net/devlink: Use strscpy() to copy strings into arrays
Subsystems (6)
PATCH 1/1 net/devlink: Use strscpy() to copy strings into arrays
From: David Laight <[email protected]>
Replacing strcpy() with strscpy() ensures that overflow of the target buffer cannot happen.
---
This is one of a group of patches that remove potentially unbounded strcpy() calls.
They are mostly replaced by strscpy() or, when strlen() has just been called, with memcpy() (usually including the '\0').
Calls with copy string literals into arrays are left unchanged. They are safe and easily detected as such.
The changes were made by getting the compiler to detect the calls and then fixing the code by hand.
Note that all the changes are only compile tested.
Some Makefiles were changed to allow files to contain strcpy(). As well as 'difficult to fix' files, this included 'show' functions as they really need to use sysfs_emit() or seq_printf().
All the patches are being sent individually to avoid very long cc lists. Apologies for the terse commit messages and likely unexpected tags. (There are about 100 patches in total.)
net/devlink/port.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/devlink/port.c +1 -1
@@ -1222,7 +1222,7 @@ static void __devlink_port_type_set(struct devlink_port *devlink_port, devlink_port->type_eth.ifindex = netdev->ifindex;BUILD_BUG_ON (sizeof (devlink_port->type_eth.ifname) !=sizeof (netdev->name)); -strcpy (devlink_port->type_eth.ifname, netdev->name); +strscpy (devlink_port->type_eth.ifname, netdev->name); }break ;case DEVLINK_PORT_TYPE_IB :
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
Paolo Abeni
maintainerQuoted 37 lines · On 6/8/26 11:54 AM, [email protected] wrote:
From: David Laight <[email protected]>
Replacing
strcpy()withstrscpy()ensures that overflow of the target buffer cannot happen.Signed-off-by David Laight <[email protected]>---
This is one of a group of patches that remove potentially unboundedstrcpy()calls.They are mostly replaced by
strscpy()or, whenstrlen()has just been called, withmemcpy()(usually including the '\0').Calls with copy string literals into arrays are left unchanged. They are safe and easily detected as such.
The changes were made by getting the compiler to detect the calls and then fixing the code by hand.
Note that all the changes are only compile tested.
Some Makefiles were changed to allow files to contain
strcpy(). As well as 'difficult to fix' files, this included 'show' functions as they really need to usesysfs_emit()orseq_printf().All the patches are being sent individually to avoid very long cc lists. Apologies for the terse commit messages and likely unexpected tags. (There are about 100 patches in total.)
net/devlink/port.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)net/devlink/port.c +0
-0
net/devlink/port.c static void __devlink_port_type_set(struct devlink_port *devlink_port, · line 1225
Quoted 5 lines
net/devlink/port.c +1
-1@@ -1222,7 +1222,7 @@ static void __devlink_port_type_set(struct devlink_port *devlink_port, devlink_port->type_eth.ifindex = netdev->ifindex;BUILD_BUG_ON (sizeof (devlink_port->type_eth.ifname) !=sizeof (netdev->name)); -strcpy (devlink_port->type_eth.ifname, netdev->name); +strscpy (devlink_port->type_eth.ifname, netdev->name);
Given the above BUILD_BUG, I don't see how this change can help?!?
Generally speaking, I suggest restricting this kind of tool-assisted changes to real problems (if any).
Thanks,
Paolo
Quoted 46 lines · On Tue, 9 Jun 2026 15:39:35 +0200 Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 37 lines · On 6/8/26 11:54 AM, [email protected] wrote:
From: David Laight <[email protected]>
Replacing
strcpy()withstrscpy()ensures that overflow of the target buffer cannot happen.Signed-off-by David Laight <[email protected]>---
This is one of a group of patches that remove potentially unboundedstrcpy()calls.They are mostly replaced by
strscpy()or, whenstrlen()has just been called, withmemcpy()(usually including the '\0').Calls with copy string literals into arrays are left unchanged. They are safe and easily detected as such.
The changes were made by getting the compiler to detect the calls and then fixing the code by hand.
Note that all the changes are only compile tested.
Some Makefiles were changed to allow files to contain
strcpy(). As well as 'difficult to fix' files, this included 'show' functions as they really need to usesysfs_emit()orseq_printf().All the patches are being sent individually to avoid very long cc lists. Apologies for the terse commit messages and likely unexpected tags. (There are about 100 patches in total.)
net/devlink/port.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)net/devlink/port.c +0
-0net/devlink/port.c static void __devlink_port_type_set(struct devlink_port *devlink_port, · line 1225
Quoted 5 lines
net/devlink/port.c +1
-1@@ -1222,7 +1222,7 @@ static void __devlink_port_type_set(struct devlink_port *devlink_port, devlink_port->type_eth.ifindex = netdev->ifindex;BUILD_BUG_ON (sizeof (devlink_port->type_eth.ifname) !=sizeof (netdev->name)); -strcpy (devlink_port->type_eth.ifname, netdev->name); +strscpy (devlink_port->type_eth.ifname, netdev->name);Given the above
BUILD_BUG, I don't see how this change can help?!?
