3 e8 46 1e 00 00 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffff61f2f38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffff61f3138 RCX: 00007fb893d3108d RDX: 0000000020000040 RSI: 00000000c01070ce RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007ffff61f3138 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 00007ffff61f3128 R14: 00007fb893dae530 R15: 0000000000000001 </TASK>
--- drivers/nvme/host/pr.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/nvme/host/pr.c +2 -2
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ static int nvme_pr_read_keys(struct block_device *bdev,if (rse_len >U32_MAX )return -EINVAL ; - rse =kzalloc (rse_len,GFP_KERNEL ); + rse =kvzalloc (rse_len,GFP_KERNEL );if (!rse)return -ENOMEM ;
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static int nvme_pr_read_keys(struct block_device *bdev, } free_rse: -kfree (rse); +kvfree (rse);return ret; }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 167/567 net: sched: avoid qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() vs dequeue race for lockless qdiscs
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Koichiro Den <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7f083faf59d14c04e01ec05a7507f036c965acf8 ]
When shrinking the number of real tx queues, netif_set_real_num_tx_queues() calls qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() to flush qdiscs for queues which will no longer be used.
qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() currently serializes qdisc_reset() with qdisc_lock(). However, for lockless qdiscs, the dequeue path is serialized by qdisc_run_begin/end() using qdisc->seqlock instead, so qdisc_reset() can run concurrently with __qdisc_run() and free skbs while they are still being dequeued, leading to UAF.
This can easily be reproduced on e.g. virtio-net by imposing heavy traffic while frequently changing the number of queue pairs:
iperf3 -ub0 -c $peer -t 0 &
while :; do
ethtool -L eth0 combined 1
ethtool -L eth0 combined 2
done
With KASAN enabled, this leads to reports like:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __qdisc_run+0x133f/0x1760 ... Call Trace: <TASK> ... __qdisc_run+0x133f/0x1760 __dev_queue_xmit+0x248f/0x3550 ip_finish_output2+0xa42/0x2110 ip_output+0x1a7/0x410 ip_send_skb+0x2e6/0x480 udp_send_skb+0xb0a/0x1590 udp_sendmsg+0x13c9/0x1fc0 ... </TASK> Allocated by task 1270 on cpu 5 at 44.558414s: ... alloc_skb_with_frags+0x84/0x7c0 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x69a/0x830 __ip_append_data+0x1b86/0x48c0 ip_make_skb+0x1e8/0x2b0 udp_sendmsg+0x13a6/0x1fc0 ... Freed by task 1306 on cpu 3 at 44.558445s: ... kmem_cache_free+0x117/0x5e0 pfifo_fast_reset+0x14d/0x580 qdisc_reset+0x9e/0x5f0 netif_set_real_num_tx_queues+0x303/0x840 virtnet_set_channels+0x1bf/0x260 [virtio_net] ethnl_set_channels+0x684/0xae0 ethnl_default_set_doit+0x31a/0x890 ...
Serialize qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt() against the lockless dequeue path by taking qdisc->seqlock for TCQ_F_NOLOCK qdiscs, matching the serialization model already used by dev_reset_queue().
Additionally clear QDISC_STATE_NON_EMPTY after reset so the qdisc state reflects an empty queue, avoiding needless re-scheduling.
--- include/net/sch_generic.h | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
include/net/sch_generic.h +10 -0
@@ -756,13 +756,23 @@ static inline bool skb_skip_tc_classify(struct sk_buff *skb)static inline void qdisc_reset_all_tx_gt (struct net_device *dev,unsigned int i) {struct Qdisc *qdisc; +bool nolock;for (; i < dev->num_tx_queues; i++) { qdisc =rtnl_dereference (netdev_get_tx_queue (dev, i)->qdisc);if (qdisc) { + nolock = qdisc->flags &TCQ_F_NOLOCK ; + +if (nolock) +spin_lock_bh (&qdisc->seqlock);spin_lock_bh (qdisc_lock (qdisc));qdisc_reset (qdisc);spin_unlock_bh (qdisc_lock (qdisc)); +if (nolock) { +clear_bit (__QDISC_STATE_MISSED, &qdisc->state); +clear_bit (__QDISC_STATE_DRAINING, &qdisc->state); +spin_unlock_bh (&qdisc->seqlock); + } } } }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 168/567 net: nfc: nci: Fix zero-length proprietary notifications
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ian Ray <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f7d92f11bd33a6eb49c7c812255ef4ab13681f0f ]
NCI NFC controllers may have proprietary OIDs with zero-length payload. One example is: drivers/nfc/nxp-nci/core.c, NXP_NCI_RF_TXLDO_ERROR_NTF.
Allow a zero length payload in proprietary notifications *only*.
Before:
-- >8 --
kernel: nci: nci_recv_frame: len 3
-- >8 --
After:
-- >8 --
kernel: nci: nci_recv_frame: len 3
kernel: nci: nci_ntf_packet: NCI RX: MT=ntf, PBF=0, GID=0x1, OID=0x23, plen=0
kernel: nci: nci_ntf_packet: unknown ntf opcode 0x123
kernel: nfc nfc0: NFC: RF transmitter couldn't start. Bad power and/or configuration? -- >8 --
After fixing the hardware:
-- >8 --
kernel: nci: nci_recv_frame: len 27
kernel: nci: nci_ntf_packet: NCI RX: MT=ntf, PBF=0, GID=0x1, OID=0x5, plen=24
kernel: nci: nci_rf_intf_activated_ntf_packet: rf_discovery_id 1 -- >8 --
--- net/nfc/nci/core.c | 12 +++++++++++- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/nfc/nci/core.c +11 -1
@@ -1471,10 +1471,20 @@ static bool nci_valid_size(struct sk_buff *skb)unsigned int hdr_size =NCI_CTRL_HDR_SIZE ;if (skb->len < hdr_size || - !nci_plen (skb->data) || skb->len < hdr_size +nci_plen (skb->data)) {return false; } + +if (!nci_plen (skb->data)) { +/* Allow zero length in proprietary notifications (0x20 - 0x3F). */ +if (nci_opcode_oid (nci_opcode (skb->data)) >=0x20 && +nci_mt (skb->data) ==NCI_MT_NTF_PKT ) +return true; + +/* Disallow zero length otherwise. */ +return false; + } +return true; }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 169/567 nfc: nci: free skb on nci_transceive early error paths
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7bd4b0c4779f978a6528c9b7937d2ca18e936e2c ]
nci_transceive() takes ownership of the skb passed by the caller, but the -EPROTO, -EINVAL, and -EBUSY error paths return without freeing it.
Due to issues clearing NCI_DATA_EXCHANGE fixed by subsequent changes the nci/nci_dev selftest hits the error path occasionally in NIPA, and kmemleak detects leaks:
unreferenced object 0xff11000015ce6a40 (size 640):
comm "nci_dev", pid 3954, jiffies 4295441246
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
6b 6b 6b 6b 00 a4 00 0c 02 e1 03 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkk.......kkkkk 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
backtrace (crc 7c40cc2a):
kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x492/0x630
__alloc_skb+0x11e/0x5f0
alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc6/0x8f0
sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x326/0x3f0
nfc_alloc_send_skb+0x94/0x1d0
rawsock_sendmsg+0x162/0x4c0
do_syscall_64+0x117/0xfc0--- net/nfc/nci/core.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/nfc/nci/core.c +7 -2
@@ -1024,18 +1024,23 @@ static int nci_transceive(struct nfc_dev *nfc_dev, struct nfc_target *target,struct nci_conn_info *conn_info; conn_info = ndev->rf_conn_info; -if (!conn_info) +if (!conn_info) { +kfree_skb (skb);return -EPROTO ; + }pr_debug ("target_idx %d, len %d\n" , target->idx, skb->len);if (!ndev->target_active_prot) {pr_err ("unable to exchange data, no active target\n" ); +kfree_skb (skb);return -EINVAL ; } -if (test_and_set_bit (NCI_DATA_EXCHANGE , &ndev->flags)) +if (test_and_set_bit (NCI_DATA_EXCHANGE , &ndev->flags)) { +kfree_skb (skb);return -EBUSY ; + }/* store cb and context to be used on receiving data */ conn_info->data_exchange_cb = cb;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 170/567 nfc: nci: clear NCI_DATA_EXCHANGE before calling completion callback
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0efdc02f4f6d52f8ca5d5889560f325a836ce0a8 ]
Move clear_bit(NCI_DATA_EXCHANGE) before invoking the data exchange callback in nci_data_exchange_complete().
The callback (e.g. rawsock_data_exchange_complete) may immediately schedule another data exchange via schedule_work(tx_work). On a multi-CPU system, tx_work can run and reach nci_transceive() before the current nci_data_exchange_complete() clears the flag, causing test_and_set_bit(NCI_DATA_EXCHANGE) to return -EBUSY and the new transfer to fail.
This causes intermittent flakes in nci/nci_dev in NIPA:
# # RUN NCI.NCI1_0.t4t_tag_read ...
# # t4t_tag_read: Test terminated by timeout
# # FAIL NCI.NCI1_0.t4t_tag_read
# not ok 3 NCI.NCI1_0.t4t_tag_read
--- net/nfc/nci/data.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/nfc/nci/data.c +8 -4
@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ void nci_data_exchange_complete(struct nci_dev *ndev, struct sk_buff *skb, conn_info =nci_get_conn_info_by_conn_id (ndev, conn_id);if (!conn_info) {kfree_skb (skb); - goto exit; +clear_bit (NCI_DATA_EXCHANGE , &ndev->flags); +return ; } cb = conn_info->data_exchange_cb;
@@ -45,6 +46,12 @@ void nci_data_exchange_complete(struct nci_dev *ndev, struct sk_buff *skb,del_timer_sync (&ndev->data_timer);clear_bit (NCI_DATA_EXCHANGE_TO , &ndev->flags); +/* Mark the exchange as done before calling the callback. +* The callback (e.g. rawsock_data_exchange_complete) may +* want to immediately queue another data exchange. +*/ +clear_bit (NCI_DATA_EXCHANGE , &ndev->flags); +if (cb) {/* forward skb to nfc core */ cb (cb_context, skb, err);
@@ -54,9 +61,6 @@ void nci_data_exchange_complete(struct nci_dev *ndev, struct sk_buff *skb,/* no waiting callback, free skb */ kfree_skb (skb); } - -exit: -clear_bit (NCI_DATA_EXCHANGE , &ndev->flags); }/* ----------------- NCI TX Data ----------------- */
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 171/567 nfc: rawsock: cancel tx_work before socket teardown
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d793458c45df2aed498d7f74145eab7ee22d25aa ]
In rawsock_release(), cancel any pending tx_work and purge the write queue before orphaning the socket. rawsock_tx_work runs on the system workqueue and calls nfc_data_exchange which dereferences the NCI device. Without synchronization, tx_work can race with socket and device teardown when a process is killed (e.g. by SIGKILL), leading to use-after-free or leaked references.
Set SEND_SHUTDOWN first so that if tx_work is already running it will see the flag and skip transmitting, then use cancel_work_sync to wait for any in-progress execution to finish, and finally purge any remaining queued skbs.
--- net/nfc/rawsock.c | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
net/nfc/rawsock.c +11 -0
@@ -67,6 +67,17 @@ static int rawsock_release(struct socket *sock)if (sock->type ==SOCK_RAW )nfc_sock_unlink (&raw_sk_list, sk); +if (sk->sk_state ==TCP_ESTABLISHED ) { +/* Prevent rawsock_tx_work from starting new transmits and +* wait for any in-progress work to finish. This must happen +* before the socket is orphaned to avoid a race where +* rawsock_tx_work runs after the NCI device has been freed. +*/ + sk->sk_shutdown |=SEND_SHUTDOWN ; +cancel_work_sync (&nfc_rawsock (sk)->tx_work); +rawsock_write_queue_purge (sk); + } +sock_orphan (sk);sock_put (sk);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 172/567 net: stmmac: Fix error handling in VLAN add and delete paths
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ovidiu Panait <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 35dfedce442c4060cfe5b98368bc9643fb995716 ]
stmmac_vlan_rx_add_vid() updates active_vlans and the VLAN hash register before writing the HW filter entry. If the filter write fails, it leaves a stale VID in active_vlans and the hash register.
stmmac_vlan_rx_kill_vid() has the reverse problem: it clears active_vlans before removing the HW filter. On failure, the VID is gone from active_vlans but still present in the HW filter table.
To fix this, reorder the operations to update the hash table first, then attempt the HW filter operation. If the HW filter fails, roll back both the active_vlans bitmap and the hash table by calling stmmac_vlan_update() again.
--- .../net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c | 18 ++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c +14 -4
@@ -6549,9 +6549,13 @@ static int stmmac_vlan_rx_add_vid(struct net_device *ndev, __be16 proto, u16 vidif (priv->hw->num_vlan) { ret =stmmac_add_hw_vlan_rx_fltr (priv, ndev, priv->hw, proto, vid); -if (ret) +if (ret) { +clear_bit (vid, priv->active_vlans); +stmmac_vlan_update (priv, is_double); goto err_pm_put; + } } + err_pm_put:pm_runtime_put (priv->device);
@@ -6572,15 +6576,21 @@ static int stmmac_vlan_rx_kill_vid(struct net_device *ndev, __be16 proto, u16 vi is_double = true;clear_bit (vid, priv->active_vlans); + ret =stmmac_vlan_update (priv, is_double); +if (ret) { +set_bit (vid, priv->active_vlans); + goto del_vlan_error; + }if (priv->hw->num_vlan) { ret =stmmac_del_hw_vlan_rx_fltr (priv, ndev, priv->hw, proto, vid); -if (ret) +if (ret) { +set_bit (vid, priv->active_vlans); +stmmac_vlan_update (priv, is_double); goto del_vlan_error; + } } - ret =stmmac_vlan_update (priv, is_double); - del_vlan_error:pm_runtime_put (priv->device);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 173/567 net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: Reset prog ptr to old_prog in case of error in mtk_xdp_setup()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lorenzo Bianconi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0abc73c8a40fd64ac1739c90bb4f42c418d27a5e ]
Reset eBPF program pointer to old_prog and do not decrease its ref-count if mtk_open routine in mtk_xdp_setup() fails.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c +12 -3
@@ -3529,12 +3529,21 @@ static int mtk_xdp_setup(struct net_device *dev, struct bpf_prog *prog,mtk_stop (dev); old_prog =rcu_replace_pointer (eth->prog, prog,lockdep_rtnl_is_held ()); + +if (netif_running (dev) && need_update) { +int err; + + err =mtk_open (dev); +if (err) { +rcu_assign_pointer (eth->prog, old_prog); + +return err; + } + } +if (old_prog)bpf_prog_put (old_prog); -if (netif_running (dev) && need_update) -return mtk_open (dev); -return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 174/567 net: bridge: fix nd_tbl NULL dereference when IPv6 is disabled
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e5e890630533bdc15b26a34bb8e7ef539bdf1322 ]
When booting with the 'ipv6.disable=1' parameter, the nd_tbl is never initialized because inet6_init() exits before ndisc_init() is called which initializes it. Then, if neigh_suppress is enabled and an ICMPv6 Neighbor Discovery packet reaches the bridge, br_do_suppress_nd() will dereference ipv6_stub->nd_tbl which is NULL, passing it to neigh_lookup(). This causes a kernel NULL pointer dereference.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000268 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [...] RIP: 0010:neigh_lookup+0x16/0xe0 [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> ? neigh_lookup+0x16/0xe0 br_do_suppress_nd+0x160/0x290 [bridge] br_handle_frame_finish+0x500/0x620 [bridge] br_handle_frame+0x353/0x440 [bridge] __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x298/0x1110 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x3d/0xa0 process_backlog+0xa0/0x140 __napi_poll+0x2c/0x170 net_rx_action+0x2c4/0x3a0 handle_softirqs+0xd0/0x270 do_softirq+0x3f/0x60
Fix this by replacing IS_ENABLED(IPV6) call with ipv6_mod_enabled() in the callers. This is in essence disabling NS/NA suppression when IPv6 is disabled.
--- net/bridge/br_device.c | 2 +- net/bridge/br_input.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/bridge/br_device.c +1 -1
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ netdev_tx_t br_dev_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev) eth_hdr(skb)->h_proto == htons(ETH_P_RARP)) && br_opt_get(br, BROPT_NEIGH_SUPPRESS_ENABLED)) {br_do_proxy_suppress_arp (skb, br, vid,NULL ); - } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && + } else if (ipv6_mod_enabled() && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6) && br_opt_get(br, BROPT_NEIGH_SUPPRESS_ENABLED) && pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) +
net/bridge/br_input.c +1 -1
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ int br_handle_frame_finish(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_ARP) || skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_RARP))) {br_do_proxy_suppress_arp (skb, br, vid, p); - } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && + } else if (ipv6_mod_enabled() && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6) && br_opt_get(br, BROPT_NEIGH_SUPPRESS_ENABLED) && pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) +
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 175/567 net: vxlan: fix nd_tbl NULL dereference when IPv6 is disabled
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 168ff39e4758897d2eee4756977d036d52884c7e ]
When booting with the 'ipv6.disable=1' parameter, the nd_tbl is never initialized because inet6_init() exits before ndisc_init() is called which initializes it. If an IPv6 packet is injected into the interface, route_shortcircuit() is called and a NULL pointer dereference happens on neigh_lookup().
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000380 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [...] RIP: 0010:neigh_lookup+0x20/0x270 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> vxlan_xmit+0x638/0x1ef0 [vxlan] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x9e/0x2e0 __dev_queue_xmit+0xbee/0x14e0 packet_sendmsg+0x116f/0x1930 __sys_sendto+0x1f5/0x200 __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x12f/0x1590 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Fix this by adding an early check on route_shortcircuit() when protocol is ETH_P_IPV6. Note that ipv6_mod_enabled() cannot be used here because VXLAN can be built-in even when IPv6 is built as a module.
--- drivers/net/vxlan/vxlan_core.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/net/vxlan/vxlan_core.c +5 -0
@@ -2126,6 +2126,11 @@ static bool route_shortcircuit(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb) {struct ipv6hdr *pip6; +/* check if nd_tbl is not initiliazed due to +* ipv6.disable=1 set during boot +*/ +if (!ipv6_stub->nd_tbl) +return false;if (!pskb_may_pull (skb,sizeof (struct ipv6hdr )))return false; pip6 =ipv6_hdr (skb);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 176/567 net: ipv6: fix panic when IPv4 route references loopback IPv6 nexthop
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jiayuan Chen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 21ec92774d1536f71bdc90b0e3d052eff99cf093 ]
When a standalone IPv6 nexthop object is created with a loopback device (e.g., "ip -6 nexthop add id 100 dev lo"), fib6_nh_init() misclassifies it as a reject route. This is because nexthop objects have no destination prefix (fc_dst=::), causing fib6_is_reject() to match any loopback nexthop. The reject path skips fib_nh_common_init(), leaving nhc_pcpu_rth_output unallocated. If an IPv4 route later references this nexthop, __mkroute_output() dereferences NULL nhc_pcpu_rth_output and panics.
Simplify the check in fib6_nh_init() to only match explicit reject routes (RTF_REJECT) instead of using fib6_is_reject(). The loopback promotion heuristic in fib6_is_reject() is handled separately by ip6_route_info_create_nh(). After this change, the three cases behave as follows:
1. Explicit reject route ("ip -6 route add unreachable 2001:db8::/64"):
RTF_REJECT is set, enters reject path, skips fib_nh_common_init(). No behavior change.
2. Implicit loopback reject route ("ip -6 route add 2001:db8::/32 dev lo"):
RTF_REJECT is not set, takes normal path, fib_nh_common_init() is called. ip6_route_info_create_nh() still promotes it to reject afterward. nhc_pcpu_rth_output is allocated but unused, which is harmless.
3. Standalone nexthop object ("ip -6 nexthop add id 100 dev lo"):
RTF_REJECT is not set, takes normal path, fib_nh_common_init() is called. nhc_pcpu_rth_output is properly allocated, fixing the crash when IPv4 routes reference this nexthop.
--- net/ipv6/route.c | 8 +++----- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/route.c +3 -5
@@ -3567,7 +3567,6 @@ int fib6_nh_init(struct net *net, struct fib6_nh *fib6_nh,netdevice_tracker *dev_tracker = &fib6_nh->fib_nh_dev_tracker;struct net_device *dev =NULL ;struct inet6_dev *idev =NULL ; -int addr_type;int err; fib6_nh->fib_nh_family =AF_INET6 ;
@@ -3609,11 +3608,10 @@ int fib6_nh_init(struct net *net, struct fib6_nh *fib6_nh, fib6_nh->fib_nh_weight =1 ; -/* We cannot add true routes via loopback here, -* they would result in kernel looping; promote them to reject routes +/* Reset the nexthop device to the loopback device in case of reject +* routes. */ - addr_type =ipv6_addr_type (&cfg->fc_dst); -if (fib6_is_reject (cfg->fc_flags, dev, addr_type)) { +if (cfg->fc_flags &RTF_REJECT ) {/* hold loopback dev/idev if we haven't done so. */ if (dev != net->loopback_dev) {if (dev) {
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 177/567 net/sched: act_ife: Fix metalist update behavior
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jamal Hadi Salim <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e2cedd400c3ec0302ffca2490e8751772906ac23 ]
Whenever an ife action replace changes the metalist, instead of replacing the old data on the metalist, the current ife code is appending the new metadata. Aside from being innapropriate behavior, this may lead to an unbounded addition of metadata to the metalist which might cause an out of bounds error when running the encode op:
[ 138.423369][ C1] ================================================================== [ 138.424317][ C1] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ife_tlv_meta_encode (net/ife/ife.c:168) [ 138.424906][ C1] Write of size 4 at addr ffff8880077f4ffe by task ife_out_out_bou/255 [ 138.425778][ C1] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 255 Comm: ife_out_out_bou Not tainted 7.0.0-rc1-00169-gfbdfa8da05b6 #624 PREEMPT(full) [ 138.425795][ C1] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 [ 138.425800][ C1] Call Trace: [ 138.425804][ C1] <IRQ> [ 138.425808][ C1] dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:122) [ 138.425828][ C1] print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:379 mm/kasan/report.c:482) [ 138.425839][ C1] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 138.425844][ C1] ? __virt_addr_valid (./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:95 (discriminator 1) ./include/linux/rcupdate.h:975 (discriminator 1) ./include/linux/mmzone.h:2207 (discriminator 1) arch/x86/mm/physaddr.c:54 (discriminator 1)) [ 138.425853][ C1] ? ife_tlv_meta_encode (net/ife/ife.c:168) [ 138.425859][ C1] kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:221 mm/kasan/report.c:597) [ 138.425868][ C1] ? ife_tlv_meta_encode (net/ife/ife.c:168) [ 138.425878][ C1] kasan_check_range (mm/kasan/generic.c:186 (discriminator 1) mm/kasan/generic.c:200 (discriminator 1)) [ 138.425884][ C1] __asan_memset (mm/kasan/shadow.c:84 (discriminator 2)) [ 138.425889][ C1] ife_tlv_meta_encode (net/ife/ife.c:168) [ 138.425893][ C1] ? ife_tlv_meta_encode (net/ife/ife.c:171) [ 138.425898][ C1] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 138.425903][ C1] ife_encode_meta_u16 (net/sched/act_ife.c:57) [ 138.425910][ C1] ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock (kernel/locking/spinlock_debug.c:114) [ 138.425916][ C1] ? __asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:105 (discriminator 3)) [ 138.425921][ C1] ? __pfx_ife_encode_meta_u16 (net/sched/act_ife.c:45) [ 138.425927][ C1] ? srso_alias_return_thunk (arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S:221) [ 138.425931][ C1] tcf_ife_act (net/sched/act_ife.c:847 net/sched/act_ife.c:879)
To solve this issue, fix the replace behavior by adding the metalist to the ife rcu data structure.
--- include/net/tc_act/tc_ife.h | 4 +- net/sched/act_ife.c | 93 ++++++++++++++++++------------------- 2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
include/net/tc_act/tc_ife.h +1 -3
@@ -13,15 +13,13 @@ struct tcf_ife_params {u8 eth_src[ETH_ALEN ];u16 eth_type;u16 flags; - +struct list_head metalist;struct rcu_head rcu; };struct tcf_ife_info {struct tc_action common;struct tcf_ife_params __rcu *params; -/* list of metaids allowed */ -struct list_head metalist; };#define to_ife (a) ((struct tcf_ife_info *)a)
net/sched/act_ife.c +44 -49
294 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 178/567 xdp: use modulo operation to calculate XDP frag tailroom
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Larysa Zaremba <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 88b6b7f7b216108a09887b074395fa7b751880b1 ]
The current formula for calculating XDP tailroom in mbuf packets works only if each frag has its own page (if rxq->frag_size is PAGE_SIZE), this defeats the purpose of the parameter overall and without any indication leads to negative calculated tailroom on at least half of frags, if shared pages are used.
There are not many drivers that set rxq->frag_size. Among them:
* i40e and enetc always split page uniformly between frags, use shared pages
* ice uses page_pool frags via libeth, those are power-of-2 and uniformly distributed across page
* idpf has variable frag_size with XDP on, so current API is not applicable
* mlx5, mtk and mvneta use PAGE_SIZE or 0 as frag_size for page_pool
As for AF_XDP ZC, only ice, i40e and idpf declare frag_size for it. Modulo operation yields good results for aligned chunks, they are all power-of-2, between 2K and PAGE_SIZE. Formula without modulo fails when chunk_size is 2K. Buffers in unaligned mode are not distributed uniformly, so modulo operation would not work.
To accommodate unaligned buffers, we could define frag_size as data + tailroom, and hence do not subtract offset when calculating tailroom, but this would necessitate more changes in the drivers.
Define rxq->frag_size as an even portion of a page that fully belongs to a single frag. When calculating tailroom, locate the data start within such portion by performing a modulo operation on page offset.
--- net/core/filter.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/core/filter.c +2 -1
@@ -4137,7 +4137,8 @@ static int bpf_xdp_frags_increase_tail(struct xdp_buff *xdp, int offset)if (!rxq->frag_size || rxq->frag_size > xdp->frame_sz)return -EOPNOTSUPP ; - tailroom = rxq->frag_size -skb_frag_size (frag) -skb_frag_off (frag); + tailroom = rxq->frag_size -skb_frag_size (frag) - +skb_frag_off (frag) % rxq->frag_size;if (unlikely (offset > tailroom))return -EINVAL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 179/567 xsk: introduce helper to determine rxq->frag_size
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Larysa Zaremba <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 16394d80539937d348dd3b9ea32415c54e67a81b ]
rxq->frag_size is basically a step between consecutive strictly aligned frames. In ZC mode, chunk size fits exactly, but if chunks are unaligned, there is no safe way to determine accessible space to grow tailroom.
Report frag_size to be zero, if chunks are unaligned, chunk_size otherwise.
--- include/net/xdp_sock_drv.h | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
include/net/xdp_sock_drv.h +10 -0
@@ -41,6 +41,11 @@ static inline u32 xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size(struct xsk_buff_pool *pool)return xsk_pool_get_chunk_size (pool) -xsk_pool_get_headroom (pool); } +static inline u32 xsk_pool_get_rx_frag_step (struct xsk_buff_pool *pool) +{ +return pool->unaligned ?0 :xsk_pool_get_chunk_size (pool); +} +static inline void xsk_pool_set_rxq_info (struct xsk_buff_pool *pool,struct xdp_rxq_info *rxq) {
@@ -263,6 +268,11 @@ static inline u32 xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size(struct xsk_buff_pool *pool)return 0 ; } +static inline u32 xsk_pool_get_rx_frag_step (struct xsk_buff_pool *pool) +{ +return 0 ; +} +static inline void xsk_pool_set_rxq_info (struct xsk_buff_pool *pool,struct xdp_rxq_info *rxq) {
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 180/567 i40e: fix registering XDP RxQ info
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Larysa Zaremba <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8f497dc8a61429cc004720aa8e713743355d80cf ]
Current way of handling XDP RxQ info in i40e has a problem, where frag_size is not updated when xsk_buff_pool is detached or when MTU is changed, this leads to growing tail always failing for multi-buffer packets.
