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openssl: upgrade 3.0.20 -> 3.0.21

PATCH In review Aditya GS 3 participants 3 messages Jun 24 – Jun 26

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Aditya GS

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PATCH v2 1/1 openssl: upgrade 3.0.20 -> 3.0.21

Upgrade OpenSSL from 3.0.20 to 3.0.21.

This upgrade brings in upstream fixes for multiple CVEs:

- CVE-2026-45447 (High): heap use-after-free in PKCS7_verify()
- CVE-2026-7383: heap buffer overflow in ASN.1 multibyte string
- CVE-2026-9076: out-of-bounds read in CMS password-based decryption
- CVE-2026-34180: heap buffer over-read in ASN.1 content parsing
- CVE-2026-42764: NULL pointer dereference in QUIC server packet handling
- CVE-2026-45445: AES-OCB IV ignored on EVP_Cipher() path
- CVE-2026-34182: CMS AuthEnvelopedData may accept forged messages
- CVE-2026-42766: NULL pointer dereference in password-based CMS decryption
- CVE-2026-42770: FFC-DH peer validation uses attacker-supplied q
- CVE-2026-45446: incorrect tag processing for empty messages in AES-GCM-SIV and AES-SIV modes

As a result of this upgrade, the following CVEs are already fixed in the upstream version and no longer require local patches:

- CVE-2024-41996: vulnerability that could lead to denial of service
- CVE-2023-50781: fixes related to certificate validation and memory handling

Remove obsolete CVE patch files that are no longer required after upgrading to OpenSSL 3.0.21.

Upstream changelog:
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/openssl-3.0.21/NEWS.md

