bpf: add icmp_send kfunc
Subsystems (8)
v7 cover bpf: add icmp_send kfunc
Hello,
This is v7 of adding the icmp_send kfunc, as suggested during LSF/MM/BPF 2025[^1]. The goal is to allow cgroup_skb programs to actively reject east-west traffic, similarly to what is possible to do with netfilter reject target. Applications can receive early feedback that something went wrong during the TCP handshake.
The first step to implement this is using ICMP control messages, with the ICMP_DEST_UNREACH type with various code ICMP_NET_UNREACH, ICMP_HOST_UNREACH, ICMP_PROT_UNREACH, etc. This is easier to implement than a TCP RST reply and will already hint the client TCP stack to abort the connection and not retry extensively.
Note that this is different than the sock_destroy kfunc, that along calls tcp_abort and thus sends a reset, destroying the underlying socket.
Caveats of this kfunc design are that a program can call this function N times, thus send N ICMP unreach control messages and that the program can return from the BPF filter with pass leading to a potential confusing situation where the TCP connection was established while the client received ICMP_DEST_UNREACH messages.
v2 updates:
- fix a build error from a missing function call rename;
- avoid changing return line in bpf_kfunc_init;
- return SK_DROP from the kfunc (similarly to bpf_redirect);
- check the return value in the selftest.
v3 update:
- fix an undefined reference build error.
v4 updates:
- prevent the kfunc to be called recursively and add a test (thanks to Martin).
- do not fetch dst route when unnecessary (thanks to Martin).
- extend the test for IPv6 (thanks to Martin).
- use SK_DROP in examples and use non blocking sockets for testing (thanks to Martin).
- test when the kfunc returns -EINVAL (thanks to Jordan).
- add the kfunc to bpf_kfunc_set_skb as suggested by Alexei.
- guard the IPv4 parts with IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET).
- fix a wrong initial value for client_fd (thanks to Yonghong).
- add documentation to the kfunc.
- to Jordan: I couldn't include <linux/icmp.h> because of redefines from <network_helpers.h>.
v5 updates:
- kfunc name is now icmp_send and takes the control message type as parameter for future potential extension (daniel)
- drop the net patches to route packet since now the kfunc is limited to cgroup_skb and tc progs (daniel & martin)
- linearize skb headers (sashiko)
- zero SKB control block (sashiko)
- bind to port 0 instead of fixed port (sashiko)
- poll to wait for POLLERR event (sashiko)
- do not use ASSERT_EQ in CMSG_NXTHDR loop (sashiko)
- fix comment about byte order (sashiko)
- fix endianness IP address issue (sashiko)
- add forgotten cleanup_cgroup_environment (sashiko)
- let packets pass in recursion test (sashiko)
- clarify evaluation order for recursion test (sashiko)
v6 updates (all from sashiko):
- bring back the net patches to route packet since tc ingress needs it.
- rename the ip_route_reply helpers from fetch to fill.
- call pskb_network_may_pull on the cloned pkt.
- check explicitly that we received one and only one ICMP err ctrl msg.
v7 updates:
- use consume_skb on success path (stanislav)
- replace recursion protection with CPU_ARRAY by checking the nature of the sk (daniel, offline)
- use reverse xmas tree in read_icmp_errqueue (jordan)
- use ASSERT_OK_FD instead of ASSERT_GE whenever possible (jordan)
- add a test for tc (jordan)
- better filtering from host cgroup test progs (sashiko)
[^1]: https://lwn.net/Articles/1022034/
Link to v6: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
Mahe Tardy (7):
net: move netfilter nf_reject_fill_skb_dst to core ipv4
net: move netfilter nf_reject6_fill_skb_dst to core ipv6
bpf: add bpf_icmp_send kfunc
selftests/bpf: add bpf_icmp_send kfunc cgroup_skb tests selftests/bpf: add bpf_icmp_send kfunc cgroup_skb IPv6 tests selftests/bpf: add bpf_icmp_send kfunc tc tests selftests/bpf: add bpf_icmp_send recursion test
include/net/ip6_route.h | 2 + include/net/route.h | 1 + net/core/filter.c | 109 ++++++++ net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c | 19 +- net/ipv4/route.c | 15 ++ net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c | 17 +- net/ipv6/route.c | 18 ++ .../bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c | 243 ++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/icmp_send.c | 172 +++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 563 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/icmp_send.c
--
2.34.1
PATCH v7 1/7 net: move netfilter nf_reject_fill_skb_dst to core ipv4
Move and rename nf_reject_fill_skb_dst from ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4 to ip_route_reply_fill_dst in ipv4/route.c so that it can be reused in the following patches by BPF kfuncs.
Netfilter uses nf_ip_route that is almost a transparent wrapper around ip_route_output_key so this patch inlines it.
--- include/net/route.h | 1 + net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c | 19 ++----------------- net/ipv4/route.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
include/net/route.h +1 -0
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ struct rtable *ip_route_output_flow(struct net *, struct flowi4 *flp, const struct sock *sk);struct dst_entry *ipv4_blackhole_route (struct net *net,struct dst_entry *dst_orig); +int ip_route_reply_fill_dst (struct sk_buff *skb);static inline struct rtable *ip_route_output_key (struct net *net,struct flowi4 *flp) {
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c +2 -17
@@ -252,21 +252,6 @@ static void nf_reject_ip_tcphdr_put(struct sk_buff *nskb, const struct sk_buff * nskb->csum_offset = offsetof(struct tcphdr , check); } -static int nf_reject_fill_skb_dst (struct sk_buff *skb_in) -{ -struct dst_entry *dst =NULL ; -struct flowi fl; - -memset (&fl,0 ,sizeof (struct flowi )); - fl.u.ip4.daddr =ip_hdr (skb_in)->saddr; -nf_ip_route (dev_net (skb_in->dev), &dst, &fl, false); -if (!dst) -return -1 ; - -skb_dst_set (skb_in, dst); -return 0 ; -} -/* Send RST reply */ void nf_send_reset (struct net *net,struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *oldskb,int hook)
@@ -279,7 +264,7 @@ void nf_send_reset(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *oldskb,if (!oth)return ; -if (!skb_dst (oldskb) &&nf_reject_fill_skb_dst (oldskb) <0 ) +if (!skb_dst (oldskb) &&ip_route_reply_fill_dst (oldskb) <0 )return ;if (skb_rtable (oldskb)->rt_flags & (RTCF_BROADCAST |RTCF_MULTICAST ))
@@ -352,7 +337,7 @@ void nf_send_unreach(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int code, int hook)if (iph->frag_off &htons (IP_OFFSET ))return ; -if (!skb_dst (skb_in) &&nf_reject_fill_skb_dst (skb_in) <0 ) +if (!skb_dst (skb_in) &&ip_route_reply_fill_dst (skb_in) <0 )return ; if (skb_csum_unnecessary(skb_in) ||
net/ipv4/route.c +15 -0
@@ -2945,6 +2945,21 @@ struct rtable *ip_route_output_flow(struct net *net, struct flowi4 *flp4, }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (ip_route_output_flow); +int ip_route_reply_fill_dst (struct sk_buff *skb) +{ +struct rtable *rt; +struct flowi4 fl4 = { + .daddr =ip_hdr (skb)->saddr + }; + + rt =ip_route_output_key (dev_net (skb->dev), &fl4); +if (IS_ERR (rt)) +return PTR_ERR (rt); +skb_dst_set (skb, &rt->dst); +return 0 ; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (ip_route_reply_fill_dst); +/* called with rcu_read_lock held */ static int rt_fill_info(struct net *net, __be32 dst, __be32 src, struct rtable *rt, u32 table_id, dscp_t dscp,
--
2.34.1
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v7 1/7] net: move netfilter nf_reject_fill_skb_dst to core ipv4
Can ip_hdr(skb)->saddr be accessed safely here?
Quoted 12 lines
include/net/route.h +1
-0@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ struct rtable *ip_route_output_flow(struct net *, struct flowi4 *flp, const struct sock *sk);struct dst_entry *ipv4_blackhole_route (struct net *net,struct dst_entry *dst_orig); +int ip_route_reply_fill_dst (struct sk_buff *skb);static inline struct rtable *ip_route_output_key (struct net *net,struct flowi4 *flp) {
[ ... ]
Quoted 5 lines
net/ipv4/route.c +0
-0
net/ipv4/route.c struct rtable *ip_route_output_flow(struct net *net, struct flowi4 *flp4, · line 2953
Quoted 9 lines
net/ipv4/route.c +6
-0@@ -2945,6 +2945,21 @@ struct rtable *ip_route_output_flow(struct net *net, struct flowi4 *flp4, }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (ip_route_output_flow); +int ip_route_reply_fill_dst (struct sk_buff *skb) +{ +struct rtable *rt; +struct flowi4 fl4 = { + .daddr =ip_hdr (skb)->saddr + };
^^^^
Can ip_hdr(skb)->saddr be accessed safely here?
Now that this is exported for BPF kfuncs, it can be reached from early hooks like TC ingress where the IPv4 header might not be linearized yet.
If a malformed packet contains less than sizeof(struct iphdr) bytes of linear data, accessing the saddr field could read beyond the available linear buffer.
Does this function need validation via pskb_may_pull() or similar to ensure the header is accessible?
Note: This concern was raised by [email protected] in v4 review
(https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/)
and repeated in v6. The author responded that 'it should be fine since it's the caller responsability to make sure the header has been linearized, and we are calling pskb_network_may_pull' but the function itself does not validate this, leaving it vulnerable if called incorrectly.
net/ipv4/route.c struct rtable *ip_route_output_flow(struct net *net, struct flowi4 *flp4, · line 2955
Quoted 2 lines
net/ipv4/route.c +2
-0+ + rt =ip_route_output_key (dev_net (skb->dev), &fl4);
^^^^^^^^
Can skb->dev be NULL here?
While safe in its original netfilter context, a BPF_PROG_TYPE_NETFILTER program attached to the NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT hook will receive locally generated SKBs before skb->dev is assigned (in __ip_local_out before ip_output).
If called from such contexts, dev_net(skb->dev) would trigger a kernel panic.
Does this function need a NULL check on skb->dev?
Note: This concern was raised by [email protected] in v4 review
(https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/)
and repeated in v6. The author responded that 'We can't attach such program as now it's only cgroup_skb and tc, outdated' but the function is exported via EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL without any enforcement, making it callable from contexts where skb->dev might be NULL.
net/ipv4/route.c struct rtable *ip_route_output_flow(struct net *net, struct flowi4 *flp4, · line 2965
Quoted 10 lines
net/ipv4/route.c +7
-0+if (IS_ERR (rt)) +return PTR_ERR (rt); +skb_dst_set (skb, &rt->dst); +return 0 ; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (ip_route_reply_fill_dst); +/* called with rcu_read_lock held */ static int rt_fill_info(struct net *net, __be32 dst, __be32 src, struct rtable *rt, u32 table_id, dscp_t dscp,
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md
CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/26459248718
Re: [PATCH bpf-next v7 1/7] net: move netfilter nf_reject_fill_skb_dst to core ipv4
In reply to Mahe TardyQuoted 97 lines · Mahe Tardy
Move and rename
nf_reject_fill_skb_dstfrom ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4 toip_route_reply_fill_dstinipv4/route.cso that it can be reused in the following patches by BPF kfuncs.Netfilter uses
nf_ip_routethat is almost a transparent wrapper aroundip_route_output_keyso this patch inlines it.Signed-off-by Mahe Tardy <[email protected]>--- include/net/route.h | 1 + net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c | 19 ++----------------- net/ipv4/route.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)include/net/route.h +1
-0@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ struct rtable *ip_route_output_flow(struct net *, struct flowi4 *flp, const struct sock *sk);struct dst_entry *ipv4_blackhole_route (struct net *net,struct dst_entry *dst_orig); +int ip_route_reply_fill_dst (struct sk_buff *skb);static inline struct rtable *ip_route_output_key (struct net *net,struct flowi4 *flp) {net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv4.c +2
-17@@ -252,21 +252,6 @@ static void nf_reject_ip_tcphdr_put(struct sk_buff *nskb, const struct sk_buff * nskb->csum_offset = offsetof(struct tcphdr , check); } -static int nf_reject_fill_skb_dst (struct sk_buff *skb_in) -{ -struct dst_entry *dst =NULL ; -struct flowi fl; - -memset (&fl,0 ,sizeof (struct flowi )); - fl.u.ip4.daddr =ip_hdr (skb_in)->saddr; -nf_ip_route (dev_net (skb_in->dev), &dst, &fl, false); -if (!dst) -return -1 ; - -skb_dst_set (skb_in, dst); -return 0 ; -} -/* Send RST reply */ void nf_send_reset (struct net *net,struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *oldskb,int hook)@@ -279,7 +264,7 @@ void nf_send_reset(struct net *net, struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *oldskb,if (!oth)return ; -if (!skb_dst (oldskb) &&nf_reject_fill_skb_dst (oldskb) <0 ) +if (!skb_dst (oldskb) &&ip_route_reply_fill_dst (oldskb) <0 )return ;if (skb_rtable (oldskb)->rt_flags & (RTCF_BROADCAST |RTCF_MULTICAST ))@@ -352,7 +337,7 @@ void nf_send_unreach(struct sk_buff *skb_in, int code, int hook)if (iph->frag_off &htons (IP_OFFSET ))return ; -if (!skb_dst (skb_in) &&nf_reject_fill_skb_dst (skb_in) <0 ) +if (!skb_dst (skb_in) &&ip_route_reply_fill_dst (skb_in) <0 )return ; if (skb_csum_unnecessary(skb_in) ||net/ipv4/route.c +15
-1@@ -2945,6 +2945,21 @@ struct rtable *ip_route_output_flow(struct net *net, struct flowi4 *flp4, }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (ip_route_output_flow); +int ip_route_reply_fill_dst (struct sk_buff *skb) +{ +struct rtable *rt; +struct flowi4 fl4 = { + .daddr =ip_hdr (skb)->saddr + }; + + rt =ip_route_output_key (dev_net (skb->dev), &fl4); +if (IS_ERR (rt)) +return PTR_ERR (rt); +skb_dst_set (skb, &rt->dst); +return 0 ; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (ip_route_reply_fill_dst); +/* called with rcu_read_lock held */ static int rt_fill_info(struct net *net, __be32 dst, __be32 src, struct rtable *rt, u32 table_id, dscp_t dscp, --
Quoted 2 lines
2.34.1
PATCH v7 2/7 net: move netfilter nf_reject6_fill_skb_dst to core ipv6
In reply to Mahe TardyMove and rename nf_reject6_fill_skb_dst from ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6 to ip6_route_reply_fill_dst in ipv6/route.c so that it can be reused in the following patches by BPF kfuncs.
