perf tools: Assorted fixes
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerv5 cover perf tools: Assorted fixes
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Hi,
Sixth batch of pre-existing bug fixes found by sashiko-bot AI review during the perf-data-validation hardening series. All bugs are latent in existing code — none were introduced by the hardening patches.
Three broad categories:
1. snprintf() accumulation overflows (patches 2, 8, 9, 10):
Several functions accumulate formatted output via ret += snprintf(). snprintf() returns the would-have-been-written count, so on truncation ret overshoots the buffer size and the next 'size - ret' underflows to a huge unsigned value, disabling bounds checking. Switched to scnprintf() which returns actual bytes written.
Affected: cpu_map__snprint(), snprintf_hex(), synthesize_bpf_prog_name(), hists__scnprintf_title(), build_id__snprintf(), hwmon_pmu__describe_items().
2. Missing safety checks on untrusted data (patches 1, 3, 5, 6):
- get_max_num(): size_t underflow on empty sysfs file causes heap over-read.
- machine__resolve(): unguarded env->cpu[] access with untrusted CPU index — switched to perf_env__get_cpu_topology() accessor, added bounds check before int16_t truncation.
- timehist: test_bit(prio, ...) without bounds check on untrusted tracepoint priority.
- idle-hist: rb_first_cached() on a tree populated with plain rb_insert_color() — rb_leftmost never set, callchains silently dropped.
3. Resource hygiene (patches 4, 7):
- bitmap_free() without NULLing the pointer (2 call sites).
- O_CLOEXEC missing from open() calls in DSO and ELF code (12 call sites across 2 files).
Patch 11 expands the libperf ABI TODO with the code simplification argument for widening struct perf_cpu.cpu — the int16_t forces truncation checks at every boundary where wider CPU indices are narrowed.
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo (11):
perf tools: Fix get_max_num() size_t underflow on empty sysfs file perf tools: Use scnprintf() in cpu_map__snprint() to prevent overflow perf tools: Use perf_env__get_cpu_topology() in machine__resolve() perf tools: NULL bitmap pointers after bitmap_free()
perf sched: Bounds-check prio before test_bit() in timehist perf sched: Fix idle-hist callchain display using wrong rb_first variant perf tools: Add O_CLOEXEC to open() calls in DSO and ELF code perf bpf: Use scnprintf() in snprintf_hex() and synthesize_bpf_prog_name() perf hists: Fix snprintf() in hists__scnprintf_title() UID filter path perf tools: Use scnprintf() in build_id__snprintf() and hwmon read_events()
libperf: Document code simplification case for widening struct perf_cpu
tools/lib/perf/TODO | 8 ++++++++ tools/perf/builtin-record.c | 1 + tools/perf/builtin-sched.c | 7 +++++-- tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c | 11 ++++++----- tools/perf/util/build-id.c | 7 +++++-- tools/perf/util/cpumap.c | 24 +++++++++++++++--------- tools/perf/util/dso.c | 4 ++-- tools/perf/util/event.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- tools/perf/util/hist.c | 7 ++++--- tools/perf/util/hwmon_pmu.c | 12 ++++++------ tools/perf/util/mmap.c | 2 ++ tools/perf/util/symbol-elf.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- 12 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
Changes since v4:
- Patch 4 (bitmap_free): also reset nbits to 0 in mmap__munmap() — without this, a reused struct mmap retains the old positive nbits while bits is NULL, and bitmap_scnprintf() dereferences the NULL pointer when perf runs with -vv.
(Found by sashiko-bot lore review)
- Patch 10 (build_id__snprintf): null-terminate bf before the loop — when bf_size == 1, the offs + 1 < bf_size guard skips the loop entirely, leaving bf[0] uninitialized.
(Found by sashiko-bot lore review)
- Collected Reviewed-by tags from Ian Rogers' v3 reviews
(patches 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9).
- Reordered Reviewed-by tags before Cc lines in commit trailers.
Changes since v3:
- Patch 3 (machine__resolve): expanded comment explaining why the outer al->cpu < nr_cpus_avail check is needed — the int16_t cast to struct perf_cpu silently truncates e.g. 65536 to 0, bypassing the accessor's internal bounds check.
(Ian Rogers review)
- Patch 10 (build_id__snprintf): fixed loop termination — after switching to scnprintf(), offs never reaches bf_size, so the loop spun doing zero-byte writes. Changed condition to offs + 1 < bf_size.
(Found by sashiko-bot, confirmed by Ian Rogers)
- Patch 11 (TODO wording): fixed "wrap to small positive numbers" to "wrap to negative numbers (two's complement)". (Found by sashiko-bot, confirmed by Ian Rogers)
Changes since v2:
- Dropped mbind patch (was v2 patch 4): the original code was correct — get_nodes() does --maxnode before computing BITS_TO_LONGS, so bitmap_zalloc(node_index + 1) with maxnode = node_index + 2 already match. The commit message misstated the kernel-side semantics.
- Split libperf ABI TODO hunk out of prio patch into standalone
patch 11.
- Patch 3 (machine__resolve): bounds-check al->cpu against env->nr_cpus_avail before truncating to int16_t struct perf_cpu. (Found by sashiko-bot lore review)
- Patch 4 (was v2 patch 5, bitmap_free): reworded from "Three call sites" to "Two call sites" — removed dead store from memory_node__delete_nodes() where NULLing a pointer right before freeing the containing struct was useless. (Found by sashiko-bot lore review)
Changes since v1:
- Patch 5 (was v1 patch 6): fix prio bounds-check logic — the
v1 condition (prio < 0 || prio >= MAX_PRIO || !test_bit(...))
incorrectly skipped events with unknown priority (prio == -1).
Changed to (prio >= 0 && (prio >= MAX_PRIO || !test_bit(...)))
to preserve the original pass-through for events without
priority info.
(Found by sashiko-bot lore review)Developed with AI assistance (Claude/sashiko), tagged in commits.
Thanks,
- Arnaldo
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerPATCH v5 1/11 perf tools: Fix get_max_num() size_t underflow on empty sysfs file
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
get_max_num() reads a sysfs file (cpu/possible, cpu/present, or node/possible) and scans backward from the end to find the last number. If the file is empty, filename__read_str() returns num == 0. The loop while (--num) decrements the size_t from 0 to SIZE_MAX, reading backward across the heap until a comma or hyphen is found or unmapped memory is hit.
Add an early return for empty files before the backward scan.
--- tools/perf/util/cpumap.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
tools/perf/util/cpumap.c +6 -0
@@ -448,6 +448,12 @@ static int get_max_num(char *path, int *max) buf[num] ='\0' ; +/* empty file — nothing to parse */ +if (num ==0 ) { + err =-1 ; + goto out; + } +/* start on the right, to find highest node num */ while (--num) {if ((buf[num] ==',' ) || (buf[num] =='-' )) {
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH 01/11] perf tools: Fix get_max_num() size_t underflow on empty sysfs file
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] size_t underflow in pmu_id() causing an out-of-bounds write when reading an empty sysfs identifier file. --
commit 9effe935b669b19aeff861c043c4e4e8a534bfab
Author: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
perf tools: Fix get_max_num() size_t underflow on empty sysfs file
This commit fixes a size_t underflow in get_max_num() that occurs when reading an empty sysfs file. By adding an early return when the read length is zero, it prevents the backward scanning loop from reading out-of-bounds across the heap.
