Skip to contentSkip to conversation

net/devlink: Use strscpy() to copy strings into arrays

PATCH In review [email protected] 3 participants 6 messages Jun 8 – Jun 10

Subsystems (6)
lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 net/devlink: Use strscpy() to copy strings into arrays

From: David Laight <[email protected]>

Replacing strcpy() with strscpy() ensures that overflow of the target buffer cannot happen.

---
This is one of a group of patches that remove potentially unbounded strcpy() calls.

They are mostly replaced by strscpy() or, when strlen() has just been called, with memcpy() (usually including the '\0').

Calls with copy string literals into arrays are left unchanged. They are safe and easily detected as such.

The changes were made by getting the compiler to detect the calls and then fixing the code by hand.

Note that all the changes are only compile tested.

Some Makefiles were changed to allow files to contain strcpy(). As well as 'difficult to fix' files, this included 'show' functions as they really need to use sysfs_emit() or seq_printf().

All the patches are being sent individually to avoid very long cc lists. Apologies for the terse commit messages and likely unexpected tags. (There are about 100 patches in total.)

 net/devlink/port.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/devlink/port.c +1 -1
index 485029d43428..108926d3f899 100644
@@ -1222,7 +1222,7 @@ static void __devlink_port_type_set(struct devlink_port *devlink_port,
 			devlink_port->type_eth.ifindex = netdev->ifindex;
 			BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(devlink_port->type_eth.ifname) !=
 				     sizeof(netdev->name));
-			strcpy(devlink_port->type_eth.ifname, netdev->name);
+			strscpy(devlink_port->type_eth.ifname, netdev->name);
 		}
 		break;
 	case DEVLINK_PORT_TYPE_IB:
Signature · 1 line
2.39.5
maintainer
#1 lore raw
Quoted 37 lines · On 6/8/26 11:54 AM, [email protected] wrote:

From: David Laight <[email protected]>

Replacing strcpy() with strscpy() ensures that overflow of the target buffer cannot happen.

---
This is one of a group of patches that remove potentially unbounded strcpy() calls.

They are mostly replaced by strscpy() or, when strlen() has just been called, with memcpy() (usually including the '\0').

Calls with copy string literals into arrays are left unchanged. They are safe and easily detected as such.

The changes were made by getting the compiler to detect the calls and then fixing the code by hand.

Note that all the changes are only compile tested.

Some Makefiles were changed to allow files to contain strcpy(). As well as 'difficult to fix' files, this included 'show' functions as they really need to use sysfs_emit() or seq_printf().

All the patches are being sent individually to avoid very long cc lists. Apologies for the terse commit messages and likely unexpected tags. (There are about 100 patches in total.)

 net/devlink/port.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/devlink/port.c +0 -0
index 485029d43428..108926d3f899 100644

net/devlink/port.c static void __devlink_port_type_set(struct devlink_port *devlink_port, · line 1225

Quoted 5 lines
net/devlink/port.c +1 -1
@@ -1222,7 +1222,7 @@ static void __devlink_port_type_set(struct devlink_port *devlink_port,
 			devlink_port->type_eth.ifindex = netdev->ifindex;
 			BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(devlink_port->type_eth.ifname) !=
 				     sizeof(netdev->name));
-			strcpy(devlink_port->type_eth.ifname, netdev->name);
+			strscpy(devlink_port->type_eth.ifname, netdev->name);

Given the above BUILD_BUG, I don't see how this change can help?!?

Generally speaking, I suggest restricting this kind of tool-assisted changes to real problems (if any).

Thanks,

Paolo

#2 lore raw
Quoted 46 lines · On Tue, 9 Jun 2026 15:39:35 +0200 Paolo Abeni <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 37 lines · On 6/8/26 11:54 AM, [email protected] wrote:

From: David Laight <[email protected]>

Replacing strcpy() with strscpy() ensures that overflow of the target buffer cannot happen.