Netfilter uses nf_ip6_route that is almost a transparent wrapper around ip6_route_output so this patch inlines it.
--- include/net/ip6_route.h | 2 ++ net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c | 17 +---------------- net/ipv6/route.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
include/net/ip6_route.h +2 -0
@@ -100,6 +100,8 @@ static inline struct dst_entry *ip6_route_output(struct net *net,return ip6_route_output_flags (net, sk, fl6,0 ); } +int ip6_route_reply_fill_dst (struct sk_buff *skb); +/* Only conditionally release dst if flags indicates * !RT6_LOOKUP_F_DST_NOREF or dst is in uncached_list. */
net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c +1 -16
@@ -293,21 +293,6 @@ nf_reject_ip6_tcphdr_put(struct sk_buff *nskb, sizeof(struct tcphdr), 0)); } -static int nf_reject6_fill_skb_dst (struct sk_buff *skb_in) -{ -struct dst_entry *dst =NULL ; -struct flowi fl; - -memset (&fl,0 ,sizeof (struct flowi )); - fl.u.ip6.daddr =ipv6_hdr (skb_in)->saddr; -nf_ip6_route (dev_net (skb_in->dev), &dst, &fl, false); -if (!dst) -return -1 ; - -skb_dst_set (skb_in, dst); -return 0 ; -} -void nf_send_reset6 (struct net *net,struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *oldskb,int hook) {
@@ -440,7 +425,7 @@ void nf_send_unreach6(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb_in,if (hooknum ==NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT && skb_in->dev ==NULL ) skb_in->dev = net->loopback_dev; -if (!skb_dst (skb_in) &&nf_reject6_fill_skb_dst (skb_in) <0 ) +if (!skb_dst (skb_in) &&ip6_route_reply_fill_dst (skb_in) <0 )return ;icmpv6_send (skb_in,ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH , code,0 );
net/ipv6/route.c +18 -0
@@ -2725,6 +2725,24 @@ struct dst_entry *ip6_route_output_flags(struct net *net, }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (ip6_route_output_flags); +int ip6_route_reply_fill_dst (struct sk_buff *skb) +{ +struct dst_entry *result; +struct flowi6 fl = { + .daddr =ipv6_hdr (skb)->saddr + }; +int err; + + result =ip6_route_output (dev_net (skb->dev),NULL , &fl); + err = result->error; +if (err) +dst_release (result); +else +skb_dst_set (skb, result); +return err; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (ip6_route_reply_fill_dst); +struct dst_entry *ip6_blackhole_route (struct net *net,struct dst_entry *dst_orig) {struct rt6_info *rt, *ort =dst_rt6_info (dst_orig);
--
2.34.1
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v7 2/7] net: move netfilter nf_reject6_fill_skb_dst to core ipv6
Could ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr read out-of-bounds memory if the IPv6 header spans paged fragments?
Quoted 13 lines
include/net/ip6_route.h +2
-0@@ -100,6 +100,8 @@ static inline struct dst_entry *ip6_route_output(struct net *net,return ip6_route_output_flags (net, sk, fl6,0 ); } +int ip6_route_reply_fill_dst (struct sk_buff *skb); +/* Only conditionally release dst if flags indicates * !RT6_LOOKUP_F_DST_NOREF or dst is in uncached_list. */
[ ... ]
Quoted 5 lines
net/ipv6/route.c +0
-0
net/ipv6/route.c struct dst_entry *ip6_route_output_flags(struct net *net, · line 2733
Quoted 9 lines
net/ipv6/route.c +6
-0@@ -2725,6 +2725,24 @@ struct dst_entry *ip6_route_output_flags(struct net *net, }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (ip6_route_output_flags); +int ip6_route_reply_fill_dst (struct sk_buff *skb) +{ +struct dst_entry *result; +struct flowi6 fl = { + .daddr =ipv6_hdr (skb)->saddr + };
Could ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr read out-of-bounds memory if the IPv6 header spans paged fragments?
Since this function is exported as EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL for use by BPF kfuncs, it might be called on packets where the header isn't guaranteed to be in the linear data area. If there are no linearization checks like pskb_may_pull() before accessing ipv6_hdr(), this could read out-of-bounds memory or cause a page fault when processing undersized or fragmented packets supplied by BPF programs.
The v6 cover letter mentions "call pskb_network_may_pull on the cloned pkt", but this linearization check is not present in this function.
While the netfilter caller (nf_send_unreach6) may ensure the header is linearized, the exported function itself doesn't validate this condition.
net/ipv6/route.c struct dst_entry *ip6_route_output_flags(struct net *net, · line 2736
Quoted 3 lines
net/ipv6/route.c +3
-0+int err; + + result =ip6_route_output (dev_net (skb->dev),NULL , &fl);
Can skb->dev be NULL in contexts where this function will be used?
Since this function is exported as EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL for use by BPF kfuncs, it might be called from program types where the device reference is not retained, such as socket filters or tc ingress before device assignment. If skb->dev is NULL in these contexts, dev_net(skb->dev) would cause a NULL pointer dereference.
While the netfilter caller (nf_send_unreach6) checks and sets skb->dev to loopback_dev if NULL, the exported function itself does not have this protection.
net/ipv6/route.c struct dst_entry *ip6_route_output_flags(struct net *net, · line 2748
Quoted 12 lines
net/ipv6/route.c +9
-0+ err = result->error; +if (err) +dst_release (result); +else +skb_dst_set (skb, result); +return err; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (ip6_route_reply_fill_dst); +struct dst_entry *ip6_blackhole_route (struct net *net,struct dst_entry *dst_orig) {struct rt6_info *rt, *ort =dst_rt6_info (dst_orig);
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md
CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/26459248718
Re: [PATCH bpf-next v7 2/7] net: move netfilter nf_reject6_fill_skb_dst to core ipv6
Quoted 41 lines · On Tue, May 26, 2026 at 04:20:14PM +0000, [email protected] wrote:
Quoted 13 lines
include/net/ip6_route.h +2
-0@@ -100,6 +100,8 @@ static inline struct dst_entry *ip6_route_output(struct net *net,return ip6_route_output_flags (net, sk, fl6,0 ); } +int ip6_route_reply_fill_dst (struct sk_buff *skb); +/* Only conditionally release dst if flags indicates * !RT6_LOOKUP_F_DST_NOREF or dst is in uncached_list. */ [ ... ]
Quoted 5 lines
net/ipv6/route.c +0
-0net/ipv6/route.c struct dst_entry *ip6_route_output_flags(struct net *net, · line 2733
Quoted 9 lines
net/ipv6/route.c +6
-0@@ -2725,6 +2725,24 @@ struct dst_entry *ip6_route_output_flags(struct net *net, }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (ip6_route_output_flags); +int ip6_route_reply_fill_dst (struct sk_buff *skb) +{ +struct dst_entry *result; +struct flowi6 fl = { + .daddr =ipv6_hdr (skb)->saddr + };Could ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr read out-of-bounds memory if the IPv6 header spans paged fragments?
Since this function is exported as
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPLfor use by BPF kfuncs, it might be called on packets where the header isn't guaranteed to be in the linear data area. If there are no linearization checks likepskb_may_pull()before accessingipv6_hdr(), this could read out-of-bounds memory or cause a page fault when processing undersized or fragmented packets supplied by BPF programs.
Quoted 7 lines
The v6 cover letter mentions "call
pskb_network_may_pullon the cloned pkt", but this linearization check is not present in this function.While the netfilter caller (
nf_send_unreach6) may ensure the header is linearized, the exported function itself doesn't validate this condition.
This is the same remark as on IPv4 on which I already responded, I don't think that's an actual issue.
Quoted 13 lines
net/ipv6/route.c struct dst_entry *ip6_route_output_flags(struct net *net, · line 2736
Quoted 4 lines
net/ipv6/route.c +3
-0+int err; + + result =ip6_route_output (dev_net (skb->dev),NULL , &fl);Can
skb->devbe NULL in contexts where this function will be used?Since this function is exported as
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPLfor use by BPF kfuncs, it might be called from program types where the device reference is not retained, such as socket filters or tc ingress before device assignment. Ifskb->devis NULL in these contexts,dev_net(skb->dev)would cause a NULL pointer dereference.
Quoted 5 lines
While the netfilter caller (
nf_send_unreach6) checks and setsskb->devtoloopback_devif NULL, the exported function itself does not have this protection.
Dito.
Quoted 20 lines
net/ipv6/route.c struct dst_entry *ip6_route_output_flags(struct net *net, · line 2748
Quoted 13 lines
net/ipv6/route.c +9
-0+ err = result->error; +if (err) +dst_release (result); +else +skb_dst_set (skb, result); +return err; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (ip6_route_reply_fill_dst); +struct dst_entry *ip6_blackhole_route (struct net *net,struct dst_entry *dst_orig) {struct rt6_info *rt, *ort =dst_rt6_info (dst_orig);---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.mdCI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/26459248718
Re: [PATCH bpf-next v7 2/7] net: move netfilter nf_reject6_fill_skb_dst to core ipv6
In reply to Mahe TardyQuoted 93 lines · Mahe Tardy
Move and rename
nf_reject6_fill_skb_dstfrom ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6 toip6_route_reply_fill_dstinipv6/route.cso that it can be reused in the following patches by BPF kfuncs.Netfilter uses
nf_ip6_routethat is almost a transparent wrapper aroundip6_route_outputso this patch inlines it.Signed-off-by Mahe Tardy <[email protected]>--- include/net/ip6_route.h | 2 ++ net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c | 17 +---------------- net/ipv6/route.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)include/net/ip6_route.h +2
-0@@ -100,6 +100,8 @@ static inline struct dst_entry *ip6_route_output(struct net *net,return ip6_route_output_flags (net, sk, fl6,0 ); } +int ip6_route_reply_fill_dst (struct sk_buff *skb); +/* Only conditionally release dst if flags indicates * !RT6_LOOKUP_F_DST_NOREF or dst is in uncached_list. */ net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_reject_ipv6.c +1
-16@@ -293,21 +293,6 @@ nf_reject_ip6_tcphdr_put(struct sk_buff *nskb, sizeof(struct tcphdr), 0)); } -static int nf_reject6_fill_skb_dst (struct sk_buff *skb_in) -{ -struct dst_entry *dst =NULL ; -struct flowi fl; - -memset (&fl,0 ,sizeof (struct flowi )); - fl.u.ip6.daddr =ipv6_hdr (skb_in)->saddr; -nf_ip6_route (dev_net (skb_in->dev), &dst, &fl, false); -if (!dst) -return -1 ; - -skb_dst_set (skb_in, dst); -return 0 ; -} -void nf_send_reset6 (struct net *net,struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *oldskb,int hook) {@@ -440,7 +425,7 @@ void nf_send_unreach6(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb_in,if (hooknum ==NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT && skb_in->dev ==NULL ) skb_in->dev = net->loopback_dev; -if (!skb_dst (skb_in) &&nf_reject6_fill_skb_dst (skb_in) <0 ) +if (!skb_dst (skb_in) &&ip6_route_reply_fill_dst (skb_in) <0 )return ;icmpv6_send (skb_in,ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH , code,0 );net/ipv6/route.c +18
-1@@ -2725,6 +2725,24 @@ struct dst_entry *ip6_route_output_flags(struct net *net, }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (ip6_route_output_flags); +int ip6_route_reply_fill_dst (struct sk_buff *skb) +{ +struct dst_entry *result; +struct flowi6 fl = { + .daddr =ipv6_hdr (skb)->saddr + }; +int err; + + result =ip6_route_output (dev_net (skb->dev),NULL , &fl); + err = result->error; +if (err) +dst_release (result); +else +skb_dst_set (skb, result); +return err; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (ip6_route_reply_fill_dst); +struct dst_entry *ip6_blackhole_route (struct net *net,struct dst_entry *dst_orig) {struct rt6_info *rt, *ort =dst_rt6_info (dst_orig); --
Quoted 2 lines
2.34.1
PATCH v7 3/7 bpf: add bpf_icmp_send kfunc
In reply to Mahe TardyThis is needed in the context of Tetragon to provide improved feedback (in contrast to just dropping packets) to east-west traffic when blocked by policies using cgroup_skb programs. We also extend this kfunc to tc program as a convenience.
