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docs: Add security considerations for migration

PATCH Applied Fabiano Rosas 3 participants 8 messages Jul 21 – Nov 19

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 docs: Add security considerations for migration

Add the security considerations that are unique to migration and that do not already fall into one of the other categories. Some aspects are better framed as security architecture considerations, so extend that section to mention TLS and clarify that disk images and guest network also need to be isolated from other processes, not just other guests.

---
 docs/system/security.rst | 22 ++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
docs/system/security.rst +18 -4
index 52bbf0cc7a2..af626a42307 100644
@@ -133,6 +133,16 @@ an issue as a normal bug.
   that affect the level 0 QEMU process. While these bugs should be
   fixed, they will not be triaged as security flaws at this time.
 
+* **migration/snapshots**. Migration failures and snapshot load
+  failures are considered part of normal operation as long as the
+  source virtual machine and savevm file, respectively, are still
+  functional. Aborting the QEMU process at the migration/snapshot
+  destination is similarly not considered a security issue. The
+  migration stream is assumed to be secure as long as the design
+  principles described in the Architecture section are held, in
+  which case plain manipulation of the stream is not considered as
+  an attack vector.
+
 * **low severity impact**. As a catch all rule, issues which
   are judged to have a "low" severity impact on the system will
   usually not justify handling as security bugs, nor assignment
@@ -159,10 +169,11 @@ could allow malicious guests to gain code execution in QEMU.  At this point the
 guest has escaped the virtual machine and is able to act in the context of the
 QEMU process on the host.
 
-Guests often interact with other guests and share resources with them.  A
-malicious guest must not gain control of other guests or access their data.
-Disk image files and network traffic must be protected from other guests unless
-explicitly shared between them by the user.
+Guests often interact with other guests and share resources with them.
+A malicious guest must not gain control of other guests or access
+their data.  Disk image files and network traffic must be protected
+from other guests, users and processes unless explicitly shared with
+them by the user.
 
 Principle of Least Privilege
 ''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
@@ -223,6 +234,9 @@ Some Linux distros already ship with UNIX groups for these devices by default.
   system calls that are not needed by QEMU, thereby reducing the host kernel
   attack surface.
 
+- Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol can be used to ensure authenticity and
+  encryption of the live migration connection where the network is untrusted.
+
 Sensitive configurations
 ------------------------
 
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Applied
#1 lore raw
Quoted 6 lines · Fabiano Rosas

Add the security considerations that are unique to migration and that do not already fall into one of the other categories. Some aspects are better framed as security architecture considerations, so extend that section to mention TLS and clarify that disk images and guest network also need to be isolated from other processes, not just other guests.

Quoted 6 lines
---
 docs/system/security.rst | 22 ++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

queued for 11.2, thanks.

Signature · 1 line
Peter Xu
#2 lore raw
In reply to Fabiano Rosas
Quoted 21 lines · Fabiano Rosas

Add the security considerations that are unique to migration and that do not already fall into one of the other categories. Some aspects are better framed as security architecture considerations, so extend that section to mention TLS and clarify that disk images and guest network also need to be isolated from other processes, not just other guests.

---
 docs/system/security.rst | 22 ++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
docs/system/security.rst +0 -0
index 52bbf0cc7a2..af626a42307 100644
@@ -133,6 +133,16 @@ an issue as a normal bug.
   that affect the level 0 QEMU process. While these bugs should be
   fixed, they will not be triaged as security flaws at this time.

docs/system/security.rst an issue as a normal bug. · line 144

Quoted 10 lines
docs/system/security.rst +9 -0
 
+* **migration/snapshots**. Migration failures and snapshot load
+  failures are considered part of normal operation as long as the
+  source virtual machine and savevm file, respectively, are still
+  functional. Aborting the QEMU process at the migration/snapshot
+  destination is similarly not considered a security issue. The
+  migration stream is assumed to be secure as long as the design
+  principles described in the Architecture section are held, in
+  which case plain manipulation of the stream is not considered as
+  an attack vector.