Quoted 2 lines
Generally speaking, I suggest restricting this kind of tool-assisted changes to real problems (if any).
My aim is to get to the point where the calling strcpy() is invalid unless it is used to copy a string literal into an array. If/when all the .c files are changed the .h file change can be committed to stop any new potential unbounded copies being added.
I do want to look at the 'fortify' version of strspcy(). The current version can call strnlen() and then real_strscpy(), so ends up doing the length scan twice.
(Never mind how much gets inlined.)strscpy() between arrays could be implemented as a memcpy() of the shorter length and an explicit zero of the final byte.
With the BUILD_BUG_ON() (which I didn't notice) the above could be e memcpy().
-- David
Quoted 5 lines
Thanks,
Paolo
Kees Cook
maintainerQuoted 4 lines · David Laight
My aim is to get to the point where the calling
strcpy()is invalid unless it is used to copy a string literal into an array. If/when all the .c files are changed the .h file change can be committed to stop any new potential unbounded copies being added.
Here's what I did a while ago in a test tree of mine, but for strlcat:
---
From d09759b1e51dbf784b503c9b9f5136b81b58560c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2024 11:08:41 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] fortify: Refuse to use strcat() on dynamically sized strings
Limit the use of strcat() to things we can determine at compile time to be safe.
--- include/linux/fortify-string.h | 6 ++++++ lib/string_helpers.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
include/linux/fortify-string.h +6 -0
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ void __read_overflow2(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of ob void __read_overflow2_field(size_t avail, size_t wanted) __compiletime_warning("detected read beyond size of field (2nd parameter); maybe use struct_group()?"); void __write_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected write beyond size of object (1st parameter)"); void __write_overflow_field(size_t avail, size_t wanted) __compiletime_warning("detected write beyond size of field (1st parameter); maybe use struct_group()?"); +void __fortify_refuse_strcat(void) __compiletime_warning("Do not use strcat() on dynamically sized destination or source strings");#define __compiletime_strlen (p) \ ({ \
@@ -411,8 +412,13 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strcat, 1, 2) char *strcat(char * const POS p, const char *q) {const size_t p_size =__member_size (p); +const size_t q_size =__member_size (q);const size_t wanted =strlcat (p, q, p_size); +if (!__builtin_constant_p (p_size) || !__builtin_constant_p (q_size) || + p_size ==SIZE_MAX || q_size ==SIZE_MAX ) +__fortify_refuse_strcat (); +if (p_size <= wanted)fortify_panic (FORTIFY_FUNC_strcat,FORTIFY_WRITE , p_size, wanted +1 , p);return p;
lib/string_helpers.c +2 -0
@@ -1019,6 +1019,8 @@ void __read_overflow2_field(size_t avail, size_t wanted) { }EXPORT_SYMBOL (__read_overflow2_field);void __write_overflow_field (size_t avail,size_t wanted) { }EXPORT_SYMBOL (__write_overflow_field); +void __fortify_refuse_strcat (void ) { } +EXPORT_SYMBOL (__fortify_refuse_strcat);static const char *const fortify_func_name[] = { #define MAKE_FORTIFY_FUNC_NAME(func) [MAKE_FORTIFY_FUNC(func)] = #func
Signature · 5 lines
2.34.1 -- Kees Cook
Kees Cook
maintainerQuoted 46 lines · Paolo Abeni
Quoted 37 lines · On 6/8/26 11:54 AM, [email protected] wrote:
From: David Laight <[email protected]>
Replacing
strcpy()withstrscpy()ensures that overflow of the target buffer cannot happen.Signed-off-by David Laight <[email protected]>---
This is one of a group of patches that remove potentially unboundedstrcpy()calls.They are mostly replaced by
strscpy()or, whenstrlen()has just been called, withmemcpy()(usually including the '\0').Calls with copy string literals into arrays are left unchanged. They are safe and easily detected as such.
The changes were made by getting the compiler to detect the calls and then fixing the code by hand.
Note that all the changes are only compile tested.
Some Makefiles were changed to allow files to contain
strcpy(). As well as 'difficult to fix' files, this included 'show' functions as they really need to usesysfs_emit()orseq_printf().All the patches are being sent individually to avoid very long cc lists. Apologies for the terse commit messages and likely unexpected tags. (There are about 100 patches in total.)
net/devlink/port.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)net/devlink/port.c +0
-0net/devlink/port.c static void __devlink_port_type_set(struct devlink_port *devlink_port, · line 1225
Quoted 5 lines
net/devlink/port.c +1
-1@@ -1222,7 +1222,7 @@ static void __devlink_port_type_set(struct devlink_port *devlink_port, devlink_port->type_eth.ifindex = netdev->ifindex;BUILD_BUG_ON (sizeof (devlink_port->type_eth.ifname) !=sizeof (netdev->name)); -strcpy (devlink_port->type_eth.ifname, netdev->name); +strscpy (devlink_port->type_eth.ifname, netdev->name);Given the above
BUILD_BUG, I don't see how this change can help?!?