Couple XDP RxQ info registering with buffer allocations and unregistering with cleaning the ring.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c | 34 ++++++++++++--------- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_txrx.c | 5 +-- 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c +19 -15
@@ -3637,18 +3637,8 @@ static int i40e_configure_rx_ring(struct i40e_ring *ring)if (ring->vsi->type !=I40E_VSI_MAIN ) goto skip; -if (!xdp_rxq_info_is_reg (&ring->xdp_rxq)) { - err =__xdp_rxq_info_reg (&ring->xdp_rxq, ring->netdev, - ring->queue_index, - ring->q_vector->napi.napi_id, - ring->rx_buf_len); -if (err) -return err; - } - ring->xsk_pool =i40e_xsk_pool (ring);if (ring->xsk_pool) { -xdp_rxq_info_unreg (&ring->xdp_rxq); ring->rx_buf_len =xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size (ring->xsk_pool); err = __xdp_rxq_info_reg(&ring->xdp_rxq, ring->netdev, ring->queue_index,
@@ -3660,17 +3650,23 @@ static int i40e_configure_rx_ring(struct i40e_ring *ring)MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL , NULL);if (err) -return err; + goto unreg_xdp;dev_info (&vsi->back->pdev->dev,"Registered XDP mem model MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL on Rx ring %d\n" , ring->queue_index); }else { + err =__xdp_rxq_info_reg (&ring->xdp_rxq, ring->netdev, + ring->queue_index, + ring->q_vector->napi.napi_id, + ring->rx_buf_len); +if (err) +return err; err =xdp_rxq_info_reg_mem_model (&ring->xdp_rxq,MEM_TYPE_PAGE_SHARED ,NULL );if (err) -return err; + goto unreg_xdp; } skip:
@@ -3708,7 +3704,8 @@ static int i40e_configure_rx_ring(struct i40e_ring *ring)dev_info (&vsi->back->pdev->dev,"Failed to clear LAN Rx queue context on Rx ring %d (pf_q %d), error: %d\n" , ring->queue_index, pf_q, err); -return -ENOMEM ; + err = -ENOMEM ; + goto unreg_xdp; }/* set the context in the HMC */
@@ -3717,7 +3714,8 @@ static int i40e_configure_rx_ring(struct i40e_ring *ring)dev_info (&vsi->back->pdev->dev,"Failed to set LAN Rx queue context on Rx ring %d (pf_q %d), error: %d\n" , ring->queue_index, pf_q, err); -return -ENOMEM ; + err = -ENOMEM ; + goto unreg_xdp; }/* configure Rx buffer alignment */
@@ -3725,7 +3723,8 @@ static int i40e_configure_rx_ring(struct i40e_ring *ring)if (I40E_2K_TOO_SMALL_WITH_PADDING ) {dev_info (&vsi->back->pdev->dev,"2k Rx buffer is too small to fit standard MTU and skb_shared_info\n" ); -return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + err = -EOPNOTSUPP ; + goto unreg_xdp; }clear_ring_build_skb_enabled (ring); }else {
@@ -3755,6 +3754,11 @@ static int i40e_configure_rx_ring(struct i40e_ring *ring) }return 0 ; +unreg_xdp: +if (ring->vsi->type ==I40E_VSI_MAIN ) +xdp_rxq_info_unreg (&ring->xdp_rxq); + +return err; }/**
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_txrx.c +3 -2
@@ -1473,6 +1473,9 @@ void i40e_clean_rx_ring(struct i40e_ring *rx_ring)if (!rx_ring->rx_bi)return ; +if (xdp_rxq_info_is_reg (&rx_ring->xdp_rxq)) +xdp_rxq_info_unreg (&rx_ring->xdp_rxq); +if (rx_ring->xsk_pool) {i40e_xsk_clean_rx_ring (rx_ring); goto skip_free;
@@ -1530,8 +1533,6 @@ void i40e_clean_rx_ring(struct i40e_ring *rx_ring)void i40e_free_rx_resources (struct i40e_ring *rx_ring) {i40e_clean_rx_ring (rx_ring); -if (rx_ring->vsi->type ==I40E_VSI_MAIN ) -xdp_rxq_info_unreg (&rx_ring->xdp_rxq); rx_ring->xdp_prog =NULL ;kfree (rx_ring->rx_bi); rx_ring->rx_bi =NULL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 181/567 i40e: use xdp.frame_sz as XDP RxQ info frag_size
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Larysa Zaremba <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c69d22c6c46a1d792ba8af3d8d6356fdc0e6f538 ]
The only user of frag_size field in XDP RxQ info is bpf_xdp_frags_increase_tail(). It clearly expects whole buffer size instead of DMA write size. Different assumptions in i40e driver configuration lead to negative tailroom.
Set frag_size to the same value as frame_sz in shared pages mode, use new helper to set frag_size when AF_XDP ZC is active.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c | 9 ++++++--- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_main.c +6 -3
@@ -3623,6 +3623,7 @@ static int i40e_configure_rx_ring(struct i40e_ring *ring)u16 pf_q = vsi->base_queue + ring->queue_index;struct i40e_hw *hw = &vsi->back->hw;struct i40e_hmc_obj_rxq rx_ctx; +u32 xdp_frame_sz;int err =0 ;bool ok;
@@ -3632,6 +3633,7 @@ static int i40e_configure_rx_ring(struct i40e_ring *ring)memset (&rx_ctx,0 ,sizeof (rx_ctx)); ring->rx_buf_len = vsi->rx_buf_len; + xdp_frame_sz =i40e_rx_pg_size (ring) /2 ;/* XDP RX-queue info only needed for RX rings exposed to XDP */ if (ring->vsi->type !=I40E_VSI_MAIN )
@@ -3639,11 +3641,12 @@ static int i40e_configure_rx_ring(struct i40e_ring *ring) ring->xsk_pool =i40e_xsk_pool (ring);if (ring->xsk_pool) { + xdp_frame_sz =xsk_pool_get_rx_frag_step (ring->xsk_pool); ring->rx_buf_len =xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size (ring->xsk_pool); err =__xdp_rxq_info_reg (&ring->xdp_rxq, ring->netdev, ring->queue_index, ring->q_vector->napi.napi_id, - ring->rx_buf_len); + xdp_frame_sz);if (err)return err; err = xdp_rxq_info_reg_mem_model(&ring->xdp_rxq,
@@ -3659,7 +3662,7 @@ static int i40e_configure_rx_ring(struct i40e_ring *ring) err =__xdp_rxq_info_reg (&ring->xdp_rxq, ring->netdev, ring->queue_index, ring->q_vector->napi.napi_id, - ring->rx_buf_len); + xdp_frame_sz);if (err)return err; err = xdp_rxq_info_reg_mem_model(&ring->xdp_rxq,
@@ -3670,7 +3673,7 @@ static int i40e_configure_rx_ring(struct i40e_ring *ring) } skip: -xdp_init_buff (&ring->xdp,i40e_rx_pg_size (ring) /2 , &ring->xdp_rxq); +xdp_init_buff (&ring->xdp, xdp_frame_sz, &ring->xdp_rxq); rx_ctx.dbuff =DIV_ROUND_UP (ring->rx_buf_len,BIT_ULL (I40E_RXQ_CTX_DBUFF_SHIFT ));
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 182/567 xdp: produce a warning when calculated tailroom is negative
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Larysa Zaremba <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 8821e857759be9db3cde337ad328b71fe5c8a55f ]
Many ethernet drivers report xdp Rx queue frag size as being the same as DMA write size. However, the only user of this field, namely bpf_xdp_frags_increase_tail(), clearly expects a truesize.
Such difference leads to unspecific memory corruption issues under certain circumstances, e.g. in ixgbevf maximum DMA write size is 3 KB, so when running xskxceiver's XDP_ADJUST_TAIL_GROW_MULTI_BUFF, 6K packet fully uses all DMA-writable space in 2 buffers. This would be fine, if only rxq->frag_size was properly set to 4K, but value of 3K results in a negative tailroom, because there is a non-zero page offset.
We are supposed to return -EINVAL and be done with it in such case, but due to tailroom being stored as an unsigned int, it is reported to be somewhere near UINT_MAX, resulting in a tail being grown, even if the requested offset is too much (it is around 2K in the abovementioned test). This later leads to all kinds of unspecific calltraces.
[ 7340.337579] xskxceiver[1440]: segfault at 1da718 ip 00007f4161aeac9d sp 00007f41615a6a00 error 6 [ 7340.338040] xskxceiver[1441]: segfault at 7f410000000b ip 00000000004042b5 sp 00007f415bffecf0 error 4 [ 7340.338179] in libc.so.6[61c9d,7f4161aaf000+160000] [ 7340.339230] in xskxceiver[42b5,400000+69000] [ 7340.340300] likely on CPU 6 (core 0, socket 6) [ 7340.340302] Code: ff ff 01 e9 f4 fe ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 4c 39 f0 74 73 31 c0 ba 01 00 00 00 f0 0f b1 17 0f 85 ba 00 00 00 49 8b 87 88 00 00 00 <4c> 89 70 08 eb cc 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8d bd f0 fe ff ff 89 85 ec fe [ 7340.340888] likely on CPU 3 (core 0, socket 3) [ 7340.345088] Code: 00 00 00 ba 00 00 00 00 be 00 00 00 00 89 c7 e8 31 ca ff ff 89 45 ec 8b 45 ec 85 c0 78 07 b8 00 00 00 00 eb 46 e8 0b c8 ff ff <8b> 00 83 f8 69 74 24 e8 ff c7 ff ff 8b 00 83 f8 0b 74 18 e8 f3 c7 [ 7340.404334] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6d255010bdffc: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 7340.405972] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 1439 Comm: xskxceiver Not tainted 6.19.0-rc1+ #21 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 7340.408006] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.17.0-5.fc42 04/01/2014 [ 7340.409716] RIP: 0010:lookup_swap_cgroup_id+0x44/0x80 [ 7340.410455] Code: 83 f8 1c 73 39 48 ba ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 03 48 8b 04 c5 20 55 fa bd 48 21 d1 48 89 ca 83 e1 01 48 d1 ea c1 e1 04 48 8d 04 90 <8b> 00 48 83 c4 10 d3 e8 c3 cc cc cc cc 31 c0 e9 98 b7 dd 00 48 89 [ 7340.412787] RSP: 0018:ffffcc5c04f7f6d0 EFLAGS: 00010202 [ 7340.413494] RAX: 0006d255010bdffc RBX: ffff891f477895a8 RCX: 0000000000000010 [ 7340.414431] RDX: 0001c17e3fffffff RSI: 00fa070000000000 RDI: 000382fc7fffffff [ 7340.415354] RBP: 00fa070000000000 R08: ffffcc5c04f7f8f8 R09: ffffcc5c04f7f7d0 [ 7340.416283] R10: ffff891f4c1a7000 R11: ffffcc5c04f7f9c8 R12: ffffcc5c04f7f7d0 [ 7340.417218] R13: 03ffffffffffffff R14: 00fa06fffffffe00 R15: ffff891f47789500 [ 7340.418229] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff891ffdfaa000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 7340.419489] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 7340.420286] CR2: 00007f415bfffd58 CR3: 0000000103f03002 CR4: 0000000000772ef0 [ 7340.421237] PKRU: 55555554 [ 7340.421623] Call Trace: [ 7340.421987] <TASK> [ 7340.422309] ? softleaf_from_pte+0x77/0xa0 [ 7340.422855] swap_pte_batch+0xa7/0x290 [ 7340.423363] zap_nonpresent_ptes.constprop.0.isra.0+0xd1/0x270 [ 7340.424102] zap_pte_range+0x281/0x580 [ 7340.424607] zap_pmd_range.isra.0+0xc9/0x240 [ 7340.425177] unmap_page_range+0x24d/0x420 [ 7340.425714] unmap_vmas+0xa1/0x180 [ 7340.426185] exit_mmap+0xe1/0x3b0 [ 7340.426644] __mmput+0x41/0x150 [ 7340.427098] exit_mm+0xb1/0x110 [ 7340.427539] do_exit+0x1b2/0x460 [ 7340.427992] do_group_exit+0x2d/0xc0 [ 7340.428477] get_signal+0x79d/0x7e0 [ 7340.428957] arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x34/0x100 [ 7340.429571] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x8e/0x4c0 [ 7340.430159] do_syscall_64+0x188/0x6b0 [ 7340.430672] ? __do_sys_clone3+0xd9/0x120 [ 7340.431212] ? switch_fpu_return+0x4e/0xd0 [ 7340.431761] ? arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare.isra.0+0xa1/0xc0 [ 7340.432498] ? do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x6b0 [ 7340.433015] ? __handle_mm_fault+0x445/0x690 [ 7340.433582] ? count_memcg_events+0xd6/0x210 [ 7340.434151] ? handle_mm_fault+0x212/0x340 [ 7340.434697] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x2b4/0x7b0 [ 7340.435271] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 [ 7340.435788] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 [ 7340.436299] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 [ 7340.436812] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80 [ 7340.437323] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 7340.437973] RIP: 0033:0x7f4161b14169 [ 7340.438468] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f4161b1413f. [ 7340.439242] RSP: 002b:00007ffc6ebfa770 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000ca [ 7340.440173] RAX: fffffffffffffe00 RBX: 00000000000005a1 RCX: 00007f4161b14169 [ 7340.441061] RDX: 00000000000005a1 RSI: 0000000000000109 RDI: 00007f415bfff990 [ 7340.441943] RBP: 00007ffc6ebfa7a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffffffff [ 7340.442824] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 7340.443707] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f415bfff990 R15: 00007f415bfff6c0 [ 7340.444586] </TASK> [ 7340.444922] Modules linked in: rfkill intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common intel_uncore_frequency_common skx_edac_common nfit libnvdimm kvm_intel vfat fat kvm snd_pcm irqbypass rapl iTCO_wdt snd_timer intel_pmc_bxt iTCO_vendor_support snd ixgbevf virtio_net soundcore i2c_i801 pcspkr libeth_xdp net_failover i2c_smbus lpc_ich failover libeth virtio_balloon joydev 9p fuse loop zram lz4hc_compress lz4_compress 9pnet_virtio 9pnet netfs ghash_clmulni_intel serio_raw qemu_fw_cfg [ 7340.449650] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
The issue can be fixed in all in-tree drivers, but we cannot just trust OOT drivers to not do this. Therefore, make tailroom a signed int and produce a warning when it is negative to prevent such mistakes in the future.
--- net/core/filter.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/core/filter.c +2 -1
@@ -4132,13 +4132,14 @@ static int bpf_xdp_frags_increase_tail(struct xdp_buff *xdp, int offset)struct skb_shared_info *sinfo =xdp_get_shared_info_from_buff (xdp);skb_frag_t *frag = &sinfo->frags[sinfo->nr_frags -1 ];struct xdp_rxq_info *rxq = xdp->rxq; -unsigned int tailroom; +int tailroom;if (!rxq->frag_size || rxq->frag_size > xdp->frame_sz)return -EOPNOTSUPP ; tailroom = rxq->frag_size -skb_frag_size (frag) -skb_frag_off (frag) % rxq->frag_size; +WARN_ON_ONCE (tailroom <0 );if (unlikely (offset > tailroom))return -EINVAL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 183/567 selftest/arm64: Fix sve2p1_sigill() to hwcap test
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yifan Wu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d87c828daa7ead9763416f75cc416496969cf1dc ]
The FEAT_SVE2p1 is indicated by ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1.SVEver. However, the BFADD requires the FEAT_SVE_B16B16, which is indicated by ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1.B16B16. This could cause the test to incorrectly fail on a CPU that supports FEAT_SVE2.1 but not FEAT_SVE_B16B16.
LD1Q Gather load quadwords which is decoded from SVE encodings and implied by FEAT_SVE2p1.
--- tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/hwcap.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/arm64/abi/hwcap.c +2 -2
@@ -216,8 +216,8 @@ static void sve2_sigill(void)static void sve2p1_sigill (void ) { -/* BFADD Z0.H, Z0.H, Z0.H */ - asmvolatile (".inst 0x65000000" : : :"z0" ); +/* LD1Q {Z0.Q}, P0/Z, [Z0.D, X0] */ + asmvolatile (".inst 0xC400A000" : : :"z0" ); }static void sveaes_sigill (void )
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 184/567 tracing: Add NULL pointer check to trigger_data_free()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 457965c13f0837a289c9164b842d0860133f6274 ]
If trigger_data_alloc() fails and returns NULL, event_hist_trigger_parse() jumps to the out_free error path. While kfree() safely handles a NULL pointer, trigger_data_free() does not. This causes a NULL pointer dereference in trigger_data_free() when evaluating data->cmd_ops->set_filter.
Fix the problem by adding a NULL pointer check to trigger_data_free().
The problem was found by an experimental code review agent based on gemini-3.1-pro while reviewing backports into v6.18.y.
--- kernel/trace/trace_events_trigger.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
kernel/trace/trace_events_trigger.c +3 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(trigger_cmd_mutex);void trigger_data_free (struct event_trigger_data *data) { +if (!data) +return ; +if (data->cmd_ops->set_filter) data->cmd_ops->set_filter (NULL , data,NULL );
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 185/567 net/sched: Only allow act_ct to bind to clsact/ingress qdiscs and shared blocks
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Victor Nogueira <[email protected]>
commit 11cb63b0d1a0685e0831ae3c77223e002ef18189 upstream.
As Paolo said earlier [1]:
"Since the blamed commit below, classify can return TC_ACT_CONSUMED while the current skb being held by the defragmentation engine. As reported by GangMin Kim, if such packet is that may cause a UaF when the defrag engine later on tries to tuch again such packet."
act_ct was never meant to be used in the egress path, however some users are attaching it to egress today [2]. Attempting to reach a middle ground, we noticed that, while most qdiscs are not handling TC_ACT_CONSUMED, clsact/ingress qdiscs are. With that in mind, we address the issue by only allowing act_ct to bind to clsact/ingress qdiscs and shared blocks. That way it's still possible to attach act_ct to egress (albeit only with clsact).
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/674b8cbfc385c6f37fb29a1de08d8fe5c2b0fbee.1771321118.git.pabeni@redhat.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/
--- include/net/act_api.h | 1 + net/sched/act_ct.c | 6 ++++++ net/sched/cls_api.c | 7 +++++++ 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
include/net/act_api.h +1 -0
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ struct tc_action {#define TCA_ACT_FLAGS_REPLACE (1U << (TCA_ACT_FLAGS_USER_BITS + 2))#define TCA_ACT_FLAGS_NO_RTNL (1U << (TCA_ACT_FLAGS_USER_BITS + 3))#define TCA_ACT_FLAGS_AT_INGRESS (1U << (TCA_ACT_FLAGS_USER_BITS + 4)) +#define TCA_ACT_FLAGS_AT_INGRESS_OR_CLSACT (1U << (TCA_ACT_FLAGS_USER_BITS + 5))/* Update lastuse only if needed, to avoid dirtying a cache line. * We use a temp variable to avoid fetching jiffies twice.
net/sched/act_ct.c +6 -0
@@ -1327,6 +1327,12 @@ static int tcf_ct_init(struct net *net,return -EINVAL ; } +if (bind && !(flags &TCA_ACT_FLAGS_AT_INGRESS_OR_CLSACT )) { +NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD (extack, +"Attaching ct to a non ingress/clsact qdisc is unsupported" ); +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + } + err =nla_parse_nested (tb,TCA_CT_MAX , nla, ct_policy, extack);if (err <0 )return err;
net/sched/cls_api.c +7 -0
@@ -2151,6 +2151,11 @@ static bool is_qdisc_ingress(__u32 classreturn (TC_H_MIN (classid) ==TC_H_MIN (TC_H_MIN_INGRESS )); } +static bool is_ingress_or_clsact (struct tcf_block *block,struct Qdisc *q) +{ +return tcf_block_shared (block) || (q && !!(q->flags &TCQ_F_INGRESS )); +} +static int tc_new_tfilter (struct sk_buff *skb,struct nlmsghdr *n,struct netlink_ext_ack *extack) {
@@ -2344,6 +2349,8 @@ replay: flags |=TCA_ACT_FLAGS_NO_RTNL ;if (is_qdisc_ingress (parent)) flags |=TCA_ACT_FLAGS_AT_INGRESS ; +if (is_ingress_or_clsact (block, q)) + flags |=TCA_ACT_FLAGS_AT_INGRESS_OR_CLSACT ; err = tp->ops->change (net, skb, tp, cl, t->tcm_handle, tca, &fh, flags, extack);if (err ==0 ) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 186/567 net: tcp: accept old ack during closing
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Menglong Dong <[email protected]>
commit 795a7dfbc3d95e4c7c09569f319f026f8c7f5a9c upstream.
For now, the packet with an old ack is not accepted if we are in FIN_WAIT1 state, which can cause retransmission. Taking the following case as an example:
Client Server
| |
FIN_WAIT1(Send FIN, seq=10) FIN_WAIT1(Send FIN, seq=20, ack=10)
| |
| Send ACK(seq=21, ack=11)
Recv ACK(seq=21, ack=11)
| Recv FIN(seq=20, ack=10)
In the case above, simultaneous close is happening, and the FIN and ACK packet that send from the server is out of order. Then, the FIN will be dropped by the client, as it has an old ack. Then, the server has to retransmit the FIN, which can cause delay if the server has set the SO_LINGER on the socket.
Old ack is accepted in the ESTABLISHED and TIME_WAIT state, and I think it should be better to keep the same logic.
In this commit, we accept old ack in FIN_WAIT1/FIN_WAIT2/CLOSING/LAST_ACK states. Maybe we should limit it to FIN_WAIT1 for now?
--- net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 18 +++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +11 -7
@@ -6705,17 +6705,21 @@ int tcp_rcv_state_process(struct sock *sreturn 0 ;/* step 5: check the ACK field */ - acceptable =tcp_ack (sk, skb,FLAG_SLOWPATH | -FLAG_UPDATE_TS_RECENT | -FLAG_NO_CHALLENGE_ACK ) >0 ; + reason =tcp_ack (sk, skb,FLAG_SLOWPATH | +FLAG_UPDATE_TS_RECENT | +FLAG_NO_CHALLENGE_ACK ); -if (!acceptable) { +if ((int )reason <=0 ) {if (sk->sk_state ==TCP_SYN_RECV )return 1 ;/* send one RST */ -tcp_send_challenge_ack (sk); -SKB_DR_SET (reason,TCP_OLD_ACK ); - goto discard; +/* accept old ack during closing */ +if ((int )reason <0 ) { +tcp_send_challenge_ack (sk); + reason = -reason; + goto discard; + } } +SKB_DR_SET (reason,NOT_SPECIFIED );switch (sk->sk_state) {case TCP_SYN_RECV : tp->delivered++;/* SYN-ACK delivery isn't tracked in tcp_ack */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 187/567 apparmor: validate DFA start states are in bounds in unpack_pdb
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Massimiliano Pellizzer <[email protected]>
commit 9063d7e2615f4a7ab321de6b520e23d370e58816 upstream.
Start states are read from untrusted data and used as indexes into the DFA state tables. The aa_dfa_next() function call in unpack_pdb() will access dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE][start], and if the start state exceeds the number of states in the DFA, this results in an out-of-bound read.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in aa_dfa_next+0x2a1/0x360 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811956fb90 by task su/1097 ...
Reject policies with out-of-bounds start states during unpacking to prevent the issue.
--- security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | 12 +++++++++++- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +11 -1
@@ -764,7 +764,17 @@ static int unpack_pdb(struct aa_ext *e,if (!aa_unpack_u32 (e, &pdb->start[AA_CLASS_FILE ],"dfa_start" )) {/* default start state for xmatch and file dfa */ pdb->start[AA_CLASS_FILE ] =DFA_START ; - }/* setup class index */ + } + +size_t state_count = pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE ]->td_lolen; + +if (pdb->start[0 ] >= state_count || + pdb->start[AA_CLASS_FILE ] >= state_count) { + *info ="invalid dfa start state" ; + goto fail; + } + +/* setup class index */ for (i =AA_CLASS_FILE +1 ; i <=AA_CLASS_LAST ; i++) { pdb->start[i] =aa_dfa_next (pdb->dfa, pdb->start[0 ], i);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 188/567 apparmor: fix memory leak in verify_header
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Massimiliano Pellizzer <[email protected]>
commit e38c55d9f834e5b848bfed0f5c586aaf45acb825 upstream.
The function sets *ns = NULL on every call, leaking the namespace string allocated in previous iterations when multiple profiles are unpacked. This also breaks namespace consistency checking since *ns is always NULL when the comparison is made.
Remove the incorrect assignment.
The caller (aa_unpack) initializes *ns to NULL once before the loop, which is sufficient.
--- security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +0 -1
@@ -1132,7 +1132,6 @@ static int verify_header(struct aa_ext * {int error = -EPROTONOSUPPORT ;const char *name =NULL ; - *ns =NULL ;/* get the interface version */ if (!aa_unpack_u32 (e, &e->version,"version" )) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 189/567 apparmor: replace recursive profile removal with iterative approach
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Massimiliano Pellizzer <[email protected]>
commit ab09264660f9de5d05d1ef4e225aa447c63a8747 upstream.
The profile removal code uses recursion when removing nested profiles, which can lead to kernel stack exhaustion and system crashes.
Reproducer:
$ pf='a'; for ((i=0; i<1024; i++)); do
echo -e "profile $pf { \n }" | apparmor_parser -K -a;
pf="$pf//x";
done
$ echo -n a > /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/.removeReplace the recursive __aa_profile_list_release() approach with an iterative approach in __remove_profile(). The function repeatedly finds and removes leaf profiles until the entire subtree is removed, maintaining the same removal semantic without recursion.
--- security/apparmor/policy.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
security/apparmor/policy.c +27 -3
@@ -182,19 +182,43 @@ static void __list_remove_profile(struct }/** -* __remove_profile - remove old profile, and children -* @profile: profile to be replaced (NOT NULL) +* __remove_profile - remove profile, and children +* @profile: profile to be removed (NOT NULL) * * Requires: namespace list lock be held, or list not be shared */ static void __remove_profile (struct aa_profile *profile) { +struct aa_profile *curr, *to_remove; +AA_BUG (!profile);AA_BUG (!profile->ns);AA_BUG (!mutex_is_locked (&profile->ns->lock));/* release any children lists first */ -__aa_profile_list_release (&profile->base.profiles); +if (!list_empty (&profile->base.profiles)) { + curr = list_first_entry(&profile->base.profiles, struct aa_profile, base.list); + +while (curr != profile) { + +while (!list_empty (&curr->base.profiles)) + curr =list_first_entry (&curr->base.profiles, + struct aa_profile, base.list); + + to_remove = curr; +if (!list_is_last (&to_remove->base.list, + &aa_deref_parent (curr)->base.profiles)) + curr =list_next_entry (to_remove, base.list); +else + curr =aa_deref_parent (curr); + +/* released by free_profile */ +aa_label_remove (&to_remove->label); +__aafs_profile_rmdir (to_remove); +__list_remove_profile (to_remove); + } + } +/* released by free_profile */ aa_label_remove (&profile->label);__aafs_profile_rmdir (profile);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 190/567 apparmor: fix: limit the number of levels of policy namespaces
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: John Johansen <[email protected]>
commit 306039414932c80f8420695a24d4fe10c84ccfb2 upstream.
Currently the number of policy namespaces is not bounded relying on the user namespace limit. However policy namespaces aren't strictly tied to user namespaces and it is possible to create them and nest them arbitrarily deep which can be used to exhaust system resource.
Hard cap policy namespaces to the same depth as user namespaces.
