6.19.13-rc1 review
Subsystems (2)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainercover 6.19.13-rc1 review
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.19.13 release. There are 86 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 15 Apr 2026 15:57:08 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.19.13-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-6.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Linux 6.19.13-rc1
Jiayuan Chen <[email protected]>
net: skb: fix cross-cache free of KFENCE-allocated skb head
Pengpeng Hou <[email protected]>
rxrpc: proc: size address buffers for %pISpc output
Wang Jie <[email protected]>
rxrpc: only handle RESPONSE during service challenge
David Howells <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix buffer overread in rxgk_do_verify_authenticator()
David Howells <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix leak of rxgk context in rxgk_verify_response()
David Howells <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix integer overflow in rxgk_verify_response()
David Howells <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix missing error checks for rxkad encryption/decryption failure
David Howells <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix key/keyring checks in setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY/KEYRING)
Luxiao Xu <[email protected]>
rxrpc: fix reference count leak in rxrpc_server_keyring()
Keenan Dong <[email protected]>
rxrpc: fix oversized RESPONSE authenticator length check
Keenan Dong <[email protected]>
rxrpc: fix RESPONSE authenticator parser OOB read
Yuqi Xu <[email protected]>
rxrpc: reject undecryptable rxkad response tickets
Douya Le <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Only put the call ref if one was acquired
Marc Dionne <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix to request an ack if window is limited
Anderson Nascimento <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix key reference count leak from call->key
Alok Tiwari <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix rack timer warning to report unexpected mode
Alok Tiwari <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix use of wrong skb when comparing queued RESP challenge serial
Oleh Konko <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix RxGK token loading to check bounds
David Howells <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix call removal to use RCU safe deletion
David Howells <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix anonymous key handling
David Howells <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix key parsing memleak
David Howells <[email protected]>
rxrpc: Fix key quota calculation for multitoken keys
David Carlier <[email protected]>
net: lan966x: fix use-after-free and leak in lan966x_fdma_reload()
David Carlier <[email protected]>
net: lan966x: fix page pool leak in error paths
David Carlier <[email protected]>
net: lan966x: fix page_pool error handling in lan966x_fdma_rx_alloc_page_pool()
Emil Tantilov <[email protected]>
idpf: set the payload size before calling the async handler
Emil Tantilov <[email protected]>
idpf: improve locking around idpf_vc_xn_push_free()
Emil Tantilov <[email protected]>
idpf: fix PREEMPT_RT raw/bh spinlock nesting for async VC handling
Baolin Wang <[email protected]>
mm: filemap: fix nr_pages calculation overflow in filemap_map_pages()
Tyllis Xu <[email protected]>
net: stmmac: fix integer underflow in chain mode
Pengpeng Hou <[email protected]>
net: qualcomm: qca_uart: report the consumed byte on RX skb allocation failure
Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
mmc: vub300: fix use-after-free on disconnect
Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
mmc: vub300: fix NULL-deref on disconnect
SeongJae Park <[email protected]>
mm/damon/stat: deallocate damon_call() failure leaking damon_ctx
SeongJae Park <[email protected]>
mm/damon/sysfs: dealloc repeat_call_control if damon_call() fails
Hao Li <[email protected]>
mm/memory_hotplug: maintain N_NORMAL_MEMORY during hotplug
Sechang Lim <[email protected]>
mm/vma: fix memory leak in __mmap_region()
Alex Dvoretsky <[email protected]>
igb: remove napi_synchronize() in igb_down()
Jacky Bai <[email protected]>
pmdomain: imx8mp-blk-ctrl: Keep the NOC_HDCP clock enabled
Michael Guralnik <[email protected]>
net/mlx5: Update the list of the PCI supported devices
Jouni Högander <[email protected]>
drm/i915/psr: Do not use pipe_src as borders for SU area
Sebastian Brzezinka <[email protected]>
drm/i915/gt: fix refcount underflow in intel_engine_park_heartbeat
Haoze Xie <[email protected]>
batman-adv: hold claim backbone gateways by reference
David Carlier <[email protected]>
net: altera-tse: fix skb leak on DMA mapping error in tse_start_xmit()
Muhammad Alifa Ramdhan <[email protected]>
net/tls: fix use-after-free in -EBUSY error path of tls_do_encryption
Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>
EDAC/mc: Fix error path ordering in edac_mc_alloc()
Lukas Wunner <[email protected]>
X.509: Fix out-of-bounds access when parsing extensions
Ruide Cao <[email protected]>
batman-adv: reject oversized global TT response buffers
Pengpeng Hou <[email protected]>
nfc: pn533: allocate rx skb before consuming bytes
Leo Timmins <[email protected]>
liveupdate: propagate file deserialization failures
Shawn Guo <[email protected]>
arm64: dts: hisilicon: hi3798cv200: Add missing dma-ranges
Shawn Guo <[email protected]>
arm64: dts: hisilicon: poplar: Correct PCIe reset GPIO polarity
Marek Vasut <[email protected]>
arm64: dts: renesas: sparrow-hawk: Reserve first 128 MiB of DRAM
Sebastian Krzyszkowiak <[email protected]>
arm64: dts: imx8mq-librem5: Bump BUCK1 suspend voltage up to 0.85V
Sebastian Krzyszkowiak <[email protected]>
Revert "arm64: dts: imx8mq-librem5: Set the DVS voltages lower"
Heiko Stuebner <[email protected]>
Revert "arm64: dts: rockchip: Further describe the WiFi for the Pinebook Pro"
Srinivas Pandruvada <[email protected]>
platform/x86/intel-uncore-freq: Handle autonomous UFS status bit
Srinivas Pandruvada <[email protected]>
platform/x86: ISST: Reset core count to 0
Yazen Ghannam <[email protected]>
x86/mce/amd: Filter bogus hardware errors on Zen3 clients
Thomas Fourier <[email protected]>
wifi: brcmsmac: Fix dma_free_coherent() size
Kai Vehmanen <[email protected]>
ASoC: SOF: Intel: hda: modify period size constraints for ACE4
Janne Grunau <[email protected]>
kbuild: modules-cpio-pkg: Respect INSTALL_MOD_PATH
Oleh Konko <[email protected]>
tipc: fix bc_ackers underflow on duplicate GRP_ACK_MSG
Qi Tang <[email protected]>
xfrm: hold dev ref until after transport_finish NF_HOOK
Yasuaki Torimaru <[email protected]>
xfrm: clear trailing padding in build_polexpire()
Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
modpost: Declare extra_warn with unused attribute
Matthew Brost <[email protected]>
workqueue: Add pool_workqueue to pending_pwqs list when unplugging multiple inactive works
Michal Wilczynski <[email protected]>
firmware: thead: Fix buffer overflow and use standard endian macros
Tuan Do <[email protected]>
netfilter: nft_ct: fix use-after-free in timeout object destroy
Anthony Pighin <[email protected]>
i2c: imx: zero-initialize dma_slave_config for eDMA
robbieko <[email protected]>
btrfs: fix incorrect return value after changing leaf in lookup_extent_data_ref()
Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
btrfs: remove pointless out labels from extent-tree.c
Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]>
MIPS: mm: Rewrite TLB uniquification for the hidden bit feature
Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]>
MIPS: mm: Suppress TLB uniquification on EHINV hardware
Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]>
MIPS: Always record SEGBITS in cpu_data.vmbits
Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
Input: uinput - take event lock when submitting FF request "event"
Mikhail Gavrilov <[email protected]>
Input: uinput - fix circular locking dependency with ff-core
Andrea Mayer <[email protected]>
seg6: separate dst_cache for input and output paths in seg6 lwtunnel
Jiayuan Chen <[email protected]>
mptcp: fix slab-use-after-free in __inet_lookup_established
Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <[email protected]>
Revert "mptcp: add needs_id for netlink appending addr"
Kai Vehmanen <[email protected]>
ALSA: hda/intel: enforce stricter period-size alignment for Intel NVL
Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
Revert "ALSA: hda/realtek: Add quirk for Gigabyte Technology to fix headphone"
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
net: rfkill: prevent unlimited numbers of rfkill events from being created
Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
xfrm_user: fix info leak in build_report()
Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
wifi: rt2x00usb: fix devres lifetime
Nathan Rebello <[email protected]>
usb: typec: ucsi: skip connector validation before init
-------------
Diffstat:
Makefile | 4 +- .../arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8mq-librem5-r3.dts | 2 +- arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8mq-librem5.dtsi | 24 +- .../boot/dts/hisilicon/hi3798cv200-poplar.dts | 2 +- arch/arm64/boot/dts/hisilicon/hi3798cv200.dtsi | 1 + .../boot/dts/renesas/r8a779g3-sparrow-hawk.dts | 11 + .../boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-pinebook-pro.dts | 18 -- arch/mips/include/asm/cpu-features.h | 1 - arch/mips/include/asm/cpu-info.h | 2 - arch/mips/include/asm/mipsregs.h | 2 + arch/mips/kernel/cpu-probe.c | 13 +- arch/mips/kernel/cpu-r3k-probe.c | 2 + arch/mips/mm/tlb-r4k.c | 285 +++++++++++++++++---- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/amd.c | 8 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 8 +- drivers/edac/edac_mc.c | 6 +- drivers/firmware/thead,th1520-aon.c | 7 +- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_psr.c | 30 ++- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_engine_heartbeat.c | 26 +- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-imx.c | 2 +- drivers/input/misc/uinput.c | 35 ++- drivers/mmc/host/vub300.c | 19 +- drivers/net/ethernet/altera/altera_tse_main.c | 1 + drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c | 20 +- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.h | 5 +- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c | 3 +- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c | 1 + .../net/ethernet/microchip/lan966x/lan966x_fdma.c | 28 +- drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/qca_uart.c | 2 +- drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/chain_mode.c | 11 +- .../net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmsmac/dma.c | 2 +- drivers/net/wireless/ralink/rt2x00/rt2x00usb.c | 2 +- drivers/nfc/pn533/uart.c | 11 +- .../x86/intel/speed_select_if/isst_tpmi_core.c | 2 + .../intel/uncore-frequency/uncore-frequency-tpmi.c | 8 +- drivers/pmdomain/imx/imx8mp-blk-ctrl.c | 8 +- drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c | 3 +- fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c | 24 +- include/linux/firmware/thead/thead,th1520-aon.h | 74 ------ include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_timeout.h | 1 + include/trace/events/rxrpc.h | 4 +- kernel/liveupdate/luo_session.c | 9 +- kernel/workqueue.c | 14 +- mm/damon/stat.c | 7 + mm/damon/sysfs.c | 3 +- mm/filemap.c | 11 +- mm/memory_hotplug.c | 20 ++ mm/vma.c | 7 + net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c | 27 +- net/batman-adv/translation-table.c | 9 +- net/core/skbuff.c | 5 +- net/ipv4/xfrm4_input.c | 5 +- net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c | 34 ++- net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c | 5 +- net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c | 24 +- net/mptcp/protocol.c | 2 + net/mptcp/protocol.h | 1 + net/mptcp/subflow.c | 15 +- net/netfilter/nft_ct.c | 2 +- net/rfkill/core.c | 35 ++- net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c | 6 - net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h | 2 +- net/rxrpc/call_object.c | 25 +- net/rxrpc/conn_event.c | 19 +- net/rxrpc/input_rack.c | 2 +- net/rxrpc/io_thread.c | 3 +- net/rxrpc/key.c | 40 +-- net/rxrpc/output.c | 2 + net/rxrpc/proc.c | 37 +-- net/rxrpc/rxgk.c | 19 +- net/rxrpc/rxkad.c | 63 +++-- net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c | 2 +- net/rxrpc/server_key.c | 3 + net/tipc/group.c | 6 +- net/tls/tls_sw.c | 10 + net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c | 18 +- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 3 + scripts/Makefile.package | 3 +- scripts/mod/modpost.c | 2 +- sound/hda/codecs/realtek/alc662.c | 9 - sound/hda/controllers/intel.c | 7 +- sound/soc/sof/intel/hda-pcm.c | 14 +- 82 files changed, 795 insertions(+), 453 deletions(-)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 1/86 usb: typec: ucsi: skip connector validation before init
6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nathan Rebello <[email protected]>
commit 5a1140404cbf7ba40137dfb1fb96893aa9a67d68 upstream.
Notifications can arrive before ucsi_init() has populated ucsi->cap.num_connectors via GET_CAPABILITY. At that point num_connectors is still 0, causing all valid connector numbers to be incorrectly rejected as bogus.
Skip the bounds check when num_connectors is 0 (not yet initialized). Pre-init notifications are already handled safely by the early-event guard in ucsi_connector_change().
--- drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c +2 -1
@@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ void ucsi_notify_common(struct ucsi *ucsreturn ;if (UCSI_CCI_CONNECTOR (cci)) { -if (UCSI_CCI_CONNECTOR (cci) <= ucsi->cap.num_connectors) +if (!ucsi->cap.num_connectors || +UCSI_CCI_CONNECTOR (cci) <= ucsi->cap.num_connectors)ucsi_connector_change (ucsi,UCSI_CCI_CONNECTOR (cci));else dev_err(ucsi->dev, "bogus connector number in CCI: %lu\n",
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 2/86 wifi: rt2x00usb: fix devres lifetime
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
commit 25369b22223d1c56e42a0cd4ac9137349d5a898e upstream.
USB drivers bind to USB interfaces and any device managed resources should have their lifetime tied to the interface rather than parent USB device. This avoids issues like memory leaks when drivers are unbound without their devices being physically disconnected (e.g. on probe deferral or configuration changes).
Fix the USB anchor lifetime so that it is released on driver unbind.
--- drivers/net/wireless/ralink/rt2x00/rt2x00usb.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/ralink/rt2x00/rt2x00usb.c +1 -1
@@ -828,7 +828,7 @@ int rt2x00usb_probe(struct usb_interfaceif (retval) goto exit_free_device; - rt2x00dev->anchor =devm_kmalloc (&usb_dev->dev, + rt2x00dev->anchor =devm_kmalloc (&usb_intf->dev,sizeof (struct usb_anchor ),GFP_KERNEL );if (!rt2x00dev->anchor) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 3/86 xfrm_user: fix info leak in build_report()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit d10119968d0e1f2b669604baf2a8b5fdb72fa6b4 upstream.
struct xfrm_user_report is a __u8 proto field followed by a struct xfrm_selector which means there is three "empty" bytes of padding, but the padding is never zeroed before copying to userspace. Fix that up by zeroing the structure before setting individual member variables.
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +1 -0
@@ -4108,6 +4108,7 @@ static int build_report(struct sk_buff *return -EMSGSIZE ; ur =nlmsg_data (nlh); +memset (ur,0 ,sizeof (*ur)); ur->proto = proto;memcpy (&ur->sel, sel,sizeof (ur->sel));
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 4/86 net: rfkill: prevent unlimited numbers of rfkill events from being created
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
commit ea245d78dec594372e27d8c79616baf49e98a4a1 upstream.
Userspace can create an unlimited number of rfkill events if the system is so configured, while not consuming them from the rfkill file descriptor, causing a potential out of memory situation. Prevent this from bounding the number of pending rfkill events at a "large" number (i.e. 1000) to prevent abuses like this.
--- net/rfkill/core.c | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
net/rfkill/core.c +24 -11
@@ -73,11 +73,14 @@ struct rfkill_int_event {struct rfkill_event_ext ev; }; +/* Max rfkill events that can be "in-flight" for one data source */ +#define MAX_RFKILL_EVENT 1000struct rfkill_data {struct list_head list;struct list_head events;struct mutex mtx;wait_queue_head_t read_wait; +u32 event_count;bool input_handler;u8 max_size; };
@@ -255,10 +258,12 @@ static void rfkill_global_led_trigger_un }#endif /* CONFIG_RFKILL_LEDS */ -static void rfkill_fill_event (struct rfkill_event_ext *ev, -struct rfkill *rfkill, -enum rfkill_operation op) +static int rfkill_fill_event (struct rfkill_int_event *int_ev, +struct rfkill *rfkill, +struct rfkill_data *data, +enum rfkill_operation op) { +struct rfkill_event_ext *ev = &int_ev->ev;unsigned long flags; ev->idx = rfkill->idx;
@@ -271,6 +276,15 @@ static void rfkill_fill_event(struct rfk RFKILL_BLOCK_SW_PREV)); ev->hard_block_reasons = rfkill->hard_block_reasons;spin_unlock_irqrestore (&rfkill->lock, flags); + + scoped_guard(mutex, &data->mtx) { +if (data->event_count++ >MAX_RFKILL_EVENT ) { + data->event_count--; +return -ENOSPC ; + } +list_add_tail (&int_ev->list, &data->events); + } +return 0 ; }static void rfkill_send_events (struct rfkill *rfkill,enum rfkill_operation op)
@@ -282,10 +296,10 @@ static void rfkill_send_events(struct rf ev =kzalloc (sizeof (*ev),GFP_KERNEL );if (!ev)continue ; -rfkill_fill_event (&ev->ev, rfkill, op); -mutex_lock (&data->mtx); -list_add_tail (&ev->list, &data->events); -mutex_unlock (&data->mtx); +if (rfkill_fill_event (ev, rfkill, data, op)) { +kfree (ev); +continue ; + }wake_up_interruptible (&data->read_wait); } }
@@ -1186,10 +1200,8 @@ static int rfkill_fop_open(struct inodeif (!ev) goto free;rfkill_sync (rfkill); -rfkill_fill_event (&ev->ev, rfkill,RFKILL_OP_ADD ); -mutex_lock (&data->mtx); -list_add_tail (&ev->list, &data->events); -mutex_unlock (&data->mtx); +if (rfkill_fill_event (ev, rfkill, data,RFKILL_OP_ADD )) +kfree (ev); }list_add (&data->list, &rfkill_fds);mutex_unlock (&rfkill_global_mutex);
@@ -1259,6 +1271,7 @@ static ssize_t rfkill_fop_read(struct fi ret = -EFAULT ;list_del (&ev->list); + data->event_count--;kfree (ev); out:mutex_unlock (&data->mtx);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 5/86 Revert "ALSA: hda/realtek: Add quirk for Gigabyte Technology to fix headphone"
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
commit 8508e9118649f13f7b857e9e10147b241db615d7 upstream.
This reverts commit 56fbbe096a89ff4b52af78a21a4afd9d94bdcc80.
It caused regressions on other Gigabyte models, and looking at the bugzilla entry again, the suggested change appears rather dubious, as incorrectly setting the front mic pin as the headphone.
--- sound/hda/codecs/realtek/alc662.c | 9 --------- 1 file changed, 9 deletions(-)
sound/hda/codecs/realtek/alc662.c +0 -9
@@ -313,7 +313,6 @@ enum {ALC897_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC_PIN2 ,ALC897_FIXUP_UNIS_H3C_X500S , ALC897_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC_PIN3, - ALC897_FIXUP_H610M_HP_PIN, }; static const struct hda_fixup alc662_fixups[] = {
@@ -767,13 +766,6 @@ static const struct hda_fixup alc662_fix { } }, }, - [ALC897_FIXUP_H610M_HP_PIN ] = { - .type =HDA_FIXUP_PINS , - .v.pins = (const struct hda_pintbl []) { - {0x19 ,0x0321403f },/* HP out */ - { } - }, - }, };static const struct hda_quirk alc662_fixup_tbl[] = {
@@ -823,7 +815,6 @@ static const struct hda_quirk alc662_fixSND_PCI_QUIRK (0x1043 ,0x8469 ,"ASUS mobo" ,ALC662_FIXUP_NO_JACK_DETECT ),SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x105b ,0x0cd6 ,"Foxconn" ,ALC662_FIXUP_ASUS_MODE2 ),SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x144d ,0xc051 ,"Samsung R720" ,ALC662_FIXUP_IDEAPAD ), -SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x1458 ,0xa194 ,"H610M H V2 DDR4" ,ALC897_FIXUP_H610M_HP_PIN ),SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x14cd ,0x5003 ,"USI" ,ALC662_FIXUP_USI_HEADSET_MODE ),SND_PCI_QUIRK (0x17aa ,0x1036 ,"Lenovo P520" ,ALC662_FIXUP_LENOVO_MULTI_CODECS ), SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x1057, "Lenovo P360", ALC897_FIXUP_HEADSET_MIC_PIN),
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 6/86 ALSA: hda/intel: enforce stricter period-size alignment for Intel NVL
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kai Vehmanen <[email protected]>
commit 082c192c0dd03f685514c9ce2eb0a80fd28e2175 upstream.
Intel ACE4 based products set more strict constraints on HDA BDLE start address and length alignment. Modify capability flags to drop AZX_DCAPS_NO_ALIGN_BUFSIZE for Intel Nova Lake platforms.
--- sound/hda/controllers/intel.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
sound/hda/controllers/intel.c +5 -2
@@ -295,6 +295,9 @@ enum {#define AZX_DCAPS_INTEL_LNL \ (AZX_DCAPS_INTEL_SKYLAKE | AZX_DCAPS_PIO_COMMANDS) +#define AZX_DCAPS_INTEL_NVL \ + (AZX_DCAPS_INTEL_LNL & ~AZX_DCAPS_NO_ALIGN_BUFSIZE) +/* quirks for ATI SB / AMD Hudson */ #define AZX_DCAPS_PRESET_ATI_SB \ (AZX_DCAPS_NO_TCSEL | AZX_DCAPS_POSFIX_LPIB |\
@@ -2552,8 +2555,8 @@ static const struct pci_device_id azx_id/* Wildcat Lake */ { PCI_DEVICE_DATA(INTEL, HDA_WCL, AZX_DRIVER_SKL | AZX_DCAPS_INTEL_LNL) },/* Nova Lake */ - { PCI_DEVICE_DATA(INTEL, HDA_NVL, AZX_DRIVER_SKL | AZX_DCAPS_INTEL_LNL) }, - { PCI_DEVICE_DATA(INTEL, HDA_NVL_S, AZX_DRIVER_SKL | AZX_DCAPS_INTEL_LNL) }, + { PCI_DEVICE_DATA(INTEL, HDA_NVL, AZX_DRIVER_SKL | AZX_DCAPS_INTEL_NVL) }, + { PCI_DEVICE_DATA(INTEL, HDA_NVL_S, AZX_DRIVER_SKL | AZX_DCAPS_INTEL_NVL) },/* Apollolake (Broxton-P) */ { PCI_DEVICE_DATA(INTEL, HDA_APL, AZX_DRIVER_SKL | AZX_DCAPS_INTEL_BROXTON) },/* Gemini-Lake */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 7/86 Revert "mptcp: add needs_id for netlink appending addr"
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <[email protected]>
commit 8e2760eaab778494fc1fa257031e0e1799647f46 upstream.
This commit was originally adding the ability to add MPTCP endpoints with ID 0 by accident. The in-kernel PM, handling MPTCP endpoints at the net namespace level, is not supposed to handle endpoints with such ID, because this ID 0 is reserved to the initial subflow, as mentioned in the MPTCPv1 protocol [1], a per-connection setting.
Note that 'ip mptcp endpoint add id 0' stops early with an error, but other tools might still request the in-kernel PM to create MPTCP endpoints with this restricted ID 0.
In other words, it was wrong to call the mptcp_pm_has_addr_attr_id helper to check whether the address ID attribute is set: if it was set to 0, a new MPTCP endpoint would be created with ID 0, which is not expected, and might cause various issues later.
--- net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c | 24 +++++------------------- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
net/mptcp/pm_kernel.c +5 -19
@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ static void __mptcp_pm_release_addr_entrstatic int mptcp_pm_nl_append_new_local_addr (struct pm_nl_pernet *pernet,struct mptcp_pm_addr_entry *entry, -bool needs_id,bool replace) +bool replace) {struct mptcp_pm_addr_entry *cur, *del_entry =NULL ;int ret = -EINVAL ;
@@ -779,7 +779,7 @@ static int mptcp_pm_nl_append_new_local_ } } -if (!entry->addr.id && needs_id) { +if (!entry->addr.id) { find_next: entry->addr.id = find_next_zero_bit(pernet->id_bitmap, MPTCP_PM_MAX_ADDR_ID + 1,
@@ -790,7 +790,7 @@ find_next: } } -if (!entry->addr.id && needs_id) +if (!entry->addr.id) goto out;__set_bit (entry->addr.id, pernet->id_bitmap);
@@ -923,7 +923,7 @@ int mptcp_pm_nl_get_local_id(struct mptcreturn -ENOMEM ; entry->addr.port =0 ; - ret =mptcp_pm_nl_append_new_local_addr (pernet, entry, true, false); + ret =mptcp_pm_nl_append_new_local_addr (pernet, entry, false);if (ret <0 )kfree (entry);
@@ -977,18 +977,6 @@ next:return 0 ; } -static bool mptcp_pm_has_addr_attr_id (const struct nlattr *attr, -struct genl_info *info) -{ -struct nlattr *tb[MPTCP_PM_ADDR_ATTR_MAX +1 ]; - -if (!nla_parse_nested_deprecated (tb,MPTCP_PM_ADDR_ATTR_MAX , attr, - mptcp_pm_address_nl_policy, info->extack) && - tb[MPTCP_PM_ADDR_ATTR_ID ]) -return true; -return false; -} -/* Add an MPTCP endpoint */ int mptcp_pm_nl_add_addr_doit (struct sk_buff *skb,struct genl_info *info) {
@@ -1037,9 +1025,7 @@ int mptcp_pm_nl_add_addr_doit(struct sk_ goto out_free; } } - ret =mptcp_pm_nl_append_new_local_addr (pernet, entry, - !mptcp_pm_has_addr_attr_id (attr, info), - true); + ret =mptcp_pm_nl_append_new_local_addr (pernet, entry, true);if (ret <0 ) {GENL_SET_ERR_MSG_FMT (info,"too many addresses or duplicate one: %d" , ret); goto out_free;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 8/86 mptcp: fix slab-use-after-free in __inet_lookup_established
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jiayuan Chen <[email protected]>
commit 9b55b253907e7431210483519c5ad711a37dafa1 upstream.
The ehash table lookups are lockless and rely on SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU to guarantee socket memory stability during RCU read-side critical sections. Both tcp_prot and tcpv6_prot have their slab caches created with this flag via proto_register().
However, MPTCP's mptcp_subflow_init() copies tcpv6_prot into tcpv6_prot_override during inet_init() (fs_initcall, level 5), before inet6_init() (module_init/device_initcall, level 6) has called proto_register(&tcpv6_prot). At that point, tcpv6_prot.slab is still NULL, so tcpv6_prot_override.slab remains NULL permanently.