---
 .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-1.patch    | 616 ------------------
 .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-2.patch    | 356 ----------
 .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-3.patch    |  39 --
 .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-4.patch    | 441 -------------
 .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-5.patch    | 284 --------
 .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-6.patch    |  57 --
 .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-41996.patch      |  48 --
 .../{openssl_3.0.20.bb => openssl_3.0.21.bb}  |   9 +-
 8 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 1849 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-1.patch
 delete mode 100644 meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-2.patch
 delete mode 100644 meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-3.patch
 delete mode 100644 meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-4.patch
 delete mode 100644 meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-5.patch
 delete mode 100644 meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-6.patch
 delete mode 100644 meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-41996.patch
 rename meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/{openssl_3.0.20.bb => openssl_3.0.21.bb} (96%)
meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-1.patch deleted +0 -616
deleted file mode 100644
index a00f670..0000000
@@ -1,616 +0,0 @@
-From 295485f5c4b3120b272b81f92356f6d24871c02e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Hubert Kario <[email protected]>
-Date: Tue, 15 Mar 2022 13:58:08 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] rsa: add implicit rejection in PKCS#1 v1.5
-
-The RSA decryption as implemented before required very careful handling
-of both the exit code returned by OpenSSL and the potentially returned
-ciphertext. Looking at the recent security vulnerabilities
-(CVE-2020-25659 and CVE-2020-25657) it is unlikely that most users of
-OpenSSL do it correctly.
-
-Given that correct code requires side channel secure programming in
-application code, we can classify the existing RSA decryption methods
-as CWE-676, which in turn likely causes CWE-208 and CWE-385 in
-application code.
-
-To prevent that, we can use a technique called "implicit rejection".
-For that we generate a random message to be returned in case the
-padding check fails. We generate the message based on static secret
-data (the private exponent) and the provided ciphertext (so that the
-attacker cannot determine that the returned value is randomly generated
-instead of result of decryption and de-padding). We return it in case
-any part of padding check fails.
-
-The upshot of this approach is that then not only is the length of the
-returned message useless as the Bleichenbacher oracle, so are the
-actual bytes of the returned message. So application code doesn't have
-to perform any operations on the returned message in side-channel free
-way to remain secure against Bleichenbacher attacks.
-
-Note: this patch implements a specific algorithm, shared with Mozilla
-NSS, so that the attacker cannot use one library as an oracle against the
-other in heterogeneous environments.
-
-CVE: CVE-2023-50781
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-[https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/7fc67e0a33102aa47bbaa56533eeecb98c0450f7]
-
-Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <[email protected]>
-Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <[email protected]>
-Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817)
-
-Signed-off-by: Jiaying Song <[email protected]>
-
----
- crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c                     |  95 +++++++-
- crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c                      | 252 ++++++++++++++++++++++
- doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in           |   5 +
- doc/man1/openssl-rsautl.pod.in            |   5 +
- doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod            |   7 +
- doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod             |  12 ++
- doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod |   7 +-
- doc/man3/RSA_public_encrypt.pod           |  11 +-
- include/crypto/rsa.h                      |   4 +
- 9 files changed, 393 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
-index 6c32764..d658a3c 100644
---- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
-+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
-@@ -17,6 +17,9 @@
- #include "crypto/bn.h"
- #include "rsa_local.h"
- #include "internal/constant_time.h"
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/sha.h>
-+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
- 
- static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-     unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-@@ -373,8 +376,13 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-     BIGNUM *f, *ret;
-     int j, num = 0, r = -1;
-     unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-+    unsigned char d_hash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {0};
-+    HMAC_CTX *hmac = NULL;
-+    unsigned int md_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
-+    unsigned char kdk[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {0};
-     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-     int local_blinding = 0;
-+    EVP_MD *md = NULL;
-     /*
-      * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