This reuses concepts from netfilter reject target codepath with the differences that:
* Packets are cloned since the BPF user can still let the packet pass (SK_PASS from the cgroup_skb progs for example) and the current skb need to stay untouched (cgroup_skb hooks only allow read-only skb payload).
* We protect against recursion since the kfunc, by generating an ICMP error message, could retrigger the BPF prog that invoked it.
For now, we support cgroup_skb and tc program types. For cgroup_skb and tc egress, almost everything should be good. However for tc ingress:
- packet will not be routed yet: need to set the net device for icmp_send, thus the call to ip[6]_route_reply_fill_dst.
- fragments could trigger hook: icmp_send will only reply to fragment 0.
- ensure the ip headers is linearized before processing, and zero out the SKB control block after cloning to prevent icmp_send()/icmpv6_send() from misinterpreting garbage data as IP options.
Only ICMP_DEST_UNREACH and ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH are currently supported. The interface accepts a type parameter to facilitate future extension to other ICMP control message types.
--- net/core/filter.c | 109 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 109 insertions(+)
net/core/filter.c +109 -0
@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@#include <linux/un.h> #include <net/xdp_sock_drv.h> #include <net/inet_dscp.h> +#include <linux/icmpv6.h> +#include <net/icmp.h> #include "dev.h"
@@ -12464,6 +12466,101 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_xdp_pull_data(struct xdp_md *x, u32 len)return 0 ; } +/** +* bpf_icmp_send - Send an ICMP control message +* @skb_ctx: Packet that triggered the control message +* @type: ICMP type (only ICMP_DEST_UNREACH/ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH supported) +* @code: ICMP code (0-15 for IPv4, 0-6 for IPv6) +* +* Sends an ICMP control message in response to the packet. The original packet +* is cloned before sending the ICMP message, so the BPF program can still let +* the packet pass if desired. +* +* Currently only ICMP_DEST_UNREACH (IPv4) and ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH (IPv6) are +* supported. +* +* Return: 0 on success, negative error code on failure: +* -EINVAL: Invalid code parameter +* -EBADMSG: Packet too short or malformed +* -ENOMEM: Memory allocation failed +* -EBUSY: Recursion detected +* -EHOSTUNREACH: Routing failed +* -EPROTONOSUPPORT: Non-IP protocol +* -EOPNOTSUPP: Unsupported ICMP type +*/ +__bpf_kfunc int bpf_icmp_send(struct __sk_buff *skb_ctx, int type, int code) +{ +struct sk_buff *skb = (struct sk_buff *)skb_ctx; +struct sk_buff *nskb; +struct sock *sk; + + sk =skb_to_full_sk (skb); +if (sk && sk->sk_kern_sock && + (sk->sk_protocol ==IPPROTO_ICMP || sk->sk_protocol ==IPPROTO_ICMPV6 )) +return -EBUSY ; + +switch (skb->protocol) { +#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_INET ) +case htons (ETH_P_IP ): +if (type !=ICMP_DEST_UNREACH ) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +if (code <0 || code >NR_ICMP_UNREACH ) +return -EINVAL ; + + nskb =skb_clone (skb,GFP_ATOMIC ); +if (!nskb) +return -ENOMEM ; + +if (!pskb_network_may_pull (nskb,sizeof (struct iphdr ))) { +kfree_skb (nskb); +return -EBADMSG ; + } + +if (!skb_dst (nskb) &&ip_route_reply_fill_dst (nskb) <0 ) { +kfree_skb (nskb); +return -EHOSTUNREACH ; + } + +memset (IPCB (nskb),0 ,sizeof (struct inet_skb_parm )); + +icmp_send (nskb, type, code,0 ); +consume_skb (nskb); +break ; +#endif +#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IPV6 ) +case htons (ETH_P_IPV6 ): +if (type !=ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH ) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +if (code <0 || code >ICMPV6_REJECT_ROUTE ) +return -EINVAL ; + + nskb =skb_clone (skb,GFP_ATOMIC ); +if (!nskb) +return -ENOMEM ; + +if (!pskb_network_may_pull (nskb,sizeof (struct ipv6hdr ))) { +kfree_skb (nskb); +return -EBADMSG ; + } + +if (!skb_dst (nskb) &&ip6_route_reply_fill_dst (nskb) <0 ) { +kfree_skb (nskb); +return -EHOSTUNREACH ; + } + +memset (IP6CB (nskb),0 ,sizeof (struct inet6_skb_parm )); + +icmpv6_send (nskb, type, code,0 ); +consume_skb (nskb); +break ; +#endif +default : +return -EPROTONOSUPPORT ; + } + +return 0 ; +} +__bpf_kfunc_end_defs (); int bpf_dynptr_from_skb_rdonly(struct __sk_buff *skb, u64 flags,
@@ -12506,6 +12603,10 @@ BTF_KFUNCS_START(bpf_kfunc_check_set_sock_ops) BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_sock_ops_enable_tx_tstamp)BTF_KFUNCS_END (bpf_kfunc_check_set_sock_ops) +BTF_KFUNCS_START (bpf_kfunc_check_set_icmp_send ) +BTF_ID_FLAGS (func, bpf_icmp_send) +BTF_KFUNCS_END (bpf_kfunc_check_set_icmp_send) + static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set bpf_kfunc_set_skb = { .owner =THIS_MODULE , .set = &bpf_kfunc_check_set_skb,
@@ -12536,6 +12637,11 @@ static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set bpf_kfunc_set_sock_ops = { .set = &bpf_kfunc_check_set_sock_ops, }; +static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set bpf_kfunc_set_icmp_send = { + .owner =THIS_MODULE , + .set = &bpf_kfunc_check_set_icmp_send, +}; +static int __init bpf_kfunc_init (void ) {int ret;
@@ -12557,6 +12663,9 @@ static int __init bpf_kfunc_init(void) ret = ret ?:register_btf_kfunc_id_set (BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR , &bpf_kfunc_set_sock_addr); ret = ret ?:register_btf_kfunc_id_set (BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS , &bpf_kfunc_set_tcp_reqsk); + ret = ret ?:register_btf_kfunc_id_set (BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB , &bpf_kfunc_set_icmp_send); + ret = ret ?:register_btf_kfunc_id_set (BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS , &bpf_kfunc_set_icmp_send); + ret = ret ?:register_btf_kfunc_id_set (BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT , &bpf_kfunc_set_icmp_send);return ret ?:register_btf_kfunc_id_set (BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS , &bpf_kfunc_set_sock_ops); }late_initcall (bpf_kfunc_init);
--
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH bpf-next v7 3/7] bpf: add bpf_icmp_send kfunc
Quoted 69 lines · Mahe Tardy
This is needed in the context of Tetragon to provide improved feedback (in contrast to just dropping packets) to east-west traffic when blocked by policies using
cgroup_skbprograms. We also extend this kfunc to tc program as a convenience.This reuses concepts from netfilter reject target codepath with the differences that:
* Packets are cloned since the BPF user can still let the packet pass (SK_PASSfrom thecgroup_skbprogs for example) and the current skb need to stay untouched (cgroup_skbhooks only allow read-only skb payload).
* We protect against recursion since the kfunc, by generating an ICMP error message, could retrigger the BPF prog that invoked it.For now, we support
cgroup_skband tc program types. Forcgroup_skband tc egress, almost everything should be good. However for tc ingress:
- packet will not be routed yet: need to set the net device foricmp_send, thus the call to ip[6]_route_reply_fill_dst.
- fragments could trigger hook:icmp_sendwill only reply to fragment 0.
- ensure the ip headers is linearized before processing, and zero out the SKB control block after cloning to prevent icmp_send()/icmpv6_send() from misinterpreting garbage data as IP options.Only
ICMP_DEST_UNREACHandICMPV6_DEST_UNREACHare currently supported. The interface accepts a type parameter to facilitate future extension to other ICMP control message types.Signed-off-by Mahe Tardy <[email protected]>--- net/core/filter.c | 109 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 109 insertions(+)net/core/filter.c +22
-0@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@#include <linux/un.h> #include <net/xdp_sock_drv.h> #include <net/inet_dscp.h> +#include <linux/icmpv6.h> +#include <net/icmp.h> #include "dev.h" @@ -12464,6 +12466,101 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_xdp_pull_data(struct xdp_md *x, u32 len)return 0 ; } +/** +* bpf_icmp_send - Send an ICMP control message +* @skb_ctx: Packet that triggered the control message +* @type: ICMP type (only ICMP_DEST_UNREACH/ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH supported) +* @code: ICMP code (0-15 for IPv4, 0-6 for IPv6) +* +* Sends an ICMP control message in response to the packet. The original packet +* is cloned before sending the ICMP message, so the BPF program can still let +* the packet pass if desired. +* +* Currently only ICMP_DEST_UNREACH (IPv4) and ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH (IPv6) are +* supported. +* +* Return: 0 on success, negative error code on failure: +* -EINVAL: Invalid code parameter +* -EBADMSG: Packet too short or malformed +* -ENOMEM: Memory allocation failed +* -EBUSY: Recursion detected +* -EHOSTUNREACH: Routing failed +* -EPROTONOSUPPORT: Non-IP protocol
net/core/filter.c __bpf_kfunc int bpf_xdp_pull_data(struct xdp_md *x, u32 len) · line 12498
Quoted 10 lines
net/core/filter.c +10
-0+* -EOPNOTSUPP: Unsupported ICMP type +*/ +__bpf_kfunc int bpf_icmp_send(struct __sk_buff *skb_ctx, int type, int code) +{ +struct sk_buff *skb = (struct sk_buff *)skb_ctx; +struct sk_buff *nskb; +struct sock *sk; + + sk =skb_to_full_sk (skb); + if (sk && sk->sk_kern_sock &&
Won't this prevent the kfunc from working for traffic emitted from kernel sockets like those used by NFS/SMB mounts? I can imagine there being a legitimate use case where you'd want those kind of connections to fail fast as well by emitting ICMP*_DEST_UNREACH.