---
This is one of a group of patches that remove potentially unbounded strcpy() calls.

They are mostly replaced by strscpy() or, when strlen() has just been called, with memcpy() (usually including the '\0').

Calls with copy string literals into arrays are left unchanged. They are safe and easily detected as such.

The changes were made by getting the compiler to detect the calls and then fixing the code by hand.

Note that all the changes are only compile tested.

Some Makefiles were changed to allow files to contain strcpy(). As well as 'difficult to fix' files, this included 'show' functions as they really need to use sysfs_emit() or seq_printf().

All the patches are being sent individually to avoid very long cc lists. Apologies for the terse commit messages and likely unexpected tags. (There are about 100 patches in total.)

 net/devlink/port.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/devlink/port.c +0 -0
index 485029d43428..108926d3f899 100644

net/devlink/port.c static void __devlink_port_type_set(struct devlink_port *devlink_port, · line 1225

Quoted 5 lines
net/devlink/port.c +1 -1
@@ -1222,7 +1222,7 @@ static void __devlink_port_type_set(struct devlink_port *devlink_port,
 			devlink_port->type_eth.ifindex = netdev->ifindex;
 			BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(devlink_port->type_eth.ifname) !=
 				     sizeof(netdev->name));
-			strcpy(devlink_port->type_eth.ifname, netdev->name);
+			strscpy(devlink_port->type_eth.ifname, netdev->name);  

Given the above BUILD_BUG, I don't see how this change can help?!?

Quoted 2 lines

Generally speaking, I suggest restricting this kind of tool-assisted changes to real problems (if any).

My aim is to get to the point where the calling strcpy() is invalid unless it is used to copy a string literal into an array. If/when all the .c files are changed the .h file change can be committed to stop any new potential unbounded copies being added.

I do want to look at the 'fortify' version of strspcy(). The current version can call strnlen() and then real_strscpy(), so ends up doing the length scan twice.
(Never mind how much gets inlined.)
strscpy() between arrays could be implemented as a memcpy() of the shorter length and an explicit zero of the final byte.

With the BUILD_BUG_ON() (which I didn't notice) the above could be e memcpy().

-- David

Quoted 5 lines

Thanks,

Paolo

maintainer
#4 lore raw
In reply to Paolo Abeni
Quoted 46 lines · Paolo Abeni
Quoted 37 lines · On 6/8/26 11:54 AM, [email protected] wrote:

From: David Laight <[email protected]>

Replacing strcpy() with strscpy() ensures that overflow of the target buffer cannot happen.

---
This is one of a group of patches that remove potentially unbounded strcpy() calls.

They are mostly replaced by strscpy() or, when strlen() has just been called, with memcpy() (usually including the '\0').

Calls with copy string literals into arrays are left unchanged. They are safe and easily detected as such.

The changes were made by getting the compiler to detect the calls and then fixing the code by hand.

Note that all the changes are only compile tested.

Some Makefiles were changed to allow files to contain strcpy(). As well as 'difficult to fix' files, this included 'show' functions as they really need to use sysfs_emit() or seq_printf().

All the patches are being sent individually to avoid very long cc lists. Apologies for the terse commit messages and likely unexpected tags. (There are about 100 patches in total.)

 net/devlink/port.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/devlink/port.c +0 -0
index 485029d43428..108926d3f899 100644

net/devlink/port.c static void __devlink_port_type_set(struct devlink_port *devlink_port, · line 1225

Quoted 5 lines
net/devlink/port.c +1 -1
@@ -1222,7 +1222,7 @@ static void __devlink_port_type_set(struct devlink_port *devlink_port,
 			devlink_port->type_eth.ifindex = netdev->ifindex;
 			BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(devlink_port->type_eth.ifname) !=
 				     sizeof(netdev->name));
-			strcpy(devlink_port->type_eth.ifname, netdev->name);
+			strscpy(devlink_port->type_eth.ifname, netdev->name);

Given the above BUILD_BUG, I don't see how this change can help?!?