--- security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h | 2 ++ security/apparmor/policy_ns.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
security/apparmor/include/policy_ns.h +2 -0
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@#include "label.h" #include "policy.h" +/* Match max depth of user namespaces */ +#define MAX_NS_DEPTH 32/* struct aa_ns_acct - accounting of profiles in namespace * @max_size: maximum space allowed for all profiles in namespace
security/apparmor/policy_ns.c +2 -0
@@ -260,6 +260,8 @@ static struct aa_ns *__aa_create_ns(struAA_BUG (!name);AA_BUG (!mutex_is_locked (&parent->lock)); +if (parent->level >MAX_NS_DEPTH ) +return ERR_PTR (-ENOSPC ); ns =alloc_ns (parent->base.hname, name);if (!ns)return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 191/567 apparmor: fix side-effect bug in match_char() macro usage
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Massimiliano Pellizzer <[email protected]>
commit 8756b68edae37ff546c02091989a4ceab3f20abd upstream.
The match_char() macro evaluates its character parameter multiple times when traversing differential encoding chains. When invoked with *str++, the string pointer advances on each iteration of the inner do-while loop, causing the DFA to check different characters at each iteration and therefore skip input characters. This results in out-of-bounds reads when the pointer advances past the input buffer boundary.
[ 94.984676] ================================================================== [ 94.985301] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760 [ 94.985655] Read of size 1 at addr ffff888100342000 by task file/976
[ 94.986319] CPU: 7 UID: 1000 PID: 976 Comm: file Not tainted 6.19.0-rc7-next-20260127 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 94.986322] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 94.986329] Call Trace: [ 94.986341] <TASK> [ 94.986347] dump_stack_lvl+0x5e/0x80 [ 94.986374] print_report+0xc8/0x270 [ 94.986384] ? aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760 [ 94.986388] kasan_report+0x118/0x150 [ 94.986401] ? aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760 [ 94.986405] aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760 [ 94.986408] __aa_path_perm+0x131/0x400 [ 94.986418] aa_path_perm+0x219/0x2f0 [ 94.986424] apparmor_file_open+0x345/0x570 [ 94.986431] security_file_open+0x5c/0x140 [ 94.986442] do_dentry_open+0x2f6/0x1120 [ 94.986450] vfs_open+0x38/0x2b0 [ 94.986453] ? may_open+0x1e2/0x2b0 [ 94.986466] path_openat+0x231b/0x2b30 [ 94.986469] ? __x64_sys_openat+0xf8/0x130 [ 94.986477] do_file_open+0x19d/0x360 [ 94.986487] do_sys_openat2+0x98/0x100 [ 94.986491] __x64_sys_openat+0xf8/0x130 [ 94.986499] do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x660 [ 94.986515] ? count_memcg_events+0x15f/0x3c0 [ 94.986526] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 94.986540] ? handle_mm_fault+0x1639/0x1ef0 [ 94.986551] ? vma_start_read+0xf0/0x320 [ 94.986558] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 94.986561] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 94.986563] ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x50/0xe0 [ 94.986572] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 94.986574] ? arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x9/0xb0 [ 94.986587] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 94.986588] ? irqentry_exit+0x3c/0x590 [ 94.986595] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 94.986597] RIP: 0033:0x7fda4a79c3ea
Fix by extracting the character value before invoking match_char, ensuring single evaluation per outer loop.
--- security/apparmor/match.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
security/apparmor/match.c +20 -10
@@ -408,13 +408,18 @@ aa_state_t aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfif (dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_EC ]) {/* Equivalence class table defined */ u8 *equiv =EQUIV_TABLE (dfa); -for (; len; len--) -match_char (state, def, base, next, check, - equiv[(u8) *str++]); +for (; len; len--) { +u8 c = equiv[(u8) *str]; + +match_char (state, def, base, next, check, c); + str++; + } }else {/* default is direct to next state */ -for (; len; len--) -match_char (state, def, base, next, check, (u8) *str++); +for (; len; len--) { +match_char (state, def, base, next, check, (u8) *str); + str++; + } }return state;
@@ -448,13 +453,18 @@ aa_state_t aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *d/* Equivalence class table defined */ u8 *equiv =EQUIV_TABLE (dfa);/* default is direct to next state */ -while (*str) -match_char (state, def, base, next, check, - equiv[(u8) *str++]); +while (*str) { +u8 c = equiv[(u8) *str]; + +match_char (state, def, base, next, check, c); + str++; + } }else {/* default is direct to next state */ -while (*str) -match_char (state, def, base, next, check, (u8) *str++); +while (*str) { +match_char (state, def, base, next, check, (u8) *str); + str++; + } }return state;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 192/567 apparmor: fix missing bounds check on DEFAULT table in verify_dfa()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Massimiliano Pellizzer <[email protected]>
commit d352873bbefa7eb39995239d0b44ccdf8aaa79a4 upstream.
The verify_dfa() function only checks DEFAULT_TABLE bounds when the state is not differentially encoded.
When the verification loop traverses the differential encoding chain, it reads k = DEFAULT_TABLE[j] and uses k as an array index without validation. A malformed DFA with DEFAULT_TABLE[j] >= state_count, therefore, causes both out-of-bounds reads and writes.
[ 57.179855] ================================================================== [ 57.180549] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660 [ 57.180904] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888100eadec4 by task su/993
[ 57.181554] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 993 Comm: su Not tainted 6.19.0-rc7-next-20260127 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 57.181558] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 57.181563] Call Trace: [ 57.181572] <TASK> [ 57.181577] dump_stack_lvl+0x5e/0x80 [ 57.181596] print_report+0xc8/0x270 [ 57.181605] ? verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660 [ 57.181608] kasan_report+0x118/0x150 [ 57.181620] ? verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660 [ 57.181623] verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660 [ 57.181627] aa_dfa_unpack+0x1610/0x1740 [ 57.181629] ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x1d0/0x470 [ 57.181640] unpack_pdb+0x86d/0x46b0 [ 57.181647] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 57.181653] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 57.181656] ? aa_unpack_nameX+0x1a8/0x300 [ 57.181659] aa_unpack+0x20b0/0x4c30 [ 57.181662] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 57.181664] ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x33/0x700 [ 57.181681] ? kasan_save_track+0x4f/0x80 [ 57.181683] ? kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 [ 57.181686] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 [ 57.181688] ? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x44a/0x780 [ 57.181693] ? aa_simple_write_to_buffer+0x54/0x130 [ 57.181697] ? policy_update+0x154/0x330 [ 57.181704] aa_replace_profiles+0x15a/0x1dd0 [ 57.181707] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 57.181710] ? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x44a/0x780 [ 57.181712] ? aa_loaddata_alloc+0x77/0x140 [ 57.181715] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 57.181717] ? _copy_from_user+0x2a/0x70 [ 57.181730] policy_update+0x17a/0x330 [ 57.181733] profile_replace+0x153/0x1a0 [ 57.181735] ? rw_verify_area+0x93/0x2d0 [ 57.181740] vfs_write+0x235/0xab0 [ 57.181745] ksys_write+0xb0/0x170 [ 57.181748] do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x660 [ 57.181762] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 57.181765] RIP: 0033:0x7f6192792eb2
Remove the MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE condition to validate all DEFAULT_TABLE entries unconditionally.
--- security/apparmor/match.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
security/apparmor/match.c +3 -2
@@ -160,9 +160,10 @@ static int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfaif (state_count ==0 ) goto out;for (i =0 ; i < state_count; i++) { -if (!(BASE_TABLE (dfa)[i] &MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE ) && - (DEFAULT_TABLE (dfa)[i] >= state_count)) +if (DEFAULT_TABLE (dfa)[i] >= state_count) { +pr_err ("AppArmor DFA default state out of bounds" ); goto out; + }if (BASE_TABLE (dfa)[i] &MATCH_FLAGS_INVALID ) {pr_err ("AppArmor DFA state with invalid match flags" ); goto out;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 193/567 apparmor: Fix double free of ns_name in aa_replace_profiles()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: John Johansen <[email protected]>
commit 5df0c44e8f5f619d3beb871207aded7c78414502 upstream.
if ns_name is NULL after
1071 error = aa_unpack(udata, &lh, &ns_name);
and if ent->ns_name contains an ns_name in
1089 } else if (ent->ns_name) {
then ns_name is assigned the ent->ns_name
1095 ns_name = ent->ns_name;
however ent->ns_name is freed at
1262 aa_load_ent_free(ent);
and then again when freeing ns_name at
1270 kfree(ns_name);
Fix this by NULLing out ent->ns_name after it is transferred to ns_name
--- security/apparmor/policy.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
security/apparmor/policy.c +1 -0
@@ -1115,6 +1115,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns goto fail; } ns_name = ent->ns_name; + ent->ns_name =NULL ; }else count++; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 194/567 apparmor: fix unprivileged local user can do privileged policy management
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: John Johansen <[email protected]>
commit 6601e13e82841879406bf9f369032656f441a425 upstream.
An unprivileged local user can load, replace, and remove profiles by opening the apparmorfs interfaces, via a confused deputy attack, by passing the opened fd to a privileged process, and getting the privileged process to write to the interface.
This does require a privileged target that can be manipulated to do the write for the unprivileged process, but once such access is achieved full policy management is possible and all the possible implications that implies: removing confinement, DoS of system or target applications by denying all execution, by-passing the unprivileged user namespace restriction, to exploiting kernel bugs for a local privilege escalation.
The policy management interface can not have its permissions simply changed from 0666 to 0600 because non-root processes need to be able to load policy to different policy namespaces.
Instead ensure the task writing the interface has privileges that are a subset of the task that opened the interface. This is already done via policy for confined processes, but unconfined can delegate access to the opened fd, by-passing the usual policy check.
--- security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 16 +++++++++------- security/apparmor/include/policy.h | 2 +- security/apparmor/policy.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c +9 -7
@@ -412,7 +412,8 @@ static struct aa_loaddata *aa_simple_wri }static ssize_t policy_update (u32 mask,const char __user *buf,size_t size, -loff_t *pos,struct aa_ns *ns) +loff_t *pos,struct aa_ns *ns, +const struct cred *ocred) {struct aa_loaddata *data;struct aa_label *label;
@@ -423,7 +424,7 @@ static ssize_t policy_update(u32 mask, c/* high level check about policy management - fine grained in * below after unpack */ - error =aa_may_manage_policy (current_cred (), label, ns, mask); + error =aa_may_manage_policy (current_cred (), label, ns, ocred, mask);if (error) goto end_section;
@@ -444,7 +445,8 @@ static ssize_t profile_load(struct file loff_t *pos) {struct aa_ns *ns =aa_get_ns (f->f_inode->i_private); -int error =policy_update (AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY , buf, size, pos, ns); +int error =policy_update (AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY , buf, size, pos, ns, + f->f_cred);aa_put_ns (ns);
@@ -462,7 +464,7 @@ static ssize_t profile_replace(struct fi {struct aa_ns *ns =aa_get_ns (f->f_inode->i_private);int error =policy_update (AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY |AA_MAY_REPLACE_POLICY , - buf, size, pos, ns); + buf, size, pos, ns, f->f_cred);aa_put_ns (ns);return error;
@@ -487,7 +489,7 @@ static ssize_t profile_remove(struct fil* below after unpack */ error =aa_may_manage_policy (current_cred (), label, ns, -AA_MAY_REMOVE_POLICY ); + f->f_cred,AA_MAY_REMOVE_POLICY );if (error) goto out;
@@ -1819,7 +1821,7 @@ static int ns_mkdir_op(struct mnt_idmapint error; label =begin_current_label_crit_section (); - error =aa_may_manage_policy (current_cred (), label,NULL , + error =aa_may_manage_policy (current_cred (), label,NULL ,NULL ,AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY );end_current_label_crit_section (label);if (error)
@@ -1869,7 +1871,7 @@ static int ns_rmdir_op(struct inode *dirint error; label =begin_current_label_crit_section (); - error =aa_may_manage_policy (current_cred (), label,NULL , + error =aa_may_manage_policy (current_cred (), label,NULL ,NULL ,AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY );end_current_label_crit_section (label);if (error)
security/apparmor/include/policy.h +1 -1
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ bool aa_policy_admin_capable(const struc struct aa_label *label, struct aa_ns *ns);int aa_may_manage_policy (const struct cred *subj_cred,struct aa_label *label,struct aa_ns *ns, -u32 mask); +const struct cred *ocred,u32 mask);bool aa_current_policy_view_capable (struct aa_ns *ns);bool aa_current_policy_admin_capable (struct aa_ns *ns);
security/apparmor/policy.c +33 -1
@@ -891,17 +891,44 @@ bool aa_current_policy_admin_capable(strreturn res; } +static bool is_subset_of_obj_privilege (const struct cred *cred, +struct aa_label *label, +const struct cred *ocred) +{ +if (cred == ocred) +return true; + +if (!aa_label_is_subset (label,cred_label (ocred))) +return false; +/* don't allow crossing userns for now */ +if (cred->user_ns != ocred->user_ns) +return false; +if (!cap_issubset (cred->cap_inheritable, ocred->cap_inheritable)) +return false; +if (!cap_issubset (cred->cap_permitted, ocred->cap_permitted)) +return false; +if (!cap_issubset (cred->cap_effective, ocred->cap_effective)) +return false; +if (!cap_issubset (cred->cap_bset, ocred->cap_bset)) +return false; +if (!cap_issubset (cred->cap_ambient, ocred->cap_ambient)) +return false; +return true; +} + +/** * aa_may_manage_policy - can the current task manage policy * @subj_cred; subjects cred * @label: label to check if it can manage policy * @ns: namespace being managed by @label (may be NULL if @label's ns) +* @ocred: object cred if request is coming from an open object * @mask: contains the policy manipulation operation being done * * Returns: 0 if the task is allowed to manipulate policy else error */ int aa_may_manage_policy (const struct cred *subj_cred,struct aa_label *label, -struct aa_ns *ns,u32 mask) +struct aa_ns *ns,const struct cred *ocred,u32 mask) {const char *op;
@@ -917,6 +944,11 @@ int aa_may_manage_policy(const struct crreturn audit_policy (label, op,NULL ,NULL ,"policy_locked" , -EACCES ); +if (ocred && !is_subset_of_obj_privilege (subj_cred, label, ocred)) +return audit_policy (label, op,NULL ,NULL , +"not privileged for target profile" , + -EACCES ); +if (!aa_policy_admin_capable (subj_cred, label, ns))return audit_policy (label, op,NULL ,NULL ,"not policy admin" , -EACCES );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 195/567 apparmor: fix differential encoding verification
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: John Johansen <[email protected]>
commit 39440b137546a3aa383cfdabc605fb73811b6093 upstream.
Differential encoding allows loops to be created if it is abused. To prevent this the unpack should verify that a diff-encode chain terminates.
Unfortunately the differential encode verification had two bugs.
1. it conflated states that had gone through check and already been marked, with states that were currently being checked and marked. This means that loops in the current chain being verified are treated as a chain that has already been verified.
2. the order bailout on already checked states compared current chain check iterators j,k instead of using the outer loop iterator i. Meaning a step backwards in states in the current chain verification was being mistaken for moving to an already verified state.
Move to a double mark scheme where already verified states get a different mark, than the current chain being kept. This enables us to also drop the backwards verification check that was the cause of the second error as any already verified state is already marked.
--- security/apparmor/include/match.h | 1 + security/apparmor/match.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
security/apparmor/include/match.h +1 -0
@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ static inline void aa_put_dfa(struct aa_#define MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE 0x80000000#define MARK_DIFF_ENCODE 0x40000000#define MATCH_FLAG_OOB_TRANSITION 0x20000000 +#define MARK_DIFF_ENCODE_VERIFIED 0x10000000#define MATCH_FLAGS_MASK 0xff000000#define MATCH_FLAGS_VALID (MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE | MATCH_FLAG_OOB_TRANSITION)#define MATCH_FLAGS_INVALID (MATCH_FLAGS_MASK & ~MATCH_FLAGS_VALID)
security/apparmor/match.c +19 -4
@@ -202,16 +202,31 @@ static int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfasize_t j, k;for (j = i; - (BASE_TABLE (dfa)[j] &MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE ) && - !(BASE_TABLE (dfa)[j] &MARK_DIFF_ENCODE ); + ((BASE_TABLE (dfa)[j] &MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE ) && + !(BASE_TABLE (dfa)[j] &MARK_DIFF_ENCODE_VERIFIED )); j = k) { +if (BASE_TABLE (dfa)[j] &MARK_DIFF_ENCODE ) +/* loop in current chain */ + goto out; k =DEFAULT_TABLE (dfa)[j];if (j == k) +/* self loop */ goto out; -if (k < j) -break ;/* already verified */ BASE_TABLE (dfa)[j] |=MARK_DIFF_ENCODE ; } +/* move mark to verified */ +for (j = i; + (BASE_TABLE (dfa)[j] &MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE ); + j = k) { + k =DEFAULT_TABLE (dfa)[j]; +if (j < i) +/* jumps to state/chain that has been +* verified +*/ +break ; +BASE_TABLE (dfa)[j] &= ~MARK_DIFF_ENCODE ; +BASE_TABLE (dfa)[j] |=MARK_DIFF_ENCODE_VERIFIED ; + } } error =0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 196/567 apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: John Johansen <[email protected]>
commit a0b7091c4de45a7325c8780e6934a894f92ac86b upstream.
There is a race condition that leads to a use-after-free situation:
because the rawdata inodes are not refcounted, an attacker can start open()ing one of the rawdata files, and at the same time remove the last reference to this rawdata (by removing the corresponding profile, for example), which frees its struct aa_loaddata; as a result, when seq_rawdata_open() is reached, i_private is a dangling pointer and freed memory is accessed.
The rawdata inodes weren't refcounted to avoid a circular refcount and were supposed to be held by the profile rawdata reference. However during profile removal there is a window where the vfs and profile destruction race, resulting in the use after free.
Fix this by moving to a double refcount scheme. Where the profile refcount on rawdata is used to break the circular dependency. Allowing for freeing of the rawdata once all inode references to the rawdata are put.
--- security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 35 ++++++++------ security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h | 71 ++++++++++++++++++------------ security/apparmor/policy.c | 12 ++--- security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | 32 +++++++++---- 4 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-)
security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c +21 -14
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static void rawdata_f_data_free(struct rif (!private)return ; -aa_put_loaddata (private->loaddata); +aa_put_i_loaddata (private->loaddata);kvfree (private); }
@@ -404,7 +404,8 @@ static struct aa_loaddata *aa_simple_wri data->size = copy_size;if (copy_from_user (data->data, userbuf, copy_size)) { -aa_put_loaddata (data); +/* trigger free - don't need to put pcount */ +aa_put_i_loaddata (data);return ERR_PTR (-EFAULT ); }
@@ -432,7 +433,10 @@ static ssize_t policy_update(u32 mask, c error =PTR_ERR (data);if (!IS_ERR (data)) { error =aa_replace_profiles (ns, label, mask, data); -aa_put_loaddata (data); +/* put pcount, which will put count and free if no +* profiles referencing it. +*/ +aa_put_profile_loaddata (data); } end_section:end_current_label_crit_section (label);
@@ -503,7 +507,7 @@ static ssize_t profile_remove(struct filif (!IS_ERR (data)) { data->data[size] =0 ; error =aa_remove_profiles (ns, label, data->data, size); -aa_put_loaddata (data); +aa_put_profile_loaddata (data); } out:end_current_label_crit_section (label);
@@ -1242,18 +1246,17 @@ static const struct file_operations seq_static int seq_rawdata_open (struct inode *inode,struct file *file,int (*show)(struct seq_file *,void *)) { -struct aa_loaddata *data =__aa_get_loaddata (inode->i_private); +struct aa_loaddata *data =aa_get_i_loaddata (inode->i_private);int error;if (!data) -/* lost race this ent is being reaped */ return -ENOENT ; error =single_open (file, show, data);if (error) {AA_BUG (file->private_data && ((struct seq_file *)file->private_data)->private); -aa_put_loaddata (data); +aa_put_i_loaddata (data); }return error;
@@ -1264,7 +1267,7 @@ static int seq_rawdata_release(struct instruct seq_file *seq = (struct seq_file *) file->private_data;if (seq) -aa_put_loaddata (seq->private); +aa_put_i_loaddata (seq->private);return single_release (inode, file); }
@@ -1378,9 +1381,8 @@ static int rawdata_open(struct inode *inif (!aa_current_policy_view_capable (NULL ))return -EACCES ; - loaddata =__aa_get_loaddata (inode->i_private); + loaddata =aa_get_i_loaddata (inode->i_private);if (!loaddata) -/* lost race: this entry is being reaped */ return -ENOENT ; private =rawdata_f_data_alloc (loaddata->size);
@@ -1405,7 +1407,7 @@ fail_decompress:return error; fail_private_alloc: -aa_put_loaddata (loaddata); +aa_put_i_loaddata (loaddata);return error; }
@@ -1422,9 +1424,9 @@ static void remove_rawdata_dents(structfor (i =0 ; i <AAFS_LOADDATA_NDENTS ; i++) {if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL (rawdata->dents[i])) { -/* no refcounts on i_private */ aafs_remove (rawdata->dents[i]); rawdata->dents[i] =NULL ; +aa_put_i_loaddata (rawdata); } } }
@@ -1463,18 +1465,21 @@ int __aa_fs_create_rawdata(struct aa_nsif (IS_ERR (dir))/* ->name freed when rawdata freed */ return PTR_ERR (dir); +aa_get_i_loaddata (rawdata); rawdata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DIR ] = dir; dent =aafs_create_file ("abi" ,S_IFREG |0444 , dir, rawdata, &seq_rawdata_abi_fops);if (IS_ERR (dent)) goto fail; +aa_get_i_loaddata (rawdata); rawdata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_ABI ] = dent; dent =aafs_create_file ("revision" ,S_IFREG |0444 , dir, rawdata, &seq_rawdata_revision_fops);if (IS_ERR (dent)) goto fail; +aa_get_i_loaddata (rawdata); rawdata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_REVISION ] = dent;if (aa_g_hash_policy) {
@@ -1482,6 +1487,7 @@ int __aa_fs_create_rawdata(struct aa_ns rawdata, &seq_rawdata_hash_fops);if (IS_ERR (dent)) goto fail; +aa_get_i_loaddata (rawdata); rawdata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_HASH ] = dent; }
@@ -1490,24 +1496,25 @@ int __aa_fs_create_rawdata(struct aa_ns &seq_rawdata_compressed_size_fops);if (IS_ERR (dent)) goto fail; +aa_get_i_loaddata (rawdata); rawdata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_COMPRESSED_SIZE ] = dent; dent =aafs_create_file ("raw_data" ,S_IFREG |0444 , dir, rawdata, &rawdata_fops);if (IS_ERR (dent)) goto fail; +aa_get_i_loaddata (rawdata); rawdata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DATA ] = dent;d_inode (dent)->i_size = rawdata->size; rawdata->ns =aa_get_ns (ns);list_add (&rawdata->list, &ns->rawdata_list); -/* no refcount on inode rawdata */ return 0 ; fail:remove_rawdata_dents (rawdata); - +aa_put_i_loaddata (rawdata); return PTR_ERR(dent); }#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY */
security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h +43 -28
112 lines not on this page · raw message
security/apparmor/policy.c +6 -6
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ void aa_free_profile(struct aa_profile * }kfree_sensitive (profile->hash); -aa_put_loaddata (profile->rawdata); +aa_put_profile_loaddata (profile->rawdata);aa_label_destroy (&profile->label);kfree_sensitive (profile);
@@ -1120,7 +1120,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_nsLIST_HEAD (lh); op = mask &AA_MAY_REPLACE_POLICY ?OP_PROF_REPL :OP_PROF_LOAD ; -aa_get_loaddata (udata); +aa_get_profile_loaddata (udata);/* released below */ error =aa_unpack (udata, &lh, &ns_name);if (error)
@@ -1172,10 +1172,10 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_nsif (aa_rawdata_eq (rawdata_ent, udata)) {struct aa_loaddata *tmp; - tmp =__aa_get_loaddata (rawdata_ent); + tmp =aa_get_profile_loaddata (rawdata_ent);/* check we didn't fail the race */ if (tmp) { -aa_put_loaddata (udata); +aa_put_profile_loaddata (udata); udata = tmp;break ; }
@@ -1188,7 +1188,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_nsstruct aa_profile *p;if (aa_g_export_binary) - ent->new->rawdata =aa_get_loaddata (udata); + ent->new->rawdata =aa_get_profile_loaddata (udata); error =__lookup_replace (ns, ent->new->base.hname, !(mask &AA_MAY_REPLACE_POLICY ), &ent->old, &info);
@@ -1321,7 +1321,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns out:aa_put_ns (ns); -aa_put_loaddata (udata); +aa_put_profile_loaddata (udata);kfree (ns_name);if (error)
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +23 -9
@@ -108,34 +108,47 @@ bool aa_rawdata_eq(struct aa_loaddata *lreturn memcmp (l->data, r->data, r->compressed_size ?: r->size) ==0 ; } +static void do_loaddata_free (struct aa_loaddata *d) +{ +kfree_sensitive (d->hash); +kfree_sensitive (d->name); +kvfree (d->data); +kfree_sensitive (d); +} + +void aa_loaddata_kref (struct kref *kref) +{ + struct aa_loaddata *d = container_of(kref, struct aa_loaddata, count); + +do_loaddata_free (d); +} +/* * need to take the ns mutex lock which is NOT safe most places that * put_loaddata is called, so we have to delay freeing it */ -static void do_loaddata_free (struct work_struct *work) +static void do_ploaddata_rmfs (struct work_struct *work) { struct aa_loaddata *d = container_of(work, struct aa_loaddata, work);struct aa_ns *ns =aa_get_ns (d->ns);if (ns) {mutex_lock_nested (&ns->lock, ns->level); +/* remove fs ref to loaddata */ __aa_fs_remove_rawdata (d);mutex_unlock (&ns->lock);aa_put_ns (ns); } - -kfree_sensitive (d->hash); -kfree_sensitive (d->name); -kvfree (d->data); -kfree_sensitive (d); +/* called by dropping last pcount, so drop its associated icount */ +aa_put_i_loaddata (d); } -void aa_loaddata_kref (struct kref *kref) +void aa_ploaddata_kref (struct kref *kref) { - struct aa_loaddata *d = container_of(kref, struct aa_loaddata, count); + struct aa_loaddata *d = container_of(kref, struct aa_loaddata, pcount);if (d) { -INIT_WORK (&d->work, do_loaddata_free); +INIT_WORK (&d->work, do_ploaddata_rmfs);schedule_work (&d->work); } }
@@ -153,6 +166,7 @@ struct aa_loaddata *aa_loaddata_alloc(sireturn ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); }kref_init (&d->count); +kref_init (&d->pcount);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&d->list);return d;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 197/567 apparmor: fix race between freeing data and fs accessing it
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: John Johansen <[email protected]>
commit 8e135b8aee5a06c52a4347a5a6d51223c6f36ba3 upstream.
AppArmor was putting the reference to i_private data on its end after removing the original entry from the file system. However the inode can and does live beyond that point and it is possible that some of the fs call back functions will be invoked after the reference has been put, which results in a race between freeing the data and accessing it through the fs.
While the rawdata/loaddata is the most likely candidate to fail the race, as it has the fewest references. If properly crafted it might be possible to trigger a race for the other types stored in i_private.
Fix this by moving the put of i_private referenced data to the correct place which is during inode eviction.