This causes MPTCP v6 subflow child sockets to be allocated via kmalloc (falling into kmalloc-4k) instead of the TCPv6 slab cache. The kmalloc-4k cache lacks SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, so when these sockets are freed without SOCK_RCU_FREE (which is cleared for child sockets by design), the memory can be immediately reused. Concurrent ehash lookups under rcu_read_lock can then access freed memory, triggering a slab-use-after-free in __inet_lookup_established.
Fix this by splitting the IPv6-specific initialization out of mptcp_subflow_init() into a new mptcp_subflow_v6_init(), called from mptcp_proto_v6_init() before protocol registration. This ensures tcpv6_prot_override.slab correctly inherits the SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU slab cache.
--- net/mptcp/protocol.c | 2 ++ net/mptcp/protocol.h | 1 + net/mptcp/subflow.c | 15 +++++++++------ 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
net/mptcp/protocol.c +2 -0
@@ -4456,6 +4456,8 @@ int __init mptcp_proto_v6_init(void) {int err; +mptcp_subflow_v6_init (); + mptcp_v6_prot = mptcp_prot;strscpy (mptcp_v6_prot.name,"MPTCPv6" ,sizeof (mptcp_v6_prot.name)); mptcp_v6_prot.slab =NULL ;
net/mptcp/protocol.h +1 -0
@@ -875,6 +875,7 @@ static inline void mptcp_subflow_tcp_falvoid __init mptcp_proto_init (void );#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_MPTCP_IPV6 )int __init mptcp_proto_v6_init (void ); +void __init mptcp_subflow_v6_init (void );#endif struct sock *mptcp_sk_clone_init(const struct sock *sk,
net/mptcp/subflow.c +9 -6
@@ -2167,7 +2167,15 @@ void __init mptcp_subflow_init(void) tcp_prot_override.psock_update_sk_prot =NULL ;#endif +mptcp_diag_subflow_init (&subflow_ulp_ops); + +if (tcp_register_ulp (&subflow_ulp_ops) !=0 ) +panic ("MPTCP: failed to register subflows to ULP\n" ); +} +#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_MPTCP_IPV6 ) +void __init mptcp_subflow_v6_init (void ) +{/* In struct mptcp_subflow_request_sock, we assume the TCP request sock * structures for v4 and v6 have the same size. It should not changed in * the future but better to make sure to be warned if it is no longer
@@ -2206,10 +2214,5 @@ void __init mptcp_subflow_init(void)/* Disable sockmap processing for subflows */ tcpv6_prot_override.psock_update_sk_prot =NULL ; #endif -#endif - -mptcp_diag_subflow_init (&subflow_ulp_ops); - -if (tcp_register_ulp (&subflow_ulp_ops) !=0 ) -panic ("MPTCP: failed to register subflows to ULP\n" ); } +#endif
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 9/86 seg6: separate dst_cache for input and output paths in seg6 lwtunnel
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Andrea Mayer <[email protected]>
commit c3812651b522fe8437ebb7063b75ddb95b571643 upstream.
The seg6 lwtunnel uses a single dst_cache per encap route, shared between seg6_input_core() and seg6_output_core(). These two paths can perform the post-encap SID lookup in different routing contexts (e.g., ip rules matching on the ingress interface, or VRF table separation). Whichever path runs first populates the cache, and the other reuses it blindly, bypassing its own lookup.
Fix this by splitting the cache into cache_input and cache_output, so each path maintains its own cached dst independently.
--- net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
net/ipv6/seg6_iptunnel.c +23 -11
@@ -48,7 +48,8 @@ static size_t seg6_lwt_headroom(struct s }struct seg6_lwt { -struct dst_cache cache; +struct dst_cache cache_input; +struct dst_cache cache_output;struct seg6_iptunnel_encap tuninfo[]; };
@@ -488,7 +489,7 @@ static int seg6_input_core(struct net *n slwt =seg6_lwt_lwtunnel (lwtst);local_bh_disable (); - dst =dst_cache_get (&slwt->cache); + dst =dst_cache_get (&slwt->cache_input);local_bh_enable (); err =seg6_do_srh (skb, dst);
@@ -504,7 +505,7 @@ static int seg6_input_core(struct net *n/* cache only if we don't create a dst reference loop */ if (!dst->error && lwtst != dst->lwtstate) {local_bh_disable (); -dst_cache_set_ip6 (&slwt->cache, dst, +dst_cache_set_ip6 (&slwt->cache_input, dst, &ipv6_hdr (skb)->saddr);local_bh_enable (); }
@@ -564,7 +565,7 @@ static int seg6_output_core(struct net * slwt =seg6_lwt_lwtunnel (orig_dst->lwtstate);local_bh_disable (); - dst =dst_cache_get (&slwt->cache); + dst =dst_cache_get (&slwt->cache_output);local_bh_enable (); err =seg6_do_srh (skb, dst);
@@ -591,7 +592,7 @@ static int seg6_output_core(struct net */* cache only if we don't create a dst reference loop */ if (orig_dst->lwtstate != dst->lwtstate) {local_bh_disable (); -dst_cache_set_ip6 (&slwt->cache, dst, &fl6.saddr); +dst_cache_set_ip6 (&slwt->cache_output, dst, &fl6.saddr);local_bh_enable (); }
@@ -701,11 +702,13 @@ static int seg6_build_state(struct net * slwt =seg6_lwt_lwtunnel (newts); - err =dst_cache_init (&slwt->cache,GFP_ATOMIC ); -if (err) { -kfree (newts); -return err; - } + err =dst_cache_init (&slwt->cache_input,GFP_ATOMIC ); +if (err) + goto err_free_newts; + + err =dst_cache_init (&slwt->cache_output,GFP_ATOMIC ); +if (err) + goto err_destroy_input;memcpy (&slwt->tuninfo, tuninfo, tuninfo_len);
@@ -720,11 +723,20 @@ static int seg6_build_state(struct net * *ts = newts;return 0 ; + +err_destroy_input: +dst_cache_destroy (&slwt->cache_input); +err_free_newts: +kfree (newts); +return err; }static void seg6_destroy_state (struct lwtunnel_state *lwt) { -dst_cache_destroy (&seg6_lwt_lwtunnel (lwt)->cache); +struct seg6_lwt *slwt =seg6_lwt_lwtunnel (lwt); + +dst_cache_destroy (&slwt->cache_input); +dst_cache_destroy (&slwt->cache_output); } static int seg6_fill_encap_info(struct sk_buff *skb,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 10/86 Input: uinput - fix circular locking dependency with ff-core
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mikhail Gavrilov <[email protected]>
commit 4cda78d6f8bf2b700529f2fbccb994c3e826d7c2 upstream.
A lockdep circular locking dependency warning can be triggered reproducibly when using a force-feedback gamepad with uinput (for example, playing ELDEN RING under Wine with a Flydigi Vader 5 controller):
ff->mutex -> udev->mutex -> input_mutex -> dev->mutex -> ff->mutex
The cycle is caused by four lock acquisition paths:
1. ff upload: input_ff_upload() holds ff->mutex and calls uinput_dev_upload_effect() -> uinput_request_submit() -> uinput_request_send(), which acquires udev->mutex.
2. device create: uinput_ioctl_handler() holds udev->mutex and calls uinput_create_device() -> input_register_device(), which acquires input_mutex.
3. device register: input_register_device() holds input_mutex and calls kbd_connect() -> input_register_handle(), which acquires dev->mutex.
4. evdev release: evdev_release() calls input_flush_device() under dev->mutex, which calls input_ff_flush() acquiring ff->mutex.
Fix this by introducing a new state_lock spinlock to protect udev->state and udev->dev access in uinput_request_send() instead of acquiring udev->mutex. The function only needs to atomically check device state and queue an input event into the ring buffer via uinput_dev_event() -- both operations are safe under a spinlock (ktime_get_ts64() and wake_up_interruptible() do not sleep). This breaks the ff->mutex -> udev->mutex link since a spinlock is a leaf in the lock ordering and cannot form cycles with mutexes.
To keep state transitions visible to uinput_request_send(), protect writes to udev->state in uinput_create_device() and uinput_destroy_device() with the same state_lock spinlock.
Additionally, move init_completion(&request->done) from uinput_request_send() to uinput_request_submit() before uinput_request_reserve_slot(). Once the slot is allocated, uinput_flush_requests() may call complete() on it at any time from the destroy path, so the completion must be initialised before the request becomes visible.
Lock ordering after the fix:
ff->mutex -> state_lock (spinlock, leaf)
udev->mutex -> state_lock (spinlock, leaf)
udev->mutex -> input_mutex -> dev->mutex -> ff->mutex (no back-edge)
--- drivers/input/misc/uinput.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/input/misc/uinput.c +21 -7
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ struct uinput_device {struct input_dev *dev;struct mutex mutex;enum uinput_state state; +spinlock_t state_lock;wait_queue_head_t waitq;unsigned char ready;unsigned char head;
@@ -146,19 +147,15 @@ static void uinput_request_release_slot(static int uinput_request_send (struct uinput_device *udev,struct uinput_request *request) { -int retval; +int retval =0 ; - retval =mutex_lock_interruptible (&udev->mutex); -if (retval) -return retval; +spin_lock (&udev->state_lock);if (udev->state !=UIST_CREATED ) { retval = -ENODEV ; goto out; } -init_completion (&request->done); -/* * Tell our userspace application about this new request * by queueing an input event.
@@ -166,7 +163,7 @@ static int uinput_request_send(struct uiuinput_dev_event (udev->dev,EV_UINPUT , request->code, request->id); out: -mutex_unlock (&udev->mutex); +spin_unlock (&udev->state_lock);return retval; }
@@ -175,6 +172,13 @@ static int uinput_request_submit(struct {int retval; +/* +* Initialize completion before allocating the request slot. +* Once the slot is allocated, uinput_flush_requests() may +* complete it at any time, so it must be initialized first. +*/ +init_completion (&request->done); + retval =uinput_request_reserve_slot (udev, request);if (retval)return retval;
@@ -289,7 +293,14 @@ static void uinput_destroy_device(structstruct input_dev *dev = udev->dev;enum uinput_state old_state = udev->state; +/* +* Update state under state_lock so that concurrent +* uinput_request_send() sees the state change before we +* flush pending requests and tear down the device. +*/ +spin_lock (&udev->state_lock); udev->state =UIST_NEW_DEVICE ; +spin_unlock (&udev->state_lock);if (dev) { name = dev->name;
@@ -366,7 +377,9 @@ static int uinput_create_device(struct uif (error) goto fail2; +spin_lock (&udev->state_lock); udev->state =UIST_CREATED ; +spin_unlock (&udev->state_lock);return 0 ;
@@ -384,6 +397,7 @@ static int uinput_open(struct inode *inoreturn -ENOMEM ;mutex_init (&newdev->mutex); +spin_lock_init (&newdev->state_lock);spin_lock_init (&newdev->requests_lock);init_waitqueue_head (&newdev->requests_waitq);init_waitqueue_head (&newdev->waitq);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 11/86 Input: uinput - take event lock when submitting FF request "event"
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dmitry Torokhov <[email protected]>
commit ff14dafde15c11403fac61367a34fea08926e9ee upstream.
To avoid racing with FF playback events and corrupting device's event queue take event_lock spinlock when calling uinput_dev_event() when submitting a FF upload or erase "event".
--- drivers/input/misc/uinput.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
drivers/input/misc/uinput.c +7 -0
@@ -25,8 +25,10 @@#include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/lockdep.h> #include <linux/miscdevice.h> #include <linux/overflow.h> +#include <linux/spinlock.h> #include <linux/input/mt.h> #include "../input-compat.h"
@@ -76,6 +78,8 @@ static int uinput_dev_event(struct inputstruct uinput_device *udev =input_get_drvdata (dev);struct timespec64 ts; +lockdep_assert_held (&dev->event_lock); +ktime_get_ts64 (&ts); udev->buff[udev->head] = (struct input_event ) {
@@ -147,6 +151,7 @@ static void uinput_request_release_slot(static int uinput_request_send (struct uinput_device *udev,struct uinput_request *request) { +unsigned long flags;int retval =0 ;spin_lock (&udev->state_lock);
@@ -160,7 +165,9 @@ static int uinput_request_send(struct ui* Tell our userspace application about this new request * by queueing an input event. */ +spin_lock_irqsave (&udev->dev->event_lock, flags);uinput_dev_event (udev->dev,EV_UINPUT , request->code, request->id); +spin_unlock_irqrestore (&udev->dev->event_lock, flags); out:spin_unlock (&udev->state_lock);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 12/86 MIPS: Always record SEGBITS in cpu_data.vmbits
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]>
commit 8374c2cb83b95b3c92f129fd56527225c20a058c upstream.
With a 32-bit kernel running on 64-bit MIPS hardware the hardcoded value of `cpu_vmbits' only records the size of compatibility useg and does not reflect the size of native xuseg or the complete range of values allowed in the VPN2 field of TLB entries.
An upcoming change will need the actual VPN2 value range permitted even in 32-bit kernel configurations, so always include the vmbits' member in struct cpuinfo_mips' and probe for SEGBITS when running on 64-bit hardware and resorting to the currently hardcoded value of 31 on 32-bit processors. No functional change for users of `cpu_vmbits'.
--- arch/mips/include/asm/cpu-features.h | 1 - arch/mips/include/asm/cpu-info.h | 2 -- arch/mips/include/asm/mipsregs.h | 2 ++ arch/mips/kernel/cpu-probe.c | 13 ++++++++----- arch/mips/kernel/cpu-r3k-probe.c | 2 ++ 5 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/mips/include/asm/cpu-features.h +0 -1
@@ -484,7 +484,6 @@# endif # ifndef cpu_vmbits# define cpu_vmbits cpu_data[0].vmbits -# define __NEED_VMBITS_PROBE# endif #endif
arch/mips/include/asm/cpu-info.h +0 -2
@@ -80,9 +80,7 @@ struct cpuinfo_mips {int srsets;/* Shadow register sets */ int package;/* physical package number */ unsigned int globalnumber; -#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT int vmbits;/* Virtual memory size in bits */ -#endif void *data;/* Additional data */ unsigned int watch_reg_count;/* Number that exist */ unsigned int watch_reg_use_cnt;/* Usable by ptrace */
arch/mips/include/asm/mipsregs.h +2 -0
@@ -1871,6 +1871,8 @@ do { \#define read_c0_entryhi () __read_ulong_c0_register($10, 0)#define write_c0_entryhi (val) __write_ulong_c0_register($10, 0, val) +#define read_c0_entryhi_64 () __read_64bit_c0_register($10, 0) +#define write_c0_entryhi_64 (val) __write_64bit_c0_register($10, 0, val)#define read_c0_guestctl1 () __read_32bit_c0_register($10, 4)#define write_c0_guestctl1 (val) __write_32bit_c0_register($10, 4, val)
arch/mips/kernel/cpu-probe.c +8 -5
@@ -210,11 +210,14 @@ static inline void set_elf_base_platform(const char *plat)static inline void cpu_probe_vmbits (struct cpuinfo_mips *c) { -#ifdef __NEED_VMBITS_PROBE -write_c0_entryhi (0x3fffffffffffe000ULL ); -back_to_back_c0_hazard (); - c->vmbits =fls64 (read_c0_entryhi () &0x3fffffffffffe000ULL ); -#endif +int vmbits =31 ; + +if (cpu_has_64bits) { +write_c0_entryhi_64 (0x3fffffffffffe000ULL ); +back_to_back_c0_hazard (); + vmbits =fls64 (read_c0_entryhi_64 () &0x3fffffffffffe000ULL ); + } + c->vmbits = vmbits; }static void set_isa (struct cpuinfo_mips *c,unsigned int isa)
arch/mips/kernel/cpu-r3k-probe.c +2 -0
@@ -137,6 +137,8 @@ void cpu_probe(void)else cpu_set_nofpu_opts (c); + c->vmbits =31 ; +reserve_exception_space (0 ,0x400 ); }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 13/86 MIPS: mm: Suppress TLB uniquification on EHINV hardware
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]>
commit 74283cfe216392c7b776ebf6045b5b15ed9dffcd upstream.
Hardware that supports the EHINV feature, mandatory for R6 ISA and FTLB implementation, lets software mark TLB entries invalid, which eliminates the need to ensure no duplicate matching entries are ever created. This feature is already used by local_flush_tlb_all(), via the UNIQUE_ENTRYHI macro, making the preceding call to r4k_tlb_uniquify() superfluous.
The next change will also modify uniquification code such that it'll become incompatible with the FTLB and MMID features, as well as MIPSr6 CPUs that do not implement 4KiB pages.
Therefore prevent r4k_tlb_uniquify() from being used on EHINV hardware, as denoted by `cpu_has_tlbinv'.
--- arch/mips/mm/tlb-r4k.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/mips/mm/tlb-r4k.c +2 -1
@@ -640,7 +640,8 @@ static void r4k_tlb_configure(void) temp_tlb_entry = current_cpu_data.tlbsize -1 ;/* From this point on the ARC firmware is dead. */ -r4k_tlb_uniquify (); +if (!cpu_has_tlbinv) +r4k_tlb_uniquify ();local_flush_tlb_all ();/* Did I tell you that ARC SUCKS? */
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 14/86 MIPS: mm: Rewrite TLB uniquification for the hidden bit feature
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Maciej W. Rozycki <[email protected]>
commit 540760b77b8fc49d39d1b2b76196e5ec57711a32 upstream.
Before the introduction of the EHINV feature, which lets software mark TLB entries invalid, certain older implementations of the MIPS ISA were equipped with an analogous bit, as a vendor extension, which however is hidden from software and only ever set at reset, and then any software write clears it, making the intended TLB entry valid.
This feature makes it unsafe to read a TLB entry with TLBR, modify the page mask, and write the entry back with TLBWI, because this operation will implicitly clear the hidden bit and this may create a duplicate entry, as with the presence of the hidden bit there is no guarantee all the entries across the TLB are unique each.
Usually the firmware has already uniquified TLB entries before handing control over, in which case we only need to guarantee at bootstrap no clash will happen with the VPN2 values chosen in local_flush_tlb_all().
However with systems such as Mikrotik RB532 we get handed the TLB as at reset, with the hidden bit set across the entries and possibly duplicate entries present. This then causes a machine check exception when page sizes are reset in r4k_tlb_uniquify() and prevents the system from booting.
Rewrite the algorithm used in r4k_tlb_uniquify() then such as to avoid the reuse of ASID/VPN values across the TLB. Get rid of global entries first as they may be blocking the entire address space, e.g. 16 256MiB pages will exhaust the whole address space of a 32-bit CPU and a single big page can exhaust the 32-bit compatibility space on a 64-bit CPU.
Details of the algorithm chosen are given across the code itself.
--- arch/mips/mm/tlb-r4k.c | 282 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 228 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
arch/mips/mm/tlb-r4k.c +228 -54
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@#include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/smp.h> #include <linux/memblock.h> +#include <linux/minmax.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/hugetlb.h> #include <linux/export.h>
@@ -24,6 +25,7 @@#include <asm/hazards.h> #include <asm/mmu_context.h> #include <asm/tlb.h> +#include <asm/tlbdebug.h> #include <asm/tlbex.h> #include <asm/tlbmisc.h> #include <asm/setup.h>
@@ -511,87 +513,259 @@ static int __init set_ntlb(char *str)__setup ("ntlb=" , set_ntlb); -/* Comparison function for EntryHi VPN fields. */ -static int r4k_vpn_cmp (const void *a,const void *b) +/* The start bit position of VPN2 and Mask in EntryHi/PageMask registers. */ +#define VPN2_SHIFT 13 + +/* Read full EntryHi even with CONFIG_32BIT. */ +static inline unsigned long long read_c0_entryhi_native (void ) +{ +return cpu_has_64bits ?read_c0_entryhi_64 () :read_c0_entryhi (); +} + +/* Write full EntryHi even with CONFIG_32BIT. */ +static inline void write_c0_entryhi_native (unsigned long long v) { -long v = *(unsigned long *)a - *(unsigned long *)b; -int s =sizeof (long ) >sizeof (int ) ?sizeof (long ) *8 -1 :0 ; -return s ? (v !=0 ) | v >> s : v; +if (cpu_has_64bits) +write_c0_entryhi_64 (v); +else +write_c0_entryhi (v); } +/* TLB entry state for uniquification. */ +struct tlbent { +unsigned long long wired:1 ; +unsigned long long global:1 ; +unsigned long long asid:10 ; +unsigned long long vpn:51 ; +unsigned long long pagesz:5 ; +unsigned long long index:14 ; +}; +/* -* Initialise all TLB entries with unique values that do not clash with -* what we have been handed over and what we'll be using ourselves. +* Comparison function for TLB entry sorting. Place wired entries first, +* then global entries, then order by the increasing VPN/ASID and the +* decreasing page size. This lets us avoid clashes with wired entries +* easily and get entries for larger pages out of the way first. +* +* We could group bits so as to reduce the number of comparisons, but this +* is seldom executed and not performance-critical, so prefer legibility. */ -static void __ref r4k_tlb_uniquify (void ) +static int r4k_entry_cmp (const void *a,const void *b) { -int tlbsize = current_cpu_data.tlbsize; -bool use_slab =slab_is_available (); -int start =num_wired_entries (); -phys_addr_t tlb_vpn_size; -unsigned long *tlb_vpns; -unsigned long vpn_mask; -int cnt, ent, idx, i; - - vpn_mask =GENMASK (cpu_vmbits -1 ,13 ); - vpn_mask |=IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_64BIT ) ?3ULL <<62 :1 <<31 ; +struct tlbent ea = *(struct tlbent *)a, eb = *(struct tlbent *)b; + +if (ea.wired > eb.wired) +return -1 ; +else if (ea.wired < eb.wired) +return 1 ; +else if (ea.global > eb.global) +return -1 ; +else if (ea.global < eb.global) +return 1 ; +else if (ea.vpn < eb.vpn) +return -1 ; +else if (ea.vpn > eb.vpn) +return 1 ; +else if (ea.asid < eb.asid) +return -1 ; +else if (ea.asid > eb.asid) +return 1 ; +else if (ea.pagesz > eb.pagesz) +return -1 ; +else if (ea.pagesz < eb.pagesz) +return 1 ; +else +return 0 ; +} - tlb_vpn_size = tlbsize *sizeof (*tlb_vpns); - tlb_vpns = (use_slab ? -kmalloc (tlb_vpn_size,GFP_ATOMIC ) : -memblock_alloc_raw (tlb_vpn_size,sizeof (*tlb_vpns))); -if (WARN_ON (!tlb_vpns)) -return ;/* Pray local_flush_tlb_all() is good enough. */ +/* +* Fetch all the TLB entries. Mask individual VPN values retrieved with +* the corresponding page mask and ignoring any 1KiB extension as we'll +* be using 4KiB pages for uniquification. +*/ +static void __ref r4k_tlb_uniquify_read (struct tlbent *tlb_vpns,int tlbsize) +{ +int start =num_wired_entries (); +unsigned long long vpn_mask; +bool global; +int i; -htw_stop (); + vpn_mask =GENMASK (current_cpu_data.vmbits -1 ,VPN2_SHIFT ); + vpn_mask |= cpu_has_64bits ?3ULL <<62 :1 <<31 ; -for (i = start, cnt =0 ; i < tlbsize; i++, cnt++) { -unsigned long vpn; +for (i =0 ; i < tlbsize; i++) { +unsigned long long entryhi, vpn, mask, asid; +unsigned int pagesz;write_c0_index (i);mtc0_tlbr_hazard ();tlb_read ();tlb_read_hazard (); - vpn =read_c0_entryhi (); - vpn &= vpn_mask &PAGE_MASK ; - tlb_vpns[cnt] = vpn; -/* Prevent any large pages from overlapping regular ones. */ -write_c0_pagemask (read_c0_pagemask () &PM_DEFAULT_MASK ); -mtc0_tlbw_hazard (); -tlb_write_indexed (); -tlbw_use_hazard (); + global = !!(read_c0_entrylo0 () &ENTRYLO_G ); + entryhi =read_c0_entryhi_native (); + mask =read_c0_pagemask (); + + asid = entryhi &cpu_asid_mask (¤t_cpu_data); + vpn = (entryhi & vpn_mask & ~mask) >>VPN2_SHIFT ; + pagesz =ilog2 ((mask >>VPN2_SHIFT ) +1 ); + + tlb_vpns[i].global = global; + tlb_vpns[i].asid = global ?0 : asid; + tlb_vpns[i].vpn = vpn; + tlb_vpns[i].pagesz = pagesz; + tlb_vpns[i].wired = i < start; + tlb_vpns[i].index = i; } +} -sort (tlb_vpns, cnt,sizeof (tlb_vpns[0 ]), r4k_vpn_cmp,NULL ); +/* +* Write unique values to all but the wired TLB entries each, using +* the 4KiB page size. This size might not be supported with R6, but +* EHINV is mandatory for R6, so we won't ever be called in that case. +* +* A sorted table is supplied with any wired entries at the beginning, +* followed by any global entries, and then finally regular entries. +* We start at the VPN and ASID values of zero and only assign user +* addresses, therefore guaranteeing no clash with addresses produced +* by UNIQUE_ENTRYHI. We avoid any VPN values used by wired or global +* entries, by increasing the VPN value beyond the span of such entry. +* +* When a VPN/ASID clash is found with a regular entry we increment the +* ASID instead until no VPN/ASID clash has been found or the ASID space +* has been exhausted, in which case we increase the VPN value beyond +* the span of the largest clashing entry. +* +* We do not need to be concerned about FTLB or MMID configurations as +* those are required to implement the EHINV feature. +*/ +static void __ref r4k_tlb_uniquify_write (struct tlbent *tlb_vpns,int tlbsize) +{ +unsigned long long asid, vpn, vpn_size, pagesz; +int widx, gidx, idx, sidx, lidx, i; -write_c0_pagemask (PM_DEFAULT_MASK ); + vpn_size =1ULL << (current_cpu_data.vmbits -VPN2_SHIFT ); + pagesz =ilog2 ((PM_4K >>VPN2_SHIFT ) +1 ); + +write_c0_pagemask (PM_4K );write_c0_entrylo0 (0 );write_c0_entrylo1 (0 ); - idx =0 ; - ent = tlbsize; -for (i = start; i < tlbsize; i++) -while (1 ) { -unsigned long entryhi, vpn; + asid =0 ; + vpn =0 ; + widx =0 ; + gidx =0 ; +for (sidx =0 ; sidx < tlbsize && tlb_vpns[sidx].wired; sidx++) + ; +for (lidx = sidx; lidx < tlbsize && tlb_vpns[lidx].global; lidx++) + ; + idx = gidx = sidx +1 ; +for (i = sidx; i < tlbsize; i++) { +unsigned long long entryhi, vpn_pagesz =0 ; - entryhi =UNIQUE_ENTRYHI (ent); - vpn = entryhi & vpn_mask &PAGE_MASK ; +while (1 ) { +if (WARN_ON (vpn >= vpn_size)) { +dump_tlb_all (); +/* Pray local_flush_tlb_all() will cope. */ +return ; + } -if (idx >= cnt || vpn < tlb_vpns[idx]) { -write_c0_entryhi (entryhi); -write_c0_index (i); -mtc0_tlbw_hazard (); -tlb_write_indexed (); - ent++; -break ; - }else if (vpn == tlb_vpns[idx]) { - ent++; - }else { +/* VPN must be below the next wired entry. */ +if (widx < sidx && vpn >= tlb_vpns[widx].vpn) { + vpn =max (vpn, + (tlb_vpns[widx].vpn + + (1ULL << tlb_vpns[widx].pagesz))); + asid =0 ; + widx++; +continue ; + } +/* VPN must be below the next global entry. */ +if (gidx < lidx && vpn >= tlb_vpns[gidx].vpn) { + vpn =max (vpn, + (tlb_vpns[gidx].vpn + + (1ULL << tlb_vpns[gidx].pagesz))); + asid =0 ; + gidx++; +continue ; + } +/* Try to find a free ASID so as to conserve VPNs. */ +if (idx < tlbsize && vpn == tlb_vpns[idx].vpn && + asid == tlb_vpns[idx].asid) { +unsigned long long idx_pagesz; + + idx_pagesz = tlb_vpns[idx].pagesz; + vpn_pagesz =max (vpn_pagesz, idx_pagesz); +do + idx++; +while (idx < tlbsize && + vpn == tlb_vpns[idx].vpn && + asid == tlb_vpns[idx].asid); + asid++; +if (asid >cpu_asid_mask (¤t_cpu_data)) { + vpn += vpn_pagesz; + asid =0 ; + vpn_pagesz =0 ; + } +continue ; + } +/* VPN mustn't be above the next regular entry. */ +if (idx < tlbsize && vpn > tlb_vpns[idx].vpn) { + vpn =max (vpn, + (tlb_vpns[idx].vpn + + (1ULL << tlb_vpns[idx].pagesz))); + asid =0 ; idx++; +continue ; } +break ; } + entryhi = (vpn <<VPN2_SHIFT ) | asid; +write_c0_entryhi_native (entryhi); +write_c0_index (tlb_vpns[i].index); +mtc0_tlbw_hazard (); +tlb_write_indexed (); + + tlb_vpns[i].asid = asid; + tlb_vpns[i].vpn = vpn; + tlb_vpns[i].pagesz = pagesz; + + asid++; +if (asid >cpu_asid_mask (¤t_cpu_data)) { + vpn +=1ULL << pagesz; + asid =0 ; + } + } +} + +/* +* Initialise all TLB entries with unique values that do not clash with +* what we have been handed over and what we'll be using ourselves. +*/ +static void __ref r4k_tlb_uniquify (void ) +{ +int tlbsize = current_cpu_data.tlbsize; +bool use_slab =slab_is_available (); +phys_addr_t tlb_vpn_size; +struct tlbent *tlb_vpns; + + tlb_vpn_size = tlbsize *sizeof (*tlb_vpns); + tlb_vpns = (use_slab ? +kmalloc (tlb_vpn_size,GFP_ATOMIC ) : +memblock_alloc_raw (tlb_vpn_size,sizeof (*tlb_vpns))); +if (WARN_ON (!tlb_vpns)) +return ;/* Pray local_flush_tlb_all() is good enough. */ + +htw_stop (); + +r4k_tlb_uniquify_read (tlb_vpns, tlbsize); + +sort (tlb_vpns, tlbsize,sizeof (*tlb_vpns), r4k_entry_cmp,NULL ); + +r4k_tlb_uniquify_write (tlb_vpns, tlbsize); + +write_c0_pagemask (PM_DEFAULT_MASK ); +tlbw_use_hazard ();htw_start ();flush_micro_tlb ();
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 15/86 btrfs: remove pointless out labels from extent-tree.c
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit ea8f9210050136bdd14f5e32b04cd01c8bd5c0ca ]
Some functions (lookup_extent_data_ref(), __btrfs_mod_ref() and btrfs_free_tree_block()) have an 'out' label that does nothing but return, making it pointless. Simplify this by removing the label and returning instead of gotos plus setting the 'ret' variable.