Quoted 4 lines
tools/perf/util/cpumap.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
tools/perf/util/cpumap.c static int get_max_num(char *path, int *max) · line 459
Quoted 13 lines
tools/perf/util/cpumap.c +6
-0@@ -448,6 +448,12 @@ static int get_max_num(char *path, int *max) buf[num] ='\0' ; +/* empty file — nothing to parse */ +if (num ==0 ) { + err =-1 ; + goto out; + } +/* start on the right, to find highest node num */ while (--num) {if ((buf[num] ==',' ) || (buf[num] =='-' )) {
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but it appears there is another instance of this exact same empty sysfs file underflow issue in pmu_id():
tools/perf/util/pmu.c:pmu_id() {
...
if (filename__read_str(path, &str, &len) < 0)
return NULL;
str[len - 1] = 0; /* remove line feed */
...
}Does this cause an out-of-bounds write? If the sysfs identifier file is empty, filename__read_str() returns len = 0. The str[len - 1] = 0 assignment then underflows, writing a null byte to str[-1]. Could this corrupt the malloc chunk metadata located immediately before the allocated buffer?
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerPATCH v5 2/11 perf tools: Use scnprintf() in cpu_map__snprint() to prevent overflow
In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de MeloFrom: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
cpu_map__snprint() accumulates snprintf() return values in ret. snprintf() returns the number of characters that *would have been written* on truncation, not the actual count. When a fragmented CPU list exceeds the buffer, ret grows past size, causing size - ret to underflow (both are size_t), and subsequent snprintf() calls write past the end of the caller's stack buffer.
Switch to scnprintf() which returns the actual number of characters written, making ret accumulation safe by construction.
--- tools/perf/util/cpumap.c | 18 +++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/cpumap.c +9 -9
@@ -692,21 +692,21 @@ size_t cpu_map__snprint(struct perf_cpu_map *map, char *buf, size_t size)if (start ==-1 ) { start = i;if (last) { - ret +=snprintf (buf + ret, size - ret, -"%s%d" ,COMMA , -perf_cpu_map__cpu (map, i).cpu); + ret +=scnprintf (buf + ret, size - ret, +"%s%d" ,COMMA , +perf_cpu_map__cpu (map, i).cpu); } }else if (((i - start) != (cpu.cpu -perf_cpu_map__cpu (map, start).cpu)) || last) {int end = i -1 ;if (start == end) { - ret +=snprintf (buf + ret, size - ret, -"%s%d" ,COMMA , -perf_cpu_map__cpu (map, start).cpu); + ret +=scnprintf (buf + ret, size - ret, +"%s%d" ,COMMA , +perf_cpu_map__cpu (map, start).cpu); }else { - ret +=snprintf (buf + ret, size - ret, -"%s%d-%d" ,COMMA , -perf_cpu_map__cpu (map, start).cpu,perf_cpu_map__cpu (map, end).cpu); + ret +=scnprintf (buf + ret, size - ret, +"%s%d-%d" ,COMMA , +perf_cpu_map__cpu (map, start).cpu,perf_cpu_map__cpu (map, end).cpu); } first = false; start = i;
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerPATCH v5 3/11 perf tools: Use perf_env__get_cpu_topology() in machine__resolve()
In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de MeloFrom: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
machine__resolve() accesses env->cpu[al->cpu].socket_id after checking al->cpu >= 0 and env->cpu != NULL, but without validating al->cpu against env->nr_cpus_avail. Since al->cpu comes from the untrusted perf.data sample, a crafted file with a large CPU index causes an out-of-bounds heap read.
Use perf_env__get_cpu_topology() which validates both NULL and bounds. Also bounds-check al->cpu before the cast to struct perf_cpu (int16_t):
without this, values like 65536 silently truncate to 0, bypassing the accessor's internal check and returning CPU 0's topology.
--- tools/perf/util/event.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/event.c +13 -2
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <linux/perf_event.h> #include "cpumap.h" #include "dso.h" +#include "env.h" #include "event.h" #include "debug.h" #include "hist.h"
@@ -836,8 +837,18 @@ int machine__resolve(struct machine *machine, struct addr_location *al,if (al->cpu >=0 ) {struct perf_env *env = machine->env; -if (env && env->cpu) - al->socket = env->cpu[al->cpu].socket_id; +/* +* Bounds-check al->cpu (s32) before casting to struct perf_cpu +* (int16_t): without this, e.g. 65536 truncates to 0 and silently +* returns CPU 0's topology. Can go once perf_cpu.cpu is widened. +*/ +if (env && al->cpu < env->nr_cpus_avail) { +struct cpu_topology_map *topo; + + topo =perf_env__get_cpu_topology (env, (struct perf_cpu ){ al->cpu }); +if (topo) + al->socket = topo->socket_id; + } }/* Account for possible out-of-order switch events. */
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Re: [PATCH 03/11] perf tools: Use perf_env__get_cpu_topology() in machine__resolve()
Quoted 9 lines · Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
machine__resolve()accesses env->cpu[al->cpu].socket_id after checkingal->cpu>= 0 andenv->cpu!= NULL, but without validatingal->cpuagainstenv->nr_cpus_avail. Sinceal->cpucomes from the untrusted perf.data sample, a crafted file with a large CPU index causes an out-of-bounds heap read.
Quoted 4 lines
Use
perf_env__get_cpu_topology()which validates both NULL and bounds. Also bounds-checkal->cpubefore the cast to structperf_cpu(int16_t):
without this, values like 65536 silently truncate to 0, bypassing the accessor's internal check and returning CPU 0's topology.
Thanks for clarifying this. Perhaps we should have a general int-to-CPU helper, but that's out of scope here.
Thanks,
Ian
Quoted 46 lines
Fixes 0c4c4debb0adda4c ("perf tools: Add processor socket info to hist_entry and addr_location")Reported-by sashiko-bot <[email protected]>Cc Kan Liang <[email protected]>Cc Ian Rogers <[email protected]>Assisted-by Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>--- tools/perf/util/event.c | 15 +++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)tools/perf/util/event.c +13
-3@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <linux/perf_event.h> #include "cpumap.h" #include "dso.h" +#include "env.h" #include "event.h" #include "debug.h" #include "hist.h" @@ -836,8 +837,18 @@ int machine__resolve(struct machine *machine, struct addr_location *al,if (al->cpu >=0 ) {struct perf_env *env = machine->env; -if (env && env->cpu) - al->socket = env->cpu[al->cpu].socket_id; +/* +* Bounds-check al->cpu (s32) before casting to struct perf_cpu +* (int16_t): without this, e.g. 65536 truncates to 0 and silently +* returns CPU 0's topology. Can go once perf_cpu.cpu is widened. +*/ +if (env && al->cpu < env->nr_cpus_avail) { +struct cpu_topology_map *topo; + + topo =perf_env__get_cpu_topology (env, (struct perf_cpu ){ al->cpu }); +if (topo) + al->socket = topo->socket_id; + } }/* Account for possible out-of-order switch events. */ --2.54.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH 03/11] perf tools: Use perf_env__get_cpu_topology() in machine__resolve()
In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de MeloThank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider: - [Medium] The bounds check on `al->cpu` fails to prevent 16-bit integer truncation when…
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Medium] The bounds check on al->cpu fails to prevent 16-bit integer truncation when env->nr_cpus_avail exceeds 32767, breaking topology resolution and bypassing the patch's stated fix. --
commit c3733692a65101be8730c41702471672bacd7115
Author: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
perf tools: Use perf_env__get_cpu_topology() in machine__resolve()
This commit fixes an out-of-bounds heap read in machine__resolve() when a perf.data sample contains a large CPU index. It replaces the unsafe array access with perf_env__get_cpu_topology(), which performs bounds and NULL validation. A bounds check is also added to attempt to prevent 16-bit integer truncation during the cast to struct perf_cpu.