Quoted 104 lines
net/core/filter.c +77
-1+ (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP || sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6)) + return -EBUSY; + +switch (skb->protocol) { +#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_INET ) +case htons (ETH_P_IP ): +if (type !=ICMP_DEST_UNREACH ) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +if (code <0 || code >NR_ICMP_UNREACH ) +return -EINVAL ; + + nskb =skb_clone (skb,GFP_ATOMIC ); +if (!nskb) +return -ENOMEM ; + +if (!pskb_network_may_pull (nskb,sizeof (struct iphdr ))) { +kfree_skb (nskb); +return -EBADMSG ; + } + +if (!skb_dst (nskb) &&ip_route_reply_fill_dst (nskb) <0 ) { +kfree_skb (nskb); +return -EHOSTUNREACH ; + } + +memset (IPCB (nskb),0 ,sizeof (struct inet_skb_parm )); + +icmp_send (nskb, type, code,0 ); +consume_skb (nskb); +break ; +#endif +#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IPV6 ) +case htons (ETH_P_IPV6 ): +if (type !=ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH ) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +if (code <0 || code >ICMPV6_REJECT_ROUTE ) +return -EINVAL ; + + nskb =skb_clone (skb,GFP_ATOMIC ); +if (!nskb) +return -ENOMEM ; + +if (!pskb_network_may_pull (nskb,sizeof (struct ipv6hdr ))) { +kfree_skb (nskb); +return -EBADMSG ; + } + +if (!skb_dst (nskb) &&ip6_route_reply_fill_dst (nskb) <0 ) { +kfree_skb (nskb); +return -EHOSTUNREACH ; + } + +memset (IP6CB (nskb),0 ,sizeof (struct inet6_skb_parm )); + +icmpv6_send (nskb, type, code,0 ); +consume_skb (nskb); +break ; +#endif +default : +return -EPROTONOSUPPORT ; + } + +return 0 ; +} +__bpf_kfunc_end_defs (); int bpf_dynptr_from_skb_rdonly(struct __sk_buff *skb, u64 flags,@@ -12506,6 +12603,10 @@ BTF_KFUNCS_START(bpf_kfunc_check_set_sock_ops) BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_sock_ops_enable_tx_tstamp)BTF_KFUNCS_END (bpf_kfunc_check_set_sock_ops) +BTF_KFUNCS_START (bpf_kfunc_check_set_icmp_send ) +BTF_ID_FLAGS (func, bpf_icmp_send) +BTF_KFUNCS_END (bpf_kfunc_check_set_icmp_send) + static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set bpf_kfunc_set_skb = { .owner =THIS_MODULE , .set = &bpf_kfunc_check_set_skb,@@ -12536,6 +12637,11 @@ static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set bpf_kfunc_set_sock_ops = { .set = &bpf_kfunc_check_set_sock_ops, }; +static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set bpf_kfunc_set_icmp_send = { + .owner =THIS_MODULE , + .set = &bpf_kfunc_check_set_icmp_send, +}; +static int __init bpf_kfunc_init (void ) {int ret;@@ -12557,6 +12663,9 @@ static int __init bpf_kfunc_init(void) ret = ret ?:register_btf_kfunc_id_set (BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR , &bpf_kfunc_set_sock_addr); ret = ret ?:register_btf_kfunc_id_set (BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS , &bpf_kfunc_set_tcp_reqsk); + ret = ret ?:register_btf_kfunc_id_set (BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB , &bpf_kfunc_set_icmp_send); + ret = ret ?:register_btf_kfunc_id_set (BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS , &bpf_kfunc_set_icmp_send); + ret = ret ?:register_btf_kfunc_id_set (BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT , &bpf_kfunc_set_icmp_send);return ret ?:register_btf_kfunc_id_set (BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS , &bpf_kfunc_set_sock_ops); }late_initcall (bpf_kfunc_init); --2.34.1
Re: [PATCH bpf-next v7 3/7] bpf: add bpf_icmp_send kfunc
Quoted 15 lines · Jordan Rife
net/core/filter.c __bpf_kfunc int bpf_xdp_pull_data(struct xdp_md *x, u32 len) · line 12498
Quoted 9 lines · Mahe Tardy
[...]
net/core/filter.c +8
-0+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_icmp_send(struct __sk_buff *skb_ctx, int type, int code) +{ +struct sk_buff *skb = (struct sk_buff *)skb_ctx; +struct sk_buff *nskb; +struct sock *sk; + + sk =skb_to_full_sk (skb); + if (sk && sk->sk_kern_sock &&Won't this prevent the kfunc from working for traffic emitted from kernel sockets like those used by NFS/SMB mounts? I can imagine there being a legitimate use case where you'd want those kind of connections to fail fast as well by emitting ICMP*_DEST_UNREACH.
I don't know much about NFS/SMB but I'd expect them to use UDP or TCP for their transport protocol, so the second half of the condition check:
Quoted 2 lines
net/core/filter.c __bpf_kfunc int bpf_xdp_pull_data(struct xdp_md *x, u32 len) · line 12500
Quoted 2 lines
net/core/filter.c +2
-0+ (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP || sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6)) +return -EBUSY ;
should fail. Meaning that this should be suitable for it.
The goal here was to identify the ICMP kernel sockets, I think this way should be precise enough and does not require new code. The other more precise ways we thought about initially were more invasive:
- exposing ipv4_icmp_sk out of net/ipv4/icmp.c to compare the pointer:
not clean as other part of the code could reuse those sockets.
- expose a helper like is_kernel_icmp_socket from net/ipv4/icmp.c to be used in net/core/filter.c: new exported functions.
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
+
[...]
Re: [PATCH bpf-next v7 3/7] bpf: add bpf_icmp_send kfunc
Quoted 17 lines · Mahe Tardy
Quoted 15 lines · Jordan Rife
net/core/filter.c __bpf_kfunc int bpf_xdp_pull_data(struct xdp_md *x, u32 len) · line 12498
Quoted 9 lines · Mahe Tardy
[...]
net/core/filter.c +8
-0+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_icmp_send(struct __sk_buff *skb_ctx, int type, int code) +{ +struct sk_buff *skb = (struct sk_buff *)skb_ctx; +struct sk_buff *nskb; +struct sock *sk; + + sk =skb_to_full_sk (skb); + if (sk && sk->sk_kern_sock &&Won't this prevent the kfunc from working for traffic emitted from kernel sockets like those used by NFS/SMB mounts? I can imagine there being a legitimate use case where you'd want those kind of connections to fail fast as well by emitting ICMP*_DEST_UNREACH.
Quoted 7 lines
I don't know much about NFS/SMB but I'd expect them to use UDP or TCP for their transport protocol, so the second half of the condition check:
Quoted 2 lines
net/core/filter.c __bpf_kfunc int bpf_xdp_pull_data(struct xdp_md *x, u32 len) · line 12500
Quoted 2 lines
net/core/filter.c +2
-0+ (sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP || sk->sk_protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6)) +return -EBUSY ;should fail. Meaning that this should be suitable for it.
Not sure how I missed this. Makes sense, thanks for explaining.
Quoted 11 lines
The goal here was to identify the ICMP kernel sockets, I think this way should be precise enough and does not require new code. The other more precise ways we thought about initially were more invasive:
- exposingipv4_icmp_skout ofnet/ipv4/icmp.cto compare the pointer:
not clean as other part of the code could reuse those sockets.
- expose a helper likeis_kernel_icmp_socketfromnet/ipv4/icmp.cto be used innet/core/filter.c: new exported functions.Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 2 lines
+
[...]
Re: [PATCH bpf-next v7 3/7] bpf: add bpf_icmp_send kfunc
In reply to Mahe TardyQuoted 181 lines · Mahe Tardy
This is needed in the context of Tetragon to provide improved feedback (in contrast to just dropping packets) to east-west traffic when blocked by policies using
cgroup_skbprograms. We also extend this kfunc to tc program as a convenience.This reuses concepts from netfilter reject target codepath with the differences that:
* Packets are cloned since the BPF user can still let the packet pass (SK_PASSfrom thecgroup_skbprogs for example) and the current skb need to stay untouched (cgroup_skbhooks only allow read-only skb payload).
* We protect against recursion since the kfunc, by generating an ICMP error message, could retrigger the BPF prog that invoked it.For now, we support
cgroup_skband tc program types. Forcgroup_skband tc egress, almost everything should be good. However for tc ingress:
- packet will not be routed yet: need to set the net device foricmp_send, thus the call to ip[6]_route_reply_fill_dst.
- fragments could trigger hook:icmp_sendwill only reply to fragment 0.
- ensure the ip headers is linearized before processing, and zero out the SKB control block after cloning to prevent icmp_send()/icmpv6_send() from misinterpreting garbage data as IP options.Only
ICMP_DEST_UNREACHandICMPV6_DEST_UNREACHare currently supported. The interface accepts a type parameter to facilitate future extension to other ICMP control message types.Signed-off-by Mahe Tardy <[email protected]>--- net/core/filter.c | 109 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 109 insertions(+)net/core/filter.c +109
-1@@ -84,6 +84,8 @@#include <linux/un.h> #include <net/xdp_sock_drv.h> #include <net/inet_dscp.h> +#include <linux/icmpv6.h> +#include <net/icmp.h> #include "dev.h" @@ -12464,6 +12466,101 @@ __bpf_kfunc int bpf_xdp_pull_data(struct xdp_md *x, u32 len)return 0 ; } +/** +* bpf_icmp_send - Send an ICMP control message +* @skb_ctx: Packet that triggered the control message +* @type: ICMP type (only ICMP_DEST_UNREACH/ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH supported) +* @code: ICMP code (0-15 for IPv4, 0-6 for IPv6) +* +* Sends an ICMP control message in response to the packet. The original packet +* is cloned before sending the ICMP message, so the BPF program can still let +* the packet pass if desired. +* +* Currently only ICMP_DEST_UNREACH (IPv4) and ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH (IPv6) are +* supported. +* +* Return: 0 on success, negative error code on failure: +* -EINVAL: Invalid code parameter +* -EBADMSG: Packet too short or malformed +* -ENOMEM: Memory allocation failed +* -EBUSY: Recursion detected +* -EHOSTUNREACH: Routing failed +* -EPROTONOSUPPORT: Non-IP protocol +* -EOPNOTSUPP: Unsupported ICMP type +*/ +__bpf_kfunc int bpf_icmp_send(struct __sk_buff *skb_ctx, int type, int code) +{ +struct sk_buff *skb = (struct sk_buff *)skb_ctx; +struct sk_buff *nskb; +struct sock *sk; + + sk =skb_to_full_sk (skb); +if (sk && sk->sk_kern_sock && + (sk->sk_protocol ==IPPROTO_ICMP || sk->sk_protocol ==IPPROTO_ICMPV6 )) +return -EBUSY ; + +switch (skb->protocol) { +#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_INET ) +case htons (ETH_P_IP ): +if (type !=ICMP_DEST_UNREACH ) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +if (code <0 || code >NR_ICMP_UNREACH ) +return -EINVAL ; + + nskb =skb_clone (skb,GFP_ATOMIC ); +if (!nskb) +return -ENOMEM ; + +if (!pskb_network_may_pull (nskb,sizeof (struct iphdr ))) { +kfree_skb (nskb); +return -EBADMSG ; + } + +if (!skb_dst (nskb) &&ip_route_reply_fill_dst (nskb) <0 ) { +kfree_skb (nskb); +return -EHOSTUNREACH ; + } + +memset (IPCB (nskb),0 ,sizeof (struct inet_skb_parm )); + +icmp_send (nskb, type, code,0 ); +consume_skb (nskb); +break ; +#endif +#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IPV6 ) +case htons (ETH_P_IPV6 ): +if (type !=ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH ) +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; +if (code <0 || code >ICMPV6_REJECT_ROUTE ) +return -EINVAL ; + + nskb =skb_clone (skb,GFP_ATOMIC ); +if (!nskb) +return -ENOMEM ; + +if (!pskb_network_may_pull (nskb,sizeof (struct ipv6hdr ))) { +kfree_skb (nskb); +return -EBADMSG ; + } + +if (!skb_dst (nskb) &&ip6_route_reply_fill_dst (nskb) <0 ) { +kfree_skb (nskb); +return -EHOSTUNREACH ; + } + +memset (IP6CB (nskb),0 ,sizeof (struct inet6_skb_parm )); + +icmpv6_send (nskb, type, code,0 ); +consume_skb (nskb); +break ; +#endif +default : +return -EPROTONOSUPPORT ; + } + +return 0 ; +} +__bpf_kfunc_end_defs (); int bpf_dynptr_from_skb_rdonly(struct __sk_buff *skb, u64 flags,@@ -12506,6 +12603,10 @@ BTF_KFUNCS_START(bpf_kfunc_check_set_sock_ops) BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_sock_ops_enable_tx_tstamp)BTF_KFUNCS_END (bpf_kfunc_check_set_sock_ops) +BTF_KFUNCS_START (bpf_kfunc_check_set_icmp_send ) +BTF_ID_FLAGS (func, bpf_icmp_send) +BTF_KFUNCS_END (bpf_kfunc_check_set_icmp_send) + static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set bpf_kfunc_set_skb = { .owner =THIS_MODULE , .set = &bpf_kfunc_check_set_skb,@@ -12536,6 +12637,11 @@ static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set bpf_kfunc_set_sock_ops = { .set = &bpf_kfunc_check_set_sock_ops, }; +static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set bpf_kfunc_set_icmp_send = { + .owner =THIS_MODULE , + .set = &bpf_kfunc_check_set_icmp_send, +}; +static int __init bpf_kfunc_init (void ) {int ret;@@ -12557,6 +12663,9 @@ static int __init bpf_kfunc_init(void) ret = ret ?:register_btf_kfunc_id_set (BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR , &bpf_kfunc_set_sock_addr); ret = ret ?:register_btf_kfunc_id_set (BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS , &bpf_kfunc_set_tcp_reqsk); + ret = ret ?:register_btf_kfunc_id_set (BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB , &bpf_kfunc_set_icmp_send); + ret = ret ?:register_btf_kfunc_id_set (BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS , &bpf_kfunc_set_icmp_send); + ret = ret ?:register_btf_kfunc_id_set (BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT , &bpf_kfunc_set_icmp_send);return ret ?:register_btf_kfunc_id_set (BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS , &bpf_kfunc_set_sock_ops); }late_initcall (bpf_kfunc_init); --
Quoted 2 lines
2.34.1
PATCH v7 4/7 selftests/bpf: add bpf_icmp_send kfunc cgroup_skb tests
In reply to Mahe TardyThis test opens a server and client, enters a new cgroup, attach a cgroup_skb program on egress and calls the bpf_icmp_send function from the client egress so that an ICMP unreach control message is sent back to the client. It then fetches the message from the error queue to confirm the correct ICMP unreach code has been sent.