Reading this (which is now in our docs), it seems unclear to me about whether it intends to say that any and all bugs that can be triggered only by manipulating the migration stream are outside the security scope, or only some of them.

It says "plain manipulation of the stream is not considered as an attack vector", which suggests "everything is out of scope". But on the other hand it has an explicit list ("migration failures", "snapshot load failures", "aborting the QEMU process"), so does it mean by that that other things than those listed (e.g. "overruns a buffer in the destination") still are security issues ?

I'd appreciate clarification, as it would make it easier to triage reported issues out of the confidential state.

thanks
-- PMM

#3 lore raw
Quoted 23 lines · Peter Maydell
Quoted 22 lines · Fabiano Rosas

Add the security considerations that are unique to migration and that do not already fall into one of the other categories. Some aspects are better framed as security architecture considerations, so extend that section to mention TLS and clarify that disk images and guest network also need to be isolated from other processes, not just other guests.

---
 docs/system/security.rst | 22 ++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
docs/system/security.rst +0 -0
index 52bbf0cc7a2..af626a42307 100644
@@ -133,6 +133,16 @@ an issue as a normal bug.
   that affect the level 0 QEMU process. While these bugs should be
   fixed, they will not be triaged as security flaws at this time.
 
Quoted 15 lines

docs/system/security.rst an issue as a normal bug. · line 144

Quoted 9 lines
docs/system/security.rst +9 -0
+* **migration/snapshots**. Migration failures and snapshot load
+  failures are considered part of normal operation as long as the
+  source virtual machine and savevm file, respectively, are still
+  functional. Aborting the QEMU process at the migration/snapshot
+  destination is similarly not considered a security issue. The
+  migration stream is assumed to be secure as long as the design
+  principles described in the Architecture section are held, in
+  which case plain manipulation of the stream is not considered as
+  an attack vector.

Reading this (which is now in our docs), it seems unclear to me about whether it intends to say that any and all bugs that can be triggered only by manipulating the migration stream are outside the security scope, or only some of them.

All of them, but we're talking specifically about feeding bad data into QEMU from the host level.

Quoted 2 lines

It says "plain manipulation of the stream is not considered as an attack vector", which suggests "everything is out of scope".

By "plain manipulation", we mean that if someone loads a compromised loadvm image or if they have access to the infrastructure and proceed to inject bytes into the migration stream that is considered out of the scope of what we considered a security issue. The premise is that migration is a special process that requires a secure network and the usage of encryption. If you migrate in plain text over the internet, that's on you.

The other scenario, this one in scope, would be an attack that starts on the guest operating system and trips the migration code to cause an effect. This would be an indirect stream manipulation, if we want to call it that.

Quoted 6 lines

But on the other hand it has an explicit list ("migration failures", "snapshot load failures", "aborting the QEMU process"), so does it mean by that that other things than those listed (e.g. "overruns a buffer in the destination") still are security issues ?

Yes, we're only isolating the scenario of attacker-controlled migration stream at the network level. That situation is (IMO) undefendable.

All issues that lead _only_ to a migration failure while still in precopy (including destination abort) will not cause any damage from the perspective of the guest's isolation. Those are considered normal operation, migrations sometimes fail.

If a legitimate migration operation - started by the admin, within a secure network, using encryption - can be influenced to cause what would otherwise be considered a security issue, then that's a security issue.

Quoted 5 lines

I'd appreciate clarification, as it would make it easier to triage reported issues out of the confidential state.

thanks
-- PMM

#4 lore raw
Quoted 34 lines · Fabiano Rosas
Quoted 11 lines · Peter Maydell

docs/system/security.rst an issue as a normal bug. · line 144

Quoted 9 lines · Fabiano Rosas
docs/system/security.rst +9 -0
+* **migration/snapshots**. Migration failures and snapshot load
+  failures are considered part of normal operation as long as the
+  source virtual machine and savevm file, respectively, are still
+  functional. Aborting the QEMU process at the migration/snapshot
+  destination is similarly not considered a security issue. The
+  migration stream is assumed to be secure as long as the design
+  principles described in the Architecture section are held, in
+  which case plain manipulation of the stream is not considered as
+  an attack vector.
Quoted 5 lines

Reading this (which is now in our docs), it seems unclear to me about whether it intends to say that any and all bugs that can be triggered only by manipulating the migration stream are outside the security scope, or only some of them.