Quoted 4 lines
tools/perf/util/event.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
Quoted 5 lines
tools/perf/util/event.c +0
-1@@ -836,8 +837,18 @@ int machine__resolve(struct machine *machine, struct addr_location *al,if (al->cpu >=0 ) {struct perf_env *env = machine->env; -if (env && env->cpu)
tools/perf/util/event.c int machine__resolve(struct machine *machine, struct addr_location *al, · line 848
Quoted 10 lines
tools/perf/util/event.c +9
-1- al->socket = env->cpu[al->cpu].socket_id; +/* +* Bounds-check al->cpu (s32) before casting to struct perf_cpu +* (int16_t): without this, e.g. 65536 truncates to 0 and silently +* returns CPU 0's topology. Can go once perf_cpu.cpu is widened. +*/ +if (env && al->cpu < env->nr_cpus_avail) { +struct cpu_topology_map *topo; + + topo =perf_env__get_cpu_topology (env, (struct perf_cpu ){ al->cpu });
[Severity: Medium]
Does this bounds check prevent truncation if env->nr_cpus_avail exceeds 32767?
If a perf.data file specifies a large nr_cpus_avail (for instance, process_nrcpus() bounds it to 1,048,576), could a malicious al->cpu of 65536 still pass this check? If so, wouldn't it cast to int16_t as 0 and silently return CPU 0's topology, bypassing the fix?
Additionally, does this break valid topology resolution for CPUs >= 32768? A valid al->cpu of 32768 would truncate to -32768, causing perf_env__get_cpu_topology() to return NULL since it verifies cpu >= 0.
Quoted 5 lines
tools/perf/util/event.c +3
-0+if (topo) + al->socket = topo->socket_id; + } }
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=3
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerPATCH v5 4/11 perf tools: NULL bitmap pointers after bitmap_free()
In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de MeloFrom: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Two call sites free bitmaps without NULLing the pointer, risking double-free if the structure is reused or cleanup is called twice:
- mmap__munmap(): map->affinity_mask.bits
- record__mmap_cpu_mask_free(): mask->bits
Set each pointer to NULL after bitmap_free().
--- tools/perf/builtin-record.c | 1 + tools/perf/util/mmap.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+)
tools/perf/builtin-record.c +1 -0
@@ -3084,6 +3084,7 @@ static int record__mmap_cpu_mask_alloc(struct mmap_cpu_mask *mask, int nr_bits)static void record__mmap_cpu_mask_free (struct mmap_cpu_mask *mask) {bitmap_free (mask->bits); + mask->bits =NULL ; mask->nbits =0 ; }
tools/perf/util/mmap.c +2 -0
@@ -238,6 +238,8 @@ static void perf_mmap__aio_munmap(struct mmap *map __maybe_unused)void mmap__munmap (struct mmap *map) {bitmap_free (map->affinity_mask.bits); + map->affinity_mask.bits =NULL ; + map->affinity_mask.nbits =0 ;zstd_fini (&map->zstd_data);
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerPATCH v5 5/11 perf sched: Bounds-check prio before test_bit() in timehist
In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de MeloFrom: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
timehist_skip_sample() reads prio from untrusted tracepoint data via perf_sample__intval(sample, "prev_prio") without bounds validation. A crafted perf.data with prev_prio >= MAX_PRIO (140) causes test_bit() to read past the end of the prio_bitmap, which is only MAX_PRIO bits.
Add a prio >= 0 && prio < MAX_PRIO check before the test_bit() call. This also makes the != -1 sentinel check explicit as >= 0.
--- tools/perf/builtin-sched.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/perf/builtin-sched.c +3 -1
@@ -2645,7 +2645,9 @@ static bool timehist_skip_sample(struct perf_sched *sched,else if (evsel__name_is (sample->evsel,"sched:sched_switch" )) prio =perf_sample__intval (sample,"prev_prio" ); -if (prio !=-1 && !test_bit (prio, sched->prio_bitmap)) { +/* prio comes from untrusted tracepoint data — bounds-check before test_bit */ +if (prio >=0 && + (prio >=MAX_PRIO || !test_bit (prio, sched->prio_bitmap))) { rc = true; sched->skipped_samples++; }
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH 05/11] perf sched: Bounds-check prio before test_bit() in timehist
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider: - [Low] The patch introduces a logic error that causes invalid negative priorities (<-1) to bypass the…
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Low] The patch introduces a logic error that causes invalid negative priorities (<-1) to bypass the --prio filter. --
commit 3165982942697d89513b8b104d95d745a4412391
Author: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
perf sched: Bounds-check prio before test_bit() in timehist
This commit adds a bounds check to timehist_skip_sample() to ensure that priority values from untrusted tracepoint data do not exceed MAX_PRIO before calling test_bit(). It also updates the sentinel check from != -1 to >= 0.
tools/perf/builtin-sched.c static bool timehist_skip_sample(struct perf_sched *sched, · line 2650
Quoted 12 lines
tools/perf/builtin-sched.c +3
-1@@ -2645,7 +2645,9 @@ static bool timehist_skip_sample(struct perf_sched *sched,else if (evsel__name_is (sample->evsel,"sched:sched_switch" )) prio =perf_sample__intval (sample,"prev_prio" ); -if (prio !=-1 && !test_bit (prio, sched->prio_bitmap)) { +/* prio comes from untrusted tracepoint data — bounds-check before test_bit */ +if (prio >=0 && + (prio >=MAX_PRIO || !test_bit (prio, sched->prio_bitmap))) {
[Severity: Low]
Does this logic inadvertently allow invalid negative priorities (less than -1) to bypass the --prio filter?
By explicitly replacing the prio != -1 sentinel check with prio >= 0, the new logic evaluates to false for any priority less than -1. This causes the block to be bypassed, meaning rc remains false and the invalid negative priority is not skipped by the filter.
Should the check be restructured to ensure that invalid negative priorities from crafted or corrupted perf.data files are also properly skipped?