Stable-dep-of: 316fb1b3169e ("btrfs: fix incorrect return value after changing leaf in lookup_extent_data_ref()")
--- fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c | 24 ++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c +10 -14
@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ static noinline int lookup_extent_data_ref(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,btrfs_item_key_to_cpu (leaf, &key, path->slots[0 ]);if (key.objectid != bytenr || key.type !=BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_REF_KEY ) - goto fail; +return ret; ref =btrfs_item_ptr (leaf, path->slots[0 ], struct btrfs_extent_data_ref);
@@ -487,12 +487,11 @@ static noinline int lookup_extent_data_ref(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,btrfs_release_path (path); goto again; } - ret =0 ; -break ; +return 0 ; } path->slots[0 ]++; } -fail: +return ret; }
@@ -2474,7 +2473,7 @@ static int __btrfs_mod_ref(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,int i;int action;int level; -int ret =0 ; +int ret;if (btrfs_is_testing (fs_info))return 0 ;
@@ -2526,7 +2525,7 @@ static int __btrfs_mod_ref(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,else ret =btrfs_free_extent (trans, &ref);if (ret) - goto fail; +return ret; }else {/* We don't know the owning_root, leave as 0. */ ref.bytenr =btrfs_node_blockptr (buf, i);
@@ -2539,12 +2538,10 @@ static int __btrfs_mod_ref(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,else ret =btrfs_free_extent (trans, &ref);if (ret) - goto fail; +return ret; } }return 0 ; -fail: -return ret; } int btrfs_inc_ref(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, struct btrfs_root *root,
@@ -3466,12 +3463,12 @@ int btrfs_free_tree_block(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,return 0 ;if (btrfs_header_generation (buf) != trans->transid) - goto out; +return 0 ;if (root_id !=BTRFS_TREE_LOG_OBJECTID ) { ret =check_ref_cleanup (trans, buf->start);if (!ret) - goto out; +return 0 ; } bg =btrfs_lookup_block_group (fs_info, buf->start);
@@ -3479,7 +3476,7 @@ int btrfs_free_tree_block(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,if (btrfs_header_flag (buf,BTRFS_HEADER_FLAG_WRITTEN )) {pin_down_extent (trans, bg, buf->start, buf->len, true);btrfs_put_block_group (bg); - goto out; +return 0 ; }/*
@@ -3503,7 +3500,7 @@ int btrfs_free_tree_block(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans, || btrfs_is_zoned(fs_info)) {pin_down_extent (trans, bg, buf->start, buf->len, true);btrfs_put_block_group (bg); - goto out; +return 0 ; }WARN_ON (test_bit (EXTENT_BUFFER_DIRTY , &buf->bflags));
@@ -3513,7 +3510,6 @@ int btrfs_free_tree_block(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,btrfs_put_block_group (bg);trace_btrfs_reserved_extent_free (fs_info, buf->start, buf->len); -out:return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 16/86 btrfs: fix incorrect return value after changing leaf in lookup_extent_data_ref()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: robbieko <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 316fb1b3169efb081d2db910cbbfef445afa03b9 ]
After commit 1618aa3c2e01 ("btrfs: simplify return variables in lookup_extent_data_ref()"), the err and ret variables were merged into a single ret variable. However, when btrfs_next_leaf() returns 0 (success), ret is overwritten from -ENOENT to 0. If the first key in the next leaf does not match (different objectid or type), the function returns 0 instead of -ENOENT, making the caller believe the lookup succeeded when it did not. This can lead to operations on the wrong extent tree item, potentially causing extent tree corruption.
Fix this by returning -ENOENT directly when the key does not match, instead of relying on the ret variable.
--- fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c +1 -1
@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ static noinline int lookup_extent_data_ref(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,btrfs_item_key_to_cpu (leaf, &key, path->slots[0 ]);if (key.objectid != bytenr || key.type !=BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_REF_KEY ) -return ret; +return -ENOENT ; ref =btrfs_item_ptr (leaf, path->slots[0 ], struct btrfs_extent_data_ref);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 17/86 i2c: imx: zero-initialize dma_slave_config for eDMA
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Anthony Pighin <[email protected]>
commit 39ed7d89b973329cc5c764b65ba6302b17b1907e upstream.
commit 66d88e16f204 ("dmaengine: fsl-edma: read/write multiple registers in cyclic transactions") causes fsl_edma_fill_tcd() to read dst_port_window_size and src_port_window_size when building transfer control descriptors.
Initialize the structure so unset fields are explicitly zero.
--- drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-imx.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-imx.c +1 -1
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ static void i2c_imx_reset_regs(struct imstatic int i2c_imx_dma_request (struct imx_i2c_struct *i2c_imx,dma_addr_t phy_addr) {struct imx_i2c_dma *dma; -struct dma_slave_config dma_sconfig; +struct dma_slave_config dma_sconfig = {};struct device *dev = i2c_imx->adapter.dev.parent;int ret;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 18/86 netfilter: nft_ct: fix use-after-free in timeout object destroy
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tuan Do <[email protected]>
commit f8dca15a1b190787bbd03285304b569631160eda upstream.
nft_ct_timeout_obj_destroy() frees the timeout object with kfree() immediately after nf_ct_untimeout(), without waiting for an RCU grace period. Concurrent packet processing on other CPUs may still hold RCU-protected references to the timeout object obtained via rcu_dereference() in nf_ct_timeout_data().
Add an rcu_head to struct nf_ct_timeout and use kfree_rcu() to defer freeing until after an RCU grace period, matching the approach already used in nfnetlink_cttimeout.c.
KASAN report:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nf_conntrack_tcp_packet+0x1381/0x29d0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881035fe19c by task exploit/80 Call Trace: nf_conntrack_tcp_packet+0x1381/0x29d0 nf_conntrack_in+0x612/0x8b0 nf_hook_slow+0x70/0x100 __ip_local_out+0x1b2/0x210 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x722/0x1580 __sys_sendto+0x2d8/0x320 Allocated by task 75: nft_ct_timeout_obj_init+0xf6/0x290 nft_obj_init+0x107/0x1b0 nf_tables_newobj+0x680/0x9c0 nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xc29/0xe00 Freed by task 26: nft_obj_destroy+0x3f/0xa0 nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x51c/0x5c0 process_one_work+0x2c4/0x5a0
--- include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_timeout.h | 1 + net/netfilter/nft_ct.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_timeout.h +1 -0
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@struct nf_ct_timeout {__u16 l3num;const struct nf_conntrack_l4proto *l4proto; +struct rcu_head rcu;char data[]; };
net/netfilter/nft_ct.c +1 -1
@@ -1021,7 +1021,7 @@ static void nft_ct_timeout_obj_destroy(cnf_queue_nf_hook_drop (ctx->net);nf_ct_untimeout (ctx->net, timeout);nf_ct_netns_put (ctx->net, ctx->family); -kfree (priv->timeout); +kfree_rcu (priv->timeout, rcu); } static int nft_ct_timeout_obj_dump(struct sk_buff *skb,
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 19/86 firmware: thead: Fix buffer overflow and use standard endian macros
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michal Wilczynski <[email protected]>
commit 88c4bd90725557796c15878b7cb70066e9e6b5ab upstream.
Addresses two issues in the TH1520 AON firmware protocol driver:
1. Fix a potential buffer overflow where the code used unsafe pointer arithmetic to access the 'mode' field through the 'resource' pointer with an offset. This was flagged by Smatch static checker as:
"buffer overflow 'data' 2 <= 3"
2. Replace custom RPC_SET_BE* and RPC_GET_BE* macros with standard kernel endianness conversion macros (cpu_to_be16, etc.) for better portability and maintainability.
The functionality was re-tested with the GPU power-up sequence, confirming the GPU powers up correctly and the driver probes successfully.
[ 12.702370] powervr ffef400000.gpu: [drm] loaded firmware powervr/rogue_36.52.104.182_v1.fw [ 12.711043] powervr ffef400000.gpu: [drm] FW version v1.0 (build 6645434 OS) [ 12.719787] [drm] Initialized powervr 1.0.0 for ffef400000.gpu on
minor 0
--- drivers/firmware/thead,th1520-aon.c | 7 -- include/linux/firmware/thead/thead,th1520-aon.h | 74 ------------------------ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 78 deletions(-)
drivers/firmware/thead,th1520-aon.c +3 -4
@@ -170,10 +170,9 @@ int th1520_aon_power_update(struct th152 hdr->func =TH1520_AON_PM_FUNC_SET_RESOURCE_POWER_MODE ; hdr->size =TH1520_AON_RPC_MSG_NUM ; -RPC_SET_BE16 (&msg.resource,0 , rsrc); -RPC_SET_BE16 (&msg.resource,2 , - (power_on ?TH1520_AON_PM_PW_MODE_ON : -TH1520_AON_PM_PW_MODE_OFF )); + msg.resource =cpu_to_be16 (rsrc); + msg.mode =cpu_to_be16 (power_on ?TH1520_AON_PM_PW_MODE_ON : +TH1520_AON_PM_PW_MODE_OFF ); ret =th1520_aon_call_rpc (aon_chan, &msg);if (ret)
include/linux/firmware/thead/thead,th1520-aon.h +0 -74
80 lines not on this page · raw message
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 20/86 workqueue: Add pool_workqueue to pending_pwqs list when unplugging multiple inactive works
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Matthew Brost <[email protected]>
commit 703ccb63ae9f7444d6ff876d024e17f628103c69 upstream.
In unplug_oldest_pwq(), the first inactive work item on the pool_workqueue is activated correctly. However, if multiple inactive works exist on the same pool_workqueue, subsequent works fail to activate because wq_node_nr_active.pending_pwqs is empty — the list insertion is skipped when the pool_workqueue is plugged.
Fix this by checking for additional inactive works in unplug_oldest_pwq() and updating wq_node_nr_active.pending_pwqs accordingly.
--- kernel/workqueue.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/workqueue.c +13 -1
@@ -1849,8 +1849,20 @@ static void unplug_oldest_pwq(struct worraw_spin_lock_irq (&pwq->pool->lock);if (pwq->plugged) { pwq->plugged = false; -if (pwq_activate_first_inactive (pwq, true)) +if (pwq_activate_first_inactive (pwq, true)) { +/* +* While plugged, queueing skips activation which +* includes bumping the nr_active count and adding the +* pwq to nna->pending_pwqs if the count can't be +* obtained. We need to restore both for the pwq being +* unplugged. The first call activates the first +* inactive work item and the second, if there are more +* inactive, puts the pwq on pending_pwqs. +*/ +pwq_activate_first_inactive (pwq, false); +kick_pool (pwq->pool); + } }raw_spin_unlock_irq (&pwq->pool->lock); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 21/86 modpost: Declare extra_warn with unused attribute
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Nathan Chancellor <[email protected]>
commit deb4605671cfae3b2803cfbbf4739e7245248398 upstream.
A recent strengthening of -Wunused-but-set-variable (enabled with -Wall) in clang under a new subwarning, -Wunused-but-set-global, points out an unused static global variable in scripts/mod/modpost.c:
scripts/mod/modpost.c:59:13: error: variable 'extra_warn' set but not used [-Werror,-Wunused-but-set-global]
59 | static bool extra_warn;
| ^This variable has been unused since commit 6c6c1fc09de3 ("modpost:
require a MODULE_DESCRIPTION()") but that is expected, as there are currently no extra warnings at W=1 right now. Declare the variable with the unused attribute to make it clear to the compiler that this variable may be unused.
--- scripts/mod/modpost.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
scripts/mod/modpost.c +1 -1
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static bool allow_missing_ns_imports;static bool error_occurred; -static bool extra_warn; +static bool extra_warn __attribute__((unused));bool target_is_big_endian;bool host_is_big_endian;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 22/86 xfrm: clear trailing padding in build_polexpire()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yasuaki Torimaru <[email protected]>
commit 71a98248c63c535eaa4d4c22f099b68d902006d0 upstream.
build_expire() clears the trailing padding bytes of struct xfrm_user_expire after setting the hard field via memset_after(), but the analogous function build_polexpire() does not do this for struct xfrm_user_polexpire.
The padding bytes after the __u8 hard field are left uninitialized from the heap allocation, and are then sent to userspace via netlink multicast to XFRMNLGRP_EXPIRE listeners, leaking kernel heap memory contents.
Add the missing memset_after() call, matching build_expire().
--- net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +2 -0
@@ -3951,6 +3951,8 @@ static int build_polexpire(struct sk_bufreturn err; } upe->hard = !!hard; +/* clear the padding bytes */ +memset_after (upe,0 , hard);nlmsg_end (skb, nlh);return 0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 23/86 xfrm: hold dev ref until after transport_finish NF_HOOK
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Qi Tang <[email protected]>
commit 1c428b03840094410c5fb6a5db30640486bbbfcb upstream.
After async crypto completes, xfrm_input_resume() calls dev_put() immediately on re-entry before the skb reaches transport_finish. The skb->dev pointer is then used inside NF_HOOK and its okfn, which can race with device teardown.
Remove the dev_put from the async resumption entry and instead drop the reference after the NF_HOOK call in transport_finish, using a saved device pointer since NF_HOOK may consume the skb. This covers NF_DROP, NF_QUEUE and NF_STOLEN paths that skip the okfn.
For non-transport exits (decaps, gro, drop) and secondary async return points, release the reference inline when async is set.
--- net/ipv4/xfrm4_input.c | 5 ++++- net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c | 5 ++++- net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c | 18 ++++++++++++++---- 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/xfrm4_input.c +4 -1
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ int xfrm4_transport_finish(struct sk_buf {struct xfrm_offload *xo =xfrm_offload (skb);struct iphdr *iph =ip_hdr (skb); +struct net_device *dev = skb->dev; iph->protocol =XFRM_MODE_SKB_CB (skb)->protocol;
@@ -73,8 +74,10 @@ int xfrm4_transport_finish(struct sk_buf }NF_HOOK (NFPROTO_IPV4 ,NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING , -dev_net (skb->dev),NULL , skb, skb->dev,NULL , +dev_net (dev),NULL , skb, dev,NULL , xfrm4_rcv_encap_finish); +if (async) +dev_put (dev);return 0 ; }
net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c +4 -1
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ static int xfrm6_transport_finish2(strucint xfrm6_transport_finish (struct sk_buff *skb,int async) {struct xfrm_offload *xo =xfrm_offload (skb); +struct net_device *dev = skb->dev;int nhlen = -skb_network_offset (skb); skb_network_header(skb)[IP6CB(skb)->nhoff] =
@@ -68,8 +69,10 @@ int xfrm6_transport_finish(struct sk_buf }NF_HOOK (NFPROTO_IPV6 ,NF_INET_PRE_ROUTING , -dev_net (skb->dev),NULL , skb, skb->dev,NULL , +dev_net (dev),NULL , skb, dev,NULL , xfrm6_transport_finish2); +if (async) +dev_put (dev);return 0 ; }
net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c +14 -4
@@ -503,7 +503,6 @@ int xfrm_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int/* An encap_type of -1 indicates async resumption. */ if (encap_type ==-1 ) { async =1 ; -dev_put (skb->dev); seq =XFRM_SKB_CB (skb)->seq.input.low;spin_lock (&x->lock); goto resume;
@@ -656,8 +655,11 @@ process:dev_hold (skb->dev); nexthdr = x->type->input (x, skb); -if (nexthdr == -EINPROGRESS ) +if (nexthdr == -EINPROGRESS ) { +if (async) +dev_put (skb->dev);return 0 ; + }dev_put (skb->dev);spin_lock (&x->lock);
@@ -692,9 +694,11 @@ resume:XFRM_MODE_SKB_CB (skb)->protocol = nexthdr; err =xfrm_inner_mode_input (x, skb); -if (err == -EINPROGRESS ) +if (err == -EINPROGRESS ) { +if (async) +dev_put (skb->dev);return 0 ; -else if (err) { + }else if (err) {XFRM_INC_STATS (net,LINUX_MIB_XFRMINSTATEMODEERROR ); goto drop; }
@@ -731,6 +735,8 @@ resume_decapped: sp->olen =0 ;if (skb_valid_dst (skb))skb_dst_drop (skb); +if (async) +dev_put (skb->dev);gro_cells_receive (&gro_cells, skb);return 0 ; }else {
@@ -750,6 +756,8 @@ resume_decapped: sp->olen =0 ;if (skb_valid_dst (skb))skb_dst_drop (skb); +if (async) +dev_put (skb->dev);gro_cells_receive (&gro_cells, skb);return err; }
@@ -760,6 +768,8 @@ resume_decapped: drop_unlock:spin_unlock (&x->lock); drop: +if (async) +dev_put (skb->dev);xfrm_rcv_cb (skb, family, x && x->type ? x->type->proto : nexthdr,-1 );kfree_skb (skb);return 0 ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 24/86 tipc: fix bc_ackers underflow on duplicate GRP_ACK_MSG
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Oleh Konko <[email protected]>
commit 48a5fe38772b6f039522469ee6131a67838221a8 upstream.
The GRP_ACK_MSG handler in tipc_group_proto_rcv() currently decrements bc_ackers on every inbound group ACK, even when the same member has already acknowledged the current broadcast round.
Because bc_ackers is a u16, a duplicate ACK received after the last legitimate ACK wraps the counter to 65535. Once wrapped, tipc_group_bc_cong() keeps reporting congestion and later group broadcasts on the affected socket stay blocked until the group is recreated.
Fix this by ignoring duplicate or stale ACKs before touching bc_acked or bc_ackers. This makes repeated GRP_ACK_MSG handling idempotent and prevents the underflow path.
--- net/tipc/group.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/tipc/group.c +5 -1
@@ -746,6 +746,7 @@ void tipc_group_proto_rcv(struct tipc_gru32 port =msg_origport (hdr);struct tipc_member *m, *pm;u16 remitted, in_flight; +u16 acked;if (!grp)return ;
@@ -798,7 +799,10 @@ void tipc_group_proto_rcv(struct tipc_grcase GRP_ACK_MSG :if (!m)return ; - m->bc_acked =msg_grp_bc_acked (hdr); + acked =msg_grp_bc_acked (hdr); +if (less_eq (acked, m->bc_acked)) +return ; + m->bc_acked = acked;if (--grp->bc_ackers)return ;list_del_init (&m->small_win);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 25/86 kbuild: modules-cpio-pkg: Respect INSTALL_MOD_PATH
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Janne Grunau <[email protected]>
commit 742de64b62b690a368dbeb846499eb8ac8ceedb9 upstream.
The modules-cpio-pkg target added in commit 2a9c8c0b59d3 ("kbuild: add target to build a cpio containing modules") is incompatible with initramfs with merged /lib and /usr/lib directories [1]. "/lib" cannot be a link and directory at the same time.
Respect a non-empty INSTALL_MOD_PATH in the modules-cpio-pkg target so that make INSTALL_MOD_PATH=/usr modules-cpio-pkg results in the same module install location as make INSTALL_MOD_PATH=/usr modules_install.
Tested with Fedora distribution initramfs produced by dracut.
--- scripts/Makefile.package | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
scripts/Makefile.package +2 -1
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ tar%-pkg: linux-$(KERNELRELEASE)-$(ARCH) .tmp_modules_cpio: FORCE $(Q)$(MAKE) -f $(srctree)/Makefile $(Q)rm -rf $@ - $(Q)$(MAKE) -f $(srctree)/Makefile INSTALL_MOD_PATH=$@ modules_install + $(Q)$(MAKE) -f $(srctree)/Makefile INSTALL_MOD_PATH=$@/$(INSTALL_MOD_PATH) modules_install quiet_cmd_cpio = CPIO $@ cmd_cpio = $(CONFIG_SHELL) $(srctree)/usr/gen_initramfs.sh -o $@ $<
@@ -265,6 +265,7 @@ help: @echo ' tarxz-pkg - Build the kernel as a xz compressed tarball' @echo ' tarzst-pkg - Build the kernel as a zstd compressed tarball' @echo ' modules-cpio-pkg - Build the kernel modules as cpio archive' + @echo ' (uses INSTALL_MOD_PATH inside the archive)' @echo ' perf-tar-src-pkg - Build the perf source tarball with no compression' @echo ' perf-targz-src-pkg - Build the perf source tarball with gzip compression' @echo ' perf-tarbz2-src-pkg - Build the perf source tarball with bz2 compression'
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 26/86 ASoC: SOF: Intel: hda: modify period size constraints for ACE4
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Kai Vehmanen <[email protected]>
commit 0f71866057262d669ed6a21246eaac0ad6d04d4e upstream.
Intel ACE4 based products set more strict constraints on HDA BDLE start address and length alignment. Add a constraint to align period size to 128 bytes.
The commit removes the "minimum as per HDA spec" comment. This comment was misleading as spec actually does allow a 2 byte BDLE length, and more importantly, period size also directly impacts how the BDLE start addresses are aligned, so it is not sufficient just to consider allowed buffer length.
--- sound/soc/sof/intel/hda-pcm.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
sound/soc/sof/intel/hda-pcm.c +12 -2
@@ -219,6 +219,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS(hda_dsp_pcm_pointer, "SND_SOC_SOF_INTEL_HDA_COMMON");int hda_dsp_pcm_open (struct snd_sof_dev *sdev,struct snd_pcm_substream *substream) { +const struct sof_intel_dsp_desc *chip_info =get_chip_info (sdev->pdata);struct snd_soc_pcm_runtime *rtd =snd_soc_substream_to_rtd (substream);struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime = substream->runtime;struct snd_soc_component *scomp = sdev->component;
@@ -268,8 +269,17 @@ int hda_dsp_pcm_open(struct snd_sof_dev *sdev,return -ENODEV ; } -/* minimum as per HDA spec */ -snd_pcm_hw_constraint_step (substream->runtime,0 ,SNDRV_PCM_HW_PARAM_PERIOD_BYTES ,4 ); +/* +* Set period size constraint to ensure BDLE buffer length and +* start address alignment requirements are met. Align to 128 +* bytes for newer Intel platforms, with older ones using 4 byte alignment. +*/ +if (chip_info->hw_ip_version >=SOF_INTEL_ACE_4_0 ) +snd_pcm_hw_constraint_step (substream->runtime,0 , +SNDRV_PCM_HW_PARAM_PERIOD_BYTES ,128 ); +else +snd_pcm_hw_constraint_step (substream->runtime,0 , +SNDRV_PCM_HW_PARAM_PERIOD_BYTES ,4 );/* avoid circular buffer wrap in middle of period */ snd_pcm_hw_constraint_integer(substream->runtime,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 27/86 wifi: brcmsmac: Fix dma_free_coherent() size
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Thomas Fourier <[email protected]>
commit 12cd7632757a54ce586e36040210b1a738a0fc53 upstream.
dma_alloc_consistent() may change the size to align it. The new size is saved in alloced.