Note that, for the client, we have to connect in non-blocking mode to let the test execute faster. Otherwise, we need to wait for the TCP three-way handshake to timeout in the kernel before reading the errno.
Also note that we don't set IP_RECVERR on the socket in connect_to_fd_nonblock since the error will be transferred anyway in our test because the connection is rejected at the beginning of the TCP handshake. See in net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:tcp_v4_err for more details.
--- .../bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c | 149 ++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/icmp_send.c | 38 +++++ 2 files changed, 187 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/icmp_send.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c new file +149 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <test_progs.h> +#include <network_helpers.h> +#include <linux/errqueue.h> +#include <poll.h> +#include "icmp_send.skel.h" + +#define TIMEOUT_MS 1000 + +#define ICMP_DEST_UNREACH 3 + +#define ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED 4 +#define NR_ICMP_UNREACH 15 + +static int connect_to_fd_nonblock (int server_fd) +{ +struct sockaddr_storage addr; +socklen_t len =sizeof (addr); +int fd, err; + +if (getsockname (server_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &len)) +return -1 ; + + fd =socket (addr.ss_family,SOCK_STREAM |SOCK_NONBLOCK ,0 ); +if (fd <0 ) +return -1 ; + + err =connect (fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, len); +if (err <0 && errno !=EINPROGRESS ) { +close (fd); +return -1 ; + } + +return fd; +} + +static void read_icmp_errqueue (int sockfd,int expected_code) +{ +struct sock_extended_err *sock_err; +char ctrl_buf[512 ]; +struct msghdr msg = { + .msg_control = ctrl_buf, + .msg_controllen =sizeof (ctrl_buf), + }; +struct pollfd pfd = { + .fd = sockfd, + .events =POLLERR , + }; +struct cmsghdr *cm; +ssize_t n; + +if (!ASSERT_GE (poll (&pfd,1 ,TIMEOUT_MS ),1 ,"poll_errqueue" )) +return ; + + n =recvmsg (sockfd, &msg,MSG_ERRQUEUE ); +if (!ASSERT_GE (n,0 ,"recvmsg_errqueue" )) +return ; + + cm =CMSG_FIRSTHDR (&msg); +if (!ASSERT_NEQ (cm,NULL ,"cm_firsthdr_null" )) +return ; + +for (; cm; cm =CMSG_NXTHDR (&msg, cm)) { +if (cm->cmsg_level !=IPPROTO_IP || cm->cmsg_type !=IP_RECVERR ) +continue ; + + sock_err = (struct sock_extended_err *)CMSG_DATA (cm); + +if (!ASSERT_EQ (sock_err->ee_origin,SO_EE_ORIGIN_ICMP , +"sock_err_origin_icmp" )) +return ; +if (!ASSERT_EQ (sock_err->ee_type,ICMP_DEST_UNREACH , +"sock_err_type_dest_unreach" )) +return ; +ASSERT_EQ (sock_err->ee_code, expected_code,"sock_err_code" ); +return ; + } + +ASSERT_FAIL ("no IP_RECVERR/IPV6_RECVERR control message found" ); +} + +static void trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue (struct icmp_send *skel,int code) +{ +int srv_fd =-1 , client_fd =-1 ; +struct sockaddr_in addr; +socklen_t len =sizeof (addr); + + srv_fd =start_server (AF_INET ,SOCK_STREAM ,"127.0.0.1" ,0 ,TIMEOUT_MS ); +if (!ASSERT_GE (srv_fd,0 ,"start_server" )) +return ; + +if (getsockname (srv_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &len)) { +close (srv_fd); +return ; + } + skel->bss->server_port =ntohs (addr.sin_port); + skel->bss->unreach_code = code; + + client_fd =connect_to_fd_nonblock (srv_fd); +if (!ASSERT_OK_FD (client_fd,"client_connect_nonblock" )) { +close (srv_fd); +return ; + } + +/* Skip reading ICMP error queue if code is invalid */ +if (code >=0 && code <=NR_ICMP_UNREACH ) +read_icmp_errqueue (client_fd, code); + +close (client_fd); +close (srv_fd); +} + +void test_icmp_send_unreach_cgroup (void ) +{ +struct icmp_send *skel; +int cgroup_fd =-1 ; + + skel =icmp_send__open_and_load (); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (skel,"skel_open" )) + goto cleanup; + + cgroup_fd =test__join_cgroup ("/icmp_send_unreach_cgroup" ); +if (!ASSERT_OK_FD (cgroup_fd,"join_cgroup" )) + goto cleanup; + + skel->links.egress = +bpf_program__attach_cgroup (skel->progs.egress, cgroup_fd); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (skel->links.egress,"prog_attach_cgroup" )) + goto cleanup; + +for (int code =0 ; code <=NR_ICMP_UNREACH ; code++) { +/* The TCP stack reacts differently when asking for +* fragmentation, let's ignore it for now. +*/ +if (code ==ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED ) +continue ; + +trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue (skel, code); +ASSERT_EQ (skel->data->kfunc_ret,0 ,"kfunc_ret" ); + } + +/* Test an invalid code */ +trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue (skel,-1 ); +ASSERT_EQ (skel->data->kfunc_ret, -EINVAL ,"kfunc_ret" ); + +cleanup: +icmp_send__destroy (skel); +close (cgroup_fd); +}
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/icmp_send.c new file +38 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include "vmlinux.h" +#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h> +#include <bpf/bpf_endian.h> + +/* 127.0.0.1 in host byte order */ +#define SERVER_IP 0x7F000001 + +#define ICMP_DEST_UNREACH 3 + +__u16 server_port =0 ; +int unreach_code =0 ; +int kfunc_ret =-1 ; + +SEC("cgroup_skb/egress") +int egress (struct __sk_buff *skb) +{ +void *data = (void *)(long )skb->data; +void *data_end = (void *)(long )skb->data_end; +struct iphdr *iph; +struct tcphdr *tcph; + + iph = data; +if ((void *)(iph +1 ) > data_end || iph->version !=4 || + iph->protocol !=IPPROTO_TCP || iph->daddr !=bpf_htonl (SERVER_IP )) +return SK_PASS ; + + tcph = (void *)iph + iph->ihl *4 ; +if ((void *)(tcph +1 ) > data_end || + tcph->dest !=bpf_htons (server_port)) +return SK_PASS ; + + kfunc_ret =bpf_icmp_send (skb,ICMP_DEST_UNREACH , unreach_code); + +return SK_DROP ; +} + +char LICENSE[] SEC("license") = "Dual BSD/GPL";
--
2.34.1
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v7 4/7] selftests/bpf: add bpf_icmp_send kfunc cgroup_skb tests
Jordan Rife raised a style concern in v6 about using ASSERT_OK_FD instead of ASSERT_GE for file descriptor checks. While this was addressed for client_fd and cgroup_fd, the srv_fd check here still…
Quoted 6 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c new file +0
-0@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
[ ... ]
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c line 90
Quoted 9 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c new file +9
-0+static void trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue (struct icmp_send *skel,int code) +{ +int srv_fd =-1 , client_fd =-1 ; +struct sockaddr_in addr; +socklen_t len =sizeof (addr); + + srv_fd =start_server (AF_INET ,SOCK_STREAM ,"127.0.0.1" ,0 ,TIMEOUT_MS ); +if (!ASSERT_GE (srv_fd,0 ,"start_server" )) +return ;
Jordan Rife raised a style concern in v6 about using ASSERT_OK_FD instead of ASSERT_GE for file descriptor checks. While this was addressed for client_fd and cgroup_fd, the srv_fd check here still uses ASSERT_GE. Should this be ASSERT_OK_FD for consistency?
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/q46w47cqezttz2otf76tncxu7sovhywy2dqwcbajigp64uhbtz@eimvxfeeexuz/
[ ... ]
Quoted 26 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c new file +26
-0+void test_icmp_send_unreach_cgroup (void ) +{ +struct icmp_send *skel; +int cgroup_fd =-1 ; + + skel =icmp_send__open_and_load (); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (skel,"skel_open" )) + goto cleanup; + + cgroup_fd =test__join_cgroup ("/icmp_send_unreach_cgroup" ); +if (!ASSERT_OK_FD (cgroup_fd,"join_cgroup" )) + goto cleanup; + + skel->links.egress = +bpf_program__attach_cgroup (skel->progs.egress, cgroup_fd); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (skel->links.egress,"prog_attach_cgroup" )) + goto cleanup; + +for (int code =0 ; code <=NR_ICMP_UNREACH ; code++) { +/* The TCP stack reacts differently when asking for +* fragmentation, let's ignore it for now. +*/ +if (code ==ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED ) +continue ; + +trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue (skel, code);
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c line 148
Quoted 10 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c new file +10
-0+ASSERT_EQ (skel->data->kfunc_ret,0 ,"kfunc_ret" ); + } + +/* Test an invalid code */ +trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue (skel,-1 ); +ASSERT_EQ (skel->data->kfunc_ret, -EINVAL ,"kfunc_ret" ); + +cleanup: +icmp_send__destroy (skel); +close (cgroup_fd);
Jordan Rife raised a concern in v6 about the cleanup path potentially closing an invalid file descriptor. Should this be guarded with 'if (cgroup_fd != -1)' before calling close(cgroup_fd)?
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/q46w47cqezttz2otf76tncxu7sovhywy2dqwcbajigp64uhbtz@eimvxfeeexuz/
Quoted 1 line
+}
[ ... ]
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.md
CI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/26459248718
Re: [PATCH bpf-next v7 4/7] selftests/bpf: add bpf_icmp_send kfunc cgroup_skb tests
Quoted 24 lines · On Tue, May 26, 2026 at 04:20:12PM +0000, [email protected] wrote:
Quoted 6 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c new file +0
-0@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@[ ... ]
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c line 90
Quoted 9 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c new file +9
-0+static void trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue (struct icmp_send *skel,int code) +{ +int srv_fd =-1 , client_fd =-1 ; +struct sockaddr_in addr; +socklen_t len =sizeof (addr); + + srv_fd =start_server (AF_INET ,SOCK_STREAM ,"127.0.0.1" ,0 ,TIMEOUT_MS ); +if (!ASSERT_GE (srv_fd,0 ,"start_server" )) +return ;Jordan Rife raised a style concern in v6 about using
ASSERT_OK_FDinstead ofASSERT_GEfor file descriptor checks. While this was addressed forclient_fdandcgroup_fd, thesrv_fdcheck here still usesASSERT_GE. Should this beASSERT_OK_FDfor consistency?
Quoted 1 line
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/q46w47cqezttz2otf76tncxu7sovhywy2dqwcbajigp64uhbtz@eimvxfeeexuz/
Indeed, this is a miss, not sure it's worth submitting a new version just for it, but will be fixed if I need to push another version.
Quoted 44 lines
[ ... ]
Quoted 26 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c new file +26
-0+void test_icmp_send_unreach_cgroup (void ) +{ +struct icmp_send *skel; +int cgroup_fd =-1 ; + + skel =icmp_send__open_and_load (); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (skel,"skel_open" )) + goto cleanup; + + cgroup_fd =test__join_cgroup ("/icmp_send_unreach_cgroup" ); +if (!ASSERT_OK_FD (cgroup_fd,"join_cgroup" )) + goto cleanup; + + skel->links.egress = +bpf_program__attach_cgroup (skel->progs.egress, cgroup_fd); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (skel->links.egress,"prog_attach_cgroup" )) + goto cleanup; + +for (int code =0 ; code <=NR_ICMP_UNREACH ; code++) { +/* The TCP stack reacts differently when asking for +* fragmentation, let's ignore it for now. +*/ +if (code ==ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED ) +continue ; + +trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue (skel, code);tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c line 148
Quoted 10 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c new file +10
-0+ASSERT_EQ (skel->data->kfunc_ret,0 ,"kfunc_ret" ); + } + +/* Test an invalid code */ +trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue (skel,-1 ); +ASSERT_EQ (skel->data->kfunc_ret, -EINVAL ,"kfunc_ret" ); + +cleanup: +icmp_send__destroy (skel); +close (cgroup_fd);Jordan Rife raised a concern in v6 about the cleanup path potentially closing an invalid file descriptor. Should this be guarded with 'if (
cgroup_fd!= -1)' before callingclose(cgroup_fd)?
Quoted 1 line
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/q46w47cqezttz2otf76tncxu7sovhywy2dqwcbajigp64uhbtz@eimvxfeeexuz/
Indeed another miss, could be fixed as well if I send a new version, not sure it's a big deal.