Quoted 3 lines
tools/perf/builtin-sched.c +0
-0rc = true; sched->skipped_samples++; }
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=5
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerRe: [PATCH 05/11] perf sched: Bounds-check prio before test_bit() in timehist
Quoted 21 lines · On Wed, Jun 10, 2026 at 05:04:00PM +0000, [email protected] wrote:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Low] The patch introduces a logic error that causes invalid negative priorities (<-1) to bypass the--priofilter. --commit
3165982942697d89513b8b104d95d745a4412391
Author: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>perf sched: Bounds-check prio before
test_bit()in timehistThis commit adds a bounds check to
timehist_skip_sample()to ensure that priority values from untrusted tracepoint data do not exceedMAX_PRIObefore callingtest_bit(). It also updates the sentinel check from != -1 to >= 0.Quoted 8 lines
tools/perf/builtin-sched.c +0
-0@@ -2645,7 +2645,9 @@ static bool timehist_skip_sample(struct perf_sched *sched,else if (evsel__name_is (sample->evsel,"sched:sched_switch" )) prio =perf_sample__intval (sample,"prev_prio" );
Quoted 2 lines
tools/perf/builtin-sched.c static bool timehist_skip_sample(struct perf_sched *sched, · line 2648
Quoted 2 lines
tools/perf/builtin-sched.c +1
-1-if (prio !=-1 && !test_bit (prio, sched->prio_bitmap)) { +/* prio comes from untrusted tracepoint data — bounds-check before test_bit */
Updated the comment to:
- /* prio comes from untrusted tracepoint data — bounds-check before test_bit */
+ /* negative prio means no info; out-of-range prio can't match the filter */
To address the comment below.
- Arnaldo
Quoted 21 lines
tools/perf/builtin-sched.c static bool timehist_skip_sample(struct perf_sched *sched, · line 2650
Quoted 2 lines
tools/perf/builtin-sched.c +2
-0+if (prio >=0 && + (prio >=MAX_PRIO || !test_bit (prio, sched->prio_bitmap))) {[Severity: Low]
Does this logic inadvertently allow invalid negative priorities (less than -1) to bypass the --prio filter?By explicitly replacing the prio != -1 sentinel check with prio >= 0, the new logic evaluates to false for any priority less than -1. This causes the block to be bypassed, meaning rc remains false and the invalid negative priority is not skipped by the filter.
Should the check be restructured to ensure that invalid negative priorities from crafted or corrupted perf.data files are also properly skipped?
Quoted 3 lines
tools/perf/builtin-sched.c +0
-0rc = true; sched->skipped_samples++; }Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=5
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerPATCH v5 6/11 perf sched: Fix idle-hist callchain display using wrong rb_first variant
In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de MeloFrom: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
timehist_print_idlehist_callchain() calls rb_first_cached() on sorted_root, but the sort function (callchain_param.sort) populates it via rb_insert_color() on the plain rb_root member — not the cached variant. This means rb_leftmost is never set, so rb_first_cached() always returns NULL and the entire callchain summary is silently dropped from --idle-hist output.
The original code in ba957ebb54893aca ("perf sched timehist: Show callchains for idle stat") was correct — it used struct rb_root and rb_first(). The bug was introduced when sorted_root was converted to rb_root_cached without converting the sort insertion path to use rb_insert_color_cached().
Use rb_first(&root->rb_root) to match how the tree was populated.
--- tools/perf/builtin-sched.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/perf/builtin-sched.c +2 -1
@@ -3130,7 +3130,8 @@ static size_t timehist_print_idlehist_callchain(struct rb_root_cached *root)size_t ret =0 ;FILE *fp = stdout;struct callchain_node *chain; -struct rb_node *rb_node =rb_first_cached (root); +/* sort() uses rb_insert_color() on rb_root, not rb_root_cached */ +struct rb_node *rb_node =rb_first (&root->rb_root);printf (" %16s %8s %s\n" ,"Idle time (msec)" ,"Count" ,"Callchains" ); printf(" %.16s %.8s %.50s\n", graph_dotted_line, graph_dotted_line,
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH 06/11] perf sched: Fix idle-hist callchain display using wrong rb_first variant
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider: - [Medium] The bounds check in `machine__resolve` fails to prevent `s32 al->cpu` from truncating to…
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Medium] The bounds check in machine__resolve fails to prevent s32 al->cpu from truncating to int16_t for large CPU values, leading to silent topology resolution errors for systems with >= 32768 CPUs. --
commit c3733692a65101be8730c41702471672bacd7115
Author: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
perf tools: Use perf_env__get_cpu_topology() in machine__resolve()
This commit modifies machine__resolve() to retrieve CPU socket IDs using perf_env__get_cpu_topology() instead of direct array access. It adds a bounds check against env->nr_cpus_avail to prevent out-of-bounds heap reads before casting the CPU index to a struct perf_cpu.
Quoted 4 lines
tools/perf/util/event.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
Quoted 5 lines
tools/perf/util/event.c +0
-1@@ -836,8 +837,18 @@ int machine__resolve(struct machine *machine, struct addr_location *al,if (al->cpu >=0 ) {struct perf_env *env = machine->env; -if (env && env->cpu)
tools/perf/util/event.c int machine__resolve(struct machine *machine, struct addr_location *al, · line 848
Quoted 10 lines
tools/perf/util/event.c +9
-1- al->socket = env->cpu[al->cpu].socket_id; +/* +* Bounds-check al->cpu (s32) before casting to struct perf_cpu +* (int16_t): without this, e.g. 65536 truncates to 0 and silently +* returns CPU 0's topology. Can go once perf_cpu.cpu is widened. +*/ +if (env && al->cpu < env->nr_cpus_avail) { +struct cpu_topology_map *topo; + + topo =perf_env__get_cpu_topology (env, (struct perf_cpu ){ al->cpu });
[Severity: Medium]
Will this still truncate to int16_t if env->nr_cpus_avail is larger than 32767?
Since env->nr_cpus_avail can legally be up to 1,048,576, the check al->cpu < env->nr_cpus_avail evaluates to true for CPU values like 65536. When cast to struct perf_cpu, which wraps an int16_t, 65536 wraps to 0 and silently fetches the topology for CPU 0 instead of the requested CPU.
For CPUs between 32768 and 65535, the cast results in a negative number, causing perf_env__get_cpu_topology() to return NULL.
Prior to this patch, env->cpu[al->cpu] successfully handled large CPU indices. Does this code introduce a functional regression on high-core-count systems or when parsing perf.data files with a large nr_cpus_avail?
Quoted 4 lines
tools/perf/util/event.c +3
-0+if (topo) + al->socket = topo->socket_id; + } }
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=6
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerPATCH v5 7/11 perf tools: Add O_CLOEXEC to open() calls in DSO and ELF code
In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de MeloFrom: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
open() calls in dso.c and symbol-elf.c omit O_CLOEXEC, which leaks file descriptors to child processes spawned during symbol resolution (e.g., addr2line, objdump). This can exhaust the fd limit during long profiling sessions or when processing many DSOs.
Add O_CLOEXEC to all open() calls in both files (12 call sites).