Change the free size to match the allocation size.
--- drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmsmac/dma.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmsmac/dma.c +1 -1
@@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ static void *dma_ringalloc(struct dma_inif (((desc_strtaddr + size -1 ) & boundary) != (desc_strtaddr & boundary)) { *alignbits =dma_align_sizetobits (size); -dma_free_coherent (di->dmadev, size, va, *descpa); +dma_free_coherent (di->dmadev, *alloced, va, *descpa); va =dma_alloc_consistent (di, size, *alignbits, alloced, descpa); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 28/86 x86/mce/amd: Filter bogus hardware errors on Zen3 clients
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yazen Ghannam <[email protected]>
commit 0422b07bc4c296b736e240d95d21fbfebbfaa2ca upstream.
Users have been observing multiple L3 cache deferred errors after recent kernel rework of deferred error handling.¹ ⁴
The errors are bogus due to inconsistent status values. Also, user verified that bogus MCA_DESTAT values are present on the system even with an older kernel.²
The errors seem to be garbage values present in the MCA_DESTAT of some L3 cache banks. These were implicitly ignored before the recent kernel rework because these do not generate a deferred error interrupt.
A later revision of the rework patch was merged for v6.19. This naturally filtered out most of the bogus error logs. However, a few signatures still remain.³
Minimize the scope of the filter to the reported CPU family/model/stepping and only for errors which don't have the Enabled bit in the MCi status MSR.
¹ https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected]
² https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected]
³ https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected]
⁴ https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAKFB093B2k3sKsGJ_QNX1jVQsaXVFyy=wNwpzCGLOXa_vSDwXw@mail.gmail.com
[ bp: Generalize the condition according to which errors are bogus. ]
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/amd.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/amd.c +8 -0
@@ -604,6 +604,14 @@ bool amd_filter_mce(struct mce *m)enum smca_bank_types bank_type =smca_get_bank_type (m->extcpu, m->bank);struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data; +/* Bogus hw errors on Cezanne A0. */ +if (c->x86 ==0x19 && + c->x86_model ==0x50 && + c->x86_stepping ==0x0 ) { +if (!(m->status &MCI_STATUS_EN )) +return true; + } +/* See Family 17h Models 10h-2Fh Erratum #1114. */ if (c->x86 == 0x17 && c->x86_model >= 0x10 && c->x86_model <= 0x2F &&
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 29/86 platform/x86: ISST: Reset core count to 0
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Srinivas Pandruvada <[email protected]>
commit e1415b9418eb22b4a7a1ef4b4aec9dd0a49e3fa7 upstream.
Based on feature revision, number of buckets can be less than the TRL_MAX_BUCKETS. In that case core counts in the remaining buckets can be set to some invalid values.
Hence reset core count to 0 for all buckets before assigning correct values.
--- drivers/platform/x86/intel/speed_select_if/isst_tpmi_core.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/platform/x86/intel/speed_select_if/isst_tpmi_core.c +2 -0
@@ -1460,6 +1460,8 @@ static int isst_if_get_turbo_freq_info(v SST_MUL_FACTOR_FREQ) } +memset (turbo_freq.bucket_core_counts,0 ,sizeof (turbo_freq.bucket_core_counts)); +if (feature_rev >=2 ) {bool has_tf_info_8 = false;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 30/86 platform/x86/intel-uncore-freq: Handle autonomous UFS status bit
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Srinivas Pandruvada <[email protected]>
commit 4ab604b3f3aa8dcccc7505f5d310016682a99d5f upstream.
When the AUTONOMOUS_UFS_DISABLED bit is set in the header, the ELC (Efficiency Latency Control) feature is non-functional. Hence, return error for read or write to ELC attributes.
--- drivers/platform/x86/intel/uncore-frequency/uncore-frequency-tpmi.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/platform/x86/intel/uncore-frequency/uncore-frequency-tpmi.c +7 -1
@@ -537,6 +537,7 @@ static void set_cdie_id(int domain_id, s#define UNCORE_VERSION_MASK GENMASK_ULL(7, 0)#define UNCORE_LOCAL_FABRIC_CLUSTER_ID_MASK GENMASK_ULL(15, 8)#define UNCORE_CLUSTER_OFF_MASK GENMASK_ULL(7, 0) +#define UNCORE_AUTONOMOUS_UFS_DISABLED BIT(32)#define UNCORE_MAX_CLUSTER_PER_DOMAIN 8static int uncore_probe (struct auxiliary_device *auxdev,const struct auxiliary_device_id *id)
@@ -598,6 +599,7 @@ static int uncore_probe(struct auxiliaryfor (i =0 ; i < num_resources; ++i) {struct tpmi_uncore_power_domain_info *pd_info; +bool auto_ufs_enabled;struct resource *res;u64 cluster_offset;u8 cluster_mask;
@@ -647,6 +649,8 @@ static int uncore_probe(struct auxiliarycontinue ; } + auto_ufs_enabled = !(header &UNCORE_AUTONOMOUS_UFS_DISABLED ); +/* Find out number of clusters in this resource */ pd_info->cluster_count =hweight8 (cluster_mask);
@@ -689,7 +693,9 @@ static int uncore_probe(struct auxiliary cluster_info->uncore_root = tpmi_uncore; -if (TPMI_MINOR_VERSION (pd_info->ufs_header_ver) >=UNCORE_ELC_SUPPORTED_VERSION ) +if ((TPMI_MINOR_VERSION (pd_info->ufs_header_ver) >= +UNCORE_ELC_SUPPORTED_VERSION ) && + auto_ufs_enabled) cluster_info->elc_supported = true; ret =uncore_freq_add_entry (&cluster_info->uncore_data,0 );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 31/86 Revert "arm64: dts: rockchip: Further describe the WiFi for the Pinebook Pro"
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Heiko Stuebner <[email protected]>
commit 29d1f56c4f3001b7f547123e0a307c009ac717f8 upstream.
This reverts commit 6d54d935062e2d4a7d3f779ceb9eeff108d0535d.
It seems there are different variants of the Wifi chipset in use on the Pinebook Pro. And according to the reported regression - see Closes below, the reverted change causes issues with one Wifi chipset.
The original commit message indicates a "further description" only and does not indicate this would fix an actual problem, so a revert should not cause further problems.
--- arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-pinebook-pro.dts | 18 ------------------ 1 file changed, 18 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-pinebook-pro.dts +0 -18
@@ -879,12 +879,6 @@ }; }; - wifi { - wifi_host_wake_l: wifi-host-wake-l { - rockchip,pins = <0 RK_PA3 RK_FUNC_GPIO &pcfg_pull_none>; - }; - }; - wireless-bluetooth { bt_wake_pin: bt-wake-pin { rockchip,pins = <2 RK_PD3 RK_FUNC_GPIO &pcfg_pull_none>;
@@ -942,19 +936,7 @@ pinctrl-names = "default"; pinctrl-0 = <&sdio0_bus4 &sdio0_cmd &sdio0_clk>; sd-uhs-sdr104; - #address-cells = <1>; - #size-cells = <0>; status = "okay"; - - brcmf: wifi@1 { - compatible = "brcm,bcm4329-fmac"; - reg = <1>; - interrupt-parent = <&gpio0>; - interrupts = <RK_PA3 IRQ_TYPE_LEVEL_HIGH>; - interrupt-names = "host-wake"; - pinctrl-names = "default"; - pinctrl-0 = <&wifi_host_wake_l>; - }; }; &sdhci {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 32/86 Revert "arm64: dts: imx8mq-librem5: Set the DVS voltages lower"
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sebastian Krzyszkowiak <[email protected]>
commit 4cd46ea0eb4504f7f4fea92cb4601c5c9a3e545e upstream.
This reverts commit c24a9b698fb02cd0723fa8375abab07f94b97b10.
It's been found that there's a significant per-unit variance in accepted supply voltages and the current set still makes some units unstable.
Revert back to nominal values.
--- arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8mq-librem5-r3.dts | 2 - arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8mq-librem5.dtsi | 22 +++++--------------- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8mq-librem5-r3.dts +1 -1
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ &a53_opp_table { opp-1000000000 { - opp-microvolt = <950000>; + opp-microvolt = <1000000>; }; };
arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8mq-librem5.dtsi +6 -16
@@ -844,8 +844,8 @@ regulator-max-microvolt = <1300000>; regulator-boot-on; regulator-ramp-delay = <1250>; - rohm,dvs-run-voltage = <880000>; - rohm,dvs-idle-voltage = <820000>; + rohm,dvs-run-voltage = <900000>; + rohm,dvs-idle-voltage = <850000>; rohm,dvs-suspend-voltage = <810000>; regulator-always-on; };
@@ -856,8 +856,8 @@ regulator-max-microvolt = <1300000>; regulator-boot-on; regulator-ramp-delay = <1250>; - rohm,dvs-run-voltage = <950000>; - rohm,dvs-idle-voltage = <850000>; + rohm,dvs-run-voltage = <1000000>; + rohm,dvs-idle-voltage = <900000>; regulator-always-on; };
@@ -866,14 +866,14 @@ regulator-min-microvolt = <700000>; regulator-max-microvolt = <1300000>; regulator-boot-on; - rohm,dvs-run-voltage = <850000>; + rohm,dvs-run-voltage = <900000>; }; buck4_reg: BUCK4 { regulator-name = "buck4"; regulator-min-microvolt = <700000>; regulator-max-microvolt = <1300000>; - rohm,dvs-run-voltage = <930000>; + rohm,dvs-run-voltage = <1000000>; }; buck5_reg: BUCK5 {
@@ -1407,13 +1407,3 @@ fsl,ext-reset-output; status = "okay"; }; - -&a53_opp_table { - opp-1000000000 { - opp-microvolt = <850000>; - }; - - opp-1500000000 { - opp-microvolt = <950000>; - }; -};
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 33/86 arm64: dts: imx8mq-librem5: Bump BUCK1 suspend voltage up to 0.85V
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sebastian Krzyszkowiak <[email protected]>
commit 511f76bf1dce5acf8907b65a7d1bc8f7e7c0d637 upstream.
The minimal voltage of VDD_SOC sourced from BUCK1 is 0.81V, which is the currently set value. However, BD71837 only guarantees accuracy of ±0.01V, and this still doesn't factor other reasons for actual voltage to slightly drop in, resulting in the possibility of running out of the operational range.
Bump the voltage up to 0.85V, which should give enough headroom.
--- arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8mq-librem5.dtsi | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8mq-librem5.dtsi +1 -1
@@ -846,7 +846,7 @@ regulator-ramp-delay = <1250>; rohm,dvs-run-voltage = <900000>; rohm,dvs-idle-voltage = <850000>; - rohm,dvs-suspend-voltage = <810000>; + rohm,dvs-suspend-voltage = <850000>; regulator-always-on; };
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 34/86 arm64: dts: renesas: sparrow-hawk: Reserve first 128 MiB of DRAM
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Marek Vasut <[email protected]>
commit ed8444006df9863ffa682e315352c44a49d9f4cb upstream.
Mark the first 128 MiB of DRAM as reserved. The first 128 MiB of DRAM may optionally be used by TFA and other firmware for its own purposes, and in such case, Linux must not use this memory.
On this platform, U-Boot runs in EL3 and starts TFA BL31 and Linux from a single combined fitImage. U-Boot has full access to all memory in the 0x40000000..0xbfffffff range, as well memory in the memory banks in the 64-bit address ranges, and therefore U-Boot patches this full complete view of platform memory layout into the DT that is passed to the next stage.
The next stage is TFA BL31 and then the Linux kernel. The TFA BL31 does not modify the DT passed from U-Boot to TFA BL31 and then to Linux with any new reserved-memory {} node to reserve memory areas used by the TFA BL31 to prevent the next stage from using those areas, which lets Linux to use all of the available DRAM as described in the DT that was passed in by U-Boot, including the areas that are newly utilized by TFA BL31.
In case of high DRAM utilization, for example in case of four instances of "memtester 3900M" running in parallel, unless the memory used by TFA BL31 is properly reserved, Linux may use and corrupt the memory used by TFA BL31, which would often lead to system becoming unresponsive.
Until TFA BL31 can properly fill its own reserved-memory node into the DT, and to assure older versions of TFA BL31 do not cause problems, add explicitly reserved-memory {} node which prevents Linux from using the first 128 MiB of DRAM.
Note that TFA BL31 can be adjusted to use different memory areas, this newly added reserved-memory {} node follows longer-term practice on the R-Car SoCs where the first 128 MiB of DRAM is reserved for firmware use. In case user does modify TFA BL31 to use different memory ranges, they must either use a future version of TFA BL31 which properly patches a reserved-memory {} node into the DT, or they must adjust the address ranges of this reserved-memory {} node accordingly.
--- arch/arm64/boot/dts/renesas/r8a779g3-sparrow-hawk.dts | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/boot/dts/renesas/r8a779g3-sparrow-hawk.dts +11 -0
@@ -118,6 +118,17 @@ reg = <0x6 0x00000000 0x1 0x00000000>; }; + reserved-memory { + #address-cells = <2>; + #size-cells = <2>; + ranges; + + tfa@40000000 { + reg = <0x0 0x40000000 0x0 0x8000000>; + no-map; + }; + }; + /* Page 27 / DSI to Display */ dp-con { compatible = "dp-connector";
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 35/86 arm64: dts: hisilicon: poplar: Correct PCIe reset GPIO polarity
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shawn Guo <[email protected]>
commit c1f2b0f2b5e37b2c27540a175aea2755a3799433 upstream.
The PCIe reset GPIO on Poplar is actually active low. The active high worked before because kernel driver didn't respect the setting from DT. This is changed since commit 1d26a55fbeb9 ("PCI: histb: Switch to using gpiod API"), and thus PCIe on Poplar got brken since then.
Fix the problem by correcting the polarity.
--- arch/arm64/boot/dts/hisilicon/hi3798cv200-poplar.dts | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm64/boot/dts/hisilicon/hi3798cv200-poplar.dts +1 -1
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ }; &pcie { - reset-gpios = <&gpio4 4 GPIO_ACTIVE_HIGH>; + reset-gpios = <&gpio4 4 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>; vpcie-supply = <®_pcie>; status = "okay"; };
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 36/86 arm64: dts: hisilicon: hi3798cv200: Add missing dma-ranges
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Shawn Guo <[email protected]>
commit 1af997cad473d505248df6d9577183bb91f69670 upstream.
Reboot starts failing on Poplar since commit 8424ecdde7df ("arm64: mm:
Set ZONE_DMA size based on devicetree's dma-ranges"), which effectively changes zone_dma_bits from 30 to 32 for arm64 platforms that do not properly define dma-ranges in device tree. It's unclear how Poplar reboot gets broken by this change exactly, but a dma-ranges limiting zone_dma to the first 1 GB fixes the regression.
--- arch/arm64/boot/dts/hisilicon/hi3798cv200.dtsi | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/arm64/boot/dts/hisilicon/hi3798cv200.dtsi +1 -0
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ #address-cells = <1>; #size-cells = <1>; ranges = <0x0 0x0 0xf0000000 0x10000000>; + dma-ranges = <0x0 0x0 0x0 0x40000000>; crg: clock-reset-controller@8a22000 { compatible = "hisilicon,hi3798cv200-crg", "syscon", "simple-mfd";
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 37/86 liveupdate: propagate file deserialization failures
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Leo Timmins <[email protected]>
commit 307e0c5859b0aecc34180468b1aa76684adcf539 upstream.
luo_session_deserialize() ignored the return value from luo_file_deserialize(). As a result, a session could be left partially restored even though the /dev/liveupdate open path treats deserialization failures as fatal.
Propagate the error so a failed file deserialization aborts session deserialization instead of silently continuing.
--- kernel/liveupdate/luo_session.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/liveupdate/luo_session.c +7 -2
@@ -558,8 +558,13 @@ int luo_session_deserialize(void) } scoped_guard(mutex, &session->mutex) { -luo_file_deserialize (&session->file_set, - &sh->ser[i].file_set_ser); + err =luo_file_deserialize (&session->file_set, + &sh->ser[i].file_set_ser); + } +if (err) { +pr_warn ("Failed to deserialize files for session [%s] %pe\n" , + session->name,ERR_PTR (err)); +return err; } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 38/86 nfc: pn533: allocate rx skb before consuming bytes
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pengpeng Hou <[email protected]>
commit c71ba669b570c7b3f86ec875be222ea11dacb352 upstream.
pn532_receive_buf() reports the number of accepted bytes to the serdev core. The current code consumes bytes into recv_skb and may already hand a complete frame to pn533_recv_frame() before allocating a fresh receive buffer.
If that alloc_skb() fails, the callback returns 0 even though it has already consumed bytes, and it leaves recv_skb as NULL for the next receive callback. That breaks the receive_buf() accounting contract and can also lead to a NULL dereference on the next skb_put_u8().
Allocate the receive skb lazily before consuming the next byte instead. If allocation fails, return the number of bytes already accepted.
--- drivers/nfc/pn533/uart.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/nfc/pn533/uart.c +8 -3
@@ -211,6 +211,13 @@ static size_t pn532_receive_buf(struct stimer_delete (&dev->cmd_timeout);for (i =0 ; i < count; i++) { +if (!dev->recv_skb) { + dev->recv_skb =alloc_skb (PN532_UART_SKB_BUFF_LEN , +GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!dev->recv_skb) +return i; + } +if (unlikely (!skb_tailroom (dev->recv_skb)))skb_trim (dev->recv_skb,0 );
@@ -219,9 +226,7 @@ static size_t pn532_receive_buf(struct scontinue ;pn533_recv_frame (dev->priv, dev->recv_skb,0 ); - dev->recv_skb =alloc_skb (PN532_UART_SKB_BUFF_LEN ,GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!dev->recv_skb) -return 0 ; + dev->recv_skb =NULL ; }return i;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 39/86 batman-adv: reject oversized global TT response buffers
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Ruide Cao <[email protected]>
commit 3a359bf5c61d52e7f09754108309d637532164a6 upstream.
batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_global_data() builds the allocation length for a global TT response in 16-bit temporaries. When a remote originator advertises a large enough global TT, the TT payload length plus the VLAN header offset can exceed 65535 and wrap before kmalloc().
The full-table response path still uses the original TT payload length when it fills tt_change, so the wrapped allocation is too small and batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_global_data() writes past the end of the heap object before the later packet-size check runs.
Fix this by rejecting TT responses whose TVLV value length cannot fit in the 16-bit TVLV payload length field.
--- net/batman-adv/translation-table.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/batman-adv/translation-table.c +7 -2
@@ -798,8 +798,8 @@ batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_global_data(struc {u16 num_vlan =0 ;u16 num_entries =0 ; -u16 change_offset; -u16 tvlv_len; +u16 tvlv_len =0 ; +unsigned int change_offset;struct batadv_tvlv_tt_vlan_data *tt_vlan;struct batadv_orig_node_vlan *vlan;u8 *tt_change_ptr;
@@ -816,6 +816,11 @@ batadv_tt_prepare_tvlv_global_data(strucif (*tt_len <0 ) *tt_len =batadv_tt_len (num_entries); +if (change_offset >U16_MAX || *tt_len >U16_MAX - change_offset) { + *tt_len =0 ; + goto out; + } + tvlv_len = *tt_len; tvlv_len += change_offset;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 40/86 X.509: Fix out-of-bounds access when parsing extensions
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Lukas Wunner <[email protected]>
commit d702c3408213bb12bd570bb97204d8340d141c51 upstream.
Leo reports an out-of-bounds access when parsing a certificate with empty Basic Constraints or Key Usage extension because the first byte of the extension is read before checking its length. Fix it.
The bug can be triggered by an unprivileged user by submitting a specially crafted certificate to the kernel through the keyrings(7) API. Leo has demonstrated this with a proof-of-concept program responsibly disclosed off-list.
--- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c +4 -4
@@ -584,10 +584,10 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context* 0x04 is where keyCertSign lands in this bit string * 0x80 is where digitalSignature lands in this bit string */ -if (v[0 ] !=ASN1_BTS ) -return -EBADMSG ;if (vlen <4 )return -EBADMSG ; +if (v[0 ] !=ASN1_BTS ) +return -EBADMSG ;if (v[2 ] >=8 )return -EBADMSG ;if (v[3 ] &0x80 )
@@ -620,10 +620,10 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context* (Expect 0xFF if the CA is TRUE) * vlen should match the entire extension size */ -if (v[0 ] != (ASN1_CONS_BIT |ASN1_SEQ )) -return -EBADMSG ;if (vlen <2 )return -EBADMSG ; +if (v[0 ] != (ASN1_CONS_BIT |ASN1_SEQ )) +return -EBADMSG ;if (v[1 ] != vlen -2 )return -EBADMSG ;/* Empty SEQUENCE means CA:FALSE (default value omitted per DER) */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 41/86 EDAC/mc: Fix error path ordering in edac_mc_alloc()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>
commit 51520e03e70d6c73e33ee7cbe0319767d05764fe upstream.
When the mci->pvt_info allocation in edac_mc_alloc() fails, the error path will call put_device() which will end up calling the device's release function.
However, the init ordering is wrong such that device_initialize() happens *after* the failed allocation and thus the device itself and the release function pointer are not initialized yet when they're called:
MCE: In-kernel MCE decoding enabled.
------------[ cut here ]------------ kobject: '(null)': is not initialized, yet kobject_put() is being called. WARNING: lib/kobject.c:734 at kobject_put, CPU#22: systemd-udevd CPU: 22 UID: 0 PID: 538 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 7.0.0-rc1+ #2 PREEMPT(full) RIP: 0010:kobject_put Call Trace: <TASK> edac_mc_alloc+0xbe/0xe0 [edac_core] amd64_edac_init+0x7a4/0xff0 [amd64_edac] ? __pfx_amd64_edac_init+0x10/0x10 [amd64_edac] do_one_initcall ...
Reorder the calling sequence so that the device is initialized and thus the release function pointer is properly set before it can be used.
This was found by Claude while reviewing another EDAC patch.
--- drivers/edac/edac_mc.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/edac/edac_mc.c +3 -3
@@ -370,13 +370,13 @@ struct mem_ctl_info *edac_mc_alloc(unsigif (!mci->layers) goto error; + mci->dev.release = mci_release; +device_initialize (&mci->dev); + mci->pvt_info =kzalloc (sz_pvt,GFP_KERNEL );if (!mci->pvt_info) goto error; - mci->dev.release = mci_release; -device_initialize (&mci->dev); -/* setup index and various internal pointers */ mci->mc_idx = mc_num; mci->tot_dimms = tot_dimms;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 42/86 net/tls: fix use-after-free in -EBUSY error path of tls_do_encryption
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Muhammad Alifa Ramdhan <[email protected]>
commit a9b8b18364fffce4c451e6f6fd218fa4ab646705 upstream.
The -EBUSY handling in tls_do_encryption(), introduced by commit 859054147318 ("net: tls: handle backlogging of crypto requests"), has a use-after-free due to double cleanup of encrypt_pending and the scatterlist entry.
When crypto_aead_encrypt() returns -EBUSY, the request is enqueued to the cryptd backlog and the async callback tls_encrypt_done() will be invoked upon completion. That callback unconditionally restores the scatterlist entry (sge->offset, sge->length) and decrements ctx->encrypt_pending. However, if tls_encrypt_async_wait() returns an error, the synchronous error path in tls_do_encryption() performs the same cleanup again, double-decrementing encrypt_pending and double-restoring the scatterlist.
The double-decrement corrupts the encrypt_pending sentinel (initialized to 1), making tls_encrypt_async_wait() permanently skip the wait for pending async callbacks. A subsequent sendmsg can then free the tls_rec via bpf_exec_tx_verdict() while a cryptd callback is still pending, resulting in a use-after-free when the callback fires on the freed record.
Fix this by skipping the synchronous cleanup when the -EBUSY async wait returns an error, since the callback has already handled encrypt_pending and sge restoration.
--- net/tls/tls_sw.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
net/tls/tls_sw.c +10 -0
@@ -584,6 +584,16 @@ static int tls_do_encryption(struct sockif (rc == -EBUSY ) { rc =tls_encrypt_async_wait (ctx); rc = rc ?: -EINPROGRESS ; +/* +* The async callback tls_encrypt_done() has already +* decremented encrypt_pending and restored the sge on +* both success and error. Skip the synchronous cleanup +* below on error, just remove the record and return. +*/ +if (rc != -EINPROGRESS ) { +list_del (&rec->list); +return rc; + } }if (!rc || rc != -EINPROGRESS ) {atomic_dec (&ctx->encrypt_pending);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 43/86 net: altera-tse: fix skb leak on DMA mapping error in tse_start_xmit()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Carlier <[email protected]>
commit 6dede3967619b5944003227a5d09fdc21ed57d10 upstream.
When dma_map_single() fails in tse_start_xmit(), the function returns NETDEV_TX_OK without freeing the skb. Since NETDEV_TX_OK tells the stack the packet was consumed, the skb is never freed, leaking memory on every DMA mapping failure.
Add dev_kfree_skb_any() before returning to properly free the skb.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/altera/altera_tse_main.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/altera/altera_tse_main.c +1 -0
@@ -572,6 +572,7 @@ static netdev_tx_t tse_start_xmit(struct DMA_TO_DEVICE);if (dma_mapping_error (priv->device, dma_addr)) {netdev_err (priv->dev,"%s: DMA mapping error\n" , __func__); +dev_kfree_skb_any (skb); ret =NETDEV_TX_OK ; goto out; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 44/86 batman-adv: hold claim backbone gateways by reference
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Haoze Xie <[email protected]>
commit 82d8701b2c930d0e96b0dbc9115a218d791cb0d2 upstream.
batadv_bla_add_claim() can replace claim->backbone_gw and drop the old gateway's last reference while readers still follow the pointer.