--- security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 194 +++++++++++++++++------------- security/apparmor/include/label.h | 16 +- security/apparmor/include/lib.h | 12 + security/apparmor/include/policy.h | 8 - security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h | 6 security/apparmor/label.c | 12 + security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | 6 7 files changed, 153 insertions(+), 101 deletions(-)
security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c +114 -80
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@#include "include/crypto.h" #include "include/ipc.h" #include "include/label.h" +#include "include/lib.h" #include "include/policy.h" #include "include/policy_ns.h" #include "include/resource.h"
@@ -62,6 +63,7 @@* securityfs and apparmorfs filesystems. */ +#define IREF_POISON 101/* * support fns
@@ -153,6 +155,71 @@ static int aafs_show_path(struct seq_filreturn 0 ; } +static struct aa_ns *get_ns_common_ref (struct aa_common_ref *ref) +{ +if (ref) { + struct aa_label *reflabel = container_of(ref, struct aa_label, + count); +return aa_get_ns (labels_ns (reflabel)); + } + +return NULL ; +} + +static struct aa_proxy *get_proxy_common_ref (struct aa_common_ref *ref) +{ +if (ref) + return aa_get_proxy(container_of(ref, struct aa_proxy, count)); + +return NULL ; +} + +static struct aa_loaddata *get_loaddata_common_ref (struct aa_common_ref *ref) +{ +if (ref) + return aa_get_i_loaddata(container_of(ref, struct aa_loaddata, + count)); +return NULL ; +} + +static void aa_put_common_ref (struct aa_common_ref *ref) +{ +if (!ref) +return ; + +switch (ref->reftype) { +case REF_RAWDATA : +aa_put_i_loaddata (container_of (ref ,struct aa_loaddata , +count )); +break ; +case REF_PROXY : +aa_put_proxy (container_of (ref ,struct aa_proxy , +count )); +break ; +case REF_NS : +/* ns count is held on its unconfined label */ +aa_put_ns (labels_ns (container_of (ref ,struct aa_label ,count ))); +break ; +default : +AA_BUG (true,"unknown refcount type" ); +break ; + } +} + +static void aa_get_common_ref (struct aa_common_ref *ref) +{ +kref_get (&ref->count); +} + +static void aafs_evict (struct inode *inode) +{ +struct aa_common_ref *ref = inode->i_private; + +clear_inode (inode); +aa_put_common_ref (ref); + inode->i_private = (void *)IREF_POISON ; +} +static void aafs_free_inode (struct inode *inode) {if (S_ISLNK (inode->i_mode))
@@ -162,6 +229,7 @@ static void aafs_free_inode(struct inodestatic const struct super_operations aafs_super_ops = { .statfs = simple_statfs, + .evict_inode = aafs_evict, .free_inode = aafs_free_inode, .show_path = aafs_show_path, };
@@ -262,7 +330,8 @@ static int __aafs_setup_d_inode(struct i* aafs_remove(). Will return ERR_PTR on failure. */ static struct dentry *aafs_create (const char *name,umode_t mode, -struct dentry *parent,void *data,void *link, +struct dentry *parent, +struct aa_common_ref *data,void *link,const struct file_operations *fops,const struct inode_operations *iops) {
@@ -299,6 +368,9 @@ static struct dentry *aafs_create(const goto fail_dentry;inode_unlock (dir); +if (data) +aa_get_common_ref (data); +return dentry; fail_dentry:
@@ -323,7 +395,8 @@ fail_lock:* see aafs_create */ static struct dentry *aafs_create_file (const char *name,umode_t mode, -struct dentry *parent,void *data, +struct dentry *parent, +struct aa_common_ref *data,const struct file_operations *fops) {return aafs_create (name, mode, parent, data,NULL , fops,NULL );
@@ -448,7 +521,7 @@ end_section:static ssize_t profile_load (struct file *f,const char __user *buf,size_t size,loff_t *pos) { -struct aa_ns *ns =aa_get_ns (f->f_inode->i_private); +struct aa_ns *ns =get_ns_common_ref (f->f_inode->i_private);int error =policy_update (AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY , buf, size, pos, ns, f->f_cred);
@@ -466,7 +539,7 @@ static const struct file_operations aa_fstatic ssize_t profile_replace (struct file *f,const char __user *buf,size_t size,loff_t *pos) { -struct aa_ns *ns =aa_get_ns (f->f_inode->i_private); +struct aa_ns *ns =get_ns_common_ref (f->f_inode->i_private);int error =policy_update (AA_MAY_LOAD_POLICY |AA_MAY_REPLACE_POLICY , buf, size, pos, ns, f->f_cred);aa_put_ns (ns);
@@ -486,7 +559,7 @@ static ssize_t profile_remove(struct filstruct aa_loaddata *data;struct aa_label *label;ssize_t error; -struct aa_ns *ns =aa_get_ns (f->f_inode->i_private); +struct aa_ns *ns =get_ns_common_ref (f->f_inode->i_private); label =begin_current_label_crit_section ();/* high level check about policy management - fine grained in
@@ -576,7 +649,7 @@ static int ns_revision_open(struct inodeif (!rev)return -ENOMEM ; - rev->ns =aa_get_ns (inode->i_private); + rev->ns =get_ns_common_ref (inode->i_private);if (!rev->ns) rev->ns =aa_get_current_ns (); file->private_data = rev;
@@ -1054,7 +1127,7 @@ static const struct file_operations seq_static int seq_profile_open (struct inode *inode,struct file *file,int (*show)(struct seq_file *,void *)) { -struct aa_proxy *proxy =aa_get_proxy (inode->i_private); +struct aa_proxy *proxy =get_proxy_common_ref (inode->i_private);int error =single_open (file, show, proxy);if (error) {
@@ -1246,7 +1319,7 @@ static const struct file_operations seq_static int seq_rawdata_open (struct inode *inode,struct file *file,int (*show)(struct seq_file *,void *)) { -struct aa_loaddata *data =aa_get_i_loaddata (inode->i_private); +struct aa_loaddata *data =get_loaddata_common_ref (inode->i_private);int error;if (!data)
@@ -1381,7 +1454,7 @@ static int rawdata_open(struct inode *inif (!aa_current_policy_view_capable (NULL ))return -EACCES ; - loaddata =aa_get_i_loaddata (inode->i_private); + loaddata =get_loaddata_common_ref (inode->i_private);if (!loaddata)return -ENOENT ;
@@ -1426,7 +1499,6 @@ static void remove_rawdata_dents(structif (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL (rawdata->dents[i])) {aafs_remove (rawdata->dents[i]); rawdata->dents[i] =NULL ; -aa_put_i_loaddata (rawdata); } } }
@@ -1465,45 +1537,41 @@ int __aa_fs_create_rawdata(struct aa_nsif (IS_ERR (dir))/* ->name freed when rawdata freed */ return PTR_ERR (dir); -aa_get_i_loaddata (rawdata); rawdata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DIR ] = dir; - dent =aafs_create_file ("abi" ,S_IFREG |0444 , dir, rawdata, + dent =aafs_create_file ("abi" ,S_IFREG |0444 , dir, &rawdata->count, &seq_rawdata_abi_fops);if (IS_ERR (dent)) goto fail; -aa_get_i_loaddata (rawdata); rawdata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_ABI ] = dent; - dent =aafs_create_file ("revision" ,S_IFREG |0444 , dir, rawdata, - &seq_rawdata_revision_fops); + dent =aafs_create_file ("revision" ,S_IFREG |0444 , dir, + &rawdata->count, + &seq_rawdata_revision_fops);if (IS_ERR (dent)) goto fail; -aa_get_i_loaddata (rawdata); rawdata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_REVISION ] = dent;if (aa_g_hash_policy) { dent =aafs_create_file ("sha1" ,S_IFREG |0444 , dir, - rawdata, &seq_rawdata_hash_fops); + &rawdata->count, + &seq_rawdata_hash_fops);if (IS_ERR (dent)) goto fail; -aa_get_i_loaddata (rawdata); rawdata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_HASH ] = dent; } dent =aafs_create_file ("compressed_size" ,S_IFREG |0444 , dir, - rawdata, + &rawdata->count, &seq_rawdata_compressed_size_fops);if (IS_ERR (dent)) goto fail; -aa_get_i_loaddata (rawdata); rawdata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_COMPRESSED_SIZE ] = dent; - dent =aafs_create_file ("raw_data" ,S_IFREG |0444 , - dir, rawdata, &rawdata_fops); + dent =aafs_create_file ("raw_data" ,S_IFREG |0444 , dir, + &rawdata->count, &rawdata_fops);if (IS_ERR (dent)) goto fail; -aa_get_i_loaddata (rawdata); rawdata->dents[AAFS_LOADDATA_DATA ] = dent;d_inode (dent)->i_size = rawdata->size;
@@ -1514,7 +1582,6 @@ int __aa_fs_create_rawdata(struct aa_ns fail:remove_rawdata_dents (rawdata); -aa_put_i_loaddata (rawdata); return PTR_ERR(dent); }#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY */
@@ -1538,13 +1605,10 @@ void __aafs_profile_rmdir(struct aa_prof__aafs_profile_rmdir (child);for (i =AAFS_PROF_SIZEOF -1 ; i >=0 ; --i) { -struct aa_proxy *proxy;if (!profile->dents[i])continue ; - proxy =d_inode (profile->dents[i])->i_private;aafs_remove (profile->dents[i]); -aa_put_proxy (proxy); profile->dents[i] =NULL ; } }
@@ -1577,14 +1641,7 @@ static struct dentry *create_profile_filstruct aa_profile *profile, const struct file_operations *fops) { - struct aa_proxy *proxy = aa_get_proxy(profile->label.proxy); -struct dentry *dent; - - dent =aafs_create_file (name,S_IFREG |0444 , dir, proxy, fops); -if (IS_ERR (dent)) -aa_put_proxy (proxy); - -return dent; + return aafs_create_file(name, S_IFREG | 0444, dir, &profile->label.proxy->count, fops); }#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY
@@ -1635,7 +1692,8 @@ static const char *rawdata_get_link_basestruct delayed_call *done, const char *name) { - struct aa_proxy *proxy = inode->i_private; + struct aa_common_ref *ref = inode->i_private; + struct aa_proxy *proxy = container_of(ref, struct aa_proxy, count);struct aa_label *label;struct aa_profile *profile;char *target;
@@ -1777,27 +1835,24 @@ int __aafs_profile_mkdir(struct aa_profiif (profile->rawdata) {if (aa_g_hash_policy) { dent =aafs_create ("raw_sha1" ,S_IFLNK |0444 , dir, - profile->label.proxy,NULL ,NULL , - &rawdata_link_sha1_iops); + &profile->label.proxy->count,NULL , +NULL , &rawdata_link_sha1_iops);if (IS_ERR (dent)) goto fail; -aa_get_proxy (profile->label.proxy); profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_HASH ] = dent; } dent =aafs_create ("raw_abi" ,S_IFLNK |0444 , dir, - profile->label.proxy,NULL ,NULL , + &profile->label.proxy->count,NULL ,NULL , &rawdata_link_abi_iops);if (IS_ERR (dent)) goto fail; -aa_get_proxy (profile->label.proxy); profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_ABI ] = dent; dent =aafs_create ("raw_data" ,S_IFLNK |0444 , dir, - profile->label.proxy,NULL ,NULL , + &profile->label.proxy->count,NULL ,NULL , &rawdata_link_data_iops);if (IS_ERR (dent)) goto fail; -aa_get_proxy (profile->label.proxy); profile->dents[AAFS_PROF_RAW_DATA ] = dent; }#endif /*CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_EXPORT_BINARY */
@@ -1834,7 +1889,7 @@ static int ns_mkdir_op(struct mnt_idmapif (error)return error; - parent =aa_get_ns (dir->i_private); + parent =get_ns_common_ref (dir->i_private);AA_BUG (d_inode (ns_subns_dir (parent)) != dir);/* we have to unlock and then relock to get locking order right
@@ -1884,7 +1939,7 @@ static int ns_rmdir_op(struct inode *dirif (error)return error; - parent =aa_get_ns (dir->i_private); + parent =get_ns_common_ref (dir->i_private);/* rmdir calls the generic securityfs functions to remove files * from the apparmor dir. It is up to the apparmor ns locking * to avoid races.
@@ -1954,27 +2009,6 @@ void __aafs_ns_rmdir(struct aa_ns *ns)__aa_fs_list_remove_rawdata (ns); -if (ns_subns_dir (ns)) { - sub =d_inode (ns_subns_dir (ns))->i_private; -aa_put_ns (sub); - } -if (ns_subload (ns)) { - sub =d_inode (ns_subload (ns))->i_private; -aa_put_ns (sub); - } -if (ns_subreplace (ns)) { - sub =d_inode (ns_subreplace (ns))->i_private; -aa_put_ns (sub); - } -if (ns_subremove (ns)) { - sub =d_inode (ns_subremove (ns))->i_private; -aa_put_ns (sub); - } -if (ns_subrevision (ns)) { - sub =d_inode (ns_subrevision (ns))->i_private; -aa_put_ns (sub); - } -for (i =AAFS_NS_SIZEOF -1 ; i >=0 ; --i) {aafs_remove (ns->dents[i]); ns->dents[i] =NULL ;
@@ -1999,40 +2033,40 @@ static int __aafs_ns_mkdir_entries(strucreturn PTR_ERR (dent);ns_subdata_dir (ns) = dent; - dent =aafs_create_file ("revision" ,0444 , dir, ns, + dent =aafs_create_file ("revision" ,0444 , dir, + &ns->unconfined->label.count, &aa_fs_ns_revision_fops);if (IS_ERR (dent))return PTR_ERR (dent); -aa_get_ns (ns);ns_subrevision (ns) = dent; - dent =aafs_create_file (".load" ,0640 , dir, ns, - &aa_fs_profile_load); + dent =aafs_create_file (".load" ,0640 , dir, + &ns->unconfined->label.count, + &aa_fs_profile_load);if (IS_ERR (dent))return PTR_ERR (dent); -aa_get_ns (ns);ns_subload (ns) = dent; - dent =aafs_create_file (".replace" ,0640 , dir, ns, - &aa_fs_profile_replace); + dent =aafs_create_file (".replace" ,0640 , dir, + &ns->unconfined->label.count, + &aa_fs_profile_replace);if (IS_ERR (dent))return PTR_ERR (dent); -aa_get_ns (ns);ns_subreplace (ns) = dent; - dent =aafs_create_file (".remove" ,0640 , dir, ns, - &aa_fs_profile_remove); + dent =aafs_create_file (".remove" ,0640 , dir, + &ns->unconfined->label.count, + &aa_fs_profile_remove);if (IS_ERR (dent))return PTR_ERR (dent); -aa_get_ns (ns);ns_subremove (ns) = dent;/* use create_dentry so we can supply private data */ - dent =aafs_create ("namespaces" ,S_IFDIR |0755 , dir, ns,NULL ,NULL , - &ns_dir_inode_operations); + dent =aafs_create ("namespaces" ,S_IFDIR |0755 , dir, + &ns->unconfined->label.count, +NULL ,NULL , &ns_dir_inode_operations);if (IS_ERR (dent))return PTR_ERR (dent); -aa_get_ns (ns);ns_subns_dir (ns) = dent;return 0 ;
security/apparmor/include/label.h +8 -8
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ enum label_flags {struct aa_label ;struct aa_proxy { -struct kref count; +struct aa_common_ref count;struct aa_label __rcu *label; };
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ struct label_it {* @ent: set of profiles for label, actual size determined by @size */ struct aa_label { -struct kref count; +struct aa_common_ref count;struct rb_node node;struct rcu_head rcu;struct aa_proxy *proxy;
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ int aa_label_match(struct aa_profile *pr*/ static inline struct aa_label *__aa_get_label (struct aa_label *l) { -if (l &&kref_get_unless_zero (&l->count)) +if (l &&kref_get_unless_zero (&l->count.count))return l;return NULL ;
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ static inline struct aa_label *__aa_get_static inline struct aa_label *aa_get_label (struct aa_label *l) {if (l) -kref_get (&(l->count)); +kref_get (&(l->count.count));return l; }
@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ static inline struct aa_label *aa_get_larcu_read_lock ();do { c =rcu_dereference (*l); - }while (c && !kref_get_unless_zero (&c->count)); + }while (c && !kref_get_unless_zero (&c->count.count));rcu_read_unlock ();return c;
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ static inline struct aa_label *aa_get_nestatic inline void aa_put_label (struct aa_label *l) {if (l) -kref_put (&l->count, aa_label_kref); +kref_put (&l->count.count, aa_label_kref); }
@@ -452,7 +452,7 @@ void aa_proxy_kref(struct kref *kref);static inline struct aa_proxy *aa_get_proxy (struct aa_proxy *proxy) {if (proxy) -kref_get (&(proxy->count)); +kref_get (&(proxy->count.count));return proxy; }
@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ static inline struct aa_proxy *aa_get_prstatic inline void aa_put_proxy (struct aa_proxy *proxy) {if (proxy) -kref_put (&proxy->count, aa_proxy_kref); +kref_put (&proxy->count.count, aa_proxy_kref); }void __aa_proxy_redirect (struct aa_label *orig,struct aa_label *new);
security/apparmor/include/lib.h +12 -0
@@ -71,6 +71,18 @@ void aa_info_message(const char *str);/* Security blob offsets */ extern struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes; +enum reftype { +REF_NS , +REF_PROXY , +REF_RAWDATA , +}; + +/* common reference count used by data the shows up in aafs */ +struct aa_common_ref { +struct kref count; +enum reftype reftype; +}; +/** * aa_strneq - compare null terminated @str to a non null terminated substring * @str: a null terminated string
security/apparmor/include/policy.h +4 -4
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ static inline aa_state_t ANY_RULE_MEDIATstatic inline struct aa_profile *aa_get_profile (struct aa_profile *p) {if (p) -kref_get (&(p->label.count)); +kref_get (&(p->label.count.count));return p; }
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ static inline struct aa_profile *aa_get_*/ static inline struct aa_profile *aa_get_profile_not0 (struct aa_profile *p) { -if (p &&kref_get_unless_zero (&p->label.count)) +if (p &&kref_get_unless_zero (&p->label.count.count))return p;return NULL ;
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ static inline struct aa_profile *aa_get_rcu_read_lock ();do { c =rcu_dereference (*p); - }while (c && !kref_get_unless_zero (&c->label.count)); + }while (c && !kref_get_unless_zero (&c->label.count.count));rcu_read_unlock ();return c;
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ static inline struct aa_profile *aa_get_static inline void aa_put_profile (struct aa_profile *p) {if (p) -kref_put (&p->label.count, aa_label_kref); +kref_put (&p->label.count.count, aa_label_kref); }static inline int AUDIT_MODE (struct aa_profile *profile)
security/apparmor/include/policy_unpack.h +3 -3
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ struct aa_ext {* fs entries and drops the associated @count ref. */ struct aa_loaddata { -struct kref count; +struct aa_common_ref count;struct kref pcount;struct list_head list;struct work_struct work;
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ aa_get_i_loaddata(struct aa_loaddata *da {if (data) -kref_get (&(data->count)); +kref_get (&(data->count.count));return data; }
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ struct aa_loaddata *aa_loaddata_alloc(sistatic inline void aa_put_i_loaddata (struct aa_loaddata *data) {if (data) -kref_put (&data->count, aa_loaddata_kref); +kref_put (&data->count.count, aa_loaddata_kref); }static inline void aa_put_profile_loaddata (struct aa_loaddata *data)
security/apparmor/label.c +8 -4
@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ static void free_proxy(struct aa_proxy *void aa_proxy_kref (struct kref *kref) { - struct aa_proxy *proxy = container_of(kref, struct aa_proxy, count); + struct aa_proxy *proxy = container_of(kref, struct aa_proxy, + count.count);free_proxy (proxy); }
@@ -63,7 +64,8 @@ struct aa_proxy *aa_alloc_proxy(struct a new =kzalloc (sizeof (struct aa_proxy ), gfp);if (new) { -kref_init (&new->count); +kref_init (&new->count.count); + new->count.reftype =REF_PROXY ;rcu_assign_pointer (new->label,aa_get_label (label)); }return new;
@@ -369,7 +371,8 @@ static void label_free_rcu(struct rcu_hevoid aa_label_kref (struct kref *kref) { - struct aa_label *label = container_of(kref, struct aa_label, count); + struct aa_label *label = container_of(kref, struct aa_label, + count.count);struct aa_ns *ns =labels_ns (label);if (!ns) {
@@ -406,7 +409,8 @@ bool aa_label_init(struct aa_label *labe label->size = size;/* doesn't include null */ label->vec[size] =NULL ;/* null terminate */ -kref_init (&label->count); +kref_init (&label->count.count); + label->count.reftype =REF_NS ;/* for aafs purposes */ RB_CLEAR_NODE (&label->node);return true;
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +4 -2
@@ -118,7 +118,8 @@ static void do_loaddata_free(struct aa_lvoid aa_loaddata_kref (struct kref *kref) { - struct aa_loaddata *d = container_of(kref, struct aa_loaddata, count); + struct aa_loaddata *d = container_of(kref, struct aa_loaddata, + count.count);do_loaddata_free (d); }
@@ -165,7 +166,8 @@ struct aa_loaddata *aa_loaddata_alloc(sikfree (d);return ERR_PTR (-ENOMEM ); } -kref_init (&d->count); +kref_init (&d->count.count); + d->count.reftype =REF_RAWDATA ;kref_init (&d->pcount);INIT_LIST_HEAD (&d->list);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 198/567 scsi: storvsc: Fix scheduling while atomic on PREEMPT_RT
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jan Kiszka <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 57297736c08233987e5d29ce6584c6ca2a831b12 ]
This resolves the follow splat and lock-up when running with PREEMPT_RT enabled on Hyper-V:
[ 415.140818] BUG: scheduling while atomic: stress-ng-iomix/1048/0x00000002
[ 415.140822] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
[ 415.140823] Modules linked in: intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common intel_uncore_frequency_common intel_pmc_core pmt_telemetry pmt_discovery pmt_class intel_pmc_ssram_telemetry intel_vsec ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel rapl binfmt_misc nls_ascii nls_cp437 vfat fat snd_pcm hyperv_drm snd_timer drm_client_lib drm_shmem_helper snd sg soundcore drm_kms_helper pcspkr hv_balloon hv_utils evdev joydev drm configfs efi_pstore nfnetlink vsock_loopback vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common hv_sock vmw_vsock_vmci_transport vsock vmw_vmci efivarfs autofs4 ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 sr_mod sd_mod cdrom hv_storvsc serio_raw hid_generic scsi_transport_fc hid_hyperv scsi_mod hid hv_netvsc hyperv_keyboard scsi_common
[ 415.140846] Preemption disabled at:
[ 415.140847] [<ffffffffc0656171>] storvsc_queuecommand+0x2e1/0xbe0 [hv_storvsc]
[ 415.140854] CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 1048 Comm: stress-ng-iomix Not tainted 6.19.0-rc7 #30 PREEMPT_{RT,(full)}
[ 415.140856] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.1 09/04/2024
[ 415.140857] Call Trace:
[ 415.140861] <TASK>
[ 415.140861] ? storvsc_queuecommand+0x2e1/0xbe0 [hv_storvsc]
[ 415.140863] dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xb0
[ 415.140870] __schedule_bug+0x9c/0xc0
[ 415.140875] __schedule+0xdf6/0x1300
[ 415.140877] ? rtlock_slowlock_locked+0x56c/0x1980
[ 415.140879] ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0x60
[ 415.140883] schedule_rtlock+0x21/0x40
[ 415.140885] rtlock_slowlock_locked+0x502/0x1980
[ 415.140891] rt_spin_lock+0x89/0x1e0
[ 415.140893] hv_ringbuffer_write+0x87/0x2a0
[ 415.140899] vmbus_sendpacket_mpb_desc+0xb6/0xe0
[ 415.140900] ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0x60
[ 415.140902] storvsc_queuecommand+0x669/0xbe0 [hv_storvsc]
[ 415.140904] ? HARDIRQ_verbose+0x10/0x10
[ 415.140908] ? __rq_qos_issue+0x28/0x40
[ 415.140911] scsi_queue_rq+0x760/0xd80 [scsi_mod]
[ 415.140926] __blk_mq_issue_directly+0x4a/0xc0
[ 415.140928] blk_mq_issue_direct+0x87/0x2b0
[ 415.140931] blk_mq_dispatch_queue_requests+0x120/0x440
[ 415.140933] blk_mq_flush_plug_list+0x7a/0x1a0
[ 415.140935] __blk_flush_plug+0xf4/0x150
[ 415.140940] __submit_bio+0x2b2/0x5c0
[ 415.140944] ? submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x272/0x360
[ 415.140946] submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x272/0x360
[ 415.140951] ext4_read_bh_lock+0x3e/0x60 [ext4]
[ 415.140995] ext4_block_write_begin+0x396/0x650 [ext4]
[ 415.141018] ? __pfx_ext4_da_get_block_prep+0x10/0x10 [ext4]
[ 415.141038] ext4_da_write_begin+0x1c4/0x350 [ext4]
[ 415.141060] generic_perform_write+0x14e/0x2c0
[ 415.141065] ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x6b/0x120 [ext4]
[ 415.141083] vfs_write+0x2ca/0x570
[ 415.141087] ksys_write+0x76/0xf0
[ 415.141089] do_syscall_64+0x99/0x1490
[ 415.141093] ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0x60
[ 415.141095] ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0xdf/0x3d0
[ 415.141097] ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0x60
[ 415.141098] ? lock_release+0x1f0/0x2a0
[ 415.141100] ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0x60
[ 415.141101] ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0xe4/0x3d0
[ 415.141103] ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0x60
[ 415.141104] ? __schedule+0xb34/0x1300
[ 415.141106] ? hrtimer_try_to_cancel+0x1d/0x170
[ 415.141109] ? do_nanosleep+0x8b/0x160
[ 415.141111] ? hrtimer_nanosleep+0x89/0x100
[ 415.141114] ? __pfx_hrtimer_wakeup+0x10/0x10
[ 415.141116] ? xfd_validate_state+0x26/0x90
[ 415.141118] ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0x60
[ 415.141120] ? do_syscall_64+0x1e0/0x1490
[ 415.141121] ? do_syscall_64+0x1e0/0x1490
[ 415.141123] ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0x60
[ 415.141124] ? do_syscall_64+0x1e0/0x1490
[ 415.141125] ? do_syscall_64+0x1e0/0x1490
[ 415.141127] ? irqentry_exit+0x140/0x7e0
[ 415.141129] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7eget_cpu() disables preemption while the spinlock hv_ringbuffer_write is using is converted to an rt-mutex under PREEMPT_RT.
--- drivers/scsi/storvsc_drv.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/storvsc_drv.c +3 -2
@@ -1861,8 +1861,9 @@ static int storvsc_queuecommand(struct Scsi_Host *host, struct scsi_cmnd *scmnd) cmd_request->payload_sz = payload_sz;/* Invokes the vsc to start an IO */ - ret =storvsc_do_io (dev, cmd_request,get_cpu ()); -put_cpu (); +migrate_disable (); + ret =storvsc_do_io (dev, cmd_request,smp_processor_id ()); +migrate_enable ();if (ret)scsi_dma_unmap (scmnd);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 199/567 ACPI: PM: Save NVS memory on Lenovo G70-35
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Piotr Mazek <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 023cd6d90f8aa2ef7b72d84be84a18e61ecebd64 ]
[821d6f0359b0614792ab8e2fb93b503e25a65079] prevented machines produced later than 2012 from saving NVS region to accelerate S3.
Despite being made after 2012, Lenovo G70-35 still needs NVS memory saving during S3. A quirk is introduced for this platform.
--- drivers/acpi/sleep.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/acpi/sleep.c +8 -0
@@ -372,6 +372,14 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id acpisleep_dmi_table[] __initconst = { DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "80E1"), }, }, + { + .callback = init_nvs_save_s3, + .ident = "Lenovo G70-35", + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "LENOVO"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "80Q5"), + }, + },/* * ThinkPad X1 Tablet(2016) cannot do suspend-to-idle using * the Low Power S0 Idle firmware interface (see
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 200/567 scsi: mpi3mr: Add NULL checks when resetting request and reply queues
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ranjan Kumar <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fa96392ebebc8fade2b878acb14cce0f71016503 ]
The driver encountered a crash during resource cleanup when the reply and request queues were NULL due to freed memory. This issue occurred when the creation of reply or request queues failed, and the driver freed the memory first, but attempted to mem set the content of the freed memory, leading to a system crash.