Quoted 2 lines

Generally speaking, I suggest restricting this kind of tool-assisted changes to real problems (if any).

How did this patch get generated? This isn't an "unbounded" case: both devlink_port->type_eth.ifname and netdev->name have known sizes. I think a way to focus these kinds of refactors would be to replace strcpy() with a macro wrapper that fails a build when the sizes aren't known, but then otherwise calls strscpy instead. With that in place, you can find all the actually unbounded cases and work through each of them, and once they have all been purged from the kernel, that strcpy macro can land, which will keep new unbounded instances from showing up.

Signature · 1 line
Kees Cook
maintainer
#3 lore raw
In reply to David Laight
Quoted 4 lines · David Laight

My aim is to get to the point where the calling strcpy() is invalid unless it is used to copy a string literal into an array. If/when all the .c files are changed the .h file change can be committed to stop any new potential unbounded copies being added.

Here's what I did a while ago in a test tree of mine, but for strlcat:

---
From d09759b1e51dbf784b503c9b9f5136b81b58560c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2024 11:08:41 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] fortify: Refuse to use strcat() on dynamically sized strings

Limit the use of strcat() to things we can determine at compile time to be safe.

---
 include/linux/fortify-string.h | 6 ++++++
 lib/string_helpers.c           | 2 ++
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
include/linux/fortify-string.h +6 -0
index 171982e53c9a..8797c06b46e1 100644
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ void __read_overflow2(void) __compiletime_error("detected read beyond size of ob
 void __read_overflow2_field(size_t avail, size_t wanted) __compiletime_warning("detected read beyond size of field (2nd parameter); maybe use struct_group()?");
 void __write_overflow(void) __compiletime_error("detected write beyond size of object (1st parameter)");
 void __write_overflow_field(size_t avail, size_t wanted) __compiletime_warning("detected write beyond size of field (1st parameter); maybe use struct_group()?");
+void __fortify_refuse_strcat(void) __compiletime_warning("Do not use strcat() on dynamically sized destination or source strings");
 
 #define __compiletime_strlen(p)					\
 ({								\
@@ -411,8 +412,13 @@ __FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strcat, 1, 2)
 char *strcat(char * const POS p, const char *q)
 {
 	const size_t p_size = __member_size(p);
+	const size_t q_size = __member_size(q);
 	const size_t wanted = strlcat(p, q, p_size);
 
+	if (!__builtin_constant_p(p_size) || !__builtin_constant_p(q_size) ||
+	    p_size == SIZE_MAX || q_size == SIZE_MAX)
+		__fortify_refuse_strcat();
+
 	if (p_size <= wanted)
 		fortify_panic(FORTIFY_FUNC_strcat, FORTIFY_WRITE, p_size, wanted + 1, p);
 	return p;
lib/string_helpers.c +2 -0
index 169eaf583494..27b9d97c60c5 100644
@@ -1019,6 +1019,8 @@ void __read_overflow2_field(size_t avail, size_t wanted) { }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__read_overflow2_field);
 void __write_overflow_field(size_t avail, size_t wanted) { }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__write_overflow_field);
+void __fortify_refuse_strcat(void) { }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__fortify_refuse_strcat);
 
 static const char * const fortify_func_name[] = {
 #define MAKE_FORTIFY_FUNC_NAME(func)	[MAKE_FORTIFY_FUNC(func)] = #func
Signature · 5 lines
2.34.1


-- 
Kees Cook
#5 lore raw
In reply to Kees Cook
Quoted 50 lines · On Wed, 10 Jun 2026 13:58:51 -0700 Kees Cook <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 46 lines · Paolo Abeni
Quoted 37 lines · On 6/8/26 11:54 AM, [email protected] wrote:

From: David Laight <[email protected]>

Replacing strcpy() with strscpy() ensures that overflow of the target buffer cannot happen.