The netlink claim dump path dereferences claim->backbone_gw->orig and takes claim->backbone_gw->crc_lock without pinning the underlying backbone gateway. batadv_bla_check_claim() still has the same naked pointer access pattern.
Reuse batadv_bla_claim_get_backbone_gw() in both readers so they operate on a stable gateway reference until the read-side work is complete. This keeps the dump and claim-check paths aligned with the lifetime rules introduced for the other BLA claim readers.
--- net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
net/batman-adv/bridge_loop_avoidance.c +18 -9
@@ -2130,6 +2130,7 @@ batadv_bla_claim_dump_entry(struct sk_bu struct batadv_bla_claim *claim) {const u8 *primary_addr = primary_if->net_dev->dev_addr; +struct batadv_bla_backbone_gw *backbone_gw;u16 backbone_crc;bool is_own;void *hdr;
@@ -2145,32 +2146,35 @@ batadv_bla_claim_dump_entry(struct sk_bugenl_dump_check_consistent (cb, hdr); - is_own =batadv_compare_eth (claim->backbone_gw->orig, - primary_addr); + backbone_gw =batadv_bla_claim_get_backbone_gw (claim); + + is_own =batadv_compare_eth (backbone_gw->orig, primary_addr); -spin_lock_bh (&claim->backbone_gw->crc_lock); - backbone_crc = claim->backbone_gw->crc; -spin_unlock_bh (&claim->backbone_gw->crc_lock); +spin_lock_bh (&backbone_gw->crc_lock); + backbone_crc = backbone_gw->crc; +spin_unlock_bh (&backbone_gw->crc_lock);if (is_own)if (nla_put_flag (msg,BATADV_ATTR_BLA_OWN )) {genlmsg_cancel (msg, hdr); - goto out; + goto put_backbone_gw; }if (nla_put (msg,BATADV_ATTR_BLA_ADDRESS ,ETH_ALEN , claim->addr) ||nla_put_u16 (msg,BATADV_ATTR_BLA_VID , claim->vid) ||nla_put (msg,BATADV_ATTR_BLA_BACKBONE ,ETH_ALEN , - claim->backbone_gw->orig) || + backbone_gw->orig) ||nla_put_u16 (msg,BATADV_ATTR_BLA_CRC , backbone_crc)) {genlmsg_cancel (msg, hdr); - goto out; + goto put_backbone_gw; }genlmsg_end (msg, hdr); ret =0 ; +put_backbone_gw: +batadv_backbone_gw_put (backbone_gw); out:return ret; }
@@ -2448,6 +2452,7 @@ out:bool batadv_bla_check_claim (struct batadv_priv *bat_priv,u8 *addr,unsigned short vid) { +struct batadv_bla_backbone_gw *backbone_gw;struct batadv_bla_claim search_claim;struct batadv_bla_claim *claim =NULL ;struct batadv_hard_iface *primary_if =NULL ;
@@ -2470,9 +2475,13 @@ bool batadv_bla_check_claim(struct batad* return false. */ if (claim) { -if (!batadv_compare_eth (claim->backbone_gw->orig, + backbone_gw =batadv_bla_claim_get_backbone_gw (claim); + +if (!batadv_compare_eth (backbone_gw->orig, primary_if->net_dev->dev_addr)) ret = false; + +batadv_backbone_gw_put (backbone_gw);batadv_claim_put (claim); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 45/86 drm/i915/gt: fix refcount underflow in intel_engine_park_heartbeat
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sebastian Brzezinka <[email protected]>
commit 4c71fd099513bfa8acab529b626e1f0097b76061 upstream.
A use-after-free / refcount underflow is possible when the heartbeat worker and intel_engine_park_heartbeat() race to release the same engine->heartbeat.systole request.
The heartbeat worker reads engine->heartbeat.systole and calls i915_request_put() on it when the request is complete, but clears the pointer in a separate, non-atomic step. Concurrently, a request retirement on another CPU can drop the engine wakeref to zero, triggering __engine_park() -> intel_engine_park_heartbeat(). If the heartbeat timer is pending at that point, cancel_delayed_work() returns true and intel_engine_park_heartbeat() reads the stale non-NULL systole pointer and calls i915_request_put() on it again, causing a refcount underflow:
``` <4> [487.221889] Workqueue: i915-unordered engine_retire [i915] <4> [487.222640] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x68/0xb0 ... <4> [487.222707] Call Trace: <4> [487.222711] <TASK> <4> [487.222716] intel_engine_park_heartbeat.part.0+0x6f/0x80 [i915] <4> [487.223115] intel_engine_park_heartbeat+0x25/0x40 [i915] <4> [487.223566] __engine_park+0xb9/0x650 [i915] <4> [487.223973] ____intel_wakeref_put_last+0x2e/0xb0 [i915] <4> [487.224408] __intel_wakeref_put_last+0x72/0x90 [i915] <4> [487.224797] intel_context_exit_engine+0x7c/0x80 [i915] <4> [487.225238] intel_context_exit+0xf1/0x1b0 [i915] <4> [487.225695] i915_request_retire.part.0+0x1b9/0x530 [i915] <4> [487.226178] i915_request_retire+0x1c/0x40 [i915] <4> [487.226625] engine_retire+0x122/0x180 [i915] <4> [487.227037] process_one_work+0x239/0x760 <4> [487.227060] worker_thread+0x200/0x3f0 <4> [487.227068] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 <4> [487.227075] kthread+0x10d/0x150 <4> [487.227083] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 <4> [487.227092] ret_from_fork+0x3d4/0x480 <4> [487.227099] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 <4> [487.227107] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 <4> [487.227141] </TASK> ```
Fix this by replacing the non-atomic pointer read + separate clear with xchg() in both racing paths. xchg() is a single indivisible hardware instruction that atomically reads the old pointer and writes NULL. This guarantees only one of the two concurrent callers obtains the non-NULL pointer and performs the put, the other gets NULL and skips it.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_engine_heartbeat.c | 26 +++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_engine_heartbeat.c +18 -8
@@ -148,10 +148,12 @@ static void heartbeat(struct work_struct/* Just in case everything has gone horribly wrong, give it a kick */ intel_engine_flush_submission (engine); - rq = engine->heartbeat.systole; -if (rq &&i915_request_completed (rq)) { -i915_request_put (rq); - engine->heartbeat.systole =NULL ; + rq =xchg (&engine->heartbeat.systole,NULL ); +if (rq) { +if (i915_request_completed (rq)) +i915_request_put (rq); +else + engine->heartbeat.systole = rq; }if (!intel_engine_pm_get_if_awake (engine))
@@ -232,8 +234,11 @@ static void heartbeat(struct work_struct unlock:mutex_unlock (&ce->timeline->mutex); out: -if (!engine->i915->params.enable_hangcheck || !next_heartbeat (engine)) -i915_request_put (fetch_and_zero (&engine->heartbeat.systole)); +if (!engine->i915->params.enable_hangcheck || !next_heartbeat (engine)) { + rq =xchg (&engine->heartbeat.systole,NULL ); +if (rq) +i915_request_put (rq); + }intel_engine_pm_put (engine); }
@@ -247,8 +252,13 @@ void intel_engine_unpark_heartbeat(strucvoid intel_engine_park_heartbeat (struct intel_engine_cs *engine) { -if (cancel_delayed_work (&engine->heartbeat.work)) -i915_request_put (fetch_and_zero (&engine->heartbeat.systole)); +if (cancel_delayed_work (&engine->heartbeat.work)) { +struct i915_request *rq; + + rq =xchg (&engine->heartbeat.systole,NULL ); +if (rq) +i915_request_put (rq); + } }void intel_gt_unpark_heartbeats (struct intel_gt *gt)
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 46/86 drm/i915/psr: Do not use pipe_src as borders for SU area
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jouni Högander <[email protected]>
commit 75519f5df2a9b23f7bf305e12dc9a6e3e65c24b7 upstream.
This far using crtc_state->pipe_src as borders for Selective Update area haven't caused visible problems as drm_rect_width(crtc_state->pipe_src) == crtc_state->hw.adjusted_mode.crtc_hdisplay and drm_rect_height(crtc_state->pipe_src) == crtc_state->hw.adjusted_mode.crtc_vdisplay when pipe scaling is not used. On the other hand using pipe scaling is forcing full frame updates and all the Selective Update area calculations are skipped. Now this improper usage of crtc_state->pipe_src is causing following warnings:
<4> [7771.978166] xe 0000:00:02.0: [drm] drm_WARN_ON_ONCE(su_lines % vdsc_cfg->slice_height)
after WARN_ON_ONCE was added by commit:
"drm/i915/dsc: Add helper for writing DSC Selective Update ET parameters"
These warnings are seen when DSC and pipe scaling are enabled simultaneously. This is because on full frame update SU area is improperly set as pipe_src which is not aligned with DSC slice height.
Fix these by creating local rectangle using crtc_state->hw.adjusted_mode.crtc_hdisplay and crtc_state->hw.adjusted_mode.crtc_vdisplay. Use this local rectangle as borders for SU area.
--- drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_psr.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/i915/display/intel_psr.c +19 -11
@@ -2656,9 +2656,9 @@ static u32 psr2_pipe_srcsz_early_tpt_calstatic void clip_area_update (struct drm_rect *overlap_damage_area,struct drm_rect *damage_area, -struct drm_rect *pipe_src) +struct drm_rect *display_area) { -if (!drm_rect_intersect (damage_area, pipe_src)) +if (!drm_rect_intersect (damage_area, display_area))return ;if (overlap_damage_area->y1 ==-1 ) {
@@ -2709,6 +2709,7 @@ static bool intel_psr2_sel_fetch_pipe_alstatic void intel_psr2_sel_fetch_et_alignment (struct intel_atomic_state *state,struct intel_crtc *crtc, +struct drm_rect *display_area,bool *cursor_in_su_area) {struct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state =intel_atomic_get_new_crtc_state (state, crtc);
@@ -2736,7 +2737,7 @@ intel_psr2_sel_fetch_et_alignment(structcontinue ;clip_area_update (&crtc_state->psr2_su_area, &new_plane_state->uapi.dst, - &crtc_state->pipe_src); + display_area); *cursor_in_su_area = true; } }
@@ -2832,6 +2833,12 @@ int intel_psr2_sel_fetch_update(struct istruct intel_crtc_state *crtc_state =intel_atomic_get_new_crtc_state (state, crtc);struct intel_plane_state *new_plane_state, *old_plane_state;struct intel_plane *plane; +struct drm_rect display_area = { + .x1 =0 , + .y1 =0 , + .x2 = crtc_state->hw.adjusted_mode.crtc_hdisplay, + .y2 = crtc_state->hw.adjusted_mode.crtc_vdisplay, + };bool full_update = false, su_area_changed;int i, ret;
@@ -2845,7 +2852,7 @@ int intel_psr2_sel_fetch_update(struct i crtc_state->psr2_su_area.x1 =0 ; crtc_state->psr2_su_area.y1 =-1 ; - crtc_state->psr2_su_area.x2 =drm_rect_width (&crtc_state->pipe_src); + crtc_state->psr2_su_area.x2 =drm_rect_width (&display_area); crtc_state->psr2_su_area.y2 =-1 ;/*
@@ -2883,14 +2890,14 @@ int intel_psr2_sel_fetch_update(struct i damaged_area.y1 = old_plane_state->uapi.dst.y1; damaged_area.y2 = old_plane_state->uapi.dst.y2;clip_area_update (&crtc_state->psr2_su_area, &damaged_area, - &crtc_state->pipe_src); + &display_area); }if (new_plane_state->uapi.visible) { damaged_area.y1 = new_plane_state->uapi.dst.y1; damaged_area.y2 = new_plane_state->uapi.dst.y2;clip_area_update (&crtc_state->psr2_su_area, &damaged_area, - &crtc_state->pipe_src); + &display_area); }continue ; }else if (new_plane_state->uapi.alpha != old_plane_state->uapi.alpha) {
@@ -2898,7 +2905,7 @@ int intel_psr2_sel_fetch_update(struct i damaged_area.y1 = new_plane_state->uapi.dst.y1; damaged_area.y2 = new_plane_state->uapi.dst.y2;clip_area_update (&crtc_state->psr2_su_area, &damaged_area, - &crtc_state->pipe_src); + &display_area);continue ; }
@@ -2914,7 +2921,7 @@ int intel_psr2_sel_fetch_update(struct i damaged_area.x1 += new_plane_state->uapi.dst.x1 - src.x1; damaged_area.x2 += new_plane_state->uapi.dst.x1 - src.x1; -clip_area_update (&crtc_state->psr2_su_area, &damaged_area, &crtc_state->pipe_src); +clip_area_update (&crtc_state->psr2_su_area, &damaged_area, &display_area); }/*
@@ -2949,7 +2956,8 @@ int intel_psr2_sel_fetch_update(struct i* cursor is added into affected planes even when * cursor is not updated by itself. */ -intel_psr2_sel_fetch_et_alignment (state, crtc, &cursor_in_su_area); +intel_psr2_sel_fetch_et_alignment (state, crtc, &display_area, + &cursor_in_su_area); su_area_changed =intel_psr2_sel_fetch_pipe_alignment (crtc_state);
@@ -3025,8 +3033,8 @@ int intel_psr2_sel_fetch_update(struct i skip_sel_fetch_set_loop:if (full_update) -clip_area_update (&crtc_state->psr2_su_area, &crtc_state->pipe_src, - &crtc_state->pipe_src); +clip_area_update (&crtc_state->psr2_su_area, &display_area, + &display_area);psr2_man_trk_ctl_calc (crtc_state, full_update); crtc_state->pipe_srcsz_early_tpt =
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 47/86 net/mlx5: Update the list of the PCI supported devices
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Michael Guralnik <[email protected]>
commit a9d4f4f6e65e0bf9bbddedecc84d67249991979c upstream.
Add the upcoming ConnectX-10 NVLink-C2C device ID to the table of supported PCI device IDs.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/main.c +1 -0
@@ -2267,6 +2267,7 @@ static const struct pci_device_id mlx5_c { PCI_VDEVICE(MELLANOX, 0x1023) }, /* ConnectX-8 */ { PCI_VDEVICE(MELLANOX, 0x1025) }, /* ConnectX-9 */ { PCI_VDEVICE(MELLANOX, 0x1027) }, /* ConnectX-10 */ + { PCI_VDEVICE(MELLANOX, 0x2101) }, /* ConnectX-10 NVLink-C2C */ { PCI_VDEVICE(MELLANOX, 0xa2d2) }, /* BlueField integrated ConnectX-5 network controller */ { PCI_VDEVICE(MELLANOX, 0xa2d3), MLX5_PCI_DEV_IS_VF}, /* BlueField integrated ConnectX-5 network controller VF */ { PCI_VDEVICE(MELLANOX, 0xa2d6) }, /* BlueField-2 integrated ConnectX-6 Dx network controller */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 48/86 pmdomain: imx8mp-blk-ctrl: Keep the NOC_HDCP clock enabled
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jacky Bai <[email protected]>
commit e91d5f94acf68618ea3ad9c92ac28614e791ae7d upstream.
Keep the NOC_HDCP clock always enabled to fix the potential hang caused by the NoC ADB400 port power down handshake.
--- drivers/pmdomain/imx/imx8mp-blk-ctrl.c | 8 +------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/pmdomain/imx/imx8mp-blk-ctrl.c +1 -7
@@ -352,9 +352,6 @@ static void imx8mp_hdmi_blk_ctrl_power_oregmap_set_bits (bc->regmap,HDMI_RTX_RESET_CTL0 ,BIT (12 ));regmap_clear_bits (bc->regmap,HDMI_TX_CONTROL0 ,BIT (3 ));break ; -case IMX8MP_HDMIBLK_PD_HDCP : -regmap_set_bits (bc->regmap,HDMI_RTX_CLK_CTL0 ,BIT (11 )); -break ;case IMX8MP_HDMIBLK_PD_HRV :regmap_set_bits (bc->regmap,HDMI_RTX_CLK_CTL1 ,BIT (3 ) |BIT (4 ) |BIT (5 ));regmap_set_bits (bc->regmap,HDMI_RTX_RESET_CTL0 ,BIT (15 ));
@@ -408,9 +405,6 @@ static void imx8mp_hdmi_blk_ctrl_power_oregmap_clear_bits (bc->regmap,HDMI_RTX_CLK_CTL0 ,BIT (7 ));regmap_clear_bits (bc->regmap,HDMI_RTX_CLK_CTL1 ,BIT (22 ) |BIT (24 ));break ; -case IMX8MP_HDMIBLK_PD_HDCP : -regmap_clear_bits (bc->regmap,HDMI_RTX_CLK_CTL0 ,BIT (11 )); -break ;case IMX8MP_HDMIBLK_PD_HRV :regmap_clear_bits (bc->regmap,HDMI_RTX_RESET_CTL0 ,BIT (15 ));regmap_clear_bits (bc->regmap,HDMI_RTX_CLK_CTL1 ,BIT (3 ) |BIT (4 ) |BIT (5 ));
@@ -439,7 +433,7 @@ static int imx8mp_hdmi_power_notifier(stregmap_write (bc->regmap,HDMI_RTX_CLK_CTL0 ,0x0 );regmap_write (bc->regmap,HDMI_RTX_CLK_CTL1 ,0x0 );regmap_set_bits (bc->regmap,HDMI_RTX_CLK_CTL0 , -BIT (0 ) |BIT (1 ) |BIT (10 )); +BIT (0 ) |BIT (1 ) |BIT (10 ) |BIT (11 ));regmap_set_bits (bc->regmap,HDMI_RTX_RESET_CTL0 ,BIT (0 ));/*
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 49/86 igb: remove napi_synchronize() in igb_down()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alex Dvoretsky <[email protected]>
commit b1e067240379f950a0022208e0685f3465c211cb upstream.
When an AF_XDP zero-copy application terminates abruptly (e.g., kill -9), the XSK buffer pool is destroyed but NAPI polling continues. igb_clean_rx_irq_zc() repeatedly returns the full budget, preventing napi_complete_done() from clearing NAPI_STATE_SCHED.
igb_down() calls napi_synchronize() before napi_disable() for each queue vector. napi_synchronize() spins waiting for NAPI_STATE_SCHED to clear, which never happens. igb_down() blocks indefinitely, the TX watchdog fires, and the TX queue remains permanently stalled.
napi_disable() already handles this correctly: it sets NAPI_STATE_DISABLE. After a full-budget poll, __napi_poll() checks napi_disable_pending(). If set, it forces completion and clears NAPI_STATE_SCHED, breaking the loop that napi_synchronize() cannot.
napi_synchronize() was added in commit 41f149a285da ("igb: Fix possible panic caused by Rx traffic arrival while interface is down"). napi_disable() provides stronger guarantees: it prevents further scheduling and waits for any active poll to exit.
Other Intel drivers (ixgbe, ice, i40e) use napi_disable() without a preceding napi_synchronize() in their down paths.
Remove redundant napi_synchronize() call and reorder napi_disable() before igb_set_queue_napi() so the queue-to-NAPI mapping is only cleared after polling has fully stopped.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igb/igb_main.c +1 -2
@@ -2203,9 +2203,8 @@ void igb_down(struct igb_adapter *adaptefor (i =0 ; i < adapter->num_q_vectors; i++) {if (adapter->q_vector[i]) { -napi_synchronize (&adapter->q_vector[i]->napi); -igb_set_queue_napi (adapter, i,NULL );napi_disable (&adapter->q_vector[i]->napi); +igb_set_queue_napi (adapter, i,NULL ); } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 50/86 mm/vma: fix memory leak in __mmap_region()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Sechang Lim <[email protected]>
commit 894f99eb535edc4514f756818f3c4f688ba53a59 upstream.
commit 605f6586ecf7 ("mm/vma: do not leak memory when .mmap_prepare swaps the file") handled the success path by skipping get_file() via file_doesnt_need_get, but missed the error path.
When /dev/zero is mmap'd with MAP_SHARED, mmap_zero_prepare() calls shmem_zero_setup_desc() which allocates a new shmem file to back the mapping. If __mmap_new_vma() subsequently fails, this replacement file is never fput()'d - the original is released by ksys_mmap_pgoff(), but nobody releases the new one.
Add fput() for the swapped file in the error path.
Reproducible with fault injection.
FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure.
name failslab, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 1
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 366 Comm: syz.7.14 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc6 #2 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x164/0x1f0 should_fail_ex+0x525/0x650 should_failslab+0xdf/0x140 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x78/0x630 vm_area_alloc+0x24/0x160 __mmap_region+0xf6b/0x2660 mmap_region+0x2eb/0x3a0 do_mmap+0xc79/0x1240 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x252/0x4c0 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0xf8/0x120 __x64_sys_mmap+0x12a/0x190 do_syscall_64+0xa9/0x580 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e </TASK>
kmemleak: 1 new suspected memory leaks (see /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak)
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff8881118aca80 (size 360):
comm "syz.7.14", pid 366, jiffies 4294913255
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 ad 4e ad de ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 .....N..........
ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff c0 28 4d ae ff ff ff ff .........(M.....
backtrace (crc db0f53bc):
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x3ab/0x630
alloc_empty_file+0x5a/0x1e0
alloc_file_pseudo+0x135/0x220
__shmem_file_setup+0x274/0x420
shmem_zero_setup_desc+0x9c/0x170
mmap_zero_prepare+0x123/0x140
__mmap_region+0xdda/0x2660
mmap_region+0x2eb/0x3a0
do_mmap+0xc79/0x1240
vm_mmap_pgoff+0x252/0x4c0
ksys_mmap_pgoff+0xf8/0x120
__x64_sys_mmap+0x12a/0x190
do_syscall_64+0xa9/0x580
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7eFound by syzkaller.
--- mm/vma.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
mm/vma.c +7 -0
@@ -2774,6 +2774,13 @@ unacct_error:if (map.charged)vm_unacct_memory (map.charged); abort_munmap: +/* +* This indicates that .mmap_prepare has set a new file, differing from +* desc->vm_file. But since we're aborting the operation, only the +* original file will be cleaned up. Ensure we clean up both. +*/ +if (map.file_doesnt_need_get) +fput (map.file);vms_abort_munmap_vmas (&map.vms, &map.mas_detach);return error; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 51/86 mm/memory_hotplug: maintain N_NORMAL_MEMORY during hotplug
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Hao Li <[email protected]>
commit 2ecbe06abf9bfb2261cd6464a6bc3a3615625402 upstream.
N_NORMAL_MEMORY is initialized from zone population at boot, but memory hotplug currently only updates N_MEMORY. As a result, a node that gains normal memory via hotplug can remain invisible to users iterating over N_NORMAL_MEMORY, while a node that loses its last normal memory can stay incorrectly marked as such.
The most visible effect is that /sys/devices/system/node/has_normal_memory does not report a node even after that node has gained normal memory via hotplug.
Also, list_lru-based shrinkers can undercount objects on such a node and may skip reclaim on that node entirely, which can lead to a higher memory footprint than expected.
Restore N_NORMAL_MEMORY maintenance directly in online_pages() and offline_pages(). Set the bit when a node that currently lacks normal memory onlines pages into a zone <= ZONE_NORMAL, and clear it when offlining removes the last present pages from zones <= ZONE_NORMAL.
This restores the intended semantics without bringing back the old status_change_nid_normal notifier plumbing which was removed in 8d2882a8edb8.
Current users that benefit include list_lru, zswap, nfsd filecache, hugetlb_cgroup, and has_normal_memory sysfs reporting.
--- mm/memory_hotplug.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+)
mm/memory_hotplug.c +20 -0
@@ -1209,6 +1209,13 @@ int online_pages(unsigned long pfn, unsiif (node_arg.nid >=0 )node_set_state (nid,N_MEMORY ); +/* +* Check whether we are adding normal memory to the node for the first +* time. +*/ +if (!node_state (nid,N_NORMAL_MEMORY ) &&zone_idx (zone) <=ZONE_NORMAL ) +node_set_state (nid,N_NORMAL_MEMORY ); +if (need_zonelists_rebuild)build_all_zonelists (NULL );
@@ -1908,6 +1915,8 @@ int offline_pages(unsigned long start_pfunsigned long flags;char *reason;int ret; +unsigned long normal_pages =0 ; +enum zone_type zt;/* * {on,off}lining is constrained to full memory sections (or more
@@ -2056,6 +2065,17 @@ int offline_pages(unsigned long start_pfinit_per_zone_wmark_min ();/* +* Check whether this operation removes the last normal memory from +* the node. We do this before clearing N_MEMORY to avoid the possible +* transient "!N_MEMORY && N_NORMAL_MEMORY" state. +*/ +if (zone_idx (zone) <=ZONE_NORMAL ) { +for (zt =0 ; zt <=ZONE_NORMAL ; zt++) + normal_pages += pgdat->node_zones[zt].present_pages; +if (!normal_pages) +node_clear_state (node,N_NORMAL_MEMORY ); + } +/* * Make sure to mark the node as memory-less before rebuilding the zone * list. Otherwise this node would still appear in the fallback lists. */
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 52/86 mm/damon/sysfs: dealloc repeat_call_control if damon_call() fails
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: SeongJae Park <[email protected]>
commit 0199390a6b92fc21860e1b858abf525c7e73b956 upstream.
damon_call() for repeat_call_control of DAMON_SYSFS could fail if somehow the kdamond is stopped before the damon_call(). It could happen, for example, when te damon context was made for monitroing of a virtual address processes, and the process is terminated immediately, before the damon_call() invocation. In the case, the dyanmically allocated repeat_call_control is not deallocated and leaked.
Fix the leak by deallocating the repeat_call_control under the damon_call() failure.
This issue is discovered by sashiko [1].
--- mm/damon/sysfs.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
mm/damon/sysfs.c +2 -1
@@ -1673,7 +1673,8 @@ static int damon_sysfs_turn_damon_on(str repeat_call_control->data = kdamond; repeat_call_control->repeat = true; repeat_call_control->dealloc_on_cancel = true; -damon_call (ctx, repeat_call_control); +if (damon_call (ctx, repeat_call_control)) +kfree (repeat_call_control);return err; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 53/86 mm/damon/stat: deallocate damon_call() failure leaking damon_ctx
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: SeongJae Park <[email protected]>
commit 4c04c6b47c361612b1d70cec8f7a60b1482d1400 upstream.
damon_stat_start() always allocates the module's damon_ctx object (damon_stat_context). Meanwhile, if damon_call() in the function fails, the damon_ctx object is not deallocated. Hence, if the damon_call() is failed, and the user writes Y to “enabled” again, the previously allocated damon_ctx object is leaked.