-      * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
-@@ -404,6 +412,11 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-         goto err;
-     }
- 
-+    if (flen < 1) {
-+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL);
-+        goto err;
-+    }
-+
-     /* make data into a big number */
-     if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, f) == NULL)
-         goto err;
-@@ -464,13 +477,91 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-         if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
-             goto err;
- 
-+    /*
-+     * derive the Key Derivation Key from private exponent and public
-+     * ciphertext
-+     */
-+    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY)) {
-+        /*
-+         * because we use d as a handle to rsa->d we need to keep it local and
-+         * free before any further use of rsa->d
-+         */
-+        BIGNUM *d = BN_new();
-+        if (d == NULL) {
-+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+            goto err;
-+        }
-+        if (rsa->d == NULL) {
-+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY);
-+            BN_free(d);
-+            goto err;
-+        }
-+        BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-+        if (BN_bn2binpad(d, buf, num) < 0) {
-+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-+            BN_free(d);
-+            goto err;
-+        }
-+        BN_free(d);
-+
-+        /*
-+         * we use hardcoded hash so that migrating between versions that use
-+         * different hash doesn't provide a Bleichenbacher oracle:
-+         * if the attacker can see that different versions return different
-+         * messages for the same ciphertext, they'll know that the message is
-+         * syntethically generated, which means that the padding check failed
-+         */
-+        md = EVP_MD_fetch(rsa->libctx, "sha256", NULL);
-+        if (md == NULL) {
-+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-+            goto err;
-+        }
-+
-+        if (EVP_Digest(buf, num, d_hash, NULL, md, NULL) <= 0) {
-+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-+            goto err;
-+        }
-+
-+        hmac = HMAC_CTX_new();
-+        if (hmac == NULL) {
-+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+            goto err;
-+        }
-+
-+        if (HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, d_hash, sizeof(d_hash), md, NULL) <= 0) {
-+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-+            goto err;
-+        }
-+
-+        if (flen < num) {
-+            memset(buf, 0, num - flen);
-+            if (HMAC_Update(hmac, buf, num - flen) <= 0) {
-+                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-+                goto err;
-+            }
-+        }
-+        if (HMAC_Update(hmac, from, flen) <= 0) {
-+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-+            goto err;
-+        }
-+
-+        md_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
-+        if (HMAC_Final(hmac, kdk, &md_len) <= 0) {
-+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-+            goto err;
-+        }
-+    }
-+
-     j = BN_bn2binpad(ret, buf, num);
-     if (j < 0)
-         goto err;
- 
-     switch (padding) {
-     case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
--        r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num);
-+        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY)
-+            r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num);
-+        else
-+            r = ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(rsa->libctx, to, num, buf, j, num, kdk);
-         break;
-     case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
-         r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0);
-@@ -493,6 +584,8 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- #endif
- 
- err:
-+    HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
-+    EVP_MD_free(md);
-     BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-     BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-     OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
-diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
-index bebb43a..3fe12b2 100644
---- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
-+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c
-@@ -21,10 +21,14 @@
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
- /* Just for the SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH value */
- #include <openssl/prov_ssl.h>
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/sha.h>
-+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
- #include "internal/cryptlib.h"
- #include "crypto/rsa.h"
- #include "rsa_local.h"
- 
-+
- int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
-     const unsigned char *from, int flen)
- {
-@@ -273,6 +277,254 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
-     return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
- }
- 
-+
-+static int ossl_rsa_prf(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx,
-+                        unsigned char *to, int tlen,
-+                        const char *label, int llen,
-+                        const unsigned char *kdk,
-+                        uint16_t bitlen)
-+{
-+    int pos;
-+    int ret = -1;
-+    uint16_t iter = 0;
-+    unsigned char be_iter[sizeof(iter)];
-+    unsigned char be_bitlen[sizeof(bitlen)];
-+    HMAC_CTX *hmac = NULL;
-+    EVP_MD *md = NULL;
-+    unsigned char hmac_out[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-+    unsigned int md_len;