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 2 lines
+}
[ ... ]
---
AI reviewed your patch. Please fix the bug or email reply why it's not a bug.
See: https://github.com/kernel-patches/vmtest/blob/master/ci/claude/README.mdCI run summary: https://github.com/kernel-patches/bpf/actions/runs/26459248718
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v7 4/7] selftests/bpf: add bpf_icmp_send kfunc cgroup_skb tests
In reply to Mahe TardyThank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider: - [Low] Multi-line comment does not follow the required BPF subsystem style. --
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Low] Multi-line comment does not follow the required BPF subsystem style. --
commit 67ff0f6d65a210627d2fdadf8ec80c32d95d6a59
Author: Mahe Tardy <[email protected]>
selftests/bpf: add bpf_icmp_send kfunc cgroup_skb tests
This commit adds a test for the bpf_icmp_send kfunc using a cgroup_skb egress program. It verifies that ICMP unreach messages are correctly sent back to the client and read from the socket's error queue.
Quoted 5 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c new file +0
-0
[ ... ]
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c void test_icmp_send_unreach_cgroup(void) · line 129
Quoted 5 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c new file +4
-0@@ -126,10 +126,10 @@ void test_icmp_send_unreach_cgroup(void) +for (int code =0 ; code <=NR_ICMP_UNREACH ; code++) { +/* The TCP stack reacts differently when asking for +* fragmentation, let's ignore it for now. +*/
[Severity: Low]
This isn't a bug, but does this multi-line comment follow the preferred kernel comment style for the BPF subsystem? The style guidelines require the opening /* to be on its own line.
Quoted 2 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c new file +2
-0+if (code ==ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED ) +continue ;
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=4
Re: [PATCH bpf-next v7 4/7] selftests/bpf: add bpf_icmp_send kfunc cgroup_skb tests
Quoted 21 lines · On Tue, May 26, 2026 at 07:24:43PM +0000, [email protected] wrote:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Low] Multi-line comment does not follow the required BPF subsystem style. --commit
67ff0f6d65a210627d2fdadf8ec80c32d95d6a59
Author: Mahe Tardy <[email protected]>selftests/bpf: add
bpf_icmp_sendkfunccgroup_skbtestsThis commit adds a test for the
bpf_icmp_sendkfunc using acgroup_skbegress program. It verifies that ICMP unreach messages are correctly sent back to the client and read from the socket's error queue.Quoted 5 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c new file +0
-0[ ... ]
Quoted 10 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c void test_icmp_send_unreach_cgroup(void) · line 129
Quoted 5 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c new file +4
-0@@ -126,10 +126,10 @@ void test_icmp_send_unreach_cgroup(void) +for (int code =0 ; code <=NR_ICMP_UNREACH ; code++) { +/* The TCP stack reacts differently when asking for +* fragmentation, let's ignore it for now. +*/ [Severity: Low]
This isn't a bug, but does this multi-line comment follow the preferred kernel comment style for the BPF subsystem? The style guidelines require the opening /* to be on its own line.
Could fix this small style issue if required.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c new file +2
-0+if (code ==ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED ) +continue ;Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=4
Re: [PATCH bpf-next v7 4/7] selftests/bpf: add bpf_icmp_send kfunc cgroup_skb tests
In reply to Mahe TardyQuoted 223 lines · Mahe Tardy
This test opens a server and client, enters a new cgroup, attach a
cgroup_skbprogram on egress and calls thebpf_icmp_sendfunction from the client egress so that an ICMP unreach control message is sent back to the client. It then fetches the message from the error queue to confirm the correct ICMP unreach code has been sent.Note that, for the client, we have to connect in non-blocking mode to let the test execute faster. Otherwise, we need to wait for the TCP three-way handshake to timeout in the kernel before reading the errno.
Also note that we don't set
IP_RECVERRon the socket inconnect_to_fd_nonblocksince the error will be transferred anyway in our test because the connection is rejected at the beginning of the TCP handshake. See in net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:tcp_v4_err for more details.Signed-off-by Mahe Tardy <[email protected]>--- .../bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c | 149 ++++++++++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/icmp_send.c | 38 +++++ 2 files changed, 187 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/icmp_send.ctools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c new file +149
-0@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <test_progs.h> +#include <network_helpers.h> +#include <linux/errqueue.h> +#include <poll.h> +#include "icmp_send.skel.h" + +#define TIMEOUT_MS 1000 + +#define ICMP_DEST_UNREACH 3 + +#define ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED 4 +#define NR_ICMP_UNREACH 15 + +static int connect_to_fd_nonblock (int server_fd) +{ +struct sockaddr_storage addr; +socklen_t len =sizeof (addr); +int fd, err; + +if (getsockname (server_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &len)) +return -1 ; + + fd =socket (addr.ss_family,SOCK_STREAM |SOCK_NONBLOCK ,0 ); +if (fd <0 ) +return -1 ; + + err =connect (fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, len); +if (err <0 && errno !=EINPROGRESS ) { +close (fd); +return -1 ; + } + +return fd; +} + +static void read_icmp_errqueue (int sockfd,int expected_code) +{ +struct sock_extended_err *sock_err; +char ctrl_buf[512 ]; +struct msghdr msg = { + .msg_control = ctrl_buf, + .msg_controllen =sizeof (ctrl_buf), + }; +struct pollfd pfd = { + .fd = sockfd, + .events =POLLERR , + }; +struct cmsghdr *cm; +ssize_t n; + +if (!ASSERT_GE (poll (&pfd,1 ,TIMEOUT_MS ),1 ,"poll_errqueue" )) +return ; + + n =recvmsg (sockfd, &msg,MSG_ERRQUEUE ); +if (!ASSERT_GE (n,0 ,"recvmsg_errqueue" )) +return ; + + cm =CMSG_FIRSTHDR (&msg); +if (!ASSERT_NEQ (cm,NULL ,"cm_firsthdr_null" )) +return ; + +for (; cm; cm =CMSG_NXTHDR (&msg, cm)) { +if (cm->cmsg_level !=IPPROTO_IP || cm->cmsg_type !=IP_RECVERR ) +continue ; + + sock_err = (struct sock_extended_err *)CMSG_DATA (cm); + +if (!ASSERT_EQ (sock_err->ee_origin,SO_EE_ORIGIN_ICMP , +"sock_err_origin_icmp" )) +return ; +if (!ASSERT_EQ (sock_err->ee_type,ICMP_DEST_UNREACH , +"sock_err_type_dest_unreach" )) +return ; +ASSERT_EQ (sock_err->ee_code, expected_code,"sock_err_code" ); +return ; + } + +ASSERT_FAIL ("no IP_RECVERR/IPV6_RECVERR control message found" ); +} + +static void trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue (struct icmp_send *skel,int code) +{ +int srv_fd =-1 , client_fd =-1 ; +struct sockaddr_in addr; +socklen_t len =sizeof (addr); + + srv_fd =start_server (AF_INET ,SOCK_STREAM ,"127.0.0.1" ,0 ,TIMEOUT_MS ); +if (!ASSERT_GE (srv_fd,0 ,"start_server" )) +return ; + +if (getsockname (srv_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &len)) { +close (srv_fd); +return ; + } + skel->bss->server_port =ntohs (addr.sin_port); + skel->bss->unreach_code = code; + + client_fd =connect_to_fd_nonblock (srv_fd); +if (!ASSERT_OK_FD (client_fd,"client_connect_nonblock" )) { +close (srv_fd); +return ; + } + +/* Skip reading ICMP error queue if code is invalid */ +if (code >=0 && code <=NR_ICMP_UNREACH ) +read_icmp_errqueue (client_fd, code); + +close (client_fd); +close (srv_fd); +} + +void test_icmp_send_unreach_cgroup (void ) +{ +struct icmp_send *skel; +int cgroup_fd =-1 ; + + skel =icmp_send__open_and_load (); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (skel,"skel_open" )) + goto cleanup; + + cgroup_fd =test__join_cgroup ("/icmp_send_unreach_cgroup" ); +if (!ASSERT_OK_FD (cgroup_fd,"join_cgroup" )) + goto cleanup; + + skel->links.egress = +bpf_program__attach_cgroup (skel->progs.egress, cgroup_fd); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (skel->links.egress,"prog_attach_cgroup" )) + goto cleanup; + +for (int code =0 ; code <=NR_ICMP_UNREACH ; code++) { +/* The TCP stack reacts differently when asking for +* fragmentation, let's ignore it for now. +*/ +if (code ==ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED ) +continue ; + +trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue (skel, code); +ASSERT_EQ (skel->data->kfunc_ret,0 ,"kfunc_ret" ); + } + +/* Test an invalid code */ +trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue (skel,-1 ); +ASSERT_EQ (skel->data->kfunc_ret, -EINVAL ,"kfunc_ret" ); + +cleanup: +icmp_send__destroy (skel); +close (cgroup_fd); +}tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/icmp_send.c new file +38
-1@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include "vmlinux.h" +#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h> +#include <bpf/bpf_endian.h> + +/* 127.0.0.1 in host byte order */ +#define SERVER_IP 0x7F000001 + +#define ICMP_DEST_UNREACH 3 + +__u16 server_port =0 ; +int unreach_code =0 ; +int kfunc_ret =-1 ; + +SEC("cgroup_skb/egress") +int egress (struct __sk_buff *skb) +{ +void *data = (void *)(long )skb->data; +void *data_end = (void *)(long )skb->data_end; +struct iphdr *iph; +struct tcphdr *tcph; + + iph = data; +if ((void *)(iph +1 ) > data_end || iph->version !=4 || + iph->protocol !=IPPROTO_TCP || iph->daddr !=bpf_htonl (SERVER_IP )) +return SK_PASS ; + + tcph = (void *)iph + iph->ihl *4 ; +if ((void *)(tcph +1 ) > data_end || + tcph->dest !=bpf_htons (server_port)) +return SK_PASS ; + + kfunc_ret =bpf_icmp_send (skb,ICMP_DEST_UNREACH , unreach_code); + +return SK_DROP ; +} + +char LICENSE[] SEC("license") = "Dual BSD/GPL"; --
Quoted 2 lines
2.34.1
PATCH v7 5/7 selftests/bpf: add bpf_icmp_send kfunc cgroup_skb IPv6 tests
In reply to Mahe TardyThis test extends the existing cgroup_skb tests with IPv6 support.
Note that we need to set IPV6_RECVERR on the socket for IPv6 in connect_to_fd_nonblock otherwise the error will be ignored even if we are in the middle of the TCP handshake. See in net/ipv6/datagram.c:ipv6_icmp_error for more details.