Quoted 2 lines
Generally speaking, I suggest restricting this kind of tool-assisted changes to real problems (if any).
How did this patch get generated? This isn't an "unbounded" case: both devlink_port->type_eth.ifname and netdev->name have known sizes. I think a way to focus these kinds of refactors would be to replace strcpy() with a macro wrapper that fails a build when the sizes aren't known, but then otherwise calls strscpy instead. With that in place, you can find all the actually unbounded cases and work through each of them, and once they have all been purged from the kernel, that strcpy macro can land, which will keep new unbounded instances from showing up.
Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
Quoted 50 lines · On Wed, 10 Jun 2026 13:58:51 -0700 Kees Cook <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 46 lines · Paolo Abeni
Quoted 37 lines · On 6/8/26 11:54 AM, [email protected] wrote:
From: David Laight <[email protected]>
Replacing
strcpy()withstrscpy()ensures that overflow of the target buffer cannot happen.Signed-off-by David Laight <[email protected]>---
This is one of a group of patches that remove potentially unboundedstrcpy()calls.They are mostly replaced by
strscpy()or, whenstrlen()has just been called, withmemcpy()(usually including the '\0').Calls with copy string literals into arrays are left unchanged. They are safe and easily detected as such.
The changes were made by getting the compiler to detect the calls and then fixing the code by hand.
Note that all the changes are only compile tested.
Some Makefiles were changed to allow files to contain
strcpy(). As well as 'difficult to fix' files, this included 'show' functions as they really need to usesysfs_emit()orseq_printf().All the patches are being sent individually to avoid very long cc lists. Apologies for the terse commit messages and likely unexpected tags. (There are about 100 patches in total.)
net/devlink/port.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)net/devlink/port.c +0
-0net/devlink/port.c static void __devlink_port_type_set(struct devlink_port *devlink_port, · line 1225
Quoted 5 lines
net/devlink/port.c +1
-1@@ -1222,7 +1222,7 @@ static void __devlink_port_type_set(struct devlink_port *devlink_port, devlink_port->type_eth.ifindex = netdev->ifindex;BUILD_BUG_ON (sizeof (devlink_port->type_eth.ifname) !=sizeof (netdev->name)); -strcpy (devlink_port->type_eth.ifname, netdev->name); +strscpy (devlink_port->type_eth.ifname, netdev->name);Given the above
BUILD_BUG, I don't see how this change can help?!?Quoted 2 lines
Generally speaking, I suggest restricting this kind of tool-assisted changes to real problems (if any).
Quoted 9 lines
How did this patch get generated? This isn't an "unbounded" case: both
devlink_port->type_eth.ifnameandnetdev->namehave known sizes. I think a way to focus these kinds of refactors would be to replacestrcpy()with a macro wrapper that fails a build when the sizes aren't known, but then otherwise calls strscpy instead. With that in place, you can find all the actually unbounded cases and work through each of them, and once they have all been purged from the kernel, that strcpy macro can land, which will keep new unbounded instances from showing up.
My current wrapper (which will allow the above is):
#if !defined(ALLOW_STRCPY)
#define strcpy(dst, src) ({ \
size_t _dst_size, _src_size; \
char *const _dst = dst; \
const char *_src = src; \
bool _use_memcpy = true; \
\
_dst_size = __is_array(dst) ? sizeof(dst) : __builtin_object_size(dst, 1); \
BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(!_dst_size, "strcpy() dst size zero"); \
BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(_dst_size == SIZE_MAX, "strcpy() dst size unknown"); \
\
if (__builtin_constant_p(_src && _src[0])) \
_src_size = __builtin_strlen(_src) + 1; \
else { \
BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(!__is_array(src), "strcpy() src unbounded"); \
_src_size = sizeof(src); \
BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(!_src_size, "strcpy() src is zero length array"); \
_use_memcpy = _src_size <= 32; \
} \
BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(!statically_true(_src_size <= _dst_size), "strcpy() src too big"); \
if (_use_memcpy) \
__underlying_memcpy(_dst, _src, _src_size); \
else \
__underlying_strcpy(_dst, _src); \
_dst; \
})__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strcpy, 1, 2) char *(strcpy)(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q)
{
BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(1, "Direct call to strcpy");
return p;
}#else
...
#endif
The one I was using before required the source be a constant string.
Note that this is just intended to find the unbounded copies at compile time, rather than being a suggested patch.
The ALLOW_STRCPY is needed for things like the acpi code which are out of tree (and other files I didn't want to fix).
The acpi code is stunningly bad, it saves the string lengths for the kmalloc() calls and then uses strcpy() to copy the data.
If anyone manages to gen them out of sync it will overwrite memory.
David