Add NULL pointer checks for reply and request queues before accessing the reply/request memory during cleanup
--- drivers/scsi/mpi3mr/mpi3mr_fw.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/mpi3mr/mpi3mr_fw.c +19 -15
@@ -4262,21 +4262,25 @@ void mpi3mr_memset_buffers(struct mpi3mr_ioc *mrioc) }for (i =0 ; i < mrioc->num_queues; i++) { - mrioc->op_reply_qinfo[i].qid =0 ; - mrioc->op_reply_qinfo[i].ci =0 ; - mrioc->op_reply_qinfo[i].num_replies =0 ; - mrioc->op_reply_qinfo[i].ephase =0 ; -atomic_set (&mrioc->op_reply_qinfo[i].pend_ios,0 ); -atomic_set (&mrioc->op_reply_qinfo[i].in_use,0 ); -mpi3mr_memset_op_reply_q_buffers (mrioc, i); - - mrioc->req_qinfo[i].ci =0 ; - mrioc->req_qinfo[i].pi =0 ; - mrioc->req_qinfo[i].num_requests =0 ; - mrioc->req_qinfo[i].qid =0 ; - mrioc->req_qinfo[i].reply_qid =0 ; -spin_lock_init (&mrioc->req_qinfo[i].q_lock); -mpi3mr_memset_op_req_q_buffers (mrioc, i); +if (mrioc->op_reply_qinfo) { + mrioc->op_reply_qinfo[i].qid =0 ; + mrioc->op_reply_qinfo[i].ci =0 ; + mrioc->op_reply_qinfo[i].num_replies =0 ; + mrioc->op_reply_qinfo[i].ephase =0 ; +atomic_set (&mrioc->op_reply_qinfo[i].pend_ios,0 ); +atomic_set (&mrioc->op_reply_qinfo[i].in_use,0 ); +mpi3mr_memset_op_reply_q_buffers (mrioc, i); + } + +if (mrioc->req_qinfo) { + mrioc->req_qinfo[i].ci =0 ; + mrioc->req_qinfo[i].pi =0 ; + mrioc->req_qinfo[i].num_requests =0 ; + mrioc->req_qinfo[i].qid =0 ; + mrioc->req_qinfo[i].reply_qid =0 ; +spin_lock_init (&mrioc->req_qinfo[i].q_lock); +mpi3mr_memset_op_req_q_buffers (mrioc, i); + } }atomic_set (&mrioc->pend_large_data_sz,0 );
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 201/567 unshare: fix unshare_fs() handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Al Viro <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6c4b2243cb6c0755159bd567130d5e12e7b10d9f ]
There's an unpleasant corner case in unshare(2), when we have a CLONE_NEWNS in flags and current->fs hadn't been shared at all; in that case copy_mnt_ns() gets passed current->fs instead of a private copy, which causes interesting warts in proof of correctness]
Quoted 1 line
I guess if private means
fs->users== 1, the condition could still be true.
Unfortunately, it's worse than just a convoluted proof of correctness. Consider the case when we have CLONE_NEWCGROUP in addition to CLONE_NEWNS (and current->fs->users == 1).
We pass current->fs to copy_mnt_ns(), all right. Suppose it succeeds and flips current->fs->{pwd,root} to corresponding locations in the new namespace. Now we proceed to copy_cgroup_ns(), which fails (e.g. with -ENOMEM). We call put_mnt_ns() on the namespace created by copy_mnt_ns(), it's destroyed and its mount tree is dissolved, but... current->fs->root and current->fs->pwd are both left pointing to now detached mounts.
They are pinning those, so it's not a UAF, but it leaves the calling process with unshare(2) failing with -ENOMEM _and_ leaving it with pwd and root on detached isolated mounts. The last part is clearly a bug.
There is other fun related to that mess (races with pivot_root(), including the one between pivot_root() and fork(), of all things), but this one is easy to isolate and fix - treat CLONE_NEWNS as "allocate a new fs_struct even if it hadn't been shared in the first place". Sure, we could go for something like "if both CLONE_NEWNS *and* one of the things that might end up failing after copy_mnt_ns() call in create_new_namespaces() are set, force allocation of new fs_struct", but let's keep it simple - the cost of copy_fs_struct() is trivial.
Another benefit is that copy_mnt_ns() with CLONE_NEWNS *always* gets a freshly allocated fs_struct, yet to be attached to anything. That seriously simplifies the analysis...
FWIW, that bug had been there since the introduction of unshare(2) ;-/
--- kernel/fork.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/fork.c +1 -1
@@ -3350,7 +3350,7 @@ static int unshare_fs(unsigned long unshare_flags, struct fs_struct **new_fsp)return 0 ;/* don't need lock here; in the worst case we'll do useless copy */ -if (fs->users ==1 ) +if (!(unshare_flags &CLONE_NEWNS ) && fs->users ==1 )return 0 ; *new_fsp =copy_fs_struct (fs);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 202/567 wifi: mac80211: set default WMM parameters on all links
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ramanathan Choodamani <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2259d14499d16b115ef8d5d2ddc867e2be7cb5b5 ]
Currently, mac80211 only initializes default WMM parameters on the deflink during do_open(). For MLO cases, this leaves the additional links without proper WMM defaults if hostapd does not supply per-link WMM parameters, leading to inconsistent QoS behavior across links.
Set default WMM parameters for each link during ieee80211_vif_update_links(), because this ensures all individual links in an MLD have valid WMM settings during bring-up and behave consistently across different BSS.
--- net/mac80211/link.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/mac80211/link.c +2 -0
@@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ static int ieee80211_vif_update_links(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata,struct ieee80211_bss_conf *old[IEEE80211_MLD_MAX_NUM_LINKS ];struct ieee80211_link_data *old_data[IEEE80211_MLD_MAX_NUM_LINKS ];bool use_deflink = old_links ==0 ;/* set for error case */ +bool non_sta = sdata->vif.type !=NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION ;sdata_assert_lock (sdata);
@@ -254,6 +255,7 @@ static int ieee80211_vif_update_links(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, link = links[link_id];ieee80211_link_init (sdata, link_id, &link->data, &link->conf);ieee80211_link_setup (&link->data); +ieee80211_set_wmm_default (&link->data, true, non_sta); }if (new_links ==0 )
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 203/567 ACPI: OSI: Add DMI quirk for Acer Aspire One D255
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sofia Schneider <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5ede90206273ff156a778254f0f972a55e973c89 ]
The screen backlight turns off during boot (specifically during udev device initialization) when returning true for _OSI("Windows 2009").
Analyzing the device's DSDT reveals that the firmware takes a different code path when Windows 7 is reported, which leads to the backlight shutoff. Add a DMI quirk to invoke dmi_disable_osi_win7 for this model.
--- drivers/acpi/osi.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
drivers/acpi/osi.c +13 -0
@@ -389,6 +389,19 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id acpi_osi_dmi_table[] __initconst = { }, }, +/* +* The screen backlight turns off during udev device creation +* when returning true for _OSI("Windows 2009") +*/ + { + .callback = dmi_disable_osi_win7, + .ident = "Acer Aspire One D255", + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "Acer"), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "AOD255"), + }, + }, + /* * The wireless hotkey does not work on those machines when * returning true for _OSI("Windows 2012")
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 204/567 scsi: ses: Fix devices attaching to different hosts
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tomas Henzl <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 70ca8caa96ce473647054f5c7b9dab5423902402 ]
On a multipath SAS system some devices don't end up with correct symlinks from the SCSI device to its enclosure. Some devices even have enclosure links pointing to enclosures attached to different SCSI hosts.
ses_match_to_enclosure() calls enclosure_for_each_device() which iterates over all enclosures on the system, not just enclosures attached to the current SCSI host.
Replace the iteration with a direct call to ses_enclosure_find_by_addr().
--- drivers/scsi/ses.c | 5 ++--- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/ses.c +2 -3
@@ -503,9 +503,8 @@ struct efd { };static int ses_enclosure_find_by_addr (struct enclosure_device *edev, -void *data) +struct efd *efd) { -struct efd *efd = data;int i;struct ses_component *scomp;
@@ -658,7 +657,7 @@ static void ses_match_to_enclosure(struct enclosure_device *edev,if (efd.addr) { efd.dev = &sdev->sdev_gendev; -enclosure_for_each_device (ses_enclosure_find_by_addr, &efd); +ses_enclosure_find_by_addr (edev, &efd); } }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 205/567 ASoC: amd: yc: Add ASUS EXPERTBOOK BM1503CDA to quirk table
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Azamat Almazbek uulu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 32fc4168fa56f6301d858c778a3d712774e9657e ]
The ASUS ExpertBook BM1503CDA (Ryzen 5 7535U, Barcelo-R) has an internal DMIC connected through the AMD ACP (Audio CoProcessor) but is missing from the DMI quirk table, so the acp6x machine driver probe returns -ENODEV and no DMIC capture device is created.
Add the DMI entry so the internal microphone works out of the box.
--- sound/soc/amd/yc/acp6x-mach.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
sound/soc/amd/yc/acp6x-mach.c +7 -0
@@ -696,6 +696,13 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id yc_acp_quirk_table[] = { DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "Vivobook_ASUSLaptop M6501RR_M6501RR"), } }, + { + .driver_data = &acp6x_card, + .matches = { + DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_VENDOR, "ASUSTeK COMPUTER INC."), + DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_NAME, "ASUS EXPERTBOOK BM1503CDA"), + } + }, {} };
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 206/567 ASoC: cs42l43: Report insert for exotic peripherals
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Charles Keepax <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6510e1324bcdc8caf21f6d17efe27604c48f0d64 ]
For some exotic peripherals the type detect can return a reserved value of 0x4. This will currently return an error and not report anything to user-space, update this to report the insert normally.
--- sound/soc/codecs/cs42l43-jack.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
sound/soc/codecs/cs42l43-jack.c +1 -0
@@ -699,6 +699,7 @@ static int cs42l43_run_type_detect(struct cs42l43_codec *priv)switch (type &CS42L43_HSDET_TYPE_STS_MASK ) {case 0x0 :// CTIA case 0x1 :// OMTP +case 0x4 :return cs42l43_run_load_detect (priv, true);case 0x2 :// 3-pole return cs42l43_run_load_detect (priv, false);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 207/567 scsi: ufs: core: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference in ufshcd_add_command_trace()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Peter Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 30df81f2228d65bddf492db3929d9fcaffd38fc5 ]
The kernel log indicates a crash in ufshcd_add_command_trace, due to a NULL pointer dereference when accessing hwq->id. This can happen if ufshcd_mcq_req_to_hwq() returns NULL.
This patch adds a NULL check for hwq before accessing its id field to prevent a kernel crash.
Kernel log excerpt:
[<ffffffd5d192dc4c>] notify_die+0x4c/0x8c [<ffffffd5d1814e58>] __die+0x60/0xb0 [<ffffffd5d1814d64>] die+0x4c/0xe0 [<ffffffd5d181575c>] die_kernel_fault+0x74/0x88 [<ffffffd5d1864db4>] __do_kernel_fault+0x314/0x318 [<ffffffd5d2a3cdf8>] do_page_fault+0xa4/0x5f8 [<ffffffd5d2a3cd34>] do_translation_fault+0x34/0x54 [<ffffffd5d1864524>] do_mem_abort+0x50/0xa8 [<ffffffd5d2a297dc>] el1_abort+0x3c/0x64 [<ffffffd5d2a29718>] el1h_64_sync_handler+0x44/0xcc [<ffffffd5d181133c>] el1h_64_sync+0x80/0x88 [<ffffffd5d255c1dc>] ufshcd_add_command_trace+0x23c/0x320 [<ffffffd5d255bad8>] ufshcd_compl_one_cqe+0xa4/0x404 [<ffffffd5d2572968>] ufshcd_mcq_poll_cqe_lock+0xac/0x104 [<ffffffd5d11c7460>] ufs_mtk_mcq_intr+0x54/0x74 [ufs_mediatek_mod] [<ffffffd5d19ab92c>] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0xc8/0x348 [<ffffffd5d19abca8>] handle_irq_event+0x3c/0xa8 [<ffffffd5d19b1f0c>] handle_fasteoi_irq+0xf8/0x294 [<ffffffd5d19aa778>] generic_handle_domain_irq+0x54/0x80 [<ffffffd5d18102bc>] gic_handle_irq+0x1d4/0x330 [<ffffffd5d1838210>] call_on_irq_stack+0x44/0x68 [<ffffffd5d183af30>] do_interrupt_handler+0x78/0xd8 [<ffffffd5d2a29c00>] el1_interrupt+0x48/0xa8 [<ffffffd5d2a29ba8>] el1h_64_irq_handler+0x14/0x24 [<ffffffd5d18113c4>] el1h_64_irq+0x80/0x88 [<ffffffd5d2527fb4>] arch_local_irq_enable+0x4/0x1c [<ffffffd5d25282e4>] cpuidle_enter+0x34/0x54 [<ffffffd5d195a678>] do_idle+0x1dc/0x2f8 [<ffffffd5d195a7c4>] cpu_startup_entry+0x30/0x3c [<ffffffd5d18155c4>] secondary_start_kernel+0x134/0x1ac [<ffffffd5d18640bc>] __secondary_switched+0xc4/0xcc
--- drivers/ufs/core/ufshcd.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/ufs/core/ufshcd.c +2 -2
@@ -461,8 +461,8 @@ static void ufshcd_add_command_trace(struct ufs_hba *hba, unsigned int tag,if (is_mcq_enabled (hba)) {struct ufs_hw_queue *hwq =ufshcd_mcq_req_to_hwq (hba, rq); - - hwq_id = hwq->id; +if (hwq) + hwq_id = hwq->id; }else { doorbell =ufshcd_readl (hba,REG_UTP_TRANSFER_REQ_DOOR_BELL ); }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 208/567 scsi: ufs: core: Fix shift out of bounds when MAXQ=32
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: wangshuaiwei <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 2f38fd99c0004676d835ae96ac4f3b54edc02c82 ]
According to JESD223F, the maximum number of queues (MAXQ) is 32. When MCQ is enabled and ESI is disabled, nr_hw_queues=32 causes a shift overflow problem.
Fix this by using 64-bit intermediate values to handle the nr_hw_queues=32 case safely.
--- drivers/ufs/core/ufshcd.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/ufs/core/ufshcd.c +1 -1
@@ -6960,7 +6960,7 @@ static irqreturn_t ufshcd_handle_mcq_cq_events(struct ufs_hba *hba) ret =ufshcd_vops_get_outstanding_cqs (hba, &outstanding_cqs);if (ret) - outstanding_cqs = (1U << hba->nr_hw_queues) -1 ; + outstanding_cqs = (1ULL << hba->nr_hw_queues) -1 ;/* Exclude the poll queues */ nr_queues = hba->nr_hw_queues - hba->nr_queues[HCTX_TYPE_POLL ];
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 209/567 ALSA: usb-audio: Avoid implicit feedback mode on DIYINHK USB Audio 2.0
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c5bf24c8aba1ff711226ee0f039ff01a5754692b ]
Although DIYINHK USB Audio 2.0 (ID 20b1:2009) shows the implicit feedback source for the capture stream, this would cause several problems for the playback. Namely, the device can get wMaxPackSize 1024 for 24/32 bit format with 6 channels, and when a high sample rate like 352.8kHz or 384kHz is played, the packet size overflows the max limit. Also, the device has another two playback altsets, and those aren't properly handled with the implicit feedback.
Since the device has been working well even before introducing the implicit feedback, we can assume that it works fine in the async mode. This patch adds the explicit skip of the implicit fb detection to make the playback running in the async mode.
--- sound/usb/quirks.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
sound/usb/quirks.c +2 -0
@@ -2251,6 +2251,8 @@ static const struct usb_audio_quirk_flags_table quirk_flags_table[] = { QUIRK_FLAG_SHARE_MEDIA_DEVICE | QUIRK_FLAG_ALIGN_TRANSFER),DEVICE_FLG (0x2040 ,0x7281 ,/* Hauppauge HVR-950Q-MXL */ QUIRK_FLAG_SHARE_MEDIA_DEVICE |QUIRK_FLAG_ALIGN_TRANSFER ), +DEVICE_FLG (0x20b1 ,0x2009 ,/* XMOS Ltd DIYINHK USB Audio 2.0 */ +QUIRK_FLAG_SKIP_IMPLICIT_FB |QUIRK_FLAG_DSD_RAW ),DEVICE_FLG (0x2040 ,0x8200 ,/* Hauppauge Woodbury */ QUIRK_FLAG_SHARE_MEDIA_DEVICE |QUIRK_FLAG_ALIGN_TRANSFER ), DEVICE_FLG(0x21b4, 0x0081, /* AudioQuest DragonFly */
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 210/567 ALSA: usb-audio: Check max frame size for implicit feedback mode, too
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7cb2a5422f5bbdf1cf32eae0eda41000485b9346 ]
When the packet sizes are taken from the capture stream in the implicit feedback mode, the sizes might be larger than the upper boundary defined by the descriptor. As already done for other transfer modes, we have to cap the sizes accordingly at sending, otherwise this would lead to an error in USB core at submission of URBs.
--- sound/usb/endpoint.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
sound/usb/endpoint.c +1 -0
@@ -224,6 +224,7 @@ int snd_usb_endpoint_next_packet_size(struct snd_usb_endpoint *ep, packet = ctx->packet_size[idx];if (packet) { + packet =min (packet, ep->maxframesize);if (avail && packet >= avail)return -EAGAIN ;return packet;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 211/567 powerpc/uaccess: Fix inline assembly for clang build on PPC32
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Christophe Leroy (CS GROUP) <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0ee95a1d458630272d0415d0ffa9424fcb606c90 ]
Test robot reports the following error with clang-16.0.6:
In file included from kernel/rseq.c:75:
include/linux/rseq_entry.h:141:3: error: invalid operand for instruction
unsafe_get_user(offset, &ucs->post_commit_offset, efault);
^
include/linux/uaccess.h:608:2: note: expanded from macro 'unsafe_get_user'
arch_unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, local_label); \
^
arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h:518:2: note: expanded from macro 'arch_unsafe_get_user'
__get_user_size_goto(__gu_val, __gu_addr, sizeof(*(p)), e); \
^
arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h:284:2: note: expanded from macro '__get_user_size_goto'
__get_user_size_allowed(x, ptr, size, __gus_retval); \
^
arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h:275:10: note: expanded from macro '__get_user_size_allowed'
case 8: __get_user_asm2(x, (u64 __user *)ptr, retval); break; \
^
arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h:258:4: note: expanded from macro '__get_user_asm2'
" li %1+1,0\n" \
^
<inline asm>:7:5: note: instantiated into assembly here
li 31+1,0
^
1 error generated.On PPC32, for 64 bits vars a pair of registers is used. Usually the lower register in the pair is the high part and the higher register is the low part. GCC uses r3/r4 ... r11/r12 ... r14/r15 ... r30/r31
In older kernel code inline assembly was using %1 and %1+1 to represent 64 bits values. However here it looks like clang uses r31 as high part, allthough r32 doesn't exist hence the error.
Allthoug %1+1 should work, most places now use %L1 instead of %1+1, so let's do the same here.
With that change, the build doesn't fail anymore and a disassembly shows clang uses r17/r18 and r31/r14 pair when GCC would have used r16/r17 and r30/r31:
Disassembly of section .fixup: 00000000 <.fixup>: 0: 38 a0 ff f2 li r5,-14 4: 3a 20 00 00 li r17,0 8: 3a 40 00 00 li r18,0 c: 48 00 00 00 b c <.fixup+0xc> c: R_PPC_REL24 .text+0xbc 10: 38 a0 ff f2 li r5,-14 14: 3b e0 00 00 li r31,0 18: 39 c0 00 00 li r14,0 1c: 48 00 00 00 b 1c <.fixup+0x1c> 1c: R_PPC_REL24 .text+0x144
--- arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h +1 -1
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ __gus_failed: \".section .fixup,\"ax\"\n" \"4: li %0,%3\n" \" li %1,0\n" \ -" li %1+1,0\n" \ +" li %L1,0\n" \" b 3b\n" \".previous\n" \EX_TABLE (1b ,4b ) \
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 212/567 remoteproc: sysmon: Correct subsys_name_len type in QMI request
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Bjorn Andersson <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit da994db94e60f9a9411108ddf4d1836147ad4c9c ]
The QMI message encoder has up until recently read a single byte (as elem_size == 1), but with the introduction of big endian support it's become apparent that this field is expected to be a full u32 - regardless of the size of the length in the encoded message (which is what elem_size specifies).
The result is that the encoder now reads past the length byte and rejects the unreasonably large length formed when including the following 3 bytes from the subsys_name array.
Fix this by changing to the expected type.
--- drivers/remoteproc/qcom_sysmon.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/remoteproc/qcom_sysmon.c +1 -1
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ static const struct qmi_elem_info ssctl_shutdown_resp_ei[] = { };struct ssctl_subsys_event_req { -u8 subsys_name_len; +u32 subsys_name_len;char subsys_name[SSCTL_SUBSYS_NAME_LENGTH ];u32 event;u8 evt_driven_valid;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 213/567 remoteproc: mediatek: Unprepare SCP clock during system suspend
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tzung-Bi Shih <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 35c3f72a2d55dbf52f28f4ecae51c76be1acf545 ]
Prior to commit d935187cfb27 ("remoteproc: mediatek: Break lock dependency to prepare_lock"), scp->clk was prepared and enabled only when it needs to communicate with the SCP. The commit d935187cfb27 moved the prepare operation to remoteproc's prepare(), keeping the clock prepared as long as the SCP is running.
The power consumption due to the prolonged clock preparation can be negligible when the system is running, as SCP is designed to be a very power efficient processor.
However, the clock remains prepared even when the system enters system suspend. This prevents the underlying clock controller (and potentially the parent PLLs) from shutting down, which increases power consumption and may block the system from entering deep sleep states.
Add suspend and resume callbacks. Unprepare the clock in suspend() if it was active and re-prepare it in resume() to ensure the clock is properly disabled during system suspend, while maintaining the "always prepared" semantics while the system is active. The driver doesn't implement .attach() callback, hence it only checks for RPROC_RUNNING.
--- drivers/remoteproc/mtk_scp.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+)
drivers/remoteproc/mtk_scp.c +39 -0
@@ -1024,12 +1024,51 @@ static const struct of_device_id mtk_scp_of_match[] = { };MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE (of, mtk_scp_of_match); +static int __maybe_unused scp_suspend (struct device *dev) +{ +struct mtk_scp *scp =dev_get_drvdata (dev); +struct rproc *rproc = scp->rproc; + +/* +* Only unprepare if the SCP is running and holding the clock. +* +* Note: `scp_ops` doesn't implement .attach() callback, hence +* `rproc->state` can never be RPROC_ATTACHED. Otherwise, it +* should also be checked here. +*/ +if (rproc->state ==RPROC_RUNNING ) +clk_unprepare (scp->clk); +return 0 ; +} + +static int __maybe_unused scp_resume (struct device *dev) +{ +struct mtk_scp *scp =dev_get_drvdata (dev); +struct rproc *rproc = scp->rproc; + +/* +* Only prepare if the SCP was running and holding the clock. +* +* Note: `scp_ops` doesn't implement .attach() callback, hence +* `rproc->state` can never be RPROC_ATTACHED. Otherwise, it +* should also be checked here. +*/ +if (rproc->state ==RPROC_RUNNING ) +return clk_prepare (scp->clk); +return 0 ; +} + +static const struct dev_pm_ops scp_pm_ops = { +SET_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM_OPS (scp_suspend, scp_resume) +}; +static struct platform_driver mtk_scp_driver = { .probe = scp_probe, .remove_new = scp_remove, .driver = { .name ="mtk-scp" , .of_match_table = mtk_scp_of_match, + .pm = &scp_pm_ops, }, };
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 214/567 powerpc: 83xx: km83xx: Fix keymile vendor prefix
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: J. Neuschäfer <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 691417ffe7821721e0a28bd25ad8c0dc0d4ae4ad ]
When kmeter.c was refactored into km83xx.c in 2011, the "keymile" vendor prefix was changed to upper-case "Keymile". The devicetree at arch/powerpc/boot/dts/kmeter1.dts never underwent the same change, suggesting that this was simply a mistake.
--- arch/powerpc/platforms/83xx/km83xx.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/platforms/83xx/km83xx.c +2 -2
@@ -155,8 +155,8 @@ machine_device_initcall(mpc83xx_km, mpc83xx_declare_of_platform_devices);/* list of the supported boards */ static char *board[]__initdata = { -"Keymile,KMETER1" , -"Keymile,kmpbec8321" , +"keymile,KMETER1" , +"keymile,kmpbec8321" ,NULL };
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 215/567 smb/server: Fix another refcount leak in smb2_open()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Guenter Roeck <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit c15e7c62feb3751cbdd458555819df1d70374890 ]
If ksmbd_override_fsids() fails, we jump to err_out2. At that point, fp is NULL because it hasn't been assigned dh_info.fp yet, so ksmbd_fd_put(work, fp) will not be called. However, dh_info.fp was already inserted into the session file table by ksmbd_reopen_durable_fd(), so it will leak in the session file table until the session is closed.
Move fp = dh_info.fp; ahead of the ksmbd_override_fsids() check to fix the problem.
Found by an experimental AI code review agent at Google.
--- fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +2 -1
@@ -2990,13 +2990,14 @@ int smb2_open(struct ksmbd_work *work) goto err_out2; } + fp = dh_info.fp; +if (ksmbd_override_fsids (work)) { rc = -ENOMEM ;ksmbd_put_durable_fd (dh_info.fp); goto err_out2; } - fp = dh_info.fp; file_info =FILE_OPENED ; rc =ksmbd_vfs_getattr (&fp->filp->f_path, &stat);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 216/567 xprtrdma: Decrement re_receiving on the early exit paths
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Eric Badger <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7b6275c80a0c81c5f8943272292dfe67730ce849 ]
In the event that rpcrdma_post_recvs() fails to create a work request (due to memory allocation failure, say) or otherwise exits early, we should decrement ep->re_receiving before returning. Otherwise we will hang in rpcrdma_xprt_drain() as re_receiving will never reach zero and the completion will never be triggered.
On a system with high memory pressure, this can appear as the following hung task:
INFO: task kworker/u385:17:8393 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
Tainted: G S E 6.19.0 #3
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:kworker/u385:17 state:D stack:0 pid:8393 tgid:8393 ppid:2 task_flags:0x4248060 flags:0x00080000
Workqueue: xprtiod xprt_autoclose [sunrpc]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x48b/0x18b0
? ib_post_send_mad+0x247/0xae0 [ib_core]
schedule+0x27/0xf0
schedule_timeout+0x104/0x110
__wait_for_common+0x98/0x180
? __pfx_schedule_timeout+0x10/0x10
wait_for_completion+0x24/0x40
rpcrdma_xprt_disconnect+0x444/0x460 [rpcrdma]
xprt_rdma_close+0x12/0x40 [rpcrdma]
xprt_autoclose+0x5f/0x120 [sunrpc]
process_one_work+0x191/0x3e0
worker_thread+0x2e3/0x420
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x10d/0x230
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x273/0x2b0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30--- net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/verbs.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/sunrpc/xprtrdma/verbs.c +4 -3
@@ -1362,7 +1362,7 @@ void rpcrdma_post_recvs(struct rpcrdma_xprt *r_xprt, int needed, bool temp) needed +=RPCRDMA_MAX_RECV_BATCH ;if (atomic_inc_return (&ep->re_receiving) >1 ) - goto out; + goto out_dec;/* fast path: all needed reps can be found on the free list */ wr =NULL ;
@@ -1389,7 +1389,7 @@ void rpcrdma_post_recvs(struct rpcrdma_xprt *r_xprt, int needed, bool temp) ++count; }if (!wr) - goto out; + goto out_dec; rc =ib_post_recv (ep->re_id->qp, wr, (const struct ib_recv_wr **)&bad_wr);
@@ -1404,9 +1404,10 @@ void rpcrdma_post_recvs(struct rpcrdma_xprt *r_xprt, int needed, bool temp) --count; } } + +out_dec:if (atomic_dec_return (&ep->re_receiving) >0 )complete (&ep->re_done); - out:trace_xprtrdma_post_recvs (r_xprt, count); ep->re_receive_count += count;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 217/567 net: dsa: realtek: rtl8365mb: remove ifOutDiscards from rx_packets
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mieczyslaw Nalewaj <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f76a93241d71fbba8425e3967097b498c29264ed ]
rx_packets should report the number of frames successfully received:
unicast + multicast + broadcast. Subtracting ifOutDiscards (a TX counter) is incorrect and can undercount RX packets. RX drops are already reported via rx_dropped (e.g. etherStatsDropEvents), so there is no need to adjust rx_packets.