This cannot simply be fixed by deallocating the damon_ctx object when damon_call() fails. That's because damon_call() failure doesn't guarantee the kdamond main function, which accesses the damon_ctx object, is completely finished. In other words, if damon_stat_start() deallocates the damon_ctx object after damon_call() failure, the not-yet-terminated kdamond could access the freed memory (use-after-free).
Fix the leak while avoiding the use-after-free by keeping returning damon_stat_start() without deallocating the damon_ctx object after damon_call() failure, but deallocating it when the function is invoked again and the kdamond is completely terminated. If the kdamond is not yet terminated, simply return -EAGAIN, as the kdamond will soon be terminated.
The issue was discovered [1] by sashiko.
--- mm/damon/stat.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
mm/damon/stat.c +7 -0
@@ -253,6 +253,12 @@ static int damon_stat_start(void) {int err; +if (damon_stat_context) { +if (damon_is_running (damon_stat_context)) +return -EAGAIN ; +damon_destroy_ctx (damon_stat_context); + } + damon_stat_context =damon_stat_build_ctx ();if (!damon_stat_context)return -ENOMEM ;
@@ -269,6 +275,7 @@ static void damon_stat_stop(void) {damon_stop (&damon_stat_context,1 );damon_destroy_ctx (damon_stat_context); + damon_stat_context =NULL ; } static int damon_stat_enabled_store(
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 54/86 mmc: vub300: fix NULL-deref on disconnect
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
commit dff34ef879c5e73298443956a8b391311ba78d57 upstream.
Make sure to deregister the controller before dropping the reference to the driver data on disconnect to avoid NULL-pointer dereferences or use-after-free.
--- drivers/mmc/host/vub300.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/mmc/host/vub300.c +1 -1
@@ -2365,8 +2365,8 @@ static void vub300_disconnect(struct usbusb_set_intfdata (interface,NULL );/* prevent more I/O from starting */ vub300->interface =NULL ; -kref_put (&vub300->kref, vub300_delete);mmc_remove_host (mmc); +kref_put (&vub300->kref, vub300_delete);pr_info ("USB vub300 remote SDIO host controller[%d]" " now disconnected" , ifnum);return ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 55/86 mmc: vub300: fix use-after-free on disconnect
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Johan Hovold <[email protected]>
commit 8f4d20a710225ec7a565f6a0459862d3b1f32330 upstream.
The vub300 driver maintains an explicit reference count for the controller and its driver data and the last reference can in theory be dropped after the driver has been unbound.
This specifically means that the controller allocation must not be device managed as that can lead to use-after-free.
Note that the lifetime is currently also incorrectly tied the parent USB device rather than interface, which can lead to memory leaks if the driver is unbound without its device being physically disconnected (e.g. on probe deferral).
Fix both issues by reverting to non-managed allocation of the controller.
--- drivers/mmc/host/vub300.c | 17 +++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/mmc/host/vub300.c +11 -6
@@ -369,11 +369,14 @@ struct vub300_mmc_host {static void vub300_delete (struct kref *kref) {/* kref callback - softirq */ struct vub300_mmc_host *vub300 =kref_to_vub300_mmc_host (kref); +struct mmc_host *mmc = vub300->mmc; +usb_free_urb (vub300->command_out_urb); vub300->command_out_urb =NULL ;usb_free_urb (vub300->command_res_urb); vub300->command_res_urb =NULL ;usb_put_dev (vub300->udev); +mmc_free_host (mmc);/* * and hence also frees vub300 * which is contained at the end of struct mmc
@@ -2112,7 +2115,7 @@ static int vub300_probe(struct usb_inter goto error1; }/* this also allocates memory for our VUB300 mmc host device */ - mmc =devm_mmc_alloc_host (&udev->dev,sizeof (*vub300)); + mmc =mmc_alloc_host (sizeof (*vub300), &udev->dev);if (!mmc) { retval = -ENOMEM ;dev_err (&udev->dev,"not enough memory for the mmc_host\n" );
@@ -2269,7 +2272,7 @@ static int vub300_probe(struct usb_interdev_err (&vub300->udev->dev,"Could not find two sets of bulk-in/out endpoint pairs\n" ); retval = -EINVAL ; - goto error4; + goto err_free_host; } retval = usb_control_msg(vub300->udev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(vub300->udev, 0),
@@ -2278,14 +2281,14 @@ static int vub300_probe(struct usb_inter0x0000 ,0x0000 , &vub300->hc_info, sizeof(vub300->hc_info), 1000);if (retval <0 ) - goto error4; + goto err_free_host; retval =usb_control_msg (vub300->udev,usb_sndctrlpipe (vub300->udev,0 ),SET_ROM_WAIT_STATES ,USB_DIR_OUT |USB_TYPE_VENDOR |USB_RECIP_DEVICE , firmware_rom_wait_states,0x0000 ,NULL ,0 ,1000 );if (retval <0 ) - goto error4; + goto err_free_host; dev_info(&vub300->udev->dev, "operating_mode = %s %s %d MHz %s %d byte USB packets\n", (mmc->caps & MMC_CAP_SDIO_IRQ) ? "IRQs" : "POLL",
@@ -2300,7 +2303,7 @@ static int vub300_probe(struct usb_inter0x0000 ,0x0000 , &vub300->system_port_status, sizeof(vub300->system_port_status), 1000);if (retval <0 ) { - goto error4; + goto err_free_host; }else if (sizeof (vub300->system_port_status) == retval) { vub300->card_present = (0x0001 & vub300->system_port_status.port_flags) ?1 :0 ;
@@ -2308,7 +2311,7 @@ static int vub300_probe(struct usb_inter (0x0010 & vub300->system_port_status.port_flags) ?1 :0 ; }else { retval = -EINVAL ; - goto error4; + goto err_free_host; }usb_set_intfdata (interface, vub300);INIT_DELAYED_WORK (&vub300->pollwork, vub300_pollwork_thread);
@@ -2338,6 +2341,8 @@ static int vub300_probe(struct usb_interreturn 0 ; error6:timer_delete_sync (&vub300->inactivity_timer); +err_free_host: +mmc_free_host (mmc);/* * and hence also frees vub300 * which is contained at the end of struct mmc
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 56/86 net: qualcomm: qca_uart: report the consumed byte on RX skb allocation failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pengpeng Hou <[email protected]>
commit b76254c55dc8f23edc089027dd3f8792554c69fb upstream.
qca_tty_receive() consumes each input byte before checking whether a completed frame needs a fresh receive skb. When the current byte completes a frame, the driver delivers that frame and then allocates a new skb for the next one.
If that allocation fails, the current code returns i even though data[i] has already been consumed and may already have completed the delivered frame. Since serdev interprets the return value as the number of accepted bytes, this under-reports progress by one byte and can replay the final byte of the completed frame into a fresh parser state on the next call.
Return i + 1 in that failure path so the accepted-byte count matches the actual receive-state progress.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/qca_uart.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/qualcomm/qca_uart.c +1 -1
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ qca_tty_receive(struct serdev_device *seif (!qca->rx_skb) {netdev_dbg (netdev,"recv: out of RX resources\n" ); n_stats->rx_errors++; -return i; +return i +1 ; } } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 57/86 net: stmmac: fix integer underflow in chain mode
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Tyllis Xu <[email protected]>
commit 51f4e090b9f87b40c21b6daadb5c06e6c0a07b67 upstream.
The jumbo_frm() chain-mode implementation unconditionally computes
len = nopaged_len - bmax;
where nopaged_len = skb_headlen(skb) (linear bytes only) and bmax is BUF_SIZE_8KiB or BUF_SIZE_2KiB. However, the caller stmmac_xmit() decides to invoke jumbo_frm() based on skb->len (total length including page fragments):
is_jumbo = stmmac_is_jumbo_frm(priv, skb->len, enh_desc);
When a packet has a small linear portion (nopaged_len <= bmax) but a large total length due to page fragments (skb->len > bmax), the subtraction wraps as an unsigned integer, producing a huge len value (~0xFFFFxxxx). This causes the while (len != 0) loop to execute hundreds of thousands of iterations, passing skb->data + bmax * i pointers far beyond the skb buffer to dma_map_single(). On IOMMU-less SoCs (the typical deployment for stmmac), this maps arbitrary kernel memory to the DMA engine, constituting a kernel memory disclosure and potential memory corruption from hardware.
Fix this by introducing a buf_len local variable clamped to min(nopaged_len, bmax). Computing len = nopaged_len - buf_len is then always safe: it is zero when the linear portion fits within a single descriptor, causing the while (len != 0) loop to be skipped naturally, and the fragment loop in stmmac_xmit() handles page fragments afterward.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/chain_mode.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/chain_mode.c +6 -5
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ static int jumbo_frm(struct stmmac_tx_quunsigned int nopaged_len =skb_headlen (skb);struct stmmac_priv *priv = tx_q->priv_data;unsigned int entry = tx_q->cur_tx; -unsigned int bmax, des2; +unsigned int bmax, buf_len, des2;unsigned int i =1 , len;struct dma_desc *desc;
@@ -31,17 +31,18 @@ static int jumbo_frm(struct stmmac_tx_quelse bmax = BUF_SIZE_2KiB; - len = nopaged_len - bmax; + buf_len = min_t(unsigned int, nopaged_len, bmax); + len = nopaged_len - buf_len; des2 =dma_map_single (priv->device, skb->data, - bmax,DMA_TO_DEVICE ); + buf_len,DMA_TO_DEVICE ); desc->des2 =cpu_to_le32 (des2);if (dma_mapping_error (priv->device, des2))return -1 ; tx_q->tx_skbuff_dma[entry].buf = des2; - tx_q->tx_skbuff_dma[entry].len = bmax; + tx_q->tx_skbuff_dma[entry].len = buf_len;/* do not close the descriptor and do not set own bit */ -stmmac_prepare_tx_desc (priv, desc,1 , bmax, csum,STMMAC_CHAIN_MODE , +stmmac_prepare_tx_desc (priv, desc,1 , buf_len, csum,STMMAC_CHAIN_MODE ,0 , false, skb->len);while (len !=0 ) {
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 58/86 mm: filemap: fix nr_pages calculation overflow in filemap_map_pages()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Baolin Wang <[email protected]>
commit f58df566524ebcdfa394329c64f47e3c9257516e upstream.
When running stress-ng on my Arm64 machine with v7.0-rc3 kernel, I encountered some very strange crash issues showing up as "Bad page state":
"
[ 734.496287] BUG: Bad page state in process stress-ng-env pfn:415735fb [ 734.496427] page: refcount:0 mapcount:1 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x4cf316 pfn:0x415735fb [ 734.496434] flags: 0x57fffe000000800(owner_2|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x3ffff) [ 734.496439] raw: 057fffe000000800 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 [ 734.496440] raw: 00000000004cf316 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 734.496442] page dumped because: nonzero mapcount
"
After analyzing this page’s state, it is hard to understand why the mapcount is not 0 while the refcount is 0, since this page is not where the issue first occurred. By enabling the CONFIG_DEBUG_VM config, I can reproduce the crash as well and captured the first warning where the issue appears:
"
[ 734.469226] page: refcount:33 mapcount:0 mapping:00000000bef2d187 index:0x81a0 pfn:0x415735c0 [ 734.469304] head: order:5 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 [ 734.469315] memcg:ffff000807a8ec00 [ 734.469320] aops:ext4_da_aops ino:100b6f dentry name(?):"stress-ng-mmaptorture-9397-0-2736200540" [ 734.469335] flags: 0x57fffe400000069(locked|uptodate|lru|head|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x3ffff) ...... [ 734.469364] page dumped because: VM_WARN_ON_FOLIO((_Generic((page + nr_pages - 1), const struct page *: (const struct folio *)_compound_head(page + nr_pages - 1), struct page *: (struct folio *)_compound_head(page + nr_pages - 1))) != folio) [ 734.469390] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 734.469393] WARNING: ./include/linux/rmap.h:351 at folio_add_file_rmap_ptes+0x3b8/0x468, CPU#90: stress-ng-mlock/9430 [ 734.469551] folio_add_file_rmap_ptes+0x3b8/0x468 (P) [ 734.469555] set_pte_range+0xd8/0x2f8 [ 734.469566] filemap_map_folio_range+0x190/0x400 [ 734.469579] filemap_map_pages+0x348/0x638 [ 734.469583] do_fault_around+0x140/0x198 ...... [ 734.469640] el0t_64_sync+0x184/0x188
"
The code that triggers the warning is: "VM_WARN_ON_FOLIO(page_folio(page + nr_pages - 1) != folio, folio)", which indicates that set_pte_range() tried to map beyond the large folio’s size.
By adding more debug information, I found that 'nr_pages' had overflowed in filemap_map_pages(), causing set_pte_range() to establish mappings for a range exceeding the folio size, potentially corrupting fields of pages that do not belong to this folio (e.g., page->_mapcount).
After above analysis, I think the possible race is as follows:
CPU 0 CPU 1filemap_map_pages() ext4_setattr()
//get and lock folio with old inode->i_size
next_uptodate_folio()
.......
//shrink the inode->i_size
i_size_write(inode, attr->ia_size); //calculate the end_pgoff with the new inode->i_size
file_end = DIV_ROUND_UP(i_size_read(mapping->host), PAGE_SIZE) - 1;
end_pgoff = min(end_pgoff, file_end);
......
//nr_pages can be overflowed, cause xas.xa_index > end_pgoff
end = folio_next_index(folio) - 1;
nr_pages = min(end, end_pgoff) - xas.xa_index + 1;
......
//map large folio
filemap_map_folio_range()
......
//truncate folios
truncate_pagecache(inode, inode->i_size);To fix this issue, move the 'end_pgoff' calculation before next_uptodate_folio(), so the retrieved folio stays consistent with the file end to avoid 'nr_pages' calculation overflow. After this patch, the crash issue is gone.
--- mm/filemap.c | 11 ++++++++--- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
mm/filemap.c +8 -3
@@ -3883,14 +3883,19 @@ vm_fault_t filemap_map_pages(struct vm_funsigned int nr_pages =0 , folio_type;unsigned short mmap_miss =0 , mmap_miss_saved; +/* +* Recalculate end_pgoff based on file_end before calling +* next_uptodate_folio() to avoid races with concurrent +* truncation. +*/ + file_end =DIV_ROUND_UP (i_size_read (mapping->host),PAGE_SIZE ) -1 ; + end_pgoff =min (end_pgoff, file_end); +rcu_read_lock (); folio =next_uptodate_folio (&xas, mapping, end_pgoff);if (!folio) goto out; - file_end =DIV_ROUND_UP (i_size_read (mapping->host),PAGE_SIZE ) -1 ; - end_pgoff =min (end_pgoff, file_end); -/* * Do not allow to map with PMD across i_size to preserve * SIGBUS semantics.
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 59/86 idpf: fix PREEMPT_RT raw/bh spinlock nesting for async VC handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Emil Tantilov <[email protected]>
commit 591478118293c1bd628de330a99eb1eb2ef8d76b upstream.
Switch from using the completion's raw spinlock to a local lock in the idpf_vc_xn struct. The conversion is safe because complete/_all() are called outside the lock and there is no reason to share the completion lock in the current logic. This avoids invalid wait context reported by the kernel due to the async handler taking BH spinlock:
[ 805.726977] =============================
[ 805.726991] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
[ 805.727006] 7.0.0-rc2-net-devq-031026+ #28 Tainted: G S OE
[ 805.727026] -----------------------------
[ 805.727038] kworker/u261:0/572 is trying to lock:
[ 805.727051] ff190da6a8dbb6a0 (&vport_config->mac_filter_list_lock){+...}-{3:3}, at: idpf_mac_filter_async_handler+0xe9/0x260 [idpf]
[ 805.727099] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 805.727111] context-{5:5}
[ 805.727119] 3 locks held by kworker/u261:0/572:
[ 805.727132] #0: ff190da6db3e6148 ((wq_completion)idpf-0000:83:00.0-mbx){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x4b5/0x730
[ 805.727163] #1: ff3c6f0a6131fe50 ((work_completion)(&(&adapter->mbx_task)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1e5/0x730
[ 805.727191] #2: ff190da765190020 (&x->wait#34){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: idpf_recv_mb_msg+0xc8/0x710 [idpf]
[ 805.727218] stack backtrace:
...
[ 805.727238] Workqueue: idpf-0000:83:00.0-mbx idpf_mbx_task [idpf]
[ 805.727247] Call Trace:
[ 805.727249] <TASK>
[ 805.727251] dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xb0
[ 805.727259] __lock_acquire+0xb3b/0x2290
[ 805.727268] ? __irq_work_queue_local+0x59/0x130
[ 805.727275] lock_acquire+0xc6/0x2f0
[ 805.727277] ? idpf_mac_filter_async_handler+0xe9/0x260 [idpf]
[ 805.727284] ? _printk+0x5b/0x80
[ 805.727290] _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x38/0x50
[ 805.727298] ? idpf_mac_filter_async_handler+0xe9/0x260 [idpf]
[ 805.727303] idpf_mac_filter_async_handler+0xe9/0x260 [idpf]
[ 805.727310] idpf_recv_mb_msg+0x1c8/0x710 [idpf]
[ 805.727317] process_one_work+0x226/0x730
[ 805.727322] worker_thread+0x19e/0x340
[ 805.727325] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 805.727328] kthread+0xf4/0x130
[ 805.727333] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 805.727336] ret_from_fork+0x32c/0x410
[ 805.727345] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 805.727347] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 805.727354] </TASK>--- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c | 14 +++++--------- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.h | 5 +++-- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c +5 -9
@@ -284,26 +284,21 @@ dma_mem_error:return err; } -/* API for virtchnl "transaction" support ("xn" for short). -* -* We are reusing the completion lock to serialize the accesses to the -* transaction state for simplicity, but it could be its own separate synchro -* as well. For now, this API is only used from within a workqueue context; -* raw_spin_lock() is enough. -*/ +/* API for virtchnl "transaction" support ("xn" for short). */ +/** * idpf_vc_xn_lock - Request exclusive access to vc transaction * @xn: struct idpf_vc_xn* to access */ #define idpf_vc_xn_lock (xn) \ - raw_spin_lock(&(xn)->completed.wait.lock) + spin_lock(&(xn)->lock)/** * idpf_vc_xn_unlock - Release exclusive access to vc transaction * @xn: struct idpf_vc_xn* to access */ #define idpf_vc_xn_unlock (xn) \ - raw_spin_unlock(&(xn)->completed.wait.lock) + spin_unlock(&(xn)->lock)/** * idpf_vc_xn_release_bufs - Release reference to reply buffer(s) and
@@ -335,6 +330,7 @@ static void idpf_vc_xn_init(struct idpf_ xn->state =IDPF_VC_XN_IDLE ; xn->idx = i;idpf_vc_xn_release_bufs (xn); +spin_lock_init (&xn->lock);init_completion (&xn->completed); }
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.h +3 -2
@@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ typedef int (*async_vc_cb) (struct idpf_* struct idpf_vc_xn - Data structure representing virtchnl transactions * @completed: virtchnl event loop uses that to signal when a reply is * available, uses kernel completion API -* @state: virtchnl event loop stores the data below, protected by the -* completion's lock. +* @lock: protects the transaction state fields below +* @state: virtchnl event loop stores the data below, protected by @lock * @reply_sz: Original size of reply, may be > reply_buf.iov_len; it will be * truncated on its way to the receiver thread according to * reply_buf.iov_len.
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ typedef int (*async_vc_cb) (struct idpf_*/ struct idpf_vc_xn {struct completion completed; +spinlock_t lock;enum idpf_vc_xn_state state;size_t reply_sz;struct kvec reply;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 60/86 idpf: improve locking around idpf_vc_xn_push_free()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Emil Tantilov <[email protected]>
commit d086fae65006368618104ba4c57779440eab2217 upstream.
Protect the set_bit() operation for the free_xn bitmask in idpf_vc_xn_push_free(), to make the locking consistent with rest of the code and avoid potential races in that logic.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c +2 -0
@@ -399,7 +399,9 @@ static void idpf_vc_xn_push_free(struct struct idpf_vc_xn *xn) {idpf_vc_xn_release_bufs (xn); +spin_lock_bh (&vcxn_mngr->xn_bm_lock);set_bit (xn->idx, vcxn_mngr->free_xn_bm); +spin_unlock_bh (&vcxn_mngr->xn_bm_lock); }/**
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 61/86 idpf: set the payload size before calling the async handler
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Emil Tantilov <[email protected]>
commit 8e2a2420e267a515f6db56a6e9570b5cacd92919 upstream.
Set the payload size before forwarding the reply to the async handler. Without this, xn->reply_sz will be 0 and idpf_mac_filter_async_handler() will never get past the size check.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/idpf_virtchnl.c +4 -0
@@ -612,6 +612,10 @@ idpf_vc_xn_forward_reply(struct idpf_ada err = -ENXIO ; goto out_unlock;case IDPF_VC_XN_ASYNC : +/* Set reply_sz from the actual payload so that async_handler +* can evaluate the response. +*/ + xn->reply_sz = ctlq_msg->data_len; err =idpf_vc_xn_forward_async (adapter, xn, ctlq_msg);idpf_vc_xn_unlock (xn);return err;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 62/86 net: lan966x: fix page_pool error handling in lan966x_fdma_rx_alloc_page_pool()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Carlier <[email protected]>
commit 3fd0da4fd8851a7e62d009b7db6c4a05b092bc19 upstream.
page_pool_create() can return an ERR_PTR on failure. The return value is used unconditionally in the loop that follows, passing the error pointer through xdp_rxq_info_reg_mem_model() into page_pool_use_xdp_mem(), which dereferences it, causing a kernel oops.
Add an IS_ERR check after page_pool_create() to return early on failure.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan966x/lan966x_fdma.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan966x/lan966x_fdma.c +2 -0
@@ -91,6 +91,8 @@ static int lan966x_fdma_rx_alloc_page_po pp_params.dma_dir =DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL ; rx->page_pool =page_pool_create (&pp_params); +if (unlikely (IS_ERR (rx->page_pool))) +return PTR_ERR (rx->page_pool);for (int i =0 ; i < lan966x->num_phys_ports; ++i) {struct lan966x_port *port;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 63/86 net: lan966x: fix page pool leak in error paths
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Carlier <[email protected]>
commit 076344a6ad9d1308faaed1402fdcfdda68b604ab upstream.
lan966x_fdma_rx_alloc() creates a page pool but does not destroy it if the subsequent fdma_alloc_coherent() call fails, leaking the pool.
Similarly, lan966x_fdma_init() frees the coherent DMA memory when lan966x_fdma_tx_alloc() fails but does not destroy the page pool that was successfully created by lan966x_fdma_rx_alloc(), leaking it.
Add the missing page_pool_destroy() calls in both error paths.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan966x/lan966x_fdma.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan966x/lan966x_fdma.c +4 -1
@@ -119,8 +119,10 @@ static int lan966x_fdma_rx_alloc(structreturn PTR_ERR (rx->page_pool); err =fdma_alloc_coherent (lan966x->dev, fdma); -if (err) +if (err) { +page_pool_destroy (rx->page_pool);return err; + }fdma_dcbs_init (fdma,FDMA_DCB_INFO_DATAL (fdma->db_size),FDMA_DCB_STATUS_INTR );
@@ -958,6 +960,7 @@ int lan966x_fdma_init(struct lan966x *la err =lan966x_fdma_tx_alloc (&lan966x->tx);if (err) {fdma_free_coherent (lan966x->dev, &lan966x->rx.fdma); +page_pool_destroy (lan966x->rx.page_pool);return err; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 64/86 net: lan966x: fix use-after-free and leak in lan966x_fdma_reload()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Carlier <[email protected]>
commit 59c3d55a946cacdb4181600723c20ac4f4c20c84 upstream.
When lan966x_fdma_reload() fails to allocate new RX buffers, the restore path restarts DMA using old descriptors whose pages were already freed via lan966x_fdma_rx_free_pages(). Since page_pool_put_full_page() can release pages back to the buddy allocator, the hardware may DMA into memory now owned by other kernel subsystems.
Additionally, on the restore path, the newly created page pool (if allocation partially succeeded) is overwritten without being destroyed, leaking it.
Fix both issues by deferring the release of old pages until after the new allocation succeeds. Save the old page array before the allocation so old pages can be freed on the success path. On the failure path, the old descriptors, pages and page pool are all still valid, making the restore safe. Also ensure the restore path re-enables NAPI and wakes the netdev, matching the success path.
--- drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan966x/lan966x_fdma.c | 21 +++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/microchip/lan966x/lan966x_fdma.c +18 -3
@@ -813,9 +813,15 @@ static int lan966x_qsys_sw_status(structstatic int lan966x_fdma_reload (struct lan966x *lan966x,int new_mtu) { +struct page *(*old_pages)[FDMA_RX_DCB_MAX_DBS ];struct page_pool *page_pool;struct fdma fdma_rx_old; -int err; +int err, i, j; + + old_pages =kmemdup (lan966x->rx.page,sizeof (lan966x->rx.page), +GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!old_pages) +return -ENOMEM ;/* Store these for later to free them */ memcpy (&fdma_rx_old, &lan966x->rx.fdma,sizeof (struct fdma ));
@@ -826,7 +832,6 @@ static int lan966x_fdma_reload(struct lalan966x_fdma_stop_netdev (lan966x);lan966x_fdma_rx_disable (&lan966x->rx); -lan966x_fdma_rx_free_pages (&lan966x->rx); lan966x->rx.page_order =round_up (new_mtu,PAGE_SIZE ) /PAGE_SIZE -1 ; lan966x->rx.max_mtu = new_mtu; err =lan966x_fdma_rx_alloc (&lan966x->rx);
@@ -834,6 +839,11 @@ static int lan966x_fdma_reload(struct la goto restore;lan966x_fdma_rx_start (&lan966x->rx); +for (i =0 ; i < fdma_rx_old.n_dcbs; ++i) +for (j =0 ; j < fdma_rx_old.n_dbs; ++j) +page_pool_put_full_page (page_pool, + old_pages[i][j], false); +fdma_free_coherent (lan966x->dev, &fdma_rx_old);page_pool_destroy (page_pool);
@@ -841,12 +851,17 @@ static int lan966x_fdma_reload(struct lalan966x_fdma_wakeup_netdev (lan966x);napi_enable (&lan966x->napi); -return err; +kfree (old_pages); +return 0 ; restore: lan966x->rx.page_pool = page_pool;memcpy (&lan966x->rx.fdma, &fdma_rx_old,sizeof (struct fdma ));lan966x_fdma_rx_start (&lan966x->rx); +lan966x_fdma_wakeup_netdev (lan966x); +napi_enable (&lan966x->napi); + +kfree (old_pages);return err; }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 65/86 rxrpc: Fix key quota calculation for multitoken keys
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Howells <[email protected]>
commit bdbfead6d38979475df0c2f4bad2b19394fe9bdc upstream.