-+
-+    if (tlen * 8 != bitlen) {
-+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-+        return ret;
-+    }
-+
-+    be_bitlen[0] = (bitlen >> 8) & 0xff;
-+    be_bitlen[1] = bitlen & 0xff;
-+
-+    hmac = HMAC_CTX_new();
-+    if (hmac == NULL) {
-+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-+        goto err;
-+    }
-+
-+    /*
-+     * we use hardcoded hash so that migrating between versions that use
-+     * different hash doesn't provide a Bleichenbacher oracle:
-+     * if the attacker can see that different versions return different
-+     * messages for the same ciphertext, they'll know that the message is
-+     * syntethically generated, which means that the padding check failed
-+     */
-+    md = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx, "sha256", NULL);
-+    if (md == NULL) {
-+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-+        goto err;
-+    }
-+
-+    if (HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, kdk, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, md, NULL) <= 0) {
-+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-+        goto err;
-+    }
-+
-+    for (pos = 0; pos < tlen; pos += SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, iter++) {
-+        if (HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) <= 0) {
-+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-+            goto err;
-+        }
-+
-+        be_iter[0] = (iter >> 8) & 0xff;
-+        be_iter[1] = iter & 0xff;
-+
-+        if (HMAC_Update(hmac, be_iter, sizeof(be_iter)) <= 0) {
-+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-+            goto err;
-+        }
-+        if (HMAC_Update(hmac, (unsigned char *)label, llen) <= 0) {
-+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-+            goto err;
-+        }
-+        if (HMAC_Update(hmac, be_bitlen, sizeof(be_bitlen)) <= 0) {
-+            ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-+            goto err;
-+        }
-+
-+        /*
-+         * HMAC_Final requires the output buffer to fit the whole MAC
-+         * value, so we need to use the intermediate buffer for the last
-+         * unaligned block
-+         */
-+        md_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
-+        if (pos + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH > tlen) {
-+            if (HMAC_Final(hmac, hmac_out, &md_len) <= 0) {
-+                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-+                goto err;
-+            }
-+            memcpy(to + pos, hmac_out, tlen - pos);
-+        } else {
-+            if (HMAC_Final(hmac, to + pos, &md_len) <= 0) {
-+                ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-+                goto err;
-+            }
-+        }
-+    }
-+
-+    ret = 0;
-+
-+err:
-+    HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
-+    EVP_MD_free(md);
-+    return ret;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() checks and removes the PKCS#1 type 2
-+ * padding from a decrypted RSA message. Unlike the
-+ * RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() it will not return an error in case it
-+ * detects a padding error, rather it will return a deterministically generated
-+ * random message. In other words it will perform an implicit rejection
-+ * of an invalid padding. This means that the returned value does not indicate
-+ * if the padding of the encrypted message was correct or not, making
-+ * side channel attacks like the ones described by Bleichenbacher impossible
-+ * without access to the full decrypted value and a brute-force search of
-+ * remaining padding bytes
-+ */
-+int ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx,
-+                                        unsigned char *to, int tlen,
-+                                        const unsigned char *from, int flen,
-+                                        int num, unsigned char *kdk)
-+{
-+/*
-+ * We need to generate a random length for the synthethic message, to avoid
-+ * bias towards zero and avoid non-constant timeness of DIV, we prepare
-+ * 128 values to check if they are not too large for the used key size,
-+ * and use 0 in case none of them are small enough, as 2^-128 is a good enough
-+ * safety margin
-+ */
-+#define MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES 128
-+    unsigned char *synthetic = NULL;
-+    int synthethic_length;
-+    uint16_t len_candidate;
-+    unsigned char candidate_lengths[MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES * sizeof(len_candidate)];
-+    uint16_t len_mask;
-+    uint16_t max_sep_offset;
-+    int synth_msg_index = 0;
-+    int ret = -1;
-+    int i, j;
-+    unsigned int good, found_zero_byte;
-+    int zero_index = 0, msg_index;
-+
-+    /*
-+     * If these checks fail then either the message in publicly invalid, or
-+     * we've been called incorrectly. We can fail immediately.
-+     * Since this code is called only internally by openssl, those are just
-+     * sanity checks
-+     */
-+    if (num != flen || tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0) {
-+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-+        return -1;
-+    }
-+
-+    /* Generate a random message to return in case the padding checks fail */
-+    synthetic = OPENSSL_malloc(flen);
-+    if (synthetic == NULL) {
-+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-+        return -1;
-+    }
-+
-+    if (ossl_rsa_prf(ctx, synthetic, flen, "message", 7, kdk, flen * 8) < 0)
-+        goto err;
-+
-+    /* decide how long the random message should be */