This patch removes the subtraction of ifOutDiscards from rx_packets in rtl8365mb_stats_update().
--- drivers/net/dsa/realtek/rtl8365mb.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/dsa/realtek/rtl8365mb.c +1 -2
@@ -1482,8 +1482,7 @@ static void rtl8365mb_stats_update(struct realtek_priv *priv, int port) stats->rx_packets = cnt[RTL8365MB_MIB_ifInUcastPkts] + cnt[RTL8365MB_MIB_ifInMulticastPkts] + - cnt[RTL8365MB_MIB_ifInBroadcastPkts] - - cnt[RTL8365MB_MIB_ifOutDiscards]; + cnt[RTL8365MB_MIB_ifInBroadcastPkts]; stats->tx_packets = cnt[RTL8365MB_MIB_ifOutUcastPkts] + cnt[RTL8365MB_MIB_ifOutMulticastPkts] +
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 218/567 drm/msm/dsi: Document DSC related pclk_rate and hdisplay calculations
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dmitry Baryshkov <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3b56d27ba1578c3d61f51de4102cf896a9a8617e ]
Provide actual documentation for the pclk and hdisplay calculations in the case of DSC compression being used.
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/577534/
Stable-dep-of: e4eb11b34d6c ("drm/msm/dsi: fix pclk rate calculation for bonded dsi")
--- drivers/gpu/drm/msm/dsi/dsi_host.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/msm/dsi/dsi_host.c +31 -2
@@ -529,6 +529,25 @@ void dsi_link_clk_disable_v2(struct msm_dsi_host *msm_host)clk_disable_unprepare (msm_host->byte_clk); } +/** +* dsi_adjust_pclk_for_compression() - Adjust the pclk rate for compression case +* @mode: The selected mode for the DSI output +* @dsc: DRM DSC configuration for this DSI output +* +* Adjust the pclk rate by calculating a new hdisplay proportional to +* the compression ratio such that: +* new_hdisplay = old_hdisplay * compressed_bpp / uncompressed_bpp +* +* Porches do not need to be adjusted: +* - For VIDEO mode they are not compressed by DSC and are passed as is. +* - For CMD mode there are no actual porches. Instead these fields +* currently represent the overhead to the image data transfer. As such, they +* are calculated for the final mode parameters (after the compression) and +* are not to be adjusted too. +* +* FIXME: Reconsider this if/when CMD mode handling is rewritten to use +* transfer time and data overhead as a starting point of the calculations. +*/ static unsigned long dsi_adjust_pclk_for_compression (const struct drm_display_mode *mode,const struct drm_dsc_config *dsc) {
@@ -937,8 +956,18 @@ static void dsi_timing_setup(struct msm_dsi_host *msm_host, bool is_bonded_dsi)if (ret)return ; -/* Divide the display by 3 but keep back/font porch and -* pulse width same +/* +* DPU sends 3 bytes per pclk cycle to DSI. If widebus is +* enabled, bus width is extended to 6 bytes. +* +* Calculate the number of pclks needed to transmit one line of +* the compressed data. + +* The back/font porch and pulse width are kept intact. For +* VIDEO mode they represent timing parameters rather than +* actual data transfer, see the documentation for +* dsi_adjust_pclk_for_compression(). For CMD mode they are +* unused anyway. */ h_total -= hdisplay; hdisplay =DIV_ROUND_UP (msm_dsc_get_bytes_per_line (msm_host->dsc),3 );
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 219/567 drm/msm/dsi: fix pclk rate calculation for bonded dsi
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pengyu Luo <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e4eb11b34d6c84f398d8f08d7cb4d6c38e739dd2 ]
Recently, we round up new_hdisplay once at most, for bonded dsi, we may need twice, since they are independent links, we should round up each half separately. This also aligns with the hdisplay we program later in dsi_timing_setup()
Example:
full_hdisplay = 1904, dsc_bpp = 8, bpc = 8 new_full_hdisplay = DIV_ROUND_UP(1904 * 8, 8 * 3) = 635
if we use half display
new_half_hdisplay = DIV_ROUND_UP(952 * 8, 8 * 3) = 318 new_full_display = 636
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/709716/
--- drivers/gpu/drm/msm/dsi/dsi_host.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/msm/dsi/dsi_host.c +23 -6
@@ -548,13 +548,30 @@ void dsi_link_clk_disable_v2(struct msm_dsi_host *msm_host)* FIXME: Reconsider this if/when CMD mode handling is rewritten to use * transfer time and data overhead as a starting point of the calculations. */ -static unsigned long dsi_adjust_pclk_for_compression (const struct drm_display_mode *mode, -const struct drm_dsc_config *dsc) +static unsigned long +dsi_adjust_pclk_for_compression (const struct drm_display_mode *mode, +const struct drm_dsc_config *dsc, +bool is_bonded_dsi) { -int new_hdisplay =DIV_ROUND_UP (mode->hdisplay *drm_dsc_get_bpp_int (dsc), - dsc->bits_per_component *3 ); +int hdisplay, new_hdisplay, new_htotal; -int new_htotal = mode->htotal - mode->hdisplay + new_hdisplay; +/* +* For bonded DSI, split hdisplay across two links and round up each +* half separately, passing the full hdisplay would only round up once. +* This also aligns with the hdisplay we program later in +* dsi_timing_setup() +*/ + hdisplay = mode->hdisplay; +if (is_bonded_dsi) + hdisplay /=2 ; + + new_hdisplay =DIV_ROUND_UP (hdisplay *drm_dsc_get_bpp_int (dsc), + dsc->bits_per_component *3 ); + +if (is_bonded_dsi) + new_hdisplay *=2 ; + + new_htotal = mode->htotal - mode->hdisplay + new_hdisplay;return mult_frac (mode->clock *1000u , new_htotal, mode->htotal); }
@@ -567,7 +584,7 @@ static unsigned long dsi_get_pclk_rate(const struct drm_display_mode *mode, pclk_rate = mode->clock *1000u ;if (dsc) - pclk_rate =dsi_adjust_pclk_for_compression (mode, dsc); + pclk_rate =dsi_adjust_pclk_for_compression (mode, dsc, is_bonded_dsi);/* * For bonded DSI mode, the current DRM mode has the complete width of the
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 220/567 bonding: handle BOND_LINK_FAIL, BOND_LINK_BACK as valid link states
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hangbin Liu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3348be7978f450ede0c308a4e8416ac716cf1015 ]
Before the fixed commit, we check slave->new_link during commit state, which values are only BOND_LINK_{NOCHANGE, UP, DOWN}. After the commit, we start using slave->link_new_state, which state also could be BOND_LINK_{FAIL, BACK}.
For example, when we set updelay/downdelay, after a failover, the slave->link_new_state could be set to BOND_LINK_{FAIL, BACK} in bond_miimon_inspect(). And later in bond_miimon_commit(), it will treat it as invalid and print an error, which would cause confusion for users.
[ 106.440254] bond0: (slave veth2): link status down for interface, disabling it in 200 ms [ 106.440265] bond0: (slave veth2): invalid new link 1 on slave [ 106.648276] bond0: (slave veth2): link status definitely down, disabling slave [ 107.480271] bond0: (slave veth2): link status up, enabling it in 200 ms [ 107.480288] bond0: (slave veth2): invalid new link 3 on slave [ 107.688302] bond0: (slave veth2): link status definitely up, 10000 Mbps full duplex
Let's handle BOND_LINK_{FAIL, BACK} as valid link states.
--- drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c +7 -1
@@ -2859,8 +2859,14 @@ static void bond_miimon_commit(struct bonding *bond)continue ; +case BOND_LINK_FAIL : +case BOND_LINK_BACK : +slave_dbg (bond->dev, slave->dev,"link_new_state %d on slave\n" , + slave->link_new_state); +continue ; +default : -slave_err (bond->dev, slave->dev,"invalid new link %d on slave\n" , +slave_err (bond->dev, slave->dev,"invalid link_new_state %d on slave\n" , slave->link_new_state);bond_propose_link_state (slave,BOND_LINK_NOCHANGE );
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 221/567 net/mlx5: IFC updates for disabled host PF
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Daniel Jurgens <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit cd1746cb6555a2238c4aae9f9d60b637a61bf177 ]
The port 2 host PF can be disabled, this bit reflects that setting.
Stable-dep-of: aed763abf0e9 ("net/mlx5: Fix deadlock between devlink lock and esw->wq")
--- include/linux/mlx5/mlx5_ifc.h | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/mlx5/mlx5_ifc.h +3 -1
@@ -11799,7 +11799,9 @@ struct mlx5_ifc_mtrc_ctrl_bits {struct mlx5_ifc_host_params_context_bits {u8 host_number[0x8 ]; -u8 reserved_at_8[0x7 ]; +u8 reserved_at_8[0x5 ]; +u8 host_pf_not_exist[0x1 ]; +u8 reserved_at_14[0x1 ];u8 host_pf_disabled[0x1 ];u8 host_num_of_vfs[0x10 ];
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 222/567 net/mlx5: Query to see if host PF is disabled
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Daniel Jurgens <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 9e84de72aef9bcf0e751a0bff3ac91b0cf52366f ]
The host PF can be disabled, query firmware to check if the host PF of this function exists.
Stable-dep-of: aed763abf0e9 ("net/mlx5: Fix deadlock between devlink lock and esw->wq")
--- .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++ .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch.c +23 -0
@@ -1038,6 +1038,25 @@ const u32 *mlx5_esw_query_functions(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev)return ERR_PTR (err); } +static int mlx5_esw_host_functions_enabled_query (struct mlx5_eswitch *esw) +{ +const u32 *query_host_out; + +if (!mlx5_core_is_ecpf_esw_manager (esw->dev)) +return 0 ; + + query_host_out =mlx5_esw_query_functions (esw->dev); +if (IS_ERR (query_host_out)) +return PTR_ERR (query_host_out); + + esw->esw_funcs.host_funcs_disabled = +MLX5_GET (query_esw_functions_out, query_host_out, + host_params_context.host_pf_not_exist); + +kvfree (query_host_out); +return 0 ; +} +static void mlx5_eswitch_event_handler_register (struct mlx5_eswitch *esw) {if (esw->mode ==MLX5_ESWITCH_OFFLOADS &&mlx5_eswitch_is_funcs_handler (esw->dev)) {
@@ -1870,6 +1889,10 @@ int mlx5_eswitch_init(struct mlx5_core_dev *dev) goto abort; } + err =mlx5_esw_host_functions_enabled_query (esw); +if (err) + goto abort; + err =mlx5_esw_vports_init (esw);if (err) goto abort;
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch.h +1 -0
@@ -315,6 +315,7 @@ struct mlx5_host_work {struct mlx5_esw_functions {struct mlx5_nb nb; +bool host_funcs_disabled;u16 num_vfs;u16 num_ec_vfs; };
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 223/567 net/mlx5: Fix deadlock between devlink lock and esw->wq
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Cosmin Ratiu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit aed763abf0e905b4b8d747d1ba9e172961572f57 ]
esw->work_queue executes esw_functions_changed_event_handler -> esw_vfs_changed_event_handler and acquires the devlink lock.
.eswitch_mode_set (acquires devlink lock in devlink_nl_pre_doit) -> mlx5_devlink_eswitch_mode_set -> mlx5_eswitch_disable_locked -> mlx5_eswitch_event_handler_unregister -> flush_workqueue deadlocks when esw_vfs_changed_event_handler executes.
Fix that by no longer flushing the work to avoid the deadlock, and using a generation counter to keep track of work relevance. This avoids an old handler manipulating an esw that has undergone one or more mode changes:
- the counter is incremented in mlx5_eswitch_event_handler_unregister.
- the counter is read and passed to the ephemeral mlx5_host_work struct.
- the work handler takes the devlink lock and bails out if the current generation is different than the one it was scheduled to operate on.
- mlx5_eswitch_cleanup does the final draining before destroying the wq.
No longer flushing the workqueue has the side effect of maybe no longer cancelling pending vport_change_handler work items, but that's ok since those are disabled elsewhere:
- mlx5_eswitch_disable_locked disables the vport eq notifier.
- mlx5_esw_vport_disable disarms the HW EQ notification and marks vport->enabled under state_lock to false to prevent pending vport handler from doing anything.
- mlx5_eswitch_cleanup destroys the workqueue and makes sure all events are disabled/finished.
--- .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch.c | 7 ++++--- .../net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch.h | 2 ++ .../mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch_offloads.c | 18 +++++++++++++----- 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch.c +4 -3
@@ -1068,10 +1068,11 @@ static void mlx5_eswitch_event_handler_register(struct mlx5_eswitch *esw)static void mlx5_eswitch_event_handler_unregister (struct mlx5_eswitch *esw) { -if (esw->mode ==MLX5_ESWITCH_OFFLOADS &&mlx5_eswitch_is_funcs_handler (esw->dev)) +if (esw->mode ==MLX5_ESWITCH_OFFLOADS && +mlx5_eswitch_is_funcs_handler (esw->dev)) {mlx5_eq_notifier_unregister (esw->dev, &esw->esw_funcs.nb); - -flush_workqueue (esw->work_queue); +atomic_inc (&esw->esw_funcs.generation); + } }static void mlx5_eswitch_clear_vf_vports_info (struct mlx5_eswitch *esw)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch.h +2 -0
@@ -311,10 +311,12 @@ struct esw_mc_addr { /* SRIOV only */struct mlx5_host_work {struct work_struct work;struct mlx5_eswitch *esw; +int work_gen; };struct mlx5_esw_functions {struct mlx5_nb nb; +atomic_t generation;bool host_funcs_disabled;u16 num_vfs;u16 num_ec_vfs;
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/eswitch_offloads.c +13 -5
@@ -3387,22 +3387,28 @@ static void esw_offloads_steering_cleanup(struct mlx5_eswitch *esw) }static void -esw_vfs_changed_event_handler (struct mlx5_eswitch *esw,const u32 *out) +esw_vfs_changed_event_handler (struct mlx5_eswitch *esw,int work_gen, +const u32 *out) {struct devlink *devlink;bool host_pf_disabled;u16 new_num_vfs; + devlink =priv_to_devlink (esw->dev); +devl_lock (devlink); + +/* Stale work from one or more mode changes ago. Bail out. */ +if (work_gen !=atomic_read (&esw->esw_funcs.generation)) + goto unlock; + new_num_vfs =MLX5_GET (query_esw_functions_out, out, host_params_context.host_num_of_vfs); host_pf_disabled =MLX5_GET (query_esw_functions_out, out, host_params_context.host_pf_disabled);if (new_num_vfs == esw->esw_funcs.num_vfs || host_pf_disabled) -return ; + goto unlock; - devlink =priv_to_devlink (esw->dev); -devl_lock (devlink);/* Number of VFs can only change from "0 to x" or "x to 0". */ if (esw->esw_funcs.num_vfs >0 ) {mlx5_eswitch_unload_vf_vports (esw, esw->esw_funcs.num_vfs);
@@ -3417,6 +3423,7 @@ esw_vfs_changed_event_handler(struct mlx5_eswitch *esw, const u32 *out) } } esw->esw_funcs.num_vfs = new_num_vfs; +unlock:devl_unlock (devlink); }
@@ -3433,7 +3440,7 @@ static void esw_functions_changed_event_handler(struct work_struct *work)if (IS_ERR (out)) goto out; -esw_vfs_changed_event_handler (esw, out); +esw_vfs_changed_event_handler (esw, host_work->work_gen, out);kvfree (out); out:kfree (host_work);
@@ -3453,6 +3460,7 @@ int mlx5_esw_funcs_changed_handler(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long type esw = container_of(esw_funcs, struct mlx5_eswitch, esw_funcs); host_work->esw = esw; + host_work->work_gen =atomic_read (&esw_funcs->generation);INIT_WORK (&host_work->work, esw_functions_changed_event_handler);queue_work (esw->work_queue, &host_work->work);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 224/567 net/mlx5e: Fix DMA FIFO desync on error CQE SQ recovery
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Gal Pressman <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 1633111d69053512d099658d4a05fc736fab36b0 ]
In case of a TX error CQE, a recovery flow is triggered, mlx5e_reset_txqsq_cc_pc() resets dma_fifo_cc to 0 but not dma_fifo_pc, desyncing the DMA FIFO producer and consumer.
After recovery, the producer pushes new DMA entries at the old dma_fifo_pc, while the consumer reads from position 0. This causes us to unmap stale DMA addresses from before the recovery.
The DMA FIFO is a purely software construct with no HW counterpart. At the point of reset, all WQEs have been flushed so dma_fifo_cc is already equal to dma_fifo_pc. There is no need to reset either counter, similar to how skb_fifo pc/cc are untouched.
Remove the 'dma_fifo_cc = 0' reset.
This fixes the following WARNING:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c:1240 iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x79/0x90
Modules linked in: mlx5_vdpa vringh vdpa bonding mlx5_ib mlx5_vfio_pci ipip mlx5_fwctl tunnel4 mlx5_core ib_ipoib geneve ip6_gre ip_gre gre nf_tables ip6_tunnel rdma_ucm ib_uverbs ib_umad vfio_pci vfio_pci_core act_mirred act_skbedit act_vlan vhost_net vhost tap ip6table_mangle ip6table_nat ip6table_filter ip6_tables iptable_mangle cls_matchall nfnetlink_cttimeout act_gact cls_flower sch_ingress vhost_iotlb iptable_raw tunnel6 vfio_iommu_type1 vfio openvswitch nsh rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink iptable_nat nf_nat xt_addrtype br_netfilter overlay zram zsmalloc rpcrdma ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm ib_core fuse [last unloaded: nf_tables]
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5_for_upstream_min_debug_2024_12_30_21_33 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x79/0x90
Code: 2b 4d 3b 21 72 26 4d 3b 61 08 73 20 49 89 d8 44 89 f9 5b 4c 89 f2 4c 89 e6 48 89 ef 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f e9 c7 ae 9e ff <0f> 0b 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? __warn+0x7d/0x110
? iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x79/0x90
? report_bug+0x16d/0x180
? handle_bug+0x4f/0x90
? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
? iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x79/0x90
? iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x2e/0x90
dma_unmap_page_attrs+0x10d/0x1b0
mlx5e_tx_wi_dma_unmap+0xbe/0x120 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_poll_tx_cq+0x16d/0x690 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_napi_poll+0x8b/0xac0 [mlx5_core]
__napi_poll+0x24/0x190
net_rx_action+0x32a/0x3b0
? mlx5_eq_comp_int+0x7e/0x270 [mlx5_core]
? notifier_call_chain+0x35/0xa0
handle_softirqs+0xc9/0x270
irq_exit_rcu+0x71/0xd0
common_interrupt+0x7f/0xa0
</IRQ>
<TASK>
asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40--- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/reporter_tx.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en/reporter_tx.c +0 -1
@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ static void mlx5e_reset_txqsq_cc_pc(struct mlx5e_txqsq *sq)"SQ 0x%x: cc (0x%x) != pc (0x%x)\n" , sq->sqn, sq->cc, sq->pc); sq->cc =0 ; - sq->dma_fifo_cc =0 ; sq->pc =0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 225/567 net/sched: teql: fix NULL pointer dereference in iptunnel_xmit on TEQL slave xmit
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Weiming Shi <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 0cc0c2e661af418bbf7074179ea5cfffc0a5c466 ]
teql_master_xmit() calls netdev_start_xmit(skb, slave) to transmit through slave devices, but does not update skb->dev to the slave device beforehand.
When a gretap tunnel is a TEQL slave, the transmit path reaches iptunnel_xmit() which saves dev = skb->dev (still pointing to teql0 master) and later calls iptunnel_xmit_stats(dev, pkt_len). This function does:
get_cpu_ptr(dev->tstats)
Since teql_master_setup() does not set dev->pcpu_stat_type to NETDEV_PCPU_STAT_TSTATS, the core network stack never allocates tstats for teql0, so dev->tstats is NULL. get_cpu_ptr(NULL) computes NULL + __per_cpu_offset[cpu], resulting in a page fault.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff8880e6659018 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 68bc067 P4D 68bc067 PUD 0 Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI RIP: 0010:iptunnel_xmit (./include/net/ip_tunnels.h:664 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c:89) Call Trace: <TASK> ip_tunnel_xmit (net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c:847) __gre_xmit (net/ipv4/ip_gre.c:478) gre_tap_xmit (net/ipv4/ip_gre.c:779) teql_master_xmit (net/sched/sch_teql.c:319) dev_hard_start_xmit (net/core/dev.c:3887) sch_direct_xmit (net/sched/sch_generic.c:347) __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:4802) neigh_direct_output (net/core/neighbour.c:1660) ip_finish_output2 (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:237) __ip_finish_output.part.0 (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:315) ip_mc_output (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:369) ip_send_skb (net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1508) udp_send_skb (net/ipv4/udp.c:1195) udp_sendmsg (net/ipv4/udp.c:1485) inet_sendmsg (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:859) __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2206)
Fix this by setting skb->dev = slave before calling netdev_start_xmit(), so that tunnel xmit functions see the correct slave device with properly allocated tstats.
--- net/sched/sch_teql.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/sched/sch_teql.c +1 -0
@@ -315,6 +315,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t teql_master_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)if (__netif_tx_trylock (slave_txq)) {unsigned int length =qdisc_pkt_len (skb); + skb->dev = slave;if (!netif_xmit_frozen_or_stopped (slave_txq) &&netdev_start_xmit (skb, slave, slave_txq, false) ==NETDEV_TX_OK ) {
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 226/567 ASoC: soc-core: drop delayed_work_pending() check before flush
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: matteo.cotifava <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 3c99c9f0ed60582c1c9852b685d78d5d3a50de63 ]
The delayed_work_pending() check before flush_delayed_work() in soc_free_pcm_runtime() is unnecessary and racy. flush_delayed_work() is safe to call unconditionally - it is a no-op when no work is pending. Remove the check.
The original check was added by commit 9c9b65203492 ("ASoC: core:
only flush inited work during free") but delayed_work_pending() followed by flush_delayed_work() has a time-of-check/time-of-use window where work can become pending between the two calls.
--- sound/soc/soc-core.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
sound/soc/soc-core.c +1 -2
@@ -456,8 +456,7 @@ static void soc_free_pcm_runtime(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *rtd)list_del (&rtd->list); -if (delayed_work_pending (&rtd->delayed_work)) -flush_delayed_work (&rtd->delayed_work); +flush_delayed_work (&rtd->delayed_work);snd_soc_pcm_component_free (rtd);/*
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 227/567 ASoC: soc-core: flush delayed work before removing DAIs and widgets
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: matteo.cotifava <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 95bc5c225513fc3c4ce169563fb5e3929fbb938b ]
When a sound card is unbound while a PCM stream is open, a use-after-free can occur in snd_soc_dapm_stream_event(), called from the close_delayed_work workqueue handler.
During unbind, snd_soc_unbind_card() flushes delayed work and then calls soc_cleanup_card_resources(). Inside cleanup, snd_card_disconnect_sync() releases all PCM file descriptors, and the resulting PCM close path can call snd_soc_dapm_stream_stop() which schedules new delayed work with a pmdown_time timer delay. Since this happens after the flush in snd_soc_unbind_card(), the new work is not caught. soc_remove_link_components() then frees DAPM widgets before this work fires, leading to the use-after-free.
The existing flush in soc_free_pcm_runtime() also cannot help as it runs after soc_remove_link_components() has already freed the widgets.
Add a flush in soc_cleanup_card_resources() after snd_card_disconnect_sync() (after which no new PCM closes can schedule further delayed work) and before soc_remove_link_dais() and soc_remove_link_components() (which tear down the structures the delayed work accesses).
--- sound/soc/soc-core.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
sound/soc/soc-core.c +3 -0
@@ -1996,6 +1996,9 @@ static void soc_cleanup_card_resources(struct snd_soc_card *card)for_each_card_rtds (card, rtd)if (rtd->initialized)snd_soc_link_exit (rtd); +/* flush delayed work before removing DAIs and DAPM widgets */ +snd_soc_flush_all_delayed_work (card); +/* remove and free each DAI */ soc_remove_link_dais (card);soc_remove_link_components (card);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 228/567 ASoC: simple-card-utils: use __free(device_node) for device node
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kuninori Morimoto <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 419d1918105e5d9926ab02f1f834bb416dc76f65 ]
simple-card-utils handles many type of device_node, thus need to use of_node_put() in many place. Let's use __free(device_node) and avoid it.
Stable-dep-of: 4185b95f8a42 ("ASoC: simple-card-utils: fix graph_util_is_ports0() for DT overlays")
--- sound/soc/generic/simple-card-utils.c | 44 +++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
sound/soc/generic/simple-card-utils.c +14 -30
@@ -988,35 +988,27 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asoc_graph_card_probe);int asoc_graph_is_ports0 (struct device_node *np) { -struct device_node *port, *ports, *ports0, *top; -int ret; + struct device_node *parent __free(device_node) = of_get_parent(np); +struct device_node *port;/* np is "endpoint" or "port" */ -if (of_node_name_eq (np,"endpoint" )) { - port =of_get_parent (np); - }else { +if (of_node_name_eq (np,"endpoint" )) + port = parent; +else port = np; -of_node_get (port); - } - - ports =of_get_parent (port); - top =of_get_parent (ports); - ports0 =of_get_child_by_name (top,"ports" ); - - ret = ports0 == ports; -of_node_put (port); -of_node_put (ports); -of_node_put (ports0); -of_node_put (top); + struct device_node *ports __free(device_node) = of_get_parent(port); + struct device_node *top __free(device_node) = of_get_parent(ports); + struct device_node *ports0 __free(device_node) = of_get_child_by_name(top, "ports"); -return ret; +return ports0 == ports; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (asoc_graph_is_ports0);static int graph_get_dai_id (struct device_node *ep) { -struct device_node *node; + struct device_node *node __free(device_node) = of_graph_get_port_parent(ep); + struct device_node *port __free(device_node) = of_get_parent(ep);struct device_node *endpoint;struct of_endpoint info;int i, id;
@@ -1039,13 +1031,10 @@ static int graph_get_dai_id(struct device_node *ep)if (of_property_present (ep,"reg" ))return info.id; - node =of_get_parent (ep); - ret =of_property_present (node,"reg" ); -of_node_put (node); + ret =of_property_present (port,"reg" );if (ret)return info.port; } - node =of_graph_get_port_parent (ep);/* * Non HDMI sound case, counting port/endpoint on its DT
@@ -1059,8 +1048,6 @@ static int graph_get_dai_id(struct device_node *ep) i++; } -of_node_put (node); -if (id <0 )return -ENODEV ;
@@ -1070,7 +1057,6 @@ static int graph_get_dai_id(struct device_node *ep)int asoc_graph_parse_dai (struct device *dev,struct device_node *ep,struct snd_soc_dai_link_component *dlc,int *is_single_link) { -struct device_node *node;struct of_phandle_args args = {};struct snd_soc_dai *dai;int ret;
@@ -1078,7 +1064,7 @@ int asoc_graph_parse_dai(struct device *dev, struct device_node *ep,if (!ep)return 0 ; - node =of_graph_get_port_parent (ep); + struct device_node *node __free(device_node) = of_graph_get_port_parent(ep);/* * Try to find from DAI node
@@ -1120,10 +1106,8 @@ int asoc_graph_parse_dai(struct device *dev, struct device_node *ep,* if he unbinded CPU or Codec. */ ret =snd_soc_get_dlc (&args, dlc); -if (ret <0 ) { -of_node_put (node); +if (ret <0 )return ret; - } parse_dai_end:if (is_single_link)
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 229/567 ASoC: simple-card-utils: fix graph_util_is_ports0() for DT overlays
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sen Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 4185b95f8a42d92d68c49289b4644546b51e252b ]
graph_util_is_ports0() identifies DPCM front-end (ports@0) vs back-end (ports@1) by calling of_get_child_by_name() to find the first "ports" child and comparing pointers. This relies on child iteration order matching DTS source order.
