openssl: upgrade 3.0.20 -> 3.0.21
PATCH v2 1/1 openssl: upgrade 3.0.20 -> 3.0.21
Upgrade OpenSSL from 3.0.20 to 3.0.21.
This upgrade brings in upstream fixes for multiple CVEs:
- CVE-2026-45447 (High): heap use-after-free in PKCS7_verify()
- CVE-2026-7383: heap buffer overflow in ASN.1 multibyte string
- CVE-2026-9076: out-of-bounds read in CMS password-based decryption
- CVE-2026-34180: heap buffer over-read in ASN.1 content parsing
- CVE-2026-42764: NULL pointer dereference in QUIC server packet handling
- CVE-2026-45445: AES-OCB IV ignored on EVP_Cipher() path
- CVE-2026-34182: CMS AuthEnvelopedData may accept forged messages
- CVE-2026-42766: NULL pointer dereference in password-based CMS decryption
- CVE-2026-42770: FFC-DH peer validation uses attacker-supplied q
- CVE-2026-45446: incorrect tag processing for empty messages in AES-GCM-SIV and AES-SIV modes
As a result of this upgrade, the following CVEs are already fixed in the upstream version and no longer require local patches:
- CVE-2024-41996: vulnerability that could lead to denial of service
- CVE-2023-50781: fixes related to certificate validation and memory handling
Remove obsolete CVE patch files that are no longer required after upgrading to OpenSSL 3.0.21.
Upstream changelog:
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/openssl-3.0.21/NEWS.md
---
.../openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-1.patch | 616 ------------------
.../openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-2.patch | 356 ----------
.../openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-3.patch | 39 --
.../openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-4.patch | 441 -------------
.../openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-5.patch | 284 --------
.../openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-6.patch | 57 --
.../openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-41996.patch | 48 --
.../{openssl_3.0.20.bb => openssl_3.0.21.bb} | 9 +-
8 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 1849 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-1.patch
delete mode 100644 meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-2.patch
delete mode 100644 meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-3.patch
delete mode 100644 meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-4.patch
delete mode 100644 meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-5.patch
delete mode 100644 meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-6.patch
delete mode 100644 meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-41996.patch
rename meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/{openssl_3.0.20.bb => openssl_3.0.21.bb} (96%)meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-1.patch deleted +0 -616
@@ -1,616 +0,0 @@ -From 295485f5c4b3120b272b81f92356f6d24871c02e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Hubert Kario <[email protected]> -Date: Tue, 15 Mar 2022 13:58:08 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] rsa: add implicit rejection in PKCS#1 v1.5 - -The RSA decryption as implemented before required very careful handling -of both the exit code returned by OpenSSL and the potentially returned -ciphertext. Looking at the recent security vulnerabilities -(CVE-2020-25659 and CVE-2020-25657) it is unlikely that most users of -OpenSSL do it correctly. - -Given that correct code requires side channel secure programming in -application code, we can classify the existing RSA decryption methods -as CWE-676, which in turn likely causes CWE-208 and CWE-385 in -application code. - -To prevent that, we can use a technique called "implicit rejection". -For that we generate a random message to be returned in case the -padding check fails. We generate the message based on static secret -data (the private exponent) and the provided ciphertext (so that the -attacker cannot determine that the returned value is randomly generated -instead of result of decryption and de-padding). We return it in case -any part of padding check fails. - -The upshot of this approach is that then not only is the length of the -returned message useless as the Bleichenbacher oracle, so are the -actual bytes of the returned message. So application code doesn't have -to perform any operations on the returned message in side-channel free -way to remain secure against Bleichenbacher attacks. - -Note: this patch implements a specific algorithm, shared with Mozilla -NSS, so that the attacker cannot use one library as an oracle against the -other in heterogeneous environments. - -CVE: CVE-2023-50781 - -Upstream-Status: Backport -[https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/7fc67e0a33102aa47bbaa56533eeecb98c0450f7] - -Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <[email protected]> -Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <[email protected]> -Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]> -(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817) - -Signed-off-by: Jiaying Song <[email protected]> - ---- - crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c | 95 +++++++- - crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c | 252 ++++++++++++++++++++++ - doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in | 5 + - doc/man1/openssl-rsautl.pod.in | 5 + - doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod | 7 + - doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod | 12 ++ - doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod | 7 +- - doc/man3/RSA_public_encrypt.pod | 11 +- - include/crypto/rsa.h | 4 + - 9 files changed, 393 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c -index 6c32764..d658a3c 100644 ---- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c -+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c -@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ - #include "crypto/bn.h" - #include "rsa_local.h" - #include "internal/constant_time.h" -+#include <openssl/evp.h> -+#include <openssl/sha.h> -+#include <openssl/hmac.h> - - static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); -@@ -373,8 +376,13 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - BIGNUM *f, *ret; - int j, num = 0, r = -1; - unsigned char *buf = NULL; -+ unsigned char d_hash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {0}; -+ HMAC_CTX *hmac = NULL; -+ unsigned int md_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; -+ unsigned char kdk[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {0}; - BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; - int local_blinding = 0; -+ EVP_MD *md = NULL; - /* - * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind - * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store -@@ -404,6 +412,11 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - goto err; - } - -+ if (flen < 1) { -+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ - /* make data into a big number */ - if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, f) == NULL) - goto err; -@@ -464,13 +477,91 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) - goto err; - -+ /* -+ * derive the Key Derivation Key from private exponent and public -+ * ciphertext -+ */ -+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY)) { -+ /* -+ * because we use d as a handle to rsa->d we need to keep it local and -+ * free before any further use of rsa->d -+ */ -+ BIGNUM *d = BN_new(); -+ if (d == NULL) { -+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (rsa->d == NULL) { -+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY); -+ BN_free(d); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); -+ if (BN_bn2binpad(d, buf, num) < 0) { -+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); -+ BN_free(d); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ BN_free(d); -+ -+ /* -+ * we use hardcoded hash so that migrating between versions that use -+ * different hash doesn't provide a Bleichenbacher oracle: -+ * if the attacker can see that different versions return different -+ * messages for the same ciphertext, they'll know that the message is -+ * syntethically generated, which means that the padding check failed -+ */ -+ md = EVP_MD_fetch(rsa->libctx, "sha256", NULL); -+ if (md == NULL) { -+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (EVP_Digest(buf, num, d_hash, NULL, md, NULL) <= 0) { -+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ hmac = HMAC_CTX_new(); -+ if (hmac == NULL) { -+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, d_hash, sizeof(d_hash), md, NULL) <= 0) { -+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (flen < num) { -+ memset(buf, 0, num - flen); -+ if (HMAC_Update(hmac, buf, num - flen) <= 0) { -+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ if (HMAC_Update(hmac, from, flen) <= 0) { -+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ md_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; -+ if (HMAC_Final(hmac, kdk, &md_len) <= 0) { -+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ - j = BN_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num); - if (j < 0) - goto err; - - switch (padding) { - case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: -- r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num); -+ if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) -+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num); -+ else -+ r = ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(rsa->libctx, to, num, buf, j, num, kdk); - break; - case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: - r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0); -@@ -493,6 +584,8 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, - #endif - - err: -+ HMAC_CTX_free(hmac); -+ EVP_MD_free(md); - BN_CTX_end(ctx); - BN_CTX_free(ctx); - OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num); -diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c -index bebb43a..3fe12b2 100644 ---- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c -+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c -@@ -21,10 +21,14 @@ - #include <openssl/rand.h> - /* Just for the SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH value */ - #include <openssl/prov_ssl.h> -+#include <openssl/evp.h> -+#include <openssl/sha.h> -+#include <openssl/hmac.h> - #include "internal/cryptlib.h" - #include "crypto/rsa.h" - #include "rsa_local.h" - -+ - int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, - const unsigned char *from, int flen) - { -@@ -273,6 +277,254 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen, - return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1); - } - -+ -+static int ossl_rsa_prf(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, -+ unsigned char *to, int tlen, -+ const char *label, int llen, -+ const unsigned char *kdk, -+ uint16_t bitlen) -+{ -+ int pos; -+ int ret = -1; -+ uint16_t iter = 0; -+ unsigned char be_iter[sizeof(iter)]; -+ unsigned char be_bitlen[sizeof(bitlen)]; -+ HMAC_CTX *hmac = NULL; -+ EVP_MD *md = NULL; -+ unsigned char hmac_out[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; -+ unsigned int md_len; -+ -+ if (tlen * 8 != bitlen) { -+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); -+ return ret; -+ } -+ -+ be_bitlen[0] = (bitlen >> 8) & 0xff; -+ be_bitlen[1] = bitlen & 0xff; -+ -+ hmac = HMAC_CTX_new(); -+ if (hmac == NULL) { -+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * we use hardcoded hash so that migrating between versions that use -+ * different hash doesn't provide a Bleichenbacher oracle: -+ * if the attacker can see that different versions return different -+ * messages for the same ciphertext, they'll know that the message is -+ * syntethically generated, which means that the padding check failed -+ */ -+ md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx, "sha256", NULL); -+ if (md == NULL) { -+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, kdk, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, md, NULL) <= 0) { -+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ for (pos = 0; pos < tlen; pos += SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, iter++) { -+ if (HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) <= 0) { -+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ be_iter[0] = (iter >> 8) & 0xff; -+ be_iter[1] = iter & 0xff; -+ -+ if (HMAC_Update(hmac, be_iter, sizeof(be_iter)) <= 0) { -+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (HMAC_Update(hmac, (unsigned char *)label, llen) <= 0) { -+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ if (HMAC_Update(hmac, be_bitlen, sizeof(be_bitlen)) <= 0) { -+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * HMAC_Final requires the output buffer to fit the whole MAC -+ * value, so we need to use the intermediate buffer for the last -+ * unaligned block -+ */ -+ md_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; -+ if (pos + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH > tlen) { -+ if (HMAC_Final(hmac, hmac_out, &md_len) <= 0) { -+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ memcpy(to + pos, hmac_out, tlen - pos); -+ } else { -+ if (HMAC_Final(hmac, to + pos, &md_len) <= 0) { -+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); -+ goto err; -+ } -+ } -+ } -+ -+ ret = 0; -+ -+err: -+ HMAC_CTX_free(hmac); -+ EVP_MD_free(md); -+ return ret; -+} -+ -+/* -+ * ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() checks and removes the PKCS#1 type 2 -+ * padding from a decrypted RSA message. Unlike the -+ * RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() it will not return an error in case it -+ * detects a padding error, rather it will return a deterministically generated -+ * random message. In other words it will perform an implicit rejection -+ * of an invalid padding. This means that the returned value does not indicate -+ * if the padding of the encrypted message was correct or not, making -+ * side channel attacks like the ones described by Bleichenbacher impossible -+ * without access to the full decrypted value and a brute-force search of -+ * remaining padding bytes -+ */ -+int ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, -+ unsigned char *to, int tlen, -+ const unsigned char *from, int flen, -+ int num, unsigned char *kdk) -+{ -+/* -+ * We need to generate a random length for the synthethic message, to avoid -+ * bias towards zero and avoid non-constant timeness of DIV, we prepare -+ * 128 values to check if they are not too large for the used key size, -+ * and use 0 in case none of them are small enough, as 2^-128 is a good enough -+ * safety margin -+ */ -+#define MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES 128 -+ unsigned char *synthetic = NULL; -+ int synthethic_length; -+ uint16_t len_candidate; -+ unsigned char candidate_lengths[MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES * sizeof(len_candidate)]; -+ uint16_t len_mask; -+ uint16_t max_sep_offset; -+ int synth_msg_index = 0; -+ int ret = -1; -+ int i, j; -+ unsigned int good, found_zero_byte; -+ int zero_index = 0, msg_index; -+ -+ /* -+ * If these checks fail then either the message in publicly invalid, or -+ * we've been called incorrectly. We can fail immediately. -+ * Since this code is called only internally by openssl, those are just -+ * sanity checks -+ */ -+ if (num != flen || tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0) { -+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ -+ /* Generate a random message to return in case the padding checks fail */ -+ synthetic = OPENSSL_malloc(flen); -+ if (synthetic == NULL) { -+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); -+ return -1; -+ } -+ -+ if (ossl_rsa_prf(ctx, synthetic, flen, "message", 7, kdk, flen * 8) < 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* decide how long the random message should be */ -+ if (ossl_rsa_prf(ctx, candidate_lengths, sizeof(candidate_lengths), -+ "length", 6, kdk, -+ MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES * sizeof(len_candidate) * 8) < 0) -+ goto err; -+ -+ /* -+ * max message size is the size of the modulus size less 2 bytes for -+ * version and padding type and a minimum of 8 bytes padding -+ */ -+ len_mask = max_sep_offset = flen - 2 - 8; -+ /* -+ * we want a mask so lets propagate the high bit to all positions less -+ * significant than it -+ */ -+ len_mask |= len_mask >> 1; -+ len_mask |= len_mask >> 2; -+ len_mask |= len_mask >> 4; -+ len_mask |= len_mask >> 8; -+ -+ synthethic_length = 0; -+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES * (int)sizeof(len_candidate); -+ i += sizeof(len_candidate)) { -+ len_candidate = (candidate_lengths[i] << 8) | candidate_lengths[i + 1]; -+ len_candidate &= len_mask; -+ -+ synthethic_length = constant_time_select_int( -+ constant_time_lt(len_candidate, max_sep_offset), -+ len_candidate, synthethic_length); -+ } -+ -+ synth_msg_index = flen - synthethic_length; -+ -+ /* we have alternative message ready, check the real one */ -+ good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]); -+ good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2); -+ -+ /* then look for the padding|message separator (the first zero byte) */ -+ found_zero_byte = 0; -+ for (i = 2; i < flen; i++) { -+ unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]); -+ zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0, -+ i, zero_index); -+ found_zero_byte |= equals0; -+ } -+ -+ /* -+ * padding must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into -+ * |from|. If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check -+ * also fails. -+ */ -+ good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8); -+ -+ /* -+ * Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte -+ * but in this case we also do not copy the message out. -+ */ -+ msg_index = zero_index + 1; -+ -+ /* -+ * old code returned an error in case the decrypted message wouldn't fit -+ * into the |to|, since that would leak information, return the synthethic -+ * message instead -+ */ -+ good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, num - msg_index); -+ -+ msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, synth_msg_index); -+ -+ /* -+ * since at this point the |msg_index| does not provide the signal -+ * indicating if the padding check failed or not, we don't have to worry -+ * about leaking the length of returned message, we still need to ensure -+ * that we read contents of both buffers so that cache accesses don't leak -+ * the value of |good| -+ */ -+ for (i = msg_index, j = 0; i < flen && j < tlen; i++, j++) -+ to[j] = constant_time_select_8(good, from[i], synthetic[i]); -+ ret = j; -+ -+err: -+ /* -+ * the only time ret < 0 is when the ciphertext is publicly invalid -+ * or we were called with invalid parameters, so we don't have to perform -+ * a side-channel secure raising of the error -+ */ -+ if (ret < 0) -+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); -+ OPENSSL_free(synthetic); -+ return ret; -+} -+ - /* - * ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2_TLS() checks and removes the PKCS1 type 2 - * padding from a decrypted RSA message in a TLS signature. The result is stored -diff --git a/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in b/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in -index 2f6ef00..015265a 100644 ---- a/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in -+++ b/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in -@@ -273,6 +273,11 @@ signed or verified directly instead of using a B<DigestInfo> structure. If a - digest is set, then the B<DigestInfo> structure is used and its length - must correspond to the digest type. - -+Note, for B<pkcs1> padding, as a protection against Bleichenbacher attack, -+the decryption will not fail in case of padding check failures. Use B<none> -+and manual inspection of the decrypted message to verify if the decrypted -+value has correct PKCS#1 v1.5 padding. -+ - For B<oaep> mode only encryption and decryption is supported. - - For B<x931> if the digest type is set it is used to format the block data -diff --git a/doc/man1/openssl-rsautl.pod.in b/doc/man1/openssl-rsautl.pod.in -index 0a32fd9..4c462ab 100644 ---- a/doc/man1/openssl-rsautl.pod.in -+++ b/doc/man1/openssl-rsautl.pod.in -@@ -105,6 +105,11 @@ The padding to use: PKCS#1 v1.5 (the default), PKCS#1 OAEP, - ANSI X9.31, or no padding, respectively. - For signatures, only B<-pkcs> and B<-raw> can be used. - -+Note: because of protection against Bleichenbacher attacks, decryption -+using PKCS#1 v1.5 mode will not return errors in case padding check failed. -+Use B<-raw> and inspect the returned value manually to check if the -+padding is correct. -+ - =item B<-hexdump> - - Hex dump the output data. -diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod -index 