In the rxrpc key preparsing, every token extracted sets the proposed quota value, but for multitoken keys, this will overwrite the previous proposed quota, losing it.
Fix this by adding to the proposed quota instead.
--- net/rxrpc/key.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
net/rxrpc/key.c +4 -3
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr_rxkad(strureturn -EKEYREJECTED ; plen =sizeof (*token) +sizeof (*token->kad) + tktlen; - prep->quotalen = datalen + plen; + prep->quotalen += datalen + plen; plen -=sizeof (*token); token =kzalloc (sizeof (*token),GFP_KERNEL );
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr_yfs_rxgk(s } plen =sizeof (*token) +sizeof (*token->rxgk) + tktlen + keylen; - prep->quotalen = datalen + plen; + prep->quotalen += datalen + plen; plen -=sizeof (*token); token =kzalloc (sizeof (*token),GFP_KERNEL );
@@ -460,6 +460,7 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse(struct key_prememcpy (&kver, prep->data,sizeof (kver)); prep->data +=sizeof (kver); prep->datalen -=sizeof (kver); + prep->quotalen =0 ;_debug ("KEY I/F VERSION: %u" , kver);
@@ -497,7 +498,7 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse(struct key_pre goto error; plen =sizeof (*token->kad) + v1->ticket_length; - prep->quotalen = plen +sizeof (*token); + prep->quotalen += plen +sizeof (*token); ret = -ENOMEM ; token =kzalloc (sizeof (*token),GFP_KERNEL );
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 66/86 rxrpc: Fix key parsing memleak
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Howells <[email protected]>
commit b555912b9b21075e8298015f888ffe3ff60b1a97 upstream.
In rxrpc_preparse_xdr_yfs_rxgk(), the memory attached to token->rxgk can be leaked in a few error paths after it's allocated.
Fix this by freeing it in the "reject_token:" case.
--- net/rxrpc/key.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/rxrpc/key.c +1 -0
@@ -274,6 +274,7 @@ nomem_token: nomem:return -ENOMEM ; reject_token: +kfree (token->rxgk);kfree (token); reject:return -EKEYREJECTED ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 67/86 rxrpc: Fix anonymous key handling
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Howells <[email protected]>
commit 6a59d84b4fc2f27f7b40e348506cc686712e260b upstream.
In rxrpc_new_client_call_for_sendmsg(), a key with no payload is meant to be substituted for a NULL key pointer, but the variable this is done with is subsequently not used.
Fix this by using "key" rather than "rx->key" when filling in the connection parameters.
Note that this only affects direct use of AF_RXRPC; the kAFS filesystem doesn't use sendmsg() directly and so bypasses the issue. Further, AF_RXRPC passes a NULL key in if no key is set, so using an anonymous key in that manner works. Since this hasn't been noticed to this point, it might be better just to remove the "key" variable and the code that sets it
- and, arguably, rxrpc_init_client_call_security() would be a better place to handle it.
--- net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/rxrpc/sendmsg.c +1 -1
@@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ rxrpc_new_client_call_for_sendmsg(structmemset (&cp,0 ,sizeof (cp)); cp.local = rx->local; cp.peer = peer; - cp.key = rx->key; + cp.key = key; cp.security_level = rx->min_sec_level; cp.exclusive = rx->exclusive | p->exclusive; cp.upgrade = p->upgrade;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 68/86 rxrpc: Fix call removal to use RCU safe deletion
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Howells <[email protected]>
commit 146d4ab94cf129ee06cd467cb5c71368a6b5bad6 upstream.
Fix rxrpc call removal from the rxnet->calls list to use list_del_rcu() rather than list_del_init() to prevent stuffing up reading /proc/net/rxrpc/calls from potentially getting into an infinite loop.
This, however, means that list_empty() no longer works on an entry that's been deleted from the list, making it harder to detect prior deletion. Fix this by:
Firstly, make rxrpc_destroy_all_calls() only dump the first ten calls that are unexpectedly still on the list. Limiting the number of steps means there's no need to call cond_resched() or to remove calls from the list here, thereby eliminating the need for rxrpc_put_call() to check for that.
rxrpc_put_call() can then be fixed to unconditionally delete the call from the list as it is the only place that the deletion occurs.
--- include/trace/events/rxrpc.h | 2 +- net/rxrpc/call_object.c | 24 +++++++++--------------- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
include/trace/events/rxrpc.h +1 -1
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ EM(rxrpc_call_see_release, "SEE release ") \ EM(rxrpc_call_see_userid_exists, "SEE u-exists") \ EM(rxrpc_call_see_waiting_call, "SEE q-conn ") \ - E_(rxrpc_call_see_zap, "SEE zap ") + E_(rxrpc_call_see_still_live, "SEE !still-l")#define rxrpc_txqueue_traces \ EM(rxrpc_txqueue_await_reply, "AWR") \
net/rxrpc/call_object.c +9 -15
@@ -654,11 +654,9 @@ void rxrpc_put_call(struct rxrpc_call *cif (dead) { ASSERTCMP(__rxrpc_call_state(call), ==, RXRPC_CALL_COMPLETE); -if (!list_empty (&call->link)) { -spin_lock (&rxnet->call_lock); -list_del_init (&call->link); -spin_unlock (&rxnet->call_lock); - } +spin_lock (&rxnet->call_lock); +list_del_rcu (&call->link); +spin_unlock (&rxnet->call_lock);rxrpc_cleanup_call (call); }
@@ -730,24 +728,20 @@ void rxrpc_destroy_all_calls(struct rxrp_enter ("" );if (!list_empty (&rxnet->calls)) { -spin_lock (&rxnet->call_lock); +int shown =0 ; -while (!list_empty (&rxnet->calls)) { - call =list_entry (rxnet->calls.next, - struct rxrpc_call, link); -_debug ("Zapping call %p" , call); +spin_lock (&rxnet->call_lock); -rxrpc_see_call (call, rxrpc_call_see_zap); -list_del_init (&call->link); +list_for_each_entry (call, &rxnet->calls, link) { +rxrpc_see_call (call, rxrpc_call_see_still_live);pr_err ("Call %p still in use (%d,%s,%lx,%lx)!\n" , call,refcount_read (&call->ref), rxrpc_call_states[__rxrpc_call_state (call)], call->flags, call->events); -spin_unlock (&rxnet->call_lock); -cond_resched (); -spin_lock (&rxnet->call_lock); +if (++shown >=10 ) +break ; }spin_unlock (&rxnet->call_lock);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 69/86 rxrpc: Fix RxGK token loading to check bounds
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Oleh Konko <[email protected]>
commit d179a868dd755b0cfcf7582e00943d702b9943b8 upstream.
rxrpc_preparse_xdr_yfs_rxgk() reads the raw key length and ticket length from the XDR token as u32 values and passes each through round_up(x, 4) before using the rounded value for validation and allocation. When the raw length is >= 0xfffffffd, round_up() wraps to 0, so the bounds check and kzalloc both use 0 while the subsequent memcpy still copies the original ~4 GiB value, producing a heap buffer overflow reachable from an unprivileged add_key() call.
Fix this by:
(1) Rejecting raw key lengths above AFSTOKEN_GK_KEY_MAX and raw ticket lengths above AFSTOKEN_GK_TOKEN_MAX before rounding, consistent with the caps that the RxKAD path already enforces via AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX.
(2) Sizing the flexible-array allocation from the validated raw key length via struct_size_t() instead of the rounded value.
(3) Caching the raw lengths so that the later field assignments and memcpy calls do not re-read from the token, eliminating a class of TOCTOU re-parse.
The control path (valid token with lengths within bounds) is unaffected.
--- net/rxrpc/key.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
net/rxrpc/key.c +17 -13
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@#include <crypto/skcipher.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/net.h> +#include <linux/overflow.h> #include <linux/skbuff.h> #include <linux/key-type.h> #include <linux/ctype.h>
@@ -171,7 +172,7 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr_yfs_rxgk(ssize_t plen;const __be32 *ticket, *key;s64 tmp; -u32 tktlen, keylen; +size_t raw_keylen, raw_tktlen, keylen, tktlen; _enter(",{%x,%x,%x,%x},%x", ntohl(xdr[0]), ntohl(xdr[1]), ntohl(xdr[2]), ntohl(xdr[3]),
@@ -181,18 +182,22 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr_yfs_rxgk(s goto reject; key = xdr + (6 *2 +1 ); - keylen =ntohl (key[-1 ]); -_debug ("keylen: %x" , keylen); - keylen =round_up (keylen,4 ); + raw_keylen =ntohl (key[-1 ]); +_debug ("keylen: %zx" , raw_keylen); +if (raw_keylen >AFSTOKEN_GK_KEY_MAX ) + goto reject; + keylen =round_up (raw_keylen,4 );if ((6 *2 +2 ) *4 + keylen > toklen) goto reject; ticket = xdr + (6 *2 +1 + (keylen /4 ) +1 ); - tktlen =ntohl (ticket[-1 ]); -_debug ("tktlen: %x" , tktlen); - tktlen =round_up (tktlen,4 ); + raw_tktlen =ntohl (ticket[-1 ]); +_debug ("tktlen: %zx" , raw_tktlen); +if (raw_tktlen >AFSTOKEN_GK_TOKEN_MAX ) + goto reject; + tktlen =round_up (raw_tktlen,4 );if ((6 *2 +2 ) *4 + keylen + tktlen != toklen) { -kleave (" = -EKEYREJECTED [%x!=%x, %x,%x]" , +kleave (" = -EKEYREJECTED [%zx!=%x, %zx,%zx]" , (6 *2 +2 ) *4 + keylen + tktlen, toklen, keylen, tktlen); goto reject;
@@ -206,7 +211,7 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr_yfs_rxgk(sif (!token) goto nomem; - token->rxgk =kzalloc (sizeof (*token->rxgk) + keylen,GFP_KERNEL ); + token->rxgk = kzalloc(struct_size_t(struct rxgk_key, _key, raw_keylen), GFP_KERNEL);if (!token->rxgk) goto nomem_token;
@@ -221,9 +226,9 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr_yfs_rxgk(s token->rxgk->enctype = tmp =xdr_dec64 (xdr +5 *2 );if (tmp <0 || tmp >UINT_MAX ) goto reject_token; - token->rxgk->key.len =ntohl (key[-1 ]); + token->rxgk->key.len = raw_keylen; token->rxgk->key.data = token->rxgk->_key; - token->rxgk->ticket.len =ntohl (ticket[-1 ]); + token->rxgk->ticket.len = raw_tktlen;if (token->rxgk->endtime !=0 ) { expiry =rxrpc_s64_to_time64 (token->rxgk->endtime);
@@ -236,8 +241,7 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr_yfs_rxgk(smemcpy (token->rxgk->key.data, key, token->rxgk->key.len);/* Pad the ticket so that we can use it directly in XDR */ - token->rxgk->ticket.data =kzalloc (round_up (token->rxgk->ticket.len,4 ), -GFP_KERNEL ); + token->rxgk->ticket.data =kzalloc (tktlen,GFP_KERNEL );if (!token->rxgk->ticket.data) goto nomem_yrxgk;memcpy (token->rxgk->ticket.data, ticket, token->rxgk->ticket.len);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 70/86 rxrpc: Fix use of wrong skb when comparing queued RESP challenge serial
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alok Tiwari <[email protected]>
commit b33f5741bb187db8ff32e8f5b96def77cc94dfca upstream.
In rxrpc_post_response(), the code should be comparing the challenge serial number from the cached response before deciding to switch to a newer response, but looks at the newer packet private data instead, rendering the comparison always false.
Fix this by switching to look at the older packet.
Fix further[1] to substitute the new packet in place of the old one if newer and also to release whichever we don't use.
--- include/trace/events/rxrpc.h | 1 + net/rxrpc/conn_event.c | 5 +++-- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
include/trace/events/rxrpc.h +1 -0
@@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ EM(rxrpc_skb_put_input, "PUT input ") \ EM(rxrpc_skb_put_jumbo_subpacket, "PUT jumbo-sub") \ EM(rxrpc_skb_put_oob, "PUT oob ") \ + EM(rxrpc_skb_put_old_response, "PUT old-resp ") \ EM(rxrpc_skb_put_purge, "PUT purge ") \ EM(rxrpc_skb_put_purge_oob, "PUT purge-oob") \EM (rxrpc_skb_put_response,"PUT response " ) \
net/rxrpc/conn_event.c +3 -2
@@ -557,11 +557,11 @@ void rxrpc_post_response(struct rxrpc_cospin_lock_irq (&local->lock); old = conn->tx_response;if (old) { -struct rxrpc_skb_priv *osp =rxrpc_skb (skb); +struct rxrpc_skb_priv *osp =rxrpc_skb (old);/* Always go with the response to the most recent challenge. */ if (after (sp->resp.challenge_serial, osp->resp.challenge_serial)) - conn->tx_response = old; + conn->tx_response = skb;else old = skb; }else {
@@ -569,4 +569,5 @@ void rxrpc_post_response(struct rxrpc_co }spin_unlock_irq (&local->lock);rxrpc_poke_conn (conn, rxrpc_conn_get_poke_response); +rxrpc_free_skb (old, rxrpc_skb_put_old_response); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 71/86 rxrpc: Fix rack timer warning to report unexpected mode
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Alok Tiwari <[email protected]>
commit 65b3ffe0972ed023acc3981a0f7e1ae5d0208bd3 upstream.
rxrpc_rack_timer_expired() clears call->rack_timer_mode to OFF before the switch. The default case warning therefore always prints OFF and doesn't identify the unexpected timer mode.
Log the saved mode value instead so the warning reports the actual unexpected rack timer mode.
--- net/rxrpc/input_rack.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/rxrpc/input_rack.c +1 -1
@@ -413,6 +413,6 @@ void rxrpc_rack_timer_expired(struct rxrbreak ;//case RXRPC_CALL_RACKTIMER_ZEROWIN: default : -pr_warn ("Unexpected rack timer %u" , call->rack_timer_mode); +pr_warn ("Unexpected rack timer %u" , mode); } }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 72/86 rxrpc: Fix key reference count leak from call->key
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Anderson Nascimento <[email protected]>
commit d666540d217e8d420544ebdfbadeedd623562733 upstream.
When creating a client call in rxrpc_alloc_client_call(), the code obtains a reference to the key. This is never cleaned up and gets leaked when the call is destroyed.
Fix this by freeing call->key in rxrpc_destroy_call().
Before the patch, it shows the key reference counter elevated:
$ cat /proc/keys | grep afs@54321 1bffe9cd I--Q--i 8053480 4169w 3b010000 1000 1000 rxrpc afs@54321: ka $
After the patch, the invalidated key is removed when the code exits:
$ cat /proc/keys | grep afs@54321 $
--- net/rxrpc/call_object.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
net/rxrpc/call_object.c +1 -0
@@ -692,6 +692,7 @@ static void rxrpc_destroy_call(struct worxrpc_put_bundle (call->bundle, rxrpc_bundle_put_call);rxrpc_put_peer (call->peer, rxrpc_peer_put_call);rxrpc_put_local (call->local, rxrpc_local_put_call); +key_put (call->key);call_rcu (&call->rcu, rxrpc_rcu_free_call); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 73/86 rxrpc: Fix to request an ack if window is limited
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Marc Dionne <[email protected]>
commit 0cd3e3f3f2ec1a45aa559e2c0f3d57fac5eb3c25 upstream.
Peers may only send immediate acks for every 2 UDP packets received. When sending a jumbogram, it is important to check that there is sufficient window space to send another same sized jumbogram following the current one, and request an ack if there isn't. Failure to do so may cause the call to stall waiting for an ack until the resend timer fires.
Where jumbograms are in use this causes a very significant drop in performance.
--- include/trace/events/rxrpc.h | 1 + net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h | 2 +- net/rxrpc/output.c | 2 ++ net/rxrpc/proc.c | 5 +++-- 4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
include/trace/events/rxrpc.h +1 -0
@@ -521,6 +521,7 @@#define rxrpc_req_ack_traces \ EM(rxrpc_reqack_ack_lost, "ACK-LOST ") \ EM(rxrpc_reqack_app_stall, "APP-STALL ") \ + EM(rxrpc_reqack_jumbo_win, "JUMBO-WIN ") \ EM(rxrpc_reqack_more_rtt, "MORE-RTT ") \ EM(rxrpc_reqack_no_srv_last, "NO-SRVLAST") \ EM(rxrpc_reqack_old_rtt, "OLD-RTT ") \
net/rxrpc/ar-internal.h +1 -1
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ struct rxrpc_net {atomic_t stat_tx_jumbo[10 ];atomic_t stat_rx_jumbo[10 ]; -atomic_t stat_why_req_ack[8 ]; +atomic_t stat_why_req_ack[9 ];atomic_t stat_io_loop; };
net/rxrpc/output.c +2 -0
@@ -479,6 +479,8 @@ static size_t rxrpc_prepare_data_subpack why = rxrpc_reqack_old_rtt; else if (!last && !after(READ_ONCE(call->send_top), txb->seq)) why = rxrpc_reqack_app_stall; + else if (call->tx_winsize <= (2 * req->n) || call->cong_cwnd <= (2 * req->n)) + why = rxrpc_reqack_jumbo_win; else goto dont_set_request_ack;
net/rxrpc/proc.c +3 -2
@@ -518,11 +518,12 @@ int rxrpc_stats_show(struct seq_file *seatomic_read (&rxnet->stat_rx_acks[RXRPC_ACK_IDLE ]), atomic_read(&rxnet->stat_rx_acks[0]));seq_printf (seq, -"Why-Req-A: acklost=%u mrtt=%u ortt=%u stall=%u\n" , +"Why-Req-A: acklost=%u mrtt=%u ortt=%u stall=%u jwin=%u\n" ,atomic_read (&rxnet->stat_why_req_ack[rxrpc_reqack_ack_lost]),atomic_read (&rxnet->stat_why_req_ack[rxrpc_reqack_more_rtt]),atomic_read (&rxnet->stat_why_req_ack[rxrpc_reqack_old_rtt]), -atomic_read (&rxnet->stat_why_req_ack[rxrpc_reqack_app_stall])); +atomic_read (&rxnet->stat_why_req_ack[rxrpc_reqack_app_stall]), +atomic_read (&rxnet->stat_why_req_ack[rxrpc_reqack_jumbo_win])); seq_printf(seq, "Why-Req-A: nolast=%u retx=%u slows=%u smtxw=%u\n", atomic_read(&rxnet->stat_why_req_ack[rxrpc_reqack_no_srv_last]),
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 74/86 rxrpc: Only put the call ref if one was acquired
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Douya Le <[email protected]>
commit 6331f1b24a3e85465f6454e003a3e6c22005a5c5 upstream.
rxrpc_input_packet_on_conn() can process a to-client packet after the current client call on the channel has already been torn down. In that case chan->call is NULL, rxrpc_try_get_call() returns NULL and there is no reference to drop.
The client-side implicit-end error path does not account for that and unconditionally calls rxrpc_put_call(). This turns a protocol error path into a kernel crash instead of rejecting the packet.
Only drop the call reference if one was actually acquired. Keep the existing protocol error handling unchanged.
--- net/rxrpc/io_thread.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/rxrpc/io_thread.c +2 -1
@@ -419,7 +419,8 @@ static int rxrpc_input_packet_on_conn(stif (sp->hdr.callNumber > chan->call_id) {if (rxrpc_to_client (sp)) { -rxrpc_put_call (call, rxrpc_call_put_input); +if (call) +rxrpc_put_call (call, rxrpc_call_put_input);return rxrpc_protocol_error (skb, rxrpc_eproto_unexpected_implicit_end); }
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 75/86 rxrpc: reject undecryptable rxkad response tickets
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Yuqi Xu <[email protected]>
commit fe4447cd95623b1cfacc15f280aab73a6d7340b2 upstream.
rxkad_decrypt_ticket() decrypts the RXKAD response ticket and then parses the buffer as plaintext without checking whether crypto_skcipher_decrypt() succeeded.
A malformed RESPONSE can therefore use a non-block-aligned ticket length, make the decrypt operation fail, and still drive the ticket parser with attacker-controlled bytes.
Check the decrypt result and abort the connection with RXKADBADTICKET when ticket decryption fails.
--- net/rxrpc/rxkad.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/rxrpc/rxkad.c +5 -1
@@ -958,6 +958,7 @@ static int rxkad_decrypt_ticket(struct rstruct in_addr addr;unsigned int life;time64_t issue, now; +int ret;bool little_endian;u8 *p, *q, *name, *end;
@@ -977,8 +978,11 @@ static int rxkad_decrypt_ticket(struct rsg_init_one (&sg[0 ], ticket, ticket_len);skcipher_request_set_callback (req,0 ,NULL ,NULL );skcipher_request_set_crypt (req, sg, sg, ticket_len, iv.x); -crypto_skcipher_decrypt (req); + ret =crypto_skcipher_decrypt (req);skcipher_request_free (req); +if (ret <0 ) +return rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXKADBADTICKET , -EPROTO , + rxkad_abort_resp_tkt_short); p = ticket; end = p + ticket_len;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 76/86 rxrpc: fix RESPONSE authenticator parser OOB read
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Keenan Dong <[email protected]>
commit 3e3138007887504ee9206d0bfb5acb062c600025 upstream.
rxgk_verify_authenticator() copies auth_len bytes into a temporary buffer and then passes p + auth_len as the parser limit to rxgk_do_verify_authenticator(). Since p is a __be32 *, that inflates the parser end pointer by a factor of four and lets malformed RESPONSE authenticators read past the kmalloc() buffer.
Decoded from the original latest-net reproduction logs with scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rxgk_verify_response()
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl() [lib/dump_stack.c:123]
print_report() [mm/kasan/report.c:379 mm/kasan/report.c:482]
kasan_report() [mm/kasan/report.c:597]
rxgk_verify_response()
[net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1103 net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1167
net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1274]
rxrpc_process_connection()
[net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:266 net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:364
net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:386]
process_one_work() [kernel/workqueue.c:3281]
worker_thread()
[kernel/workqueue.c:3353 kernel/workqueue.c:3440]
kthread() [kernel/kthread.c:436]
ret_from_fork() [arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164]
Allocated by task 54:
rxgk_verify_response()
[include/linux/slab.h:954 net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1155
net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1274]
rxrpc_process_connection()
[net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:266 net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:364
net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:386]Convert the byte count to __be32 units before constructing the parser limit.
--- net/rxrpc/rxgk.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/rxrpc/rxgk.c +2 -1
@@ -1164,7 +1164,8 @@ static int rxgk_verify_authenticator(str } p = auth; - ret =rxgk_do_verify_authenticator (conn, krb5, skb, p, p + auth_len); + ret =rxgk_do_verify_authenticator (conn, krb5, skb, p, + p + auth_len /sizeof (*p)); error:kfree (auth);return ret;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 77/86 rxrpc: fix oversized RESPONSE authenticator length check
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Keenan Dong <[email protected]>
commit a2567217ade970ecc458144b6be469bc015b23e5 upstream.
rxgk_verify_response() decodes auth_len from the packet and is supposed to verify that it fits in the remaining bytes. The existing check is inverted, so oversized RESPONSE authenticators are accepted and passed to rxgk_decrypt_skb(), which can later reach skb_to_sgvec() with an impossible length and hit BUG_ON(len).
Decoded from the original latest-net reproduction logs with scripts/decode_stacktrace.sh:
RIP: __skb_to_sgvec()
[net/core/skbuff.c:5285 (discriminator 1)]
Call Trace:
skb_to_sgvec() [net/core/skbuff.c:5305]
rxgk_decrypt_skb() [net/rxrpc/rxgk_common.h:81]
rxgk_verify_response() [net/rxrpc/rxgk.c:1268]
rxrpc_process_connection()
[net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:266 net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:364
net/rxrpc/conn_event.c:386]
process_one_work() [kernel/workqueue.c:3281]
worker_thread()
[kernel/workqueue.c:3353 kernel/workqueue.c:3440]
kthread() [kernel/kthread.c:436]
ret_from_fork() [arch/x86/kernel/process.c:164]Reject authenticator lengths that exceed the remaining packet payload.
--- net/rxrpc/rxgk.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/rxrpc/rxgk.c +1 -1
@@ -1224,7 +1224,7 @@ static int rxgk_verify_response(struct r auth_offset = offset; auth_len =ntohl (xauth_len); -if (auth_len < len) +if (auth_len > len) goto short_packet;if (auth_len &3 ) goto inconsistent;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 78/86 rxrpc: fix reference count leak in rxrpc_server_keyring()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Luxiao Xu <[email protected]>
commit f125846ee79fcae537a964ce66494e96fa54a6de upstream.
This patch fixes a reference count leak in rxrpc_server_keyring() by checking if rx->securities is already set.
--- net/rxrpc/server_key.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
net/rxrpc/server_key.c +3 -0
@@ -125,6 +125,9 @@ int rxrpc_server_keyring(struct rxrpc_so_enter ("" ); +if (rx->securities) +return -EINVAL ; +if (optlen <=0 || optlen >PAGE_SIZE -1 )return -EINVAL ;
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 79/86 rxrpc: Fix key/keyring checks in setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY/KEYRING)
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Howells <[email protected]>
commit 2afd86ccbb2082a3c4258aea8c07e5bb6267bc2f upstream.
An AF_RXRPC socket can be both client and server at the same time. When sending new calls (ie. it's acting as a client), it uses rx->key to set the security, and when accepting incoming calls (ie. it's acting as a server), it uses rx->securities.
setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY) sets rx->key to point to an rxrpc-type key and setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEYRING) sets rx->securities to point to a keyring of rxrpc_s-type keys.
Now, it should be possible to use both rx->key and rx->securities on the same socket - but for userspace AF_RXRPC sockets rxrpc_setsockopt() prevents that.