-+    if (ossl_rsa_prf(ctx, candidate_lengths, sizeof(candidate_lengths),
-+                     "length", 6, kdk,
-+                     MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES * sizeof(len_candidate) * 8) < 0)
-+        goto err;
-+
-+    /*
-+     * max message size is the size of the modulus size less 2 bytes for
-+     * version and padding type and a minimum of 8 bytes padding
-+     */
-+    len_mask = max_sep_offset = flen - 2 - 8;
-+    /*
-+     * we want a mask so lets propagate the high bit to all positions less
-+     * significant than it
-+     */
-+    len_mask |= len_mask >> 1;
-+    len_mask |= len_mask >> 2;
-+    len_mask |= len_mask >> 4;
-+    len_mask |= len_mask >> 8;
-+
-+    synthethic_length = 0;
-+    for (i = 0; i < MAX_LEN_GEN_TRIES * (int)sizeof(len_candidate);
-+            i += sizeof(len_candidate)) {
-+        len_candidate = (candidate_lengths[i] << 8) | candidate_lengths[i + 1];
-+        len_candidate &= len_mask;
-+
-+        synthethic_length = constant_time_select_int(
-+            constant_time_lt(len_candidate, max_sep_offset),
-+            len_candidate, synthethic_length);
-+    }
-+
-+    synth_msg_index = flen - synthethic_length;
-+
-+    /* we have alternative message ready, check the real one */
-+    good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
-+    good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2);
-+
-+    /* then look for the padding|message separator (the first zero byte) */
-+    found_zero_byte = 0;
-+    for (i = 2; i < flen; i++) {
-+        unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]);
-+        zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
-+                                              i, zero_index);
-+        found_zero_byte |= equals0;
-+    }
-+
-+    /*
-+     * padding must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into
-+     * |from|. If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
-+     * also fails.
-+     */
-+    good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
-+
-+    /*
-+     * Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
-+     * but in this case we also do not copy the message out.
-+     */
-+    msg_index = zero_index + 1;
-+
-+    /*
-+     * old code returned an error in case the decrypted message wouldn't fit
-+     * into the |to|, since that would leak information, return the synthethic
-+     * message instead
-+     */
-+    good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, num - msg_index);
-+
-+    msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, synth_msg_index);
-+
-+    /*
-+     * since at this point the |msg_index| does not provide the signal
-+     * indicating if the padding check failed or not, we don't have to worry
-+     * about leaking the length of returned message, we still need to ensure
-+     * that we read contents of both buffers so that cache accesses don't leak
-+     * the value of |good|
-+     */
-+    for (i = msg_index, j = 0; i < flen && j < tlen; i++, j++)
-+        to[j] = constant_time_select_8(good, from[i], synthetic[i]);
-+    ret = j;
-+
-+err:
-+    /*
-+     * the only time ret < 0 is when the ciphertext is publicly invalid
-+     * or we were called with invalid parameters, so we don't have to perform
-+     * a side-channel secure raising of the error
-+     */
-+    if (ret < 0)
-+        ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-+    OPENSSL_free(synthetic);
-+    return ret;
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2_TLS() checks and removes the PKCS1 type 2
-  * padding from a decrypted RSA message in a TLS signature. The result is stored
-diff --git a/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in b/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in
-index 2f6ef00..015265a 100644
---- a/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in
-+++ b/doc/man1/openssl-pkeyutl.pod.in
-@@ -273,6 +273,11 @@ signed or verified directly instead of using a B<DigestInfo> structure. If a
- digest is set, then the B<DigestInfo> structure is used and its length
- must correspond to the digest type.
- 
-+Note, for B<pkcs1> padding, as a protection against Bleichenbacher attack,
-+the decryption will not fail in case of padding check failures. Use B<none>
-+and manual inspection of the decrypted message to verify if the decrypted
-+value has correct PKCS#1 v1.5 padding.
-+
- For B<oaep> mode only encryption and decryption is supported.
- 
- For B<x931> if the digest type is set it is used to format the block data
-diff --git a/doc/man1/openssl-rsautl.pod.in b/doc/man1/openssl-rsautl.pod.in
-index 0a32fd9..4c462ab 100644
---- a/doc/man1/openssl-rsautl.pod.in
-+++ b/doc/man1/openssl-rsautl.pod.in
-@@ -105,6 +105,11 @@ The padding to use: PKCS#1 v1.5 (the default), PKCS#1 OAEP,
- ANSI X9.31, or no padding, respectively.
- For signatures, only B<-pkcs> and B<-raw> can be used.
- 
-+Note: because of protection against Bleichenbacher attacks, decryption
-+using PKCS#1 v1.5 mode will not return errors in case padding check failed.
-+Use B<-raw> and inspect the returned value manually to check if the
-+padding is correct.
-+
- =item B<-hexdump>
- 
- Hex dump the output data.
-diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
-index 3075eaa..e788f38 100644
---- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
-+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl.pod
-@@ -386,6 +386,13 @@ this behaviour should be tolerated then
- OSSL_ASYM_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_NEGOTIATED_VERSION should be set to the actual