--- tools/perf/util/dso.c | 4 ++-- tools/perf/util/symbol-elf.c | 20 ++++++++++---------- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/dso.c +2 -2
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ int filename__decompress(const char *name, char *pathname,* descriptor to the uncompressed file. */ if (!compressions[comp].is_compressed (name)) -return open (name,O_RDONLY ); +return open (name,O_RDONLY |O_CLOEXEC ); fd =mkstemp (tmpbuf);if (fd <0 ) {
@@ -1911,7 +1911,7 @@ static const u8 *__dso__read_symbol(struct dso *dso, const char *symfs_filename,int saved_errno;nsinfo__mountns_enter (dso__nsinfo (dso), &nsc); - fd =open (symfs_filename,O_RDONLY ); + fd =open (symfs_filename,O_RDONLY |O_CLOEXEC ); saved_errno = errno;nsinfo__mountns_exit (&nsc);if (fd <0 ) {
tools/perf/util/symbol-elf.c +10 -10
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ bool filename__has_section(const char *filename, const char *sec)GElf_Shdr shdr;bool found = false; - fd =open (filename,O_RDONLY ); + fd =open (filename,O_RDONLY |O_CLOEXEC );if (fd <0 )return false;
@@ -872,7 +872,7 @@ static int read_build_id(const char *filename, struct build_id *bid)if (size <BUILD_ID_SIZE ) goto out; - fd =open (filename,O_RDONLY ); + fd =open (filename,O_RDONLY |O_CLOEXEC );if (fd <0 ) goto out;
@@ -935,7 +935,7 @@ int sysfs__read_build_id(const char *filename, struct build_id *bid)size_t size =sizeof (bid->data);int fd, err =-1 ; - fd =open (filename,O_RDONLY ); + fd =open (filename,O_RDONLY |O_CLOEXEC );if (fd <0 ) goto out;
@@ -995,7 +995,7 @@ int filename__read_debuglink(const char *filename, char *debuglink,if (err >=0 ) goto out; - fd =open (filename,O_RDONLY ); + fd =open (filename,O_RDONLY |O_CLOEXEC );if (fd <0 ) goto out;
@@ -1153,7 +1153,7 @@ int symsrc__init(struct symsrc *ss, struct dso *dso, const char *name, type =dso__symtab_type (dso); }else { - fd =open (name,O_RDONLY ); + fd =open (name,O_RDONLY |O_CLOEXEC );if (fd <0 ) { *dso__load_errno (dso) = errno;return -1 ;
@@ -1952,7 +1952,7 @@ static int kcore__open(struct kcore *kcore, const char *filename) {GElf_Ehdr *ehdr; - kcore->fd =open (filename,O_RDONLY ); + kcore->fd =open (filename,O_RDONLY |O_CLOEXEC );if (kcore->fd ==-1 )return -1 ;
@@ -1985,7 +1985,7 @@ static int kcore__init(struct kcore *kcore, char *filename, int elfclass,if (temp) kcore->fd =mkstemp (filename);else - kcore->fd =open (filename,O_WRONLY |O_CREAT |O_EXCL ,0400 ); + kcore->fd =open (filename,O_WRONLY |O_CREAT |O_EXCL |O_CLOEXEC ,0400 );if (kcore->fd ==-1 )return -1 ;
@@ -2461,11 +2461,11 @@ static int kcore_copy__compare_files(const char *from_filename, {int from, to, err =-1 ; - from =open (from_filename,O_RDONLY ); + from =open (from_filename,O_RDONLY |O_CLOEXEC );if (from <0 )return -1 ; - to =open (to_filename,O_RDONLY ); + to =open (to_filename,O_RDONLY |O_CLOEXEC );if (to <0 ) goto out_close_from;
@@ -2883,7 +2883,7 @@ int get_sdt_note_list(struct list_head *head, const char *target)Elf *elf;int fd, ret; - fd =open (target,O_RDONLY ); + fd =open (target,O_RDONLY |O_CLOEXEC );if (fd <0 )return -EBADF ;
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH 07/11] perf tools: Add O_CLOEXEC to open() calls in DSO and ELF code
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [Medium] Incomplete fix for file descriptor leaks to child processes (O_CLOEXEC missed for mkstemp). --
commit d5ad19894a39e26303c73d34d537bede2c1838e4
Author: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
perf tools: Add O_CLOEXEC to open() calls in DSO and ELF code
This commit adds the O_CLOEXEC flag to open() calls in dso.c and symbol-elf.c. This aims to prevent file descriptors from leaking to child processes spawned during symbol resolution, which can exhaust the file descriptor limit.
tools/perf/util/dso.c int filename__decompress(const char *name, char *pathname, · line 349
Quoted 11 lines
tools/perf/util/dso.c +1
-1@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ int filename__decompress(const char *name, char *pathname,* descriptor to the uncompressed file. */ if (!compressions[comp].is_compressed (name)) -return open (name,O_RDONLY ); +return open (name,O_RDONLY |O_CLOEXEC ); fd =mkstemp (tmpbuf);
[Severity: Medium]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but since the goal is to prevent file descriptor leaks, doesn't mkstemp() also leave the file descriptor without the O_CLOEXEC flag?
If the file is compressed, the returned decompressed file descriptor might still leak to child processes. Could mkstemp(tmpbuf) be changed to mkostemp(tmpbuf, O_CLOEXEC) to fully close the leak?
Quoted 3 lines
tools/perf/util/symbol-elf.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
tools/perf/util/symbol-elf.c static int kcore__init(struct kcore *kcore, char *filename, int elfclass, · line 1988
Quoted 6 lines
tools/perf/util/symbol-elf.c +1
-1@@ -1985,7 +1985,7 @@ static int kcore__init(struct kcore *kcore, char *filename, int elfclass,if (temp) kcore->fd =mkstemp (filename);else - kcore->fd =open (filename,O_WRONLY |O_CREAT |O_EXCL ,0400 ); + kcore->fd =open (filename,O_WRONLY |O_CREAT |O_EXCL |O_CLOEXEC ,0400 );
[Severity: Medium]
This is a pre-existing issue, but updating only the open() call creates an inconsistency between the temp and non-temp paths. Will temporary kcore file descriptors still leak to child processes when temp is true?
Additionally, looking at read_gnu_debugdata() in this same file, there is another pre-existing mkstemp() call used for temporary files. Would it make sense to convert all of these mkstemp() calls to mkostemp(..., O_CLOEXEC) in this series to completely prevent file descriptor exhaustion?
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=7
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerPATCH v5 8/11 perf bpf: Use scnprintf() in snprintf_hex() and synthesize_bpf_prog_name()
In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de MeloFrom: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Both functions accumulate formatted output via ret += snprintf(buf + ret, size - ret, ...). If the buffer is too small and snprintf() returns more than the remaining space, ret exceeds size and the next 'size - ret' underflows, causing snprintf() to write past the buffer end.
Switch to scnprintf() which returns the actual number of bytes written, making the accumulation safe.
--- tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c +6 -5
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ static int snprintf_hex(char *buf, size_t size, unsigned char *data, size_t len)size_t i;for (i =0 ; i < len; i++) - ret +=snprintf (buf + ret, size - ret,"%02x" , data[i]); + ret +=scnprintf (buf + ret, size - ret,"%02x" , data[i]);return ret; }
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static int synthesize_bpf_prog_name(char *buf, int size,const struct btf_type *t;int name_len; - name_len =snprintf (buf, size,"bpf_prog_" ); + name_len =scnprintf (buf, size,"bpf_prog_" ); name_len +=snprintf_hex (buf + name_len, size - name_len, prog_tags[sub_id],BPF_TAG_SIZE );if (btf) {
@@ -153,9 +153,10 @@ static int synthesize_bpf_prog_name(char *buf, int size, short_name = info->name; }else short_name ="F" ; -if (short_name) - name_len +=snprintf (buf + name_len, size - name_len, -"_%s" , short_name); +if (short_name) { + name_len +=scnprintf (buf + name_len, size - name_len, +"_%s" , short_name); + }return name_len; }
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH 08/11] perf bpf: Use scnprintf() in snprintf_hex() and synthesize_bpf_prog_name()
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 6 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 6 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Missing NULL check for the result of btf__type_by_id() in synthesize_bpf_prog_name leading to a potential NULL pointer dereference.
- [High] The synthesize_bpf_prog_name function dereferences func_infos unconditionally if a BTF object is present, even if the BPF program does not have function info.
- [High] Unsafe use of snprintf in length accumulation sequences leads to size_t underflow and stack buffer overflows in perf_pmu__for_each_event.
- [High] The bpil_offs_to_addr function translates offsets to addresses without bounds checking, allowing out-of-bounds reads from malicious perf.data files.
- [Medium] Leaked info_node->metadata on the error path where perf_env__insert_bpf_prog_info fails.
- [Medium] Leaked BTF and rodata objects in bpf_metadata_create when bpf_metadata_alloc fails.
--
commit 7fa567954fb3de5f92865c25d5e803bee0ef956a
Author: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
perf bpf: Use scnprintf() in snprintf_hex() and synthesize_bpf_prog_name()
Both functions accumulate formatted output via snprintf. This patch switches them to scnprintf() to prevent buffer size underflows and write overruns when accumulating the output length.
Quoted 4 lines
tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
Quoted 12 lines
tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c +1
-1@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static int synthesize_bpf_prog_name(char *buf, int size,const struct btf_type *t;int name_len; - name_len =snprintf (buf, size,"bpf_prog_" ); + name_len =scnprintf (buf, size,"bpf_prog_" ); name_len +=snprintf_hex (buf + name_len, size - name_len, prog_tags[sub_id],BPF_TAG_SIZE );if (btf) {@@ -153,9 +153,10 @@ static int synthesize_bpf_prog_name(char *buf, int size, short_name = info->name; }else
tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c static int synthesize_bpf_prog_name(char *buf, int size, · line 161
Quoted 10 lines
tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c +4
-3short_name ="F" ; -if (short_name) - name_len +=snprintf (buf + name_len, size - name_len, -"_%s" , short_name); +if (short_name) { + name_len +=scnprintf (buf + name_len, size - name_len, +"_%s" , short_name); + }return name_len; }
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but could the surrounding code in synthesize_bpf_prog_name() segfault if a BPF program does not have func_info?
In synthesize_bpf_prog_name(), if the program lacks function info, func_infos becomes NULL. However, bpf_metadata_create() can pass the .rodata MAP's BTF, satisfying the if (btf) check:
tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c:synthesize_bpf_prog_name() {
...
if (btf) {
finfo = func_infos + sub_id * info->func_info_rec_size;
t = btf__type_by_id(btf, finfo->type_id);
short_name = btf__name_by_offset(btf, t->name_off);
...
}Is it possible that finfo evaluates to an offset from NULL, leading to a segfault when dereferencing finfo->type_id?
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does btf__type_by_id() guarantee returning a non-NULL pointer here?
If the provided type_id is out of bounds, t becomes NULL. Would the immediate dereference of t->name_off then cause a segfault?
While reviewing these formatting string fixes, I noticed a few other pre-existing regressions in the perf bpf and pmu utilities.
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but does the length accumulation in perf_pmu__for_each_event() risk a stack buffer overflow?
tools/perf/util/pmu.c:perf_pmu__for_each_event() {
...
buf_used += snprintf(buf + buf_used, sizeof(buf) - buf_used,
"%G%s", event->scale, event->unit) + 1;
...
}If the snprintf output is truncated, buf_used exceeds the buffer size. The subsequent call uses the remaining size, which would underflow to a large positive value. Can this cause the next snprintf call to write out of bounds?
[Severity: Medium]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does the error path in perf_env__add_bpf_info() leak the metadata object?
tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c:perf_env__add_bpf_info() {
...
if (!perf_env__insert_bpf_prog_info(env, info_node)) {
pr_debug("%s: duplicate add bpf info request for id %u\n",
__func__, btf_id);
free(info_linear);
free(info_node);
goto out;
}
...
}If perf_env__insert_bpf_prog_info() fails, info_linear and info_node are freed, but there is no call to bpf_metadata_free(info_node->metadata). Should the allocated metadata be freed before jumping to the out label?
[Severity: Medium]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does the failure path for bpf_metadata_alloc() in bpf_metadata_create() leak the map resources?
tools/perf/util/bpf-event.c:bpf_metadata_create() {
...
metadata = bpf_metadata_alloc(info->nr_prog_tags, map.num_vars);
if (!metadata)
continue;
...
}If bpf_metadata_read_map_data() succeeds earlier in the loop, map.btf and map.rodata are allocated. If bpf_metadata_alloc() then fails, the loop continues without calling bpf_metadata_free_map_data(). Should these resources be cleaned up before continuing the loop?
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does bpil_offs_to_addr() translate offsets to addresses without bounds checking?
tools/perf/util/bpf-utils.c:bpil_offs_to_addr() {
...
offs = bpf_prog_info_read_offset_u64(&info_linear->info,
desc->array_offset);
addr = offs + ptr_to_u64(info_linear->data);
bpf_prog_info_set_offset_u64(&info_linear->info,
desc->array_offset, addr);
...
}The untrusted offset from info_linear->info is added to ptr_to_u64(info_linear->data) to compute addr. If a crafted perf.data file provides an offset exceeding data_len, could this allow arbitrary out-of-bounds reads when the perf tool dereferences it?
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=8
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerPATCH v5 9/11 perf hists: Fix snprintf() in hists__scnprintf_title() UID filter path
In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de MeloFrom: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
hists__scnprintf_title() accumulates formatted output into a buffer using scnprintf() for all filter clauses except the UID filter, which uses snprintf(). If the buffer fills up and snprintf() returns more than the remaining space, printed exceeds size and the next 'size - printed' underflows, causing later scnprintf() calls to write past the buffer.
Switch the UID filter clause to scnprintf() to match the rest of the function.