When the DPCM topology comes from a DT overlay, __of_attach_node() inserts new children at the head of the sibling list, reversing the order. of_get_child_by_name() then returns ports@1 instead of ports@0, causing all front-end links to be classified as back-ends. The card registers with no PCM devices.
Fix this by matching the unit address directly from the node name instead of relying on sibling order.
--- sound/soc/generic/simple-card-utils.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
sound/soc/generic/simple-card-utils.c +8 -4
@@ -997,11 +997,15 @@ int asoc_graph_is_ports0(struct device_node *np)else port = np; - struct device_node *ports __free(device_node) = of_get_parent(port); - struct device_node *top __free(device_node) = of_get_parent(ports); - struct device_node *ports0 __free(device_node) = of_get_child_by_name(top, "ports"); + struct device_node *ports __free(device_node) = of_get_parent(port); +const char *at =strchr (kbasename (ports->full_name),'@' ); -return ports0 == ports; +/* +* Since child iteration order may differ +* between a base DT and DT overlays, +* string match "ports" or "ports@0" in the node name instead. +*/ +return !at || !strcmp (at,"@0" ); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (asoc_graph_is_ports0);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 230/567 net: sfp: re-implement ignoring the hardware TX_FAULT signal
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Russell King (Oracle) <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e184e8609f8c1cd9fef703f667245b6ebd89c2ed ]
Re-implement how we ignore the hardware TX_FAULT signal. Rather than having a separate boolean for this, use a bitmask of the hardware signals that we wish to ignore. This gives more flexibility in the future to ignore other signals such as RX_LOS.
Stable-dep-of: 87d126852158 ("net: sfp: improve Huawei MA5671a fixup")
--- drivers/net/phy/sfp.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/net/phy/sfp.c +8 -8
@@ -257,6 +257,7 @@ struct sfp {unsigned int state_hw_drive;unsigned int state_hw_mask;unsigned int state_soft_mask; +unsigned int state_ignore_mask;unsigned int state;struct delayed_work poll;
@@ -280,7 +281,6 @@ struct sfp {unsigned int rs_state_mask;bool have_a2; -bool tx_fault_ignore;const struct sfp_quirk *quirk;
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ static void sfp_fixup_long_startup(struct sfp *sfp)static void sfp_fixup_ignore_tx_fault (struct sfp *sfp) { - sfp->tx_fault_ignore = true; + sfp->state_ignore_mask |=SFP_F_TX_FAULT ; }// For 10GBASE-T short-reach modules
@@ -800,7 +800,8 @@ static void sfp_soft_start_poll(struct sfp *sfp)mutex_lock (&sfp->st_mutex);// Poll the soft state for hardware pins we want to ignore - sfp->state_soft_mask = ~sfp->state_hw_mask & mask; + sfp->state_soft_mask = ~sfp->state_hw_mask & ~sfp->state_ignore_mask & + mask;if (sfp->state_soft_mask & (SFP_F_LOS |SFP_F_TX_FAULT ) && !sfp->need_poll)
@@ -2325,7 +2326,7 @@ static int sfp_sm_mod_probe(struct sfp *sfp, bool report) sfp->module_t_start_up =T_START_UP ; sfp->module_t_wait =T_WAIT ; - sfp->tx_fault_ignore = false; + sfp->state_ignore_mask =0 ; if (sfp->id.base.extended_cc == SFF8024_ECC_10GBASE_T_SFI || sfp->id.base.extended_cc == SFF8024_ECC_10GBASE_T_SR ||
@@ -2348,6 +2349,8 @@ static int sfp_sm_mod_probe(struct sfp *sfp, bool report)if (sfp->quirk && sfp->quirk->fixup) sfp->quirk->fixup (sfp); + + sfp->state_hw_mask &= ~sfp->state_ignore_mask;mutex_unlock (&sfp->st_mutex);return 0 ;
@@ -2848,10 +2851,7 @@ static void sfp_check_state(struct sfp *sfp)mutex_lock (&sfp->st_mutex); state =sfp_get_state (sfp); changed = state ^ sfp->state; -if (sfp->tx_fault_ignore) - changed &=SFP_F_PRESENT |SFP_F_LOS ; -else - changed &=SFP_F_PRESENT |SFP_F_LOS |SFP_F_TX_FAULT ; + changed &=SFP_F_PRESENT |SFP_F_LOS |SFP_F_TX_FAULT ;for (i =0 ; i <GPIO_MAX ; i++)if (changed &BIT (i))
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 231/567 net: sfp: improve Nokia GPON sfp fixup
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Russell King (Oracle) <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5ffe330e40bdfad9c49a615c54d2d89343b2f08a ]
Improve the Nokia GPON fixup - we need to ignore not only the hardware LOS signal, but also the software implementation as well. Do this by using the new state_ignore_mask to indicate that we should ignore not only the hardware RX_LOS signal, and also clear the LOS bits in the option field.
Stable-dep-of: 87d126852158 ("net: sfp: improve Huawei MA5671a fixup")
--- drivers/net/phy/sfp.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/phy/sfp.c +16 -1
@@ -345,11 +345,26 @@ static void sfp_fixup_long_startup(struct sfp *sfp) sfp->module_t_start_up =T_START_UP_BAD_GPON ; } +static void sfp_fixup_ignore_los (struct sfp *sfp) +{ +/* This forces LOS to zero, so we ignore transitions */ + sfp->state_ignore_mask |=SFP_F_LOS ; +/* Make sure that LOS options are clear */ + sfp->id.ext.options &= ~cpu_to_be16 (SFP_OPTIONS_LOS_INVERTED | +SFP_OPTIONS_LOS_NORMAL ); +} +static void sfp_fixup_ignore_tx_fault (struct sfp *sfp) { sfp->state_ignore_mask |=SFP_F_TX_FAULT ; } +static void sfp_fixup_nokia (struct sfp *sfp) +{ +sfp_fixup_long_startup (sfp); +sfp_fixup_ignore_los (sfp); +} +// For 10GBASE-T short-reach modules static void sfp_fixup_10gbaset_30m (struct sfp *sfp) {
@@ -449,7 +464,7 @@ static const struct sfp_quirk sfp_quirks[] = {// Alcatel Lucent G-010S-A can operate at 2500base-X, but report 3.2GBd // NRZ in their EEPROM SFP_QUIRK ("ALCATELLUCENT" ,"3FE46541AA" , sfp_quirk_2500basex, - sfp_fixup_long_startup), + sfp_fixup_nokia),// Fiberstore SFP-10G-T doesn't identify as copper, and uses the // Rollball protocol to talk to the PHY.
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 232/567 net: sfp: add quirk for Potron SFP+ XGSPON ONU Stick
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chris Morgan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit dfec1c14aecee6813f9bafc7b560cc3a31d24079 ]
Add quirk for Potron SFP+ XGSPON ONU Stick (YV SFP+ONT-XGSPON).
This device uses pins 2 and 7 for UART communication, so disable TX_FAULT and LOS. Additionally as it is an embedded system in an SFP+ form factor provide it enough time to fully boot before we attempt to use it.
https://www.potrontec.com/index/index/list/cat_id/2.html#11-83
https://pon.wiki/xgs-pon/ont/potron-technology/x-onu-sfpp/
Stable-dep-of: 87d126852158 ("net: sfp: improve Huawei MA5671a fixup")
--- drivers/net/phy/sfp.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/phy/sfp.c +20 -1
@@ -359,6 +359,11 @@ static void sfp_fixup_ignore_tx_fault(struct sfp *sfp) sfp->state_ignore_mask |=SFP_F_TX_FAULT ; } +static void sfp_fixup_ignore_hw (struct sfp *sfp,unsigned int mask) +{ + sfp->state_hw_mask &= ~mask; +} +static void sfp_fixup_nokia (struct sfp *sfp) {sfp_fixup_long_startup (sfp);
@@ -392,7 +397,19 @@ static void sfp_fixup_halny_gsfp(struct sfp *sfp)* these are possibly used for other purposes on this * module, e.g. a serial port. */ - sfp->state_hw_mask &= ~(SFP_F_TX_FAULT |SFP_F_LOS ); +sfp_fixup_ignore_hw (sfp,SFP_F_TX_FAULT |SFP_F_LOS ); +} + +static void sfp_fixup_potron (struct sfp *sfp) +{ +/* +* The TX_FAULT and LOS pins on this device are used for serial +* communication, so ignore them. Additionally, provide extra +* time for this device to fully start up. +*/ + +sfp_fixup_long_startup (sfp); +sfp_fixup_ignore_hw (sfp,SFP_F_TX_FAULT |SFP_F_LOS ); }static void sfp_fixup_rollball (struct sfp *sfp)
@@ -500,6 +517,8 @@ static const struct sfp_quirk sfp_quirks[] = {SFP_QUIRK_F ("Walsun" ,"HXSX-ATRC-1" , sfp_fixup_fs_10gt),SFP_QUIRK_F ("Walsun" ,"HXSX-ATRI-1" , sfp_fixup_fs_10gt), +SFP_QUIRK_F ("YV" ,"SFP+ONU-XGSPON" , sfp_fixup_potron), +// OEM SFP-GE-T is a 1000Base-T module with broken TX_FAULT indicator SFP_QUIRK_F("OEM", "SFP-GE-T", sfp_fixup_ignore_tx_fault),
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 233/567 net: sfp: improve Huawei MA5671a fixup
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Álvaro Fernández Rojas <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 87d126852158467ab87d5cbc36ccfd3f15464a6c ]
With the current sfp_fixup_ignore_tx_fault() fixup we ignore the TX_FAULT signal, but we also need to apply sfp_fixup_ignore_los() in order to be able to communicate with the module even if the fiber isn't connected for configuration purposes.
This is needed for all the MA5671a firmwares, excluding the FS modded firmware.
--- drivers/net/phy/sfp.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/phy/sfp.c +7 -1
@@ -359,6 +359,12 @@ static void sfp_fixup_ignore_tx_fault(struct sfp *sfp) sfp->state_ignore_mask |=SFP_F_TX_FAULT ; } +static void sfp_fixup_ignore_tx_fault_and_los (struct sfp *sfp) +{ +sfp_fixup_ignore_tx_fault (sfp); +sfp_fixup_ignore_los (sfp); +} +static void sfp_fixup_ignore_hw (struct sfp *sfp,unsigned int mask) { sfp->state_hw_mask &= ~mask;
@@ -501,7 +507,7 @@ static const struct sfp_quirk sfp_quirks[] = {// Huawei MA5671A can operate at 2500base-X, but report 1.2GBd NRZ in // their EEPROM SFP_QUIRK ("HUAWEI" ,"MA5671A" , sfp_quirk_2500basex, - sfp_fixup_ignore_tx_fault), + sfp_fixup_ignore_tx_fault_and_los),// FS 2.5G Base-T SFP_QUIRK_M("FS", "SFP-2.5G-T", sfp_quirk_oem_2_5g),
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 234/567 serial: caif: hold tty->link reference in ldisc_open and ser_release
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shuangpeng Bai <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 288598d80a068a0e9281de35bcb4ce495f189e2a ]
A reproducer triggers a KASAN slab-use-after-free in pty_write_room() when caif_serial's TX path calls tty_write_room(). The faulting access is on tty->link->port.
Hold an extra kref on tty->link for the lifetime of the caif_serial line
discipline: get it in ldisc_open() and drop it in ser_release(), and also drop it on the ldisc_open() error path.
With this change applied, the reproducer no longer triggers the UAF in my testing.
--- drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/net/caif/caif_serial.c +3 -0
@@ -311,6 +311,7 @@ static void ser_release(struct work_struct *work)dev_close (ser->dev);unregister_netdevice (ser->dev);debugfs_deinit (ser); +tty_kref_put (tty->link);tty_kref_put (tty); }rtnl_unlock ();
@@ -345,6 +346,7 @@ static int ldisc_open(struct tty_struct *tty) ser =netdev_priv (dev); ser->tty =tty_kref_get (tty); +tty_kref_get (tty->link); ser->dev = dev;debugfs_init (ser, tty); tty->receive_room =N_TTY_BUF_SIZE ;
@@ -353,6 +355,7 @@ static int ldisc_open(struct tty_struct *tty)rtnl_lock (); result =register_netdevice (dev);if (result) { +tty_kref_put (tty->link);tty_kref_put (tty);rtnl_unlock ();free_netdev (dev);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 235/567 mctp: i2c: fix skb memory leak in receive path
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Haiyue Wang <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e3f5e0f22cfc2371e7471c9fd5b4da78f9df7c69 ]
When 'midev->allow_rx' is false, the newly allocated skb isn't consumed by netif_rx(), it needs to free the skb directly.
--- drivers/net/mctp/mctp-i2c.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/mctp/mctp-i2c.c +1 -0
@@ -344,6 +344,7 @@ static int mctp_i2c_recv(struct mctp_i2c_dev *midev) }else { status =NET_RX_DROP ;spin_unlock_irqrestore (&midev->lock, flags); +kfree_skb (skb); }if (status ==NET_RX_SUCCESS ) {
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 236/567 can: hi311x: hi3110_open(): add check for hi3110_power_enable() return value
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wenyuan Li <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 47bba09b14fa21712398febf36cb14fd4fc3bded ]
In hi3110_open(), the return value of hi3110_power_enable() is not checked. If power enable fails, the device may not function correctly, while the driver still returns success.
Add a check for the return value and propagate the error accordingly.
--- drivers/net/can/spi/hi311x.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/can/spi/hi311x.c +4 -1
@@ -756,7 +756,9 @@ static int hi3110_open(struct net_device *net)return ret;mutex_lock (&priv->hi3110_lock); -hi3110_power_enable (priv->transceiver,1 ); + ret =hi3110_power_enable (priv->transceiver,1 ); +if (ret) + goto out_close_candev; priv->force_quit =0 ; priv->tx_skb =NULL ;
@@ -791,6 +793,7 @@ static int hi3110_open(struct net_device *net)hi3110_hw_sleep (spi); out_close:hi3110_power_enable (priv->transceiver,0 ); + out_close_candev:close_candev (net);mutex_unlock (&priv->hi3110_lock);return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 237/567 mctp: route: hold key->lock in mctp_flow_prepare_output()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chengfeng Ye <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 7d86aa41c073c4e7eb75fd2e674f1fd8f289728a ]
mctp_flow_prepare_output() checks key->dev and may call mctp_dev_set_key(), but it does not hold key->lock while doing so.
mctp_dev_set_key() and mctp_dev_release_key() are annotated with __must_hold(&key->lock), so key->dev access is intended to be serialized by key->lock. The mctp_sendmsg() transmit path reaches mctp_flow_prepare_output() via mctp_local_output() -> mctp_dst_output() without holding key->lock, so the check-and-set sequence is racy.
Example interleaving:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
mctp_flow_prepare_output(key, devA)
if (!key->dev) // sees NULL
mctp_flow_prepare_output(
key, devB)
if (!key->dev) // still NULL
mctp_dev_set_key(devB, key)
mctp_dev_hold(devB)
key->dev = devB
mctp_dev_set_key(devA, key)
mctp_dev_hold(devA)
key->dev = devA // overwrites devBNow both devA and devB references were acquired, but only the final key->dev value is tracked for release. One reference can be lost, causing a resource leak as mctp_dev_release_key() would only decrease the reference on one dev.
Fix by taking key->lock around the key->dev check and mctp_dev_set_key() call.
--- net/mctp/route.c | 11 +++++++---- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/mctp/route.c +7 -4
@@ -267,6 +267,7 @@ static void mctp_flow_prepare_output(struct sk_buff *skb, struct mctp_dev *dev) {struct mctp_sk_key *key;struct mctp_flow *flow; +unsigned long flags; flow =skb_ext_find (skb,SKB_EXT_MCTP );if (!flow)
@@ -274,12 +275,14 @@ static void mctp_flow_prepare_output(struct sk_buff *skb, struct mctp_dev *dev) key = flow->key; -if (key->dev) { +spin_lock_irqsave (&key->lock, flags); + +if (!key->dev) +mctp_dev_set_key (dev, key); +else WARN_ON (key->dev != dev); -return ; - } - mctp_dev_set_key(dev, key); + spin_unlock_irqrestore(&key->lock, flags); }#else static void mctp_skb_set_flow (struct sk_buff *skb,struct mctp_sk_key *key) {}
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 238/567 amd-xgbe: fix link status handling in xgbe_rx_adaptation
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Raju Rangoju <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6485cb96be5cd0f4bf39554737ba11322cc9b053 ]
The link status bit is latched low to allow detection of momentary link drops. If the status indicates that the link is already down, read it again to obtain the current state.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-phy-v2.c | 19 ++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-phy-v2.c +14 -5
@@ -2050,7 +2050,7 @@ static void xgbe_set_rx_adap_mode(struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata,static void xgbe_rx_adaptation (struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata) {struct xgbe_phy_data *phy_data = pdata->phy_data; -unsigned int reg; +int reg;/* step 2: force PCS to send RX_ADAPT Req to PHY */ XMDIO_WRITE_BITS(pdata, MDIO_MMD_PMAPMD, MDIO_PMA_RX_EQ_CTRL4,
@@ -2072,11 +2072,20 @@ static void xgbe_rx_adaptation(struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata)/* Step 4: Check for Block lock */ -/* Link status is latched low, so read once to clear -* and then read again to get current state -*/ - reg =XMDIO_READ (pdata,MDIO_MMD_PCS ,MDIO_STAT1 ); reg =XMDIO_READ (pdata,MDIO_MMD_PCS ,MDIO_STAT1 ); +if (reg <0 ) + goto set_mode; + +/* Link status is latched low so that momentary link drops +* can be detected. If link was already down read again +* to get the latest state. +*/ +if (!pdata->phy.link && !(reg &MDIO_STAT1_LSTATUS )) { + reg =XMDIO_READ (pdata,MDIO_MMD_PCS ,MDIO_STAT1 ); +if (reg <0 ) + goto set_mode; + } +if (reg &MDIO_STAT1_LSTATUS ) {/* If the block lock is found, update the helpers * and declare the link up
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 239/567 amd-xgbe: prevent CRC errors during RX adaptation with AN disabled
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Raju Rangoju <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 27a4dd0c702b3b2b9cf2c045d100cc2fe8720b81 ]
When operating in 10GBASE-KR mode with auto-negotiation disabled and RX adaptation enabled, CRC errors can occur during the RX adaptation process. This happens because the driver continues transmitting and receiving packets while adaptation is in progress.
Fix this by stopping TX/RX immediately when the link goes down and RX adaptation needs to be re-triggered, and only re-enabling TX/RX after adaptation completes and the link is confirmed up. Introduce a flag to track whether TX/RX was disabled for adaptation so it can be restored correctly.
This prevents packets from being transmitted or received during the RX adaptation window and avoids CRC errors from corrupted frames.
The flag tracking the data path state is synchronized with hardware state in xgbe_start() to prevent stale state after device restarts. This ensures that after a restart cycle (where xgbe_stop disables TX/RX and xgbe_start re-enables them), the flag correctly reflects that the data path is active.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-drv.c | 4 ++ drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-phy-v2.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++- drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe.h | 4 ++ 3 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-drv.c +4 -0
@@ -1338,6 +1338,10 @@ static int xgbe_start(struct xgbe_prv_data *pdata) hw_if->enable_tx (pdata); hw_if->enable_rx (pdata); +/* Synchronize flag with hardware state after enabling TX/RX. +* This prevents stale state after device restart cycles. +*/ + pdata->data_path_stopped = false;udp_tunnel_nic_reset_ntf (netdev);
drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe-phy-v2.c +61 -2
88 lines not on this page · raw message
drivers/net/ethernet/amd/xgbe/xgbe.h +4 -0
@@ -1321,6 +1321,10 @@ struct xgbe_prv_data {bool en_rx_adap;int rx_adapt_retries;bool rx_adapt_done; +/* Flag to track if data path (TX/RX) was stopped for RX adaptation. +* This prevents packet corruption during the adaptation window. +*/ +bool data_path_stopped;bool mode_set; };
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 240/567 netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: fix stack out-of-bounds read in pipapo_drop()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jenny Guanni Qu <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d6d8cd2db236a9dd13dbc2d05843b3445cc964b5 ]
pipapo_drop() passes rulemap[i + 1].n to pipapo_unmap() as the to_offset argument on every iteration, including the last one where i == m->field_count - 1. This reads one element past the end of the stack-allocated rulemap array (declared as rulemap[NFT_PIPAPO_MAX_FIELDS] with NFT_PIPAPO_MAX_FIELDS == 16).
Although pipapo_unmap() returns early when is_last is true without using the to_offset value, the argument is evaluated at the call site before the function body executes, making this a genuine out-of-bounds stack read confirmed by KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in pipapo_drop+0x50c/0x57c [nf_tables] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8000810e71a4
This frame has 1 object:
[32, 160) 'rulemap'
The buggy address is at offset 164 -- exactly 4 bytes past the end of the rulemap array.
Pass 0 instead of rulemap[i + 1].n on the last iteration to avoid the out-of-bounds read.
--- net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/netfilter/nft_set_pipapo.c +2 -1
@@ -1570,6 +1570,7 @@ static void pipapo_drop(struct nft_pipapo_match *m,int i;nft_pipapo_for_each_field (f, i, m) { +bool last = i == m->field_count -1 ;int g;for (g =0 ; g < f->groups; g++) {
@@ -1589,7 +1590,7 @@ static void pipapo_drop(struct nft_pipapo_match *m, }pipapo_unmap (f->mt, f->rules, rulemap[i].to, rulemap[i].n, - rulemap[i +1 ].n, i == m->field_count -1 ); + last ?0 : rulemap[i +1 ].n, last);if (pipapo_resize (f, f->rules, f->rules - rulemap[i].n)) {/* We can ignore this, a failure to shrink tables down * doesn't make tables invalid.
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 241/567 netfilter: x_tables: guard option walkers against 1-byte tail reads
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Dull <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit cfe770220ac2dbd3e104c6b45094037455da81d4 ]
When the last byte of options is a non-single-byte option kind, walkers that advance with i += op[i + 1] ? : 1 can read op[i + 1] past the end of the option area.
Add an explicit i == optlen - 1 check before dereferencing op[i + 1] in xt_tcpudp and xt_dccp option walkers.
--- net/netfilter/xt_dccp.c | 4 ++-- net/netfilter/xt_tcpudp.c | 6 ++++-- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/xt_dccp.c +2 -2
@@ -62,10 +62,10 @@ dccp_find_option(u_int8_t option,return true; } -if (op[i] <2 ) +if (op[i] <2 || i == optlen -1 ) i++;else - i += op[i+1 ]?:1 ; + i += op[i +1 ] ? :1 ; }spin_unlock_bh (&dccp_buflock);
net/netfilter/xt_tcpudp.c +4 -2
@@ -59,8 +59,10 @@ tcp_find_option(u_int8_t option,for (i =0 ; i < optlen; ) {if (op[i] == option)return !invert; -if (op[i] <2 ) i++; -else i += op[i+1 ]?:1 ; +if (op[i] <2 || i == optlen -1 ) + i++; +else + i += op[i +1 ] ? :1 ; }return invert;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 242/567 netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: fix entry leak in bridge verdict error path
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hyunwoo Kim <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit f1ba83755d81c6fc66ac7acd723d238f974091e9 ]
nfqnl_recv_verdict() calls find_dequeue_entry() to remove the queue entry from the queue data structures, taking ownership of the entry. For PF_BRIDGE packets, it then calls nfqa_parse_bridge() to parse VLAN attributes. If nfqa_parse_bridge() returns an error (e.g. NFQA_VLAN present but NFQA_VLAN_TCI missing), the function returns immediately without freeing the dequeued entry or its sk_buff.
This leaks the nf_queue_entry, its associated sk_buff, and all held references (net_device refcounts, struct net refcount). Repeated triggering exhausts kernel memory.
Fix this by dropping the entry via nfqnl_reinject() with NF_DROP verdict on the error path, consistent with other error handling in this file.
--- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +3 -1
@@ -1283,8 +1283,10 @@ static int nfqnl_recv_verdict(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nfnl_info *info,if (entry->state.pf ==PF_BRIDGE ) { err =nfqa_parse_bridge (entry, nfqa); -if (err <0 ) +if (err <0 ) { +nfqnl_reinject (entry,NF_DROP );return err; + } }if (nfqa[NFQA_PAYLOAD ]) {
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 243/567 netfilter: nfnetlink_cthelper: fix OOB read in nfnl_cthelper_dump_table()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hyunwoo Kim <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 6dcee8496d53165b2d8a5909b3050b62ae71fe89 ]
nfnl_cthelper_dump_table() has a 'goto restart' that jumps to a label inside the for loop body. When the "last" helper saved in cb->args[1] is deleted between dump rounds, every entry fails the (cur != last) check, so cb->args[1] is never cleared. The for loop finishes with cb->args[0] == nf_ct_helper_hsize, and the 'goto restart' jumps back into the loop body bypassing the bounds check, causing an 8-byte out-of-bounds read on nf_ct_helper_hash[nf_ct_helper_hsize].
The 'goto restart' block was meant to re-traverse the current bucket when "last" is no longer found, but it was placed after the for loop instead of inside it. Move the block into the for loop body so that the restart only occurs while cb->args[0] is still within bounds.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nfnl_cthelper_dump_table+0x9f/0x1b0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888104ca3000 by task poc_cthelper/131 Call Trace: nfnl_cthelper_dump_table+0x9f/0x1b0 netlink_dump+0x333/0x880 netlink_recvmsg+0x3e2/0x4b0 sock_recvmsg+0xde/0xf0 __sys_recvfrom+0x150/0x200 __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x76/0x90 do_syscall_64+0xc3/0x6e0 Allocated by task 1: __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x21b/0x700 nf_ct_alloc_hashtable+0x65/0xd0 nf_conntrack_helper_init+0x21/0x60 nf_conntrack_init_start+0x18d/0x300 nf_conntrack_standalone_init+0x12/0xc0
--- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_cthelper.c +4 -4
@@ -603,10 +603,10 @@ nfnl_cthelper_dump_table(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb) goto out; } } - } -if (cb->args[1 ]) { - cb->args[1 ] =0 ; - goto restart; +if (cb->args[1 ]) { + cb->args[1 ] =0 ; + goto restart; + } } out:rcu_read_unlock ();
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 244/567 netfilter: xt_IDLETIMER: reject rev0 reuse of ALARM timer labels
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yuan Tan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 329f0b9b48ee6ab59d1ab72fef55fe8c6463a6cf ]
IDLETIMER revision 0 rules reuse existing timers by label and always call mod_timer() on timer->timer.
If the label was created first by revision 1 with XT_IDLETIMER_ALARM, the object uses alarm timer semantics and timer->timer is never initialized. Reusing that object from revision 0 causes mod_timer() on an uninitialized timer_list, triggering debugobjects warnings and possible panic when panic_on_warn=1.