3075eaa..e788f38 100644 ---- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod -+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod -@@ -386,6 +386,13 @@ this behaviour should be tolerated then - OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION should be set to the actual - negotiated protocol version. Otherwise it should be left unset. - -+Similarly to the B<RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING> above, since OpenSSL version -+3.1.0, the use of B<RSA_PKCS1_PADDING> will return a randomly generated message -+instead of padding errors in case padding checks fail. Applications that -+want to remain secure while using earlier versions of OpenSSL, still need to -+handle both the error code from the RSA decryption operation and the -+returned message in a side channel secure manner. -+ - =head2 DSA parameters - - EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_bits() sets the number of bits used for DSA -diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod -index b6f9bad..898535a 100644 ---- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod -+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod -@@ -51,6 +51,18 @@ return 1 for success and 0 or a negative value for failure. In particular a - return value of -2 indicates the operation is not supported by the public key - algorithm. - -+=head1 WARNINGS -+ -+In OpenSSL versions before 3.1.0, when used in PKCS#1 v1.5 padding, -+both the return value from the EVP_PKEY_decrypt() and the B<outlen> provided -+information useful in mounting a Bleichenbacher attack against the -+used private key. They had to processed in a side-channel free way. -+ -+Since version 3.1.0, the EVP_PKEY_decrypt() method when used with PKCS#1 -+v1.5 padding doesn't return an error in case it detects an error in padding, -+instead it returns a pseudo-randomly generated message, removing the need -+of side-channel secure code from applications using OpenSSL. -+ - =head1 EXAMPLES - - Decrypt data using OAEP (for RSA keys): -diff --git a/doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod b/doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod -index 9f7025c..36ae185 100644 ---- a/doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod -+++ b/doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod -@@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ L<ERR_get_error(3)>. - - =head1 WARNINGS - --The result of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() is a very sensitive --information which can potentially be used to mount a Bleichenbacher -+The result of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() is exactly the -+information which is used to mount a classical Bleichenbacher - padding oracle attack. This is an inherent weakness in the PKCS #1 - v1.5 padding design. Prefer PKCS1_OAEP padding. If that is not - possible, the result of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() should be -@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ as this would create a small timing side channel which could be - used to mount a Bleichenbacher attack against any padding mode - including PKCS1_OAEP. - -+You should prefer the use of EVP PKEY APIs for PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption -+as they implement the necessary workarounds internally. -+ - =head1 SEE ALSO - - L<RSA_public_encrypt(3)>, -diff --git a/doc/man3/RSA_public_encrypt.pod b/doc/man3/RSA_public_encrypt.pod -index 1d38073..bd3f835 100644 ---- a/doc/man3/RSA_public_encrypt.pod -+++ b/doc/man3/RSA_public_encrypt.pod -@@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ Encrypting user data directly with RSA is insecure. - - =back - --B<flen> must not be more than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 11 for the PKCS #1 v1.5 --based padding modes, not more than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 42 for -+When encrypting B<flen> must not be more than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 11 for the -+PKCS #1 v1.5 based padding modes, not more than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 42 for - RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING and exactly RSA_size(B<rsa>) for RSA_NO_PADDING. - When a padding mode other than RSA_NO_PADDING is in use, then - RSA_public_encrypt() will include some random bytes into the ciphertext -@@ -92,6 +92,13 @@ which can potentially be used to mount a Bleichenbacher padding oracle - attack. This is an inherent weakness in the PKCS #1 v1.5 padding - design. Prefer RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING. - -+In OpenSSL before version 3.1.0, both the return value and the length of -+returned value could be used to mount the Bleichenbacher attack. -+Since version 3.1.0, OpenSSL does not return an error in case of padding -+checks failed. Instead it generates a random message based on used private -+key and provided ciphertext so that application code doesn't have to implement -+a side-channel secure error handling. -+ - =head1 CONFORMING TO - - SSL, PKCS #1 v2.0 -diff --git a/include/crypto/rsa.h b/include/crypto/rsa.h -index 797dc1f..2f86e4c 100644 ---- a/include/crypto/rsa.h -+++ b/include/crypto/rsa.h -@@ -83,6 +83,10 @@ int ossl_rsa_param_decode(RSA *rsa, const X509_ALGOR *alg); - RSA *ossl_rsa_key_from_pkcs8(const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf, - OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq); - -+int ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, -+ unsigned char *to, int tlen, -+ const unsigned char *from, int flen, -+ int num, unsigned char *kdk); - int ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2_TLS(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *to, - size_t tlen, - const unsigned char *from,
meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-2.patch deleted +0 -356
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meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-3.patch deleted +0 -39
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@ -From 156a6ca5791f9c642a77270a90d5dbd0a3a7a33d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Hubert Kario <[email protected]> -Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2022 18:25:49 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] smime/pkcs7: disable the Bleichenbacher workaround - -CVE: CVE-2023-50781 - -Upstream-Status: Backport -[https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/056dade341d2589975a3aae71f81c8d7061583c7] - -Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <[email protected]> -Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <[email protected]> -Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]> -(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817) - -Signed-off-by: Jiaying Song <[email protected]> - ---- - crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c | 7 +++++++ - 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c -index a38e8a3..d751f5e 100644 ---- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c -+++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c -@@ -168,6 +168,13 @@ static int pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(unsigned char **pek, int *peklen, - if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pctx) <= 0) - goto err; - -+ if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "RSA")) -+ /* upper layer pkcs7 code incorrectly assumes that a successful RSA -+ * decryption means that the key matches ciphertext (which never -+ * was the case, implicit rejection or not), so to make it work -+ * disable implicit rejection for RSA keys */ -+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(pctx, "rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection", "0"); -+ - if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pctx, NULL, &eklen, - ri->enc_key->data, ri->enc_key->length) - <= 0)
meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-4.patch deleted +0 -441
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meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-5.patch deleted +0 -284
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meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-6.patch deleted +0 -57
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meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-41996.patch deleted +0 -48
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meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.0.21.bb renamed from meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.0.20.bb +1 -8
@@ -12,20 +12,13 @@ SRC_URI = "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/releases/download/openssl-${PV}/op file://0001-buildinfo-strip-sysroot-and-debug-prefix-map-from-co.patch \ file://afalg.patch \ file://0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch \ - file://CVE-2024-41996.patch \ - file://CVE-2023-50781-1.patch \ - file://CVE-2023-50781-2.patch \ - file://CVE-2023-50781-3.patch \ - file://CVE-2023-50781-4.patch \ - file://CVE-2023-50781-5.patch \ - file://CVE-2023-50781-6.patch \ " SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \ file://environment.d-openssl.sh \ " -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c80a01dfc70ece4dc21168932c37739042d404d46ccc81a5986dd75314ecda6f" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "617e29af8e421f46649484a4937e48c685e47f46488167c982f88bc4ec1d522f" inherit lib_package multilib_header multilib_script ptest perlnative MULTILIB_SCRIPTS = "${PN}-bin:${bindir}/c_rehash"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Hi,
Just following up on this patch: [meta-lts-collab][Kirkstone] openssl: upgrade 3.0.20 -> 3.0.21 Are there any updates or feedback on this? Please let me know if any changes or improvements are needed. I will be happy to send a v3 if required. Thanks for your time and review. Regards,
Aditya GS
Hi Aditya,
Thanks for the v2 patch, it has been applied.
https://github.com/garmin/meta-lts-collab/commit/5ce3646fa069497f2e9868f7df3df71e35f16df6
Best,
Colin
Quoted 29 lines · Aditya GS via lists.yoctoproject.org
Hi,
Just following up on this patch: [meta-lts-collab][Kirkstone] openssl:
upgrade 3.0.20 -> 3.0.21 Are there any updates or feedback on this? Please let me know if any changes or improvements are needed. I will be happy to send a v3 if required. Thanks for your time and review. Regards,
Aditya GS
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