All of them, but we're talking specifically about feeding bad data into QEMU from the host level.

Quoted 2 lines

It says "plain manipulation of the stream is not considered as an attack vector", which suggests "everything is out of scope".

By "plain manipulation", we mean that if someone loads a compromised loadvm image or if they have access to the infrastructure and proceed to inject bytes into the migration stream that is considered out of the scope of what we considered a security issue. The premise is that migration is a special process that requires a secure network and the usage of encryption. If you migrate in plain text over the internet, that's on you.

Quoted 4 lines

The other scenario, this one in scope, would be an attack that starts on the guest operating system and trips the migration code to cause an effect. This would be an indirect stream manipulation, if we want to call it that.

Thanks. I think we could maybe make the text clearer. Here's my suggestion, that splits out the cases into a set of bullet points:

* **migration/snapshots**. The user must deploy QEMU following the design principles described in the Architecture section to ensure that the migration stream is secure. Plain manipulation of the stream is not considered to be an attack vector. This means that:
* Migration failures and snapshot load failures are part of normal operation; these are not bugs as long as the source virtual machine or savevm file are still functional
* Aborts, crashes or misbehaviour of the destination QEMU due to an externally manipulated migration stream are bugs, but not security issues
* A crash of the destination QEMU that can be triggered by a guest manipulating a device on the source QEMU before a migration may be a security issue, if it meets the other criteria we document for security issues

How does that sound?

I think we should also:

* add a subsection to the "Sensitive configurations" part of this document at the bottom, that makes it clear that the user needs to be careful about the migration stream and loadvm files (to parallel the one that says "it's your job to lock down monitor access")
* update the part at the to of the document that includes in its list of untrusted entities "Network protocols (e.g. NBD, live migration)" as this suggests the opposite of what the later text says. I guess just delete "live migration" ?

We also have 15 or so existing bugs that are labelled "confidential" but which are "crafted migration stream can exploit the destination QEMU". Unless you object I'll mark all those as non-confidential non-security issues.

thanks
-- PMM

#5 lore raw
Quoted 58 lines · Peter Maydell
Quoted 34 lines · Fabiano Rosas
Quoted 11 lines · Peter Maydell

docs/system/security.rst an issue as a normal bug. · line 144

Quoted 9 lines · Fabiano Rosas
docs/system/security.rst +9 -0
+* **migration/snapshots**. Migration failures and snapshot load
+  failures are considered part of normal operation as long as the
+  source virtual machine and savevm file, respectively, are still
+  functional. Aborting the QEMU process at the migration/snapshot
+  destination is similarly not considered a security issue. The
+  migration stream is assumed to be secure as long as the design
+  principles described in the Architecture section are held, in
+  which case plain manipulation of the stream is not considered as
+  an attack vector.
Quoted 5 lines

Reading this (which is now in our docs), it seems unclear to me about whether it intends to say that any and all bugs that can be triggered only by manipulating the migration stream are outside the security scope, or only some of them.

All of them, but we're talking specifically about feeding bad data into QEMU from the host level.

Quoted 2 lines

It says "plain manipulation of the stream is not considered as an attack vector", which suggests "everything is out of scope".

By "plain manipulation", we mean that if someone loads a compromised loadvm image or if they have access to the infrastructure and proceed to inject bytes into the migration stream that is considered out of the scope of what we considered a security issue. The premise is that migration is a special process that requires a secure network and the usage of encryption. If you migrate in plain text over the internet, that's on you.

Quoted 4 lines

The other scenario, this one in scope, would be an attack that starts on the guest operating system and trips the migration code to cause an effect. This would be an indirect stream manipulation, if we want to call it that.