--- tools/perf/util/hist.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/hist.c +4 -3
@@ -2963,9 +2963,10 @@ int __hists__scnprintf_title(struct hists *hists, char *bf, size_t size, bool sh ev_name, sample_freq_str, enable_ref ? ref : " ", nr_events); -if (hists->uid_filter_str) - printed +=snprintf (bf + printed, size - printed, -", UID: %s" , hists->uid_filter_str); +if (hists->uid_filter_str) { + printed +=scnprintf (bf + printed, size - printed, +", UID: %s" , hists->uid_filter_str); + }if (thread) {if (hists__has (hists, thread)) { printed += scnprintf(bf + printed, size - printed,
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerPATCH v5 10/11 perf tools: Use scnprintf() in build_id__snprintf() and hwmon read_events()
In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de MeloFrom: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
build_id__snprintf() and hwmon_pmu__read_events() accumulate formatted output via snprintf(), which returns the would-have-been-written count on truncation. In build_id__snprintf(), this inflates the return value beyond the buffer size. In hwmon_pmu__read_events(), len overshoots out_buf_len and the next 'out_buf_len - len' underflows.
Switch both to scnprintf() which returns actual bytes written.
In build_id__snprintf(), also tighten the loop guard from 'offs < bf_size' to 'offs + 1 < bf_size': since scnprintf() returns at most size-1, offs never reaches bf_size, and the original condition would spin doing zero-byte writes once the buffer fills.
--- tools/perf/util/build-id.c | 7 +++++-- tools/perf/util/hwmon_pmu.c | 12 ++++++------ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
tools/perf/util/build-id.c +5 -2
@@ -93,8 +93,11 @@ int build_id__snprintf(const struct build_id *build_id, char *bf, size_t bf_sizereturn 0 ; } -for (size_t i =0 ; i < build_id->size && offs < bf_size; ++i) - offs +=snprintf (bf + offs, bf_size - offs,"%02x" , build_id->data[i]); +if (bf_size >0 ) + bf[0 ] ='\0' ; + +for (size_t i =0 ; i < build_id->size && offs +1 < bf_size; ++i) + offs +=scnprintf (bf + offs, bf_size - offs,"%02x" , build_id->data[i]);return offs; }
tools/perf/util/hwmon_pmu.c +6 -6
@@ -442,12 +442,12 @@ static size_t hwmon_pmu__describe_items(struct hwmon_pmu *hwm, char *out_buf, si buf[read_len] ='\0' ; val =strtoll (buf,/*endptr=*/ NULL ,10 ); - len +=snprintf (out_buf + len, out_buf_len - len,"%s%s%s=%g%s" , - len ==0 ?" " :", " , - hwmon_item_strs[bit], - is_alarm ?"_alarm" :"" , - (double )val /1000.0 , - hwmon_units[key.type]); + len +=scnprintf (out_buf + len, out_buf_len - len,"%s%s%s=%g%s" , + len ==0 ?" " :", " , + hwmon_item_strs[bit], + is_alarm ?"_alarm" :"" , + (double )val /1000.0 , + hwmon_units[key.type]); }close (fd); }
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Re: [PATCH 10/11] perf tools: Use scnprintf() in build_id__snprintf() and hwmon read_events()
Quoted 9 lines · Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
build_id__snprintf()andhwmon_pmu__read_events()accumulate formatted output viasnprintf(), which returns the would-have-been-written count on truncation. Inbuild_id__snprintf(), this inflates the return value beyond the buffer size. Inhwmon_pmu__read_events(), len overshootsout_buf_lenand the next 'out_buf_len- len' underflows.
Quoted 6 lines
Switch both to
scnprintf()which returns actual bytes written.In
build_id__snprintf(), also tighten the loop guard from 'offs <bf_size' to 'offs + 1 <bf_size': sincescnprintf()returns at most size-1, offs never reachesbf_size, and the original condition would spin doing zero-byte writes once the buffer fills.
Thanks,
Ian
Quoted 55 lines
Fixes fccaaf6fbbc59910 ("perf build-id: Change sprintf functions to snprintf")Fixes 53cc0b351ec99278 ("perf hwmon_pmu: Add a tool PMU exposing events from hwmon in sysfs")Reported-by sashiko-bot <[email protected]>Cc Ian Rogers <[email protected]>Assisted-by Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>--- tools/perf/util/build-id.c | 7 +++++-- tools/perf/util/hwmon_pmu.c | 12 ++++++------ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)tools/perf/util/build-id.c +5
-2@@ -93,8 +93,11 @@ int build_id__snprintf(const struct build_id *build_id, char *bf, size_t bf_sizereturn 0 ; } -for (size_t i =0 ; i < build_id->size && offs < bf_size; ++i) - offs +=snprintf (bf + offs, bf_size - offs,"%02x" , build_id->data[i]); +if (bf_size >0 ) + bf[0 ] ='\0' ; + +for (size_t i =0 ; i < build_id->size && offs +1 < bf_size; ++i) + offs +=scnprintf (bf + offs, bf_size - offs,"%02x" , build_id->data[i]);return offs; }tools/perf/util/hwmon_pmu.c +6
-7@@ -442,12 +442,12 @@ static size_t hwmon_pmu__describe_items(struct hwmon_pmu *hwm, char *out_buf, si buf[read_len] ='\0' ; val =strtoll (buf,/*endptr=*/ NULL ,10 ); - len +=snprintf (out_buf + len, out_buf_len - len,"%s%s%s=%g%s" , - len ==0 ?" " :", " , - hwmon_item_strs[bit], - is_alarm ?"_alarm" :"" , - (double )val /1000.0 , - hwmon_units[key.type]); + len +=scnprintf (out_buf + len, out_buf_len - len,"%s%s%s=%g%s" , + len ==0 ?" " :", " , + hwmon_item_strs[bit], + is_alarm ?"_alarm" :"" , + (double )val /1000.0 , + hwmon_units[key.type]); }close (fd); } --2.54.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH 10/11] perf tools: Use scnprintf() in build_id__snprintf() and hwmon read_events()
In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de MeloThank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Off-by-one stack buffer overflow when reading sysfs files without reserving space for the null terminator. --
commit e6063aeb686d4d547e9272a51fc950e7a84f13a8
Author: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
perf tools: Use scnprintf() in build_id__snprintf() and hwmon read_events()
build_id__snprintf() and hwmon_pmu__read_events() accumulate formatted output via snprintf(), which returns the would-have-been-written count on truncation.
tools/perf/util/hwmon_pmu.c static size_t hwmon_pmu__describe_items(struct hwmon_pmu *hwm, char *out_buf, si · line 443
Quoted 7 lines
tools/perf/util/hwmon_pmu.c +0
-0@@ -442,12 +442,12 @@ static size_t hwmon_pmu__describe_items(struct hwmon_pmu *hwm, char *out_buf, si buf[read_len] ='\0' ;
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but could this lead to an off-by-one stack buffer overflow?
Looking at hwmon_pmu__describe_items() in tools/perf/util/hwmon_pmu.c, we read up to sizeof(buf) bytes:
ssize_t read_len = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
If the sysfs file contains exactly the capacity of the buffer (64 bytes) and does not end with a newline, read_len will be 64.
When terminating the string here:
buf[read_len] = '\0';
Does this write a null byte exactly one byte past the end of the buf array? It appears similar patterns exist in hwmon_pmu__read_events() and evsel__hwmon_pmu_read() as well, where reading the full buffer size leads to an out-of-bounds null termination.
