docs: Add security considerations for migration
PATCH 1/1 docs: Add security considerations for migration
Add the security considerations that are unique to migration and that do not already fall into one of the other categories. Some aspects are better framed as security architecture considerations, so extend that section to mention TLS and clarify that disk images and guest network also need to be isolated from other processes, not just other guests.
--- docs/system/security.rst | 22 ++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
docs/system/security.rst +18 -4
@@ -133,6 +133,16 @@ an issue as a normal bug. that affect the level 0 QEMU process. While these bugs should be fixed, they will not be triaged as security flaws at this time. +* **migration/snapshots**. Migration failures and snapshot load + failures are considered part of normal operation as long as the + source virtual machine and savevm file, respectively, are still + functional. Aborting the QEMU process at the migration/snapshot + destination is similarly not considered a security issue. The + migration stream is assumed to be secure as long as the design + principles described in the Architecture section are held, in + which case plain manipulation of the stream is not considered as + an attack vector. + * **low severity impact**. As a catch all rule, issues which are judged to have a "low" severity impact on the system will usually not justify handling as security bugs, nor assignment
@@ -159,10 +169,11 @@ could allow malicious guests to gain code execution in QEMU. At this point the guest has escaped the virtual machine and is able to act in the context of the QEMU process on the host. -Guests often interact with other guests and share resources with them. A -malicious guest must not gain control of other guests or access their data. -Disk image files and network traffic must be protected from other guests unless -explicitly shared between them by the user. +Guests often interact with other guests and share resources with them. +A malicious guest must not gain control of other guests or access +their data. Disk image files and network traffic must be protected +from other guests, users and processes unless explicitly shared with +them by the user. Principle of Least Privilege ''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
@@ -223,6 +234,9 @@ Some Linux distros already ship with UNIX groups for these devices by default. system calls that are not needed by QEMU, thereby reducing the host kernel attack surface. +- Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol can be used to ensure hypervisor + authenticity and encryption of the live migration connection. + Sensitive configurations ------------------------
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Quoted 7 lines · Fabiano Rosas
Add the security considerations that are unique to migration and that do not already fall into one of the other categories. Some aspects are better framed as security architecture considerations, so extend that section to mention TLS and clarify that disk images and guest network also need to be isolated from other processes, not just other guests.
Signed-off-by Fabiano Rosas <[email protected]>
Signature · 1 line
Peter Xu
Quoted 49 lines · Fabiano Rosas
Add the security considerations that are unique to migration and that do not already fall into one of the other categories. Some aspects are better framed as security architecture considerations, so extend that section to mention TLS and clarify that disk images and guest network also need to be isolated from other processes, not just other guests.
Signed-off-by Fabiano Rosas <[email protected]>--- docs/system/security.rst | 22 ++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)docs/system/security.rst +15
-4@@ -133,6 +133,16 @@ an issue as a normal bug. that affect the level 0 QEMU process. While these bugs should be fixed, they will not be triaged as security flaws at this time. +* **migration/snapshots**. Migration failures and snapshot load + failures are considered part of normal operation as long as the + source virtual machine and savevm file, respectively, are still + functional. Aborting the QEMU process at the migration/snapshot + destination is similarly not considered a security issue. The + migration stream is assumed to be secure as long as the design + principles described in the Architecture section are held, in + which case plain manipulation of the stream is not considered as + an attack vector. + * **low severity impact**. As a catch all rule, issues which are judged to have a "low" severity impact on the system will usually not justify handling as security bugs, nor assignment@@ -159,10 +169,11 @@ could allow malicious guests to gain code execution in QEMU. At this point the guest has escaped the virtual machine and is able to act in the context of the QEMU process on the host. -Guests often interact with other guests and share resources with them. A -malicious guest must not gain control of other guests or access their data. -Disk image files and network traffic must be protected from other guests unless -explicitly shared between them by the user. +Guests often interact with other guests and share resources with them. +A malicious guest must not gain control of other guests or access +their data. Disk image files and network traffic must be protected +from other guests, users and processes unless explicitly shared with +them by the user. Principle of Least Privilege ''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
docs/system/security.rst Some Linux distros already ship with UNIX groups for these devices by default. · line 238
Quoted 5 lines
docs/system/security.rst +2
-0@@ -223,6 +234,9 @@ Some Linux distros already ship with UNIX groups for these devices by default. system calls that are not needed by QEMU, thereby reducing the host kernel attack surface. +- Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol can be used to ensure hypervisor + authenticity and encryption of the live migration connection.
I'd be a bit stronger
- Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol should be used to ensure hypervisor authenticity and encryption of the live migration connection where the network is untrusted.
None the less,
With regards,
Daniel
Signature · 3 lines
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Quoted 53 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
Quoted 52 lines · Fabiano Rosas
Add the security considerations that are unique to migration and that do not already fall into one of the other categories. Some aspects are better framed as security architecture considerations, so extend that section to mention TLS and clarify that disk images and guest network also need to be isolated from other processes, not just other guests.
Signed-off-by Fabiano Rosas <[email protected]>--- docs/system/security.rst | 22 ++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)docs/system/security.rst +15
-4@@ -133,6 +133,16 @@ an issue as a normal bug. that affect the level 0 QEMU process. While these bugs should be fixed, they will not be triaged as security flaws at this time. +* **migration/snapshots**. Migration failures and snapshot load + failures are considered part of normal operation as long as the + source virtual machine and savevm file, respectively, are still + functional. Aborting the QEMU process at the migration/snapshot + destination is similarly not considered a security issue. The + migration stream is assumed to be secure as long as the design + principles described in the Architecture section are held, in + which case plain manipulation of the stream is not considered as + an attack vector. + * **low severity impact**. As a catch all rule, issues which are judged to have a "low" severity impact on the system will usually not justify handling as security bugs, nor assignment@@ -159,10 +169,11 @@ could allow malicious guests to gain code execution in QEMU. At this point the guest has escaped the virtual machine and is able to act in the context of the QEMU process on the host. -Guests often interact with other guests and share resources with them. A -malicious guest must not gain control of other guests or access their data. -Disk image files and network traffic must be protected from other guests unless -explicitly shared between them by the user. +Guests often interact with other guests and share resources with them. +A malicious guest must not gain control of other guests or access +their data. Disk image files and network traffic must be protected +from other guests, users and processes unless explicitly shared with +them by the user. Principle of Least Privilege ''''''''''''''''''''''''''''@@ -223,6 +234,9 @@ Some Linux distros already ship with UNIX groups for these devices by default. system calls that are not needed by QEMU, thereby reducing the host kernel attack surface.
Quoted 9 lines
docs/system/security.rst Some Linux distros already ship with UNIX groups for these devices by default. · line 238
Quoted 2 lines
docs/system/security.rst +2
-0+- Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol can be used to ensure hypervisor + authenticity and encryption of the live migration connection.I'd be a bit stronger
- Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol should be used to ensure hypervisor authenticity and encryption of the live migration connection where the network is untrusted.
The tone of the "Isolation mechanisms" sections is a non-prescriptive one, so for consistency "can" is more fitting, IMO. The addition about untrusted networks already serves to indicate that there's no other option (untrusted network without TLS). I'll add that part in v2.
Quoted 4 lines
None the less,
Reviewed-by Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]>
Thank you, I appreciate your guidance in these matters, it's always very helpful.
Quoted 4 lines
With regards,
Daniel