Fix this by rejecting revision 0 rule insertion when an existing timer with the same label is of ALARM type.
--- net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c +6 -0
@@ -320,6 +320,12 @@ static int idletimer_tg_checkentry(const struct xt_tgchk_param *par) info->timer =__idletimer_tg_find_by_label (info->label);if (info->timer) { +if (info->timer->timer_type &XT_IDLETIMER_ALARM ) { +pr_debug ("Adding/Replacing rule with same label and different timer type is not allowed\n" ); +mutex_unlock (&list_mutex); +return -EINVAL ; + } + info->timer->refcnt++;mod_timer (&info->timer->timer,msecs_to_jiffies (info->timeout *1000 ) + jiffies);
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 245/567 regulator: pca9450: Make IRQ optional
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Frieder Schrempf <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 83808c54064eef620ad8645dfdcaffe125551532 ]
The IRQ line might not be connected on some boards. Allow the driver to be probed without it.
Stable-dep-of: 5d0efaf47ee9 ("regulator: pca9450: Correct interrupt type")
--- drivers/regulator/pca9450-regulator.c | 41 +++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
drivers/regulator/pca9450-regulator.c +19 -22
@@ -711,11 +711,6 @@ static int pca9450_i2c_probe(struct i2c_client *i2c)unsigned int reset_ctrl;int ret; -if (!i2c->irq) { -dev_err (&i2c->dev,"No IRQ configured?\n" ); -return -EINVAL ; - } - pca9450 =devm_kzalloc (&i2c->dev,sizeof (struct pca9450 ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!pca9450)return -ENOMEM ;
@@ -782,23 +777,25 @@ static int pca9450_i2c_probe(struct i2c_client *i2c) } } - ret =devm_request_threaded_irq (pca9450->dev, pca9450->irq,NULL , - pca9450_irq_handler, - (IRQF_TRIGGER_FALLING |IRQF_ONESHOT ), -"pca9450-irq" , pca9450); -if (ret !=0 ) { -dev_err (pca9450->dev,"Failed to request IRQ: %d\n" , - pca9450->irq); -return ret; - } -/* Unmask all interrupt except PWRON/WDOG/RSVD */ - ret =regmap_update_bits (pca9450->regmap,PCA9450_REG_INT1_MSK , -IRQ_VR_FLT1 |IRQ_VR_FLT2 |IRQ_LOWVSYS | -IRQ_THERM_105 |IRQ_THERM_125 , -IRQ_PWRON |IRQ_WDOGB |IRQ_RSVD ); -if (ret) { -dev_err (&i2c->dev,"Unmask irq error\n" ); -return ret; +if (pca9450->irq) { + ret =devm_request_threaded_irq (pca9450->dev, pca9450->irq,NULL , + pca9450_irq_handler, + (IRQF_TRIGGER_FALLING |IRQF_ONESHOT ), +"pca9450-irq" , pca9450); +if (ret !=0 ) { +dev_err (pca9450->dev,"Failed to request IRQ: %d\n" , + pca9450->irq); +return ret; + } +/* Unmask all interrupt except PWRON/WDOG/RSVD */ + ret =regmap_update_bits (pca9450->regmap,PCA9450_REG_INT1_MSK , +IRQ_VR_FLT1 |IRQ_VR_FLT2 |IRQ_LOWVSYS | +IRQ_THERM_105 |IRQ_THERM_125 , +IRQ_PWRON |IRQ_WDOGB |IRQ_RSVD ); +if (ret) { +dev_err (&i2c->dev,"Unmask irq error\n" ); +return ret; + } }/* Clear PRESET_EN bit in BUCK123_DVS to use DVS registers */
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 246/567 regulator: pca9450: Correct interrupt type
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Peng Fan <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 5d0efaf47ee90ac60efae790acee3a3ed99ebf80 ]
Kernel warning on i.MX8MP-EVK when doing module test:
irq: type mismatch, failed to map hwirq-3 for gpio@30200000!
Per PCA945[X] specification: The IRQ_B pin is pulled low when any unmasked interrupt bit status is changed and it is released high once application processor read INT1 register.
So the interrupt should be configured as IRQF_TRIGGER_LOW, not IRQF_TRIGGER_FALLING.
--- drivers/regulator/pca9450-regulator.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/regulator/pca9450-regulator.c +1 -1
@@ -780,7 +780,7 @@ static int pca9450_i2c_probe(struct i2c_client *i2c)if (pca9450->irq) { ret =devm_request_threaded_irq (pca9450->dev, pca9450->irq,NULL , pca9450_irq_handler, - (IRQF_TRIGGER_FALLING |IRQF_ONESHOT ), + (IRQF_TRIGGER_LOW |IRQF_ONESHOT ),"pca9450-irq" , pca9450);if (ret !=0 ) { dev_err(pca9450->dev, "Failed to request IRQ: %d\n",
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 247/567 sched: idle: Make skipping governor callbacks more consistent
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit d557640e4ce589a24dca5ca7ce3b9680f471325f ]
If the cpuidle governor .select() callback is skipped because there is only one idle state in the cpuidle driver, the .reflect() callback should be skipped as well, at least for consistency (if not for correctness), so do it.
--- drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c | 10 ---------- kernel/sched/idle.c | 11 ++++++++++- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/cpuidle/cpuidle.c +0 -10
@@ -356,16 +356,6 @@ noinstr int cpuidle_enter_state(struct cpuidle_device *dev,int cpuidle_select (struct cpuidle_driver *drv,struct cpuidle_device *dev,bool *stop_tick) { -/* -* If there is only a single idle state (or none), there is nothing -* meaningful for the governor to choose. Skip the governor and -* always use state 0 with the tick running. -*/ -if (drv->state_count <=1 ) { - *stop_tick = false; -return 0 ; - } -return cpuidle_curr_governor->select (drv, dev, stop_tick); }
kernel/sched/idle.c +10 -1
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ static void cpuidle_idle_call(void) next_state =cpuidle_find_deepest_state (drv, dev, max_latency_ns);call_cpuidle (drv, dev, next_state); - }else { + }else if (drv->state_count >1 ) {bool stop_tick = true;/*
@@ -217,6 +217,15 @@ static void cpuidle_idle_call(void)* Give the governor an opportunity to reflect on the outcome */ cpuidle_reflect (dev, entered_state); + }else { +tick_nohz_idle_retain_tick (); + +/* +* If there is only a single idle state (or none), there is +* nothing meaningful for the governor to choose. Skip the +* governor and always use state 0. +*/ +call_cpuidle (drv, dev,0 ); } exit_idle:
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 248/567 nvme-pci: Fix slab-out-of-bounds in nvme_dbbuf_set
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sungwoo Kim <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit b4e78f1427c7d6859229ae9616df54e1fc05a516 ]
dev->online_queues is a count incremented in nvme_init_queue. Thus, valid indices are 0 through dev->online_queues − 1.
This patch fixes the loop condition to ensure the index stays within the valid range. Index 0 is excluded because it is the admin queue.
KASAN splat:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nvme_dbbuf_free drivers/nvme/host/pci.c:377 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nvme_dbbuf_set+0x39c/0x400 drivers/nvme/host/pci.c:404 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88800592a574 by task kworker/u8:5/74 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 74 Comm: kworker/u8:5 Not tainted 6.19.0-dirty #10 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: nvme-reset-wq nvme_reset_work Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xea/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xce/0x5d0 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xdc/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:595 __asan_report_load2_noabort+0x18/0x20 mm/kasan/report_generic.c:379 nvme_dbbuf_free drivers/nvme/host/pci.c:377 [inline] nvme_dbbuf_set+0x39c/0x400 drivers/nvme/host/pci.c:404 nvme_reset_work+0x36b/0x8c0 drivers/nvme/host/pci.c:3252 process_one_work+0x956/0x1aa0 kernel/workqueue.c:3257 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3340 [inline] worker_thread+0x65c/0xe60 kernel/workqueue.c:3421 kthread+0x41a/0x930 kernel/kthread.c:463 ret_from_fork+0x6f8/0x8c0 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246 </TASK> Allocated by task 34 on cpu 1 at 4.241550s: kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:57 kasan_save_track+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:78 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x3c/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:570 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:398 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0xb5/0xc0 mm/kasan/common.c:415 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:263 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:5657 [inline] __kmalloc_node_noprof+0x2bf/0x8d0 mm/slub.c:5663 kmalloc_array_node_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1075 [inline] nvme_pci_alloc_dev drivers/nvme/host/pci.c:3479 [inline] nvme_probe+0x2f1/0x1820 drivers/nvme/host/pci.c:3534 local_pci_probe+0xef/0x1c0 drivers/pci/pci-driver.c:324 pci_call_probe drivers/pci/pci-driver.c:392 [inline] __pci_device_probe drivers/pci/pci-driver.c:417 [inline] pci_device_probe+0x743/0x920 drivers/pci/pci-driver.c:451 call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:583 [inline] really_probe+0x29b/0xb70 drivers/base/dd.c:661 __driver_probe_device+0x3b0/0x4a0 drivers/base/dd.c:803 driver_probe_device+0x56/0x1f0 drivers/base/dd.c:833 __driver_attach_async_helper+0x155/0x340 drivers/base/dd.c:1159 async_run_entry_fn+0xa6/0x4b0 kernel/async.c:129 process_one_work+0x956/0x1aa0 kernel/workqueue.c:3257 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3340 [inline] worker_thread+0x65c/0xe60 kernel/workqueue.c:3421 kthread+0x41a/0x930 kernel/kthread.c:463 ret_from_fork+0x6f8/0x8c0 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800592a000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
The buggy address is located 244 bytes to the right of
allocated 1152-byte region [ffff88800592a000, ffff88800592a480)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x5928 head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 anon flags: 0xfffffc0000040(head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 000fffffc0000040 ffff888001042000 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000080008 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 000fffffc0000040 ffff888001042000 0000000000000000 dead000000000001
head: 0000000000000000 0000000000080008 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 000fffffc0000003 ffffea0000164a01 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff
head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000008
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88800592a400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff88800592a480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88800592a500: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff88800592a580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88800592a600: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
==================================================================--- drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/nvme/host/pci.c +1 -1
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static void nvme_dbbuf_set(struct nvme_dev *dev)/* Free memory and continue on */ nvme_dbbuf_dma_free (dev); -for (i =1 ; i <= dev->online_queues; i++) +for (i =1 ; i < dev->online_queues; i++)nvme_dbbuf_free (&dev->queues[i]); } }
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 249/567 nvme-pci: Fix race bug in nvme_poll_irqdisable()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sungwoo Kim <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit fc71f409b22ca831a9f87a2712eaa09ef2bb4a5e ]
In the following scenario, pdev can be disabled between (1) and (3) by (2). This sets pdev->msix_enabled = 0. Then, pci_irq_vector() will return MSI-X IRQ(>15) for (1) whereas return INTx IRQ(<=15) for (2). This causes IRQ warning because it tries to enable INTx IRQ that has never been disabled before.
To fix this, save IRQ number into a local variable and ensure disable_irq() and enable_irq() operate on the same IRQ number. Even if pci_free_irq_vectors() frees the IRQ concurrently, disable_irq() and enable_irq() on a stale IRQ number is still valid and safe, and the depth accounting reamins balanced.
task 1:nvme_poll_irqdisable()
disable_irq(pci_irq_vector(pdev, nvmeq->cq_vector)) ...(1) enable_irq(pci_irq_vector(pdev, nvmeq->cq_vector)) ...(3)
task 2:nvme_reset_work()
nvme_dev_disable()
pdev->msix_enable = 0; ...(2)
crash log:
------------[ cut here ]------------ Unbalanced enable for IRQ 10 WARNING: kernel/irq/manage.c:753 at __enable_irq+0x102/0x190 kernel/irq/manage.c:753, CPU#1: kworker/1:0H/26 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 26 Comm: kworker/1:0H Not tainted 6.19.0-dirty #9 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_timeout_work RIP: 0010:__enable_irq+0x107/0x190 kernel/irq/manage.c:753 Code: ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 0f b6 14 02 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 04 84 d2 75 79 48 8d 3d 2e 7a 3f 05 41 8b 74 24 2c <67> 48 0f b9 3a e8 ef b9 21 00 5b 41 5c 5d e9 46 54 66 03 e8 e1 b9 RSP: 0018:ffffc900001bf550 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000007 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffffb20c0e90 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000000a RDI: ffffffffb74b88f0 RBP: ffffc900001bf560 R08: ffff88800197cf00 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff8880012a6000 R13: 1ffff92000037eae R14: 000000000000000a R15: 0000000000000293 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b49f7000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000555da4a25fa8 CR3: 00000000208e8000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> enable_irq+0x121/0x1e0 kernel/irq/manage.c:797 nvme_poll_irqdisable+0x162/0x1c0 drivers/nvme/host/pci.c:1494 nvme_timeout+0x965/0x14b0 drivers/nvme/host/pci.c:1744 blk_mq_rq_timed_out block/blk-mq.c:1653 [inline] blk_mq_handle_expired+0x227/0x2d0 block/blk-mq.c:1721 bt_iter+0x2fc/0x3a0 block/blk-mq-tag.c:292 __sbitmap_for_each_set include/linux/sbitmap.h:269 [inline] sbitmap_for_each_set include/linux/sbitmap.h:290 [inline] bt_for_each block/blk-mq-tag.c:324 [inline] blk_mq_queue_tag_busy_iter+0x969/0x1e80 block/blk-mq-tag.c:536 blk_mq_timeout_work+0x627/0x870 block/blk-mq.c:1763 process_one_work+0x956/0x1aa0 kernel/workqueue.c:3257 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3340 [inline] worker_thread+0x65c/0xe60 kernel/workqueue.c:3421 kthread+0x41a/0x930 kernel/kthread.c:463 ret_from_fork+0x6f8/0x8c0 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246 </TASK> irq event stamp: 74478 hardirqs last enabled at (74477): [<ffffffffb5720a9c>] __raw_spin_unlock_irq include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:159 [inline] hardirqs last enabled at (74477): [<ffffffffb5720a9c>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2c/0x60 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:202 hardirqs last disabled at (74478): [<ffffffffb57207b5>] __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:108 [inline] hardirqs last disabled at (74478): [<ffffffffb57207b5>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x85/0xa0 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162 softirqs last enabled at (74304): [<ffffffffb1e9466c>] __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:656 [inline] softirqs last enabled at (74304): [<ffffffffb1e9466c>] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:496 [inline] softirqs last enabled at (74304): [<ffffffffb1e9466c>] __irq_exit_rcu+0xdc/0x120 kernel/softirq.c:723 softirqs last disabled at (74287): [<ffffffffb1e9466c>] __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:656 [inline] softirqs last disabled at (74287): [<ffffffffb1e9466c>] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:496 [inline] softirqs last disabled at (74287): [<ffffffffb1e9466c>] __irq_exit_rcu+0xdc/0x120 kernel/softirq.c:723 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
--- drivers/nvme/host/pci.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/nvme/host/pci.c +4 -2
@@ -1103,14 +1103,16 @@ static irqreturn_t nvme_irq_check(int irq, void *data)static void nvme_poll_irqdisable (struct nvme_queue *nvmeq) {struct pci_dev *pdev =to_pci_dev (nvmeq->dev->dev); +int irq;WARN_ON_ONCE (test_bit (NVMEQ_POLLED , &nvmeq->flags)); -disable_irq (pci_irq_vector (pdev, nvmeq->cq_vector)); + irq =pci_irq_vector (pdev, nvmeq->cq_vector); +disable_irq (irq);spin_lock (&nvmeq->cq_poll_lock);nvme_poll_cq (nvmeq,NULL );spin_unlock (&nvmeq->cq_poll_lock); -enable_irq (pci_irq_vector (pdev, nvmeq->cq_vector)); +enable_irq (irq); }static int nvme_poll (struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx,struct io_comp_batch *iob)
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 250/567 i40e: fix src IP mask checks and memcpy argument names in cloud filter
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alok Tiwari <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e809085f492842ce7a519c9ef72d40f4bca89c13 ]
Fix following issues in the IPv4 and IPv6 cloud filter handling logic in both the add and delete paths:
- The source-IP mask check incorrectly compares mask.src_ip[0] against tcf.dst_ip[0]. Update it to compare against tcf.src_ip[0]. This likely goes unnoticed because the check is in an "else if" path that only executes when dst_ip is not set, most cloud filter use cases focus on destination-IP matching, and the buggy condition can accidentally evaluate true in some cases.
- memcpy() for the IPv4 source address incorrectly uses ARRAY_SIZE(tcf.dst_ip) instead of ARRAY_SIZE(tcf.src_ip), although both arrays are the same size.
- The IPv4 memcpy operations used ARRAY_SIZE(tcf.dst_ip) and ARRAY_SIZE (tcf.src_ip), Update these to use sizeof(cfilter->ip.v4.dst_ip) and sizeof(cfilter->ip.v4.src_ip) to ensure correct and explicit copy size.
- In the IPv6 delete path, memcmp() uses sizeof(src_ip6) when comparing dst_ip6 fields. Replace this with sizeof(dst_ip6) to make the intent explicit, even though both fields are struct in6_addr.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/i40e/i40e_virtchnl_pf.c +7 -7
@@ -3825,10 +3825,10 @@ static int i40e_vc_del_cloud_filter(struct i40e_vf *vf, u8 *msg) cfilter.n_proto =ETH_P_IP ;if (mask.dst_ip[0 ] & tcf.dst_ip[0 ])memcpy (&cfilter.ip.v4.dst_ip, tcf.dst_ip, -ARRAY_SIZE (tcf.dst_ip)); -else if (mask.src_ip[0 ] & tcf.dst_ip[0 ]) +sizeof (cfilter.ip.v4.dst_ip)); +else if (mask.src_ip[0 ] & tcf.src_ip[0 ])memcpy (&cfilter.ip.v4.src_ip, tcf.src_ip, -ARRAY_SIZE (tcf.dst_ip)); +sizeof (cfilter.ip.v4.src_ip));break ;case VIRTCHNL_TCP_V6_FLOW : cfilter.n_proto =ETH_P_IPV6 ;
@@ -3883,7 +3883,7 @@ static int i40e_vc_del_cloud_filter(struct i40e_vf *vf, u8 *msg)/* for ipv6, mask is set for all sixteen bytes (4 words) */ if (cfilter.n_proto ==ETH_P_IPV6 && mask.dst_ip[3 ])if (memcmp (&cfilter.ip.v6.dst_ip6, &cf->ip.v6.dst_ip6, -sizeof (cfilter.ip.v6.src_ip6))) +sizeof (cfilter.ip.v6.dst_ip6)))continue ;if (mask.vlan_id)if (cfilter.vlan_id != cf->vlan_id)
@@ -3971,10 +3971,10 @@ static int i40e_vc_add_cloud_filter(struct i40e_vf *vf, u8 *msg) cfilter->n_proto =ETH_P_IP ;if (mask.dst_ip[0 ] & tcf.dst_ip[0 ])memcpy (&cfilter->ip.v4.dst_ip, tcf.dst_ip, -ARRAY_SIZE (tcf.dst_ip)); -else if (mask.src_ip[0 ] & tcf.dst_ip[0 ]) +sizeof (cfilter->ip.v4.dst_ip)); +else if (mask.src_ip[0 ] & tcf.src_ip[0 ])memcpy (&cfilter->ip.v4.src_ip, tcf.src_ip, -ARRAY_SIZE (tcf.dst_ip)); +sizeof (cfilter->ip.v4.src_ip));break ;case VIRTCHNL_TCP_V6_FLOW : cfilter->n_proto =ETH_P_IPV6 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 251/567 e1000/e1000e: Fix leak in DMA error cleanup
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Matt Vollrath <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit e94eaef11142b01f77bf8ba4d0b59720b7858109 ]
If an error is encountered while mapping TX buffers, the driver should unmap any buffers already mapped for that skb.
Because count is incremented after a successful mapping, it will always match the correct number of unmappings needed when dma_error is reached. Decrementing count before the while loop in dma_error causes an off-by-one error. If any mapping was successful before an unsuccessful mapping, exactly one DMA mapping would leak.
In these commits, a faulty while condition caused an infinite loop in dma_error:
Commit 03b1320dfcee ("e1000e: remove use of skb_dma_map from e1000e driver")
Commit 602c0554d7b0 ("e1000: remove use of skb_dma_map from e1000 driver")
Commit c1fa347f20f1 ("e1000/e1000e/igb/igbvf/ixgb/ixgbe: Fix tests of unsigned in *_tx_map()") fixed the infinite loop, but introduced the off-by-one error.
This issue may still exist in the igbvf driver, but I did not address it in this patch.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c | 2 -- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c | 2 -- 2 files changed, 4 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c +0 -2
@@ -2951,8 +2951,6 @@ static int e1000_tx_map(struct e1000_adapter *adapter, dma_error:dev_err (&pdev->dev,"TX DMA map failed\n" ); buffer_info->dma =0 ; -if (count) - count--;while (count--) {if (i ==0 )
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c +0 -2
@@ -5633,8 +5633,6 @@ static int e1000_tx_map(struct e1000_ring *tx_ring, struct sk_buff *skb, dma_error:dev_err (&pdev->dev,"Tx DMA map failed\n" ); buffer_info->dma =0 ; -if (count) - count--;while (count--) {if (i ==0 )
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 252/567 ACPI: OSL: fix __iomem type on return from acpi_os_map_generic_address()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ben Dooks <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 393815f57651101f1590632092986d1d5a3a41bd ]
The pointer returned from acpi_os_map_generic_address() is tagged with __iomem, so make the rv it is returned to also of void __iomem * type.
Fixes the following sparse warning:
drivers/acpi/osl.c:1686:20: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces)drivers/acpi/osl.c:1686:20: expected void *rvdrivers/acpi/osl.c:1686:20: got void [noderef] __iomem *
--- drivers/acpi/osl.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/acpi/osl.c +1 -1
@@ -1656,7 +1656,7 @@ acpi_status __init acpi_os_initialize(void)* Use acpi_os_map_generic_address to pre-map the reset * register if it's in system memory. */ -void *rv; +void __iomem *rv; rv =acpi_os_map_generic_address (&acpi_gbl_FADT.reset_register); pr_debug("%s: Reset register mapping %s\n", __func__,
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 253/567 ASoC: amd: acp3x-rt5682-max9836: Add missing error check for clock acquisition
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chen Ni <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 53f3a900e9a383d47af7253076e19f510c5708d0 ]
The acp3x_5682_init() function did not check the return value of clk_get(), which could lead to dereferencing error pointers in rt5682_clk_enable().
Fix this by:
1. Changing clk_get() to the device-managed devm_clk_get().
2. Adding proper IS_ERR() checks for both clock acquisitions.
--- sound/soc/amd/acp3x-rt5682-max9836.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
sound/soc/amd/acp3x-rt5682-max9836.c +7 -2
@@ -94,8 +94,13 @@ static int acp3x_5682_init(struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *rtd)return ret; } - rt5682_dai_wclk =clk_get (component->dev,"rt5682-dai-wclk" ); - rt5682_dai_bclk =clk_get (component->dev,"rt5682-dai-bclk" ); + rt5682_dai_wclk =devm_clk_get (component->dev,"rt5682-dai-wclk" ); +if (IS_ERR (rt5682_dai_wclk)) +return PTR_ERR (rt5682_dai_wclk); + + rt5682_dai_bclk =devm_clk_get (component->dev,"rt5682-dai-bclk" ); +if (IS_ERR (rt5682_dai_bclk)) +return PTR_ERR (rt5682_dai_bclk); ret = snd_soc_card_jack_new_pins(card, "Headset Jack", SND_JACK_HEADSET |
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 254/567 ASoC: detect empty DMI strings
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Casey Connolly <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit a9683730e8b1d632674f81844ed03ddfbe4821c0 ]
Some bootloaders like recent versions of U-Boot may install some DMI properties with empty values rather than not populate them. This manages to make its way through the validator and cleanup resulting in a rogue hyphen being appended to the card longname.
--- sound/soc/soc-core.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
sound/soc/soc-core.c +4 -1
@@ -1719,12 +1719,15 @@ static void cleanup_dmi_name(char *name)/* * Check if a DMI field is valid, i.e. not containing any string -* in the black list. +* in the black list and not the empty string. */ static int is_dmi_valid (const char *field) {int i =0 ; +if (!field[0 ]) +return 0 ; +while (dmi_blacklist[i]) {if (strstr (field, dmi_blacklist[i]))return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 255/567 net: bonding: Fix nd_tbl NULL dereference when IPv6 is disabled
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ricardo B. Marlière <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 30021e969d48e5819d5ae56936c2f34c0f7ce997 ]
When booting with the 'ipv6.disable=1' parameter, the nd_tbl is never initialized because inet6_init() exits before ndisc_init() is called which initializes it. If bonding ARP/NS validation is enabled, an IPv6 NS/NA packet received on a slave can reach bond_validate_na(), which calls bond_has_this_ip6(). That path calls ipv6_chk_addr() and can crash in __ipv6_chk_addr_and_flags().
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000005d8 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:__ipv6_chk_addr_and_flags+0x69/0x170 Call Trace: <IRQ> ipv6_chk_addr+0x1f/0x30 bond_validate_na+0x12e/0x1d0 [bonding] ? __pfx_bond_handle_frame+0x10/0x10 [bonding] bond_rcv_validate+0x1a0/0x450 [bonding] bond_handle_frame+0x5e/0x290 [bonding] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 __netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x3e8/0xe50 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? update_cfs_rq_load_avg+0x1a/0x240 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __enqueue_entity+0x5e/0x240 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x39/0xa0 process_backlog+0x9c/0x150 __napi_poll+0x30/0x200 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 net_rx_action+0x338/0x3b0 handle_softirqs+0xc9/0x2a0 do_softirq+0x42/0x60 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x62/0x70 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2d3/0x1000 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? packet_parse_headers+0x10a/0x1a0 packet_sendmsg+0x10da/0x1700 ? kick_pool+0x5f/0x140 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __queue_work+0x12d/0x4f0 __sys_sendto+0x1f3/0x220 __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 do_syscall_64+0x101/0xf80 ? exc_page_fault+0x6e/0x170 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK>
Fix this by checking ipv6_mod_enabled() before dispatching IPv6 packets to bond_na_rcv(). If IPv6 is disabled, return early from bond_rcv_validate() and avoid the path to ipv6_chk_addr().
--- drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/bonding/bond_main.c +1 -1
@@ -3447,7 +3447,7 @@ int bond_rcv_validate(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct bonding *bond, }else if (is_arp) {return bond_arp_rcv (skb, bond, slave);#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IPV6 ) - } else if (is_ipv6) { + } else if (is_ipv6 && likely(ipv6_mod_enabled())) {return bond_na_rcv (skb, bond, slave);#endif }else {
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 256/567 octeontx2-af: devlink: fix NIX RAS reporter recovery condition
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.6-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alok Tiwari <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit dc26ca99b835e21e76a58b1463b84adb0ca34f58 ]
The NIX RAS health reporter recovery routine checks nix_af_rvu_int to decide whether to re-enable NIX_AF_RAS interrupts. This is the RVU interrupt status field and is unrelated to RAS events, so the recovery flow may incorrectly skip re-enabling NIX_AF_RAS interrupts.
Check nix_af_rvu_ras instead before writing NIX_AF_RAS_ENA_W1S.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_devlink.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/octeontx2/af/rvu_devlink.c +1 -1
@@ -579,7 +579,7 @@ static int rvu_hw_nix_ras_recover(struct devlink_health_reporter *reporter,if (blkaddr <0 )return blkaddr; -if (nix_event_ctx->nix_af_rvu_int) +if (nix_event_ctx->nix_af_rvu_ras)rvu_write64 (rvu, blkaddr,NIX_AF_RAS_ENA_W1S , ~0ULL );return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.51.0