Should we reserve space for the null terminator by reading sizeof(buf) - 1 instead?
Quoted 16 lines
tools/perf/util/hwmon_pmu.c +6
-6val =strtoll (buf,/*endptr=*/ NULL ,10 ); - len +=snprintf (out_buf + len, out_buf_len - len,"%s%s%s=%g%s" , - len ==0 ?" " :", " , - hwmon_item_strs[bit], - is_alarm ?"_alarm" :"" , - (double )val /1000.0 , - hwmon_units[key.type]); + len +=scnprintf (out_buf + len, out_buf_len - len,"%s%s%s=%g%s" , + len ==0 ?" " :", " , + hwmon_item_strs[bit], + is_alarm ?"_alarm" :"" , + (double )val /1000.0 , + hwmon_units[key.type]); }close (fd); }
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=10
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerRe: [PATCH 10/11] perf tools: Use scnprintf() in build_id__snprintf() and hwmon read_events()
Quoted 30 lines · On Wed, Jun 10, 2026 at 05:17:26PM +0000, [email protected] wrote:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Off-by-one stack buffer overflow when reading sysfs files without reserving space for the null terminator. --commit
e6063aeb686d4d547e9272a51fc950e7a84f13a8
Author: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>perf tools: Use
scnprintf()inbuild_id__snprintf()and hwmonread_events()
build_id__snprintf()andhwmon_pmu__read_events()accumulate formatted output viasnprintf(), which returns the would-have-been-written count on truncation.tools/perf/util/hwmon_pmu.c static size_t hwmon_pmu__describe_items(struct hwmon_pmu *hwm, char *out_buf, si · line 443
Quoted 7 lines
tools/perf/util/hwmon_pmu.c +0
-0@@ -442,12 +442,12 @@ static size_t hwmon_pmu__describe_items(struct hwmon_pmu *hwm, char *out_buf, si buf[read_len] ='\0' ;[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but could this lead to an off-by-one stack buffer overflow?Looking at
hwmon_pmu__describe_items()intools/perf/util/hwmon_pmu.c, we read up to sizeof(buf) bytes:
Quoted 8 lines
ssize_t read_len = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));If the sysfs file contains exactly the capacity of the buffer (64 bytes) and does not end with a newline,
read_lenwill be 64.When terminating the string here:
buf[read_len] = '\0';
This is fixed in the following series, acting on your comments.
- Arnaldo
Quoted 27 lines
Does this write a null byte exactly one byte past the end of the buf array? It appears similar patterns exist in
hwmon_pmu__read_events()andevsel__hwmon_pmu_read()as well, where reading the full buffer size leads to an out-of-bounds null termination.Should we reserve space for the null terminator by reading sizeof(buf) - 1 instead?
Quoted 16 lines
tools/perf/util/hwmon_pmu.c +6
-6val =strtoll (buf,/*endptr=*/ NULL ,10 ); - len +=snprintf (out_buf + len, out_buf_len - len,"%s%s%s=%g%s" , - len ==0 ?" " :", " , - hwmon_item_strs[bit], - is_alarm ?"_alarm" :"" , - (double )val /1000.0 , - hwmon_units[key.type]); + len +=scnprintf (out_buf + len, out_buf_len - len,"%s%s%s=%g%s" , + len ==0 ?" " :", " , + hwmon_item_strs[bit], + is_alarm ?"_alarm" :"" , + (double )val /1000.0 , + hwmon_units[key.type]); }close (fd); }Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=10
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
maintainerPATCH v5 11/11 libperf: Document code simplification case for widening struct perf_cpu
In reply to Arnaldo Carvalho de MeloFrom: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Add a bullet point to the libperf ABI TODO explaining the code simplification benefit of widening struct perf_cpu.cpu from int16_t to int: the narrow type forces defensive truncation checks at every boundary where wider CPU indices are narrowed, and values > 32767 silently wrap to negative numbers (two's complement), bypassing bounds validation without them.
--- tools/lib/perf/TODO | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
tools/lib/perf/TODO +8 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,14 @@ together. (x86_64 max is 8192, arm64 is 4096), but NR_CPUS limits keep growing. perf clamps to INT16_MAX in set_max_cpu_num() as a safety net. + - Code simplification: the int16_t forces defensive truncation + checks at every boundary where a wider CPU index (int from + sample->cpu, al->cpu, etc.) is narrowed into struct perf_cpu. + Without these checks, values > 32767 silently wrap to negative + numbers (two's complement), bypassing bounds validation. + Widening to int eliminates this entire class of silent + truncation bugs and removes the need for the INT16_MAX clamp + in set_max_cpu_num(). - Scope: struct perf_cpu is embedded everywhere — perf_cpu_map__cpu(), perf_cpu_map__min(), perf_cpu_map__max(), perf_cpu_map__has(), the for_each_cpu macros, and all internal callers. The perf_cpu_map
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0
Re: [PATCH 11/11] libperf: Document code simplification case for widening struct perf_cpu
Quoted 10 lines · Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
Add a bullet point to the libperf ABI TODO explaining the code simplification benefit of widening struct perf_cpu.cpu from
int16_tto int: the narrow type forces defensive truncation checks at every boundary where wider CPU indices are narrowed, and values > 32767 silently wrap to negative numbers (two's complement), bypassing bounds validation without them.
Quoted 4 lines
Cc Ian Rogers <[email protected]>Cc Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>Assisted-by Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>
The size motivation was for cases like having 1000 CPUs and a struct perf_cpu_map with a CPU for each entry. In the data file we compress this by tracking such cases as a range of CPUs. I wonder if the struct perf_cpu_map abstraction should do something similar. It would save memory, potentially be faster (iterating a range rather than loading incrementally increasing values from an array) and then we wouldn't care so much whether the struct perf_cpu was an int16_t or an int32_t.
Looking at lscpu, which does a similar job:
https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/blob/master/sys-utils/lscpu.c
They use cpu_set_t but that seems to be a bitmap with fixed support for around 1024 CPUs. So I prefer perf_cpu_map.
Thanks,
Ian
Quoted 26 lines
--- tools/lib/perf/TODO | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)tools/lib/perf/TODO +8
-1@@ -11,6 +11,14 @@ together. (x86_64 max is 8192, arm64 is 4096), but NR_CPUS limits keep growing. perf clamps to INT16_MAX in set_max_cpu_num() as a safety net. + - Code simplification: the int16_t forces defensive truncation + checks at every boundary where a wider CPU index (int from + sample->cpu, al->cpu, etc.) is narrowed into struct perf_cpu. + Without these checks, values > 32767 silently wrap to negative + numbers (two's complement), bypassing bounds validation. + Widening to int eliminates this entire class of silent + truncation bugs and removes the need for the INT16_MAX clamp + in set_max_cpu_num(). - Scope: struct perf_cpu is embedded everywhere — perf_cpu_map__cpu(), perf_cpu_map__min(), perf_cpu_map__max(), perf_cpu_map__has(), the for_each_cpu macros, and all internal callers. The perf_cpu_map --2.54.0