--- .../bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c | 77 +++++++++++++------ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/icmp_send.c | 48 +++++++++--- 2 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c +53 -24
@@ -8,15 +8,17 @@#define TIMEOUT_MS 1000#define ICMP_DEST_UNREACH 3 +#define ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH 1#define ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED 4#define NR_ICMP_UNREACH 15 +#define ICMPV6_REJECT_ROUTE 6static int connect_to_fd_nonblock (int server_fd) {struct sockaddr_storage addr;socklen_t len =sizeof (addr); -int fd, err; +int fd, err, on =1 ;if (getsockname (server_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &len))return -1 ;
@@ -25,6 +27,12 @@ static int connect_to_fd_nonblock(int server_fd)if (fd <0 )return -1 ; +if (addr.ss_family ==AF_INET6 && +setsockopt (fd,IPPROTO_IPV6 ,IPV6_RECVERR , &on,sizeof (on)) <0 ) { +close (fd); +return -1 ; + } + err =connect (fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, len);if (err <0 && errno !=EINPROGRESS ) {close (fd);
@@ -34,8 +42,14 @@ static int connect_to_fd_nonblock(int server_fd)return fd; } -static void read_icmp_errqueue (int sockfd,int expected_code) +static void read_icmp_errqueue (int sockfd,int expected_code,int af) { +int expected_ee_type = (af ==AF_INET ) ?ICMP_DEST_UNREACH : +ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH ; +int expected_origin = (af ==AF_INET ) ?SO_EE_ORIGIN_ICMP : +SO_EE_ORIGIN_ICMP6 ; +int expected_level = (af ==AF_INET ) ?IPPROTO_IP :IPPROTO_IPV6 ; +int expected_type = (af ==AF_INET ) ?IP_RECVERR :IPV6_RECVERR ;struct sock_extended_err *sock_err;char ctrl_buf[512 ];struct msghdr msg = {
@@ -61,15 +75,16 @@ static void read_icmp_errqueue(int sockfd, int expected_code)return ;for (; cm; cm =CMSG_NXTHDR (&msg, cm)) { -if (cm->cmsg_level !=IPPROTO_IP || cm->cmsg_type !=IP_RECVERR ) +if (cm->cmsg_level != expected_level || + cm->cmsg_type != expected_type)continue ; sock_err = (struct sock_extended_err *)CMSG_DATA (cm); -if (!ASSERT_EQ (sock_err->ee_origin,SO_EE_ORIGIN_ICMP , -"sock_err_origin_icmp" )) +if (!ASSERT_EQ (sock_err->ee_origin, expected_origin, +"sock_err_origin" ))return ; -if (!ASSERT_EQ (sock_err->ee_type,ICMP_DEST_UNREACH , +if (!ASSERT_EQ (sock_err->ee_type, expected_ee_type,"sock_err_type_dest_unreach" ))return ;ASSERT_EQ (sock_err->ee_code, expected_code,"sock_err_code" );
@@ -79,14 +94,15 @@ static void read_icmp_errqueue(int sockfd, int expected_code)ASSERT_FAIL ("no IP_RECVERR/IPV6_RECVERR control message found" ); } -static void trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue (struct icmp_send *skel,int code) +static void trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue (struct icmp_send *skel,int code, +int af,const char *ip) {int srv_fd =-1 , client_fd =-1 ;struct sockaddr_in addr;socklen_t len =sizeof (addr); - srv_fd =start_server (AF_INET ,SOCK_STREAM ,"127.0.0.1" ,0 ,TIMEOUT_MS ); -if (!ASSERT_GE (srv_fd,0 ,"start_server" )) + srv_fd =start_server (af,SOCK_STREAM , ip,0 ,TIMEOUT_MS ); +if (!ASSERT_OK_FD (srv_fd,"start_server" ))return ;if (getsockname (srv_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &len)) {
@@ -94,6 +110,8 @@ static void trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue(struct icmp_send *skel, int code)return ; } skel->bss->server_port =ntohs (addr.sin_port); + skel->bss->unreach_type = (af ==AF_INET ) ?ICMP_DEST_UNREACH : +ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH ; skel->bss->unreach_code = code; client_fd =connect_to_fd_nonblock (srv_fd);
@@ -103,13 +121,33 @@ static void trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue(struct icmp_send *skel, int code) }/* Skip reading ICMP error queue if code is invalid */ -if (code >=0 && code <=NR_ICMP_UNREACH ) -read_icmp_errqueue (client_fd, code); +if (code >=0 && ((af ==AF_INET && code <=NR_ICMP_UNREACH ) || + (af ==AF_INET6 && code <=ICMPV6_REJECT_ROUTE ))) +read_icmp_errqueue (client_fd, code, af);close (client_fd);close (srv_fd); } +static void run_icmp_test (struct icmp_send *skel,int af,const char *ip, +int max_code) +{ +for (int code =0 ; code <= max_code; code++) { +/* The TCP stack reacts differently when asking for +* fragmentation, let's ignore it for now. +*/ +if (af ==AF_INET && code ==ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED ) +continue ; + +trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue (skel, code, af, ip); +ASSERT_EQ (skel->data->kfunc_ret,0 ,"kfunc_ret" ); + } + +/* Test an invalid code */ +trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue (skel,-1 , af, ip); +ASSERT_EQ (skel->data->kfunc_ret, -EINVAL ,"kfunc_ret" ); +} +void test_icmp_send_unreach_cgroup (void ) {struct icmp_send *skel;
@@ -128,20 +166,11 @@ void test_icmp_send_unreach_cgroup(void)if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (skel->links.egress,"prog_attach_cgroup" )) goto cleanup; -for (int code =0 ; code <=NR_ICMP_UNREACH ; code++) { -/* The TCP stack reacts differently when asking for -* fragmentation, let's ignore it for now. -*/ -if (code ==ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED ) -continue ; - -trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue (skel, code); -ASSERT_EQ (skel->data->kfunc_ret,0 ,"kfunc_ret" ); - } +if (test__start_subtest ("ipv4" )) +run_icmp_test (skel,AF_INET ,"127.0.0.1" ,NR_ICMP_UNREACH ); -/* Test an invalid code */ -trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue (skel,-1 ); -ASSERT_EQ (skel->data->kfunc_ret, -EINVAL ,"kfunc_ret" ); +if (test__start_subtest ("ipv6" )) +run_icmp_test (skel,AF_INET6 ,"::1" ,ICMPV6_REJECT_ROUTE ); cleanup:icmp_send__destroy (skel);
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/icmp_send.c +39 -9
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--
2.34.1
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v7 5/7] selftests/bpf: add bpf_icmp_send kfunc cgroup_skb IPv6 tests
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider: - [Medium] Type confusion and address truncation in getsockname() due to using struct sockaddr_in for IPv6…
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Medium] Type confusion and address truncation in getsockname() due to using struct sockaddr_in for IPv6 addresses. --
commit 0cc9d08ecac1ed3d21b7e5cbf50d68e27cb610de
Author: Mahe Tardy <[email protected]>
selftests/bpf: add bpf_icmp_send kfunc cgroup_skb IPv6 tests
This test extends the existing cgroup_skb tests for the bpf_icmp_send kfunc by adding IPv6 support.
Quoted 4 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
Quoted 20 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c +4
-3@@ -79,14 +94,15 @@ static void read_icmp_errqueue(int sockfd, int expected_code)ASSERT_FAIL ("no IP_RECVERR/IPV6_RECVERR control message found" ); } -static void trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue (struct icmp_send *skel,int code) +static void trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue (struct icmp_send *skel,int code, +int af,const char *ip) {int srv_fd =-1 , client_fd =-1 ;struct sockaddr_in addr;socklen_t len =sizeof (addr); - srv_fd =start_server (AF_INET ,SOCK_STREAM ,"127.0.0.1" ,0 ,TIMEOUT_MS ); -if (!ASSERT_GE (srv_fd,0 ,"start_server" )) + srv_fd =start_server (af,SOCK_STREAM , ip,0 ,TIMEOUT_MS ); +if (!ASSERT_OK_FD (srv_fd,"start_server" ))return ;if (getsockname (srv_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &len)) {
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c static void trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue(struct icmp_send *skel, int code) · line 112
Quoted 3 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c +0
-0@@ -94,6 +110,8 @@ static void trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue(struct icmp_send *skel, int code)return ; } skel->bss->server_port =ntohs (addr.sin_port);
[Severity: Medium]
When af is AF_INET6, does this cause an address truncation in getsockname() since addr is defined as struct sockaddr_in?
For an IPv6 socket, getsockname() requires struct sockaddr_in6 which is larger than struct sockaddr_in. While reading addr.sin_port happens to map to the same memory offset as sin6_port, could this lead to type confusion if the address fields are ever used?
Would it be safer to use struct sockaddr_storage here to ensure enough space for either address family, similar to what is used in connect_to_fd_nonblock()?
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=5
Re: [PATCH bpf-next v7 5/7] selftests/bpf: add bpf_icmp_send kfunc cgroup_skb IPv6 tests
Quoted 47 lines · On Tue, May 26, 2026 at 07:32:48PM +0000, [email protected] wrote:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Medium] Type confusion and address truncation ingetsockname()due to using structsockaddr_infor IPv6 addresses. --commit
0cc9d08ecac1ed3d21b7e5cbf50d68e27cb610de
Author: Mahe Tardy <[email protected]>selftests/bpf: add
bpf_icmp_sendkfunccgroup_skbIPv6 testsThis test extends the existing
cgroup_skbtests for thebpf_icmp_sendkfunc by adding IPv6 support.Quoted 4 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c +0
-0[ ... ]
Quoted 20 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c +4
-3@@ -79,14 +94,15 @@ static void read_icmp_errqueue(int sockfd, int expected_code)ASSERT_FAIL ("no IP_RECVERR/IPV6_RECVERR control message found" ); } -static void trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue (struct icmp_send *skel,int code) +static void trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue (struct icmp_send *skel,int code, +int af,const char *ip) {int srv_fd =-1 , client_fd =-1 ;struct sockaddr_in addr;socklen_t len =sizeof (addr); - srv_fd =start_server (AF_INET ,SOCK_STREAM ,"127.0.0.1" ,0 ,TIMEOUT_MS ); -if (!ASSERT_GE (srv_fd,0 ,"start_server" )) + srv_fd =start_server (af,SOCK_STREAM , ip,0 ,TIMEOUT_MS ); +if (!ASSERT_OK_FD (srv_fd,"start_server" ))return ;if (getsockname (srv_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &len)) {tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c static void trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue(struct icmp_send *skel, int code) · line 112
Quoted 3 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c +0
-0@@ -94,6 +110,8 @@ static void trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue(struct icmp_send *skel, int code)return ; } skel->bss->server_port =ntohs (addr.sin_port);[Severity: Medium]
When af isAF_INET6, does this cause an address truncation ingetsockname()since addr is defined as structsockaddr_in?
Quoted 7 lines
For an IPv6 socket,
getsockname()requires structsockaddr_in6which is larger than structsockaddr_in. While reading addr.sin_port happens to map to the same memory offset assin6_port, could this lead to type confusion if the address fields are ever used?Would it be safer to use struct
sockaddr_storagehere to ensure enough space for either address family, similar to what is used inconnect_to_fd_nonblock()?
I already replied many times to this point, I don't think that's a problem here.
Quoted 3 lines
Signature · 2 lines
-- Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=5
PATCH v7 6/7 selftests/bpf: add bpf_icmp_send kfunc tc tests
In reply to Mahe TardyThis test is similar to the one with cgroup_skb programs but uses tc egress instead.
--- .../bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c | 25 ++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/icmp_send.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c +25 -0
@@ -176,3 +176,28 @@ void test_icmp_send_unreach_cgroup(void)icmp_send__destroy (skel);close (cgroup_fd); } + +void test_icmp_send_unreach_tc (void ) +{ +LIBBPF_OPTS (bpf_tcx_opts, opts); +struct icmp_send *skel; +struct bpf_link *link =NULL ; + + skel =icmp_send__open_and_load (); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (skel,"skel_open" )) + goto cleanup; + + link =bpf_program__attach_tcx (skel->progs.tc_egress,1 , &opts); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (link,"prog_attach" )) + goto cleanup; + +if (test__start_subtest ("ipv4" )) +run_icmp_test (skel,AF_INET ,"127.0.0.1" ,NR_ICMP_UNREACH ); + +if (test__start_subtest ("ipv6" )) +run_icmp_test (skel,AF_INET6 ,"::1" ,ICMPV6_REJECT_ROUTE ); + +cleanup: +bpf_link__destroy (link); +icmp_send__destroy (skel); +}
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/icmp_send.c +60 -0
70 lines not on this page · raw message
--
2.34.1
PATCH v7 7/7 selftests/bpf: add bpf_icmp_send recursion test
In reply to Mahe TardyThis test is similar to test_icmp_send_unreach_cgroup but checks that, in case of recursion, meaning that the BPF program calling the kfunc was re-triggered by the icmp_send done by the kfunc, the kfunc will stop early and return -EBUSY.
The test attaches to the root cgroup to ensure the ICMP packet generated by the kfunc re-triggers the BPF program. Since it's attached only for this recursion test, it should not disrupt the whole network.
--- .../bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/icmp_send.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c +41 -1
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 #include <test_progs.h> #include <network_helpers.h> +#include <cgroup_helpers.h> #include <linux/errqueue.h> #include <poll.h> #include "icmp_send.skel.h"
@@ -10,6 +11,7 @@#define ICMP_DEST_UNREACH 3#define ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH 1 +#define ICMP_HOST_UNREACH 1#define ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED 4#define NR_ICMP_UNREACH 15#define ICMPV6_REJECT_ROUTE 6
@@ -193,7 +195,6 @@ void test_icmp_send_unreach_tc(void)if (test__start_subtest ("ipv4" ))run_icmp_test (skel,AF_INET ,"127.0.0.1" ,NR_ICMP_UNREACH ); -if (test__start_subtest ("ipv6" ))run_icmp_test (skel,AF_INET6 ,"::1" ,ICMPV6_REJECT_ROUTE );
@@ -201,3 +202,42 @@ void test_icmp_send_unreach_tc(void)bpf_link__destroy (link);icmp_send__destroy (skel); } + +void test_icmp_send_unreach_recursion (void ) +{ +struct icmp_send *skel; +int cgroup_fd =-1 ; + + skel =icmp_send__open_and_load (); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (skel,"skel_open" )) + goto cleanup; + +if (setup_cgroup_environment ()) { +fprintf (stderr,"Failed to setup cgroup environment\n" ); + goto cleanup; + } + + cgroup_fd =get_root_cgroup (); +if (!ASSERT_GE (cgroup_fd,0 ,"get_root_cgroup" )) + goto cleanup; + + skel->links.recursion = +bpf_program__attach_cgroup (skel->progs.recursion, cgroup_fd); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (skel->links.recursion,"prog_attach_cgroup" )) + goto cleanup; + +trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue (skel,ICMP_HOST_UNREACH ,AF_INET , +"127.0.0.1" ); + +/* Because there's recursion involved, the first call will return at +* index 1 since it will return the second, and the second call will +* return at index 0 since it will return the first. +*/ +ASSERT_EQ (skel->data->rec_kfunc_rets[0 ], -EBUSY ,"kfunc_rets[0]" ); +ASSERT_EQ (skel->data->rec_kfunc_rets[1 ],0 ,"kfunc_rets[1]" ); + +cleanup: +cleanup_cgroup_environment (); +icmp_send__destroy (skel); +close (cgroup_fd); +}
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/icmp_send.c +44 -0
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--
2.34.1
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v7 7/7] selftests/bpf: add bpf_icmp_send recursion test
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider: - [Medium] Attaching to the system-wide root cgroup without PID filtering intercepts all system-wide…
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Medium] Attaching to the system-wide root cgroup without PID filtering intercepts all system-wide loopback ICMP traffic, causing data races and network disruption.