- negotiated protocol version. Otherwise it should be left unset.
- 
-+Similarly to the B<RSA_PKCS1_WITH_TLS_PADDING> above, since OpenSSL version
-+3.1.0, the use of B<RSA_PKCS1_PADDING> will return a randomly generated message
-+instead of padding errors in case padding checks fail. Applications that
-+want to remain secure while using earlier versions of OpenSSL, still need to
-+handle both the error code from the RSA decryption operation and the
-+returned message in a side channel secure manner.
-+
- =head2 DSA parameters
- 
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dsa_paramgen_bits() sets the number of bits used for DSA
-diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod
-index b6f9bad..898535a 100644
---- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod
-+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_decrypt.pod
-@@ -51,6 +51,18 @@ return 1 for success and 0 or a negative value for failure. In particular a
- return value of -2 indicates the operation is not supported by the public key
- algorithm.
- 
-+=head1 WARNINGS
-+
-+In OpenSSL versions before 3.1.0, when used in PKCS#1 v1.5 padding,
-+both the return value from the EVP_PKEY_decrypt() and the B<outlen> provided
-+information useful in mounting a Bleichenbacher attack against the
-+used private key. They had to processed in a side-channel free way.
-+
-+Since version 3.1.0, the EVP_PKEY_decrypt() method when used with PKCS#1
-+v1.5 padding doesn't return an error in case it detects an error in padding,
-+instead it returns a pseudo-randomly generated message, removing the need
-+of side-channel secure code from applications using OpenSSL.
-+
- =head1 EXAMPLES
- 
- Decrypt data using OAEP (for RSA keys):
-diff --git a/doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod b/doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod
-index 9f7025c..36ae185 100644
---- a/doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod
-+++ b/doc/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.pod
-@@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
- 
- =head1 WARNINGS
- 
--The result of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() is a very sensitive
--information which can potentially be used to mount a Bleichenbacher
-+The result of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() is exactly the
-+information which is used to mount a classical Bleichenbacher
- padding oracle attack. This is an inherent weakness in the PKCS #1
- v1.5 padding design. Prefer PKCS1_OAEP padding. If that is not
- possible, the result of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2() should be
-@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ as this would create a small timing side channel which could be
- used to mount a Bleichenbacher attack against any padding mode
- including PKCS1_OAEP.
- 
-+You should prefer the use of EVP PKEY APIs for PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption
-+as they implement the necessary workarounds internally.
-+
- =head1 SEE ALSO
- 
- L<RSA_public_encrypt(3)>,
-diff --git a/doc/man3/RSA_public_encrypt.pod b/doc/man3/RSA_public_encrypt.pod
-index 1d38073..bd3f835 100644
---- a/doc/man3/RSA_public_encrypt.pod
-+++ b/doc/man3/RSA_public_encrypt.pod
-@@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ Encrypting user data directly with RSA is insecure.
- 
- =back
- 
--B<flen> must not be more than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 11 for the PKCS #1 v1.5
--based padding modes, not more than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 42 for
-+When encrypting B<flen> must not be more than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 11 for the
-+PKCS #1 v1.5 based padding modes, not more than RSA_size(B<rsa>) - 42 for
- RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING and exactly RSA_size(B<rsa>) for RSA_NO_PADDING.
- When a padding mode other than RSA_NO_PADDING is in use, then
- RSA_public_encrypt() will include some random bytes into the ciphertext
-@@ -92,6 +92,13 @@ which can potentially be used to mount a Bleichenbacher padding oracle
- attack. This is an inherent weakness in the PKCS #1 v1.5 padding
- design. Prefer RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING.
- 
-+In OpenSSL before version 3.1.0, both the return value and the length of
-+returned value could be used to mount the Bleichenbacher attack.
-+Since version 3.1.0, OpenSSL does not return an error in case of padding
-+checks failed. Instead it generates a random message based on used private
-+key and provided ciphertext so that application code doesn't have to implement
-+a side-channel secure error handling.
-+
- =head1 CONFORMING TO
- 
- SSL, PKCS #1 v2.0
-diff --git a/include/crypto/rsa.h b/include/crypto/rsa.h
-index 797dc1f..2f86e4c 100644
---- a/include/crypto/rsa.h
-+++ b/include/crypto/rsa.h
-@@ -83,6 +83,10 @@ int ossl_rsa_param_decode(RSA *rsa, const X509_ALGOR *alg);
- RSA *ossl_rsa_key_from_pkcs8(const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf,
-     OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq);
- 
-+int ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx,
-+                                        unsigned char *to, int tlen,
-+                                        const unsigned char *from, int flen,
-+                                        int num, unsigned char *kdk);
- int ossl_rsa_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2_TLS(OSSL_LIB_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *to,
-     size_t tlen,
-     const unsigned char *from,
meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-2.patch deleted +0 -356

