KVM: x86: Introduce has_protected_pmu state for TDX VMs
Subsystems (4)
PATCH v4 1/1 KVM: x86: Introduce has_protected_pmu state for TDX VMs
PMU state for TDX VMs is virtualized by TDX Module [1]. Host has following toggles to control the PMU functionality exposed to TDX VMs:
1) Configure TD_PARAMS to allow guests to use performance monitoring.
2) Restrict the TD to a subset of the PEBS counters if supported.
3) Limit the TD to setup a certain perfmon events using basic/enhanced event filtering.
KVM will need to be enlightened to support these toggles. Introduce has_protected_pmu state to track the pmu state for such scenarios and explicitly set the has_protected_pmu flag for TDX VMs.
If pmu state is protected:
1) Disable KVM's PMU virtualization framework as additional enlightenment is needed within KVM to control/manage the visibility of PMU state to such VMs.
2) Disallow userspace VMM from enabling PMU virtualization state using KVM_CAP_PMU_CAPABILITY.
[1] Section 15.2: https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/733575
---
v3 -> v4:
- Allow userspace to disable pmu virtualization even if has_protected_pmu is set.
- Addressed feedback around enable_pmu initialization in kvm_arch_init_vm().
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 6 ++++++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 9 ++++++++- 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +1 -0
@@ -1422,6 +1422,7 @@ struct kvm_arch {bool has_private_mem;bool has_protected_state;bool has_protected_eoi; +bool has_protected_pmu;bool pre_fault_allowed;struct hlist_head *mmu_page_hash;struct list_head active_mmu_pages;
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +6 -0
@@ -638,6 +638,12 @@ int tdx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm) kvm->arch.has_private_mem = true; kvm->arch.disabled_quirks |=KVM_X86_QUIRK_IGNORE_GUEST_PAT ; +/* +* PMU support is provided by the TDX-Module (if enabled for the VM). +* From KVM's perspective, the VM doesn't have a virtual PMU. +*/ + kvm->arch.has_protected_pmu = true; +/* * Because guest TD is protected, VMM can't parse the instruction in TD. * Instead, guest uses MMIO hypercall. For unmodified device driver,
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +8 -1
@@ -6909,6 +6909,13 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm,if (!enable_pmu || (cap->args[0 ] & ~KVM_CAP_PMU_VALID_MASK ))break ; +if (kvm->arch.has_protected_pmu) { +WARN_ON_ONCE (kvm->arch.enable_pmu); +if (cap->args[0 ] ==KVM_PMU_CAP_DISABLE ) + r =0 ; +break ; + } +mutex_lock (&kvm->lock);if (!kvm->created_vcpus && !kvm->arch.created_mediated_pmu) { kvm->arch.enable_pmu = !(cap->args[0 ] &KVM_PMU_CAP_DISABLE );
@@ -13375,7 +13382,7 @@ int kvm_arch_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long type) kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz = max_tsc_khz ? : tsc_khz; kvm->arch.apic_bus_cycle_ns =APIC_BUS_CYCLE_NS_DEFAULT ; kvm->arch.guest_can_read_msr_platform_info = true; - kvm->arch.enable_pmu = enable_pmu; + kvm->arch.enable_pmu = enable_pmu && !kvm->arch.has_protected_pmu;#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_HYPERV )spin_lock_init (&kvm->arch.hv_root_tdp_lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0.563.g4f69b47b94-goog
Sean Christopherson
maintainerarch/x86/kvm/x86.c int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, · line 6916
Quoted 13 lines · Vishal Annapurve
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +5
-0@@ -6909,6 +6909,13 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm,if (!enable_pmu || (cap->args[0 ] & ~KVM_CAP_PMU_VALID_MASK ))break ; +if (kvm->arch.has_protected_pmu) { +WARN_ON_ONCE (kvm->arch.enable_pmu); +if (cap->args[0 ] ==KVM_PMU_CAP_DISABLE ) + r =0 ; +break ;
Sashiko: 3, Sean: 0
: Does this code bypass standard lifecycle validation?
:
: For standard VMs, KVM strictly enforces that PMU capabilities can only be : configured before any vCPUs are created, returning -EINVAL otherwise. The newly : added block for TDX VMs short-circuits this logic, returning 0 unconditionally : when disabling the PMU, regardless of whether vCPUs have been created. : Could this introduce a UAPI inconsistency where the same userspace sequence : could fail on standard VMs but silently succeed on TDX VMs, potentially : hiding VMM initialization order bugs?
That potential issue crossed my mind when first trying to figure out how to allow KVM_PMU_CAP_DISABLE for protected PMUs, but then SQUIRREL!!!
I think my original reaction is the way to go: add extra validation for protected PMUs (reject everything except CAP_DISABLE), but otherwise let the normal flow do it's thing.
Completely untested, but I think this would do what we want?
case KVM_CAP_PMU_CAPABILITY:
r = -EINVAL;
if (!enable_pmu || (cap->args[0] & ~KVM_CAP_PMU_VALID_MASK))
break;
if (kvm->arch.has_protected_pmu &&
cap->args[0] != KVM_PMU_CAP_DISABLE)
break;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
if (!kvm->created_vcpus && !kvm->arch.created_mediated_pmu) {
kvm->arch.enable_pmu = !(cap->args[0] & KVM_PMU_CAP_DISABLE);
r = 0;
}
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
break;Quoted 28 lines · Sean Christopherson
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm, · line 6916
Quoted 13 lines · Vishal Annapurve
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +5
-0@@ -6909,6 +6909,13 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm,if (!enable_pmu || (cap->args[0 ] & ~KVM_CAP_PMU_VALID_MASK ))break ; +if (kvm->arch.has_protected_pmu) { +WARN_ON_ONCE (kvm->arch.enable_pmu); +if (cap->args[0 ] ==KVM_PMU_CAP_DISABLE ) + r =0 ; +break ;Sashiko: 3, Sean: 0
: Does this code bypass standard lifecycle validation?
:
: For standard VMs, KVM strictly enforces that PMU capabilities can only be : configured before any vCPUs are created, returning-EINVALotherwise. The newly : added block for TDX VMs short-circuits this logic, returning 0 unconditionally : when disabling the PMU, regardless of whether vCPUs have been created. : Could this introduce a UAPI inconsistency where the same userspace sequence : could fail on standard VMs but silently succeed on TDX VMs, potentially : hiding VMM initialization order bugs?
Quoted 8 lines
That potential issue crossed my mind when first trying to figure out how to allow
KVM_PMU_CAP_DISABLEfor protected PMUs, but then SQUIRREL!!!I think my original reaction is the way to go: add extra validation for protected PMUs (reject everything except
CAP_DISABLE), but otherwise let the normal flow do it's thing.Completely untested, but I think this would do what we want?
SGTM. Will include this suggestion in the next version.
Quoted 17 lines
case KVM_CAP_PMU_CAPABILITY:
r = -EINVAL;
if (!enable_pmu || (cap->args[0] & ~KVM_CAP_PMU_VALID_MASK))
break;
if (kvm->arch.has_protected_pmu &&
cap->args[0] != KVM_PMU_CAP_DISABLE)
break;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
if (!kvm->created_vcpus && !kvm->arch.created_mediated_pmu) {
kvm->arch.enable_pmu = !(cap->args[0] & KVM_PMU_CAP_DISABLE);
r = 0;
}
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
break;