Thanks. I think we could maybe make the text clearer. Here's my suggestion, that splits out the cases into a set of bullet points:

* **migration/snapshots**. The user must deploy QEMU following the design principles described in the Architecture section to ensure that the migration stream is secure. Plain manipulation of the stream is not considered to be an attack vector. This means that:
* Migration failures and snapshot load failures are part of normal operation; these are not bugs as long as the source virtual machine or savevm file are still functional
* Aborts, crashes or misbehaviour of the destination QEMU due to an externally manipulated migration stream are bugs, but not security issues
* A crash of the destination QEMU that can be triggered by a guest manipulating a device on the source QEMU before a migration may be a security issue, if it meets the other criteria we document for security issues

Quoted 2 lines

How does that sound?

Looks good, thanks. I'll send a patch.

Quoted 12 lines

I think we should also:

* add a subsection to the "Sensitive configurations" part of this document at the bottom, that makes it clear that the user needs to be careful about the migration stream and loadvm files (to parallel the one that says "it's your job to lock down monitor access")
* update the part at the to of the document that includes in its list of untrusted entities "Network protocols (e.g. NBD, live migration)" as this suggests the opposite of what the later text says. I guess just delete "live migration" ?

Yes, this one has been coming up frequently. The point was to keep developers thinking about migration stream validation. But it's misleading, better to remove it.

Quoted 5 lines

We also have 15 or so existing bugs that are labelled "confidential" but which are "crafted migration stream can exploit the destination QEMU". Unless you object I'll mark all those as non-confidential non-security issues.

Ack

Quoted 2 lines

thanks
-- PMM

#6 lore raw
Quoted 20 lines · Fabiano Rosas
Quoted 18 lines · Peter Maydell

Thanks. I think we could maybe make the text clearer. Here's my suggestion, that splits out the cases into a set of bullet points:

* **migration/snapshots**. The user must deploy QEMU following the design principles described in the Architecture section to ensure that the migration stream is secure. Plain manipulation of the stream is not considered to be an attack vector. This means that:
* Migration failures and snapshot load failures are part of normal operation; these are not bugs as long as the source virtual machine or savevm file are still functional
* Aborts, crashes or misbehaviour of the destination QEMU due to an externally manipulated migration stream are bugs, but not security issues
* A crash of the destination QEMU that can be triggered by a guest manipulating a device on the source QEMU before a migration may be a security issue, if it meets the other criteria we document for security issues

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

How does that sound?

Looks good, thanks. I'll send a patch.

Thanks. You should check whether I have the nested-bulleted list rst syntax correct there, I just hand-wrote it in the email client :-)

Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 12 lines

I think we should also:

* add a subsection to the "Sensitive configurations" part of this document at the bottom, that makes it clear that the user needs to be careful about the migration stream and loadvm files (to parallel the one that says "it's your job to lock down monitor access")
* update the part at the to of the document that includes in its list of untrusted entities "Network protocols (e.g. NBD, live migration)" as this suggests the opposite of what the later text says. I guess just delete "live migration" ?

Yes, this one has been coming up frequently. The point was to keep developers thinking about migration stream validation. But it's misleading, better to remove it.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

We also have 15 or so existing bugs that are labelled "confidential" but which are "crafted migration stream can exploit the destination QEMU". Unless you object I'll mark all those as non-confidential non-security issues.

Ack

OK, I'll do that at some point this week.

-- PMM

#7 lore raw
In reply to Fabiano Rosas
Quoted 15 lines · Fabiano Rosas
Quoted 15 lines

* **migration/snapshots**. The user must deploy QEMU following the design principles described in the Architecture section to ensure that the migration stream is secure. Plain manipulation of the stream is not considered to be an attack vector. This means that:
* Migration failures and snapshot load failures are part of normal operation; these are not bugs as long as the source virtual machine or savevm file are still functional
* Aborts, crashes or misbehaviour of the destination QEMU due to an externally manipulated migration stream are bugs, but not security issues
* A crash of the destination QEMU that can be triggered by a guest manipulating a device on the source QEMU before a migration may be a security issue, if it meets the other criteria we document for security issues

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

How does that sound?

Looks good, thanks. I'll send a patch.

Not yet? :)

Signature · 1 line
Peter Xu