- [Low] Multi-line comments do not follow the mandated BPF subsystem style.
--
commit a40313de8eec16152c739a5ecc571fcd166b9bba
Author: Mahe Tardy <[email protected]>
selftests/bpf: add bpf_icmp_send recursion test
This commit adds a test to verify that recursive calls to bpf_icmp_send from a BPF program return -EBUSY and stop early.
Quoted 3 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
Quoted 7 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c +3
-0@@ -201,3 +202,42 @@ void test_icmp_send_unreach_tc(void)bpf_link__destroy (link);icmp_send__destroy (skel); } + +void test_icmp_send_unreach_recursion (void ) +{
[ ... ]
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c void test_icmp_send_unreach_tc(void) · line 235
Quoted 7 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c +7
-0+trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue (skel,ICMP_HOST_UNREACH ,AF_INET , +"127.0.0.1" ); + +/* Because there's recursion involved, the first call will return at +* index 1 since it will return the second, and the second call will +* return at index 0 since it will return the first. +*/
[Severity: Low]
This isn't a bug, but BPF subsystem multi-line comments should have the opening /* on its own line.
Quoted 3 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/icmp_send.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
Quoted 7 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/icmp_send.c +3
-0@@ -125,4 +128,45 @@ int tc_egress(struct __sk_buff *skb)return TCX_DROP ; } +SEC("cgroup_skb/egress") +int recursion (struct __sk_buff *skb) +{
[ ... ]
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/icmp_send.c int tc_egress(struct __sk_buff *skb) · line 160
Quoted 9 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/icmp_send.c +9
-0+ }else if (iph->protocol !=IPPROTO_ICMP ) { +return SK_PASS ; + } + +/* This call will provoke a recursion: the ICMP packet generated by the +* kfunc will re-trigger this program since we are in the root cgroup in +* which the kernel ICMP socket belongs. However when re-entering the +* kfunc, it should return EBUSY. +*/
[Severity: Low]
This isn't a bug, but this multi-line comment should also have the opening /* on its own line.
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/icmp_send.c int tc_egress(struct __sk_buff *skb) · line 163
Quoted 3 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/icmp_send.c +3
-0+ ret =bpf_icmp_send (skb, unreach_type, unreach_code); + rec_kfunc_rets[rec_count &1 ] = ret; +__sync_fetch_and_add (&rec_count,1 );
[Severity: Medium]
Could attaching to the system-wide root cgroup without PID filtering intercept all system-wide loopback ICMP traffic and disrupt other processes?
Because ICMP traffic is not filtered by port, any ICMP traffic to 127.0.0.1 on the host will trigger this BPF program and generate unintended ICMP Destination Unreachable replies.
Also, can concurrent executions cause a data race here? Two CPUs could read the same rec_count, overwrite each other's return values in the array, and corrupt the state, causing test flakes.
Would filtering by the test's PID securely isolate the test? The recursive kernel socket call executes synchronously in the same task context, which should make PID filtering reliable here.
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=7
Re: [PATCH bpf-next v7 7/7] selftests/bpf: add bpf_icmp_send recursion test
Quoted 29 lines · On Tue, May 26, 2026 at 08:22:31PM +0000, [email protected] wrote:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Medium] Attaching to the system-wide root cgroup without PID filtering intercepts all system-wide loopback ICMP traffic, causing data races and network disruption.
- [Low] Multi-line comments do not follow the mandated BPF subsystem style.
--commit
a40313de8eec16152c739a5ecc571fcd166b9bba
Author: Mahe Tardy <[email protected]>selftests/bpf: add
bpf_icmp_sendrecursion testThis commit adds a test to verify that recursive calls to
bpf_icmp_sendfrom a BPF program return-EBUSYand stop early.Quoted 3 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c +0
-0[ ... ]
Quoted 7 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c +3
-0@@ -201,3 +202,42 @@ void test_icmp_send_unreach_tc(void)bpf_link__destroy (link);icmp_send__destroy (skel); } + +void test_icmp_send_unreach_recursion (void ) +{[ ... ]
Quoted 11 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c void test_icmp_send_unreach_tc(void) · line 235
Quoted 7 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c +7
-0+trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue (skel,ICMP_HOST_UNREACH ,AF_INET , +"127.0.0.1" ); + +/* Because there's recursion involved, the first call will return at +* index 1 since it will return the second, and the second call will +* return at index 0 since it will return the first. +*/ [Severity: Low]
This isn't a bug, but BPF subsystem multi-line comments should have the opening /* on its own line.
Style issue could be fixed if required.
Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 4 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/icmp_send.c +0
-0[ ... ]
Quoted 7 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/icmp_send.c +3
-0@@ -125,4 +128,45 @@ int tc_egress(struct __sk_buff *skb)return TCX_DROP ; } +SEC("cgroup_skb/egress") +int recursion (struct __sk_buff *skb) +{[ ... ]
Quoted 13 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/icmp_send.c int tc_egress(struct __sk_buff *skb) · line 160
Quoted 9 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/icmp_send.c +9
-0+ }else if (iph->protocol !=IPPROTO_ICMP ) { +return SK_PASS ; + } + +/* This call will provoke a recursion: the ICMP packet generated by the +* kfunc will re-trigger this program since we are in the root cgroup in +* which the kernel ICMP socket belongs. However when re-entering the +* kfunc, it should return EBUSY. +*/ [Severity: Low]
This isn't a bug, but this multi-line comment should also have the opening /* on its own line.
Dito.
Quoted 13 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/icmp_send.c int tc_egress(struct __sk_buff *skb) · line 163
Quoted 4 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/icmp_send.c +3
-0+ ret =bpf_icmp_send (skb, unreach_type, unreach_code); + rec_kfunc_rets[rec_count &1 ] = ret; +__sync_fetch_and_add (&rec_count,1 );[Severity: Medium]
Could attaching to the system-wide root cgroup without PID filtering intercept all system-wide loopback ICMP traffic and disrupt other processes?Because ICMP traffic is not filtered by port, any ICMP traffic to 127.0.0.1 on the host will trigger this BPF program and generate unintended ICMP Destination Unreachable replies.
Quoted 7 lines
Also, can concurrent executions cause a data race here? Two CPUs could read the same
rec_count, overwrite each other's return values in the array, and corrupt the state, causing test flakes.Would filtering by the test's PID securely isolate the test? The recursive kernel socket call executes synchronously in the same task context, which should make PID filtering reliable here.
I don't think it's necessary, we already added some filtering here, we can always add more but I'm really not sure it's useful.
Quoted 3 lines
Signature · 2 lines
-- Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=7
Re: [PATCH bpf-next v7 7/7] selftests/bpf: add bpf_icmp_send recursion test
In reply to Mahe TardyQuoted 75 lines · Mahe Tardy
This test is similar to
test_icmp_send_unreach_cgroupbut checks that, in case of recursion, meaning that the BPF program calling the kfunc was re-triggered by theicmp_senddone by the kfunc, the kfunc will stop early and return-EBUSY.The test attaches to the root cgroup to ensure the ICMP packet generated by the kfunc re-triggers the BPF program. Since it's attached only for this recursion test, it should not disrupt the whole network.
Signed-off-by Mahe Tardy <[email protected]>--- .../bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/icmp_send.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c +30
-1@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 #include <test_progs.h> #include <network_helpers.h> +#include <cgroup_helpers.h> #include <linux/errqueue.h> #include <poll.h> #include "icmp_send.skel.h" @@ -10,6 +11,7 @@#define ICMP_DEST_UNREACH 3#define ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH 1 +#define ICMP_HOST_UNREACH 1#define ICMP_FRAG_NEEDED 4#define NR_ICMP_UNREACH 15#define ICMPV6_REJECT_ROUTE 6@@ -193,7 +195,6 @@ void test_icmp_send_unreach_tc(void)if (test__start_subtest ("ipv4" ))run_icmp_test (skel,AF_INET ,"127.0.0.1" ,NR_ICMP_UNREACH ); -if (test__start_subtest ("ipv6" ))run_icmp_test (skel,AF_INET6 ,"::1" ,ICMPV6_REJECT_ROUTE );@@ -201,3 +202,42 @@ void test_icmp_send_unreach_tc(void)bpf_link__destroy (link);icmp_send__destroy (skel); } + +void test_icmp_send_unreach_recursion (void ) +{ +struct icmp_send *skel; +int cgroup_fd =-1 ; + + skel =icmp_send__open_and_load (); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (skel,"skel_open" )) + goto cleanup; + +if (setup_cgroup_environment ()) { +fprintf (stderr,"Failed to setup cgroup environment\n" ); + goto cleanup; + } + + cgroup_fd =get_root_cgroup (); +if (!ASSERT_GE (cgroup_fd,0 ,"get_root_cgroup" )) + goto cleanup; + + skel->links.recursion = +bpf_program__attach_cgroup (skel->progs.recursion, cgroup_fd); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (skel->links.recursion,"prog_attach_cgroup" )) + goto cleanup; + +trigger_prog_read_icmp_errqueue (skel,ICMP_HOST_UNREACH ,AF_INET , +"127.0.0.1" ); + +/* Because there's recursion involved, the first call will return at
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c void test_icmp_send_unreach_tc(void) · line 242
Quoted 10 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c +10
-0+* index 1 since it will return the second, and the second call will +* return at index 0 since it will return the first. +*/ +ASSERT_EQ (skel->data->rec_kfunc_rets[0 ], -EBUSY ,"kfunc_rets[0]" ); +ASSERT_EQ (skel->data->rec_kfunc_rets[1 ],0 ,"kfunc_rets[1]" ); + +cleanup: +cleanup_cgroup_environment (); +icmp_send__destroy (skel); +close (cgroup_fd);
This will close(-1) if the first two goto cleanup branches are taken. Not the end of the world, but most tests I've seen try to avoid it by doing something like this:
if (cgroup_fd != -1)
close(cgroup_fd);
Quoted 64 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/icmp_send_kfunc.c +1
-0+}tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/icmp_send.c +44
-1@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ int unreach_type = 0;int unreach_code =0 ;int kfunc_ret =-1 ; +unsigned int rec_count =0 ; +int rec_kfunc_rets[] = {-1 ,-1 }; + SEC("cgroup_skb/egress")int egress (struct __sk_buff *skb) {@@ -125,4 +128,45 @@ int tc_egress(struct __sk_buff *skb)return TCX_DROP ; } +SEC("cgroup_skb/egress") +int recursion (struct __sk_buff *skb) +{ +void *data = (void *)(long )skb->data; +void *data_end = (void *)(long )skb->data_end; +struct tcphdr *tcph; +struct iphdr *iph; +int ret; + + iph = data; +if ((void *)(iph +1 ) > data_end || iph->version !=4 ) +return SK_PASS ; + +if (iph->daddr !=bpf_htonl (SERVER_IP )) +return SK_PASS ; + +if (iph->protocol ==IPPROTO_TCP ) { + tcph = (void *)iph + iph->ihl *4 ; +if ((void *)(tcph +1 ) > data_end || + tcph->dest !=bpf_htons (server_port)) +return SK_PASS ; + }else if (iph->protocol !=IPPROTO_ICMP ) { +return SK_PASS ; + } + +/* This call will provoke a recursion: the ICMP packet generated by the +* kfunc will re-trigger this program since we are in the root cgroup in +* which the kernel ICMP socket belongs. However when re-entering the +* kfunc, it should return EBUSY. +*/ + ret =bpf_icmp_send (skb, unreach_type, unreach_code); + rec_kfunc_rets[rec_count &1 ] = ret; +__sync_fetch_and_add (&rec_count,1 ); + +/* Let the first ICMP error message pass */ +if (iph->protocol ==IPPROTO_ICMP ) +return SK_PASS ; + +return SK_DROP ; +} + char LICENSE[] SEC("license") = "Dual BSD/GPL"; --2.34.1