---
This is one of a group of patches that remove potentially unbounded strcpy() calls.

They are mostly replaced by strscpy() or, when strlen() has just been called, with memcpy() (usually including the '\0').

Calls with copy string literals into arrays are left unchanged. They are safe and easily detected as such.

The changes were made by getting the compiler to detect the calls and then fixing the code by hand.

Note that all the changes are only compile tested.

Some Makefiles were changed to allow files to contain strcpy(). As well as 'difficult to fix' files, this included 'show' functions as they really need to use sysfs_emit() or seq_printf().

All the patches are being sent individually to avoid very long cc lists. Apologies for the terse commit messages and likely unexpected tags. (There are about 100 patches in total.)

 net/devlink/port.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/devlink/port.c +0 -0
index 485029d43428..108926d3f899 100644

net/devlink/port.c static void __devlink_port_type_set(struct devlink_port *devlink_port, · line 1225

Quoted 5 lines
net/devlink/port.c +1 -1
@@ -1222,7 +1222,7 @@ static void __devlink_port_type_set(struct devlink_port *devlink_port,
 			devlink_port->type_eth.ifindex = netdev->ifindex;
 			BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(devlink_port->type_eth.ifname) !=
 				     sizeof(netdev->name));
-			strcpy(devlink_port->type_eth.ifname, netdev->name);
+			strscpy(devlink_port->type_eth.ifname, netdev->name);  

Given the above BUILD_BUG, I don't see how this change can help?!?

Quoted 2 lines

Generally speaking, I suggest restricting this kind of tool-assisted changes to real problems (if any).

Quoted 9 lines

How did this patch get generated? This isn't an "unbounded" case: both devlink_port->type_eth.ifname and netdev->name have known sizes. I think a way to focus these kinds of refactors would be to replace strcpy() with a macro wrapper that fails a build when the sizes aren't known, but then otherwise calls strscpy instead. With that in place, you can find all the actually unbounded cases and work through each of them, and once they have all been purged from the kernel, that strcpy macro can land, which will keep new unbounded instances from showing up.

My current wrapper (which will allow the above is):
#if !defined(ALLOW_STRCPY)

#define strcpy(dst, src) ({ \ 
        size_t _dst_size, _src_size; \
        char *const _dst = dst; \
        const char *_src = src; \
        bool _use_memcpy = true; \
\
        _dst_size = __is_array(dst) ? sizeof(dst) : __builtin_object_size(dst, 1); \
        BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(!_dst_size, "strcpy() dst size zero"); \
        BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(_dst_size == SIZE_MAX, "strcpy() dst size unknown"); \
\
        if (__builtin_constant_p(_src && _src[0])) \
                _src_size = __builtin_strlen(_src) + 1; \
        else { \
                BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(!__is_array(src), "strcpy() src unbounded"); \
                _src_size = sizeof(src); \
                BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(!_src_size, "strcpy() src is zero length array"); \
                _use_memcpy = _src_size <= 32; \
        } \
        BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(!statically_true(_src_size <= _dst_size), "strcpy() src too big"); \
        if (_use_memcpy) \
                __underlying_memcpy(_dst, _src, _src_size); \
        else \
                __underlying_strcpy(_dst, _src); \
        _dst; \
})

__FORTIFY_INLINE __diagnose_as(__builtin_strcpy, 1, 2) char *(strcpy)(char * const POS p, const char * const POS q)

{
        BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(1, "Direct call to strcpy");
        return p;
}

#else
...
#endif

The one I was using before required the source be a constant string.

Note that this is just intended to find the unbounded copies at compile time, rather than being a suggested patch.
The ALLOW_STRCPY is needed for things like the acpi code which are out of tree (and other files I didn't want to fix).

The acpi code is stunningly bad, it saves the string lengths for the kmalloc() calls and then uses strcpy() to copy the data.
If anyone manages to gen them out of sync it will overwrite memory.

David