Fix this by:
(1) Remove the incorrect check rxrpc_setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEYRING)
makes on rx->key.
(2) Move the check that rxrpc_setsockopt(RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY) makes on
rx->key down into rxrpc_request_key().
(3) Remove rxrpc_request_key()'s check on rx->securities.
This (in combination with a previous patch) pushes the checks down into the functions that set those pointers and removes the cross-checks that prevent both key and keyring being set.
--- net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c | 6 ------ net/rxrpc/key.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-)
net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c +0 -6
@@ -654,9 +654,6 @@ static int rxrpc_setsockopt(struct socke goto success;case RXRPC_SECURITY_KEY : - ret = -EINVAL ; -if (rx->key) - goto error; ret = -EISCONN ;if (rx->sk.sk_state !=RXRPC_UNBOUND ) goto error;
@@ -664,9 +661,6 @@ static int rxrpc_setsockopt(struct socke goto error;case RXRPC_SECURITY_KEYRING : - ret = -EINVAL ; -if (rx->key) - goto error; ret = -EISCONN ;if (rx->sk.sk_state !=RXRPC_UNBOUND ) goto error;
net/rxrpc/key.c +1 -1
@@ -622,7 +622,7 @@ int rxrpc_request_key(struct rxrpc_sock_enter ("" ); -if (optlen <=0 || optlen >PAGE_SIZE -1 || rx->securities) +if (optlen <=0 || optlen >PAGE_SIZE -1 || rx->key)return -EINVAL ; description =memdup_sockptr_nul (optval, optlen);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 80/86 rxrpc: Fix missing error checks for rxkad encryption/decryption failure
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Howells <[email protected]>
commit f93af41b9f5f798823d0d0fb8765c2a936d76270 upstream.
Add error checking for failure of crypto_skcipher_en/decrypt() to various rxkad function as the crypto functions can fail with ENOMEM at least.
--- net/rxrpc/rxkad.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
net/rxrpc/rxkad.c +38 -19
@@ -197,6 +197,7 @@ static int rxkad_prime_packet_security(sstruct rxrpc_crypt iv;__be32 *tmpbuf;size_t tmpsize =4 *sizeof (__be32); +int ret;_enter ("" );
@@ -225,13 +226,13 @@ static int rxkad_prime_packet_security(sskcipher_request_set_sync_tfm (req, ci);skcipher_request_set_callback (req,0 ,NULL ,NULL );skcipher_request_set_crypt (req, &sg, &sg, tmpsize, iv.x); -crypto_skcipher_encrypt (req); + ret =crypto_skcipher_encrypt (req);skcipher_request_free (req);memcpy (&conn->rxkad.csum_iv, tmpbuf +2 ,sizeof (conn->rxkad.csum_iv));kfree (tmpbuf); -_leave (" = 0" ); -return 0 ; +_leave (" = %d" , ret); +return ret; }/*
@@ -264,6 +265,7 @@ static int rxkad_secure_packet_auth(consstruct scatterlist sg;size_t pad;u16 check; +int ret;_enter ("" );
@@ -286,11 +288,11 @@ static int rxkad_secure_packet_auth(consskcipher_request_set_sync_tfm (req, call->conn->rxkad.cipher);skcipher_request_set_callback (req,0 ,NULL ,NULL );skcipher_request_set_crypt (req, &sg, &sg,8 , iv.x); -crypto_skcipher_encrypt (req); + ret =crypto_skcipher_encrypt (req);skcipher_request_zero (req); -_leave (" = 0" ); -return 0 ; +_leave (" = %d" , ret); +return ret; }/*
@@ -345,7 +347,7 @@ static int rxkad_secure_packet(struct rxunion {__be32 buf[2 ]; } crypto__aligned(8) ; -u32 x, y; +u32 x, y =0 ;int ret; _enter("{%d{%x}},{#%u},%u,",
@@ -376,8 +378,10 @@ static int rxkad_secure_packet(struct rxskcipher_request_set_sync_tfm (req, call->conn->rxkad.cipher);skcipher_request_set_callback (req,0 ,NULL ,NULL );skcipher_request_set_crypt (req, &sg, &sg,8 , iv.x); -crypto_skcipher_encrypt (req); + ret =crypto_skcipher_encrypt (req);skcipher_request_zero (req); +if (ret <0 ) + goto out; y =ntohl (crypto.buf[1 ]); y = (y >>16 ) &0xffff ;
@@ -413,6 +417,7 @@ static int rxkad_secure_packet(struct rxmemset (p + txb->pkt_len,0 , gap); } +out:skcipher_request_free (req);_leave (" = %d [set %x]" , ret, y);return ret;
@@ -453,8 +458,10 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_1(structskcipher_request_set_sync_tfm (req, call->conn->rxkad.cipher);skcipher_request_set_callback (req,0 ,NULL ,NULL );skcipher_request_set_crypt (req, sg, sg,8 , iv.x); -crypto_skcipher_decrypt (req); + ret =crypto_skcipher_decrypt (req);skcipher_request_zero (req); +if (ret <0 ) +return ret;/* Extract the decrypted packet length */ if (skb_copy_bits (skb, sp->offset, &sechdr,sizeof (sechdr)) <0 )
@@ -531,10 +538,14 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_2(structskcipher_request_set_sync_tfm (req, call->conn->rxkad.cipher);skcipher_request_set_callback (req,0 ,NULL ,NULL );skcipher_request_set_crypt (req, sg, sg, sp->len, iv.x); -crypto_skcipher_decrypt (req); + ret =crypto_skcipher_decrypt (req);skcipher_request_zero (req);if (sg != _sg)kfree (sg); +if (ret <0 ) { +WARN_ON_ONCE (ret != -ENOMEM ); +return ret; + }/* Extract the decrypted packet length */ if (skb_copy_bits (skb, sp->offset, &sechdr,sizeof (sechdr)) <0 )
@@ -602,8 +613,10 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet(struct rxskcipher_request_set_sync_tfm (req, call->conn->rxkad.cipher);skcipher_request_set_callback (req,0 ,NULL ,NULL );skcipher_request_set_crypt (req, &sg, &sg,8 , iv.x); -crypto_skcipher_encrypt (req); + ret =crypto_skcipher_encrypt (req);skcipher_request_zero (req); +if (ret <0 ) + goto out; y =ntohl (crypto.buf[1 ]); cksum = (y >>16 ) &0xffff ;
@@ -1077,21 +1090,23 @@ static int rxkad_decrypt_ticket(struct r/* * decrypt the response packet */ -static void rxkad_decrypt_response (struct rxrpc_connection *conn, -struct rxkad_response *resp, -const struct rxrpc_crypt *session_key) +static int rxkad_decrypt_response (struct rxrpc_connection *conn, +struct rxkad_response *resp, +const struct rxrpc_crypt *session_key) {struct skcipher_request *req = rxkad_ci_req;struct scatterlist sg[1 ];struct rxrpc_crypt iv; +int ret;_enter (",,%08x%08x" ,ntohl (session_key->n[0 ]),ntohl (session_key->n[1 ]));mutex_lock (&rxkad_ci_mutex); -if (crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey (rxkad_ci, session_key->x, -sizeof (*session_key)) <0 ) -BUG (); + ret =crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey (rxkad_ci, session_key->x, +sizeof (*session_key)); +if (ret <0 ) + goto unlock;memcpy (&iv, session_key,sizeof (iv));
@@ -1100,12 +1115,14 @@ static void rxkad_decrypt_response(strucskcipher_request_set_sync_tfm (req, rxkad_ci);skcipher_request_set_callback (req,0 ,NULL ,NULL );skcipher_request_set_crypt (req, sg, sg,sizeof (resp->encrypted), iv.x); -crypto_skcipher_decrypt (req); + ret =crypto_skcipher_decrypt (req);skcipher_request_zero (req); +unlock:mutex_unlock (&rxkad_ci_mutex);_leave ("" ); +return ret; }/*
@@ -1198,7 +1215,9 @@ static int rxkad_verify_response(struct/* use the session key from inside the ticket to decrypt the * response */ -rxkad_decrypt_response (conn, response, &session_key); + ret =rxkad_decrypt_response (conn, response, &session_key); +if (ret <0 ) + goto temporary_error_free_ticket; if (ntohl(response->encrypted.epoch) != conn->proto.epoch || ntohl(response->encrypted.cid) != conn->proto.cid ||
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 81/86 rxrpc: Fix integer overflow in rxgk_verify_response()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Howells <[email protected]>
commit 699e52180f4231c257821c037ed5c99d5eb0edb8 upstream.
In rxgk_verify_response(), there's a potential integer overflow due to rounding up token_len before checking it, thereby allowing the length check to be bypassed.
Fix this by checking the unrounded value against len too (len is limited as the response must fit in a single UDP packet).
--- net/rxrpc/rxgk.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/rxrpc/rxgk.c +2 -1
@@ -1209,7 +1209,8 @@ static int rxgk_verify_response(struct r token_offset = offset; token_len =ntohl (rhdr.token_len); -if (xdr_round_up (token_len) +sizeof (__be32) > len) +if (token_len > len || +xdr_round_up (token_len) +sizeof (__be32) > len) goto short_packet;trace_rxrpc_rx_response (conn, sp->hdr.serial,0 , sp->hdr.cksum, token_len);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 82/86 rxrpc: Fix leak of rxgk context in rxgk_verify_response()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Howells <[email protected]>
commit 7e1876caa8363056f58a21d3b31b82c2daf7e608 upstream.
Fix rxgk_verify_response() to clean up the rxgk context it creates.
--- net/rxrpc/rxgk.c | 6 ++++-- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/rxrpc/rxgk.c +4 -2
@@ -1270,16 +1270,18 @@ static int rxgk_verify_response(struct rif (ret <0 ) {rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXGK_SEALEDINCON , ret, rxgk_abort_resp_auth_dec); - goto out; + goto out_gk; } ret =rxgk_verify_authenticator (conn, krb5, skb, auth_offset, auth_len);if (ret <0 ) - goto out; + goto out_gk; conn->key = key; key =NULL ; ret =0 ; +out_gk: +rxgk_put (gk); out:key_put (key);_leave (" = %d" , ret);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 83/86 rxrpc: Fix buffer overread in rxgk_do_verify_authenticator()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: David Howells <[email protected]>
commit f564af387c8c28238f8ebc13314c589d7ba8475d upstream.
Fix rxgk_do_verify_authenticator() to check the buffer size before checking the nonce.
--- net/rxrpc/rxgk.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/rxrpc/rxgk.c +4 -1
@@ -1085,6 +1085,9 @@ static int rxgk_do_verify_authenticator(_enter ("" ); +if ((end - p) *sizeof (__be32) <24 ) +return rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXGK_NOTAUTH , -EPROTO , + rxgk_abort_resp_short_auth);if (memcmp (p, conn->rxgk.nonce,20 ) !=0 )return rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXGK_NOTAUTH , -EPROTO , rxgk_abort_resp_bad_nonce);
@@ -1098,7 +1101,7 @@ static int rxgk_do_verify_authenticator( p +=xdr_round_up (app_len) /sizeof (__be32);if (end - p <4 )return rxrpc_abort_conn (conn, skb,RXGK_NOTAUTH , -EPROTO , - rxgk_abort_resp_short_applen); + rxgk_abort_resp_short_auth); level =ntohl (*p++); epoch =ntohl (*p++);
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 84/86 rxrpc: only handle RESPONSE during service challenge
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Wang Jie <[email protected]>
commit c43ffdcfdbb5567b1f143556df8a04b4eeea041c upstream.
Only process RESPONSE packets while the service connection is still in RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING. Check that state under state_lock before running response verification and security initialization, then use a local secured flag to decide whether to queue the secured-connection work after the state transition. This keeps duplicate or late RESPONSE packets from re-running the setup path and removes the unlocked post-transition state test.
--- net/rxrpc/conn_event.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/rxrpc/conn_event.c +12 -2
@@ -247,6 +247,7 @@ static int rxrpc_process_event(struct rx struct sk_buff *skb) {struct rxrpc_skb_priv *sp =rxrpc_skb (skb); +bool secured = false;int ret;if (conn->state ==RXRPC_CONN_ABORTED )
@@ -262,6 +263,13 @@ static int rxrpc_process_event(struct rxreturn ret;case RXRPC_PACKET_TYPE_RESPONSE : +spin_lock_irq (&conn->state_lock); +if (conn->state !=RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING ) { +spin_unlock_irq (&conn->state_lock); +return 0 ; + } +spin_unlock_irq (&conn->state_lock); + ret = conn->security->verify_response (conn, skb);if (ret <0 )return ret;
@@ -272,11 +280,13 @@ static int rxrpc_process_event(struct rxreturn ret;spin_lock_irq (&conn->state_lock); -if (conn->state ==RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING ) +if (conn->state ==RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING ) { conn->state =RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE ; + secured = true; + }spin_unlock_irq (&conn->state_lock); -if (conn->state ==RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE ) { +if (secured) {/* Offload call state flipping to the I/O thread. As * we've already received the packet, put it on the * front of the queue.
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 85/86 rxrpc: proc: size address buffers for %pISpc output
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Pengpeng Hou <[email protected]>
commit a44ce6aa2efb61fe44f2cfab72bb01544bbca272 upstream.
The AF_RXRPC procfs helpers format local and remote socket addresses into fixed 50-byte stack buffers with "%pISpc".
That is too small for the longest current-tree IPv6-with-port form the formatter can produce. In lib/vsprintf.c, the compressed IPv6 path uses a dotted-quad tail not only for v4mapped addresses, but also for ISATAP addresses via ipv6_addr_is_isatap().
As a result, a case such as
[ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:0:5efe:255.255.255.255]:65535
is possible with the current formatter. That is 50 visible characters, so 51 bytes including the trailing NUL, which does not fit in the existing char[50] buffers used by net/rxrpc/proc.c.
Size the buffers from the formatter's maximum textual form and switch the call sites to scnprintf().
Changes since v1:
- correct the changelog to cite the actual maximum current-tree case explicitly
- frame the proof around the ISATAP formatting path instead of the earlier mapped-v4 example
--- net/rxrpc/proc.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
net/rxrpc/proc.c +18 -14
@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@#include <net/af_rxrpc.h> #include "ar-internal.h" +#define RXRPC_PROC_ADDRBUF_SIZE \ + (sizeof("[xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:255.255.255.255]") + \ + sizeof(":12345")) +static const char *const rxrpc_conn_states[RXRPC_CONN__NR_STATES ] = { [RXRPC_CONN_UNUSED ] ="Unused " , [RXRPC_CONN_CLIENT_UNSECURED ] ="ClUnsec " ,
@@ -53,7 +57,7 @@ static int rxrpc_call_seq_show(struct sestruct rxrpc_net *rxnet =rxrpc_net (seq_file_net (seq));enum rxrpc_call_state state;rxrpc_seq_t tx_bottom; -char lbuff[50 ], rbuff[50 ]; +char lbuff[RXRPC_PROC_ADDRBUF_SIZE ], rbuff[RXRPC_PROC_ADDRBUF_SIZE ];long timeout =0 ;if (v == &rxnet->calls) {
@@ -69,11 +73,11 @@ static int rxrpc_call_seq_show(struct se local = call->local;if (local) -sprintf (lbuff,"%pISpc" , &local->srx.transport); +scnprintf (lbuff,sizeof (lbuff),"%pISpc" , &local->srx.transport);else strcpy (lbuff,"no_local" ); -sprintf (rbuff,"%pISpc" , &call->dest_srx.transport); +scnprintf (rbuff,sizeof (rbuff),"%pISpc" , &call->dest_srx.transport); state =rxrpc_call_state (call);if (state !=RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_PREALLOC )
@@ -142,7 +146,7 @@ static int rxrpc_connection_seq_show(strstruct rxrpc_connection *conn;struct rxrpc_net *rxnet =rxrpc_net (seq_file_net (seq));const char *state; -char lbuff[50 ], rbuff[50 ]; +char lbuff[RXRPC_PROC_ADDRBUF_SIZE ], rbuff[RXRPC_PROC_ADDRBUF_SIZE ];if (v == &rxnet->conn_proc_list) { seq_puts(seq,
@@ -161,8 +165,8 @@ static int rxrpc_connection_seq_show(str goto print; } -sprintf (lbuff,"%pISpc" , &conn->local->srx.transport); -sprintf (rbuff,"%pISpc" , &conn->peer->srx.transport); +scnprintf (lbuff,sizeof (lbuff),"%pISpc" , &conn->local->srx.transport); +scnprintf (rbuff,sizeof (rbuff),"%pISpc" , &conn->peer->srx.transport); print: state =rxrpc_is_conn_aborted (conn) ? rxrpc_call_completions[conn->completion] :
@@ -228,7 +232,7 @@ static int rxrpc_bundle_seq_show(struct {struct rxrpc_bundle *bundle;struct rxrpc_net *rxnet =rxrpc_net (seq_file_net (seq)); -char lbuff[50 ], rbuff[50 ]; +char lbuff[RXRPC_PROC_ADDRBUF_SIZE ], rbuff[RXRPC_PROC_ADDRBUF_SIZE ];if (v == &rxnet->bundle_proc_list) { seq_puts(seq,
@@ -242,8 +246,8 @@ static int rxrpc_bundle_seq_show(struct bundle = list_entry(v, struct rxrpc_bundle, proc_link); -sprintf (lbuff,"%pISpc" , &bundle->local->srx.transport); -sprintf (rbuff,"%pISpc" , &bundle->peer->srx.transport); +scnprintf (lbuff,sizeof (lbuff),"%pISpc" , &bundle->local->srx.transport); +scnprintf (rbuff,sizeof (rbuff),"%pISpc" , &bundle->peer->srx.transport); seq_printf(seq, "UDP %-47.47s %-47.47s %4x %3u %3d" " %c%c%c %08x | %08x %08x %08x %08x %08x\n",
@@ -279,7 +283,7 @@ static int rxrpc_peer_seq_show(struct se {struct rxrpc_peer *peer;time64_t now; -char lbuff[50 ], rbuff[50 ]; +char lbuff[RXRPC_PROC_ADDRBUF_SIZE ], rbuff[RXRPC_PROC_ADDRBUF_SIZE ];if (v ==SEQ_START_TOKEN ) { seq_puts(seq,
@@ -290,9 +294,9 @@ static int rxrpc_peer_seq_show(struct se peer = list_entry(v, struct rxrpc_peer, hash_link); -sprintf (lbuff,"%pISpc" , &peer->local->srx.transport); +scnprintf (lbuff,sizeof (lbuff),"%pISpc" , &peer->local->srx.transport); -sprintf (rbuff,"%pISpc" , &peer->srx.transport); +scnprintf (rbuff,sizeof (rbuff),"%pISpc" , &peer->srx.transport); now =ktime_get_seconds (); seq_printf(seq,
@@ -401,7 +405,7 @@ const struct seq_operations rxrpc_peer_sstatic int rxrpc_local_seq_show (struct seq_file *seq,void *v) {struct rxrpc_local *local; -char lbuff[50 ]; +char lbuff[RXRPC_PROC_ADDRBUF_SIZE ];if (v ==SEQ_START_TOKEN ) { seq_puts(seq,
@@ -412,7 +416,7 @@ static int rxrpc_local_seq_show(struct s local = hlist_entry(v, struct rxrpc_local, link); -sprintf (lbuff,"%pISpc" , &local->srx.transport); +scnprintf (lbuff,sizeof (lbuff),"%pISpc" , &local->srx.transport); seq_printf(seq, "UDP %-47.47s %3u %3u %3u\n",
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerPATCH 86/86 net: skb: fix cross-cache free of KFENCE-allocated skb head
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman6.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Jiayuan Chen <[email protected]>
commit 0f42e3f4fe2a58394e37241d02d9ca6ab7b7d516 upstream.
SKB_SMALL_HEAD_CACHE_SIZE is intentionally set to a non-power-of-2 value (e.g. 704 on x86_64) to avoid collisions with generic kmalloc bucket sizes. This ensures that skb_kfree_head() can reliably use skb_end_offset to distinguish skb heads allocated from skb_small_head_cache vs. generic kmalloc caches.
However, when KFENCE is enabled, kfence_ksize() returns the exact requested allocation size instead of the slab bucket size. If a caller (e.g. bpf_test_init) allocates skb head data via kzalloc() and the requested size happens to equal SKB_SMALL_HEAD_CACHE_SIZE, then slab_build_skb() -> ksize() returns that exact value. After subtracting skb_shared_info overhead, skb_end_offset ends up matching SKB_SMALL_HEAD_HEADROOM, causing skb_kfree_head() to incorrectly free the object to skb_small_head_cache instead of back to the original kmalloc cache, resulting in a slab cross-cache free:
kmem_cache_free(skbuff_small_head): Wrong slab cache. Expected skbuff_small_head but got kmalloc-1k
Fix this by always calling kfree(head) in skb_kfree_head(). This keeps the free path generic and avoids allocator-specific misclassification for KFENCE objects.
--- net/core/skbuff.c | 5 +---- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/core/skbuff.c +1 -4
@@ -1062,10 +1062,7 @@ static int skb_pp_frag_ref(struct sk_bufstatic void skb_kfree_head (void *head,unsigned int end_offset) { -if (end_offset ==SKB_SMALL_HEAD_HEADROOM ) -kmem_cache_free (net_hotdata.skb_small_head_cache, head); -else -kfree (head); +kfree (head); }static void skb_free_head (struct sk_buff *skb)
Hi
no regressions here on x86_64 (Intel 11th Gen. CPU)
Thanks
# Librecast Test Results
020/020 [ OK ] liblcrq
010/010 [ OK ] libmld
120/120 [ OK ] liblibrecast
CPU/kernel: Linux auntie 6.19.13-rc1-g425b22d9f3ed #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Mon Apr 13 17:28:52 -00 2026 x86_64 AMD Ryzen 9 9950X 16-Core Processor AuthenticAMD GNU/Linux
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.19.13 release. There are 86 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 15 Apr 2026 15:57:08 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.19.13-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
On ARCH_BRCMSTB using 32-bit and 64-bit ARM kernels, build tested on BMIPS_GENERIC:
Signature · 1 line
Florian
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.19.13 release. There are 86 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 15 Apr 2026 15:57:08 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.19.13-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
All tests passing for Tegra ...
Test results for stable-v6.19:
10 builds: 10 pass, 0 fail
28 boots: 28 pass, 0 fail
140 tests: 140 pass, 0 failLinux version: 6.19.13-rc1-g425b22d9f3ed
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra186-p2771-0000,
tegra186-p3509-0000+p3636-0001, tegra194-p2972-0000,
tegra194-p3509-0000+p3668-0000, tegra20-ventana,
tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra210-p3450-0000,
tegra234-p3737-0000+p3701-0000,
tegra234-p3768-0000+p3767-0005, tegra30-cardhu-a04Jon
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.19.13 release. There are 86 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 15 Apr 2026 15:57:08 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.19.13-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Built and booted successfully on RISC-V RV64 (HiFive Unmatched).
Hi Greg
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.19.13 release. There are 86 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 15 Apr 2026 15:57:08 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 9 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.19.13-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
6.19.13-rc1 tested.
Build successfully completed.
Boot successfully completed.
No dmesg regressions.
Video output normal.
Sound output normal.
Lenovo ThinkPad X1 Carbon Gen10(Intel i7-1260P(x86_64) arch linux)
[ 0.000000] Linux version 6.19.13-rc1rv-g425b22d9f3ed
(takeshi@ThinkPadX1Gen10J0764) (gcc (GCC) 15.2.1 20260209, GNU ld (GNU Binutils) 2.46) #1 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Tue Apr 14 19:32:50 JST 2026
Thanks
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.19.13 release. There are 86 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 15 Apr 2026 15:57:08 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 9 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.19.13-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.
thanks,
-- Shuah
Quoted 4 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.19.13 release. There are 86 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Quoted 8 lines · On Mon, 13 Apr 2026 17:59:07 +0200 Greg Kroah-Hartman…
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.19.13 release. There are 86 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 15 Apr 2026 15:57:08 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
Boot-tested under QEMU for Rust x86_64, arm64 and riscv64; built-tested for loongarch64:
(arm 32-bit seems to build-test fine as well. Same for UML x86_64 on a non-debug configuration.)
Thanks!
Cheers,
Miguel
Am 13.04.2026 um 17:59 schrieb Greg Kroah-Hartman:
Quoted 4 lines
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.19.13 release. There are 86 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Builds, boots and works on my 2-socket Ivy Bridge Xeon E5-2697 v2 server. No dmesg oddities or regressions found.
Beste Grüße,
Peter Schneider
Signature · 8 lines
Climb the mountain not to plant your flag, but to embrace the challenge, enjoy the air and behold the view. Climb it so you can see the world, not so the world can see you. -- David McCullough Jr. OpenPGP: 0xA3828BD796CCE11A8CADE8866E3A92C92C3FF244 Download: https://www.peters-netzplatz.de/download/pschneider1968_pub.asc https://keys.mailvelope.com/pks/lookup?op=get&[email protected] https://keys.mailvelope.com/pks/lookup?op=get&[email protected]
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.19.13 release. There are 86 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 15 Apr 2026 15:57:08 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
Quoted 8 lines
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.19.13-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.thanks,
greg k-h
Tested on my amd64 DIY home NAS. Working well, no regressions observed.
Signature · 1 line
-Barry K. Nathan <[email protected]>
Quoted 7 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.19.13 release. There are 86 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 15 Apr 2026 15:57:08 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
test_progs, test_progs-no_alu32, test_progs-cpuv4, test_maps, test_verifier in BPF selftests all passes[1] on x86_64.
1: https://github.com/shunghsiyu/libbpf/actions/runs/24418242274/job/71333106576
[...]
Quoted 15 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 6.19.13 release. There are 86 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
Responses should be made by Wed, 15 Apr 2026 15:57:08 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.
The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v6.x/stable-review/patch-6.19.13-rc1.gzor in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.gitlinux-6.19.y
and the diffstat can be found below.
Quoted 5 lines
thanks,
greg k-h
-------------
Build and Boot Report 6.19.13-rc1
I built and tested Linux kernel version 6.19.13 using the default configurations on both x86_64 and arm64 architectures in a virtualized environment.
The kernel compiled successfully on both architectures and booted without issues.
I did not observe any regressions or new warnings in dmesg during boot.
Kernel version: 6.19.13-rc1
Configurations tested: x86_64_defconfig, defconfig
Architectures tested: x86_64, arm64
Kernel source: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
Commit:
Best regards,
Dileep Malepu.