356 lines not on this page · raw message

meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-3.patch deleted +0 -39
deleted file mode 100644
index 324e41e..0000000
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-From 156a6ca5791f9c642a77270a90d5dbd0a3a7a33d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Hubert Kario <[email protected]>
-Date: Tue, 22 Nov 2022 18:25:49 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] smime/pkcs7: disable the Bleichenbacher workaround
-
-CVE: CVE-2023-50781
-
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-[https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/056dade341d2589975a3aae71f81c8d7061583c7]
-
-Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <[email protected]>
-Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <[email protected]>
-Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13817)
-
-Signed-off-by: Jiaying Song <[email protected]>
-
----
- crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c | 7 +++++++
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
-index a38e8a3..d751f5e 100644
---- a/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
-+++ b/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
-@@ -168,6 +168,13 @@ static int pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(unsigned char **pek, int *peklen,
-     if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pctx) <= 0)
-         goto err;
- 
-+    if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "RSA"))
-+        /* upper layer pkcs7 code incorrectly assumes that a successful RSA
-+         * decryption means that the key matches ciphertext (which never
-+         * was the case, implicit rejection or not), so to make it work
-+         * disable implicit rejection for RSA keys */
-+        EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(pctx, "rsa_pkcs1_implicit_rejection", "0");
-+
-     if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pctx, NULL, &eklen,
-             ri->enc_key->data, ri->enc_key->length)
-         <= 0)
meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-4.patch deleted +0 -441

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meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-5.patch deleted +0 -284

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meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-50781-6.patch deleted +0 -57

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meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-41996.patch deleted +0 -48

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meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.0.21.bb renamed from meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.0.20.bb +1 -8
similarity index 96%
rename from meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.0.20.bb
rename to meta-core/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.0.21.bb
index d33874e..fffe303 100644
@@ -12,20 +12,13 @@ SRC_URI = "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/releases/download/openssl-${PV}/op
            file://0001-buildinfo-strip-sysroot-and-debug-prefix-map-from-co.patch \
            file://afalg.patch \
            file://0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch \
-           file://CVE-2024-41996.patch \
-           file://CVE-2023-50781-1.patch \
-           file://CVE-2023-50781-2.patch \
-           file://CVE-2023-50781-3.patch \
-           file://CVE-2023-50781-4.patch \
-           file://CVE-2023-50781-5.patch \
-           file://CVE-2023-50781-6.patch \
           "
 
 SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \
            file://environment.d-openssl.sh \
            "
 
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c80a01dfc70ece4dc21168932c37739042d404d46ccc81a5986dd75314ecda6f"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "617e29af8e421f46649484a4937e48c685e47f46488167c982f88bc4ec1d522f"
 
 inherit lib_package multilib_header multilib_script ptest perlnative
 MULTILIB_SCRIPTS = "${PN}-bin:${bindir}/c_rehash"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#1 lore raw

Hi,
Just following up on this patch: [meta-lts-collab][Kirkstone] openssl: upgrade 3.0.20 -> 3.0.21 Are there any updates or feedback on this? Please let me know if any changes or improvements are needed. I will be happy to send a v3 if required. Thanks for your time and review. Regards,
Aditya GS

#2 lore raw

Hi Aditya,

Thanks for the v2 patch, it has been applied.
https://github.com/garmin/meta-lts-collab/commit/5ce3646fa069497f2e9868f7df3df71e35f16df6

Best,
Colin

Quoted 29 lines · Aditya GS via lists.yoctoproject.org

Hi,
Just following up on this patch: [meta-lts-collab][Kirkstone] openssl:
upgrade 3.0.20 -> 3.0.21 Are there any updates or feedback on this? Please let me know if any changes or improvements are needed. I will be happy to send a v3 if required. Thanks for your time and review. Regards,
Aditya GS
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